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256 Alaska 982 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 60(b)(6).21 Rather, we view them ‘‘as instan- claim to a portion of the proceeds. The tiations of the equitable factors required to record is devoid of any evidence or argument overcome the principle that, at some point, regarding the life insurance policies. There- ‘litigation [must] be brought to an end.’ ’’ 22 fore, we conclude that it was premature to Camille’s claim for relief met the standards rule on this issue and we vacate this ruling. for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), because her eligibility for the survivorship benefits was IV. CONCLUSION one of the fundamental assumptions underly- We AFFIRM the superior court’s holding ing the property division. We therefore hold that it lacks jurisdiction to enforce the prop- that Camille is entitled to relief under Rule erty settlement agreement. But we RE- 60(b)(6). VERSE the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief to Camille and REMAND for proceedings con- C. Equity Demands that Camille Receive sistent with this opinion. We VACATE the Half of the Value of the Marital Por- order regarding Camille’s claim to the insur- tion of William’s Civil Service Pen- ance proceeds. sion. [17] Because we hold that the parties agreed to divide William’s civil service pen- , sion we conclude that Camille should receive one-half of the value of the marital portion of William’s civil service pension—valued as of the date the parties entered into the proper- ty settlement agreement, August 12, 1992. A.A., Appellant, This is the most equitable result given the particular facts of this case. We remand this v. valuation question to the superior court for STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF determination. FAMILY & YOUTH SERVICES, Appellee. D. It Was Premature to Rule on Ca- No. S–8663. mille’s Claim to the Proceeds of Wil- liam’s Life Insurance Policies. Supreme Court of Alaska. As part of its order, the superior court June 25, 1999. held that ‘‘[Camille] is entitled to no part of any life insurance proceeds which may have been received by Intervenors Cynthia Gilbert Upon reversal of his murder conviction, and Rachel Evans, as a result of the death of father moved to continue a hearing on a [William].’’ Camille objects to this holding petition to terminate his parental rights with as premature. She asserts that if this court respect to his son, an Indian child. The Supe- awards a substantial judgment against Wil- rior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchor- liam’s estate and the estate is unable to age, John Reese, J., denied motion and ter- satisfy the judgment, then she may have a minated his parental rights. Father appealed. claim to the insurance proceeds. Moreover, The Supreme Court, Fabe, J., held that: (1) Camille notes that her entitlement to the denial of father’s motion to continue was not proceeds is the subject of a separate lawsuit an abuse of discretion, and (2) Department of before a different judge. Family & Youth Services (DFYS) met its Although it seems unlikely that Camille duty under the Indian Child Welfare Act will be able to reach the proceeds for satis- (ICWA) to make active efforts to provide faction of this award, we cannot rule out the remedial services. possibility that Camille may have a legal Affirmed. 21. See Clauson, 831 P.2d at 1260–61. 22. Id. at 1261 (quoting Lowe, 817 P.2d at 459). A.A. v. STATE Alaska 257 Cite as 982 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1999) 1. Appeal and Error O966(1) State of its duty under the Indian Child Supreme Court reviews a trial court’s Welfare Act (ICWA) to make active remedial denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of efforts, the practical circumstances surround- discretion; Supreme Court will consider the ing a parent’s incarceration, the difficulty of particular facts and circumstances of each providing resources to inmates generally, the individual case to determine whether the de- unavailability of specific resources, and the nial was so unreasonable or so prejudicial as length of incarceration, may have a direct to amount to an abuse of discretion. bearing on what active remedial efforts are possible. