Paper Andean Working ------(continued on page 9) It is important to note that politics in in politics that note to important is It to the country’sEcuador rarely correspond norms democratic from Breaks norms. legal the year in since 1979, have been frequent to military from passed country the which 1984 to 1988 for example, From civilian rule. experienced a period of authoritari constitutional in lapses frequent and anism of the Supreme CourtThe work was rule. vio were of Congress sessions obstructed, suspected subversives were lently suspended, was president the and executed, summarily age. The political system that began in 1979 1979 in began that system political The age. political local and regional by dominated was building decades two nearly spent that parties their electoral strongholds. beyond networks After liberal eco the attempt to introduce of policies disastrous the and reforms nomic the in government Ballén Durán Sixto the to their these parties retreated mid-1990s, the government As a result, bases. regional factions competing into fragment to began atrophied. while state institutions Ecuadoran political during process the presi concentration the is Correa Rafael of dency This executive. in the hands of the of power of both the slow is the result consolidation political and institutions of Ecuador’s erosion popularity. personal strong Correa’s Institutional Breakdown is largely government a reac The Correa regimes political past of failures the to tion and patron corruption, rife with nepotism, Adrián Bonilla the of characteristic important most The ------(continued on page 3) Rafael ’s Political Project 1 Two Perspectives on Perspectives Ecuador Two The author thanks Marco Romero for his comments. Romero The author thanks Marco 1 spread. As parties became acutely fragmented, spread. new local to fill the void. rose leaderships like Congress, the justice system the and politi like Congress, Angry credibility. and face lost parties cal of the political systemrejection became wide The central government becameThe central government weakened in the decentraland unable to fulfill its role institutions democratic Key process. ization armed forces were frequently called upon to to upon called frequently were forces armed arbitrate squabbling. the constant became mired in conflict, obstructionist obstructionist conflict, in mired became Justice and over and blackmail. tactics, the and politicized became institutions sight Constitution and the law to suit special special suit to law the and Constitution became interests an everyday occurrence. branches legislative and executive The distant dream. the flouting turmoil, ensuing the In 1995. None of the seven Ecuador presidents None 1995. his completed had in the years that followed stability seemed a Political term of office. Correa cameCorrea to office in the wake of a cri President Vice after off set governance of sis in office from removed was Dahik Alberto How Did Rafael CorreaBecome ? tutional referendum. Brief is also mention referendum. tutional state the and policy foreign Correa’s of made of the economy. a review of the type of constitution he seeks seeks he constitution of type the of review a and likely scenarios the consti following This article in which examines the context his initia becameRafael Correa president, by followed accomplishments, his and tives, César Montúfar August 2008 The Inter-American Dialogue is delighted to publish this paper, which features two separate essays prepared by Adrián Bonilla, director of FLACSO (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences)/Ecuador, and César Montúfar, professor of social and global studies at the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar in Quito. Bonilla and Montúfar, who are among Ecuador’s leading and most respected political analysts, offer different perspectives on the political origins and outlook of the Rafael Correa government, with a focus on its foreign policy priorities, including relations with the United States. Their thoughtful essays, which concur in some respects and diverge in others, provide important insights about where the Correa administration might be headed.

This working paper is the eighteenth in a special series focused on the Andean countries of South America. The Dialogue’s aim is to stimulate a broad and well-informed public debate on the complex issues facing key analysts and decision makers concerned with Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. We seek to offer diagnoses of the current situation as well as policy prescriptions to deal more effectively with deep-seated problems.

The series is a byproduct of a working group project launched by the Dialogue in 2001. The

Pullquote. Foreword Andean working group is comprised of select and diverse analysts and policymakers from the Andean region, other Latin American countries, Europe, Canada and the United States. Like “ ” the working paper series itself, the group was launched with a particular focus on the Colombian conflict but then naturally expanded to encompass all of the Andean countries.

The working group essentially serves as a “brain trust” or core group of advisors for the Dialogue as well as for policy officials in the Andean region, elsewhere in Latin America, and in the United States, Europe and Canada. The goal of the group is not necessarily to reach agreements or produce consensus documents. Rather, it is to generate fresh and innovative interpretations of multiple Andean challenges, in order to inform the thinking of the relevant actors, and encourage constructive responses from them.

To date, the papers have dealt with a wide range of topics, including the Colombian conflict, drug trafficking, civil-military relations, human security and the political stalemate in Bolivia. We hope this paper will contribute to a deeper understanding of a critical and complex situation in the hemisphere. The opinions of Bonilla and Montúfar do not necessarily reflect the views of the working group or the Inter-American Dialogue.

We are pleased to recognize the assistance provided by the Ford Foundation for our work on the Andean region and for supporting the production of this report.

