CEU eTD Collection THE FUTURE OF AL-QAEDA AFTER THE DEATH OF BIN in partial offulfilment therequirements forthedegree ofMaster of Artsin Public Policy LADEN: FIGHTING TERRORISM FIGHTING LADEN: Supervisor: Professor Evelyne Professor Supervisor: Patrizia Hübscher Central EuropeanUniversity Department of Public Policy Department of Budapest, Hungary Roman Roman Kalina Submitted to 2012 By CEU eTD Collection The loss will of defeat tothe lead support of al-Qaeda. strengthof whichis al-Qaeda core group, group. the supportof public, willlosethe the group, but to target the ideology of al-Qaeda United counterterrorist States’ strategy be wouldnottherefore to target leader the of the as a whole. By discreditingthe for aim main The associates. close his and Laden bin Osama by the set was which ideologyideology, of the the upon act al-Qaeda hierarchy, which of elements and arethethird second dangerous value, death of cause therefore and bin not Laden damagethe More will group. tothe is with a group flexiblethe where structure, the coreleadership has nowadays only a symbolic factal-Qaeda In al-Qaeda. and of terrorism the defeat final asa Americans by the celebrated Abstract Death of the leader of al-Qaedabin May2,2011,was Laden Death oftheleader Osama of on terrorist group i CEU eTD Collection University. which memy necessary attheCentral were giving they support, during studies European Public forPolicy, providing the and sources, making the study-friendly environment. andmefor introducing to interesting of the subject terrorism. me valuable advices on how tostructure my paper andwhich direction myshould go. project Acknowledgments Last but not least I would like to thank my family and my girlfriend Klaudia for the for Klaudia girlfriend my and family my thank to like would I least not but Last of Department the to especially University, European Central the to grateful I am likeI wouldinspiration, thank also for Nikolai to Professor Sitter providing sources, I am thankful to my supervisor Professor Evelyne Patrizia Hübscher, whohad given ii CEU eTD Collection References ...... 38 Conclusion ...... 36 Chapter 4: End of al-Qaeda?!of ChapterEnd4: ...... 22 Chapter...... Al-Qaeda3: 14 Chapter 2: Osama bin Laden ...... 8 Chapter 1:Islamic resurgence ...... 5 Introduction...... 1 contentsof Table ...... iii Acknowledgments...... ii Abstract ...... i contents of Table 4.3 Defeating al-Qaeda: Giving them whattheywant...... 30 Negotiations 4.2 ...... 28 Targeted4.1 assassinations militaryinvasionsand ...... 23 Al-QaedaLaden3.2afterbin death of ...... 19 Structureal-Qaeda3.1of ...... 16 9/11afterLaden Bin 2.3 ...... 12 Laden’sfatwasBin 2.1 ...... 10 1.1 Modern jihad ...... 5 4.3.2 New role:4.3.2New negotiator Peace ...... 32 EasternMiddle4.3.1Challenge ...... 30 iii CEU eTD Collection iv CEU eTD Collection 1 differences into wavesin his differences article classified these (2012), DavidC.history, Rappoport andtherefore the varied throughout and of achievement andthepolitical actions of a political goals cases violent), goal. Types is inmost an features:(which action characteristic deed,or two contain these definitions program of action that embark– different fear,to some quite terrorist –notthe else on of which “leadssomebody will accomplish whateverinspireto DavidFromkin ends.” fearforassigned political (1975) terrorism the creation with is that the terrorist(1995), Israeli definedPrime Minister, “the it andas deliberate systematic assaulton civilians really desires.”intimidating join into concessions” it, 1997).BenjaminNetanyahu or (Feeman, opponents All of purpose of attracting attention to a political cause, forcing those aloof from the struggle to for military of action targets illegitimate be to normally considered persons orother civilians properly defined. understand the impactof binkilling Laden on global phenomenonterrorism, this behas to terrorism. Terrorism was not always labelled as a global threat, and thereforein order to terrorism as a threat is still present.sea within United 24 hours. States hadDeath and captured killed its number oneenemy,but of bin Laden will influence the resurgence bin infaceLaden. He Osama was his assassinated andhouse, in Pakistani buried the of the global 2001 attack on the World 11, September for the whichwasresponsible al-Qaeda, leader group terrorist the planet”, of Trade Center in New York, and the icon of the modernIntroduction Islamic Navy SEALS Diplomat’s dictionary defines terrorism as a“use of terrorism Diplomat’s againstnon-combatants, dictionary violence defines Special Forces States On May2,2011Unites The four wavesThe four ofmodern terrorism. 1 1 killed, “the most wanted man on the on man wanted most “the killed, CEU eTD Collection addition of the ‘martyrs’ i.e. suicide bombers (Rapoport, 2012). Terrorist attack on the United achievein to their with techniques goals, order terrorist arecombining previous terrorists The vanguardMuslim state. nowadaysdoubt is al-Qaeda. organization without Islamic is of the establishment so-calledthe resurgence Islamic goal of The main defining by its aspect. religious is characteristic threat wave actual the and assassinations kidnappings and of achieve influentialthe to people inorder their goal.Fourth ofit. features Italian Red Brigadesand Faction Red Army German were using targeted the with regime, least at or socialism, establish to order in order, political against, fought which movements, Leftist or aMarxists were terrorists wave Third as awhole. establishment state the wave challenging first as the was same terrorism of wave Third countries. coherent in nationally emerged in terrorism newtrend conflicts, nationalist does the so present, representatives of the second wave of terrorism. However, the nationalistmovements are still police like of Groups “oppressor”. the Irish IRA,Palestinian or Algerian PLO, FLN, are the fight the army and the to in order warfare of guerrilla use bythe replaced was assassination the targeted of Tactics nation. their of achieve sovereignty the to was nationalists to nationalism, which is the characteristic With feudal anarchism fall changed wholewere killedthe regimes, Europe. the of throughout feature of the second“Golden Age ofAssassinations”, during whichtheleaders and representatives regimes of wave of terror. Goal of the Russian in assassinated the Czar AlexanderThe peak II 1881. firstof the wavewasin 1890s they because group, terrorist anarchist successful most was Volya Narodnaya change. assassination of the fought“famous against the old Czarist regime. In order toachieve theirpolitical goals they focused on public figures”, wereanarchists, who terrorists Russian emerged.Nineteenth century modern terrorism the which represented the regime they wanted to First wave of terrorism started in the late 19th century in Russia, and it is also where 2 umma, which is the creation of the of creation is the which CEU eTD Collection tactics should United States implement in order to defeat al-Qaeda? Assassination of of the Assassination defeatal-Qaeda? to in implement order States United should tactics group. Global terrorism will remain untouched and the question that follows from this is what the death of bin Laden he Therefore isdeadoraliveis hisideology among andresonates still hissupporters. present would not hurt al-Qaeda,whetherbut figure,independently. Laden wasanimportant cellswhich act Bin different the nor would it enhance in becamefranchise organization group a hierarchically centred strictly 1980s. From the the potential of would or leaveretaliations, it unchanged? thegroup Al-Qaedahad evolved since