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Small Vessel Security Strategy Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SMALL VESSEL SECURITY STRATEGY APRIL 2008 i Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy FOREWORD Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, maritime security efforts have focused primarily on large commercial vessels, cargoes, and crew. Efforts to address the small vessel1 environment have largely been limited to traditional safety and basic law enforcement concerns. Small vessels are, however, readily vulnerable to potential exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other criminals. Small vessels have also been successfully employed overseas by terrorists to deliver Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs). Additionally, a significant number of these craft Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of operate internationally, especially in regions such distinguishing between the vast number of as the Great Lakes, the Gulf of Mexico, and the legitimate vessel operators and the relatively few Caribbean Sea. During Fiscal Year 2006, only individuals engaged in illicit activities. The 70,000 boater foreign arrivals were recorded in the challenge is immense, as it involves nearly 13 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) million registered U.S. recreational vessels,2 Pleasure Boat Reporting System (PBRS), based on 82,000 fishing vessels, and 100,000 other boater self-reporting. Conservative estimates commercial small vessels. On any given day, a suggest that these reporting figures represent only considerable number of these boats share a fraction of the actual international boater traffic, waterways with commercial and military traffic, especially given the ease with which boaters operating at hundreds of U.S. ports and in the operate in these waters. immediate vicinity of critical maritime infrastructure, including bridges and waterfront Currently, the U.S. Government has an incomplete facilities such as petrochemical plants. More knowledge of the international recreational information concerning small vessels is needed to boating public, their travel patterns, and the improve the proper assessment of the risk posed facilities they use. Couple this with the limited by these vessels. The challenge is to balance the information available regarding fishing fleets and collection of requisite information necessary for the multitude of small commercial vessels proper assessment of risk posed by these vessels, operating in or near U.S. waters and the with the freedom of the seas expected by the small complexity of the issue becomes obvious. boating community. Hence, there is a clear need to close security gaps and enhance the small vessel security environment. The Small Vessel Security Strategy 1 (SVSS) addresses these concerns and provides a Small vessels are characterized as any watercraft regardless of method of propulsion, less than 300 gross tons. Small vessels can include commercial coherent framework to improve maritime security fishing vessels, recreational boats and yachts, towing vessels, uninspected and safety. It envisions a coordinated effort of passenger vessels, or any other commercial vessels involved in foreign or U.S. voyages. Federal, state, local, and Tribal authorities, 2 CG 2006 boater statistics compiled from state boater registration reports together with international partners, private (does not include unregistered watercraft, which, when combined with industry, and recreational users of the waterways. registered boats, is estimated at 17 million total U.S. watercraft). i Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD................................................................................................................................................................................. i TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................................................iii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................................................................... iv INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................................................ 1 PURPOSE OF THE STRATEGY................................................................................................................................ 1 SCOPE............................................................................................................................................................................ 1 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER STRATEGIES AND PLANS................................................................................... 1 METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................................................ 2 KEY DEFINITIONS ..................................................................................................................................................... 2 STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT................................................................................................................................................. 4 IMPORTANCE OF THE MARITIME DOMAIN ..................................................................................................... 4 MARITIME GOVERNANCE...................................................................................................................................... 5 SMALL VESSEL COMMUNITY................................................................................................................................ 5 SMALL VESSEL RISK ................................................................................................................................................ 6 STRATEGIC VISION............................................................................................................................................................... 15 GUIDING PRINCIPLES ............................................................................................................................................ 15 OVERARCHING VISION AND MAJOR GOALS ................................................................................................. 16 RISK MANAGEMENT............................................................................................................................................................. 22 ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND COORDINATION............................................................... 24 THE WAY AHEAD ................................................................................................................................................................... 29 CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................................................... 31 APPENDIX A—UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES...............................................A-1 APPENDIX B—RELEVANT AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................................... B-1 APPENDIX C—EXISTING INTERAGENCY INSTITUTIONS .......................................................................................C-1 APPENDIX D—ACRONYMS................................................................................................................................................D-1 iii Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) exists within the framework of other security strategies. It does not replace any of the current strategies or relevant documents. Rather, this strategy harmonizes directions from related strategies into a multi-layered, unified approach for the component agencies within the DHS, and to lay the groundwork for DHS participation in coordination across all levels of government, as well as other public, private and international stakeholders in the maritime domain. This strategy’s purpose is to address the risk that small vessels1 might be used to smuggle terrorists or WMD into the United States or might be used as either a stand-off weapon been effective in controlling risk in the operation platform or as a means of a direct attack with a of larger vessels that fall under the traditional WBIED. The resulting risks are difficult to oversight and regulations of commercial manage because small vessels are not centrally operations in international trade. These solutions registered, operators have not always provide direction, but each solution needs to be demonstrated proficiency in small vessel creatively adapted to suit the circumstances of operations, and the ability to screen or detect small vessels, due to their difference in size, vessel-borne hazards is extremely limited. There operation, and use compared to larger is, moreover, a tradition and expectation among commercially operated vessels. the large population of small vessel operators of largely unrestricted access to U.S. waterways. This strategy identifies specific goals where efforts can achieve the greatest risk reduction This strategy also describes the small vessel across the breadth of the
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