UNIVERSALITY of PUNISHMENT Horizons (In Semiotica, 2013); Create to Rule

Unità del sapere giuridico 14 Quaderni di scienze penalistiche e filosofico-giuridiche ANTONIO INCAMPO is Full Professor of Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza We only have to consider the ius commune Philosophy of Law at the University of Bari Università degli Studi di Bari “Aldo Moro” of tenth-century continental Europe (or “Aldo Moro.” In the past, he was Director of the ius gentium of the Romans) to realise the Department of Criminal Law, Criminal that the concept of law has historically Procedural Law and Philosophy of Law at the been undergoing an irreversible process University of Bari, and President of the Degree of maturation, particularly intense in the Courses of the Second Faculty of Law at the twentieth century, towards rational universality. same University. He is author of numerous One central goal of contemporary law, essays on philosophy and semiotics of legal however, which is of paramount importance language. Among his major works are: Sul to the studies in this volume, is that the law Fondamento della Validità Deontica. Identità should not only be supra-national, but also Non-Contraddizione (Bari, 1996), Atto e universally enforceable. Every nation has Funzione. Sistema di Deontica Materiale A obligations to other nations, inevitably with Priori (Bari, 1997), Validità Funzionale di Norme the rise of the modern state, which are not (Bari, 2001), Filosofia del Dovere Giuridico restricted to the defence of national borders, (Bari, 2003, 20122), Ricerche di Filosofia del and which could potentially involve the Diritto, with A.G. Conte, P. Di Lucia, G. Lorini, W. use of force in defence of the common ed. by A. Incampo and W. Zełaniec

Zełaniec (Turin, 2007), Metafisica del Processo. good irrespective of sovereignty or national

Idee per una Critica della Ragione Giuridica borders. In this way, the law is increasingly (Bari, 2010), Verità e Processo Penale, with “Let us be sacrificers, but not butchers, Caius.” becoming a true “nómos of the Earth.” V. Garofoli (Milan, 2012), Herbert Schambeck. What are the issues? Paradoxically, while Sein und Sollen: Grundfragen der Philosophie the law is supra-national in its intent and des Rechtes und des Staates, with H.F. Köck, William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, II, 1 significance, that is not how penal courts C. Hermida del Llano, A. Szmyt (Berlin, 2014). around the world work. Rights may be universal, but the means and methods of punishment are not. While there is a general international consensus concerning the WOJCIECH ZEŁANIEC teaches philosophy at unlawfulness of certain acts – for example, the University of Gdansk´ (Poland). In the past, genocide or war crimes – the diverse he has carried out research at the International justice systems do not deliver a coherent Academy of Philosophy in the Principality of response when it comes to punishment. Liechtenstein, SUNY in Buffalo NY and the UNIVERSALITY The studies in this volume all arrive at the Julius Maximilian University in Würzburg, same basic conclusion: progress in the Germany. He has also taught at Czestochowa˛ universalization of law presupposes penal (Poland), Würzburg, Zielona Góra (Poland), OF PUNISHMENT justice based on the fundamental right to Istanbul, Santiago de Chile and in Cagliari. human dignity – it is unthinkable to have His most recent work includes: On a Value edited by Antonio Incampo and Wojciech Zełaniec laws based on human rights enforced of Eccentricity (in Rivista di Estetica, 2014); by a totally inhumane penal system. An Example of the “Synthetic A Priori:” On

How It Helps Us to Widen Our Philosophical UNIVERSALITY OF PUNISHMENT Horizons (in Semiotica, 2013); Create to Rule. Dust jacket: Studies on Constitutive Rules (Milan, 2013); Herbert Boeckl, Apokaliptische Reiter ,1952–1960 Truth-Value and Self-Reference. Against the CACUCCI EDITORE (Engelkapelle, Abtei Seckau) Spectre of the ‘Revenge Liar’ (Milan, 2013). € 35,00 BARI

Unità del sapere giuridico Quaderni di scienze penalistiche e filosofico-giuridiche

Collana diretta da Antonio Incampo e Vito Mormando

Comitato scientifico

Angiola Filipponio, Heribert Franz Köck, Mariano Menna, Francesco

Palazzo, Carlo Enrico Paliero, Luigi Pannarale, Otto Pfersmann, Aldo Regina, Adolfo Scalfati, Herbert Schambeck, Giorgio Spangher,

Gunther Teubner, Wojciech Żełaniec.

