Colour Guide Republican Romans by Michael Farnworth November 2009
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Ancient Greek Hoplites and Their Origins
Ancient Greek Hoplites and their Origins By Jordan Wilde Senior Seminar (HST 499W) June 6, 2008 Primary Reader: Dr. Benedict Lowe Secondary Reader: Dr. Lorie Carlson Course Instructor: Dr. David Doellinger History Department Western Oregon University 1 The ancient Greek hoplites were heavily armed infantry soldiers, known for wearing extensive armor, carrying a large rounded shield, spears, and a sword. By looking at armor, weapons, tactics, and vases recovered from archaeological digs, along with literature of the time, such as Homer’s Iliad (ca. 700 B.C.)1 and Hesiod’s Shield of Heracles (ca. end of the late 8th century B.C)2, who and what a hoplite was can be defined. The scholarly consensus has been that eighth century B.C. is crucial in exploring the origins of hoplites. The eighth century sees a dramatic increase in population leading to the rise of city-states and hoplites. In this paper I am going to consider the evidence for the existence of hoplites during the eighth century B.C. and whether or not there is any evidence for their existence before this. When examining evidence for defining when hoplites first appeared, it’s important to understand what makes a hoplite unique, specifically his equipment, weapons, and tactics. In the article “Hoplites and Heresies,” A.J. Holladay looks at the overall view of the hoplite on the battlefield and some forms of military tactics the Greeks might have had. Holladay examines what is typically assumed as hoplite customs, fighting in a close pack, with their shields in their left hand protecting themselves and their neighbors as well as carrying a spear in their right hand. -
The Biomechanics of Spear Throwing: an Analysis of the Effects of Anatomical Variation on Throwing Performance, with Implications for the Fossil Record
Washington University in St. Louis Washington University Open Scholarship All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) Spring 4-24-2013 The iomechB anics of Spear Throwing: An Analysis of the Effects of Anatomical Variation on Throwing Performance, with Implications for the Fossil Record Julia Marie Maki Washington University in St. Louis Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd Part of the Anthropology Commons Recommended Citation Maki, Julia Marie, "The iomeB chanics of Spear Throwing: An Analysis of the Effects of Anatomical Variation on Throwing Performance, with Implications for the Fossil Record" (2013). All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs). 1044. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1044 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS Department of Anthropology Dissertation Examination Committee: Erik Trinkaus, Chair Ruth Clark Glenn Conroy Jane Phillips-Conroy Herman Pontzer E.A. Quinn The Biomechanics of Spear Throwing: An Analysis of the Effects of Anatomical Variation on Throwing Performance, with Implications for the Fossil Record by Julia Marie Maki A dissertation presented to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2013 St. Louis, Missouri © 2013, Julia Marie Maki TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES v LIST OF TABLES viii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xii ABSTRACT xv CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 Research Questions and Hypotheses 3 CHAPTER 2: THROWING IN CONTEXT 8 CHAPTER 3: THROWING IN THE PALEOLITHIC 16 I. -
ROMAN REPUBLICAN CAVALRY TACTICS in the 3Rd-2Nd
ACTA MARISIENSIS. SERIA HISTORIA Vol. 2 (2020) ISSN (Print) 2668-9545 ISSN (Online) 2668-9715 DOI: 10.2478/amsh-2020-0008 “BELLATOR EQUUS”. ROMAN REPUBLICAN CAVALRY TACTICS IN THE 3rd-2nd CENTURIES BC Fábián István Abstact One of the most interesting periods in the history of the Roman cavalry were the Punic wars. Many historians believe that during these conflicts the ill fame of the Roman cavalry was founded but, as it can be observed it was not the determination that lacked. The main issue is the presence of the political factor who decided in the main battles of this conflict. The present paper has as aim to outline a few aspects of how the Roman mid-republican cavalry met these odds and how they tried to incline the balance in their favor. Keywords: