Losing Mosul, Regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic State Could Exploit Iraq’S Sectarian Tinderbox by Michael Knights and Alex Mello

Home , Balad Ruz, Baqubah, Buhriz, Highway 2 (Iraq)

OCTOBER 2016 CTC SENTINEL 1 Losing Mosul, Regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic State Could Exploit Iraq’s Sectarian Tinderbox By Michael Knights and Alex Mello

Diyala’s Role as a Base for the Insurgency The Islamic State may be driven out of Mosul in the Since 2003, Diyala province1 has served as a fallback location for coming months, which would effectively destroy the the takfiria predecessors of the Islamic State—the Islamic State of group’s pretensions of administering a caliphate in Iraq (ISI) and before that al-Qaìda in Iraq (AQI). As Diyala-based Iraq. But the Islamic State has vowed to fight on, and if coalition interrogator Richard Buchanan noted in 2014, “The re- the past is prologue, the group may eye an opportunity covery and refit area for the Sunni insurgents was always Diyala to regenerate in Diyala province, Iraq’s sectarian province. The insurgents who were married moved their families there, and their wounded would be often moved there as well.”2 tinderbox. By escalating terrorist attacks against Shià When the U.S. surge cleared Anbar in 2007, ISI fell back into Diyala targets there, the group could create a spiral of sectarian and very nearly took over the entire province. In the second quarter violence that it could exploit to make a comeback. The of 2007, an average of 418 attacks hit Diyala each month, mostly strategy almost worked a decade ago. After the U.S. against Shià targets, and the government lost its ability to expend surge cleared Islamic State of Iraq fighters from Anbar more than two percent of its budget or to distribute salaries or food province, the group made significant gains in Diyala by rations.3 In Baqubah, the provincial capital, ISI controlled the city carrying out a terrorist campaign against Shià targets center, and the U.S. military was forced to lead major urban combat designed to plunge the country deeper into civil war. operations to clear the city of ISI fighters.b The attractiveness of Diyala to Sunni militant groups is partly geographic. Diyala is a hub, connecting many militant operating osul may be liberated from the Islamic State in areas; Tarmiyah and other takfiri bases in southern Salah al-Din the coming months, presenting Islamic State province lie to the west. The desolate Jallam Desert and Hamrin militants in Iraq with a new set of challeng- Mountain range lie to the north, providing access to northern Iraqi es, opportunities, and decisions. For insur- provinces and ultimately Syria. The violent, ethno-sectarian melt- gency-watchers pondering Iraq’s near-future, ing pots of Tuz Khurmatu and Kirkuk are to the north, linked to Mthere may be value in focusing on Diyala province, named after Baghdad by Highway 2, which runs through northern Diyala. In the river by the same name that runs from eastern Baghdad to the the south, Diyala wraps around the eastern Baghdad metropolitan Iranian border. Diyala is not unlike a time machine, ofering a kind area, including the key takfiri target of Sadr City, a largely Shià of glimpse into the future, even as the Islamic State had already metropolis of two million people. Running down the Diyala River transitioned back to an insurgency in the province by the start of Valley (DRV) is the pilgrim route of Highway 5, which brings Shià 2016. Diyala also ofers an intriguing window into the other war in visitors from Iran to Iraq and back throughout the year. Iraq against the Islamic State—the one being fought primarily by The terrain of Diyala also makes the province an ideal location Iranian-backed Shià militias with practically no involvement of for insurgents seeking to shelter from security forces. In most rural the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Re- areas of Diyala, it is impossible to drive for more than two kilo- solve (CJTF-OIR). The war in Diyala gives insight into what future meters without meeting a canal or irrigation ditch, complicating counterinsurgency operations of the Iraqi state might look like in counterinsurgency raids. The 90-kilometer Diyala River delta is cross-sectarian, multi-ethnic areas if CJTF-OIR support is discon- lined with dense palm groves that extend for one to three kilo- tinued and Shià militias take the lead. meters on either side of the river, making this one of the largest rough-terrain corridors in Iraq, twice as big as the hard-to-secure palm groves between Ramadi and Fallujah. The river is sparsely bridged, presenting a serious obstacle to motorized security forces, but is easily traversed by small boat at dozens of points, making monitoring and interdiction difcult for security forces.4 For these Michael Knights, a Lafer Fellow with The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has