Invasion of Malaya

CHAPTER 8 INVASION OF MALAYA Y dawn on 8th December, seventeen sorties had been carried out by B Hudsons of No . 1 Squadron R.A.A.F. against Japanese ships and troops engaged in the landing at Kota Bharu . Continuous heavy rains had created conditions in which the Kota Bharu airfield would normally hav e been regarded as unserviceable, and a thick blanket of cloud hung lo w over the sea . However, ground staff and crews sprang to their tasks, an d low-level attacks were made on enemy vessels, amid intense anti-aircraf t fire from the Japanese . It appeared, when results were reviewed, that one transport had been blown up, one containing tanks and artillery had been set ablaze, and one had disappeared after receiving direct hits .' Of the squadron's ten serviceable Hudsons, two, with their crews, had been lost . The captain of one of the latter was Flight Lieutenant Ramshaw,2 who had first located the Japanese convoys . Most of the other Hudsons were damaged, but were made again serviceable after daylight. They, and other aircraft mustered for early daylight operations, then attacked landing craf t and Japanese troops ashore. Air Force headquarters planned an all-out effort against Japanese trans - ports at Kota Bharu at dawn on the 8th, but when the squadrons arrived over the area the ships had withdrawn. At 7.30 a.m. Japanese bombers and fighters began delivering heavy attacks on Malaya's northern airfields , using light bombs against planes and personnel, and avoiding seriou s damage to airfield surfaces . They were notably successful in arriving ove r the airfields while defending craft were descending or taking off . The performance of the enemy aircraft, and the accuracy of the bombing , came "as an unpleasant surprise "3 to Malaya Command, despite Intelli- gence reports of the performance of the Zero fighters which had bee n sent to the Far Eastern Air Command headquarters.4 It appeared that the fighters had been given increased range by auxiliary fuel tanks, torpedo - shaped and made of aluminium, which could be jettisoned when their contents had been used . Eight attacks were made in ten hours on Kot a Bharu airfield, which was frequently strafed by low-flying aircraft . On the beaches where the Japanese had landed, the ground force s received little air support, and it soon became apparent that the Japanes e had complete mastery of the air in the vicinity . Although the Dogras stuck gamely to their task, a gap made by the enemy remained open . The Awagisan Maru was sunk, and Ayato Maru and Sakewa Maru were damaged . 2 F-Lt J . C . Ramshaw; No. 1 Sqn RAAF. Draftsman ; of Malvern, Vic ; b . Bangalore, India, 1 8 Oct 1914. Killed in action 8 Dec 1941 . A. E . Percival, Despatch on Operations of Malaya Command, from 8th December 1941 to 15th February 1942 . ' It transpired that the information had lain unnoticed among the accumulation of Intelligenc e material at the headquarters . Its establishment did not include an Intelligence staff at the time the report was received, and the Combined Intelligence Bureau was inadequate for the needs of the three Services. 138 INVASION OF MALAYA 8 Dec 1941 Brigadier Key,5 commanding the 8th Indian Brigade, decided that if th e airfield were to be held this gap must be closed before dusk; but the 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles and the 2/ 12th Frontier Force Regiment , ordered forward for the purpose, were delayed by numerous rivers an d creeks, and by the nature of the country generally . In the confused situatio n which resulted, Key received during the afternoon a report that the airfiel d was already being attacked from the ground. This report was a repeat of one already dispatched to Air Head- quarters at Singapore during the temporary absence from his headquarter s of the station commander, Wing Commander Noble.6 On his return, Noble was dismayed to find the station headquarters ablaze and the staff pre - paring to leave, as Singapore had acted on the report and ordered a withdrawal. Having ordered his staff to remain, Noble joined Key in a reconnaissance of the airfield and discovered from the Indians that the Japanes e were not yet about the perimeter defences . In the meantime the Australians of No . 