Republic; cavalry; Hannibal; battle; tactics The main role of a well performing cavalry is to disrupt an infantry formation and harm the enemy’s cavalry units. From this perspective the Roman cavalry, especially the middle Republican one, performed well by employing tactics “if not uniquely Roman, were quite distinct from the normal tactics of many other ancient Mediterranean cavalry forces. The Roman predilection to shock actions against infantry may have been shared by some contemporary cavalry forces, but their preference for stationary hand-to-hand or dismounted combat against enemy cavalry was almost unique to them”.1 The main problem is that there are no major sources concerning this period except for Polibyus and Titus Livius. The first may come as more reliable for two reasons: he used first-hand information from the witnesses of the conflicts between 220-167 and ”furthermore Polybius’ account is particularly valuable because he had serves as hypparch in Achaea and clearly had interest and aptitude in analyzing military affairs”2. -
General Principles
The Legion in Civitates Bellatorum General Principles While it is perfectly possible to deploy Roman Legionaries in units of several cohorts or detachments, Civitates Bellatorum is designed to allow players to field whole legions as single units. This is particularly appropriate for the Republican period where there are two possible Legion types the ‘Manipular’ (pre-100 BC) and the ‘Cohort’ (post-100 BC) Legion. A single Manipular Legion Unit should have 6, 9 or 12 heavy infantry stands divided into 3 equal lines. The first two (Hastati and Principes) are pilum-armed swordsmen. The third line is made up of spear- armed Triarii. The Triarii should be as many stands as each of the front lines but count as under- strength representing the fact that a Triarii line had 600 men while the Hastati and Principes were 1200 each. From the late 2nd century BC pilum-armed swordsmen could replace the Triarii. Legionary light infantry and cavalry should be deployed as separated units. A Manipular Legion Unit may be used to represent a single legion or even two ‘legions’ (one Roman legion plus their allies), depending on the scale being used. For example, at scale of 1 full strength stand = 1200 men, a Legion unit of 6 stands could represent both the Romans and their allies. At a scale of one stand = 300 men, a 12 stand unit could represent a single Roman Legion without allies. From the late Republic onwards, a Cohort Legion Unit should have 5-10 stands, again depending on the scale being used. For example, with smaller scale figures, such as 6mm and 2mm on 20mm bases, it is practical to have each stand representing a cohort of 400-500 men with each Legion Unit containing 10 stands (or maybe 11 to represent a double-strength First Cohort). -
The Military Reforms of Gaius Marius in Their Social, Economic, and Political Context by Michael C. Gambino August, 2015 Directo
The Military Reforms of Gaius Marius in their Social, Economic, and Political Context By Michael C. Gambino August, 2015 Director of Thesis: Dr. Frank Romer Major Department: History Abstract The goal of this thesis is, as the title affirms, to understand the military reforms of Gaius Marius in their broader societal context. In this thesis, after a brief introduction (Chap. I), Chap. II analyzes the Roman manipular army, its formation, policies, and armament. Chapter III examines Roman society, politics, and economics during the second century B.C.E., with emphasis on the concentration of power and wealth, the legislative programs of Ti. And C. Gracchus, and the Italian allies’ growing demand for citizenship. Chap. IV discusses Roman military expansion from the Second Punic War down to 100 B.C.E., focusing on Roman military and foreign policy blunders, missteps, and mistakes in Celtiberian Spain, along with Rome’s servile wars and the problem of the Cimbri and Teutones. Chap. V then contextualizes the life of Gaius Marius and his sense of military strategy, while Chap VI assesses Marius’s military reforms in his lifetime and their immediate aftermath in the time of Sulla. There are four appendices on the ancient literary sources (App. I), Marian consequences in the Late Republic (App. II), the significance of the legionary eagle standard as shown during the early principate (App. III), and a listing of the consular Caecilii Metelli in the second and early first centuries B.C.E. (App. IV). The Marian military reforms changed the army from a semi-professional citizen militia into a more professionalized army made up of extensively trained recruits who served for longer consecutive terms and were personally bound to their commanders. -