Michael Shifter Vice President for Policy

2 Two Perspectives on Ecuador (Montúfar, continued from page 1) tion of wealth, subsidies for the poor, holding That was the state of affairs in Ecuador when the line on utility rates and reducing sales the presidential election of October 2006 taxes. Correa benefitted greatly from his con- was called. Rafael Correa, a former econ- tender’s unpopularity, as many voted for him omy and finance minister under President primarily to preclude a Noboa win. In brief, , ran on the Alianza País (AP) Correa won because he appealed to a wider or National Alliance ticket. AP was an ad audience, addressed the demands of the hoc movement bringing together elements needy, and stood as a viable option for anti- of the established left, disaffected mem- Noboa voters. bers of traditional parties, and a sprinkling of social movement figures. In addition, Correa Rafael Correa, however, was a weak president the instant he acceded to power. His decision received support from the Socialist Party Rather than an in the first vote and from the Democratic not to field congressional candidates meant Popular Movement in a subsequent run- he had no support in the legislature. State “outsiders’ revolt that off election. Indigenous representatives institutions were still controlled by the party sets about transforming Pachakutik and CONAIE (Ecuadoran establishment and his grassroots support was Confederation of Indigenous Nations) no greater than that of other new presidents. the state, Correa’s declined, leaving the movement out of the Just like other Ecuadoran presidents elected winning coalition. on the second ballot, Correa had won with project originates in the support of voters who could not toler- In the first round, Correa took second place ate his challenger. At that point, the stunning the state and is being with 23 percent of the votes cast. Álvaro increase in support he would later enjoy was imposed on society from Noboa garnered 26 percent. Correa sub- hard to envision. sequently won the runoff election with 56 the top down. percent of the vote. In the first round, he had However, Correa owes his phenomenal advanced a left-leaning platform denounc- popularity to his use of every tool the state ” ing “the long neoliberal night,” international apparatus can offer. Rather than an outsiders’ financial institutions, a free trade agree- revolt that sets about transforming the state— ment with the United States, and U.S. use of as Correa’s “Citizens’ Revolution” campaign Ecuador’s Manta air force base. Most impor- slogan would suggest—his project originates tantly, Correa ran on the need to convene a in the state and is being imposed on society constituent assembly capable of “refounding” from the top down. the country and ridding Ecuador of political Correa’s Initiatives and party élites. AP declined to field candidates Accomplishments for Congress and emphasized that only a constituent assembly could really change Since his inauguration on January 15, 2007, Ecuador, and this strategic move paid off Rafael Correa has used every political, legal, handsomely. From a dark horse who barely fiscal and public relations tool available to registered seven percent in initial voter sur- build his constituency. The government, for veys, in a matter of weeks he was leading example, conducts systematic opinion polls the polls. as inputs for initiatives and messages which are then widely publicized. Correa has also Correa then toned down his message. In succeeded in introducing the “permanent the second round he emphasized redistribu- campaign” style of governing, based on main-

Inter-American Dialogue 3 César Montúfar   Working Paper taining high approval ratings.2 Depending by an absolute government majority. This on the polling agency, his numbers in March required unconstitutionally removing 57 2008 ranged from 62 percent (Cedatos) to legislators from office and shutting down 80 percent (Pérez). Approval was greatest in Congress. Once in control of the assembly, Cuenca, slightly less in Quito, and somewhat the president ruled single-handedly on the lower in . Such levels of presiden- contents of the new Constitution. tial approval are unprecedented for Ecuador, where most incumbents have governed with In addition, constitutional assembly Directive 40 percent support or less. 001 stated that the Constitution remains in effect only insofar as it does not conflict with Correa’s permanent campaign approach builds the decisions of the assembly. This peculiar on the anti-political discourse of his candidacy interpretation is aligned with government Correa’s and works by polarizing issues as a prelude to requirements and gives the assembly a free permanent“ campaign a confrontation with traditional power holders. hand in altering legal structures before the A key component of this strategy is constant new Constitution takes effect. approach works by confrontation of political parties, local gov- ernments, private banks and corporations, the Effectively doing away with the separation of polarizing issues media, and multilateral lenders. From the gov- powers, the assembly has directly or indirectly as a prelude to ernment’s perspective, political initiative is the helped the government achieve unbridled sole prerogative of a president who must do influence on the judiciary, the Constitutional a confrontation battle against the “mafias” of the past. Correa Court, and the elections agency, as well as the offices of the Comptroller General, with traditional sees himself as representing the public against the oligarchy, as the embodiment of a state Public Prosecutor, Solicitor General and the power holders. which must be strengthened in order to defend Ombudsman, not to mention the Central the public against the criminals who plundered Bank and a majority of local governments. ” it from within. The Correa government has also imple- Essential to building this new order is dis- mented a range of populist measures, crediting and supplanting the private news including cash transfers, a “redistributionist” media. As it fills the airwaves and newspapers tax reform, revision of oil company contracts, with a massive barrage of propaganda, the and price controls. His expansive fiscal policy government is hard at work building a parallel is designed to benefit the poor, the mili- print and broadcasting network. The intent is tary, organized labor, and powerful unions, in to lift the monopoly on shaping public opin- exchange for support. ion from private media hands and ensure that Correa has also created new sectoral and Correa’s sense of urgency flows unimpeded to regional coordination ministries, plus a all citizens. plethora of other cabinet posts. In so doing, Using these tactics, Rafael Correa convoked he has issued emergency decrees exempt- a national constituent assembly, controlled ing the administration from established procedure. For example, he has handed con- 2 “The permanent campaign” strategy defined by Norman trol of PetroEcuador, the state oil company, Ornstein and Thomas Mann is a form of governing in which acts of government and political marketing techniques are to the armed forces and given major road inextricably intertwined. In the permanent campaign, the line construction contracts to the Army Corps separating governmental processes and proselytizing begins to blur. See Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann, “Conclusion: of Engineers. The Permanent Campaign and the Future of American Democracy”, in Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann, Eds., In the elections of March and September The Permanent Campaign and Its Future. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2000. 2007, Alianza País emerged as the indisput-