worked in all of Iraq’s provinces, including periods spent embedded with Iraqi security forces. His latest a Use of the term takfiri in this article refers to Sunni insurgent groups that study is the Washington Institute report “The Long Haul: Reboot- justify violence against some Muslims and all non-Muslims because their ing U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq.” Follow @mikeknightsiraq religious beliefs are not compatible with their groups’ ideology. Key takfiri groups in Iraq include the Islamic State, Islamic Army of Iraq, and Ansar al-Sunna/Ansar al-Islam. Alex Mello is lead Iraq security analyst at Horizon Client Access, b Operation Arrowhead Ripper, launched on June 18, 2007, was the an advisory service working with global energy companies. Follow culminating point. See Kimberly Kagan, “The Battle for Diyala,” Iraq Report @AlexMello02 IV, Weekly Standard, May 7, 2007. 2 CTC SENTINEL OCTOBER 2016 KNIGHTS / MELLO

Diyala province, Iraq (Rowan Technology) reasons, the Islamic State and its predecessors have repeatedly built governorship, and police force for all but six of the last 13 years.c bases for fighters and their families north of the river in the remote Sunnis also fear that the demographic balance may be shifting groves of Diyala, a completely diferent concept from their nesting slowly against them through displacement by unstable conditions, within pre-existing, semi-urban Sunni areas in Iraq.5 Rural Diyala Shià militia harassment, and drought.d In 2013, Diyala’s main is currently a true terrorist safe haven. Sunni bloc ran its provincial election campaigns on the theme of Equally important, the human terrain of Diyala is attractive to an “existential” threat detailed in a Shià militia campaign to “ex- takfiri militant groups. Around a 60-percent majority of Diyala res- terminate the people of Diyala.”9 Meanwhile, the Kurds claim the idents are Sunni Arabs and Sunni Turkmen, with the remainder right to evict Sunni settlers brought by Saddam Hussein’s regime split between Shià Arabs and Shià Turkmen (25 percent) and Kurds (15 percent).6 Sunni Arab majorities live in the provincial capital of Baqubah (population 627,000 in 2007) and the DRV 7 c A good example is Diyala police chief Ghanem al-Qurayshi, a Badr-affiliated farming districts of Muqdadiyah (population 248,000 in 2007). former military officer who worked from 2005-2008 to reduce Sunni There are Shià majorities in Khalis (population 319,000 in 2007) involvement in local security forces. See Dahr Jamail, “‘Provincial Saddam’ and Balad Ruz (population 135,000 in 2007) districts (plus Abu Goes, Finally,” Inter Press Service, August 14, 2008. At the district level, Sayda subdistrict in Muqdadiyah). Iranian-backed Shià parties the situation was no better. The Muqdadiyah police chief, another Badrist, like Badr—formed by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War from Iraqi ran an extensive car stealing and arrest extortion racket that principally targeted local Sunnis. See Joel Wing, “How Iraq’s Civil War Broke Out In Shià prisoners of war and oppositionists—have worked hard since Diyala Province: Interview With Former Interrogator Richard Buchanan,” 2003 to wield disproportionate influence over the Sunni majority,8 Musings on Iraq, July 28, 2014. cooperating with Kurdish allies to dominate the provincial council, d It should be noted that Shià have an equally justified fear that Sunni militants are trying to cleanse them from the province. OCTOBER 2016 CTC SENTINEL 3 into northern Diyala areas like Jalula, Saadiyah, Qara Tapa, and But a more important factor was the level of resistance the Is- Mandali.10 These identity issues have worked to sustain recruitment lamic State faced from Shià paramilitaries and the Kurdish pesh- by Sunni insurgent groups like AQI/ISI, the Islamic Army of Iraq merga. This tough resistance was lacking in nearby rural Kirkuk, (IAI), 1920s Revolution Brigades, Hamas al-Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, where five Arab-populated districts fell to very small Islamic State and the neo-Ba’athist Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN) patrols because the 12th Iraqi Army division had disbanded without and Al-Awda (Return) groups.11 e a fight. In Diyala, the resisting power of the 5th Iraqi Army division Nonidentity-based human terrain factors have also favored mil- was bolstered by the strong cadre of Badr commanders in the force itant groups in Diyala. The eastern parts of the province, such as and by the existing presence of major Shià militia forces in the Muqdadiyah and Balad Ruz districts, are exceedingly poor, with 51 province such as Badr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous, percent and 48 percent of households falling into the lowest wealth AAH), Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Moqtada al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salam quintile