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 2. Infants O252 § 102(d), 25 U.S.C.A. § 1912(d). When reviewing issues of termination of parental rights, Supreme Court will affirm a 8. Indians O6(2) trial court’s factual findings unless those Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did findings are clearly erroneous. not obligate the State to make active efforts 3. Infants O249 to prevent the breakup of an Indian family Supreme Court reviews de novo any until father’s paternity had been established questions of law in termination of parental where the father did not acknowledge pater- rights proceeding. nity before a blood test. Indian Child Wel- fare Act of 1978, §§ 4(9), 102(d), 25 U.S.C.A. 4. Infants O204 §§ 1903(9), 1912(d). Denial of father’s motion to continue a hearing on a petition to terminate his paren- 9. Indians O6(2) tal rights, made following reversal of his Department of Family & Youth Services murder conviction, was not an abuse of dis- (DFYS) met its duty under the Indian Child cretion; trial court explicitly noted that its Welfare Act (ICWA) to make active efforts decision to terminate did not rest on the to provide remedial services designed to pre- conviction, but on father’s extensive history vent the breakup of an Indian family, even of assaultive behavior after completing an though it never fashioned an individualized anger management course, and the court also case plan for the incarcerated father of an correctly focused on child’s best interests, Indian child; father demonstrated a lack of noting the time that it would take before willingness to participate in treatment, and father could possibly be acquitted on retrial engaged in assaults on prison staff and in- and prepared to be a safe parent. mates after the reversal of his murder con- 5. Infants O204 viction and the filing of the termination of In a termination of parental rights trial, parental rights petition. Indian Child Wel- the best interests of the child, not those of fare Act of 1978, § 102(d), 25 U.S.C.A. the parents, are paramount, and thus, while § 1912(d). there are dangers of relying on a conviction of a parent that is not yet final, a trial court should have the discretion to proceed to a Stuart G. Ross, Law Office of Stuart G. termination trial without a final ruling on a Ross, Anchorage, for Appellant. parent’s criminal appeal. Lisa B. Nelson, Assistant Attorney Gener- 6. Infants O155 al, Anchorage, Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney Reversal of a parent’s criminal convic- General, Juneau, and James H. Parker, As- tion does not prevent termination of parental sistant Public Advocate, Brant McGee, Public rights as long as the termination rests on Advocate, Anchorage, for Appellee. other grounds. 7. Indians O6(2) Before MATTHEWS, Chief Justice, While neither incarceration nor doubtful EASTAUGH, FABE, BRYNER, and prospects for rehabilitation will relieve the CARPENETI, Justices. 258 Alaska 982 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES OPINION whether I.K. was a child in need of aid. At FABE, Justice. this hearing, both M.K. and R.C. represent- I. INTRODUCTION ed that R.C. was the father of I.K. But on March 29, 1995, M.K. filed a paternity affida- Upon reversal of his murder conviction, vit with the Child Support Enforcement Di- A.A. moved to postpone the hearing on the vision (CSED) listing A.A. as the named de- Department of Family & Youth Services’s fendant. Even so, other information in the petition to terminate his parental rights with affidavit reflected M.K.’s belief that R.C. was respect to his son, I.K. The superior court the father. The paternity information ‘‘lo- denied A.A.’s request out of concern that a cate sheet’’ also named R.C. as the ‘‘alleged’’ lengthy delay of the termination proceedings or ‘‘most likely’’ father. would negatively affect I.K.’s best interests. A.A. appeals the superior court’s decision to DFYS took emergency physical custody of terminate his parental rights, arguing that he I.K. on April 7 because of M.K’s failure to had a right to a continuance and that the comply with her case plan. At a probable State failed to make ‘‘active efforts’’ as re- cause hearing on the emergency petition, quired by the Indian Child Welfare Act. Be- DFYS raised the issue of the biological fa- cause we conclude that the superior court ther’s identity and suggested paternity test- acted within its discretion in refusing to de- ing.1 lay the termination trial and correctly found that the State made ‘‘active efforts,’’ we af- While M.K. and R.C. were involved in firm. these proceedings, CSED served A.A. with a complaint at Spring Creek Correctional Cen- II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS ter in May 1995, alleging his potential pater- M.K., an Alaska Native, gave birth to I.K. nity of I.K. A.A. denied paternity and re- on November 4, 1994. I.K.’s biological fa- quested blood testing. ther, A.A., was arrested on murder charges during M.K.’s pregnancy and has been incar- The superior court held a review hearing cerated since June 1994. A.A. was convicted of I.K.’s case in June 1995. DFYS reported of first-degree murder and sentenced to a that I.K. was still in foster care and that sixty-six-year prison term in July 1995.

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