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Anbar, Baghdad & Diyala

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Anbar, Baghdad & Diyala ANBAR, BAGHDAD & DIYALA GOVERNORATE PROFILES POST-FEBRUARY 2006 IDP NEEDS ASSESSMENTS DECEMBER 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section: Page: I. IOM Assessment Background 1 II. Overview 2 1. Area Background 2. Restrictions on IDP Entry or Registration Dahuk il rb E S 3. Ethnicity and Religion u la y a m 4. Places of origin ew in a N n iy 5. Reasons for displacement a h 6. Pre-2006 IDP population Kirkuk 7. IDP relations w/ host community S al ah 8. IDP Intentions a l- Di D n iy III. Emergency Assessment and Needs 7 a l 1. Security 7 a i. Security Baghdad W ii. Vulnerabilities Kerbala assit Babylon Q iii. Women and Children ad Anbar is si 2. Shelter and Basic Services 9 ya i. Shelter (living arrangements) Missan Thi-Qar ii. Food/PDS Najaf iii. Water and Sanitation Basrah iv. Fuel and Electricity Muthanna v. Health Care vi. Education 3. Legal 13 i. Property Issues ii. Documentation IV. Humanitarian Assistance Received 14 V. Priority Needs 14 1. Top Priority Needs 2. JOC Projects VI. Conclusion 16 I. POST-FEBRUARY 2006 IDP ASSESSMENTS: BACKGROUND Following the 22 February 2006 bombing of the Samarra Al-Askari Mosque, sectarian violence led to an alarming increase in population displacement within Iraq. In coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) and other entities, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is conducting in-depth assessments on recently displaced persons throughout Iraq. IOM monitors use IDP Rapid Assessment questionnaires to gather information from MoDM, IDP tribal and community leaders, local NGOs, local government bodies, and individual IDP families. Based on a database of this information, IOM disseminates bi-weekly, bi-annual, and annual reports containing updates, statistics, and 1 analyses on displacement. These assist IOM and other organizations in prioritizing areas of operation, planning emergency responses, and designing long-term, durable solutions programs. As of the time of writing, there are an estimated 1.2 million 2 Iraqis internally displaced since February 2006. While the rate of displacement has decreased considerably towards the end of 2007 and some IDPs are beginning to return, the number of displaced is still significant and far exceeds the number who have returned. This is one of six Iraq Governorate Profile reports released by IOM at the close of 2007. These reports profile the displacement situation in each Iraq governorate, using statistics and reporting from the field. 1 IOM reports are available at http://www.iom-iraq.net/idp.html . 2 Based on information provided by MoDM and the Kurdistan Regional Government. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION II. OVERVIEW Anbar Baghdad Diyala Capital Ramadi Baghdad Baqubah Adhamiya, Abu Ghraib, Al Fallujah, Al-Ka’im, Ramadi, Baqubah, Al-Muqdadiya, Al- Districts Resafa, Karkh, Taji, Tarmia, Ana, Haditha, Heet, Al Rutba Khalis, Baladrooz, Khanaqin, Kifri Mada’in, Mahmoudiya Population 3 1,271,000 individuals 6,500,000 individuals 1,224,357 individuals 4 10,225 families (est. 61,350 59,346 families (est. 365,618 12,796 families (est. 76,601 Total post-Feb 2006 IDPs individuals) individuals) individuals) 5 1,214 families (est. 29,418 3,867 families (est. 23,202 9,100 families (est. 54,600 Total pre-Feb 2006 IDPs individuals) individuals) individuals) Number of post-Feb 2006 10,188 families (est. 61,128 32,515 families (est. 195,090 9,934 families (est. 59,604 IDPs assessed by IOM 6 individuals) individuals) individuals) 1. Area Background These three governorates have experienced some of the highest numbers of post-February 2006 displacement. Baghdad, the capital of the country and largest city, is the place of origin for 70% of the displaced. Anbar hosts the majority of the Sunni displaced, and Diyala’s continuous instability causes internal displacement as well as many Iraqis to flee the governorate. However, over the past few months, security has improved remarkably in both Anbar and Baghdad. This has caused an increase in the number of IDP and refugee returnees, especially to Baghdad. However, these returnees are also returning due to lack of access to services (health, education, etc.), exhausted finances, and restrictive visa requirements for those in neighbouring countries. Anbar is Iraq’s largest and most resource-poor governorate. It is located to the west of Baghdad and stretches from the capital to Jordan and Syria. The governorate forms part of the Sunni Triangle and its population is almost entirely Sunni Arab. Due to this religious makeup, it is also a haven to thousands of Sunni IDP families fleeing sectarian violence. Another large source of displacement within Anbar results from military operations and