late the the terrorism? Would it lead to the complete end of the calledgroup,creator of group 2011;Cronin,a terrorist 2009). (Sheuer al-Qaeda or would it sparkon the information providedthe by the mass media. Osama bin Laden wavewas a jihad warrior and the of narratives”, which follows from the misinformation, using the wrong sources, orfrom relying case bin of Laden itself. These byMichael were labelled (2011)as“binLaden’s Scheuer in the is also ideas and arguments of mixture Same 9/11. since stronger significantly became Paul Riedel and(2007), AbelR. Pillar BariAtwan (2011), (2006)arguethat al-Qaeda (2001), and RikCoolsaet(2005) claim al-Qaeda was that established inthelate 1980s.Bruce Peter L. Bergen Ontheotherhand, isposes Michael Scheuer (2011), group exaggerated. the that threat the since2001,andtherefore major capable attack not al-Qaedaof is argue that Qaeda as agroupforthefirst timein 1998.FawazGerges(2011)and JohnMueller (2006) years the between and State 1996and 2001,United the al- States Departmentreferred to existed isitrecognized popularly as al-Qaeda Jason Burke (2003), According to differ. them about thoughts worldwide, attacks terrorist many in involved been have they although because since then terrorism became a ‘global threat’ (Satya, 2002). is by 2001 executed in SeptemberStates on 11, the turningal-Qaeda ageof pointthe terror, How will assassination of bin Laden influence the nature of global of andthe al-Qaeda nature influence the binLaden willof How assassination Since September 11,2001al-Qaedamostgroup nowadays, is recognizable terrorist 3 CEU eTD Collection Qaeda and its manual. which are derived from the analysis of the life of the bin Laden, his writings and history of al- provide recommendations fortheUnitedwhich States, defeatare aimed atthe of al-Qaedathe Chapter 3will will al-Qaedaconclude happen what to after death the binof Laden. of the subchapter last The al-Qaeda. of characteristics hierarchy, and ideologies, functions, from 1996 and 1998, and his and position role inal-Qaeda. Qaeda. ideas of who Islamicideologues, the had theimpact onbin Laden and on ideology the of al- articles by specialists on terrorism, al-Qaeda andbinLaden. and books literature: a secondary alsoused I defeatal-Qaeda. to in order government U.S. Zawahiri’s writingof theare religiousthe base fromterror,Zawahiri’s al- Ayman which and I theam motivationsanalyzing theand recommendationsthe goals of al-Qaeda. towards Bin Laden’s and al- Occupying the Land of the ofthe TwoOccupying theLand HolyPlaces bin usedal-Qaedaalso manual, Laden’s I Laden. bin on impact an have also which Azzam, Yusuf Abdullah Sheikh and Faraj, Salam Deen Ahmad Ibn Qutb,Syed Sayyid AbulTaymiyyah, A'la Maududi,Muhammad abd al- of al-Qaeda. power the will undermine it but be weakness, not seen as goals will of their fulfilment This aretangible. Qaeda which biggest enemy of the al-Qaeda, have to aimhurt the tacticsinternally, on fulfilling i.e.some of itsthe be Al-Qaedasuccessful. hasto not are and Iraq, Afghanistan of invasion leadership the and goalsideology of al- has to be compromised, and therefore United States, as the The structure of my dissertation will be as follows: beas will of mydissertation The structure In my I usedoriginaldissertation of works prominentthe Islam likethinkers Taqi ud- Chapter 2 will portray life will of portray binOsama Laden,hisideas in reflected his two Knights under Banner theProphet's fatwa’s 4 , and : Declaration of War Declaration of against theAmericans Jihad againstJews andCrusaders , in order to understand nature the in to , order Chapter 3 Chapter 1 I will describe history, describe will I willsummarize the Chapter 4 fatwas , and , CEU eTD Collection Sharia. of law Islamic the implement and elements, these of get to is therefore Islam of meaning True freedom. his limiting are which distinctions, social and racial like elements from man a 2004). Qutb(2004) tried define(Laqueur, of to defendjihad, goals Islamic the whichwereto in 1966andhis Muhammad brother Qutb,university spreadhisprofessor, ideastothe world Sayyid Qutb,Egyptian school wrote mostinspector, of his thoughtsin prison, wherehe died Abul A'la Maududi, Muhammad abd al-Salam Faraj, and Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. 1.1 Modern jihad entirely." [Qur'an.8:39] 2:193, Allah and Muhammad, "until Prophet no is there persecution and the religion isAllah's upon act IbnGod’s (Doran,orders 2002). punish wanted Taymiyyah Muslims,do notto (2004) who form. They want to a get it Salafispurify want to isIslam, which back according them nowadays not to worshiped inits pure to its original form, ProphetMuhammad. the to is which referring “the forefathers,” venerable al-Salaf al-Salih, which was acting in accordance key figures in formulation of Salafism (Laqueur, 2004). Salafism is(Salafiyya) from derived with against Mongols, which according to him was obligatory to every Muslim. against Mongolsthe in histhirteenth and fourteenth century. In fought who Taymiyyah, AhmadIbn importantud-Deen wasTaqi scholar first a whole. The historical figures,whoinfluenced Osama binLaden and the Islamicresurgence movementas contemporary religious terrorism as a whole itis important to look at the crucial Islamic Chapter 1:Islamic resurgence Thoughts of Thoughts of Ibn followed Taymiyyah intwentieth were century by Qutb,Sayyid Syed In order tounderstandideasIn order of binLaden, goalsof the Osama the and al-Qaeda Qur’an , according to , according Sharia , and fightunbelievers,i.e. infidels, enemies who are of 5 fatwa he jihad declared He was one of the CEU eTD Collection Boudjema Bounoua (known as Abdullah Anas), who inBoudjema (knownasAbdullah Anas),who 1984establishedNGO-like Bounoua thousands withwas also Osama bin Laden,who cooperated Azzam and hisson-in-law, the of One war. Afghan in participated who Muslims, of thousands attracted jihad Afghan and in thoughts His and deeds nonoconferences, dialogues" 2004). (Azzam, negotiations, No "Jihad rifleand alone: the 2004). jihad(Laqueur, is weapon and the be through created bring Islam as the only religion and religion only the as Islam bring will revolution This countries. non-Muslim of rule the from countries all free will which (Laqueur, 2004).Maududi (2004) claims thatjihad must bring auniversal Islamic revolution, Muslim clergy. Even though was not as extreme as Qutb, major topic of his works was jihad joined the Afghanjoined jihad the only USSR,becauseherealized against thatthe way how in in becamewhich Afghan he a jihadin1981, andtook the 2011).He part 1986(Sheuer in Islamabad, University atIslamic International lucrativethe post from the Azzam retired far enemyal-Baeed” “al-Adou (Gerges,2011) By jihadclassifying he distinguished near enemiesthe enemies to al-Quareed”, “al-Adou and 3. Jihadagainstdisbelievers and hypocrites. and devil); Jihad shaytan 2. the (the of 1. Jihad of nafsthe (inner self) stages: three leadership Ayman al-Zawahiri of merged Faraj al-Qaeda. with (2004) classified jihadinto al-Jihad1981. Thewhich Anwar group Egyptian assassinated president under the Sadat Syed Abul A'la Maududi was not a scholar, Syed not Maududi AbulA'la although hewas recognized among was The most important figure in modern jihad was Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. Muhammad abdal-Salam Faraj was leaderthe of al-Jihad,IslamistEgyptian group Sharia as the only system of laws. 6 umma can CEU eTD Collection 3 2 his two lifeandthen portray explore the see ideologues impact of the on binLaden, Iwill Arab To amongresonance these countries. between Afghanistan name duringand Soviet