Christopher R. Browning. Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xii + 185 pp. $21.99, paper, ISBN 978-0-521-77490-1.

Reviewed by Joachim Lerchenmueller

Published on H-Genocide (April, 2002)

Ordinary Killers, Extraordinary Crimes and resettlement policies in (former) Poland. He This volume comprises six lectures delivered portrays Eichmann's autumn 1939 Plan for by Christoper R. Browning at Cambridge Universi‐ the expulsion and deportation of Jews and Gyp‐ ty in the Lent Term of 1999. Fortunately, author sies from Reich territory--both old and new--to the and publisher decided not to revise the format of district and Rademacher's Madagascar the original texts substantially. Hence the book as Plan of June 1940 as examples of "timely low-level a whole is very readable, with the individual lec‐ initiative[s] that ofered a way to implement poli‐ tures being shining examples for concise and cy decisions just made at the top" (p. 17). Accord‐ clear argumentation. The lectures address three ing to Browning, both plans were abruptly halted pertinent issues of current Holocaust scholarship: when political circumstances changed without be‐ (a) decision and policy making with regard to the ing formally abandoned. Instead these plans "lin‐ , (b) the role of economic considera‐ gered as the ofcial policy until an alternative tions in these decision making processes, and (c) was proclaimed" (p. 17). Browning illustrates this the behaviour and mindset of those who by referring to the sudden defeat of France and implemented Nazi policy on local level. the problem of fnding space for the incoming eth‐ nic Germans which had rendered the Nisko Plan Addressing these issues in close (and often obsolete, just as the was ren‐ horrible) detail and based on his own extensive dered unrealistic by the failure of the Blitzkrieg archival work, Browning presents the reader with against Great Britain. Similarly, Browning contin‐ a critical, yet very reasoned and diligent discus‐ ues, Heydrich's three Nahplaene (short-range sion of other scholars' viewpoints. plans), aimed at deporting Poles and Jews from The frst two lectures deal with the evolution the recently annexed Polish territories to the Gen‐ of Nazi Jewish policy from the time of the inva‐ eralgouvernement, had to be revised due to sion of Poland to late 1941. Browning discusses in changing conditions in the Generalgouvernement. detail the various plans to implement Nazi racial H-Net Reviews

Browning contends that wartime Nazi Jewish brief entry in Himmler's ofce diary documents policy initially was dominated by the ideological the Fuehrer's instruction to eliminate all the Jews goal to cleanse all Reich territory of Jews and that in Europe: "There can be no doubt that what plans put forward by lower level ofcials to that Himmler wrote down after the vertical line repre‐ efect were readily seized upon without having sented the results of that conversation. But what due regard to their feasibility. Additionally, did the brief notation mean? Linguistically, the Browning contends that these plans either failed statement is an order." I would argue that not to take account of other NS policy objectives--such only is it possible in principle to doubt that this as the resettlement of ethnic Germans and statement is a summing-up of their conversation, wartime economic planning--or were overtaken but there is also no compelling reason to interpret by events in the war. The repeated failure of these what clearly is a notation by Himmler as a state‐ SS plans for ethnic cleansing "left the frustrated ment from Hitler. Linguistically, it may just as German demographic planners receptive to ever well refer to a suggestion that Himmler intended more radical solutions" (p. 17). Browning goes on to put to the Fuehrer at that meeting. Gerlach, to argue that it was in the context of planning the however, doesn't even entertain that thought, invasion of the Soviet Union that Nazi Jewish poli‐ which is not surprising as his whole line of argu‐ cy reached another level of escalation--the whole‐ ment depends on the assumption that this sen‐ sale deportation of Jews from European territo‐ tence refers to a fundamental decision in princi‐ ries ruled or controlled by Germany to a "territory ple by Hitler. And it was this fundamental deci‐ yet to be determined" (i.e., the Soviet Union).[1] sion, Gerlach claims, that is the real reason be‐ Clearly, Browning is not of the opinion that this hind the postponement of the Wannsee Confer‐ phrase (used in late January 1941) was merely a ence: it had to be rescheduled for 20 January 1942 euphemism camoufaging the intended annihila‐ in order to give time to prepare for this new task. tion of European Jewry (p. 21), even though he Browning's refutation of Gerlach's argumen‐ speculates that as early March 1941, Hitler, tation is not based on a linguistic and philological Himmler, and Heydrich might have lost interest analysis of this single entry, even though this in this 'solution' and were thinking "of another alone is sufcient to put a big question mark on possibility, if all went well with the imminent mil‐ Gerlach's hypothesis. Instead, Browning draws on itary campaign" (p. 22). numerous archival records and established facts The question of when and how precisely the to reconfrm his viewpoint that the fate of Euro‐ decision to annihilate the Jews of Europe was pean Jewry had been sealed much earlier than eventually arrived at is at the center of Brown‐ December 1941. And Browning's refutation is as ing's second lecture. Here he takes issue with detailed as it is convincing. For one, he doubts Christian Gerlach's hypothesis [2] that the fate of that Hitler attributed as much meaning to U.S. en‐ German and west European Jewry had still been try into the war as Gerlach would hypothesize undecided in mid-December 1941. According to him to have had. Rather than U.S. entry into the Gerlach, it was the United States' entry into the war, Browning asserts, it was the military situa‐ war that triggered the implementation of Hitler's tion on the eastern front that eventually sealed 1939 prophecy of annihilation. Gerlach refers to the fate of European Jewry. Browning points to an entry under the 18 December 1941 in Himm‐ the fact that Hitler solicited a "feasibility study" ler's Terminkalender as the "'smoking pistol' docu‐ for the physical destruction of European Jews as ment" (p. 34). This entry reads: "Judenfrage ? | Als early as mid-July 1941. He shows that by late Au‐ Partisanen auszurotten" ("Jewish question ? to be gust of that year Eichmann had changed his "year exterminated as partisans" [3]. For Gerlach, this old formulaic answer to the Foreign Ofce" that