Comitato di redazione

Marilena Colamussi, Enzo Dell’Andro, Francesco Di Renzo, Massimo Leccese, Giuseppe Losappio, Vincenzo Bruno Muscatiello, Lucia Iandolo

Pisanelli, Maria Antonella Pasculli, Porzia Teresa Persio, Guglielmo Siniscalchi, Maurizio Sozio, Nicola Triggiani, Miranda Zerlotin.

I volumi inseriti nella collana, ritenuti preliminarmente ammissibili dai Direttori con l’ausilio del Comitato scientifico, sono sottoposti alla revisione tra pari [peer review] secondo i regolamenti attualmente vigenti per le pubblicazioni scientifiche.

Universality of Punishment

edited by Antonio Incampo and Wojciech Żełaniec

Cacucci Editore

Bari

PROPRIETÀ LETTERARIA RISERVATA

Ai sensi della legge sul diritto d’autore e del codice civile è vietata la riproduzione di questo libro o di parte di esso con qualsiasi mezzo, elet- tronico, meccanico, per mezzo di fotocopie, microfilm, registrazioni o altro.

Stampato in Italia Printed in Italy

Puglia Grafica Sud - Bari

Contents 5

Contents

Introduction p. 7

I. WHAT PUNISHMENT?

Salvatore Amato, Criminal Punishment in Crisis » 15

Matthew H. Kramer, Retributivism in the Spirit of Finnis » 29

Giuseppe Lorini, Revenge as Universal Legal Structure vs. Revenge as Individual Legal Institution » 61

Marek Piechowiak, Plato’s Conception of Punitive Justice » 73

Gregorio Robles, The Communication Theory of Law and the Juridical Coercion » 97

Maurizio Sozio, What Punishment in a “Brave Neuro World”? » 107

Leo Zaibert, Justifying Incarceration » 135

Wojciech Żełaniec, Now You Know: The Educative Purpose of Punishment » 155

II. UNIVERSAL JUSTICE

Diane Bernard, Claims to Universality, an Obstacle to International Criminal Justice? » 173

Hope Elizabeth May, Virtue Jurisprudence and the Function of Punishment in International Criminal Law » 187

Maria Antonella Pasculli, Some Reflections on Restorative Justice in Searching for Universal Justice » 215

Damien Scalia, The Illusion of Universality in International Criminal Law » 231 6 Universality of Punishment

III. PUNISHMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Cristina Hermida del Llano, The Universality of Human Rights and the Universality of Punishment p. 251

Antonio Incampo, Don’t Kill Cain: Towards a Theory of Mesofacts and Punishments » 263

Heribert Franz Köck, Universality of Punishment and the Common Good of Mankind: Some Considerations of Principle » 277

Guglielmo Siniscalchi, Escape … to Alcatraz: Rechtsgefühl, Punishment, Prison Movies » 309

Acknowledgements » 329

About the authors » 331

Index » 333

Diane Bernard 171

II.

UNIVERSAL JUSTICE

172 Universality of Punishment

Diane Bernard 173

Diane Bernard

Claims to Universality, an Obstacle to International Criminal Justice?

There is no established theory of crime or punishment in international criminal law. A general rejection of impunity i.e. a will to punish is proclaimed in the search for international peace, as if punishing were the only option and an obvious reaction to mass atrocities. This paper discusses such ‘obviousness’ by focusing on the alleged ‘universality’ of international criminal law. My hypothesis is that its alleged universality could constitute a hindrance to the project of justice for mass atrocities. International criminal law is here defined as the branch of law dedicated to international crimes – genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression, considered as the “worse crimes.”1 This essay focuses more specifically on the International Criminal Court (ICC, founded by the Rome Statute), but references will also be made to national law and to the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). My argument first focuses on the alleged universality of international criminal law, but also on the resistance to this overarching discourse (sub 1). I then challenge the “universalisability” of the justifications for penalties by the ICTs and the ICC (sub 2).

1. A claim to universality

The view that the punishment of some crimes is universally justified is explicitly stated in the concept of universal jurisdiction (i), and implemented in the Statute of the ICC (ii). It nevertheless is encountering growing opposition (iii).