4 Two Perspectives on Ecuador able new majority, shifting Ecuador from unseated. The government suggests that con- massive political fragmentation to tight con- centration of power was a tactic required by centration. With the probable exception of the need to transform old structures, and the mayor of Guayaquil, the government has that the new Constitution will emphasize managed to neutralize most national and democracy and power-sharing. Can these local political opponents. Now the sole actor assurances be believed? The answer lies in the on the political and media scene, the presi- draft Constitution. dent is overshadowed by no one, including his own supporters in the assembly. Political The Proposed Constitution initiative is effectively a monopoly in presi- By controlling a majority of the constitu- dential hands. ent assembly, the government had no need to negotiate the content of the Constitution The new political and economic arrangement with other groups. A reading of the consti- Correa and his supporters seek is a work in tutional text, presented on July 25, reflects progress. So far, all we can say is that the per- this imposition: manent campaign style of governing has, in Political a very short time, allowed Correa to make • A Strong Presidential System: The pro- initiative is effectively fundamental changes in the way power is “ posed Constitution would permit reelection shared. Old parties have been destroyed, as and expand presidential prerogatives. This a monopoly in have new political options, while state organs power is manifest in the ability to dis- presidential hands. have been shut down or reorganized to con- solve Congress, presidential influence over form to presidential wishes. An expansive constitutional oversight bodies, curbs on fiscal policy establishes and reproduces clien- ” private media and expansion of government telistic practices. To circumvent checks and outlets, referendum democracy based on balances on fiscal expansion, the role of the support for the president, an electoral sys- executive has been restructured. Ecuador is tem that concentrates representation, and being offered a new state built exclusively the mobilization of client groups through around the presidential persona. The plan direct democracy. includes supplanting and discrediting all other intermediaries (i.e., democratic insti- • A Centralist Territorial Arrangement: tutions, opposition parties, the news media, There would be a strong state, due to a unions, business groups) and building a struc- recentralization of powers and resources as ture based on direct exchanges between the well as a government-controlled region- executive and society. All other intermediaries alization resulting in weaker local and have been temporarily or permanently pushed autonomous governments. aside by new institutions. • A State-Centric Economy: The new The unprecedented concentration of power constitutional document includes strong in Correa’s hands has proceeded at the cost central planning, a coercive tax system, an of breaking down or damaging the consti- expanded economic role for the state and tutional and legal order. In this regard, the the armed forces, the transfer of strate- government’s chief strategic achievement gic areas of the economy to government is to have secured control of the process of control, consolidation of a resource export change. Government spokesmen argue that economic model, curbs on both the domes- it was the only way the power elite, includ- tic and international private sectors, and ing the political and economic mafia that expanded partnerships with government- had commandeered the state, could be owned corporations in other countries.

Inter-American Dialogue 5 César Montúfar   Working Paper Rolling out these changes is likely to lead to Scenarios after the Constitutional conflict and erode government support, with Referendum a few likely flash points: To bring its plans to fruition, the government • The new territorial arrangement runs must first win the constitutional referen- counter to the decentralization and auton- dum, which is contingent on consolidating its omy efforts of the past 15 years. It should hold on the electorate and attaining a major- encounter strong opposition from local ity among local governments. Thus, 2008 is stakeholders and will likely be a key point an exceedingly political year, with all gov- of contention. ernment and assembly initiatives revolving around this objective. Crucially, assem- • The new economic model will hurt seg- bly rules dictate that the draft Constitution ments of the private sector, communities in requires the approval of 50 percent plus one and around resource-rich areas, and mid- of the electorate. It also requires a much While Correa’s dle- and low-income groups hit by high higher voter turnout than in September 2007, “support makes taxes and economic decline. when presidential popularity was at 80 per- cent and AP won 52 percent of votes cast approval highly • The new political system will weaken to give it a strong majority of constituent a liberal middle class that believes in likely, it is by no assembly seats. In a scenario resembling con- democracy and rights. These sectors ditions in September 2007, approval of the means a foregone are key media influences and can sway new Constitution would require 59.5 per- public opinion. cent of votes cast. In the conditions of the conclusion. The government proposal is likely to receive March 2007 referendum, the figure would be support from: 53.1 percent, and in the scenario of the gen- ” eral elections of October 2006, 76 percent.3 • Radicalized middle-class leftists who sup- Whatever the circumstances, as in 2007, the port state-centric, authoritarian positions; government will surely not hesitate to use every available resource to secure victory at • Beneficiaries of subsidies and cash transfers; the polls.

• The armed forces (although they are likely While Correa’s support makes approval to keep their distance in order to retain highly likely, it is by no means a foregone room to maneuver); and conclusion. An economic downturn, the • Public service associations and powerful impact of severe flooding in coastal areas, or unions, including for teachers, healthcare, controversy over constitutional issues could and oil workers. yet prevent the government from obtaining the plurality it needs. The government’s constituency is a diverse 3 As estimated by mathematician Germán Rojas of the National mix of impoverished clients, radicalized left- Polytechnic School. “Referendo es igual a plebiscito,” Revista ists, public service and other unions, the armed Vanguardia, Issue 125, 19-25 February 2008, p. 21. forces, and elements of the indigenous move- ment. The government will likely remain flexible on some issues in order to negotiate support from additional sectors as required.

