EURAMERICA Vol. 48, No. 3 (September 2018), 387-427 © Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica http://euramerica.org

The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus —Security Speech Acts and Threat Inflation, 2011-2012*  Chi-hung Wei Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica No. 128, Sec. 2, Academia Rd., Taipei 11529, E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract During 2011-2012, the “1992 Consensus” was understood as relating to the cross-Strait security situation. Yet, I argue that the 1992 Consensus was not intrinsically a security problem but rather became one through U.S. acts of securitization. While the 1992 Consensus was originally seen as a political issue, the United States brought a security logic to bear on it by arguing that cross-Strait relations would likely become unstable should the 1992 Consensus be denied. As a result of the issue linkage or rhetorical framing, what once had been a political formula came to be underst ood in Taiwan as a

Received Octorber 24, 2017; accepted March 23, 2018; last revised April 11, 2018 Proofreaders: Min-Fang Tsai, Yu-Tung Yeh, Chia-Chi Tseng * A version of this article was presented at the “U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations, 2012-2017” Conference held in December 2017 by the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica. For helpful comments, I thank Chin-Kuei Tsui and other participants in the conference. I also thank three anonymous reviewers of EurAmerica. 388 EURAMERICA

security issue. I also argue that the U.S. securitization of the 1992 Consensus was a discursive practice that inflated Chinese threats to Taiwan. A comparative-historical analysis reveals that what causes cross-Strait tensions is Taipei’s adoption of pro-independence policies that provoke China rather than Taipei’s rejection of the 1992 Consensus.

Key Words: The United States, securitization, the 1992 Consensus, speech acts, threat inflation

The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 389

I. Introduction

The “1992 Consensus” figured heavily in the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election. According to a post-election poll, (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou won reelection with 51.6 percent of the vote primarily because his advocacy of the 1992 Consensus received support from those with a stake in a peaceful cross-Strait relation (Romberg, 2012a: 4). Conversely, Tsai Ing-wen, the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), failed to convince the voters that her opposition to the 1992 Consensus would not cause cross-Strait instability, as the DPP admitted in a post-election report. 1 At a time when the cross-Strait tensions characteristic of the Chen Shui-bian years (2000-2008) were still in the forefront of the Taiwanese mind, the election result was attributed largely to Taiwanese people’s pursuit of security predicated on the 1992 Consensus. As a Chinese official put it, “Taiwan compatriots in the end chose peace, rejecting instability” (Romberg, 2012a: 9).2 Without denying Chinese threats posed to Taiwan, this article nonetheless argues that the Taiwanese understanding of the 1992 Consensus as a security issue was not unproblematic. A careful review reveals that the 1992 Consensus was originally coined as a political issue addressing the meaning of “one China.” Shortly after Chen Shui-bian was elected president in March 2000, the KMT invented a term called the 1992 Consensus and defined it as “one China, respective interpretations,” which KMT leaders argued was first agreed upon by Taipei and Beijing in 1992. In the period 2000-2008, debates over the term revolved around whether a cross-Strait consensus had been reached in 1992, and whether

1 The DPP’s post-election report is available at http://www.dpp.org.tw/ news_content. php?&sn=6043 2 For the role of security concerns in the 2012 presidential election, see also Li (2014). 390 EURAMERICA

President Chen should accept it as the basis for resuming cross-Strait dialogue. In few circumstances was the 1992 Consensus associated with security (or insecurity). Using the securitization theory pioneered by the Copenhagen School, I argue that the 1992 Consensus was not intrinsically a security problem but rather became so through securitizing discourses. I further ascribe the securitization of the 1992 Consensus to American practices. At a time when Tsai rejected the 1992 Consensus during the 2012 presidential campaign, the United States brought a security logic to bear on the term, arguing that the 1992 Consensus was essential to cross-Strait peace and that cross-Strait relations would likely become unstable should it be disregarded. As a result of the issue linkage or rhetorical framing, what had once been a political formula came to be perceived in Taiwan as a security issue. Theoretically, this article suggests the limits of materialist approaches to the securitization of the 1992 Consensus. China’s military weapons (missiles, tanks, fighter jets, warships, and so on) were objectively real, but the 1992 Consensus as a security problem was not an outgrowth of China’s material capabilities. To the contrary, it emerged out of U.S. speech acts. When U.S. actors articulated the 1992 Consensus as a security issue, their securitizing practices not only sank its original political meaning to oblivion but also shaped the intersubjective understanding about the cross-Strait security situation. To examine the U.S. securitization of the 1992 Consensus, this article adopts genealogical methods. Genealogy, a framework of analysis pioneered by Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1989) and popularized by Michel Foucault (1984), traces the origin, lineage, history, and even transformation of meanings embedded in the discursive representation of an object, be it in material or linguistic forms. This method is helpful to explore how political elites and their linguistic practices impart a particular meaning to a particular object. Therefore, this article offers a genealogy of the 1992 The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 391

Consensus not only by uncovering its original political meaning but also by analyzing the linguistic process through which the United States moved the 1992 Consensus away from the political field and into the security realm. It is important to note that this article refrains from any involvement in the partisan debate over whether Taiwan and China reached any consensus in 1992. Whether the 1992 Consensus was a consensus per se has been the subject of heated debate in Taiwan, and between Taiwan and China. Even different U.S. actors have different stances on it. In this article, I treat the 1992 Consensus as a terminological invention. Regardless of whether a cross-Strait consensus existed in 1992, the 1992 Consensus as a term exists because it has been said by both proponents and opponents of the term. It is an object, though in a linguistic form, that merits study. This article first examines the origin of the 1992 Consensus, with a special focus on U.S. stances on it during 2000-2008. I then explain securitization theory and review its application to European and American Studies. The attention then shifts to how the United States securitized the 1992 Consensus during 2011-2012. I also argue that U.S. securitization gained momentum due partly to the lack of “desecuritization.” Afterwards, I assess the validity of the U.S. argument that vetoing the 1992 Consensus would destabilize cross-Strait relations. I show that cross-Strait tensions arouse during 2000-2008 not because President Chen denied the 1992 Consensus but because he adopted pro-independence moves that provoked Beijing. I also show that the post-2016 cross-Strait relationship has been devoid of the 1992 Consensus but avoided tensions because President Tsai Ing-wen has taken a pro-status quo approach that to some extent assures Beijing. I thus argue that the U.S. securitization of the 1992 Consensus was a practice that inflated Chinese threats to Taiwan. Afterwards, I explain why the securitization process was of American rather than Chinese making. I attribute the outcome to American authority in cross-Strait security affairs. I also point to China’s past failures to influence Taiwan’s elections through 392 EURAMERICA coercive means. I conclude that American speech acts explain the securitization of the 1992 Consensus better than China’s material power alone.