1 A definition of international crimes is to be found in Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2008, pp. 3–27. 174 Universality of Punishment

(i) Unlike other principles of jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction does not require any link to the locus delicti, the nationality of the offender or victims, nor the interests of the State. It transcends national sovereignty and the right of the accused to be prosecuted before his “natural judge” because of “the interest of the international community […].”2 The view that a community of nations shares common values, to be collectively and singularly protected, is not new.3 However, historically, the gravity of the crime i.e. a breached value was not the foundation of universal jurisdiction: it was due to fill the negative conflicts of jurisdiction in cases where no State was directly called to prosecute (piracy on the high seas, in particular).4 Therefore, the ratio legis of universal jurisdiction has always been to prevent any crime from going unpunished but, since the end of World War II, it has been dedicated to “serious crimes.”5 Hostes humani generis are not pirates any more, but perpetrators of heinous crimes, such as genocide or war crimes. These crimes are “so grave” that they are deemed to affect international peace and security, and even the morals of an “international community.” 6 Thus, the principle of universal jurisdiction enables each State to assert jurisdiction over these crimes on behalf of the international community.7 (ii) The Statute of the ICC explicitly relies on universality. It states that the gravest crimes “shock the conscience of humanity”8

2 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, in ‘Virginia Journal of International Law,’ 42 (2001), pp. 81–162, p. 96. 3 See Cesare Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, 1965, p. 71. 4 Noora Arajärvi, Looking back from Nowhere: Is there a Future for Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes?, in ‘Tilburg Law Review,’ 16 (2011), pp 5–29, p. 8. 5 The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Program in Law and Public Affairs, 2001, Principle 1, p. 18. 6 Bruce Broomhall, Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes under International Law, in ‘New England Law Review,’ 35 (2001), pp. 401–420, p. 402. Crimes against humanity holds this very same idea in their wording. 7 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, in ‘Virginia Journal of International Law,’ 42 (2001), p. 88. 8 In this regard, see also the Preamble of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948. Diane Bernard 175

(al. 2) and “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world” (al. 3), being therefore “of concern to the international community as a whole” (al. 4) “for the sake of present and future generations” (al. 9). Since the first expressions of international criminal justice, universality has been at the heart of this project: Robert Jackson already referred to “the common sense of mankind” in his opening address to the Nuremberg trials.9 M. Cherif Bassiouni, chairman of the drafting committee of the Rome Statute, defined the establishment of the Court as embodying “certain fundamental values and expectations shared by all peoples of the world.”10 Antonio Cassese, former president of the ICTY and the STL, and one of the most distinguished experts in the field, referred to the “fundamental dictates of humanity.”11 The universality of the ICC is technically implemented through the definition of its territorial jurisdiction. The Court may judge crimes committed on the territory of State Parties or by their nationals (art. 12–2), but it may also intervene in situations deferred to The Hague by the Security Council of the United Nations (art. 13–b). De jure, the Rome Statute therefore applies to the 122 State Parties to the Rome Statute, but also to every member of the United Nations.12 This makes is (potentially) quasi-universal. (iii) Political issues strongly limit the ‘universality’ of international criminal law.13 US resistance to its subversive potential has sapped the Belgian Law on universal jurisdiction;14 the Spanish

9 Michael R. Marrus (ed.), The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945–46: a Documentary History, 1997, p. 80. 10 M. Cherif Bassiouni in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Court. Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2008, p. XXVII. 11 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2008, p. 18. 12 Robert Kolb and Damien Scalia, Droit international pénal, 2012, p. 276. 13 Dalila V. Hoover, Universal Jurisdiction not so Universal: a Time to Delegate to the International Criminal Court, in ‘Cornell Law School Inter- University Graduate Student Conference Papers,’ 52 (2011), pp. 14–19; for a more general point of view, see Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court. Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law, 2004. 14 Antoine Bailleux, L’histoire de la loi belge de compétence universelle. Une valse à trois temps: ouverture, étroitesse, modestie, in ‘Droit et société,’ 59 (2005/1), p. 107–134. 176 Universality of Punishment courts have encountered similarly strong opposition.15 While, on the one hand, States officially support the quest for justice and the struggle against impunity for the “worse crimes,” on the other, they do not want to give up their sovereignty, and risk being publicly prosecuted, even through individuals, for their military or political positions. Moreover, opponents to the ICC present it as a pillar of Western hegemony. The judiciary ritual and mechanism are part of the Western tradition and could therefore be poorly trusted by people used to other judicial customs. Based on economic and socio-political arguments, this critique has been growing for the last few years, in particular in East Africa. 16 Moreover, if Western opinion seems to consider the Rome Statute as well ratified, one could say that more than 50 percent of the world’s population does not officially acknowledge it (the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt). This leads to the conclusion that universality is more a claim and a vocation than an actual characteristic of international criminal law.