6 Two Perspectives on Ecuador In the aftermath of the referendum, the coun- Regardless, there is no easy way out. try may face the following scenarios: Scenarios 1 to 3 would be particularly detri- mental to Ecuador. Scenario 4 would be less Scenario 1: Strong authoritarian institu- traumatic but is also less likely. tions (Likelihood: medium to high) If the draft Constitution passes by a wide or reason- Foreign Policy ably comfortable margin, the stage would be The crisis following Colombia’s March 1 set for Alianza País to make a clean sweep at incursion against a Revolutionary Armed the subsequent local, presidential and con- Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp in gressional elections. The new Constitution Ecuadoran territory became a watershed would set the country on a period of political moment for Correa’s foreign policy. Prior to stability under an authoritarian and illiberal this, he had kept a low profile and focused If the draft regime running a strong central state with mostly on relations with South America. control over economic and resource distribu- Ecuador was an early supporter of the Bank “Constitution passes tion matters. of the South initiative; forged closer energy by a wide margin, the Scenario 2: Weaker authoritarian institu- and political ties to Venezuela while keep- tions (Likelihood: medium to high) Should ing its distance from Hugo Chávez; and stage would be set sought stronger ties with China, Indonesia, the draft Constitution pass by a narrow mar- for Alianza País to gin, the government could stumble at the and Iran. Despite Ecuador’s refusal to resume polls or have trouble implementing the new trade talks with the United States or renew make a clean sweep Constitution. It may win reelection, but its the Manta agreement, bilateral relations position could be weakened as the opposition remained fluid. The Ecuadoran government at the subsequent did not indulge in anti-U.S. rhetoric and con- begins to regain strength. Depending on the elections. balance of power, this scenario could morph tinued to seek cooperation and understanding into Scenario 1 or 3. on specific issues. ” Scenario 3: Return to political instability Rafael Correa had come into office at the (Likelihood: low) If the draft Constitution lowest point in bilateral relations with neigh- does not pass, the government may not be boring Colombia in recent history. In an strong enough to win the next elections. This effort to reverse the trend—during which his might bring back political instability and even predecessor withdrew Ecuador’s ambassa- lead to extremes, such as the resignation of dor to Colombia for several months—Correa President Correa or the rise of a destabilizing oversaw a notable improvement in political, opposition. The laws and directives passed trade, and diplomatic relations. Of course, by the assembly would no longer be in effect, aerial fumigation of suspected coca crops causing constitutional and legal chaos. along the border remained a source of fric- tion. Faced with Colombia’s refusal to put the Scenario 4: Return to democratic insti- spraying on hold, Ecuador had even threat- tutions (Likelihood: very low) If the draft ened to take the matter to the International Constitution fails to pass and the president Court of Justice. accepts the results, reformulates his objec- tives and agrees to leave office as mandated But the events of March 1 shook Ecuador’s by the 1998 Constitution, assembly laws and overall foreign policy. In addition to denounc- directives would be set aside and the opposi- ing the incursion in the strongest terms, tion could regain strength without recourse to Correa made scathing remarks about conspiracies or destabilizing tactics. Colombian security policy, branding it an

Inter-American Dialogue 7 César Montúfar   Working Paper instrument of U.S. interests in the region. Brief Overview of the Economy He expelled the Colombian ambassador, Rafael Correa has had good news on the broke off diplomatic ties and made good on world economic front. World prices for his threat to take the fumigation issue to the crude oil and other key Ecuadoran exports World Court. A radicalized Correa went as are high, remittance flows are on the rise, far as charging Ecuadoran military intelli- and local exports are benefitting from a gence with taking their marching orders from declining U.S. dollar. Yet, in spite of this the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. bright outlook, economic performance in The initial Ecuadoran strategy was closely 2007 came up short. Ecuador’s 1.9 per- aligned with Venezuela’s. Although cent gross domestic product (GDP) growth Presidents Chávez and Uribe later moved was among Latin America’s lowest. Crude Friction and to defuse the situation, an uncompromis- oil production fell and growth in other sec- mutual mistrust can ing Correa persisted in blasting Colombia, tors of the economy was sluggish. As of “ March 2008, inflation had climbed to over even after the resolution passed by minis- be expected to ters of Foreign Affairs at the Organization five percent and job creation was down year- of American States. Going forward, fric- on-year. Foreign investment in 2007 was continue between tion and mutual mistrust can be expected a low $900 million, interest rates went up, Colombia and Ecuador, to continue, whether diplomatic ties are re- and public spending increased exponen- established or not. To Correa, standing up to tially. Cash transfers took a $4 billion chunk whether diplomatic Uribe pays high political dividends at home, out of the budget and public sector wages were raised by 23 percent for political and ties are re-established especially when coupled with tough words about national sovereignty and interven- electoral reasons. or not. tion by “foreign powers,” Correa’s code for For 2008, prospects are more upbeat the United States. On the other hand, the although not outstanding (the International ” international community will have to judge Monetary Fund forecasts 2.9 percent GDP Colombian charges of links between the growth). While crude oil production is FARC and Ecuadoran officials. President expected to increase in a context of high Uribe himself has maintained that the world prices, a global downturn could hurt FARC contributed to Correa’s election cam- Ecuadoran exports and drive inflation. These paign. While the Correa government has externalities may be compounded by current succeeded in convincing Ecuadorans that bad weather and by further fiscal expansion these allegations are part of a smear cam- designed to help Ecuador emerge from what paign, the issue may eventually undermine Correa terms “the long neoliberal night.” the support Correa has received from around Latin America.

8 Two Perspectives on Ecuador (Bonilla, continued from page 1) years, Ecuador has never emerged from cam- kidnapped. In short, the country was clearly paign mode and neither has Correa, the most not governed democratically. important national political figure.

