Security The European Union and the Kosovo Challenge a m a Gemma Collantes Celador The Ahtisaari Plan r o n Post-Doctoral Research Fellow a P Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), In November 2005 Martti Ahtisaari, former Finnish Barcelona President, was appointed UN Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. After over a year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations, expert consul- 2007 has been a year of crucial changes for Kosovo, par- tations involving the leadership of both Serbia and 8 0 0 ticularly in relation to the ongoing debate over its future Kosovo, and the delay caused by parliamentary elec- 2 . d status as a sovereign territory. This debate was marked tions in Serbia, his conclusions were rather bleak. In e M by various diplomatic attempts to bring the two parties his March 2007 “Comprehensive Proposal for the – Serbia and Kosovo – to a common position, namely Kosovo Status Settlement” (commonly known as through the Ahtisaari plan and the Troika process. The the Ahtisaari plan or Settlement proposal), he admit- failure of these initiatives confirmed that whatever the out- ted that the situation is hostage to, come of the status talks, the future of Kosovo continued 3 6 to depend on international assistance, with the onus in- “categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade 1 creasingly falling on the EU as it identifies the Western demands Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia, while Balkans as belonging to its realm of responsibility. As a Pristina will accept nothing short of independence result, the year 2007 also constitutes a key year in the […] it is my view that the negotiations’ potential to EU’s preparations for yet another new step in its grow- produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s ing role in the region, best exemplified by the prepara- status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, tions to launch the largest civilian European Security whatever the format, will overcome this impasse.” and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission to date: the Euro- (UN 2007b: 2). pean Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). This article will analyse the main events that took The status situation at the time – as outlined in place in 2007. In particular, these events confirmed that Resolution 1244 – was nevertheless deemed unten- Kosovo will be a notable challenge for a European Union able by the Settlement proposal.1 The status quo was eager to show that its security and defence mecha- negatively impacting on Kosovo’s democratic devel- nisms are ready to tackle difficult conflict scenarios. opment, accountability, economic recovery and inter- ethnic reconciliation. The only way out from this impasse was – according to Ahtisaari – to support The Diplomatic Game the conditional independence of Kosovo with inter- national supervision until the territory enjoyed the local The year 2007 witnessed another set of efforts by capacity to ensure a “viable, sustainable and stable the international community to bring closer the two [Kosovo] in which all communities and their members opposing views on the future of this territory, with very can live in a peaceful and dignified existence” (UN limited success. 2007b: 2). 1 Resolution 1244 respected the territorial integrity of Serbia but introduced the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to prepare Kosovo for seff- government, pending a political settlement on its future status. This new situation meant that Serbia did not exercise any legislative, executive and judicial authority over the territory of Kosovo. All these powers rested with the transitional administration that UNMIK represented (UN 1999). The temporary international supervision recommend- in the UN Security Council over Kosovo’s future sta- ed by the Ahtisaari plan was to be exercised by an tus, and agreement among the six-nation Contact International Civilian Representative, double-hatted as Group on the need to move the process out of its European Union Special Representative, acting as the stalemate situation.4 This new initiative, mediated by ultimate supervisory authority over the implementa- a “Troika” of representatives from the EU, Russia tion of the Settlement proposal. The mandate of this and US, was meant to provide one last chance to figure would be complemented by an ESDP mission Belgrade and Pristina to find a common solution. in the rule of law area; a NATO-led military force to pro- vide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, The Ahtisaari plan was killed by just as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) had been doing since 1999; and finally, an OSCE mission to assist in the fruitless negotiations with a monitoring process of the Plan’s implementation. The Belgrade, which rejected it, m a r temporary international presence should be inten- while the Kosovo Albanians fully o n a sively engaged in institutional capacity-building in addi- P endorsed it. It was also hostage tion to enjoying strong but focused powers in critical to irreconcilable differences areas such as community rights,2 decentralisation,3 the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the between the USA and rule of law. These powers, which extended as far as all the members of the EU 8 the capacity to annul decisions/laws and remove pub- 0 0 2 lic officials, should be exercised when the Kosovo The Troika reported back in December 2007 with poor . d e authorities “contravene the provisions of the Settlement results (UN 2007a). Neither side was still willing to M proposals and the spirit in which they were crafted” compromise on the status issue. The Troika proposed (UN 2007b: 4). In other words, these powers should a fourteen-point assessment – as a basis for evalua- be “corrective” rather than prescriptive. ting a range of solutions – that outlined a variety of The Ahtisaari plan was killed by fruitless negotia- parameters by which common bodies would be estab- 4 tions with Belgrade, which rejected it, while the Kosovo lished to implement cooperation between Serbia and 6 1 Albanians fully endorsed it. It was also hostage to Kosovo. This would come in exchange for Serbia’s irreconcilable differences between the USA and all commitment not to govern or re-establish a physical the members of the EU (some of which had to be presence on Kosovo’s territory or to interfere in Kosovo’s coaxed) on the one side and Russia on the other, access to international financial institutions and its path which explains the UN Security Council’s failure to towards EU integration. At the same Kosovo was meant draft a resolution to implement the Settlement pro- to commit to full regional integration, particularly on the posal. Russia, an ally of Serbia, was worried of the economic side (ICG 2007: 3). Coined “Ahtisaari-minus” precedent Kosovo could set for other secessionist by the Kosovo media, this assessment was not con- regions, such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia or sidered seriously by the Kosovo authorities. They were Transdniestria. The USA, on the other extreme, even only open to discussing post-independence arrange- declared at one point Kosovo’s right to declare inde- ments with Serbia, had little trust in the negotiation pendence unilaterally and immediately. process and were more concerned at the time with their November 2007 general elections.5 Serbia was The Troika Process similarly dismissive of the Troika assessment, insisting on Kosovo remaining within Serbia but with substan- At the end of July 2007 a new round of negotiations tial autonomy and with no return to the pre-March- began. This was the result of the ongoing differences 1999 situation (ICG 2007: 3-4). 2 Non-majority communities in Kosovo were in effect provided with a veto over laws of particular interest to their communities in areas such as language, culture, education and symbols (UN 2007b: 6). 3 The Plan envisaged offering Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo enhanced municipal competences in areas such as healthcare, higher edu- cation, local courts and the selection of the police chief; considerable autonomy over their financial matters, including the capacity to receive funding from Serbia; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb-majority municipalities (UN 2007b: 7). 4 The Contact Group is an informal grouping of influential states (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US) interested in the stabilisa- tion of the Balkans. 5 These elections gave the victory to Hasmim Thaçi, former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), who was determined to make Kosovo independent as soon as possible. With the Troika reporting back its lack of success in On the basis of the work completed by the EU Planning finding a negotiated solution, the conditional or super- Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) established in April vised independence proposed by the Ahtisaari Plan 2006, the activation of the EU mission has since taken was back on the table as the best way forward. In place swiftly. On 16th February 2008 the Council of fact, as it became clearer that the Troika process the EU decided to launch EULEX Kosovo, the EU would not yield positive results, the Kosovo authori- Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. Headed by Yves de ties began to devise alternative ways of moving towards Kermabon, this mission aims to support the Kosovo independence – even without UN Security Council authorities in building a sustainable and functional authorisation – in close cooperation with those Rule of Law system on the basis of an initial two- Western states ready to support them. As summed year mandate which will probably have to be expand- up by the International Crisis Group, the alternative ed. The mission will include approximately 1,800/1,900 was not an option: international police officers, judges, prosecutors a m a and custom officers and 1,000 local staff to assist r o n “Accepting paralysis is not a viable option, however.