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Homeland Security: Defending U.S. Airspace

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Homeland Security: Defending U.S. Airspace Order Code RS21394 Updated June 6, 2006 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Homeland Security: Defending U.S. Airspace Christopher Bolkcom Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary The September 11th attacks drew attention to U.S. air defense, and the 9/11 Commission Report recommended that Congress regularly assess the ability of Northern Command to defend the United States against military threats. Protecting U.S. airspace may require improvements in detecting aircraft and cruise missiles, making quick operational decisions, and intercepting them. A number of options exist in each of these areas. A variety of issues must be weighed including expediency, cost, and minimizing conflicts with civilian aviation. This report will be updated. Background In response to the Cold War threat of Soviet bombers and cruise missiles, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in1958.1 NORAD deployed a network of radars, fighter aircraft, and surface- to-air missiles (SAMs) around the United States. The emergence of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the 1960s drew attention away from U.S. air defenses. The air and cruise missile threat appeared to decline further with the Soviet Union’s demise, and growing U.S. superiority over other hostile air forces. Because an air attack on the United States appeared unlikely, DOD relaxed its posture. By September 11, 2001, only 14 Air Force fighters at 7 bases were assigned to protect the continental United States (CONUS) from air attacks.2 This number has subsequently been increased to over 100. Today, NORAD operates radars in the United States and Canada, oriented outward, to detect air attacks from foreign countries. NORAD augments these radars by communicating with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which operates its own radars, and by flying E-3 AWACS aircraft. NORAD commands F-15 Eagle, F-16 Falcon, and Canadian CF-18 fighter aircraft flying combat air patrols (CAP) and on strip alert (prepared to take off on short notice). NORAD’s Command and Control (C2) centers 1 For more information about cruise missiles and proliferation see CRS Report RS21252, by Andrew Feickert. 2 Adam Hebert, “Ongoing Operations Made NORAD Response to Sept. 11 ‘Seamless,’” Inside the Air Force, Dec. 21, 2001. Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress CRS-2 are located at Cheyenne Mountain Air Station (CO), Elmendorf AFB (AK), Tyndal AFB (FL), and Canadian Forces Base, (Winnipeg Manitoba). The Air National Guard is also a key organization in continental air defense. In July 2004, it was reported that The Air Force had permanently transferred the homeland defense air patrol mission to the Air National Guard, shifting more than $84 million from the Air Force operations and maintenance budget.3 Due to the September 11 attacks, and the growing threat of cruise missiles, some policy makers are re-evaluating today’s modest U.S. air defenses. Improving defense of U.S. airspace poses numerous challenges to defense planners, who must assess the pros and cons of several military options. As part of its oversight role, Congress may be called upon to assess these options and determine the most effective mix of systems employed. Indeed, the 9/11 Commission Report [http://www.9-11commission.gov/] specifically recommended that DOD and congressional oversight committees “should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command’s strategies and planning to defend the United States against military threats to the homeland.” Subsequent congressional legislation on intelligence reform (H.R. 10 and S. 2845) do not directly address this recommendation. Air Defense Challenges Effectively protecting U.S. airspace requires detecting threatening aircraft and cruise missiles, making decisions on how to address these threats (called “command and control”, or C2), and negating these threats. On June 9, 2004, a small aircraft carrying the governor of Kentucky flew into restricted airspace around Washington, DC. The misidentified aircraft caused panic among Capitol Hill employees, and two F-15s were scrambled to intercept the aircraft.4 This event suggests that 2½ years after the September 11 attacks, effective defense of U.S. airspace is still in question. Surveillance. Detecting and tracking airborne threats to the United States are complicated by environment and enemy tactics. The large volume of airspace that must be surveyed presents one key environmental challenge. Airspace over the continental United States is estimated at approximately 3 million square miles.5 Enemy tactics could include flying low to the ground, which makes detection difficult, or applying stealth technology, which reduces an aircraft’s vulnerability to radar detection. As the September 11th hijackers demonstrated, turning commercial or civil aircraft into weapons is another tactic that would make threat detection difficult. Command & Control. Expediently identifying airborne threats, and accurately verifying that they are not civilian or friendly military aircraft is a key air defense challenge. The large amount of air traffic within CONUS will likely make separating “friend from foe” difficult. FAA data show that on a given day, over 80,000 distinct domestic commercial aircraft movements (e.g., departures, overflights) take place over 3 Cynthia Di Pasquale, “Air Sovereignty Alert Becomes Permanent Air Guard Mission,” Inside the Air Force, July 16, 2004. 