1 Squadron were working o n their Hudsons under periodic air attack. During the afternoon, they detected what they thought to be aimed small-arms fire in their vicinity ; a supposition which their commanding officer verified . Faced with the headquarters order to withdraw, Noble began an orderly retreat after Ke y had agreed to it. When the last of the few serviceable Hudsons had flow n off at dusk, the Australian ground staff joined the station headquarters staff and left by truck for Krai, where they were to entrain for Singapore . In view of this occurrence, the reappearance of Japanese transport s off the beach soon after dark, and the prospect of his forward troop s becoming isolated and overwhelmed, Key, with higher approval, ordere d withdrawal during the night to a position north of Kota Bharu township — a course which he found had been decided upon also by Malaya Com- mand. By midnight, the troops and guns on the airfield had been evacuated , and it was in enemy hands . The purpose for which troops had bee n stationed in Kelantan had thus disappeared in twenty-four hours . The fact that the main Japanese landings were at Singora and Patan i had been revealed in the course of dawn air reconnaissance on 8th December ; and later in the morning many Japanese planes, mostly fighters , were found to be using the Singora airfield. The Japanese had forestalle d Operation MATADOR, for which the troops of the 11th Indian Divisio n had been standing by at half an hour's notice in drenching rain since th e afternoon of 6th December. As the division was disposed, with three battalions beside trains, two in camp with their trucks loaded, and on e forward near the frontier, they were ill prepared for any other move. There they remained, despite what was happening, and endeavours t o obtain authority from Malaya Command for action, until about 1 .30 p.m. Then, when vital hours had been lost, orders which had been issued at Maj-Gen B . W. Key, DSO, MC. Comd 8 Ind Bde 1940-42 ; GOC 11 Ind Div 1942. Regular soldier; b. 19 Dec 1895 . • Gp Capt C. H. Noble, OBE . Station Comd Kota Bharu 1941, Lahat 1942, Ender 1942-43 ; Assist Comdt RAF Base Batavia 1942 . Of Melbourne; b. Bristol, Gloucester, England, 18 Apr 1905 . Khlaung Ngae 23]0. bra Setup) P9`Bessr Z~ \ \`lam II ""' . iPEERLIS ;'TM I^^'. Kangar K dia g it A u n .Nerang' if' `\\~ \~an at Jitra j K Japan's opening moves in Malaya 140 INVASION OF MALAYA 8Dec 11 .30 a.m. reached III Indian Corps headquarters requiring it to adopt the alternative plan and occupy selected defensive positions on th e Singora and Kroh-Patani roads, and to dispatch a mobile column toward s Singora, in an endeavour to obstruct the Japanese advance . The 28th Indian Brigade was allotted to the 11th Division as a reserve force, an d entrained at Ipoh at 5 p .m. That such a restricted manoeuvre was all that remained of the dynamic plan to move into Thailand was naturall y dispiriting to the troops and their commanders . Even this might be fore- stalled by the enemy; and the men would be tired and confused before they could give battle . The main defensive line now to be held, running from east of Jitr a to the west coast, was in the State of Kedah, astride the main road an d railway from Malaya into Thailand. Its right flank rested on jungle-clad hills which had been considered by the planners of Malay a's defence system to be militarily impenetrable . Selected for the protection of the airfiel d at Alor Star and others south of it, the line was the only so-called pre - pared position of such extent on the Malayan mainland. Its system of communication trenches and line signal communications was, however , incomplete ; it had not been wired, and anti-tank mines had not been laid. In fulfilment of orders, a force known as "Krohcol" (Lieut-Colonel Moorhead') based on Kroh, and comprising in the first instance 3/16th Punjab, was sent to seize a position known as "The Ledge ", thirty miles beyond the frontier. Another force, "Laycol" (Brigadier Lays ) comprising two companies and the carrier platoon of 1/8th Punjab, with anti-tan k guns and engineers, advanced along the Changlun road towards Ba n Sadao, eight miles beyond the frontier on the way to Singora . An armoure d train, manned by a platoon of the 2/ 16th Punjab and some engineers , entered Thailand from Padang Besar, in Perlis, northernmost state o f Malaya. The vanguard of Krohcol crossed the frontier in mid-afternoon, an d was immediately fired upon by Thai armed constabulary. As a result, it had cleared only three miles of the road past the frontier when it halted for the night . Laycol reached Ban Sadao at dusk, and took up a position north of the village . There, about 9 p.m., a Japanese column o f thirty-five vehicles, preceded by tanks, and with headlights blazing, bor e down on it. Two of the tanks were knocked out by gun and rifle fire , but the Japanese infantry, who had dismounted at the beginning of th e action, were soon engaged in an enveloping movement .

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