Principles of Perceptual Measurement

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Principles of Perceptual Measurement Principles of Perceptual Measurement In this chapter . .. A SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF PERCEPTUAL MEASUREMENT • You will discover the main controversies that arose instudies todetermine the relationship between physical stimuli and the sensations they evoke within us. B CLASSICAL PSYCHOPHYSICS You will also learn how todescribe and give examples ofthe human ability to 1. Psychophysical Methods estimate sensations. 2. Absolute Threshold • You will examine famous classical psychophysicists, such as Gustav Fechner 3. Difference Threshold and Ernst Weber, and the experimental methods they designed to study 4. Weber's Law sensory perception . You will become familiar with psychometric function 5. Fechner's Law and how it can be affected by both sensory and nonsensory parameters . C MODERN PSYCHOPHYSICS • You will become familiar with the difference threshold, which determines how 1. Magnitude Estimation and the much extra stimulus is needed in order tojustnotice a change. You will also Power Law become familiar with Webers law, which states that the difference threshold 2. Psychophysical Scaling does not remain constant as the stimulus increases in intensity; and Fechner's 3. Scaling of Nonsensory Variables law, which was found tobe flawed but transformed the field ofsensory science 4. Signal Detection Theory and remains influential to this day. • You will learn about Stanley S. Stevens, who began the era ofmodern psycho­ physics.You will also learn about the method of magnitude estimation, which led tothe development ofthe power law. • You will study the difference between prothetic and metathetic stimuli and how they are assessed. Finally, you will become famil iar with differences in human sensitivity to stimuli and how researchers use techniques to compare those differences in terms ofz-scores, Tru e SciCIlCC investigates and bri1 t,<s to 1/l1I/1a1l perception sutli truths and such kllowlcdgc as Most ofus would be abletocorrectly identify the colour red orgreen the pe ople I!f agivclltime and society consider orblue. But does that mean we are all experiencing an identical most important. psychological event, orcould it be that each ofus experiences something slightly different? Photo:Trout55/iStockphoto.com - Leo Tolstoy Fundamentals of Sensory Perception We are co nstantly being bombarded by energy indi viduals, and therefore the data can be sci­ from the physical wo rld, whether it is in the entifically validated (Gescheider, 1997). We form of visual, auditory, tactile, or chemose n­ will return to this deb ate and explore the sory stimulation. T hese stimuli are very real issues on both sides later in this chapter. But and can be measured . The inte nsity of light first, it is necessary to learn some thing abo ut reflected by an object, for example, can be the experimental approaches to studying sen­ exactly determined with a device called a ra di­ sory processes, the kinds ofproblems to which ometer.T his device will spec ify the intensity in a they can be applied, and the infor mation they set of units for wh ich it has been calibrated. In reveal about the op eration of the brain. What general, all physical stimuli that we are capable will follow is a set of core concepts that will ofperceiving can be spec ified in real terms that surface throughout this book as we examine give us a value acco rding to some dim ension of each of the sensory systems in detail. its physical reality. But what abo ut the psychological events that evoke within us an appreciation of that .A. Scientific Basis of physical stim ulus ? Can the resulting perceptual experience also be measured?That depends on Perceptual Measurement wh o is doing the measurin g. If it happens to be The most obvious question to begin with is anyone other than the perceiver, the answer of "Why take a scientific approach to this prob­ course is /l 0 . Percepti on is a very private experi­ lem?" That is, what do we hop e to gain by ence, and since it cannot be exposed to anyone developing and applying a set of rigorous else, it canno t be directly measured by any­ experi me ntal procedures to the study of per­ one else either. Consider the followin g. Most ception? The reason most psychologists would of us wo uld be able to correctly identify the first offer is that it satisfies an intellectual curios­ colour of a stoplight. But does that mean we ity. Perception is such a mysterious and almost . are all expe rien cing an identi cal psychological magical phenomenon that a first step toward event, or could it be that each ofus experiences learning anything about it is to establish a quan­ some thing slightly different but that we have all tifiable relationship between the two variables been taught to call it red since childhood? We in this process-the physical stimulus and the SideNote 1...;:.1.:.... 