2 H-Net Reviews the Final Solution was "imminent" to saying that it less of the economic productivity and usefulness was "now in preparation" (p. 36). Browning stress‐ of its inmates. es that the deportation of Reich Jews began in Browning's fourth lecture is based on 134 tes‐ mid-October, at the same time that Himmler or‐ timonies by survivors of the Starachowice labor dered that all Jewish emigration cease immediate‐ camp (south of Radom). These testimonies fall ly and construction of the Belzec death camp got into three distinct categories: those collected im‐ under way. Unconvincingly, Gerlach tries to ex‐ mediately after the war in Poland, 1960s testi‐ plain away the fact that Belzec was under con‐ monies taken by German investigators, and those struction already well before Hitler's alleged fun‐ videotaped for the Fortunof Archives in the damental decision by stating: "Exactly what fu‐ 1980s. Browning's critical evaluation of these ture expectations were associated with the erec‐ sources is meticulous. This chapter of the book is tion of the Belzec camp remains unknown" (p. all the more relevant and merits scholarly atten‐ 807). Thus, Browning sticks to his well-known the‐ tion because it serves to redress the imbalance sis [4] that the Final Solution was the result of "an that most historiography of is based incremental, ongoing decision-making process on sources that emanated from the perpetrators. that stretched from the spring of 1941 to the sum‐ By combining survivors' testimonies and archival mer of 1942, with key turning points in the mid‐ written evidence, Browning overcomes the short‐ summer and early fall of 1941 that corresponded comings of either category of sources and uses to the peaks of German victory euphoria" (p. 56). them to construct an account of the everyday his‐ Browning's model of incremental, ongoing de‐ tory of this . This account is as fasci‐ cision-making is supported by his fndings on the nating as it is depressing to read, especially when exploitation and destruction of Jewish workers in one learns at the very end that despite these de‐ Poland, the theme of his third lecture. Focusing on tailed testimonies, just one Starachowice guard the situation in Lodz and Warsaw, Browning stud‐ was convicted for exactly one murder (p. 115). ies in some detail the debates over the use of Jew‐ The issue of local initiative and leverage in ish labor between so-called "productionists" the decison-making process is revisited in the ffth (arguing that ghettoized Jews ought to be put to lecture, where Browning discusses the destruc‐ work so as to keep themselves alive by their own tion of the Brest-Litovsk Jewry. The author argues eforts and at their own expense) and so-called that the guidelines issued by the Nazi leadership "attritionists" (who viewed ghettos as a means for a war of destruction against the Soviet Union only to liquidate Jews). Browning shows convinc‐ were interpreted by local authorities in diferent ingly that during those periods in which the "pro‐ ways and that the SS leadership in turn seized ductionists" were permitted to pursue their goals, upon those local initiatives and improvisations "the ultimate ideological goal was never super‐ "that best suited their purposes and institutional‐ seded, just temporarily deferred" (p. 59). Econom‐ ized them as policies and methods to be imple‐ ic considerations (e.g. the labor shortage in Ger‐ mented elsewhere" (p. 126). Where, however, lo‐ many) were allowed to be taken into account only cal initiatives "challenged the regime's policies in so long as there was no agreement over the na‐ principle", they "were crushed with draconic ture of the Final Solution. Once the decision was severity" (p. 142). made for the Final Solution, the ideological goal While Browning is appreciative of recent re‐ proved paramount and the destruction of the gional studies by German scholars [5] that stress commenced in July 1942 regard‐ the importance of local initiatives, he maintains his well-known viewpoint that it is really the in‐