Union, which OsamabinLaden gained thoughts andthoughts with their deeds their with influenced Azzam Yusuf Abdullah Sheikh and Faraj, al-Salam abd Muhammad jihad until all the countries will Islam,accept toliberate and Palestine (Laqueur,2004). main Azzam’sjihad werepromotion fight (Sheuer goals 2011). of intheIslamic countries to and propaganda to also and mujahedeen the supply to used were money The Afghanistan. main Arab other Its raisecountries. was for purpose gainfunds jihad and the to in al-Khadamat Makhtab organization Only Ibn Taymiyyah, and Abdullah Azzam were actively involved in jihad Services Bureau Taqi Taqi ud-Deen Ahmad Ibn Sayyid SyedTaymiyyah, Qutb, AbulA'la Maududi, 3 new generation of jihadists. They started to form in the war inthe form to started They jihadists. of generation new 2 . Makhtab al-Khadamat expanded from Afghanistan to Afghanistan from expanded al-Khadamat Makhtab . fatwas 7 he wrote in 1996 and 1998. CEU eTD Collection contractor of the King Faisal of Saudi Arabia (Bergen, 2001). Laden became a minister ofpublic works for one serving period, and after thathe became the private 4 April 1987 camp was training around 70 jihadist. However bin Laden was not in binjihadist. HoweverApril Ladenwasnot wastraining around1987 camp charge, 70 al-Ansar’, Lion’s Den theof Companions,it and started to work on October 1986, and by the ‘al-Masadah name Jaji campwas, 2011).The the 2001; Riedel, 2008; Scheuer, of (Bodansky city near mountains in the camp atraining up set to Sayyaf Rasul Rab Abdul Ustad (IULA) Afghanistan of Liberation for the Union Islamic the leaderof from the asked forapermission jihadists.company,for buildand secrethidesandtraining to roads camps 1984 binLaden In family his of vehicles construction the using war Afghan in participate actively to started Laden Bin Laden. bin for enough not was fundraising but Afghanistan, in jihadists Arab the of operation the financing he was countries Arab other from money With mujahedeen. McCants 2011). In war, Osama began to be involved atfirst as a collector of funds for exile go to forced (Bergen, to thirdpeople 2001; the country was the were killed and about of Muslim (BodanskyBrotherhood Riedel, 2008; 2001; Scheuer, 2011). the with associated was he time first the for and Qutb, Muhamman and Azzam Abdullah Kingdom,Arabian where he was KingAbdul-Azizattending University,met hefirst where inhis Saudi the received education Ahmadentire of views Taymiyyah. He Ibn ud-Deen Taqi Islamists settings atthe byhisfather. organized Asman he a young admire began to the formmeeting his with prominentbegan Hewas consciousness. to pro-Islamicreactionary Saudi Arabia Chapter 2: Osama bin Laden Bin Laden’s father Muhammad emigrated here from Yemeni city called Hadramawt. In 1950s Muhammad bin In December 1979, USSR invaded Afghanistan. The war was brutal: over millioninvadedIn Afghanistan. Thewarwasbrutal: over 1979,USSR December Osama bin-Muhammadbin-Awad bin Ladenwasborn March on 10, 1957in Riyadh, 4 (Bodansky 2001; Riedel,Since 2008; Scheuer, 2011). he was young Osama 8 CEU eTD Collection the Two Holy Places the TwoHoly Laden’s first Laden’s protection.1996 OnAugust 23, London based newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi,bin published he Taliban’s under Kandahar, was come where to Mullahleader Omar to invited by Taliban Afghanistanmoved to After(Farrall, the failed 2011). in assassination he Jalalabad, was attacks (Burke, 2003;Scheuer,Bin 2011). Laden was from expelled Sudan in 1996andhe Laden’s major aims in Sudan, wastoincreasehis fortune, sohecan moresupport terrorist forces in U.S. 1992, and anti-U.S. forces in also Somalia during 1992andbin 1994.One of on attack the Yemeni Hesupported States. United the support the waragainst hebegan to not Iraq.He leftfrom Saudi Arabia toPakistan inand then 1991 he moved toSudan,where west, identified Islam of enemy real the as and anger, his hiding not was Laden Bin help. for attack them after Kuwait. Royal family rejected bin Laden’s offer and asked for United States his help defence to the minister of Arabia,Saudi Hussein becausetheywereafraid that can of Osama bin Laden was, when Saddam Hussein invadedKuwaitin 1990.Bin Laden offered Afghan jihad. (2011) claims,itwas that continue in established exactly in 1988, to thelegacyorder of the namedestablished al-Qaeda. (Scheuer, group 2005).Scheuer 2011;Bergen Coolsaet2001; jihadAfghan during late1980s,bin Laden Inthe 2001; Riedel,2008; 2011). Scheuer, name Osama binLaden amongIslamic the prominent (Bergen, jihadists 2001; Bodansky the long for such put Mujahedeen The Jajiresistance long a time. that Soviets were resisting retreat itwas thefirsttime in Although binLadenwasforced to camp from retreat Jaji. their operation,in which started August After 1987. three weeks ‘bin Laden’s men’ were forced to military one through went only Den Lion’s al-Masri. Hafs Abu and al-Panshiri Ubaydah Abu from Egypt mujahedeen more experienced tothe out command the hehanded because After the experience in Afghanistan, second important situation that defined the ideas the situation defined that second important inAfghanistan, After experience the fatwa named: , which was followed was, which byhissecond Declaration of War against the Americans OccupyingtheLandof War theAmericans against Declaration of 9 fatwa released on February released onFebruary 23, CEU eTD Collection against the West. the against fight to Muslims the can unite preachers these that afraid, are they because Abdur Rahman), Omar Sheikh and Yaseen, Ahmad Sheikh Azzaam, Abdullah (Sheikh preachers Islamist death of Prophetthe in AD 632(Doran, 2002). troops of Arabian is Peninsula aggression greatest the against Muslimscommitted the since for brutal these killings Muslim peopleof Laden, (bin And 2004). the occupation U.S. of are andallies,responsible its U.S. of States therefore conspiracy resultthe United and among werea Eretria, andinBosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya Philippine, Fatani, Ogadin, Somalia, Assam, Cashmere, Burma, Tajikistan, Lebanon, Iraq, in massacresPalestine, that He claims Laden’s2.1 Bin fatwas Scheuer, 2011). 2011;McCants, Laden statingandideas, are that hispositions, (binLaden,2004;Burke, aims, goals 2003, 1998: his releasedsecond, in 1998, and jihadsigned by other leaders. himself,itand therefore did get much influential not More attention. and important of is country the Bin duty”issued aprime first (bin Laden,2012). Laden his themselves, to their common enemy - United States andits allies: “T Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Mir Hamzah, from Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, and Fazul Rahman Fazul and from Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, Mir Hamzah, al-Islamiyya, Gama'a jihadistsAyman al-Zawahiri,Ahmed Refai (Abu from Taha Yasser) al-Egyptian group Jihad AgainstJews andCrusaders Bin Laden was trying to shift Bin Laden Muslims from among attention wastrying to conflicts the of the theprominent are huntingand bin killing according Laden (2012), United to States, Bin Laden hisIn 1996 Second binLaden’s Second fatwa fatwa releasedin 1998,was andsupported signed byfour other expresses his anger towards United States and its allies. its and States United towards his anger expresses , which are two most important statements of bin 10 o push o push enemy…out the fatwa fatwa was by CEU eTD Collection armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim” any threaten to unable and defeated Islam, of lands the all of out move to armies in[Mosque Jerusalem] and mosque thefrom holy [Mecca] their for grip, and