2. The non “universalisability” of penal justifications

More theoretically, the universality of international criminal law seems hard to maintain with regard to the justifications brought to legal punishment. Two main conceptions are traditionally opposed in the justification of penalties: retributivism and utilitarianism. 17 In general, both are partially confounded. And indeed, the International

15 Javier Chinchon Alvarez, Anàlisis formal y material de la reforma del principio de jurisdicciòn universal en la legislaciòn española: de la ‘abrogaciòn de facto’ a la ‘derogaciòn de iure,’ in ‘La ley,’13345 (2009). 16 See e.g. Stéphanie Maupas, La CPI, une justice de blancs, in ‘Le Monde,’ 4 July 2013 ; or AFP, L’Union africaine dénonce la ‘chasse raciale’ opérée par la Cour pénale internationale, 27 mai 2013. 17 See Michel van de Kerchove, Sens et non-sens de la peine, 2009. Diane Bernard 177

Tribunals have simultaneously implemented both: the ICTY and the ICTR have consistently stated that the two main functions of punishment are retribution and deterrence.18 In this view, punitur quia peccatur (the individual must be punished because he broke the law), but also punitur ne peccetur (he must be punished so that he and others will no longer break the law). The ICC takes the same direction in justifying its punitive action.19 These justifications cannot be fully applied on an “international scale” either because they require an impossible consensus on morals and politics, or because they appear as practically impossible to implement. A brief analysis of retributivism (i) and the different utilities of punishment considered by the literature (ii) can confirm this scale discrepancy. (i) In retributivism, also called deontic or non-consequentialist justification, the penalty is a reaction to a crime already committed.20 The perpetrator is punished because of the harm he has inflicted. This vision is founded on an ideal or a value: the criminal has to suffer for his crime because what he did was wrong. No attention is drawn to the consequences of the sentence: the first goal is to settle with the past. This justification already appears in the Treaty of Versailles,21 and nothing appears in the Nuremberg or Tokyo judgements about the utility or specific goal

18 ICTY, Zoran Kupreškic et al., IT-95-16, Judgement, 14 January 2000, § 848; or ICTY, Anto Furundžija, IT-95-17/1, Judgement, 10 December 1998, § 288; ICTY, Zlatko Aleksovski, IT-95-14/I, Judgement (Appeal), 24 March 2000, § 185; ICTR, Jean Kambanda, IT-97-23-S, Judgement, 4 September 1998, § 26; ICTR, Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, Sentence, 2 October 1998; ICTR, Georges Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3, Judgement and Sentence, 6 December 1999, § 456. 19 See Damien Scalia, Du principe de légalité des peines en droit internatinal pénal, 2011. 20 A.C. Berghuis, La prévention générale: limites et possibilités, in Aglaia Tsitsoura (ed.), Les objectifs de la sanction pénale. En hommage à Lucien Slachmuylder, 1989, p. 70. 21 Art. 227: “The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” 178 Universality of Punishment of penalties: 22 it was all about retribution. 23 The reason why perpetrators of the worst crimes are punished is to be found in their breach of fundamental values, the harm they have inflicted on the community. There are major objections to retribution. First, retribution requires a proportionality between the crime and its penalty, or at least between the penalties themselves. However, it is impossible to find a proportionality between a judgement and mass murder or genocide,24 or to compare it to “common sentences” for “ordinary crimes:” damages caused by international crimes are incommensurable; moreover, penalties for international crimes do not follow a proportionate grid of severity. Second, the idea of an absolute justice is illusory with regard to the diversity of human nature and activity: claiming to define the international justice seems morally dangerous and potentially hegemonic, especially in times of conflict and delicate political balances.25 This second objection directly refers to universality as an obstacle to the legitimacy of international criminal justice. (ii) Utilitarianism is also restricted by references to an alleged universality. Deterrence is the ultimate rationale of penalties. It may be specific (to prevent the offender from recidivism) or general (as a general dissuasion addressed to all). Specific deterrence is of little significance in international