II. The 1992 Consensus, 2000-2008 The year 1992 marked the convocation of a cross-Strait meeting that later became a matter of political debate. In October, Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) met in Hong Kong. According to the KMT, the two organizations reached a “one China, respective interpretations” consensus. It was on the basis of the consensus that SEF Chair Koo Chen-fu and ARATS Chair met in Singapore in 1993 (Su & Cheng, 2002). However, cross-Strait dialogue came to a halt after President Lee Teng-hui visited the United States in 1995, and the cross-Strait deadlock endured for the rest of his tenure. In March 2000, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidency. Before his inauguration, Su Chi, Chair of the , concocted a term that he called 1992 Consensus. The term, he argued, “referred to the period between 1992 and 1995 when the Taiwan Strait experienced a period of détente, so its basic tone was one of moderation and good will” (Su, 2009: 90). Because the KMT claimed that Taipei and Beijing had “agreed to disagree” in 1992 over the meaning of one China, it defined the 1992 Consensus as “one China, respective interpretations.” For KMT actors, the 1992 Consensus offered the possibility of bridging the divide between the DPP and Beijing. The 1992 Consensus was warmly welcomed in Beijing, as Chinese leaders suggested that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait reopen dialogue on the basis of the term. However, Beijing never defined it in the same fashion as the KMT. Beijing did claim that both sides had struck a consensus in 1992, but argued that “the SEF and the ARATS reached a consensus allowing the two organizations The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 393 to express, in their respective oral ways, the formulation ‘both sides of the Strait insist on one China.’”3 In other words, Beijing equated the 1992 Consensus with one China without agreeing to respective interpretations. For Beijing, “one China, respective interpretations” would create an impression of “” (Bush, 2005: 286-287; Su, 2009: 91; Xu, 2003). President Chen, conversely, opposed the 1992 Consensus, stressing that accepting it would sell out Taiwan’s sovereignty. He also argued that the term distorted the conclusion of the 1992 meeting. If anything had been concluded, he argued, it was “a consensus that both sides did not reach any consensus” on one China. He thus defined that consensus as the “1992 spirit” (Wei, 2015: 75). In the United States, as in Taiwan and in the cross-Strait arena, the 1992 Consensus (or the 1992 meeting) was left open to interpretation. While Washington saw the term as a Taiwanese or cross-Strait affair and forwent much embroilment, it did not stand completely apart from the debate. On the one hand, some U.S. officials expressed reservations about the 1992 Consensus. On 28 August 2001, Raymond Burghardt, then-Director of the Taipei Office of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), said that the KMT’s use of the 1992 Consensus was “confusing and misleading” (Huang, 2016). In a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, he recalled his diplomatic experience as Consul General in Shanghai during 1997-1999, in which he exchanged views with Wang Daohan. To the best of his understanding, when Taipei and Beijing debated one China in the early 1990s, there were “some language that overlapped and some language that differed” (2016). Because both sides, he added, recognized that it was in their interest to enter dialogue, “the negotiators decided to put aside the intractable

3 The Chinese phrase is “Haixiehui yu haijihui dacheng gezi yi koutou fangshi biaoshu haixia liangan junjianchi yige zhongguo yuanze degongshi.” See of the State Council PRC, 2011a. 394 EURAMERICA political issues concerning sovereignty and the definition of one China in order to make progress on practical issues” (Kan, 2015). Burghardt thus stressed, “To me, I’m not sure why you could call that a consensus” (Dreyer, 2016: 425-426). For him, what Taipei and Beijing had negotiated was not so much political issues as practical ones, and therefore it was something of a misnomer to describe the negotiation as reaching any political consensus. At best, according to him, what had been struck was a cross-Strait “understanding” (Huang, 2016). Concerning the cross-Strait future, Burghardt suggested that “If the political will were there on both sides, it doesn’t have to be that complicated. Maybe all you have to do is say that an agreement [that talks are mutually beneficial] was reached . . . in 1992 and that it remains in effect” (AIT pans “1992 Consensus,” 2006). For him, the Chinese insistence on the 1992 Consensus as the precondition for cross-Strait dialogue seemed to be unwise and unnecessary. On the other hand, another U.S. position held that Taiwan and China had struck a consensus in 1992. In November 2001, an unnamed State Department official, while urging Taiwan and China to hold dialogue without setting any precondition, implied that the 1993 Koo-Wang meeting would not have convened had a consensus not been forged in the first place (Huang, 2016). What consensus did Washington believe to have been reached in 1992? In testimony on 21 April 2004, James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, explicitly followed the KMT’s interpretation of the 1992 meeting:

The 1990s ushered in a decade of incremental consensus-building. Both sides agreed in 1992 that there was one China, but left each side free to express their interpretation of the concept. This ambiguity and decision to reserve differences cleared the way in 1993 for the first high-level meeting in Singapore. (Kelly, 2004)

While Burghardt claimed that Taiwan and China had sidestepped the definition of one China in 1992, Kelly implied that The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 395 the two sides had reached a “one China, respective interpretations” consensus, although he did not use the term “1992 Consensus.” His testimony, according to Su Chi (2009: 256), was the first time the phrase of “one China, respective interpretations” was used in official documentation by the George W. Bush administration. Between the two American positions lied a middle ground. From a third American perspective, the DPP might be right to argue that the 1992 meeting had forged no concrete consensus, but the 1992 Consensus was a practical solution to the cross-Strait stalemate. As former AIT Chair Richard Bush said,

As for the 1992 “consensus,” the two sides never agreed on the substantive meaning of “one China” and Taiwan’s relationship to it, which is the heart of the dispute. In theory, that ambiguity could be a basis for the two sides to return to dialogue. If, for pragmatic reasons, Beijing needs a symbolic fig leaf to justify resuming dialogue—and if Taipei is willing to take a chance on offering one—then the 1992 Consensus would be the best option. (Bush, 2005: 286-287)

To sum up, the 2000-2008 period witnessed debates over (1) what Taiwan and China had concluded in 1992 and (2) whether Taipei should embrace the 1992 Consensus as the political basis for cross-Strait relations. The DPP, the KMT, Beijing, and U.S. actors had different positions on these two issues, but they all treated the 1992 Consensus in terms of its political implications for cross-Strait relations (surprisingly, few U.S. actors followed the Chinese interpretation of the 1992 meeting).4 Of course, security concerns were not overlooked during 2000-2008. This held particularly true for Washington. While U.S. actors who were concerned about cross-Strait relations diverged over the two political issues, most of them were fearful of a

4 This was the case perhaps because Taipei was so pro-independence that few U.S. actors believed that Taipei had agreed to one China. 396 EURAMERICA cross-Strait war that would entangle the United States. However, the American worry resulted from President Chen’s revisionist moves that provoked China rather than from Beijing’s displeasure with the DPP’s denial of the 1992 Consensus. In other words, the 1992 Consensus hardly posed a security problem for Washington. I will return later to this point.