in Iraq (compared to a national average of 21.7 percent).12 (Peace Companies), and Sayyid al-Shuhada.19 From June 13, 2014, The Sunni tribes, regularly brought in since the 1970s to service Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appointed Badr leader Hadi al- the government’s newly irrigated farmlands, are smaller and more Ameri as the provincial security chief in Diyala. Reinforcements fragmented than in Anbar, rural Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, or Nineveh. from Badr and special forces units of the army and Ministry of In- Most rural families are highly dependent on irrigation systems and terior quickly reached al-Ameri at his base in Camp Ashraf, north the generators that power them, a factor that insurgents have fre- of Baqubah.20 Iran also provided direct military support to the Iraqi quently exploited.13 The harvesting cycles in Diyala have also made and Kurdish security forces in Diyala, extending a security zone 50 it very easy for strangers to come and go without notice, blending kilometers into Iraqi territory and flying dozens of Iranian Air Force into the inflow and outflow of seasonal agricultural workers.f All F-4E Phantom and Su-25 close-air support missions in support of these socio-economic conditions have made it relatively easy for the Hashd al-Sha’abi (Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF).21 These insurgents to control Diyala’s rural populations. forces successfully limited the expansion of Islamic State control in Diyala. Why Didn’t the Islamic State Capture Diyala? The Islamic State briefly threatened the western side of the With all these circumstantial factors in the Islamic State’s favor, it capital Baqubah—the newer and poorer residential areasg like Ga- might be intuitive to ask why the movement failed to overrun the tun, Muallimeen, and Mafraq—on June 17, 2014, with Iraqi SWAT security forces in Diyala completely in 2014. The provincial capitals teams carrying out the preemptive execution of around 50 detain- of other Sunni Arab-majority provinces—Mosul, Ramadi, Tikrit— ees when insurgents threatened to overrun the Mafraq police com- were all captured by the group and held for sustained periods, pound.22 In Buhriz, to the south of Baqubah city, insurgents over- but not Baqubah. Likewise the Iraqi Army divisions in Nineveh, ran and held the local police station for several hours before being Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din collapsed entirely but not the 5th Iraqi pushed out by Shià militiamen supported by Iraqi Army Aviation Army division in Diyala. What accounts for the diference, and how Mi-35 helicopters. The clearance of Buhriz was accompanied by does the explanation impact the Islamic State’s future in Diyala? the torching of civilian houses and mosques, the execution of up One cluster of factors relate to the Islamic State’s low starting to 30 military-aged males, and the displacement of much of the base of operations in Diyala when Mosul fell in June 2014. In com- local population.23 Outside Baqubah, the scattered 5th Iraqi Army parison to Nineveh, where there was an average of 347 security division forces and PMF units secured Khalis and regained contact incidents per month in the first five months of 2014, there were with all the DRV towns by early July.24 only 71 per month in Diyala.14 In the week before Mosul fell, there The Islamic State seems to have concentrated its eforts in north- were a staggering 208 attacks versus 32 in Diyala.15 As RAND’s ex- ern Diyala, specifically the towns “Arabized” by the Saddam Hussein tensive study of captured ISI documents noted, Diyala was only regime such as Jalula, Saadiyah, and Qara Tapa, within what ISI periodically a priority for AQI/ISI: it generated no funds and was, called the Azim sector.h In the spring of 2014, the Islamic State was in fact, a net drain on the budget.16 The province is far from Syria, clearly preparing to evict Iraqi Army forces from these areas, ready- from where the Islamic State staged and supported its attack on ing the battlefield in a manner similar to its lead-up to the Mosul Mosul.17 Moreover, the Islamic State did not have a good level of ofensive. These shaping operations included attacking bridges with control over its most dangerous adversaries in the province—other car bombs in order to obstruct security force reinforcement of the insurgent groups. There are solid indications that the Islamic State area; use of platoon-sized assaults to overrun police stations; and was still actively fighting Ansar al-Sunna and JRTN elements in the larger assaults on headquarters involving very large, water-tanker summer of 2014,18 even as these groups maintained uneasy truces suicide VBIEDs and follow-on infantry assaults.25 Much of the Is- with the Islamic State or were defecting to the Islamic State in other lamic State’s reinforcements in Diyala in 2014 seems to have been provinces.