The Impact of the Roman Army (200 BC – AD 476)
Impact of Empire 6 IMEM-6-deBlois_CS2.indd i 5-4-2007 8:35:52 Impact of Empire Editorial Board of the series Impact of Empire (= Management Team of the Network Impact of Empire) Lukas de Blois, Angelos Chaniotis Ségolène Demougin, Olivier Hekster, Gerda de Kleijn Luuk de Ligt, Elio Lo Cascio, Michael Peachin John Rich, and Christian Witschel Executive Secretariat of the Series and the Network Lukas de Blois, Olivier Hekster Gerda de Kleijn and John Rich Radboud University of Nijmegen, Erasmusplein 1, P.O. Box 9103, 6500 HD Nijmegen, The Netherlands E-mail addresses: [email protected] and [email protected] Academic Board of the International Network Impact of Empire geza alföldy – stéphane benoist – anthony birley christer bruun – john drinkwater – werner eck – peter funke andrea giardina – johannes hahn – fik meijer – onno van nijf marie-thérèse raepsaet-charlier – john richardson bert van der spek – richard talbert – willem zwalve VOLUME 6 IMEM-6-deBlois_CS2.indd ii 5-4-2007 8:35:52 The Impact of the Roman Army (200 BC – AD 476) Economic, Social, Political, Religious and Cultural Aspects Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, 200 B.C. – A.D. 476) Capri, March 29 – April 2, 2005 Edited by Lukas de Blois & Elio Lo Cascio With the Aid of Olivier Hekster & Gerda de Kleijn LEIDEN • BOSTON 2007 This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC 4.0 License, which permits any non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. -
The Samnite Legacy
THE SAMNITE LEGACY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE SAMNITIC INFLUENCES UPON THE ROMAN STATE WILLIAM DOBERSTEIN Bachelor of Arts, University of Lethbridge, 2014 A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Lethbridge in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS History Department University of Lethbridge Lethbridge, Canada © William Doberstein, 2014 THE SAMNITE LEGACY: AN EXAMINATION OF SAMNITE SOCIETY AND ITS LASTING INFLUENCES UPON THE ROMAN STATE WILLIAM DOBERSTEIN Date of Examination: Dr. Christopher Epplett Associate Professor Ph.D Supervisor Dr. Kevin McGeough Associate Professor Ph.D Thesis Examination Committee Member Dr. David Hay Associate Professor Ph.D Thesis Examination Committee Member Dr. Heather Ladd Assistant Professor Ph.D Chair. Thesis Examination Committee Abstract The objective of this thesis is to fully deconstruct and isolate the considerable Samnite contributions to the Roman state during the period of the Samnite Wars. Although the literary sources have espoused a Samnitic origin for many Roman institutions, very little academic focus has been directed towards these claims. Scholars have generally tended to focus on one or two of these claims only as part of a larger argument. Thus no comprehensive examination of Romano-Samnite interactions exists, with the majority of studies depicting a unilateral process of Romanization. Since the Romanization of the Samnites has been widely documented, this study will focus on the reverse process, a “Samnitization” of Roman society. This will be achieved by examining the potential Samnite origins of the Roman military oath, gladiatorial munus, and the manipular organization and its armaments. Although the available literary and archaeological evidence prevents any definitive conclusions, these institutions appear to have significant Samnite elements; this illustrates a vibrant society which was not dominated by Roman society, but actively interacted and integrated with it. -
“Won by the Spear” the Importance of the Dory to the Ancient Greek Warrior