inorder their itindoinin any country is whichit it, toliberate possible to the order al-Aqsa Mosque makes killing of Americans and their allies “an individual forduty every Muslim who can do Muslims.” bin“clearaccording Laden to declaration Allah, (2004), hisof war on Messenger, and are, facts three These Laden,2004). (bin the peninsula” of occupation brutal crusade the of continuation the and survival Israel's guarantee to weakness and disunion their through ofand and paper statelets Arabia,Sudan intostates suchas region Egypt, Saudi the Iraq, the murders of Muslim people. “The best proof of this is their endeavour to fragment all the their Muslim neighbours” (bin Laden, 2004). humiliate to and is people of this left what annihilate here to they come So and devastation. fragmentation the waron ferocious the imposed after blockade with protracted the content not they are asthough massacres, horrific repeat the “trying to are they million people, which fight to neighbouring the Muslim people” (bin Laden, 2004). terrorizing its andneighbours, turning its bases in peninsulathe into aspearhead through Arabian its plunderingitspeninsula, riches, rulers, to dictating its humiliating people, of the places, inthe holiest lands ofIslam the “occupying years more than seven are for U.S. Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders (bin Laden, 2004). leader of All Bangladeshi Jihad Movement. signatoriesthe identified themselvesasa World Upon Upon facts these bin Laden issued and the signatories Thirdly, that the devastation of Iraq is to move the attention from Israel, to cover up more than killed alliance” where “crusader-Zionist Iraq, on attack the after Secondly, second his In fatwa bin Laden is reminding the three most important facts. Firstly, facts. important most three the reminding is Laden bin 11 fatwa , binding, which ruling, CEU eTD Collection development had an on position the Laden,effect of bin and shifted himfrom position the of Zawahiri reached theirintended goals (Doran, 2002). ItisAyman leaders al-Qaeda, OsamabinLaden because the and states. al- with core the also (Mueller, butthey morefocused 2006), on on Western the soil the targets Muslim the of strikemanage soil again notIraq inatU.S. to invasion did 2001al-Qaeda to 2003. Since the development of the hierarchy of al-Qaeda which occurred2011). scholars anti-jihad (Scheuer, Islamic moderate after 9/11 and after the infidels,U.S. fight against the U.S. friendly Muslim states, and it was also trying to discredit the the waragainst injustifying focused Hismediawar al-Qaeda does. that every deed, world”. Since the 9/11gained ahuge global andrecognition, became bin Laden wanted man “most the in the attack he started to focus more on the mediaLaden 2.3 Binafter 9/11 and the resonance of had (Bergen,2001;Scheuer,2011). radically changed bin After 9/11attack, al-Zawahiri.his in Laden’s role inassociate terrorism andthe al-Qaeda with along masterminded binwhich Laden onSeptember11,2001, Center executed Trade didwas attack bringnot attacks desirableWorld the the Theturningon point outcomes. embassies in attackon the alsothrough USS Cole1998, and All 2002). in2000(Doran, the U.S. the on attacks several through them, against fight them make to and lands Muslim to “plundermoney” their (bin Laden, 2004). andfightits against US, They (bin Laden, alliesandalsoevery to are urgingMuslim 2004). Since its establishment in the late 1980s, al-Qaeda, overcame lots of overcameinchanges. 1980s,al-Qaeda, of This lots the late Since its establishment was lessinBin role Laden’s 2001,less and wasalso after al-Qaeda It active. due to name onSeptember11,2001, Worldon After OsamabinLaden Center attack Trade his toput In order fatwas to work, bin Laden was trying to bring U.S. troops to the bringbinto troops work, U.S. was trying Laden to to 12 CEU eTD Collection contemporary hierarchy.contemporary hierarchy beforeof it group the changed tothenowadays organization, andalso the Iwill brief the describe of al-Qaeda, group, history the through I will about go chapter mainthe leader, planner, financier, andideologue to positionthe a roleof model. Inthe next 13 CEU eTD Collection 2002; 2011). McCants, out outside Arabthe lands, of was1993bomb Worldon the attack (Doran, Center Trade wanted to kill U.S. soldiers, wholived in both hotels (MSNBC, 2012). The first attack carried Australianbecausewas which 2 attack also al-Qaeda This unsuccessful, tourists. killed Movenpick, Hotel on in Yemen attack another by followed was attack This anybody. kill attack was executed in year 1992 in Yemen on the Gold Mohur hotel, where the bomb did not first al-Qaeda The his activities. expanded in where he Africa, newbuilthe camps training Afghanistan where binLaden established training camps. After his move toSudanin 1991, form warin began 1980s.Thelate the Afghan to in group during Qaeda wasestablished the 9/11 attacked on the soil of the ‘Western world’, but not in the U.S. alsoafter in Muslimlands,andal-Qaeda the focusingtargets on Western the al-Qaedawas does not reflect the power of the group. Asseen inthebinLaden’s of not power group. the reflectdoes group does not exist. Other argument that al-Qaeda is not untilindicatethe mention not Department didnot 1998 does that the al-Qaedaasagroup capable of attack on theStates United U.S. that fact soil, the hand, other the On threat. the exaggerating is only government threat?, 1998 (Burke,2003).John famousMueller (2006) inhis article: for first time the mentioned in asagroup Department State al-Qaeda also2001, United States onlybetween al-Qaedaisexisted existwhat as publicly 1996 and anymorerecognized and several storiesal-Qaeda. about Accordingdifferent Jason to al-Qaeda Burke (2003), doesnot 3:Al-Qaeda Chapter Michael Scheuer (2011), Peter L.BergenMichael al- and(2005) claim Peter Rik CoolsaetScheuer (2011),(2001), Same as in the case of the former head of the al-Qaeda Osama bin Laden, there are there binLaden, Osama al-Qaeda the headof former the in caseof the Same as argued that al-Qaeda is not capable of the terrorist attack, and therefore the US the and therefore attack, terrorist the capable of not isal-Qaeda argued that 14 Is there still a terrorist still there Is fatwas discussed above, discussed CEU eTD Collection supporters andin activefighters Pakistan,supporters also an Iraq, created andAfghanistan. It al-Qaeda Iraq ininvasion to 2003. Presenceof soldiers foreign the on the soil Iraqi gained al-Qaeda leditWhatal-Qaeda 9/11, losthas gainedafterU.S. the after Gerges, 2011;Riedel, 2007). Kandahar, Taliban’s the support inlost capital, Afghanistan had al-Qaeda 2011; (Farrall, them for bringing U.S. the troops to soldiers Muslimlands.the WhenU.S. had conquered When invadedUnited States Afghanistan in 2001, many Islamicprominent scholars criticized 2007). Afghanistan in in2001, and Iraq 2003 (Burke,2003;Farrall, 2011; McCants, 2011; Riedel, As United result States. Unitedits States invadedtightened homeland security, and killedattacks more than 3000 people $500billion acaused loss economy over tothe the of to destroy the World Itmanaged andTradeattack. important definingits most out carried al-Qaeda September 11,2001 Center and the partOn and 2011). (Scheuer, propaganda religion military,components: administration, of Pentagon, with captured(Farrall, Sincein its establishment 2011). lateconsisted 1980s,group majorfourof airplanes. Themartyrs, whichhad and “graduates” 122members, 700 around of trainingtheir camps brigade members, 200core around of bin a byOsama Laden.Theyhad hierarchy directed led by whobecameal-Zawahiri, binLaden’s hand.right inCole merged Yemen (Ajami,In June group 2001). 