22 See Michael R. Marrus (ed.), The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945–46: a Documentary History, 1997, p. 80. 23 Roelof Haveman, Supranational Expectations of a Punitive Approach, in Roelof Haveman, Olaoluwa Olusanya (eds.), Sentencing and Sanctioning in Supranational Criminal Law, 2006, pp. 66–69. 24 Frederik Harhoff, Sense and Sensibility in Sentencing – Taking Stock of International Criminal Punishment, in Ola Engdahl and Pål Wrange (eds), Law at War: the Law as It Was and the Law as It Should Be. Liber Amicorum Ove Bring, 2008, p. 5. 25Tzvetan Todorov, The Limitations of Justice, in ‘Journal of International Criminal Justice,’ 2 (2004), p. 715; Alain Papaux, Développement durable, jus cogens et justice internationale, in Christophe Eberhard (ed.), Droit, gouvernance et développement durable: les nouveaux chemins de la responsabilité, 2008, pp. 731–746. Or more generally, Hannah Arendt, La condition de l’homme moderne, 1961, p. 271. Diane Bernard 179 criminal law: the accused are very unlikely to get the opportunity to commit genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity again. General deterrence is considered as one of the two primary justifications of international penal action.26 In the Preamble to the Rome Statute, States declare themselves to be “determined to put an end to impunity […] and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.” 27 The risk of judicial prosecution could indeed discourage a few belligerents, even if it remains a low risk; 28 criminal trials could also prevent victims from seeking revenge by committing crimes in return.29 It is, however, ethically difficult to punish an individual in order to deter others: the ICTY itself has admitted “that a sentence should in principle be imposed on an offender for his culpable conduct – it may be unfair to impose a sentence on an offender greater than is appropriate to that conduct solely in the belief that it will deter others.”30 Moreover,

26 Roelof Haveman, Supranational Expectations of a Punitive Approach, in Roelof Haveman, Olaoluwa Olusanya (eds.), Sentencing and Sanctioning in Supranational Criminal Law, 2006, p. 147; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Etude historique: 1919–1998, in CPI ratification et législation nationale d’application, 1999, p. 2: “les buts de la CPI incluent les objectifs suivants: établir une justice exemplaire et rétributive, fournir réparation aux victimes, se rappeler l’histoire, renforcer les valeurs sociales et la rectitude individuelle, éduquer les générations présentes et à venir et – le plus important – décourager et prévenir de futures déprédations humaines.” 27 StICC, Preamble, alinea 5. 28 See e.g. Pierre Hazan, La paix contre la justice? Comment reconstruire un Etat avec des criminels de guerre, 2013, p. 10: “L’intrusion de la justice a forcé les différents protagonistes à penser différemment la guerre et la construction de la paix. Le risque judiciaire existe désormais pour les belligérants. Il est faible, mais il n’est pas nul.” 29 Fourth annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, A/52/375 – S/1997/729, 18 September 1997, §§ 117–118; or Antonio Cassese, Quelques réflexions sur la justice pénale internationale, in Emmanuela Fronza and Stefano Manacorda (eds.), La justice pénale internationale dans les décisions des tribunaux ad hoc, Etudes des Law clinics en droit pénal international, 2003, pp. 284 et 289–290. 30 ICTY, Dragoljub Kunarac, IT-96-23, Judgement, 22 February 2001, § 840 (italics from the judges). A contrario, see ICTY, Tihomir Blaškić, IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 3 March 2000, § 761. 180 Universality of Punishment apart from a few exceptions, “everybody knows that prevention does not work, even if we hope it might one day. Everybody knows but knowledge has no consequences.” 31 Three judges at the European Court of Human Rights also stated that “the (general or individual) preventive effect of sentences has long been the subject of extensive studies and research, particularly of an empirical nature. Such studies have concluded that this effect is relative, if not limited.”32 Indeed, the ICTY did not prevent the Srebrenica slaughter nor the 1999 drama in Kosovo,33 and neither the decisions made by the ICTR nor the ICC Congolese cases seem to have had any impact on the M23 or, more generally, on war in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. No impact on ongoing conflicts is visible and, even so, deterrence could never be measured (how could one evaluate an event that did not occur?). Accused and convicted people, moreover, share no common characteristics: historically and geographically, their crimes have been committed within very different (sometimes competing) groups, in the name of different (sometimes competing) ideologies. For all these reasons, it seems inaccurate, or at least premature, to allege that general deterrence could justify punishment. The “utility” of punishment requires a common background shared by all the convicted people, and a reception in all and every conflict zone. In other words, universality is here requested ... but absent.