g These areas were historically strong AQI/ISI operating areas, adjacent to e The author received a detailed map-aided brieﬁng on concentration the ISI Tarmiyah sector on the west side of the Tigris and next to Hibhib, levels in the insurgent areas of control. AQI/ISI dominated in western and where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006. northern Baqubah, the Hamrin area, Iranian border areas, and the groves of h This refers to Uzaym/Udaim, a river running parallel to the Diyala, including the DRV. Ansar al-Sunna had strongholds near Balad Ruz. The other former Udaim town and dam, Qara Tapa, and Deli Abbas, a key launch-pad location regime and Iraqi takﬁri groups were mainly located in eastern Baqubah within the Diyala River delta north of Muqdadiyah. See Patrick B. Johnston, (where there were Republican Guard communities) and in Muqdadiyah and Jacob N. Shapiro, Howard J. Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle F. Jung, Hamrin. Patrick Ryan, and Jonathan Wallace, Foundations of the Islamic State: f The province is the center of citrus and date farming in Iraq and is a major Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010 (Santa Monica, CA: producer of cereals. RAND Corporation, 2016), pp. 85-89. 4 CTC SENTINEL OCTOBER 2016 KNIGHTS / MELLO

Screen capture from video released in August 2016 by Diyala Media Bureau, Islamic State fed into the northern fight against the Kurds for control of Jalula, such as Zaghaniyah, Qubbah, Mukhisa, and Abu Karmah is par- which the Islamic State seized in a massive deliberate assault on Au- ticularly problematic for the security forces. In the riverside groves gust 11, 2014, that employed 20 suicide vest bombers. This northern to the north of these areas, the Islamic State has returned to the preference seems to have been based on the Islamic State’s alliance old AQI/ISI habit of creating major defensive bunker complexes, with local tribes in the Lake Hamrin area, arguably the only place bomb-making factories, supply points, and training camps.j In Au- in Diyala where AQI/ISI and later the Islamic State maintained a gust 2015 insurgents extended their presence into the DRV groves strong, pre-existing base of support in 2014. When Kurdish forces south of Baqubah, with IED cells operating from bastions on the moved forward to replace a collapsing Iraqi security forces (ISF) west bank of the Diyala River between Baqubah and Khan Bani presence in late June and July, the Islamic State quickly struck deals Saad.27 The Islamic State is increasingly hard to ignore in these with anti-Kurdish Sunni tribes such as the Kerwi and strongly sup- areas because they are using the groves to launch an escalating ported a joint operation against the Kurds.i drumbeat of efective IEDsk and mortar strikesl on local villages and security outposts and, lately, also larger assaults on outposts Islamic State Regeneration since 2015 and fixed checkpoint positions. In the first of many similar assaults, Between the fall of Mosul in June 2014 and January 2015, the Iraqi an ISF outpost in the groves near Muqdadiyah was attacked on Army and various Shià militias working under the rubric of the July 15, 2015, by a platoon-sized Islamic State cell in a sustained Hashd al-Sha’abi (Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF) recap- engagement that lasted for several hours.28 By December 2015, pla- tured territory in Diyala. In January 2015, the Tigris Operations toon-sized Islamic State fighting cells were conducting night raids Command declared the liberation of Diyala province.26 But Badr’s “mission accomplished” moment in Diyala only marked the begin- ning of a new phase of the local conflict with the Islamic State and j In August 2015, ISF cleared a large insurgent training camp, refit and one in which the insurgents have partially regained the initiative. support base, and IED-manufacturing site deep in the groves near Mukhisa. The Islamic State has fallen back into the ungoverned spaces of Di- See Ali Salem, “Diyala destroys the camp Zarqawi used to recruit and train yala: the dense palm groves of the DRV between Muqdadiyah and extremists,” New Sabah, August 21, 2015. Baqubah; the inhospitable wastes of the Iranian border; and the k In a recent example on January 11, 2016, Islamic State fighters infiltrated Hamrin Mountains, where parallel striations, or ridgelines, greatly across the Diyala River from Sherween (north of Abu Sayda) to set up two daisy-chained roadside IEDs that were used against a Sunni tribal militia slow motorized security forces, giving insurgents plenty of time to working with the ISF, wounding one fighter. All incident data is drawn from relocate or set ambushes. the authors’ geolocated Significant Action (SIGACT) dataset. The dataset The Islamic State’s use of historic Diyala River delta bastions brings together declassified