III. Security vs. Securitization The above genealogical analyses show that the 1992 Consensus, before being accepted as a security problem, acted originally as a political issue. A puzzle, then, is why and how the 1992 Consensus underwent such a transformation. More importantly, from where did its security logic arise? In the discipline of international relations (IR), security is one of the key topics of study. According to traditional Security Studies, “security exists out there independently of our putting it into security terminology” (Kelstrup & Williams, 2000: 251). For traditionalists, to study security is to study material structures that threaten the survival of a specific state.5 In this structuralist view, if a security threat exists in the world, its existence is prior to what and how agents (e.g., states, international organizations, policymakers, elites, etc.) say about it. 6 Traditionalists further invoke a causal logic, arguing that the inherent nature of threats elicits state efforts to adopt a security policy as a countermeasure

5 Buzan (1997) distinguishes between traditionalist and critical approaches in Security Studies. Traditionalists hold a military-political, not linguistic, understanding of security. For them, security is about survival, and therefore an issue becomes a security problem when survival is at stake. 6 There has been a structure/agent debate in IR (see, for example, Wendt, 1987). With their military-political understanding of security, most traditionalists adopt structuralist approaches because they examine structural factors that have military-political implications, including the distribution of power, the balance of power, alliance formation, etc. For them, security or insecurity is an issue that recurs in the international system. The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 397

(Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 21). When policymakers conduct security affairs, they respond to threats rather than designate other states as threatening. The United States, for example, launched the Second Gulf War because Iraq, in traditionalist logic, was a threat to the established world order. Yet, the concept of security (or insecurity) embraced by traditionalists fails to offer a sufficient account of the 1992 Consensus, for three reasons. First, it overlooks the centrality of interpretation and reinterpretation in the making of meaning. As analyzed above, actors involved in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations articulated the 1992 Consensus in a political term during 2000-2008. It was essentially interpretive practices that made the 1992 Consensus a political issue. By the same token, the 1992 Consensus popped up as a security problem only through reinterpretation. While traditionalists treat a security threat as a structural given, I argue that the 1992 Consensus as a security problem had its origins in elite discourses. In other words, ontological priority should be given to agents rather than material structures because elite discourses “naturalized” the security dimension of the 1992 Consensus to the extent that its original political dimension became a distant memory. Second, and related, a structuralist approach cannot explain the transformation of the 1992 Consensus from a political issue to a security one. If an issue, political or security, is treated as a structural given, constancy is always assumed, and change is believed to be impossible. The 1992 Consensus, however, did not remain a political issue forever; nor was it a security issue in the first place. Its transformation thus poses difficulties for structuralist approaches. Therefore, one should shift attention to elite discourses. While traditionalists would presume the 1992 Consensus to be a security issue, a discursive approach seeks to “denaturalize” it by examining (re)interpretive practices that shifted the meaning of the 1992 Consensus from a political to a security sphere. 398 EURAMERICA

Third, traditionalists assume security (or insecurity) to be a timeless condition and thus ignore the possibility of historical contingency (Roe, 2004: 283). Again, structuralism is responsible for the traditionalist undertaking. Seeing security as a structural given, traditionalists tend to treat a security threat as persistent across time. However, it is possible that a security issue only emerges at a particular point in time and that it is a time-bound product of (re)interpretation. In the case of the 1992 Consensus, a traditionalist claim that sees the 1992 Consensus as a security issue is ahistorical; it overlooks the historical fact that the 1992 Consensus did not become a security problem until 2011-2012. This article thus forgoes the concept of security (or insecurity) and instead invokes securitization theory. Proposed by such University of Copenhagen scholars as Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, securitization theory posits that a security threat does not manifest itself as such. Drawing upon John Austin’s notion of “illocutionary” acts, which refer to the performance of an act in saying something (Austin, 1975), the Copenhagen School instead acknowledges a role for speech acts in labeling a specific issue a security one. For Wæver and Buzan, it is not that the objective existence of threats causes a security policy, but rather that state leaders “speak” security or insecurity at a particular time in order to break free of “normal politics,” which refers to democratic procedures and checks and balances at the domestic level, as well as to diplomatic negotiation and interstate governance at the international level. As Wæver (1995: 55) argues, security should not be understood “as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance [of security] itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship).” The act of utterance, according to the Copenhagen School, does not just say or describe security (or insecurity) but rather exerts what Austin (1975) calls “perlocutionary” effects, which refer to the consequential effects of speech acts upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience. When a security narrative is The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 399 accepted by the audience, the speaker succeeds in shaping intersubjective understandings about security or insecurity. For the Copenhagen School, therefore, security is not about power politics but rather intersubjective politics (Balzacq, 2005; McDonald, 2008; Oren & Solomon, 2015; Stritzel, 2007). Of course, audience acceptance does not appear out of thin air. According to the Copenhagen School, successful securitization requires three facilitating conditions. First, the speaker has to follow the grammar of security—the presence of an existential threat, the status of urgency, the necessity of emergency measures, and so on. In the international realm, an issue can be located on a spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning that states do not intervene in international economic exchange), to politicized (meaning that issues are part of foreign policy requiring diplomatic negotiation or international governance), to securitized (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 23, 33). To justify actions outside of non-politicization and politicization, the securitizer has to invoke the language of security. As I will suggest later, when U.S. actors securitized the 1992 Consensus, they no longer took pains to explore what the “truth” was about the 1992 meeting; nor did they emphasize the 1992 Consensus as the “normal political” basis for cross-Strait relations. They instead enunciated a security argument by portraying what the cross-Strait security situation might look like in the presence or absence of the 1992 Consensus. The second condition concerns the social capital or authority of the securitizing actor. For the Copenhagen School, no one is guaranteed the ability to convince the audience of the priority and urgency of an existential threat. Only when the speaker is in a position of authority will he or she be privileged in performing security speech acts (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 33). Indeed, the United States succeeded in selling its security arguments to the people of Taiwan because it had been the most important supporter of Taiwan’s security, a point I will return to later. Third, security narratives resonate when the securitized object 400 EURAMERICA is generally held to be threatening—for example, missiles and other military weapons (Weldes, 1999). Indeed, when American neoconservatives paint China as a threat, their speech acts gain prominence because rising Chinese power itself appears to be dangerous (Nyman, 2014). Similarly, the U.S. securitization of the 1992 Consensus resonated in Taiwan because Beijing had posed substantial military threats to Taiwan. However, this is not a materialist explanation. As I will show later, China’s use and threat of force have failed to impose its will on the Taiwanese people. What matters more is instead securitizing practices. Securitization theory has been applied to such issues as immigration, minority rights, refugees, human trafficking, transnational crime, and HIV/AIDS (Aradau, 2004: 388; Elbe, 2006; Emmers, 2003; McDonald, 2008: 563). In the case of immigration, for example, political elites in Western European countries and the United States have stirred up the “we” feeling and represented immigrants, particularly Muslim ones, as a threatening other that undermines Western identity and civilization. For securitization theorists, Muslim immigrants emerge as a security problem when European and American elites declare them to be so (Doty, 1998). Securitization theory has also been applied to U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the context of the post-2001 U.S.-led “War on Terror.” In the U.S.-Iraqi case, for example, three-quarters of the American public supported the Iraq War because the Bush administration exaggerated a connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005: 525). Given that no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were found after Hussein was removed, scholars argue that the U.S. securitization of Iraq was a practice of “threat inflation” (Kaufmann, 2004; Mueller, 2005). In their view, the Iraqi threat was an interpretive production that went beyond the range of danger that disinterested experts would credit as true. The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 401

IV. Securitizing the 1992 Consensus This section applies the securitization framework to U.S.-Taiwan relations. I first analyze the U.S. securitization of the 1992 Consensus during 2011-2012. I then examine the extent to which other actors countered the securitization process.