2001, the with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, U.S. embassies inKenya Tanzania inand and 2000,they bombed American battleship USS (Burke, Qaeda focused 2003).In1998 largely military and targets strategic they on bombed al- time this At in Afghanistan. fought who mujahedeen, experienced were them of most becamebegan torise. It with ahierarchicalorganization, 100members, 50 to from whom 9/11 gained al-Qaeda new supporters, but they butits they lost traditionalsupporters. have 9/11 gainednewsupporters, al-Qaeda firm with organization terrorist conventional a was al-Qaeda 2001 late the Until With binAfghanistanthe move to Laden’s andwith supportof the Taliban, al-Qaeda 15 CEU eTD Collection Qaeda, i.e. “network” (Cronin, 2009). The groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Qaeda Islamic inal-Qaeda Iraq, likeal-Qaeda The (Cronin, groups i.e. 2009). “network” Qaeda, they are not state supported; the top leadership acts as a state (Burke, 2003). i.e.is terrorist “trans-national” Farrall, group, the (Cronin,Because al-Qaeda 2009; 2011). leadershipof group the by is represented central the accordance with ideology which the the in only independently, they act or level al-Qaeda, second from of the directed they are either give ordirectly manage franchise orders operationstheirbranch the of because or groups, They not do ideology messagesof group. andthe andthe represent spreadthe is to leadership function leaderof primary top the al-Zawahiri. contemporary The wrapped around the leadership,isFarrall, al-QaedaelementFirst (Burke,2003), the hardcore or 2011). top (Burke,2003;Cronin, Falkenrath,al-Qaeda threeelements the of 2006; 2009; consists itis loosely but (Riedel, Hierarchically, structure rather organized. firm hierarchical 2007), 3.1 Structure ofal-Qaeda structure of the al-Qaeda, and how strong each elements of the group are. defining tool of contemporary the Inthenextal-Qaeda. Iwillsubchapter examine the the whole world. They loosely franchise-like organized, organization, with influencethe are onthe Muslims throughout radicalized through firmleadership, toflexible,structured organization,with terrorist the hierarchy, directive internet, which plays a big role, and it is a organization of Muslimthe jihad (Pillar, 2011;Riedel, 2007). led 2002) havebecame (Whittaker, by Muslims U.S. vanguard andthe al-Qaeda united Freedom Iraqi hundreds in Operation of people. killing andWestern Iraq, U.S. targets managed ledbranchin – who attacks on byAbuMusabal-Zarqawi,several Iraq, al-Qaeda Second element of al-Qaeda consists of the Islamic militant groups associated with al- isAl-Qaeda not structurally a Since traditional group. it not haveterrorist 2001 a does a traditionally from hadevolved al-Qaeda Center, World Trade the on After attack 16 CEU eTD Collection the attacks executed on July 7, 2005 on means of the public transportation in London. The 7/7 191 people more andfew injured example hundredsmore. Second of leaderless jihad,the are Afghanistan,any muchless al-Qaeda´sof trainingto camps”(Mueller,2006).They killed bombings inMadridby werecarried out of mena tiny group whohad neverbeen to by managed whole the (Bergen, “The 2004 financed, andattack executed 2011) themselves Madrid’s transportation public by was executed group the of Moroccan Spaniards, who mastermindedthe groups ofattack on independent by were Terrorist people. andexecuted the (Bergen, 2011). November 2, 2004,who waskilled by 26 years Moroccan origin Dutchmanof old Mohammad Bouyerima on is one of acting only the upon ideology the of al-Qaeda. Deathof Dutchfilmmakerthe Theovan Gogh, examples by cells,which 9/11wereexecuted after were independent the Western Alltheattacks world. of how loose the the to threat abiggest jihad poses Leaderless secondelement. the to connections indirect structureswhich a jihad” freely “leaderless 2008), with creates acts element occasional (Sageman, the of al-Qaeda because of franchisethe likeare whichis nature, inreflected this third This element. third McDonald’s, itto the compared (2005) Coolsaet setter, anagenda hereas serves hardcore al-Qaeda The independently. act they and core, the with relationship formal any have 2003; Cronin, 2009;Farrall, 2011). from al-Qaedafights for (Burke, troops withdrawal goals,Iraq of U.S. e.g. the narrow Iraq, because have more they like groups, moreterrorist ideology, are they the conventional broad leadership of andtheir al-Qaeda from If top. groups core the these the we separate from orders direct any receive not do they because also independently, act they but hardcore, the to are responsive that aregroups Peninsula, in Arabian the Al-Qaeda or Maghreb, The two most deadly terrorist attacks on the European soil of the twenty-first century on deadlymost of Europeansoil attacks the The two twenty-first the terrorist not does which individuals, or cells small the of consists al-Qaeda of element Third 17 CEU eTD Collection flexible structure is the most successful among the three components with the 100 per cent 100 with the threecomponents the among most is successful the structure flexible is around 67percent(Helfstein 2011).TheWright, and thirdof al-Qaeda’sthe element within their Muslim because even though countries, success rate mostly traced, they operate be areless likely to less theirits carefully, attacks attack and plans al-Qaeda of element or 2011). Thenetwork, second the (Helfstein andWright, cent is 50per around attacks) plotted anddiscovered attacks executed of successfully (rate rate Their them. success track intelligence is focusing primary on andtheir networks, ‘known’ is it intelligencefor easier to because intelligence work, vulnerable Itismoreto its potential attacks. each planning of like attack attacks whichexecuted 9/11,or USS ColeQaeda hardcore on isin carefully 2000, whichinternet is crucial for al-Qaeda (Burke,2003). media, actions, through of report andalso spread outthrough ideology, istheir which which Therefore(Cronin, 2009). thethird notinclude does is it element, any group, simply their movement online an is also it but goals, tangible and aims, narrow with groups, terrorist traditional of small the itconsists also identifiable, are easily who its leaders, has Qaeda Al-2012). Muriel, 2012;Cronin,Simon, 2009; Benjamin,andcyberspace (Atwan, 2008; recruitmentpropaganda, or its is members, dependent al-Qaeda of enormously the on communication, is their it Whether internet. is the name brand al-Qaeda’s in promoting factor in topromote order their in ‘achievements’ a completely way,unique butmost the crucial of product a huge marketingits campaign ‘brandname’of (Lia, 2005).They mass media use metmembers of al-Qaeda trainingfacility 2011). (Bergen, he Pakistan, where to travels London,madeseveral attacked that thegroup member of one and only hardcore, have al-Qaeda the affiliations, to directnogroups Both cards andloans. creditfinancedtheir they through were managed citizens and were by attacks British the All these three structural elements differ in tactics and lethality of their attacks. Al- whichis (Cronin, becauseof its 2009), a structure isAl-Qaeda resilient characteristic 18 CEU eTD Collection whodieare willing the to for al-Qaeda mostly ideology. The network of groups, the consist agency’, which its informs supporters, and creates,throughits websites, new mujahedeen, a ‘pr of activities its maintains Al-Qaeda it. with identify to likely be will Muslims and world, createand intended a al-Zawahiri name’,‘brand which to willberecognizable the throughout BinLaden itsof tactics. waspart