31 Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, in ‘European Journal of International Law,’ 2002, pp. 561 and 590; in the same sense, see Damien Vandermeersch, La mesure de la responsabilité et de la peine, in Françoise Tulkens, Yves Cartuyvels and Christine Guillain (eds.), La peine dans tous ses états. Hommage à Michel van de Kerchove, 2011, p. 152; Michel van de Kerchove, Le sens de la peine, 2009, pp. 205– 207; David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, in ‘Fordham International Law Journal,’ 23 (1999–2000), p. 475. 32 EctHR, Gäfgen v. Allemagne, Requ. 22978/05, 1 June 2010, Joint partly concurring opinions of judges Tulkens, Ziemele and Bianku, § 5. 33 See Danilo Zolo, Peace Through Criminal Law, in ‘Journal of International Criminal Justice,’ 2 (2004), p. 732. Diane Bernard 181

Reparation is a second utilitarian justification for punishment. It consists of the idea that the perpetrator of a crime must pay compensation (be punished) for the suffering or damage caused.34 While deterrence aims for a better future, reparation focuses on the present.35 Creating the ICTs, the Security Council was “convinced” that those tribunals would “contribute to ensuring that […] violations are […] effectively redressed;” the Statutes did not concretise this, but several actions were taken to allow for reparations.36 The Statute of the ICC better establishes clear “principles relating to reparations to, in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.”37 However, many concrete difficulties ruin these consequentialist expectations. First, as previously stated, “the worst crimes” seem irreparable: the damages are too serious. Second, it would be impossible to hear and offer reparation to all victims – universality here appears as an unattainable goal, almost a lie. If neither deterrence nor reparation can be obtained, what could be the utility of international trials? One hypothesis is that international punishment may contribute to the strengthening of values.38 This is known as the “social pedagogical function” of penalties, mobilising a kind of immaterial consequentialism: the criminal is punished “in order to” do something and not “because of” something. Individual and collective representations

34 Michel van de Kerchove, Sens et non-sens de la peine, 2009, pp. 231–233. 35 François Ost and Michel van de Kerchove, Le présent, horizon paradoxal des sanctions réparatrices ?, in Loïc Cadiet, Marie-Jeanne Campana and Soukaïna Bouraoui (eds), Philosophie du droit et droit économique. Quel dialogue ? Mélanges en l’honneur de Gérard Farjat, 1999, pp. 477–492. 36 See Luc Walleyn, Victimes et témoins de crimes internationaux: du droit à une protection au droit à la parole, in ‘Revue internationale de la Croix Rouge,’ 845 (2002), p. 59; Victims’ compensation and participation, Appendix to the Letter dated 2 November 2000 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2000/1063; Letter dated 14 December 2000 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2000/1198. 37 StICC, art. 75 and 79. 38Jean-Pierre Brodeur, Sanction pénale et contre-impunité, in ‘Informations sociales,’ 127 (2005), on cairn.info (last accessed on 8. March 2015). 182 Universality of Punishment are produced to revive the values that have been affronted by the crime. This directly refers to Durkheim: “the essential function of punishment is not to make the guilty expiate his crime through suffering or to intimidate possible imitators through threats, but to buttress those consciences which violations of a rule can and must necessarily disturb in their faith.”39 Penalties here appear as a way to express disapproval of crimes, and therefore allow for memory and truth–criminal law is not about punishing first and foremost, but about reinforcing law and order. This last utilitarian function is questionable nevertheless: it implies a social consensus (expressed by norms reinforced by penalties), and so could consist of the imposition of a Western moral code on the rest of the world. It leads to a narrative that can hardly be described as universal; in other words, the same censure here applies as against retributivism. Excluding universality, that is, admitting a certain relativity, would certainly reinforce this (potential) justification.

3. Conclusion

Struggling against impunity is the leitmotiv of international criminal justice. However, no axiological discourse exists to support this fundamental goal: all and every crime has to be punished, but the choice for criminal law i.e. judicial punishment is not fully explained. The ICTs and the ICC certainly aim at contributing to peace, but without really clarifying the connection between their decisions and reconciliation or political pacification. Is criminal law the obvious answer to mass atrocities? In Western countries maybe. However, there is no universal law, not much universal jurisdiction, and most probably no universal morals. Justifications of penalties do not pass the “universality test.” Moreover, politics never stop demonstrating that one judicial decision can be differently received and perceived,40 so