A. U.S. Securitization After the DPP lost power in 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou restored cross-Strait relations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. By 2012, Taipei and Beijing held seven rounds of negotiation and signed 16 agreements on cross-Strait exchanges (Hu, 2013: 1). During the 2012 presidential campaign, however, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen challenged the 1992 Consensus and instead proposed a “Taiwan consensus” as an alternative, which she argued would be a democratic process through which a domestic consensus on the future of cross-Strait relations would take shape. Tsai’s China policy discomfited the United States, however. According to U.S. nongovernmental experts on cross-Strait relations, the American government tried to stay neutral in the Taiwanese election, but it actually favored Ma’s reelection (Romberg, 2011: 23). From an American perspective, Ma’s China policy had improved cross-Strait relations, and a Tsai victory that undermined the 1992 Consensus would bring about cross-Strait instability. The United States thus conveyed messages on three occasions that the 1992 Consensus was a foundation for cross-Strait peace and stability and that Tsai’s China policy would put cross-Strait relations at risk. First, in September 2011, Tsai visited Washington D.C. to discuss cross-Strait issues with the Barack Obama administration. During the visit, however, an unnamed U.S. official told the Financial Times, “She left us with distinct doubts about whether she is both willing and able to continue the stability in cross-Strait 402 EURAMERICA relations the region has enjoyed in recent years.” At a time when the 1992 Consensus had recently contributed to cross-Strait stability, what the 1992 meeting had concluded was not as important to the United States as ever before. Instead, what appeared more important was how Tsai would sustain cross-Strait stability without embracing the 1992 Consensus. During the bilateral conversation, however, Tsai failed to convince the U.S. side of her ability to continue cross-Strait stability. As the U.S. official said, it was “far from clear . . . that she and her advisers fully appreciate the depth of [Chinese] mistrust of her motives and DPP aspirations” (Fifield, Kwong, & Hille, 2011). Second, in 4 October testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, denied any U.S. intervention in the Taiwanese election. As he said, “We do not pick candidates, we do not take sides” (as cited in Romberg, 2012b: 6). But he went on to say,

The current approach to cross-Strait relations that promotes stability and gradual reconciliation is what the people on Taiwan have come to expect from their elected leaders. Their expectations are mirrored in the international community, which hopes to see continued peace and prosperity across the region. We have always supported improved cross-Strait ties and will continue to do so. (7)

In the testimony, Campbell refrained from describing Tsai’s China policy as dangerous, but he praised the current approach to China as a favorable condition for cross-Strait stability and reconciliation. His securitizing practice was mild, but his remarks implied that Taiwan’s acceptance of the 1992 Consensus would be a necessary step to sustain cross-Strait peace and stability. Third, on 12 January 2012, two days before the election, Douglas H. Paal, who served as AIT Director in Taipei during 2002-2006, expressed his support for the 1992 Consensus during a The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 403

TV interview broadcast in Taiwan. Without tracing what had happened in the 1992 meeting, he stressed that the 1992 Consensus had been an “effective means” for Taiwan and China to cooperate since 2008 while holding on to their respective political stances (Shih, 2012). “It’s not ideal, it has many shortcomings, of course,” but he added, “This is one of the necessary compromises that states have to make with other states” (Shih & Wang, 2012). The normal politics of cross-Strait relations, however, was not the focus of what Paal said in the interview. He instead spent much more time securitizing the 1992 Consensus, in a tone much stronger than Campbell’s. He said, “Disruption of that [1992 Consensus] could have unforeseen effects on the mainland succession process, on tensions in the region and on our own election if high tension in the Taiwan Strait re-emerges during the course of the American election” (Shih & Wang, 2012). At the time of a close race between Ma and Tsai, “The US and China are both sitting on the edge of their chairs, nervous about the outcome of this upcoming election in Taiwan” (Shih, 2012). If Tsai won the election, “The U.S. will quickly engage itself and try to help her come up with a formula that will preserve the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” (Shen, 2012). He added,

The US, I am sure, is trying to send a very strong signal that she has to, from the very beginning after the day of the election, not do anything to make any situation worse and try to find means to persuade China that she is not a threat to their perception of what’s required for peace and stability in the cross-Strait area. (Shih, 2012)

For Paal, an election victory by Tsai would upset cross-Strait peace and stability. After his statements raised controversies in Taiwan, he stressed the next day, “I’m just trying to explain to the Taiwanese that there are external consequences to giving up on the ’92 Consensus” (Jacobs, 2012). If KMT candidate Ma were re-elected, conversely, both Washington and Beijing would breathe “a huge sigh of relief” 404 EURAMERICA

(Jacobs, 2012). Given that President Ma had upheld the 1992 Consensus, Paal said that “the absence of tension [in the] Taiwan Strait has been a big lubricant to better US-China relations and [has] improved international atmosphere in this part of the world” (Shih, 2012). He thus stressed that the 1992 Consensus would be critical to maintaining cross-Strait peace. With respect to Tsai’s Taiwan consensus proposal, Paal described it as synonymous with “a way of saying [that Tsai has] no desire to reach cross-Strait agreements” (Shih, 2012). He also recalled Tsai’s visit to Washington, D.C. the previous year, “The assurances given about the management of cross-Strait ties in Tsai’s administration were too vague to make Washington comfortable” (Shen, 2012).