From this vantage point, Correa’s presidency The public image that the president seeks can be seen as another episode within a long to project is of an anti-system, patriotic tradition of Ecuadoran politics dominated by reformer. He emphasizes the reemergence individual leaders rather than stable or endur- of the Ecuadoran national identity through ing institutions. The difference now is that the frequent invocation of the “patria” or no president in recent Ecuadoran history has homeland. Somehow the president and his enjoyed the popular support or total insti- publicity team have generated a collective Correa’s tutional control that Correa enjoys. Nor has identity that is exceptionally strong, partic- any president faced such weak and divided ularly for Ecuador, which is usually united presidency can be only by athletic triumphs or international “ opposition from the political class, gen- eral population or business interests. Beyond military confrontations. seen as another episode any specific reform or deliberate effort to Third, the Correa government has retained within a long tradition weaken the state, the present concentration popularity by avoiding the perception was enabled by the unpopularity and disin- of Ecuadoran politics of significant or generalized corruption, tegration of the political system inaugurated particularly illicit personal enrichment. So in 1979. dominated by individual far, at least, the figures surrounding the Popularity president—technocrats, academics, and leaders rather than leftist activists—have not provoked hostility stable or enduring What explains Correa’s popularity? The among the electorate or evoked the negative first reason is the dismal reputation of the stereotypes of traditional politicians. institutions. post-1979 political order, which was domi- nated by corrupt and exclusionary political Lastly, Correa’s support is a product of the ” parties. Correa is seen as completely outside fact that Ecuadoran society is marked by of the Ecuadoran political class, due to his inequality and exclusion. The collapse of independence and lack of previous experi- the financial system and dollarization in the ence, but also to his relative youth and fiery 1990s cost the country over $4 billion, left anti-establishment rhetoric. millions destitute, and pushed ten percent of the population to leave the country. Special A second factor explaining Correa’s popu- interests had captured the state, protecting larity is his strategic management of his some sectors and impoverishing others. Even public image, both during electoral cam- after years of economic growth, the current paigns and while president. Correa governs poverty rate is 38 percent, with 11 percent of as though he is on a permanent campaign the population living in extreme poverty. This and has benefited from excellent marketing, history helps explain why the discourse of without hesitating to finance it with public the current Ecuadoran government makes a resources. Part of the reason Correa has delib- clear break with past regimes and emphasizes erately never ceased to be a candidate is that equality and inclusion. he has participated in four national elections: the first round of the presidential election, Given his widespread support, popular the presidential runoff, the referendum to referenda have been the most powerful convoke the constituent assembly, and the instruments for legitimizing Correa and his election of assembly delegates. In the past two proposals for reform. The sudden blossoming

Inter-American Dialogue 9 Adrián Bonilla   Working Paper of political change that had been germinating ting governments. The Correa government is for more than a decade can only be explained no exception to this trend, and there is a high by the sudden appearance of an extraordi- probability that the current draft constitu- narily popular political figure. Correa enjoys tion will fall victim to the same fate. While an exceptional electoral mandate, particularly the political arena—particularly the media by Ecuadoran standards, and uses it to apply and elites—has undergone a social and gen- pressure to the rest of the political system. erational evolution, the Correa administration has not yet demonstrated that it will break Correa’s popularity has barely diminished from Ecuador’s questionable traditional polit- despite several incidents during his admin- ical practices. istration. Just in the last few months, these include the confrontation with Colombia The Rise of Correa stemming from the bombing of a FARC Three coups, six governments, three supreme encampment in Ecuadoran territory, the res- Correa enjoys an courts, and two constituent assemblies over ignation of the president of the constituent the last 13 years testify to Ecuador’s political exceptional electoral assembly, and the confiscation of more than “ turmoil. The instability began in 1995 with 160 subsidiaries of the Isaías Group (the mandate and uses the first interruption of a government man- owners of banks that collapsed at the begin- date. Congress impeached then-vice president it to apply pressure ning of the decade), including two nationally Alberto Dahik, marking the beginning of broadcast television channels. While his pop- a decade in which no Ecuadoran president to the rest of the ularity has dropped somewhat from earlier would manage to complete his term. Abdalá levels, he retains strong personal support. political system. Bucaram was thrown out of office for “men- Old Politics tal incompetence” barely six months after ” his term began, followed by One question still to be answered is whether of the conservative wing of the Christian Correa’s political project is another episode Democratic Party in 2000. Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador’s history of political instability won the 2002 elections with leftist rhetoric or a turning point toward greater institu- and the support of the indigenous party, only tionalization. Movimiento País or National to change his political orientation and expel Movement, the center-left coalition of pow- his former allies from government six months erful local leaders (caudillos), small social into his term. movements, and minority political par- ties, is the loose political coalition that backs Small groups on the left, low-profile local the president. It professes the common goal caudillos, union leaders, intellectuals and aca- of transforming the state, but the modus demics initiated Correa’s 2006 presidential operandi of its members is nearly indistin- campaign, which later garnered the sup- guishable from that of the traditional political port of other powerful social movements, operatives. Clientelism and patronage, espe- including indigenous groups. The candidate’s cially at the local government and corporate personal charisma and work ethic, coupled levels, continue to be standard practice. with a well-funded campaign, put him ahead in the polls during the last weeks before the In the era since 1979, the central laws gov- election. Correa came in second in the first erning Ecuador’s political parties, elections, round of voting, six points behind the mul- law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary timillionaire Álvaro Noboa, who combined have been repeatedly modified and revised to populist pledges with devout Catholic rhet- accommodate the immediate interests of sit- oric. Correa’s campaign gained new life,

10 Two Perspectives on Ecuador however, when he decided not to support solved the Congress, the media was virtually candidates for Congress, which leant cred- the only social or political force that came ibility to his proposal to convene a constituent to its defense. A new Congress comprised assembly. Against all predictions, Correa won of substitute deputies expressed their grati- the second round runoff by an overwhelming tude toward Correa by voting in favor of all of 16 percent. his proposals.

