OCTOBER 2016 CTC SENTINEL 1 Losing Mosul, Regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic State Could Exploit Iraq’s Sectarian Tinderbox By Michael Knights and Alex Mello Diyala’s Role as a Base for the Insurgency The Islamic State may be driven out of Mosul in the Since 2003, Diyala province1 has served as a fallback location for coming months, which would effectively destroy the the takfiria predecessors of the Islamic State—the Islamic State of group’s pretensions of administering a caliphate in Iraq (ISI) and before that al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI). As Diyala-based Iraq. But the Islamic State has vowed to fight on, and if coalition interrogator Richard Buchanan noted in 2014, “The re- the past is prologue, the group may eye an opportunity covery and refit area for the Sunni insurgents was always Diyala to regenerate in Diyala province, Iraq’s sectarian province. The insurgents who were married moved their families there, and their wounded would be often moved there as well.”2 tinderbox. By escalating terrorist attacks against Shi`a When the U.S. surge cleared Anbar in 2007, ISI fell back into Diyala targets there, the group could create a spiral of sectarian and very nearly took over the entire province. In the second quarter violence that it could exploit to make a comeback. The of 2007, an average of 418 attacks hit Diyala each month, mostly strategy almost worked a decade ago. After the U.S. against Shi`a targets, and the government lost its ability to expend surge cleared Islamic State of Iraq fighters from Anbar more than two percent of its budget or to distribute salaries or food province, the group made significant gains in Diyala by rations.3 In Baqubah, the provincial capital, ISI controlled the city carrying out a terrorist campaign against Shi`a targets center, and the U.S. military was forced to lead major urban combat designed to plunge the country deeper into civil war. operations to clear the city of ISI fighters.b The attractiveness of Diyala to Sunni militant groups is partly geographic. Diyala is a hub, connecting many militant operating osul may be liberated from the Islamic State in areas; Tarmiyah and other takfiri bases in southern Salah al-Din the coming months, presenting Islamic State province lie to the west. The desolate Jallam Desert and Hamrin militants in Iraq with a new set of challeng- Mountain range lie to the north, providing access to northern Iraqi es, opportunities, and decisions. For insur- provinces and ultimately Syria. The violent, ethno-sectarian melt- gency-watchers pondering Iraq’s near-future, ing pots of Tuz Khurmatu and Kirkuk are to the north, linked to Mthere may be value in focusing on Diyala province, named after Baghdad by Highway 2, which runs through northern Diyala. In the river by the same name that runs from eastern Baghdad to the the south, Diyala wraps around the eastern Baghdad metropolitan Iranian border. Diyala is not unlike a time machine, ofering a kind area, including the key takfiri target of Sadr City, a largely Shi`a of glimpse into the future, even as the Islamic State had already metropolis of two million people. Running down the Diyala River transitioned back to an insurgency in the province by the start of Valley (DRV) is the pilgrim route of Highway 5, which brings Shi`a 2016. Diyala also ofers an intriguing window into the other war in visitors from Iran to Iraq and back throughout the year. Iraq against the Islamic State—the one being fought primarily by The terrain of Diyala also makes the province an ideal location Iranian-backed Shi`a militias with practically no involvement of for insurgents seeking to shelter from security forces. In most rural the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Re- areas of Diyala, it is impossible to drive for more than two kilo- solve (CJTF-OIR). The war in Diyala gives insight into what future meters without meeting a canal or irrigation ditch, complicating counterinsurgency operations of the Iraqi state might look like in counterinsurgency raids. The 90-kilometer Diyala River delta is cross-sectarian, multi-ethnic areas if CJTF-OIR support is discon- lined with dense palm groves that extend for one to three kilo- tinued and Shi`a militias take the lead. meters on either side of the river, making this one of the largest rough-terrain corridors in Iraq, twice as big as the hard-to-secure palm groves between Ramadi and Fallujah. The river is sparsely bridged, presenting a serious obstacle to motorized security forces, but is easily traversed by small boat at dozens of points, making monitoring and interdiction difcult for security forces.4 For these Michael Knights, a Lafer Fellow with The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has worked in all of Iraq’s provinces, includ- ing periods spent embedded with Iraqi security forces. His latest a Use of the term takfiri in this article refers to Sunni insurgent groups that study is the Washington Institute report “The Long Haul: Reboot- justify violence against some Muslims and all non-Muslims because their ing U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq.” Follow @mikeknightsiraq religious beliefs are not compatible with their groups’ ideology. Key takfiri groups in Iraq include the Islamic State, Islamic Army of Iraq, and Ansar al-Sunna/Ansar al-Islam. Alex Mello is lead Iraq security analyst at Horizon Client Access, b Operation Arrowhead Ripper, launched on June 18, 2007, was the an advisory service working with global energy companies. Follow culminating point. See Kimberly Kagan, “The Battle for Diyala,” Iraq Report @AlexMello02 IV, Weekly Standard, May 7, 2007. 