B. Counterarguments? To counter securitization, one needs to undertake desecuritization, which refers to the process in which an issue is moved off the security agenda and back into the realm of normal political debate (Aradau, 2004; Roe, 2004; Wæver, 1995). In the desecuritization process, a key step is to deal with the tricky question of danger. According to Huysmans, danger deconstruction requires an “objectivist” strategy. In the case of immigration, “the objectivists will try to convince people of the fact that the migrant is not really a security problem” (Huysmans, 1995: 65). To the extent that immigrants are not real threats, an objectivist strategy may undo securitization processes and (re)politicize or normalize the relations between immigrants and natives. In the U.S.-Taiwanese case, did anyone desecuritize the 1992 Consensus? After Paal’s interview, Frank H. Murkowski, the former Republican Senator from Alaska who was leading a delegation of election observers in Taiwan, convened a press conference and raised three counterarguments. First, Murkowski criticized Paal as “careless,” “irresponsible,” and “inexcusable.” For The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 405 him, it was inappropriate for Paal to frighten Taiwanese voters. Second, he accused Paal of trying to aid the campaign of the KMT. “I challenge the credibility of Mr. Paal to speak for me or my government” (Jacobs, 2012). Third, he pronounced a democracy discourse, saying that Tsai’s Taiwan consensus proposal “represents the will of the Taiwan people, and that is what democracy is all about” (“US ex-senator,” 2012). The three counterarguments, however, were not acts of desecuritization. However convincing they might be in and of themselves, they fell far short of explaining to the Taiwanese people whether cross-Strait relations would not be placed in danger should the DPP be elected. To criticize Paal’s behavior as inappropriate, as Murkowski and others did, was not sufficient to desecuritize the 1992 Consensus. Murkowski’s democracy discourse resonated with both Taiwan’s democratic politics and the shared democratic values on which the U.S.-Taiwan relationship had been based, but it was not a (re)politicization approach to the cross-Strait relationship. Although it appealed to the normal political situation in Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan relations, it said little about how to normalize cross-Strait relations. Moreover, because Taiwan’s democracy would disappear after a Chinese invasion, what could better assuage the rising sense of urgency in Taiwan should be a discourse addressing the question of danger. The democracy discourse, however, failed to perform such a function. The AIT also responded to Paal’s remarks, but its responses were even weaker. First, it announced U.S. neutrality in the election. It also said that Paal no longer held any government position and merely expressed his “personal views.” Second, to avoid endorsing Paal’s remarks, AIT Director William Stanton immediately called off a meeting with him. From an AIT perspective, it would be inappropriate for Stanton to meet in an official capacity with Paal (Shih & Wang, 2012). These two responses, however, merely distanced the AIT from Paal and never unpacked the security problem. 406 EURAMERICA

Nor did the DPP spearhead any desecuritization efforts. As with the AIT, it designated Paal’s remarks as personal. As with Murkowski, it criticized Paal as pro-KMT and argued that “We hope people from democratic countries can respect our democratic process” (Jacobs, 2012). Although the DPP also reiterated its efforts to sustain cross-Strait peace and stability, it never explained how its opposition to the 1992 Consensus could assure China. A key question, then, is why desecuritization was missing. I argue that the U.S. securitization left those who opposed the 1992 Consensus—Murkowski, like-minded U.S. actors, and the DPP— unable to propose viable desecuritizing rationales. First, at the time of U.S. securitization, an objectivist could counter-argue that cross-Strait tensions would not really ensue should the 1992 Consensus be denied. Yet, the opponents of the 1992 Consensus seemed to be uncertain whether a cross-Strait relationship that vetoed the 1992 Consensus would not become unstable. This uncertainty was best illustrated in the DPP’s post-election report, as mentioned in the introduction of this article. After the election, the DPP even debated whether to accept the 1992 Consensus as a way to signal DPP commitments to cross-Strait peace (Wei, 2015: 85). At a time when the KMT and Beijing supported the 1992 Consensus, and when Washington declared an emergency condition, a dominant belief in Taiwan held that the 1992 Consensus represented peace, as former Vice President Annette Lu observed (Romberg, 2012a: 4). Consequently, the opposing side found itself on the defensive and seemed to lack the confidence to adopt any objectivist strategy. Second, an alternative way of offsetting the securitization process could be a call for a return to normal politics. While the democracy argument dealt only with the normalcy of Taiwanese politics and U.S.-Taiwan relations, a direct appeal for the (re)politicization of cross-Strait relations seemed to be an antidote to the U.S. securitization. However, politicization was not a feasible strategy for the opposing side. According to the securitization The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 407 literature, political elites undertake securitization in order to break normal political rules. In the U.S.-Taiwanese case, by contrast, U.S. actors securitized the 1992 Consensus in order to sustain the normal cross-Strait politics. Given that the 1992 Consensus had normalized cross-Strait politics, any advocacy of normal politics would amount to a support for the 1992 Consensus. The opponents could not have upheld the normal cross-Strait politics while at the same time derecognizing the 1992 Consensus.7 Alternatively, the opposing side, rather than carrying out desecuritization, could propose an alternative security logic. According to critics of the Copenhagen School, securitization theorists assume that there is only one logic of security, thereby failing to recognize that multiple understandings of security may be operative. Security, critics argue, should better be understood as a site of contestation in which one articulates alternative (even emancipatory) discourses of security in order to contest a dominant security narrative (Doty, 1998). For example, while authoritarian leaders have justified human rights abuses of dissidents in the name of national security, the counterarguments deployed by Amnesty International include not only that dissidents are not real threats to national security but also that national security can better be achieved through rights-based human security (McDonald, 2008: 575). During the 2012 presidential campaign, the DPP did propose an alternative logic of security—Taiwan’s security meant sovereignty and independence, and throwing away the 1992 Consensus would advance the goal. Indeed, President Chen had articulated this sovereignty-based logic of security during his tenure. However, the security discourse had little resonance during

7 The normal cross-Strait politics should be understood as a matter of degree. For China, normalcy refers to unification. For advocates of Taiwan independence, it refers to a Chinese recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. The normal cross-Strait politics grounded on the 1992 Consensus fell somewhere between the two forms. 408 EURAMERICA

2011-2012. After the experience of cross-Strait instability during 2000-2008, mainstream Taiwanese opinion held that an improvement in cross-Strait relations would consolidate Taiwan’s security. Indeed, President Ma’s China policy received much support. Take the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement as an example. A 2010 poll showed that about 70 percent of Taiwanese people were in favor of signing it (Mainland Affairs Council, 2009). For those people, economic exchanges would be favorable to cross-Strait stability. Another reason why the “sovereignty card” was less resonant was that the fear of unification was less severe during 2008-2012 than it would later become during President Ma’s second term. Effective though the sovereignty card might be during the 2016 presidential campaign, it had been of limited utility during 2011-2012 in reversing the dominant logic of security predicated on the 1992 Consensus. 8 During 2011-2012, to establish a connection between sovereignty and security did allow Tsai to garner 45.6 percent of the vote, but the strategy lost ground to the 1992 Consensus. Without any viable counterarguments, opponents of the 1992 Consensus found themselves caught in a bind. The forces for securitizing the 1992 Consensus carried the day not only because of the three facilitating conditions—the grammar of security, U.S. authority in Taiwan’s security affairs, and potential Chinese threats, but also because the opposing side failed to engage in desecuritization or redefine the logic of security. They criticized Paal and appealed to democratic values, but they held their tongues when confronted with the issue of security (or insecurity).