coalition SIGACT data plus private security company and open-source SIGACT data used to supplement and extend the dataset as coalition incident collection degraded in 2009-2011 and was absent in 2012-2014. i The Kerwi tribesmen are long-time inhabitants of the Lake Hamrin area l These are typically mortar salvos of five to seven rounds that appear to and include a high proportion of former military officers as well as farmers. be carefully surveyed. Firing against static and unprotected targets like “Diyala Governor Splits Sunnis to Defeat Impeachment Bid,” Inside Iraqi checkpoints or civilian villages, the attacks frequently cause fatalities and Politics 134. multiple injuries. Authors’ SIGACT dataset. OCTOBER 2016 CTC SENTINEL 5 on ISF in the Buhriz area, just four kilometers south of the provin- to increase Baghdad’s power supply.q cial capital.m By October 2016, DRV towns like Qubbah and Abu Mass-casualty attacks are efective in stirring local sectarian Karmah were being isolated by Islamic State patrolling and snap and tribal tensions in cross-sectarian areas like Diyala. Following checkpoints, a potential precursor to an overrun.29 a January 11, 2016, double bombing in a café in Muqdadiyah that The Badr-led security efort in Diyala has struggled to come to killed over 46, including a local Badr commander, roving bands grips with the Islamic State rural bastions. Some areas such as the of Badr and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) fighters cruised the city, us- Mandali and Nida areas on the Iranian border and the shores of ing loudspeakers to call on Sunni families to leave or face execu- Lake Hamrin appear to have been yielded to the insurgents, and tion. Militiamen also torched Sunni-owned shops and houses and ISF only goes in temporarily during inefective clearance opera- firebombed seven Sunni mosques, despite the curfew in place and tions.30 The groves around Mukhisa—dubbed the “Kandahar of the deployment of Diyala police reinforcements.35 Another suicide Diyala” by local security ofcials 31—have been the scene of painful, bombing of a Shià militia funeral in a village outside Muqdadiyah IED-initiated ambushesn against ISF patrols attempting to push in February 2016 resulted in over 50 fatalities, including several into the bush. The Tigris Operations Command is bulldozing and AAH and Badr commanders. The attack was followed by clashes burning back the ancient palm groves to protect better the exten- between police and militias at the Muqdadiyah police headquarters sion of fixed security checkpoints and patrols along the roads.o Re- when militiamen attempt to storm the jail and execute detainees.36 taliation against the local Sunni population has been a regular oc- The Islamic State has also used Diyala as a base to launch attacks currence over the last three years 32 and is likely to increase as Iraqi on Baghdad, particularly Shià-majority east Baghdad, which is ac- Army and PMF frustrations and casualties grow.p cessible at multiple points from Balad Ruz and Baqubah districts.r On July 3, 2016, a suicide car bomb detonated in front of a shopping A Strategic Terrorist Campaign mall in Baghdad’s Karrada peninsula, sparking a fire that killed The Islamic State may not place much priority on the control of over 300 Iraqis, one of the deadliest single attacks in Iraq since Baqubah and southern Diyala, but the movement will find the prov- 2003.37 The Iraqi Ministry of Interior indicated the car bomb had ince immensely useful if it wishes to resurrect the idea of fomenting been constructed in Diyala and passed through a checkpoint near a Shià-Sunni war in Iraq by drawing sectarian retaliation onto the Khalis before driving on to Baghdad. A wave of three car bombs Sunnis and driving them toward the Islamic State for protection. in Sadr City and east Baghdad in early May 2016 was also traced This was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s specific intent in his February back to Diyala.38 If further car bombings spark sectarian reprisals 2004 letter to Ayman al-Zawahiri.33 The Islamic State has already in Baghdad or elsewhere, or skew the shape of sectarian politics begun to bait Badr and the PMF with local car bombings. VBIEDs and electioneering or security force appointments, then the Islamic have targeted Shià civilians and PMF in Baqubah, Khalis, Muq- State may be able to quickly move past its battlefield defeats with a dadiyah, and also in the Shià-majority agricultural towns of Balad highly consequential strategic terrorist campaign. Ruz and Kan’an. Such attacks can be highly lethal; on July 17, 2015, a massive ice truck VBIED hit a market in Khan Bani Sa’ad, killing The Future of the Islamic State in Diyala and in Iraq over 120 Iraqis.34 The Islamic State has also upped its attacks on The Islamic State would undoubtedly prefer to control