2 CTC SENTINEL OCTOBER 2016 KNIGHTS / MELLO Diyala province, Iraq (Rowan Technology) reasons, the Islamic State and its predecessors have repeatedly built governorship, and police force for all but six of the last 13 years.c bases for fighters and their families north of the river in the remote Sunnis also fear that the demographic balance may be shifting groves of Diyala, a completely diferent concept from their nesting slowly against them through displacement by unstable conditions, within pre-existing, semi-urban Sunni areas in Iraq.5 Rural Diyala Shi`a militia harassment, and drought.d In 2013, Diyala’s main is currently a true terrorist safe haven. Sunni bloc ran its provincial election campaigns on the theme of Equally important, the human terrain of Diyala is attractive to an “existential” threat detailed in a Shi`a militia campaign to “ex- takfiri militant groups. Around a 60-percent majority of Diyala res- terminate the people of Diyala.”9 Meanwhile, the Kurds claim the idents are Sunni Arabs and Sunni Turkmen, with the remainder right to evict Sunni settlers brought by Saddam Hussein’s regime split between Shi`a Arabs and Shi`a Turkmen (25 percent) and Kurds (15 percent).6 Sunni Arab majorities live in the provincial capital of Baqubah (population 627,000 in 2007) and the DRV 7 c A good example is Diyala police chief Ghanem al-Qurayshi, a Badr-affiliated farming districts of Muqdadiyah (population 248,000 in 2007). former military officer who worked from 2005-2008 to reduce Sunni There are Shi`a majorities in Khalis (population 319,000 in 2007) involvement in local security forces. See Dahr Jamail, “‘Provincial Saddam’ and Balad Ruz (population 135,000 in 2007) districts (plus Abu Goes, Finally,” Inter Press Service, August 14, 2008. At the district level, Sayda subdistrict in Muqdadiyah). Iranian-backed Shi`a parties the situation was no better. The Muqdadiyah police chief, another Badrist, like Badr—formed by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War from Iraqi ran an extensive car stealing and arrest extortion racket that principally targeted local Sunnis. See Joel Wing, “How Iraq’s Civil War Broke Out In Shi`a prisoners of war and oppositionists—have worked hard since Diyala Province: Interview With Former Interrogator Richard Buchanan,” 2003 to wield disproportionate influence over the Sunni majority,8 Musings on Iraq, July 28, 2014. cooperating with Kurdish allies to dominate the provincial council, d It should be noted that Shi`a have an equally justified fear that Sunni militants are trying to cleanse them from the province. OCTOBER 2016 CTC SENTINEL 3 into northern Diyala areas like Jalula, Saadiyah, Qara Tapa, and But a more important factor was the level of resistance the Is- Mandali.10 These identity issues have worked to sustain recruitment lamic State faced from Shi`a paramilitaries and the Kurdish pesh- by Sunni insurgent groups like AQI/ISI, the Islamic Army of Iraq merga. This tough resistance was lacking in nearby rural Kirkuk, (IAI), 1920s Revolution Brigades, Hamas al-Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, where five Arab-populated districts fell to very small Islamic State and the neo-Ba’athist Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN) patrols because the 12th Iraqi Army division had disbanded without and Al-Awda (Return) groups.11 e a fight. In Diyala, the resisting power of the 5th Iraqi Army division Nonidentity-based human terrain factors have also favored mil- was bolstered by the strong cadre of Badr commanders in the force itant groups in Diyala. The eastern parts of the province, such as and by the existing presence of major Shi`a militia forces in the Muqdadiyah and Balad Ruz districts, are exceedingly poor, with 51 province such as Badr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous, percent and 48 percent of households falling into the lowest wealth AAH), Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Moqtada al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salam quintile in Iraq (compared to a national average of 21.7 percent).12 (Peace Companies), and Sayyid al-Shuhada.19 From June 13, 2014, The Sunni tribes, regularly brought in since the 1970s to service Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appointed Badr leader Hadi al- the government’s newly irrigated farmlands, are smaller and more Ameri as the provincial security chief in Diyala.