8 According to the securitization literature, the utility of an alternative logic of security in countering the dominant one is historically contingent rather than timeless. The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 409

V. The Security Reality In studies of securitization, scholars hold either interpretivist or objectivist understandings of reality. On the one hand, securitization scholars who adopt an interpretivist orientation refrain from assessing the validity of a security claim. For them, it is difficult to objectively assess what objects are really threatening because those objects identified as threatening come to be ascribed as such only through interpretation. Interpretivists thus merely observe security arguments and securitization processes (see, for example, Campbell, 1992). Nyman, for example, examines the U.S. securitization of Chinese bids to acquire U.S. energy companies and argues that “energy security is constituted and contingent, rather than an objectively identifiable [emphasis added] goal” (Nyman, 2014: 44). For her, whether China is a real threat to the United States cannot be understood outside of American interpretations. On the other hand, securitization scholars who are objectivist-leaning do not just observe securitization processes; they also suggest that there is an objective reality against which security arguments can be judged true or false. Based on “epistemic realism,” they believe that whether or not an object operates as a threat is independent of arguments or beliefs about it. If the securitized object appears less threatening than the securitizing actor claims, this is a case of “threat inflation.” As Krebs and Lobasz (2009: 118) argue, threat inflation implies that “threats exist independently of the viability of their articulation.” The U.S.-Iraqi case best illustrated threat inflation, as reviewed above. The same can be said of the Western securitization of immigrants (Doty, 1998). Conversely, “threat deflation” means that political elites fail to recognize the extent of a real threat (Thrall, 2007). A question then arises: is there any objective reality with respect to the cross-Strait security situation? How will the cross-Strait security situation change in the absence of the 1992 Consensus? Was the U.S. argument that denying the 1992 410 EURAMERICA

Consensus would destabilize cross-Strait relations a true or false statement? This section addresses these questions by examining the 2000-2008 period and the post-2016 period, during both of which Taiwanese leaders cast aside the 1992 Consensus. First, after the election of Chen Shui-bian, Washington was concerned with how Beijing would react to his pro-independence stance. For Washington, if the DPP did not moderate its China policy, cross-Strait relations would likely escalate to conflict. Then-AIT Director Burghardt thus exchanged views with Chen on how to compose a moderate inaugural speech (Tucker, 2009: 253-254). At U.S. request, President Chen announced a “five noes” policy in his inaugural ceremony. He pledged that he would not (1) declare independence for Taiwan; (2) change the national title; (3) rewrite the Constitution by characterizing cross-Strait relations as state-to-state; (4) call a referendum on independence; or (5) abolish the National Unification Council. Indeed, Washington was pleased with the moderating effect of the “five noes” on cross-Strait relations. When President Chen later become pro-independence and triggered cross-Strait tensions, U.S. officials repeatedly asked him to comply with his “five noes” promise.9 With respect to the 1992 Consensus, Washington took no clear position. While asking President Chen to adhere to the “five noes,” it never explicitly asked him to accept the 1992 Consensus. From an American perspective, the “five noes” policy was sufficient to assure Beijing, and the substance of the 1992 Consensus was a political issue for Taiwan and China to decide or negotiate. Of course, there was no progress on cross-Strait politicization during the Chen years, but the political stalemate never worried Washington as much as the DPP’s initiatives to push Taiwan toward de jure independence. Indeed, cross-Strait tensions were reduced after the announcement of the “five noes” policy. Chinese leaders were

9 One of the American requests was Kelly’s testimony (2004). The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 411 certainly dissatisfied with Chen’s policy direction, but this was at least acceptable to them. Although Beijing repeatedly asked President Chen to accept the 1992 Consensus, it never retaliated in response to his rebuttal by heightening cross-Strait tensions. Quite the contrary, it softened its Taiwan policy. Beijing first postponed unification into some point in the future as long as Taiwan made no steps toward independence. It then offered preferential treatment for Taiwanese people and companies (Wei, 2016). Due to Beijing’s non-politicization strategies, cross-Strait exchanges grew (though they would have grown more rapidly if cross-Strait relations had been politicized). Of course, cross-Strait relations were not without crises during the presidency of Chen Shui-bian, but cross-Strait crises had nothing to do with Taiwan’s rejection of the 1992 Consensus. Instead, they resulted from President Chen’s efforts to unilaterally change the cross-Strait status quo. In 2004, for example, President Chen called a referendum asking the people of Taiwan whether they would demand that China withdraw the nearly 500 missiles it had aimed at Taiwan. In retaliation, Beijing enacted the “Anti-Secession Law” in 2005. Washington watched with alarm as tensions spiraled and thus attempted to “leash” President Chen. In early December 2003, for example, a White House official traveled to Taipei and warned Chen not to hold any referendum (Lobe, 2003). On 7 December, President Bush publicly criticized Chen’s referendum plan: “The comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose” (Bush, 2003: 1777). In other words, Washington opposed revisionist steps by Taipei that provoked Beijing, primarily because those step presented Washington with a security problem. Second, since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in May 2016, she has deemphasized the 1992 Consensus. What she emphasizes is instead the historical fact of the 1992 meeting. As she said in her 412 EURAMERICA inaugural speech, “In 1992, the SEF and the ARATS, through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. . . . I respect this historical fact” (Tsai, 2016). For her, the two sides should avoid the debate over the 1992 Consensus and instead communicate and negotiate on the basis of the 1992 meeting. A question, then, is whether the post-2016 cross-Strait relationship has returned to a path of turbulence? To be sure, the normal communication between the Taiwanese and Chinese governments that flourished during 2008-2016 has been stalled. However, there is no sign that cross-Strait relations have, or will, become unstable. It is true that Chinese aircraft carriers and fighter jets have sailed into the Taiwan Strait and flown around Taiwan, respectively, but it would be an exaggeration to say that these Chinese actions have heightened cross-Strait tensions. As AIT Chair Burghardt said in June 2016, “We’re not at a crisis stage. I think we’re at a stage where there’s a lot of watching each other, and listening to each other” (Voice of America, 2016). While President Chen’s pro-independence policies prompted cross-Strait crises, the post-2016 cross-Strait relationship has remained in the state of watching/listening primarily because President Tsai has taken a pro-status quo approach. While she proposed a Taiwan consensus during 2011-2012, her current China policy has been predicated on “the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation” (Tsai, 2016). Beijing, of course, is displeased, but it seems to remain patient with the status quo. Given that the Constitution defines China as the Republic of China, Tsai’s promise is more acceptable to Beijing than any pro-independence step. The pro-status quo policy has also satisfied U.S. expectations. As Susan Thornton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said in May 2015, “There should be no unilateral attempts to change the status quo, and that applies to The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 413 both sides [of the Taiwan Strait]” (Thornton, 2015). The next month, Tsai visited Washington D.C. as a presidential candidate. While an unnamed U.S. official had criticized her China policy during her 2011 visit to D.C., fewer U.S. officials questioned the pro-status quo policy during the 2015 visit. For the first time, high-ranking U.S. officials even met Tsai within government buildings, including the White House and the Department of State (Tsao, Chen, & Chen, 2015). These American gestures indicated some degree of U.S. satisfaction with the pro-status quo policy. What do the two periods tell us about cross-Strait relations? I argue that there is an objective reality about the cross-Strait security situation. The objective reality, I further argue, is that Taiwan’s denial of the 1992 Consensus does not necessarily lead to cross-Strait tensions. A Taiwanese government that casts away the 1992 Consensus and adopts pro-independence policies (e.g., the Chen administration) will meet with Beijing’s retaliatory measures. Conversely, a Taiwanese government that denies the 1992 Consensus but embraces the status quo (e.g., the Tsai administration) is likely to avoid increased cross-Strait tensions. What makes the difference is whether Taipei is pro-independence or pro-status quo. Building on the objective reality, I thus argue that the U.S. securitization of the 1992 Consensus during 2011-2012 was an act of threat inflation. A U.S. argument that a revisionist step made by Taiwan is prone to cross-Strait tensions largely reflects the objective reality, as does a U.S. argument that the cross-Strait politicization will regress should the 1992 Consensus be dismissed. What is also true is a U.S. argument that accepting the 1992 Consensus or the one-China principle is conducive to cross-Strait politicization and peace. However, the U.S. argument that casting aside the 1992 Consensus would be a cause of cross-Strait instability was an exaggeration of Chinese threats to Taiwan. Of course, Chinese threats had existed and never declined, but the U.S. securitization did not truly reflect the “red line” that Beijing had drawn for 414 EURAMERICA