39 Emile Durkheim, L’éducation morale, 1963, p. 141. 40 See the recent demonstrations in Croatia and Serbia, following the acquittement of their respective nationals by the ICTY. Diane Bernard 183 that justice is certainly not universally recognised. In the sense, Ricoeur incidentally writes that any true universality would erase history, every person becoming a stranger to herself, 41 deprived of her own past, genealogy, and references. International criminal law therefore entertains an “asymptotic” connection with universality. The latter goal is pursued, but will never be achieved, even if a progression can be operated ‒ it is a utopian vocation. At the same time, this vocation often appears as a claim: international criminal justice is presented as emanating from “the community” or “mankind.” This phenomenon, of course, reduces the impact of international decisions, as they do not implement their “universal” claim. Concretely, expressing more humility could certainly reinforce the legitimacy of international criminal law. International criminal justice may contribute to peace, but does so within a whole set of political, humanitarian, and social actions. Judgements therefore officially presenting punishment as “one answer (among others) to this crime committed in this peculiar situation” could also promote cooperation between judicial actors and civil society; for example, the defendants of alternative reactions to mass atrocities. A path may be found between the call for justice expressed by the moral breach committed by mass criminals and the absolute imposition of one kind of moral and judicial answer.42 Then, universality could remain a utopian dream, more than an obstacle to the legitimacy and credibility of justice.

41 Paul Ricoeur, Sur la traduction, 2004, p. 18. 42 Tsvetan Todorov, The Limitations of Justice, in ‘Journal of International Criminal Justice,’ 2 (2004), p. 715. 184 Universality of Punishment

Bibliography

AFP, L’Union africaine dénonce la ‘chasse raciale’ opérée par la Cour pénale internationale, 27 mai 2013. Arajärvi, Noora, Looking back from Nowhere: Is there a Future for Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes?, in ‘Tilburg Law Review,” 16 (2011), pp 5–29. Arendt, Hannah, La condition de l’homme moderne, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1961. Bailleux, Antoine, L’histoire de la loi belge de compétence universelle. Une valse à trois temps: ouverture, étroitesse, modestie, in ‘Droit et société,’ 59 (2005/1), pp. 107–134. M. Cherif Bassiouni and Bruce Broomhall (eds.), CPI ratification et législation nationale d’application, (coll. Nouvelles Etudes Pénales), Érès, Paris, 1999. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, in ‘Virginia Journal of International Law,’ 42 (2001), pp. 81–162. Beccaria, Cesare, Dei Delitti e Delle Pene, Franco Venturi (ed.), Einaudi, Turin, 1965. Berghuis, A.C., La prévention générale: limites et possibilités, in Aglaia Tsitsoura (ed.), Les objectifs de la sanction pénale. En hommage à Lucien Slachmuylder, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1989, pp. 69–100. Brodeur, Jean-Pierre, Sanction pénale et contre-impunité, in ‘Informations sociales,’ 127 (2005), online. Broomhall, Bruce, Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes under International Law, in ‘New England Law Review,’ 35 (2001), pp. 401–420. Broomhall, Bruce, International Justice and the International Criminal Court. Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004. Cassese, Antonio, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. Cassese, Antonio, Quelques réflexions sur la justice pénale internationale, in Emmanuela Fronza and Stefano Manacorda (eds.), La justice pénale internationale dans les décisions des tribunaux ad hoc. Etudes des Law clinics en droit pénal international, Dalloz/Giuffrè, Paris/Milan, 2003. Chinchon Alvarez, Javier, Anàlisis formal y material de la reforma del principio de jurisdicciòn universal en la legislaciòn española: de la ‘abrogaciòn de facto’ a la ‘derogaciòn de iure,’ in ‘La ley,’13345 (2009). Durkheim, Emile, L’éducation morale, PUF, Paris, 1963. Harhoff, Frederik, Sense and Sensibility in Sentencing – Taking Stock of International Criminal Punishment, in Ola Engdahl and Pål Wrange (eds), Law at War: the Law as It Was and the Law as It Should Be. Liber Amicorum Ove Bring, Nijhof, Leiden, 2008, pp. 121–140. Haveman, Roelof, Supranational Expectations of a Punitive Approach, in Haveman Roelof and Olusanya Olaoluwa (eds.), Sentencing and Sanctioning in Supranational Criminal Law, Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford, 2006, pp. 66–69. Diane Bernard 185