armed clashes due to fighting among and between tribes, MNF-I/IF, insurgents, and criminals. Ongoing clashes, widespread checkpoints, and regularly enforced curfews also affect monitors’ activities. In addition, IDPs are increasingly reluctant to share information in interviews due to fear. Although situated in a predominantly Sunni Arab region, Baghdad Governorate contains a mix of Iraq’s various communities: Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Christian Assyrians, and Sunni and Shia Muslims. This complicated makeup of ethnicity, religion and sect, combined with Baghdad’s attraction as the Iraqi capital and the home for many international and national entities, makes it especially diverse and as a result, volatile. Diyala has a history of ethnic mixing and changing political agendas, creating tension among the different ethnic communities. It has now become the most dangerous and violent governorate in Iraq. The Public Distribution System (PDS) is not functioning, as violence prevents the provision of services. Schools are closed and insurgents, who tend to be very familiar with the governorate, are targeting police, government officials, and military forces. The few NGOs that continue to work in the governorate work on a “no profile” basis, as they are also targets. 3 As per 1997 census; number is individuals. 4 As per the Ministry of Displacement and Migration. 5 As per IOM Monitoring, November 2007. 6 Please note that this is the number of post-February 2006 IDPs assessed by IOM, not the total number of IDPs in the governorate. 2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION 2. Restrictions on IDP Entry or Registration Although there are no official restrictions on IDP entry into Anbar, the escalation of intertribal tensions in 2007 now means that IDPs may be unwelcome in Anbar unless they have tribal ties to the area they arrive in. MoDM maintains an office in Ramadi, but due to insecurity and lack of capacity has not been able to register a significant portion of the IDP population in Anbar. IDP entry into Baghdad and Diyala is not officially restricted, but IDP movement is limited by ethno-religious homogeneity in many areas. MoDM registration is open, although some IDPs may not register due to insecurity or the fear that registration information may be used against them. 3. Ethnicity and Religion RELIGION & ETHNICITY Anbar Baghdad Diyala Area All Iraq Shia Arab 75.88% 36.34% 53.73% 61.39% Sunni Arab 100.00% 23.94% 52.65% 44.08% 28.80% Shia Kurd 0.13% 9.50% 1.88% 0.86% Sunni Kurd 1.28% 0.24% 1.66% Other 0.00% 0.04% 0.23% 0.07% 7.14% Dahuk il rb 4. Places of Origin E S u la a y ew m in a N n The majority (64%) of IDPs assessed in Anbar iy a fled from Baghdad. However, a large minority Kirkuk h (31%) were internally displaced within Anbar S al ah itself. a l- Di D n iy a 64.15% la Baghdad 31.08% Kerbala W 0.00% Babylon assit Dahuk l i 0.08% Q b ad r i E Anbar ss iy a 0.11% S u Missan la a y ew m in a Thi-Qar N n Najaf 0.38% iy a Kirkuk h 4.69% Basrah Muthanna 1.18% S 15.75% al ah a l- Di D n iy a la In Baghdad , displacement was mostly 80.21% Baghdad internal, with 80% of the assessed 2.23% Kerbala originating from within the governorate. Wa 0.00% Babylon ssit Shias fled mixed communities to the 0.09% Q 0.01% ad 0.03% Anbar is eastern area of Baghdad, while Sunnis fled si ya 0.00% Missan to the west. The remaining 20% of IDPs in Baghdad come from almost every 0.00% Thi-Qar Najaf governorate in Iraq. 0.02% Basrah Muthanna 3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION Dahuk il rb E S u la a y ew m Diyala also suffers from internal in a N n iy 0.39% a displacement, with 79% of IDPs Kirkuk h originating from communities within 0.17% Diyala. Smaller percentages fled S 78.65% al ah a governorates in the south and center. l- Di D n iy a la 5. Reasons for Displacement Baghdad 0.27% 20.15% Kerbala Babylon Wassit The majority (65%) of IDPs assessed in 0.23% Q ad Anbar is 0.03% si the reporting area fled their place of ya origin due to direct threats to life. Many Missan Thi-Qar also cited generalized violence (39%) and Najaf fear (43%) as motives. Over one-third 0.10% Basrah (36%) said they had been forcibly Muthanna displaced from property. Reasons for displacement are as follows: Reason for Displacement Anbar Baghdad Diyala Area All Iraq Armed conflict 24.6% 3.0% 37.5% 13.7% 10.3% Direct threats of life 30.3% 72.7% 76.3% 65.2% 62.4% Forced displacement from property 18.6% 32.7% 63.2% 35.7% 25.3% Generalized violence 43.4% 32.6% 53.9% 38.7% 47.0% Left out of fear 10.9% 50.8% 50.4% 43.0% 39.2% Other 0.2% 1.2% 2.3% 1.2% 1.1% When asked whether they felt specifically targeted and if so, why, the overwhelming majority (87%) of IDPs assessed in the reporting area said that they were targeted due to religious/sectarian identity.
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