Mosul, Ra- electricity transmission pylons and gas pipelines that are intended madi, Fallujah, or Tikrit than rural Diyala, but the group is rap- idly being denied that option. Diyala has always been a fallback, a place to hide and recover, which suits exactly the Islamic State’s current needs. The exclusion of coalition forces from Diyala due to Badr’s stranglehold on the Tigris Operations Command will make it far harder for ISF to penetrate the Islamic State’s rural bastions, which historically required U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and re- connaissance plus special operations, precision-strike capabilities, m An Islamic State photo report released in December 2015 showcased the and local Sunni militias. Without determined sectarian and ethnic operations of a platoon-sized Islamic State unit in the Buhriz area raiding peace-building eforts, the identity politics of Diyala will keep the the houses of ISF personnel and carrying out battlefield extrajudicial killings. See imagery in “IS’ Diyala Province Releases Photo Report on Islamic State and allied movements stocked with recruits in the Raiding Enemy Sites in Buhriz,” SITE Intelligence Group, December 2, 2015. years to come and deny the security forces vital intelligence on the n In another recent example on July 12, an ISF patrol on a rural road four enemy. kilometers east of Mukhisa was hit with an IED and engaged with small- arms fire from insurgents in groves. Authors’ SIGACT dataset. o In May 2016, the Tigris Operations Command began implementing a new security plan for the area supported by the deployment of provincial SWAT q Since 2013, the Islamic State has carried out a persistent multi-year units from Baghdad and Wasit, pushing new roads into the groves along campaign on electricity pylons carrying Iranian voltage to Iraq and more the Diyala River, setting up new fixed checkpoints on the farm roads linking recently has struck Iranian pipeline crews working on a pipeline to bring the villages, and stepping up patrolling. See “Security forces in Diyala open Iranian gas to Diyala power stations (and eventually to Baghdad). On road amid orchards to control the areas Daesh,” Alhurra Iraq, available on December 13, 2013, 15 Iranians were shot dead along with three Iraqis in Youtube.com, May 17, 2015. one such attack on pipeline teams. More recently, ISF captured an Islamic State cell on April 26, 2016, in Imam Ways (north of Muqdadiyah) involved p In the first three quarters of 2016, the number of openly reported ISF and in IED attacks on pylons and repair crews. Authors’ SIGACT dataset. PMF casualties in frontline fighting in Muqdadiyah district were 40-50 killed and 80-90 wounded. Diyala is less open to journalists than other parts of r Along with the Tarmiyah area just north of Baghdad city, the Baghdad Iraq, and considering that ISF casualties are generally underreported, the Operations Command views Diyala as the chief source of the car bomb above numbers likely represent a half or a third of actual security force threat against the capital. Author (Knights) interview, Baghdad security casualties. Authors’ SIGACT dataset. official, 2016. 6 CTC SENTINEL OCTOBER 2016 KNIGHTS / MELLO

Neither Badr nor the Kurds seem likely to adopt efective coun- is still rejecting alliances with Sunni fighters. For instance, nearly terinsurgency approaches such as the reconciliation and Sunni em- 3,000 original pre-2011 Diyala “Popular Committee” fightersx have powerment initiatives that suppressed AQI/ISI in Diyala in 2007- been demobilized since the fall of Mosul,41 suggesting Badr prefers 2009. In May 2015, the pan-Shià and Kurdish blocs colluded with to blanket Sunni areas with Shià militias rather than trust Diyala some Sunni factions to replace the Sunni provincial governor Amer Sunnis with weapons. Unlike in other Sunni-majority provinces al-Majmais with Badr’s own Muthanna al-Tamimi, a Shià politi- where Sunni leaders command the Hashd forces, the Diyala PMF cian.39 Though Badr has ofered to support a Sunni provincial gov- are led by provincial councilman Qasim al-Maamuri, a Shià ally ernor after new local elections (due in 2017),40 the likelihood is that of Badr.42 The Kurds do not allow any Arab paramilitary forces in Badr will continue to dominate local politics and security. Where the areas they control and have even stated that no members of Sunnis feel divided and powerless in the political sphere, the lure the Kerwi tribe, which backed the Islamic State, will be allowed to of armed opposition will grow. return to Jalula.y Badr has various options if it seeks to secure the support of Diya- Diyala ofers a look into the near-future of Iraq’s security sit- la’s fractured Sunni population. Albeit for its own factional motives, uation in areas where ethno-sectarian tensions are neglected or Badr is starting to crack down on rival