Hazan, Pierre, La paix contre la justice? Comment reconstruire un Etat avec des criminels de guerre, GRIP/André Versaille, Bruxelles, 2013. Hoover, Dalila V., Universal Jurisdiction not so Universal: a Time to Delegate to the International Criminal Court, in ‘Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers,’ 52 (2011), p. 32, online. Kolb, Robert and Damien Scalia, Droit international pénal, Helbing, Basel, 2012. Marrus, Michael R. (ed.), The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945–46: a Documentary History, Bedford Books, Boston, 1997. Maupas, Stéphanie, La CPI, une justice de blancs, in ‘Le Monde,’ 4 July 2013. Ost, François and Michel van de Kerchove, Le présent, horizon paradoxal des sanctions réparatrices?, in Loïc Cadiet, Marie-Jeanne Campana and Soukaïna Bouraoui (eds), Philosophie du droit et droit économique. Quel dialogue? Mélanges en l’honneur de Gérard Farjat, Frison-Roche, Paris, 1999, pp. 477–492. Papaux, Alain, Développement durable, jus cogens et justice internationale, in Christophe Eberhard (ed.), Droit, gouvernance et développement durable: les nouveaux chemins de la responsabilité, FUSL/Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2008, pp. 731–746. Ricoeur, Paul, Sur la traduction, Bayard, Paris, 2004. Scalia Damien, Du principe de légalité des peines en droit international pénal, Larcier, Bruxelles, 2011. Tallgren, Immi, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, in ‘European Journal of International Law,’ 13 (2002), pp. 561–595. Todorov, Tzvetan, The Limitations of Justice, in ‘Journal of International Criminal Justice,’ 2 (2004), pp. 711–715. Triffterer, Otto (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Court. Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, Beck/Hart/Nomos, Munich/Oxford/ Baden-Baden, 2008. van de Kerchove, Michel, Sens et non-sense de la peine, Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, Bruxelles, 2009. Vandermeersch, Damien, La mesure de la responsabilité et de la peine, in Françoise Tulkens, Yves Cartuyvels and Christine Guillain (eds.), La peine dans tous ses états. Hommage à Michel van de Kerchove, Larcier, Bruxelles, 2011, pp. 149–162. Walleyn, Luc, Victimes et témoins de crimes internationaux: du droit à une protection au droit à la parole, in ‘Revue internationale de la Croix Rouge,’ 845 (2002), pp. 51–78. Wippman, David, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, in ‘Fordham International Law Journal,’ 23 (1999–2000), pp. 473–488. Zolo, Danilo, Peace Through Criminal Law, in ‘Journal of International Criminal Justice,’ 2 (2004), pp. 727–734.

186 Universality of Punishment

331

About the authors

Salvatore Amato, Full Professor of Philosophy of Law, Department of Law, University of Catania, Italy; Member of the National Bioethics Committee. Diane Bernard, Post-doc Researcher at the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS); Professor at the University of Saint-Louis (Brussels), UCL (Louvain) and ULg (Liège), Belgium; Visiting Researcher at the Harvard Law School, Cambridge (Massachusetts), USA. Cristina Hermida del Llano, Professor of Philosophy of Law, King Juan Carlos University of Madrid, Spain. Antonio Incampo, Full Professor of Philosophy of Law, Department of Law; Former Director of the Department of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedural Law and Philosophy of Law, University of Bari “Aldo Moro,” Italy. Heribert Franz Köck, Emeritus Professor of Law, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria; Former President of the Fédération Internationale pour le Droit Européen. Matthew H. Kramer, Professor of Legal and Political Philosophy, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge, England. Giuseppe Lorini, Associate Professor of Philosophy of Law, Department of Law, University of Cagliari, Italy. Hope Elizabeth May, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Professional and Personal Ethics, Central Michigan University, USA. Maria Antonella Pasculli, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, Department of Law, University of Bari “Aldo Moro,” Italy. Marek Piechowiak, Professor of Philosophy of Law and Head of the Department of Theory, Philosophy and History of Law, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Institut of Law (Branch Faculty in Poznań), Poland. Gregorio Robles, Full Professor of Philosophy of Law, University of the Balearic Islands (Palma de Mallorca), Spain; Ordinary Member of the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences (Madrid), Spain. Damien Scalia, Advanced Researcher at the Swiss National Science Foundation and at the CRID&P (UCLouvain); Invited Professor at the USL-Brussels, Belgium. Guglielmo Siniscalchi, Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Law, Department of Law, University of Bari “Aldo Moro,” Italy. Maurizio Sozio, Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Law, Department of Law, University of Bari “Aldo Moro,” Italy. Leo Zaibert, Professor of Philosophy and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Union College, USA. Wojciech Żełaniec, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Chair of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism, University of Gdańsk, Poland. 332

Puglia Grafica Sud -Bari

104