ПРАКТИКА ОБУЧЕНИЯ ВОЕННОМУ ДЕЛУ В ДРЕВНЕЙ ГРЕЦИИ “WON BY THE SPEAR” THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DORY TO THE ANCIENT GREEK WARRIOR Steven Ross MURRAY The spear, or dory, was the major weapon of the ancient Greeks. The ancient Greek warrior, especially the hoplite, was known for his prowess in using the dory as a thrusting weapon in hand-to-hand combat and as part of the formidable Greek phalanx, but the dory, too, could be used as a missile weapon, when necessary. Other spe- cialized throwing-spears were commonplace among the ancient Greeks’ arsenal of weapons. The Greeks incorporated a throwing loop, called an ankyle, that was used to maximize the distance that a spear could be thrown, enhancing the ancient Greeks’ military domi- nance on the battlefield. The dory, and its athletic kin, the javelin, or akon or akonition, were fixtures in ancient Greece, and often Greek soldiers would carry two spears into battle for an edge over their ad- versaries. The following is a description of the dory, its construction and development, and how modern-day experiments indicate how impressive the ankyle was at helping the ancient Greeks to achieve victory that was “won by the spear”. Sophocles, in his fifth century BCE tragedy, Ajax, forever immor- talized the importance of the spear, or dory (δόρυ), to the ancient Greeks. The dory was the weapon of choice for the ancient Greek warrior, espe- cially the hoplite, who would typically be fitted with a helmet, greaves, and a shield for protection1, but used the spear as his main offensive weapon. -
Roman Painting 6001.Pdf
6001 6002 ROMAN WARS-Legionary 6003 Painting Instructions 1 In addition to filing off any flash from the figure, the 5 Paint as supplied is usually too thick. Thin with the bottom should be flattened where the ingot was removed. appropriate thinners until it covers the areas touched by the 2 Wash the figure in warm soapy water in preparation for brush but does not spread to other areas. painting. 6 Shading or dry brushing will enhance detail on the figures 3 Prime the pieces with a white undercoat then allow 24 giving better depth and animation. hours to dry. 7 We recommend that you give the figures a coat of either matt 4 Always paint the lighter colours first as these are easily or gloss varnish. Remember however never to varnish over overpainted with a darker colour. metal finish paints as this may cause the metallic sheen to spread to other areas which you have carefully painted. FLESH B = BASE (B) 860 Med Flesh + 815 Basic Skintone DB = DRY BRUSH (W) 846 Mahogany Brown W = WASH (DB) 860 + 815 Light mix HELMET & ARMOUR (B) 950 Black (DB) 863 Gunmetal Grey + 997 Silver mix 878 Old Gold mix with 998 Bronze for decorations TUNIC (B) 908 Carmine Red (W) 814 Burnt Cad Red. SANDALS, LEATHER BELTS, STRIPS & SWORD SHEATH (B) 981 Orange Brown (W) 939 Smoke PILUM (JAVELINS - bottom) (B) 977 Desert Yellow (W) 828 Woodgrain + 939 Smoke TOP SHAFT 864 Natural Steel SHIELD 864 Natural Steel (Trim) 908 Carmine Red (Front) 951 White (Embossed image) 878 Old Gold mix with 998 Bronze (Boss) SHIELD BACK (B) 977 Desert Yellow, (W) 828 Woodgrain + 939 Smoke SWORD HILT 878 Old Gold mix with 998 Bronze BASE (B) 890 Reflective Green, (DB) 967 Olive Green + 915 Yellow All figures were primed and undercoated in white undercoat, and further coats of paint were dry brushed or painted over this. -
Phalanxes and Triremes: Warfare in Ancient Greece by Ancient History Encyclopedia, Adapted by Newsela Staff on 08.08.17 Word Count 1,730 Level 1230L
Phalanxes and Triremes: Warfare in Ancient Greece By Ancient History Encyclopedia, adapted by Newsela staff on 08.08.17 Word Count 1,730 Level 1230L A lithograph plate showing ancient Greek warriors in a variety of different uniforms. Photo from Wikimedia. In the ancient Greek world, warfare was seen as a necessary evil of the human condition. Whether it be small frontier skirmishes between neighboring city-states, lengthy city-sieges, civil wars or large-scale battles between multi-alliance blocks on land and sea, the vast rewards of war were thought to outweigh the costs in material and lives. While there were lengthy periods of peace, the desire for new territory, war booty or revenge meant the Greeks were regularly engaged in warfare both at home and abroad. Toward professional warfare The Greeks did not always have professional soldiers. Warfare started out as the business of private individuals. Armed bands led by warrior leaders, city militias of part-time soldiers provided their own equipment and may have included all the citizens of the city-state. Eventually, the conduct of warfare started to move away from private individuals and into the realm of the state. This article is available at 5 reading levels at https://newsela.com. In the early stages of Greek warfare in the Archaic period, training was haphazard. There were no uniforms or insignia and as soon as the conflict was over the soldiers would return to their farms. By the fifth century B.C, the military might of Sparta provided a model for all other states to follow. -