Upon assuming power, the constituent assem- The Constitutional Assembly bly plan became the main focus of the Correa Ecuador has already undergone twenty con- administration. Not only was it a central cam- stitutional experiments, and they have most paign theme, it is his symbolic link to the often been used as a way out of an insti- renewal and change sought by the electorate. tutional crisis or period of instability, such The assembly proposal distinguished and dis- as when it entered or emerged from dic- The current tanced Correa from the opposition, ensuring tatorships. The current Constitution is no he had the popular support in each political Constitution responds different, offering a response to recent politi- “ battle. cal turmoil by ushering in dramatic changes to recent political Such clashes were numerous because Correa to presidential powers and electoral rules. turmoil by ushering in assumed control of the executive in a posi- Government Control tion of extreme political weakness. He was dramatic changes to bombarded with attacks from the opposition, Once the congressional opposition was which controlled law enforcement agencies, neutralized, obstacles to convoking the con- presidential powers and the Constitutional Tribunal, the Electoral stituent assembly were suddenly swept away. electoral rules. Tribunal, the Supreme Court, and most Correa quickly moved forward with his importantly, Congress. Facing this onslaught, agenda, winning the referendum to convoke ” Correa appeared headed for the same fate as the constitutional assembly with more than past presidents: blackmailed by political par- 80 percent in favor. The subsequent vote to ties and later unceremoniously thrown out elect delegates had a low electoral thresh- of office. old for representation, which benefited small parties and minority groups to an unprece- While the congressional opposition dented degree. Once again, Correa achieved attempted to stymie Correa by blocking the an overwhelming electoral victory, unmatched constituent assembly, its resistance was eas- in Ecuadoran history. Movimiento País, the ily dissolved, overcome by overwhelming president’s political coalition, won 86 out of public support and an Electoral Tribunal 130 seats. The Partido Sociedad Patriotica or ruling of dubious legality. This first con- Patriotic Society Party, led by ex-president frontation with the Congress was decisive. Lucio Gutiérrez, was the next runner up with Correa took advantage of the unpopularity just seven seats. of the legislature to overwhelm it. A major- ity of Congress opposed calling a referendum Such a resounding victory made the to decide whether or not to convoke the debate over the decision making powers assembly, but the opposition became entan- of the assembly irrelevant. The opposition gled in the legal wrangling over control of always maintained that the body’s man- the Electoral Tribunal. At the same time, 58 date extended no further than the drafting opposition members of Congress were dis- of a new Constitution, but the government missed, accused of sabotaging the electoral majority argued it had the power to reorga- process. When the Tribunal eventually dis- nize any institution. As such, the first action

Inter-American Dialogue 11 Adrián Bonilla   Working Paper taken by the assembly was to effectively dis- collective authority named by the President, solve Congress by declaring it in recess, even asking Acosta to resign the presidency of the though it had also served as just a rubber assembly. He complied, and the body finished stamp for the president. drafting the Constitution under the watch- ful eye of the president’s legal advisor. The With its overwhelming majority, government dismissal of Acosta cemented Correa’s per- allies can control the outcome of the process sonal control over the political movement and without having to compromise or respond to the government. dissent. Politics has turned inwards, reflect- ing the priorities of the Movimiento País Correa defines himself as a politician of the governing coalition without representing or left, but he does not govern in collaboration including opposition interests. Because it with any of Ecuador’s traditional leftist social Because it lacks lacks input from large sectors of the popula- movements. Emblematic of this isolation is tion, the constitutional document approved his rocky relationship with the Ecuadoran input“ from large sectors at the end of July will not necessarily mark a Confederation of Indigenous Nations or point of unification for a new society. CONAIE. A key actor in Ecuadoran politics of the population, the during the 1990s, CONAIE was dam- Internal Conflict draft constitution will aged by its alliance with ex-president Lucio Acuerdo País, the political party that supports Gutiérrez and has been excluded from any not necessarily mark a Correa and controlled the assembly, is hardly participation in Correa’s government. Its presidential candidate garnered barely two point of unification for a a homogenous group, and several points of ideological tension have emerged. All of these percent of the vote in the last elections, and new society. conflicts have been resolved by the omnip- various parts of the organization have been otent interventions of the president, who co-opted by the president’s political project. ” settles controversial issues according to politi- Thus, CONAIE’s opposition to some gov- cal convenience or his own ideological values. ernment policies has not hurt the government This became especially evident when the or Correa’s popularity. president of the constituent assembly and a Environmental issues are among the most close ally of the president, Alberto Acosta, important and contentious internal conflicts. was obliged to resign. The president has little sympathy for ecology, Up until he stepped down, Acosta was the as his background in development economics second most important political figure in conflicts with the demands of environmen- Ecuador and a symbol of the movement that tal groups. This is the issue where the discord brought Correa to power. In some ways, he between the president and his former men- was an early mentor to the president, push- tor Alberto Acosta was the most visible, ing him into public life through the study and but they also disagreed over the timeline for debate groups that proliferated in the coun- the assembly and the necessity of involving try after the banking crisis. An argument social movements. with the president about when the assembly Issues of individual rights have also provoked should finish its work was the last episode in disagreement within the Alianza leadership. a series of disagreements over collective and Correa is a devout and conservative, even individual rights, environmental protections, recalcitrant, Catholic on these issues. Various and indigenous issues. The dispute ended members of the assembly, on the other hand, with the political bureau of Acuerdo País, a have lobbied for the legalization of homosex-

12 Two Perspectives on Ecuador ual marriage and abortion. This discrepancy supporters in Bolivia. In the last elections has led to delays and tensions within the in Ecuador, in fact, government candidates coalition, but the eventual compromise more won by a three-to-one margin in Guayaquil, closely reflected Correa’s view. which is both the center of opposition and the city where Correa was born. While these conflicts have taken a toll on the governing coalition, the most important The Draft Constitution divisions will be those that emerge when the The president’s approval ratings will prob- government is obliged to select candidates. ably fall in the run-up to the referendum, but If the draft constitution is passed, new elec- it is difficult to predict if they will descend tions will be called in which the government’s to a level that would endanger his project. chosen candidates stand a far better chance The government will likely win the referen- The mayor of of victory. Thus, the hierarchy within Alianza dum to approve the Constitution as well as País will be critical. While there are differ- the subsequent presidential elections, which “Guayaquil, Jaime Nebot, ent political currents within the coalition, so are particularly significant given that the new far they have all been obscured by the over- is the default opposition Constitution would allow for reelection. powering presence of the president and his spokesman, but he personalist style of government. All function- In general terms, the draft Constitution aries and activists now declare themselves represents another step towards hyper- has no intention of correístas—Correa supporters—but the presi- presidentialism. Not only are there fewer sacrificing his post to dent clearly favors some friends over others. checks and balances on the executive, but the president would gain more prerogatives and challenge Correa at the Opposition powers. The provision allowing for imme- The opposition was devastated during the diate presidential reelection breaks with the national level. first year of the Correa government. The tradition of alternation in power dating back business and political elites have been unable to the return of civilian government. Beyond ” to organize themselves since they lost control the nationalist rhetoric that flows through the of state institutions, which they had openly document, at the crux are provisional regula- profited from for decades. Less than two tions that guarantee presidential control over years after winning the first round of presi- all state authorities and powers, including the dential voting, Álvaro Noboa was forced to Supreme Court and the Electoral Tribunal. give up his seat in the assembly because he refused to make a full disclosure of his assets. This concentration of power contrasts with Former president Lucio Gutiérrez has lost the respect for civil liberties shown by the influence after he was implicated in various administration. For example, the confis- espionage scandals and his collaborators were cation of the media outlets of the Isaías named in bribery cases. This leaves the mayor brothers, the ex-bankers accused of not of Guayaquil, Jaime Nebot, as the default paying debts to their clients and the state, opposition spokesman, but he has no inten- was carried out according to legal proce- tion of sacrificing his post to challenge Correa dures and overwhelmingly supported by the at the national level. public. The problem is that constitutional legality in Ecuador is the product of the Regional tensions do persist in Ecuador, but political system and, as such, can be com- not nearly at the level of conflict between the promised at any moment. Santa Cruz economic elite and Evo Morales’s