1=--- _ may never know the answer to this. resulting perceptual impression (SideNote 1.1). If an outsider is not capable of measur­ Since it is impossible to open up the mind and Although the terms sensation and perceptionare often used ing our own percepti on s, then are we? Are observe the process of percepti on , one advan­ interchangeably, it is import- we capable of determining, say, the psycho­ tage of knowing this relationship is that it may ant to establish the distinction logical int ensity of a sound that is experienced offer clues about the nature of the brain, the between them atthe outset. in our mind, giving it a value, and compar­ way it processes information, and, ultim ately, Sensoryprocesses capture ing its perceived inte nsity with a different how the biological operations within it lead to information from the physical sound or a different type of sensation alto­ sensation and perception. world and transform them gether? R em arkably, the answer is yes. And it into biologicalsignals that Quantitative relationships and their benefits are interpreted by the brain. turns out that we are actually quite goo d at it In so doing , the brain creates even though perceptions do not reside in the There are several additional advantages to a perceptual representation very real world ofphysics (Stevens, 1986). And understanding the math ematical relation ship inourmind that allows us to therein lies a rath er thorny probl em . Many between the physical and perceptual wo rlds. appreciate the physical world . psychologists have asserted that even makin g One is that it provid es an estimate of the per­ Thus, perception represents the attempt at measuring a perceptual event is ceptual quality of a stimulus in numer ical terms a singleunified awareness of fruitl ess because it is not a measurable thing and and thu s allows comparisons with other stim­ astimulus that in turn arises therefore can never be verified (He idelberger uli. Say for example that a new perfume has from the sensation produced j ust been developed and the co mpany wishes by our sensory systems. & Klohr, 200 4). To say that this issue has generated some to test its aromatic acceptance by the publi c lively debate in the past wou ld be an under­ before spending millions of dollars on its pro­ stateme nt. This is largely because of the moti on . By applying a set of experime ntal pro­ opposite view held by some experime ntal cedures, which we will soon learn, it is possible psychologists that the perceived intensity of to obtain a numerical index of its impact on sensations can indeed be reliably estimated the sense of sme ll and then use this to provide by the perceiver. Furthermore, the informa­ a meanin gful comparison with the perceptual tion so obtained is generally consistent across impression made by other perfumes. Such data Chapter 1 Principles of Perceptual Measurement can predict the likely social acceptability ofthe shown in Figure 1.1. new produ ct and therefore can be used by the The simplest is a linear function. For any compa ny's executives to make imp ortant com­ given increase in physical intensity, th ere is a mercia l decisions (Lodge, 198 1). certain inc reme nt in th e perceived intensity. Quant itative relation ships also have the T he prop ortion between th e two remai ns advantage that they allow co mparisons amo ng co nstant across the who le range . In other individuals and even species.The later chapters wo rds, th e slope remai ns co nstant .This is not of this book will cover many details about our the case for th e other two possibiliti es shown limits and capacities in processing informatio n in Figure 1.1. In an expo nent ial relation ship, from the physical world, how they vary with the perceived sensation intensity changes age, and, where appropriate, how they co mpare very slow ly at low values of physical intensity. with other animals. The factors that are used But after a certain point, th e function takes in such comparisons are always math emat­ off such that even small changes in stimulus ical descriptors of the system in question . An intensity produce a dramatic increase in per­ extension of this idea is the comparison amo ng ception. In an exponential fun ction, th erefore, the different sensory modalities-a so-called th e slope itself progressively increases with cross-modal comparison-r-io see if any similarities physical int ensity. The opp osite is true of a exist among them (Luce, 1990). For example, if logarithmic function where the slope is very we perceive warmth on the skin in some defin­ large at th e beginning such that perceived able way to the temperature ofthe object, then intensities can change dramatically wi th small how does this relation ship co mpare to the way changes in stimulus int ensity.
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