Taiwan. If Tsai had been elected president in 2012, the cause of a cross-Strait crisis could have been her pro-independence policies rather than her repudiation of the 1992 Consensus; conversely, a cross-Strait crisis could have been avoided if a Tsai administration had conformed to a pro-status quo policy. Therefore, the Taiwanese perception of the 1992 Consensus as a security problem did not result from a potential Chinese attack in response to a DPP victory that undercut the 1992 Consensus. It was instead a linguistic creation arising from U.S. securitization. Two notes are in order. First, Washington securitized the 1992 Consensus perhaps because it confused a step to challenge the 1992 Consensus with a pro-independence move. During 2000-2008, President Chen not only scorned the 1992 Consensus but also moved Taiwan toward independence. Perhaps because the Chen years had exerted a deep hold on the American mind, Washington mistakenly treated Tsai’s rejection of the 1992 Consensus as equivalent to a pro-independence step. Conversely, it distinguished better between the two stances during 2015-2016. Thornton, for example, responded to the issue of the 1992 Consensus by saying, “We want to see the continued stable foundation and continuation of stable cross-Strait ties.” But as to “the name that is given to that foundation, I don’t think that it’s really appropriate for the U.S. to either favor or disfavor” (Cheng & Hou, 2015). In the remarks, Thornton seemed to indicate that the 1992 Consensus was not the only condition for cross-Strait stability and that a pro-status quo approach would not necessarily be dangerous. Second, China has become increasingly assertive in regional issues (including the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and so on). Therefore, it is less likely to continue to tolerate President Tsai’s China policy. However, such a prediction is tantamount to a securitizing act that inflates Chinese threats as long as the following conditions hold up: (1) China still needs a peaceful environment to boost its economy; (2) it still faces separatist challenges from Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia; (3) it believes that “buying” Taiwan The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 415 is cheaper than a war; (4) it believes that the KMT will return to power; and (5) Washington keeps its defense commitments to Taiwan. As long as some of the conditions constrain China’s use of force, the 1992 Consensus is less likely to become a real security problem. Indeed, while Chinese President Xi Jinping advocated the 1992 Consensus in his report to the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, he never threatened to use force in retaliation for Taiwan’s rejection of it.

VI. U.S. or Chinese Securitization? A final question is why the securitization process was of American making. One might argue that Chinese speech acts were also responsible. Indeed, Beijing securitized the 1992 Consensus during the 2012 presidential campaign. For example, Wang Yi, then-Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), warned that cross-Strait peace would be lost if Taiwan withdrew recognition of the 1992 Consensus (Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC, 2011b). Historical records, however, suggest that Chinese securitization has rarely succeeded in coercing the people of Taiwan into accepting Beijing’s political demands, be they the 1992 Consensus or the one-China principle. During 1995-1996, Beijing securitized the one-China principle via “verbal attacks and military intimidation.” However, President Lee Teng-hui won the 1996 presidential election. Three days before the 2000 presidential election, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji openly warned that Taiwanese independence would lead to a war. However, Zhu’s coercive language backfired, and Chen was elected president.10 Having learned from these two failures, China acted with

10 Although Chen won the election with less than 40 percent of the vote, the one-China principle and the “one country, two systems” formula were unpopular in Taiwan. 416 EURAMERICA restraint during the 2004 and 2008 presidential campaigns, without securitizing, in word or in deed, the 1992 Consensus. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Beijing securitized the 1992 Consensus, as it had during the 2012 presidential campaign. In March 2015, for example, President Xi warned that “the earth will move, and the mountains will shake” should the 1992 Consensus be cast aside. However, Xi’s securitization failed, and Tsai won the election. These cases suggest that China, despite its substantial military capabilities, has failed to shape the Taiwanese definition of security in ways that favor Chinese interests. When Beijing securitizes its political demands, it only drives the Taiwanese to reject them and define security in terms of sovereignty/independence or autonomy. While Chinese material power does raise Taiwanese fears, the dominant logic of security usually holds that keeping China’s political demands at bay is essential to Taiwan’s security. Given the limitations of Chinese securitization, the Taiwanese acceptance of the 1992 Consensus as a security problem derived largely from U.S. speech acts. As suggested above, only actors with strong institutional positions can successfully speak security. Indeed, the U.S. securitization of the 1992 Consensus cannot be understood apart from Washington’s position as a protector of Taiwan. In early 1950, the fall of Taiwan to Chinese control seemed only a matter of time, but the situation changed in Taiwan’s favor after President Harry Truman neutralized the Taiwan Strait by sending the Seventh Fleet to the region. In 1954, Washington also signed a mutual defense treaty with Taipei. With U.S. protection, Taiwan’s security free of Chinese invasion was ensured. In 1979, however, pessimism about Taiwan’s future arose when Washington shifted diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In 1982, Washington also signed a communiqué with Beijing that cut U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Only after Washington enacted the Taiwan Relations Act, and only after President Ronald Reagan issued the “,” did the pessimistic atmosphere The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 417 subside in Taiwan. In the 1990s, U.S. commitments to Taiwan’s security stepped up as Washington no longer needed Chinese assistance to counterbalance the Soviet Union. President George H. W. Bush, for example, sold 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan.11 At the time of Taiwanese democratization, U.S. support played a role in encouraging a Taiwan national identity. During the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996, Taiwan did not feel secure until after President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region. During the Chen years, Washington also played a crucial role in Taiwan’s relations with China. In 2001, President George W. Bush promised that Washington would do “whatever it takes” to help Taiwan defend itself (Cohen, 2010: 268). With the U.S. commitment, President Chen was determined to push Taiwan toward independence. However, Washington leashed Chen after he “abused” the commitment. Indeed, Chen’s referendum proposal fell short of the necessary 50 percent voter turnout partly because U.S. officials opposed it and warned the Taiwanese of its negative implications for security.12 Indeed, numerous polls have shown that the Taiwanese have seen the United States as their best hope to ensure the island’s security. A 2016 poll, for example, indicates that 47.7 percent of Taiwanese people trust the U.S. military to intervene in a cross-Strait war, compared with 37.3 percent who feel less assured. 13 According to another poll, other areas essential to Taiwanese security include U.S. assistance in helping Taiwan join