Ross Burns Justinian's Fortifications East of Antioch
Ross Burns Justinian’s Fortifications East of Antioch Almost fifty years ago, Dillemann put the issues starkly – fortifications were a useless distraction: The Notitia Dignatatum, at the beginning of the 5th Century, only speaks of units, generally cavalry, with their bases. In [Procopius’] Buildings, the only issues are fortified positions with no mention of units. Defence policy has reached sclerosis. Previously, positions were surrounded by walls of light construction, like enclosures, which attracted Procopius’ disapproval. For good reasons Justinian’s predecessors judged it useless to raise solid ramparts; it was a nonsense to condemn cavalry to defend them. The latter only had to be given shelter from the blows of marauders and pillagers; they did not imagine they had to withstand a siege.1 Is it true, as Dillemann has argued, that Justinian put too much faith in fortresses and not enough in manpower and élan? As a corrective, we have Liebeschuetz’s observation that while fortresses did not in themselves amount to an impermeable physical barrier, they prevented permanent occupation of territory by an enemy. In the sixth century there was no way in which the Persians could be prevented from penetrating into the Empire. The only way to check an invasion was by means of a field army strong enough to defeat or at least to threaten the invading force. Fortified cities provided no kind of barrier and most of them could be captured easily. Nevertheless, they too had an important function. They provided shelter for the inhabitants, their corn and their animals. They also provided bases for Roman armies operating in the neighbourhood…[The Persians] could not remain in permanent occupation while the cities were not in their hands.2 It is well recognised that no line of fortresses can operate as an effective line of defence in its own right.3 Nevertheless, the distribution of forts could mark out the extent of territory a state sought to control for most purposes. -
Roman Warfare and Fortification
Roman Warfare and Fortification Oxford Handbooks Online Roman Warfare and Fortification Gwyn Davies The Oxford Handbook of Engineering and Technology in the Classical World Edited by John Peter Oleson Print Publication Date: Dec 2009 Subject: Classical Studies, Ancient Roman History, Material Culture Studies Online Publication Date: Sep 2012 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734856.013.0028 Abstract and Keywords This article concentrates on the role of technology in improving the operational capabilities of the Roman state. It reviews the organizational and weapon system developments that enabled Roman armies to engage their enemies with confidence in the field, alongside the evolution of fortification schemes that enabled economies of force, which were essential to imperial security. Roman weapons and equipment include the spear, sword, missiles, artillery, shields, helmets, and body armor. Although the Roman army was often on the attack and made use of complex siege technology, it was also highly skilled in the preparation of defensive fortifications. The Romans diligently applied themselves to the arts of war. Their successful mastery of battlefield techniques and their adoption, where appropriate, of equipment and technologies first introduced by their opponents allowed Roman armies to sustain the state over several hundreds of years of challenge and change. Keywords: Roman armies, Roman warfare, Roman fortification, spear, sword, missiles, artillery, shields, helmets, body armor Warfare and the Romans A message relayed to the Roman people by Romulus after his translation to the heavens, stands as an unambiguous endorsement of Roman military prowess. “Tell the Romans that it is the gods' will that my Rome shall be the capital of the world; therefore let them cultivate the arts of war and let them know and teach their children that no human force can resist Roman arms” (Livy 1.16.7).