militia AAH,t the militia most even exacerbated by government policies and the presence of un- regularly linked to sectarian massacres, criminal rackets, and high- controlled militias. The Islamic State’s partial regaining of the ini- way checkpoint shakedowns.u Hadi al-Ameri has also splintered tiative, very quick recovery, and transition back toward insurgency and co-opted some Sunni tribes by facilitating—or withholding— and strategic terrorism in Diyala is instructive, though it may not the return of internally displaced persons to their homes.v Badr is be matched in other provinces due to the unique mix of geography also allowing some returned tribes to serve as Hashd al-Àsha’iri and human terrain in each Iraqi governorate. If Diyala continues (tribal mobilization forces) in order to penetrate Islamic State rural on its present path, it is likely to become the Islamic State’s main bastions.w But outside of these rural northern Diyala hotspots, Badr safe haven location in Iraq, back-to-back with other key operational locations like Tarmiyah, the Jallam Desert, the Hamrin Mountains, the Iranian border, and the eastern approaches to Baghdad. CTC s Al-Majmai was himself a puppet of the Shià parties in Baghdad, replacing another Sunni governor, Omar al-Humayri, ousted by a Badr-led intrigue. The authors wish to thank Kirk Sowell and Nate Rabkin of the Inside Iraqi Politics team for their outstanding work on the collation and analysis of political trends in Diyala. t On September 21-26, 2016, Badr paramilitaries and AAH paramilitaries were fighting for control of the sub-district center of Abu Sayda. In Tuz Khurmatu, meanwhile, Badr moved against AAH locations within the town. Authors’ SIGACT dataset. u For example, on February 23, 2013, leaflets signed by AAH threatened families living in Muqdadiyah unless they left their homes in 48 hours. x This was the highly successful Diyala version of the “Sahwa” (Awakening). Authors’ SIGACT dataset. Numerous Sunni paramilitary volunteer groups flipped from anti-coalition v Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri personally accompanied 400 Sunni families insurgency to anti-AQI/ISI operations in 2007-2009. For a useful reference, returning to Mansouriyah in May 2016. See “Diyala Governor Splits Sunnis see Multi-National Division–North PAO Press Release No. 20061210-09, to Defeat Impeachment Bid,” Inside Iraqi Politics 134, July 11, 2016. “Sheiks continue discussions of security, stability for Diyala,” Dec. 10, 2006, and Multi-National Division–North PAO, “Sheiks sign peace agreement,” w Badr seems to have made good progress with the Azzawi tribe, a major May 3, 2007. grouping in the Hamrin and Muqdadiyah area, with the Tigris Operations Command nominally led by an Azzawi figure, Major General Muzhir al- y The Kerwi are the largest Sunni tribe in Jalula, and Diyala’s elected Azzawi. Jabbouri confederation Hashd al-Asha’ir fighters also work with Provincial Council Chairman, Omar al-Kerwi, is from this tribe. Inside Iraqi Badr in northern Diyala, as they do in the Tikrit and Kirkuk areas. Politics 134.

Citations

1 For primers on Diyala, see Eric Hamilton, “Expanding Security in Diyala,” 4 Wing, “How Iraq’s Civil War Broke Out In Diyala Province.” Institute for the Study of War, August 2008; Kimberly Kagan, “The Battle 5 For a detailed account of AQI’s takeover of the rural Diyala River villages in for Diyala,” Iraq Report IV, Weekly Standard, May 7, 2007; and Michael 2006-2007, see James Few, “The Break Point: AQIZ Establishes the ISI in Knights, “Pursuing Al-Qaeda into Iraq’s Diyala Province,” CTC Sentinel 1:9 Zaganiyah,” Small Wars Journal, April 17, 2008. (2008). 6 See Knights, “Pursuing Al-Qaeda into Iraq’s Diyala Province” and Annex 2 Joel Wing, “How Iraq’s Civil War Broke Out In Diyala Province: Interview 5 on 2005 provincial election results in Michael Knights and Eamon Mc- With Former Interrogator Richard Buchanan,” Musings on Iraq, July 28, Carthy, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” 2014. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008. 3 A very sharp picture of AQI/ISI’s near-victory and the total loss of govern- 7 “Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey,” Comprehensive Food Security ment control is given in Patrick B. Johnston, Jacob N. Shapiro, Howard and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA), Central Organization for Statistics J. Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle F. Jung, Patrick Ryan, and Jonathan & Information Technology (COSIT), and United Nations World Food Wallace, Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror Programme, 2008, pp. 129-136. in Iraq, 2005–2010 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), pp. 35, 8 For a summary of Badr’s long involvement in Diyala, see Michael Knights, 50. “Iraq’s Bekaa Valley,” Foreign Afairs, March 16, 2015. OCTOBER 2016 CTC SENTINEL 7