Inter-American Dialogue 13 Adrián Bonilla   Working Paper Ecuador in the Context of Andean political regime that concentrates power in Populism the hands of the executive, putting some civil liberties at risk. The other is the general ten- The Andean region, with the probable excep- dency of Latin American voters to elect leftist tion of Peru, is characterized by the presence governments. It would be a methodological of extremely powerful executives, the lack of and conceptual error to presume that ideol- checks and balances on the powers of state, ogy—in this case the left—causes or creates a weakly represented civil society, and col- the political regime that many call populism, lapsed political parties. These conditions have neo-populism, or radical populism. spawned a new form of politics, one that is replacing the old order with coalitions of In order to understand Ecuadoran democ- social and regional caudillos united around the racy, one must ask whether the “populism” Rafael Correa image of the president. concept is useful in distinguishing among particular cases. To the contrary, populism “is attempting to Ecuador, a part of this trend, is undergoing a is broad enough to describe nearly the full transition to a new political framework, very leave Ecuador’s spectrum of political processes in the region. different from the one adopted during the Rather than shedding light on the nature of discredited political transfer from military to civilian rule. Like its emerging political practices, the term more Andean neighbors, the new system involves a often generalizes very distinct processes, model behind, but he is powerful executive, few checks and balances, thereby constructing stereotypes with little political symbolism, a malleable constitution, not merely duplicating informative value. and legitimization through elections.1 another country’s A regime of this nature has been estab- External Influences approach. lished fairly late in Ecuador, relative to other Venezuela Andean societies. Fujimori began the series While the Ecuadoran government is fre- ” in Peru during the 1990s, but this model quently called “pro-Chávez,” this label is both can also be seen in Venezuela under Hugo vague and an oversimplification. Elements of Chávez, Colombia under Álvaro Uribe, Ecuador’s domestic politics and constituent Bolivia under Evo Morales, and of course in assembly may evoke the Venezuelan expe- Ecuador under Correa. rience, but it has staked out international, This political system has existed as much in social, and economic policies that are dis- governments of the left as those of the right. tinct from Venezuela’s. For example, Quito Personalist rule is not a product of a specific has not accepted the invitation to become a ideology, but rather of the inability of the member of Chávez’s Bolivarian Alternative liberal economic model to deal with the pres- trade arrangement, ALBA. In fact, the sures of globalization. For this reason, it is level of cooperation with Venezuela since necessary to differentiate between two phe- Correa came to power has remained nearly nomena occurring in the Andes and within unchanged. Rafael Correa is attempting to Ecuador. The first is the development of a leave Ecuador’s discredited political model behind, but he is not merely duplicating 1 Some of the ideas developed in this work were also expounded another country’s approach. during the conference “Understanding Populism and Participation: A New Look at the New Left in Latin America,” Wilson Center, March 2008

14 Two Perspectives on Ecuador Ecuador has attempted to diversify its for- The one-size-fits-all approach of the United eign relations, moving away from a reliance States is especially ironic given its emphasis on either the United States or Venezuela. In on bilateralism. Washington’s preference for the area of defense, for example, Venezuela trade negotiations with individual countries is hardly Ecuador’s principal partner. Chile reveals the limits of its influence beyond secu- and Brazil are the main sources of Ecuador’s rity issues. By decoupling historic economic weapon systems within the region, and tra- relationships between neighboring countries, ditional suppliers such as the United States, bilateralism has severely weakened the frag- Israel, France and China continue to main- ile institutions of the Andean Community tain normal flows. For ideological and of Nations (CAN), particularly Ecuador and practical security reasons, Ecuador and Colombia. Venezuela both harbor a certain level of dis- trust towards the government of Colombia. Multilateral Institutions Ecuador has This tension, however, has not necessar- The consensus that emerged from the attempted to diversify ily hurt Ecuador’s relationship with other Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994 “ countries. For example, in spite of recent ushered in years of cooperation on defense its foreign relations, temptations presented by the border crisis and democracy, but it has now disintegrated. with Colombia, the Correa government has This remarkable progress was undermined moving away from a largely avoided confrontational rhetoric with by the unilateral character of Washington’s reliance on either the United States. global initiatives and its focus on security. the United States United States Responsibility for the exclusive focus on secu- Andean countries are much more heteroge- rity does not lie only with Washington. In or Venezuela. neous than even the rest of Latin America, the Andean region at least, several states fol- particularly when it comes to their policies lowed and consolidated this trend based on ” towards the United States. Venezuela strives their own national interests. Specifically, to construct a counter-hegemonic bloc while the Colombian effort to present its internal Colombia tries to maintain a special alliance conflict as a regional issue provoked nega- with the United States. Ecuador has distant tive reactions among its neighbors, especially but cordial relations with the superpower, Ecuador. This tension prompted the militari- without hostility or explicit membership in zation of borders, enunciation of separate and any regional alliance. Peru keeps up its inde- isolated conflict strategies, and “securitization” pendence and good bilateral relations while of Ecuador’s relationship with Colombia. As Bolivia joins Venezuela in its negative view of a result, bilateral relations between Colombia the United States. and Ecuador deteriorated to an unprece- dented degree. The indifference of the United States towards changes in the region and its stubborn adher- The absence of democratic accountability ence to a uniform agenda for extremely on the hemispheric and regional level—the heterogeneous countries help explain the ten- product of the weakening of multilateral sions in the hemisphere. United States policy institutions—has encouraged the tolerance toward the Andean region is characterized by of antidemocratic conduct. The most dra- overemphasis on security, reliance on a Cold matic case in the Andean region remains the War era approach to the Colombian con- government of in Peru in flict, and unwillingness to adapt to political the 1990s. This lack of collective democratic changes in the region.