11 U.S. electoral politics and economic interests were also responsible for the F-16 sale. During the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton accused Bush of “coddling” Beijing. American high-tech companies also argued that the F-16 sale could create jobs. Bush thus sold Taiwan F-16s. 12 Another reason was that the referendum itself was relatively unpopular. 13 The poll is available at http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/files/news/487_bfcb911d.pdf. It is possible that those not believing in a U.S. military intervention still see U.S. assistance as essential to Taiwan’s security. They might just consider how Washington would do cost-benefit calculations. 418 EURAMERICA international organizations (51 percent) and regional economic integration (33.6 percent).14 Of course, it remains unclear whether Washington would conduct these missions, but it is clear that Washington possesses substantial authority in the Taiwanese mind. This condition in turn gives Washington a big say in Taiwan’s relations with China. Indeed, this finding is consistent with those suggested by a substantial body of literature on U.S. discursive power (see, for example, Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005; Kaufmann, 2004; Mueller, 2005). The study of U.S. foreign policy has traditionally focused on U.S. material power, but an increasing number of scholars have examined U.S. power in the discursive realm. For them, discourse is productive of power. Discourse analysis, however, has made little headway in the study of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations. This study thus seeks to fill the gap by examining the U.S. securitization of the 1992 Consensus. Future research could also examine the securitization of Chinese immigrants and news media as potential “Trojan Horses” in the United States, Taiwan, and other countries. Scholars could also examine the securitization of food imports from China. These topics could enrich our understandings of securitization in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations. In sum, intersubjective struggles—that is, interpretive disputes over the nature of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle—merit more attention than do material ones, such as arms races, diplomatic contestation, and economic competition. Two final notes are in order. First, during 2011-2012, Beijing exerted its influence in the economic rather than security realm. Specifically, it framed the 1992 Consensus as an economic issue, arguing that it would likely cut off cross-Strait economic exchanges should Taiwan veto the term. Indeed, numerous scholars have

14 See http://www.tisr.com.tw/?p=6616. According to the poll, Taiwanese support for U.S. arms sales is low (2.7 percent). This is primarily because U.S. weapons are expensive. But it is possible that those who do not support arms deals still hope for U.S. assistance. The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus 419 demonstrated the centrality of economic issues in the 2012 presidential election (see, for example, Cabestan, 2011: 21; Li, 2014: 130; Wei, 2015). After 2008, Taiwan’s economic dependence on the Chinese market became higher. This economic condition thus gave Beijing the capital, or authority, to sell the 1992 Consensus to the Taiwanese. While Washington spoke security successfully, Beijing succeeded in speaking economics. As Keohane and Nye (2001) have suggested, different states dominate different issue-areas. Of course, this economic dimension of the 1992 Consensus is beyond the scope of this study, but future research should offer detailed examination and theorization. Second, Washington did not hold a clear view on the 1992 Consensus and usually acted passively in response to the issue. Moreover, U.S. doubts about Tsai during 2011-2012 were linked less to her failure to endorse the 1992 Consensus than to her pro-independence tendency.15 As a result, to establish a connection between the United States and the 1992 Consensus seems less convincing. However, what matters is not so much what Washington thought about the 1992 Consensus as what it said about the term. Indeed, securitization theorists rarely ask what views Western elites take on immigrants. Western elites may dislike immigrants for historical, economic, psychological, or cultural reasons, but securitization theorists merely focus on the language of security uttered by Western elites. In the U.S.-Taiwanese case, Washington neither took a clear position on the 1992 Consensus nor said much about the term during 2000-2010. During 2011-2012, however, it did take a position, and much of its articulation revolved around security. This study thus applies the securitization framework to the 2011-2012 period.

15 I thank two anonymous reviewers for raising these two points. 420 EURAMERICA

VII. Conclusion As suggested above, one of the facilitating conditions for successful securitization is the extent to which a material condition appears threatening. According to the literature, material capabilities constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition for securitization. Only when an act of securitization is launched at a particular time will a material structure likely be accepted by the audience as a security problem. Theoretically, a materialist approach should be complemented by a focus on speech acts in order to offer a complete understanding. Indeed, materialism cannot fully explain the 1992 Consensus. Rising Chinese power had existed as a structural factor since the 1992 Consensus was coined in 2000. Materialists then would have expected the 1992 Consensus to be a security issue throughout the Chen years. However, the fact was that it appeared first as a political issue and did not become a security problem until 2011-2012. If a material structure remains constant but only triggers a security problem at a particular point in time, how explanatory is materialism? This article thus argues that the transformation of the 1992 Consensus into a security problem was attributable more to U.S. security discourses than to China’s material capabilities alone. The materially induced threats from China existed “out there” independently of discourses or human thought, but their relations, or lack thereof, with the 1992 Consensus proved to be contingent upon U.S. (re)interpretation, at least insofar as the 2011-2012 period was concerned.

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美國，安全化與九二共識： 安全論述與誇大威脅，2011-2012

韋奇宏 中央研究院歐美研究所 11529 臺北市研究院路二段 128 號 Email: [email protected]

摘 要

在 2011-2012 年之間，「九二共識」的普遍了解是一個兩岸 安全的議題。然而，我的論點是，九二共識並不是一個天生的安全 議題，而是經由美國「安全化」的論述做為而建構成為一個安全議 題。在 2000-2008 年之間，九二共識是一個圍繞在「一個中國」 定義上的政治議題。然而，2012 年臺灣總統大選期間，美國賦予 九二共識一個安全邏輯，其做法為聲稱一個沒有九二共識的兩岸關 係會變成不穩定與緊張。經由美國的議題連結或者語言技巧，九二 共識原本的政治意義消去，而成為一個安全議題。我同時主張，美 國的安全化作為誇大中國對臺灣的威脅。歷史經驗顯示，兩岸關係 緊張導致於臺灣的獨立舉動，而非臺灣拒絕九二共識。

關鍵詞：美國、安全化、九二共識、論述、誇大威脅