4 David Hughes, “Capitol Hill Investigates King Air Security Incident,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 12, 2004. 5 R.W. Rogers, “Terrorists Exploited U.S. Air Defense,” Newport News Daily Press, Oct.7, 2001. CRS-3 CONUS.6 These 80,000 aircraft movements do not include international flights, or the approximately 200,000 civil aircraft in the United States that fly some 24 million flight hours annually. Nor does this number include military aircraft that fly within both civilian and military airspace. Air defense C2 over CONUS is further complicated by the fact that decision making will not be a solely military enterprise. Civil entities such as the FAA, and the U.S. Customs Service, and military authorities will require seamless communications and hardware interoperability to make effective decisions. Intercept. Anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), or military aircraft can shoot down enemy aircraft and cruise missiles. In dire situations, hijacked civilian aircraft may also need to be shot down, although negating this threat in other ways will likely be preferred. Minimizing civilian casualties both in the air and on the ground may be a key challenge, especially if the threatening aircraft or missile carries weapons of mass destruction. Adequately covering the large number of assets (e.g., cities, nuclear power plants, military facilities, national buildings and monuments) will also be challenging. Options and Issues Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOD increased the resources devoted to CONUS air defense by deploying an aircraft carrier to New York harbor and by flying fighter CAPs over major cities. NATO allies contributed to this effort (called Operation Noble Eagle) by flying AWACS aircraft over CONUS. Although these efforts were welcome, they appear unsustainable in the long term, as Operation Noble Eagle costs DOD about $3 billion per year.7 DOD must still develop a long-term plan for improving air and cruise missile defense of CONUS. When considering air defense options DOD may evaluate factors such as expediency, potential impact on commercial and civil air traffic, potential competition with other military needs, and minimizing collateral damage and civilian casualties. Designing a defense that can address the whole range of potential threats (e.g., enemy bombers, stealthy cruise missiles, and hijacked commercial aircraft), yet be optimized to address the most likely or most dangerous threat may also be a key challenge. Cost is another key consideration. Estimated costs for air and cruise missile defense of CONUS vary widely depending on assumptions regarding the threat (e.g., number of attackers, flight characteristics, and payload), what is to be protected, system effectiveness (the number of “leakers” that is acceptable) and the exact mix of systems deployed. A 1986 study estimated that a system capable of defeating a Soviet air and cruise missile attack would cost on the order of $70 billion.8 A 1989 study estimated that fielding a system that could defend the 20 largest U.S. cities and 50 military installations from a large scale air and cruise missile attack would cost between $54 billion and $170 billion, 6 [http://www.apo.data.faa.gov/faaatadsall.htm]. 7 Elizabeth Rees. “USAF Forced to Pay ‘05 Noble Eagle Bill; Money not in Supplemental. Inside the Air Force. Feb. 11, 2005. 8 Barry Blechman. “The Macroeconomics of Strategic Defenses,” International Security, Winter 1986-1987, pp. 33-70. CRS-4 depending on the exact mix of forces deployed.9 A more contemporary study suggests that an air and cruise missile defense system for CONUS could cost in the neighborhood of $30 billion, with annual operating costs on the order of $1 billion.10 Surveillance. Surveillance radars can be divided into three categories: ground- based, airborne, and space-based. The primary advantage of ground-based radars is that they tend to be less expensive to field and operate than other radars. A shortcoming of ground-based radars is that they tend to have trouble detecting low flying aircraft. Features such as mountains and buildings block or “clutter” the radar picture, and the Earth’s curvature leaves gaps in coverage that low-flying threats can exploit. NORAD already operates a network of ground based radars, and it will likely serve as one component of a CONUS defense surveillance system. Improvements in this network may be considered however, including upgrading the radar to improve its ability to detect stealthy threats, deploying more radars to cover gaps in coverage, and fielding radars that survey airspace within CONUS, to augment today’s outward looking radars.
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