because itisthis wasweakened, leadership because their is Itnotonly (Cronin,2011; terrorist 2011). Stern, Pillar, Mueller, attack 2006; 2009; amajor isexecuting incapable nowadays hardcore of Al-Qaeda ideology al-Qaeda. of 3.2 Al-Qaedaafter death ofbinLaden influence the group as a whole? smaller.Which element then possesses a bigger threat, and how would the death of bin Laden its thelethality is buttherefore attacks is higher, on of handits other success the much rate leadership of al-Qaeda plans its attacks more carefully, then network, or individuals and cells, core above Asmentioned theattacks. of severity the aredueto differences casualty injuredkilled or an average of (Helfstein173 people perattacks 2011).TheseWright, and of network the injured attacks 452people on average, and or leadership killed al-Qaeda of managed by attacks core injured andexecuted the killed whereas or onaverage, 13people individuals or cells small of the Attacks network. or the hardcore, al-Qaeda of the attacks the islower than lethality their attacks of hand other buton the attacks, terrorist the execute not spotted any suspicious behaviour of theirs.have neighbours their and jobs, ordinary have they citizens, abiding law as act they time the most because of hard trace, are individuals and to alsoor because thesecells planned attacks, followslesscarefully the success from Its rate 2011). andWright, (Helfstein success rate The biggest threat of all the elements possesses the third element, which is the Individuals and small cells of the al-Qaeda ideology adherents are more successful to 19 CEU eTD Collection either killed, captured, or they simply abandoned the group (Scheuer, 2011). Despite this fact 2011). Despite this (Scheuer, orthey abandoned the group eithercaptured, simply killed, Al-Qaedahas lostestablishment. 5to7 fighters andthousand its thirds two of leadershipwas Jihadi propaganda involved andbin quoted Laden less less.and anyhe did execute less attack hardcore was involved not injihad.major anti-Western even because WebAnd jihadi sites. al-Qaeda in mostly files on which audioreleased were lessLaden in was involvedless thematters al-Qaeda. few of and Hereleased speeches, only whichbe by beaten cannot decapitation the leader. Aftertheirof September 11,2001,bin continuesfunction,an group the Al-Qaeda afterevolved to organization 2001. to asitwas head BinLaden one chopped andthe newheadswill and was replacedby grow. al-Zawahiri where United (Singh,as a States 2003), Al-Qaeda isa whole. ‘hydra-headed organization’ bin hurt death Laden group afterLaden unlikely the will 9/11attacks, of the and theal-Qaeda al-Qaeda? hurtthe binLaden death of Will Osama West. recent tothe the threat the are transportation, local London onMadrid and of attacks the and executors masterminds al-Qaeda network. the or hardcore, from al-Qaeda either anydirections didhereceive al-Qaeda, nor ties to direct He wasprime example third of the element of Merahal-Qaeda. himself calling a mujahedeen, hadno a French Merah,citizen who earlier thisof year ordinary citizens with jobs, ordinary and ordinary habits. PeoplelikeMohammeddaily Algerian killed four people indescent. It isthe because the ‘members’ of the third Jewishcomponent, are the secret adherents of their ideology, school OzarMerah Hatorah, arealong the with the from troops which Iraq, havealready happened. U.S. the of withdrawal the for fights which Iraq, like al-Qaeda goals, very clear with the Death Death the onlylossnot since its of bin Ladenis thatal-Qaedain suffered leadership spreadby has bin been Osama that and its message the flexible structure, Due to countries. Western tothe biggest threat is the structure of al-Qaeda component Third 20 CEU eTD Collection such a flexible group besuch aflexible yes defeated? group If whatare the in toachieveit?conditions order has killedits almost whole leadership including the supreme leader Osama bin Laden. Can bother radical Muslims the most. Al-Qaeda is still strongwhich despite facts, the are the fact, activities that Israeli United of support and States Arabia, in Saudi presence military Iraq, tactics of are,United States byfar, notlikely defeat al-Qaeda.to Invasion Afghanistan to and Europe, and radical Muslims livingin Arabthe world. Qaeda set upthefirm ideology isfollowedwhich by Muslimslivinginradical theWestern Qaeda Evennetwork. death the of al-Zawahiri will hurtnot al-Qaeda (Farrall,Al- 2011). al- the andwith membersal-Qaeda of senior all with have ties close directly, or and internet, through either which communicate information committees, communication, through 2011).Itwill due tothespecific its of on remain, type actionsimpact (McCants, future also Its structure is so flexible and loose that the replacement partwell jihadist in known andtook therefore9/11 attack, apart. al-Qaedais torn unlikely to of the figurehead will not have any of Muslim jihad (Ajami,The 2001). group is nowunderleadership of al-Zawahiri,is who for ayounginspiration he jihadists, is andmodel their aChe icon (Scheuer, 2011), Guevara 2006; Farrall,Helfstein 2011; 2011;Ikenberry,Wright, and Bin 2002). Laden has been an group isthe it stronger that has before been 9/11(Bergen,Burke, 2003;Falkenrath, 2011, Death of of Death paralyzedOsama bin hurt not al-Qaeda,anddid counterterrorist or Laden the 21 CEU eTD Collection members, it is crucial that the ideology is defeated not the terrorists itself. If itself. terrorist the terrorists If is notthe ideology defeated the itisthat members, crucial new andradicalizing inform recruiting of high has response rate sucha Qaeda’s ideology modern victory terrorism the ismeans. through different achieved message Because the of al- its will,in form political of sanctions, on its opponent(Gordon, 2007).In fightagainst the terrorism can be defeated, and what does defeat of the terrorism means? whether basic question moremust beanswered there can al-Qaeda, defeat examining what In still continues. “Westerners” jihad against the al-Qaeda,and of cause the defeat the not Laden has been only a symbol jihadof “crusaders” againstits not leader, though his death did Bin world. all bythe followed over Muslims ideology, abroad he created dead. Therefore collapsehe groupwillbemorepersonality, the knewthat because vulnerableto his after his around wrap thewhole group not intentto putal-Qaeda. Hedid to binLaden wastrying where of sign first is the This al-Masri. Hafs Abu and al-Panshiri Ubaydah Abu mujahedeen not put himself in the command of the camp. The leaders of the camp became two Egyptian Invasions toAfghanistan and Iraqand killingbin Laden did notdefeat al-Qaeda. (Global 2012). incidents Database, peakingin with 110 Terrorism over theyear2007, more wounded. Majority of attackswereexecutedthe U.S.invaded after in Iraq 2003, wereleavinginvolvedin more people even groups 480incidents, than thousands dead,and affiliate its After and terrorist September 11,2001,al-Qaeda reach. with global the player majorand a athreat still remains soil, al-Qaeda U.S. on a major attack carried out not did Despite andworklikely (Lutz 2004). claim theal-Qaeda Mueller’snot Lutz, that (2006) to 4:Endofal-Qaeda?! Chapter In war victory In areclear.iswar victory and its defeat Winneronewhodefeats enemy imposes and When bin hisLaden first trainingestablished camp inJajiarea,Afghanistan, hedid are States United by the implemented techniques counterterrorist The contemporary 22 CEU eTD Collection Targeting leadership, thewhichisnow core lead byAyman they focus al-Zawahiri; can also have options. three States assassinations United In targeted terrorist. harbouring