9 “Shift to Extreme Polarization Continues,” Inside Iraqi Politics 83, April 19, 25 Matt Bradley and Ali A. Nabhan, “Fledgling Iraqi Military Is Outmatched 2014, p. 2. on Battlefield,” Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2014. 10 For a good explanation on the parts of Diyala claimed by the Kurds, see 26 Wing, “Iraq’s Diyala Province: An Insurgent Stronghold.” Sean Kane, “Iraq’s Disputed Territories: A View of the Political Horizon and 27 “Diyala governor pushes for ‘quick solutions’ to curb the killings and Implications for U.S. Policy,” U.S. Institute for Peace, 2011. set up improvised explosive devices in the village of Bani Saad,” Almada 11 Author (Knights) interview, Iraqi intelligence officers, Diyala province, Press, August 22, 2015. 2011. 28 Authors’ SIGACT dataset. 12 “Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey,” pp. 130-132. 29 “A mortar shell fell on the farming village northeast of Baquba,” Al Su- 13 A good summary of trends can be found in “The Water Wars Waged by the maria, October 3, 2016. Islamic State,” Stratfor, November 25, 2015. 30 For a good characterization of ISF’s missteps in the Lake Hamrin area, 14 All incident data is drawn from the authors’ geolocated Significant Action see “Badr’s Bid to Lead Shia Camp Struggles in Diyala, Tuz,” Inside Iraqi (SIGACT) dataset. The dataset brings together declassified coalition SI- Politics 130, pp. 5-6, June 20, 2015. GACT data plus private security company and open-source SIGACT data 31 Àmmar Tariq and Nida’ Fu’ad, “Amn Abi Sayda: Al-Makhisa Qandahar used to supplement and extend the dataset as coalition incident collec- Diyala wala Nahtaj ila Athan Al-Siyasiyyin li Darb Al-Irhab,” Al-Sumaria, tion degraded in 2009-2011 and was absent in 2012-2014. April 19, 2014, http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/98297/# 15 Authors’ SIGACT dataset. 32 A thorough collation of ISF and PMF atrocities in Diyala can be found in 16 Johnston et al., pp. 20-22. Wing, “Iraq’s Diyala Province: An Insurgent Stronghold.” For a close look 17 Ned Parker, “Special Report: How Mosul fell - An Iraqi general disputes at early 2014 atrocities, see “Low-Level Sectarian Violence Defies Recon- Baghdad’s story,” Reuters, October 14, 2014. ciliation Efforts,” Inside Iraqi Politics 78, February 3, 2014, p. 8. 18 An excellent collation of open-source articles on these intra-insurgent 33 A translation of this letter is available on the U.S. State Department web- clashes is provided in Joel Wing, “Iraq’s Diyala Province An Insurgent site. Stronghold,” Musings on Iraq, February 2, 2015. 34 Kevin Conlon, Jason Hanna, and Mohammed Tawfeeq, “Iraq ice truck 19 For an excellent breakdown of these groups, see “Appendix 5: Iraq’s New bombing kills 120,” CNN, July 19, 2015. Iranian-Influenced/Proxy Militias” in Phillip Smyth, “The Shiite Jihad in 35 A good summary of the events in Muqdadiyah is available in Joel Wing, Syria and Its Regional Effects,” Policy Focus 138, Washington Institute for “Iraq’s Diyala Province Explodes in Sectarian Violence after Islamic State Near East Policy, February 2015. Bombing,” Musings on Iraq, January 14, 2015. 20 Susannah George, “Breaking Badr,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2014. 36 “Iraq crisis: Suicide bomb kills 38 at Shia funeral,” BBC, February 29, 21 David Cenciotti, “Previously unknown details about Iranian F-4, F-5, Su-24 2016. and UAVs involvement in air strikes on ISIS targets in Iraq,” Aviationist, 37 Ali A. Nabhan and Karen Leigh, “Death Toll from Sunday Baghdad Bomb- December 4, 2015. ing Nears 300,” Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2016. 22 Ahmed Ali, Heather L. Pickerell, and ISW Iraq Team, “ISW Iraq Situation 38 “Kayfa Dakhalat Al-Sayyarah Al-Mufakhakha ila Madinat Al-Sadir?” Al- Report,” June 17, 2014; “Iraq conflict: Clashes on approaches to Baghdad,” Muàlimmah, May 11, 2016. BBC, June 17, 2014; Oliver Holmes, “Sunnis accuse Iraq forces of jailhouse 39 “Militia Clashes Raise Issue of Stability in Liberated Areas,” Inside Iraqi massacre,” Reuters, June 19, 2014. Politics 111, pp. 4-5, May 21, 2015; “Sunni Provincial Leaders Emasculat- 23 Ned Parker, Ahmed Rasheed, and Raheem Salman, “Sectarian strife ed,” Inside Iraqi Politics 112, pp. 5-7, June 20, 2015. threatens Iraq ahead of election,” Reuters, April 27, 2014; Ghaith Ab- 40 Ibid. dul-Ahad, “Iraq election holds little hope of change for town scarred by 41 “Awakening warns of absence for its fighters in Diyala area,” Al Sumaria, decade of war,” Guardian, April 29, 2014. July 5, 2016. 24 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Iraq: on the frontline with the Shia fighters taking 42 “Diyala: Militias Push for More Professional Organization,” Inside Iraqi Pol- the war to Isis,” Guardian, August 24, 2014. itics 94, October 21, 2014, p. 4.