3 H-Net Reviews teraction between local and central authorities Semites" (p. 166). No reserve policeman joined that is key to understanding how the Final Solu‐ them. On the morning of the ghetto clearance one tion evolved. Hence Browning reafrms in this German committed suicide, and following the ac‐ lecture his position combining intentionalist and tion one German lodged an ofcial protest trigger‐ functionalist reasonings, and again he does so ing the ofcial investigation. Browning compares very convincingly. His almost awesome command this with a Jewish survivor's account of the behav‐ of primary sources serves to show that the argu‐ iour of a German Gendarmerie unit in Mir ments of either school are best put to use not to (Byelorussia) which paints a rather similar pic‐ refute each other but to arrive at a synthesis--a ture (pp. 150-154). While Browning acknowledges synthesis, however, that acknowledges the cen‐ that the empirical basis is very small, he never‐ ter's preponderance in the decision-making theless ventures to infer the following: there was process. a "signifcant core of eager and enthusiastic The fnal lecture addresses the issue which is killers [...] who required no process of gradual at the heart of Browning's study of the Reserve brutalization to accustom themselves to their Police Battalion 101 [6]--the motivation, mind-set, murderous task" (p.166). At the same time, the ev‐ and behavior of ordinary Germans involved in idence pertaining to Mir and Marcinkance does the Final Solution. Against the backdrop of his not indicate "any transformation over time into fndings in that study, Browning in this chapter eager killers". And fnally, among both groups looks at three specifc instances of racial persecu‐ there was "a signifcant minority of men who did tion, and he does so by drawing on new evidence not participate in the shooting of Jews" and who from four rather diferent sources: eyewitness ac‐ faced no disciplinary consequences for their ab‐ counts by Jewish survivors; the records of the stention (p. 167). Only when non-participation Schutzpolizei station of Czeladz in East Upper Sile‐ turned into protest (lodging the ofcial complaint) sia; the letters of a member of Reserve Police Bat‐ did tensions arise within the unit and was disci‐ talion 105 in the Baltic; and the records of a Ger‐ plinary action taken. man wartime investigation of an unplanned mas‐ In a way, these new case studies at the micro sacre of the Jews of Marcinkance in the Bialystok level support Browning's own fndings in the pre‐ district in November 1942 (p. 145). Again it is the vious chapter with regard to initiatives taken at combination of both victims' and perpetrators' local and regional level. Anything that challenged perspectives, and the reliance on both survivors' the regime's policy in principle was met with dra‐ memories and documentary facts that add signif‐ conic severity. Apparently, this also applied to the cantly to the quality of this chapter. In particular, individual behaviour of ordinary Germans. Un‐ Browning's detailed account (pp. 159-167) of the fortunately, so Browning concludes his fnal lec‐ ofcial investigation of the unplanned massacre ture, "the presence of a minority of men who at Marcinkance yields interesting information: 17 sought not to participate in the regime's racial Germans had been assigned the task to clear the killing had no measurable efect whatsoever" (p. ghetto which resulted in the unplanned killing of 169). some 100 Jews and the escape of approximately At the same time, however, these new case the same number, of whom 45 survived the war, studies also require Browning to modify one of and of those 17 Germans, only four (two career the conclusions he drew in Ordinary Men. While policemen, a customs ofcial, and a railway man) he sees his original fndings with regard to those joined in the hunt for the escaped Jews. According Germans that sought to abstain from the actual to the documentary evidence available, they were killings supported (i.e, that they were a small mi‐ "all Nazi Party members and avowed anti-