which are kill They invade gathering. intelligence leaders of to are trying group the or country, the the 4.1 Targeted assassinations andmilitary invasions doingare United tactics radically.What States changemustits wrong? counterterrorist of U.S. defeat ideology support al-Qaeda, and to inthe lands.Inorder troops the Muslim handhadit givensupport tothe al-Qaedabecause and of Taliban, presenceof the foreign the Invasions toAfghanistan and Iraqdestroyed the oppressive regimes militarily; on otherthe oppression peoplethat fell. andbecause the of underdevelopment, hugeeconomic the because of itself,discredited notgive people what they wanted, and what they expected. The regime and the ideology have itdid because collapsed, regime The Party. Communist the leaders of any the of assassinate between USSR and the USA, though USSR collapsed. USA did notbombed Kremlin, did not conflict armed wasnodirect War, there War. Cold In from Cold bethe can drawn opponent, Taleban government. defeated of thetroops after U.S. support lost partin jihad They also al-Qaeda. take the of also after the 9/11 attack on United States, where many prominent Islamic scholars refused to and 2012), and people (Boot, Muslim killed attacked they after Muslimcountries in several its but lostseveral intended supportAl-Qaeda (Cronin,also tourists and kids targets, 2009). itsIRA lost after Omagh in bombingsupport not killed 1988, where bomb car the its did is itisbeengroup defeated, hasmessage because their among not supporters. their respected The main of technique U.S. dealing with al-Qaedathe involves military and fight On The iscounterproductive. against al-Qaeda hand, contemporary one According to Philip H. Gordon (2007), lessons, how to defeat the ideology of the 23 CEU eTD Collection weaker because the presence of the U.S. troops in no longer causing the anti-U.S. sentiment, inno longer anti-U.S. the troops causing of U.S. the thepresence weaker because and is from thewithdrawal after financial now U.S.troops group the support even of Iraq, its lostcapture leadership.the Thegroup members,helped U.S.soldiers groups’ to who were its attacks against Iraqi civilians inthelate 2007.Group lost its support, and also its supporters, who were dedicated to jihad against the U.S. What really hurt the al-Qaeda in Iraq soldiers in Iraq sparked U.S. of the presence it operate, was because wascontinuing to Zarqawi,including group the wave of anti-U.S. Zarqawi is prime the example.After the killing ofseveral leaders of al-Qaeda in in 2006, Iraq sentiment and thelead hurt as The byal- inital-Qaeda notdamage, group the case of but Iraq a whole. will group as a whole had its paralyze the group, but they will notdefeat it in long term. can temporarily they leadership, core the target to willcontinue States United message. If theirspread out to andthird components second onthe becauserely they attack, any terrorist plottingplanningactive,itis is or not not and hardcore of al-Qaeda times because most the country where the terrorists soil a on of the action andlarge military gathering, intelligence itbecause requires costly, are hiding. Benefits of this action will not overcome its costs, years ago in years ago but will overall group the remain because ideology unchanged, the was of stated group the hardcore, it would have only short term effectal-Qaeda entire on the kill the to group.manage somehow Its will recoveryStates United If will results. take some desirable the time,bring particular country of the Western world. in the time the of most attacks, the plotting and planning individuals and cells small the Maghreb; lastoption,the which isfully hunton intelligence workof the depended isto down like al-Qaeda networkAl-Qaeda groups or Islamic on of in leaders the al-Qaeda the Iraq Targeting and hunting the al-Qaeda affiliate groups can also cause only term cause only also groupscan affiliate short al-Qaeda huntingTargeting the and United States can continue targeting the core leadership of al-Qaeda, but it notwill but leadership al-Qaeda, of can core the United targeting continue States fatwas , which are the core of al-Qaeda franchise. Such military very is military action Such franchise. of al-Qaeda core arethe , which 24 CEU eTD Collection of the third element and the whole process of investigation is creating more is anti-U.S. investigation creating process of whole the element and of third the targeting ineffective. The and arecontra-productive internment and imprisonment Preventive rights. human for fighting “Westerners” also and countries, “Western” in the living Muslims radicalizing is also it East, in Middle living Muslims among only not protests sparking is prison, Guantanamo the and rights, human individual the on emphasis the put which state the emptive imprisonmentis undermining the United States as a whole, which claim that they are Pre- by authorities. the after released they were more violent became even terrorists frustrated the and group, the hurt not did prison into terrorists putting trial, without internment the implemented government British where IRA, of case in the As individuals. or cells which ideology impact the have on is of group the of no mainmotivation smalls the these will attacks, terrorist possible breakupthe ortrying to them targeting Secondly, of al-Qaeda. financialtheir operations, becausenot they do receivefrom anysupport network core the or notrequiredoes large financial capital,is hard therefore and their totrack cards, or credit which scaleattack, asmall They usually execute track. arehardto because they 100 percent, is almost attacks of the rate Theirsuccess its network. to or leadership of al-Qaeda core the or individuals are most of the times ordinary,law abiding citizen, with no affiliations either to cells small These them. track to easy not is it Firstly, either. strategy feasible not is countries, intervention. in taxmoney whose causing the pressurefrom are spent UScitizens, ineffective the the Military interventions are imposing heavyfinancial burden on U.S.the budget, which is also inwere present just troops, their groups, because theU.S. country. affiliated Qaeda andits caused more anti-U.S. sentiment militaryQaeda, required invasion Afghanistan wasthe caseof the which and Iraq,which among ordinary citizens, which by was caused leadership the groups invasion. Targeting the of affiliate of the al- who became the members of al- Targeting the small cells and individuals, who mostly operate in the “Western” in the operate mostly who individuals, and cells small the Targeting 25 CEU eTD Collection another Muslim another country. fall of the Ba'ath Party,goals butof Islamic also the of is one which scholars.because Pan-Arabism, promotes Party Ba'ath because Muslims, This radical ofamong willthe presencegain more strength of the to al-Qaeda,U.S. otherhanditcause disagreementpresidentBashar andBa'athParty. the al-Assad will On the troops not only on becausethe soil of theamong one hand support the are fighting Syrians, who authoritarian againstthe of regime of on cause will of intervention Syria U.S. in Yugoslavia. asthe conflict seemssame Clinton to get rid of Muammar Gaddafi.duringArab so-called Spring. members other USalonghelped with NATO Libyan of rebels Another “hot Libya, of “liberation” was wasinvolved, USarmy where interventions, latest the One of spot” is Syria, which ex-U.S. president Bill none. Qaeda hadalmost Qaeda gained among support large Islamicscholars, radical and supportin whereIraq, al- gainedcase. Invasion different to Iraq in support, which made the aleader jihad.al-Qaeda Al- was SecondU.S.ledinvasion