Inter-American Dialogue 15 Adrián Bonilla   Working Paper standards allows for a variety of practices that has concentrated all the powers of govern- contravene the rule of law, political tolerance, ment and representative functions in his and free electoral competition. own hands.

Conclusion It is impossible to understand the domestic politics of Andean countries, and particularly The political regime inaugurated in 1979 the Ecuadoran case, if one does not reflect was unable to process the central tensions on the nature of US foreign policy over the in Ecuadoran society and, as a result, col- last dozen years and its impact on the region. lapsed with the election of Rafael Correa. In Bilateralism is the preferred form of rela- less than a single year, without widespread tions, and security issues have dominated the or lethal violence, all of Ecuador’s political agenda. Hemispheric and regional multilat- In Ecuador’s power institutions fell under control of the execu- eral institutions have eroded, as evidenced by tive. The opposition, which was never loyal the absence of regional strategic blocs, and “vacuum, Correa, seen to the concept of equality or representative domestic political institutions are weakening democracy, has been decimated. In this power as a reformist caudillo, as well. vacuum, Correa, seen as a reformist caudillo, has concentrated all the powers of government and representative functions in his own hands.”

16 Two Perspectives on Ecuador Inter-American Dialogue Publications on Colombia and the Andean Region Working Paper Series

“A Watershed Moment for Venezuela,” “State, Drug Policy, and Democracy in the by Teodoro Petkoff, August 2008. Andes,” by Eduardo A. Gamarra. June 2005.

“Bolivia’s Long and Winding Road,” “Turning Point in Colombia? A Rapporteur’s by George Gray Molina. July 2008. Report of the Colombia Working Group,” by Vinay Jawahar. June 2004. “Ending the Conflict with the FARC: Time for a New Course,” by Antonio “Álvaro Uribe: Dissident,” by Fernando Navarro Wolff. January 2007. Cepeda Ulloa. August 2003.

“Petropolitics in Latin America: A Review “A New Approach: Álvaro Uribe’s of Energy Policy and Regional Relations,” Democratic Security Project,” by by Genaro Arriagada. December 2006. Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez. July 2003.

“A New Uribe? Álvaro Uribe’s Second-Term “‘Doing Something’ in Colombia,” Challenges,” by Rodrigo Pardo. November by Eduardo Posada Carbó. August 2002. 2006. “The Prospects for Peace in Colombia: “The Military and Politics in the Andean Lessons from Recent Experience,” Region,” by Carlos Basombrío Iglesias. by Rafael Pardo Rueda. July 2002. April 2006. “Colombia: Negotiate, But What?” “Towards Greater ‘Human Security’ and by Joaquín Villalobos. June 2002. Peace in Colombia,” by Michael Shifter. July 2005. “Reflections on the Colombian Conflict: A Rapporteur’s Report of the Colombia “The Colombian Conflict and the Risk of a Working Group,” by Daniel Mack and Regional Human Rights and Humanitarian Victoria Wigodzky. June 2002. Crisis,” by César Montúfar. July 2005.

“Europe and the Colombian Conflict,” by Sabine Kurtenbach. June 2005.

Task Force Report Published Testimony Toward Greater Peace and Security in “Colombia’s Security Predicament and Colombia: Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy. Opportunities for Peace: Guidelines for U.S. The Report of an Independent Task Force Policy,” by Michael Shifter. September 1998. Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-American Dialogue. Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Co-Chairs. October 2000.

For other testimonies and articles on the Andean Region please visit the Dialogue’s web site: www.thedialogue.org.

Inter-American Dialogue 17   Working Paper

Inter-American Dialogue Board Of Directors

Carla A. Hills, Co-Chair, United States Ricardo Lagos, Co-Chair, Chile Peter D. Bell, Co-Vice Chair, United States Enrique Iglesias, Co-Vice Chair, Uruguay Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil David de Ferranti, United States William L. Friend, United States Francis Fukuyama, United States L. Enrique García, Bolivia Donna J. Hrinak, United States Yolanda Kakabadse, Ecuador Jim Kolbe, United States Thomas J. Mackell, Jr., United States Barbara J. McDougall, Canada Thomas F. McLarty III, United States M. Peter McPherson, United States Billie Miller, Barbados Sonia Picado, Costa Rica Jorge Quiroga, Bolivia Jesús Silva-Herzog, Mexico Eduardo Stein, Guatemala Elena Viyella de Paliza, Dominican Republic

Peter Hakim President In t e r -Am e r i c a n Dia l o g u e

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