4 H-Net Reviews nority of some 10-20 per cent), his assessment of conference on the role of the Security Service in the so-called "eager killers" needs to be revised. the Nazi regime by Yacoov Lozowick [8]. The as‐ They were actually a "signifcant minority, not a sembled experts on the Security Service found it a majority, and some were transformed by the situ‐ difcult one to answer. ation in which they found themselves. But, many Notes: of them were ideologically motivated men ready [1]. Theodor Dannecker, memorandum dated to kill Jews and other so-called enemies of the Re‐ 21 January 1941. Cf. p. 20. ich from the start" (p. 175). Browning thus goes some way to bridging the gap between his earlier [2]. Christian Gerlach, "The Wannsee Confer‐ position and the fndings of Omer Bartov who ence, the Fate of German Jews, and Hitler's Deci‐ stresses the importance of ideological motivation sion in Principle to Exterminate All European [7]. Nevertheless, with regard to the relative ma‐ Jews", Journal of Modern History. 12 (1998), pp. jority of men in the German Order Police, Brown‐ 759-812. ing maintains that they "complied with the poli‐ [3]. Ibid., p. 780. cies of the regime more out of situational and or‐ [4]. Christopher R. Browning, Fateful Months: ganizational rather than ideological factors" (p. Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution 169). (New York, 1985). Together, these lectures are the best introduc‐ [5]. He mentions, inter alia, Christian Ger‐ tion to current issues in serious lach's and Christoph Dieckmann's articles in Na‐ available at the moment. I would highly recom‐ tionalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik mend the book to any student or scholar looking 1939-1945: Neue Forschungen und Kontroversen, for a succinct summary and critical discussion of ed. Ulrich Herbert (Frankfurt, 1998). the state of knowledge in this feld. [6]. Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: And yet, as it is the case with many studies in Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solu‐ the behavior and motivation of genocidal killers, tion in Poland (New York, 1992). the reader is eventually left pondering the basic [7]. Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, question: how could these men do it? (There were Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York, only very few female perpetrators). The rational 1991). sociological and psychological explanations we academics have to ofer, as concise, analytical, [8]. "Rolle und Politik des SD im NS-Regime", and convincing as they are, answer that question Hamburg (Germany), 11-13 Oct 2001. The confer‐ but partly. Put another way: how can we ultimate‐ ence was organized by Michael Wildt on behalf of ly explain the (crucial) diference in behaviour be‐ the Hamburger Institut fuer Sozialforschung. The tween the small minority that evaded participa‐ proceedings of this conference will be published tion in the killings and those that did not? Or be‐ by Hamburger Edition. See also Jaacov Lozowick's tween those that (merely) evaded participation forthcoming book (together with Haim Watz‐ and the one German at Marcinkance that commit‐ mann), Hitler's Bureaucrats: The Nazi Security ted suicide rather than become part of the ghetto- Police and the Banality of Evil (Continuum Pub. clearing squad? Is it ultimately possible to explain Group, due out March 2002; ISBN: 0826457118). these diferences in behavior without attributing Copyright 2002 by H-Net, all rights reserved. them to a fundamental choice made by the indi‐ H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of vidual human being between good and evil? This this work for nonproft, educational purposes, question was put to the participants of a recent with full and accurate attribution to the author,

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Citation: Joachim Lerchenmueller. Review of Browning, Christopher R. Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers. H-Genocide, H-Net Reviews. April, 2002.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=6134

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