Talibanto Iraq totally because support. ithurtand al-Qaeda’s Muslim lands. In this important Islamicthinkers foreign because attracted 9/11attack and figures, tothe troops case the military interventionIslamic of some prominent lostsupport militarily, defeatedTaliban al-Qaeda U.S. the of U.S. canMilitary invasion late 2001 Afghanistaninaimedto was andTaliban.After againstal-Qaeda be regarded as successful,military,intelligence, and violence –intervention of countries which are harbouring terrorists. on. continuation isnumber not one priority, U.S.counterterrorism on which should putemphasis andits isnotfeasible, tactic this therefore terrorists, itis than sentiment capturing There are still few possibilities for US to military intervene to the Muslim countries. Muslim the to intervene military to US for possibilities few still are There used technique,whichinvolved other UnitedStates assassinations Besides targeted 26 CEU eTD Collection assassinations and military effective arenotinterventions andmilitary assassinations sofar.is still Al-Qaeda dangerous (bin Laden, 2004)whenever and whereverpossible.Besides its financial difficulties, targeted bin from Laden’sfatwa 1998, where heis urging Muslim“plunder every to money” the U.S. fulfil and economically, fellapart they can Iraq, Iran,and Syria, like Afghanistan, countries towards policies “imperialistic” its pursue to continue will U.S. If forces. its withdraw burden on a country, which can lead to bankruptcy Laden’s game,because from Afghan from jihad,his experience waris a heavy economical of the country, which will force of is bin thepart keep warexpensive both arevery costly. handtactics terrorism.one On To them to alleged of attack country work very pre-emptively, asa are unlikely to tactics tostop attack. deadly execute they Iran, can it can force them be reactionaryto inand topersuade U.S. order troops to withdrawfrom U.S. troops.Invasion Iran to can alsoinfluence theIranians livingin world, Western the and will be influenced by war,the by driven sentiment anti-U.S. the join will jihadalso against Iran,Qaeda will Ordinary spread to tofightagainsttheforeignlives whose troops. people, Laden in both of hisdid The invasion to Iran will have Sunni against the Muslims. conflictthe in they Iranians enduring the areShiaMuslims,and effect, of identifying U.S.emptively as the common enemy, will as bincause increasetryingnuclearfor their just potential industrial to the Invading Iran pre- reasons. a large unificationIran still among does Muslims,not have the foundWMD’s,was defeated whichhim.possessing werenottroops accused of after the U.S. capabilitiesdespite the to developfact was invadedHussein because Saddam Iraq primarily same outcomesIraq. of astheinvasion that WMD’s majority and they declared of potential, Destruction.Weapons of Mass Iraq wouldcause and Invading alsodeveloping that they are Targeted assassinations along with the military intervention, which have to cease the have to which intervention, military the with along assassinations Targeted nuclear its enhancing of isaccused -Iran, which interest” U.S. of “sphere Another fatwas . There is a high possibility that after invasion to Iran, al- 27 CEU eTD Collection by tongueandteeth” by word and bullet; and by penandgun; and cooperativecouncils.Theyareestablishedas theyalways havebeen: governments havenever...Islamic andwill beestablished throughpeacefulsolutions never destruction, diplomacyof andthe thecannon and machine gun. assassination,bullets, theideals and of bombing, of diplomacy. Butitknows thedialogue apostate Platonicidealy...Nor regimes notknowSocratic does debates... Aristotelian foughtjihaddialogues: isnot through that states clearly manual,in which al-Qaeda arereflected ideas These ‘crusader alliance’. againstthe act to is Muslims other urgingbecause he negotiations of any kind, to opened not its becauseitis opponents, language Westunderstands. only is the Al-Zawahiri that therefore members causethegreatest damage al-Qaeda the encourages to to Al-Zawahiri either.(2004) Knights undertheProphet’s Banner also mandatory for every leaderMuslim. CurrentAyman in al-Zawahiri his(2004) text both of his happen. in Laden Bin areunlikely enemies to theirof Qaeda leadershipandrepresentatives 4.2 Negotiations defeat help al-Qaeda? to Will negotiation negotiation. is tactics from two these opposite Complete tactics. different towards nature “imperialistic” not work,and expanding also due to the actions undertaken by the U.S. Therefore, these two tactics will and will cause more damage than benefits. U.S. has to switch from its If we look at the bin Laden’s atthe look If we fatwas is calling for jihad, which is a religious war against the infidels. This war is war This infidels. the against war religious isa which jihad, for iscalling (al-Qaeda, 2004) , is alsoindicating, negotiations that are unlikely work to fatwas “The confrontation thatwe withconfrontation arecallingfor the “The , they are indicating that negotiations between al- between negotiations that indicating are , they 28 CEU eTD Collection group whichgroup will lead toits disruption andits defeat. Laden’s State will have to focus on their goals, and aims,from which all of them are stated in both bin United them with negotiate than Rather them.defeat not will terrorist the with Negotiations of al-Qaeda. structure flexible the due to and also happen, isit unlikely to reason that hardcore. with al-Qaeda nordo the interact they network, the with only not affiliations no have they time, the of most and organized, loosely is it independently, more even acts element Third none. surely minimal, be will structure, Qaeda mostly from emanatingbin Laden’s acting are from ideology independently, tothe network according the of only al-Qaeda mostfractions of but the negotiations, the outcomes bemay influenced by of leadershipthe Some fractions, which belong to the second structural element –network – with the ties to the flexibleSinghvery and even structure; loose (2003) it called a ‘hydra-headed’ organization. intoAs outcomesthe practice. beputhas of negotiations the arguedabove,al-Qaeda will isit with representatives, chance al-Qaeda todiplomatic very the negotiations that unlikely In the unlikely event that thewill notcause representativethe end of the al-Qaeda as a whole, but itmay cost theirlives as traitors. of Unitedhidden. Secondly,itis because itis againstideology, their and the denial ideology of their States or Unitedinmeeting is evenmore some camp al-Qaedatraining they because remain unlikely want to Nation the willand country, Western any of soil the get enter they when arrested be the could they that possible itsof and leadershipconsists is whoarewanted, because Firstly,people reasons. it highly for two of Nations or with United the representatives the of Unitedthe representatives States, Negotiations are not going to help discredit the ideology of al-Qaeda, due to the the with meet will leaders al-Qaeda the that unlikely very is it ideology their Besides fatwas . Giving all al-Qaeda what they want will cause the internal change of the of change internal the cause will want they what al-Qaeda all Giving . fatwas . The influence of the third element of the al- 29 CEU eTD Collection (Gordon, 2007). with policiesdesigned toprovide alternativehopes and dreams topotential enemies” with thesame strength, sort ofpatience, andresolve thathelpedwin theColdWar and “The United States willwinand itsallies thewar they fightitinthe only if right way- 4.3.1 Middle Eastern Challenge States. United amongpeople has toberesolved, support Muslims towards can alsoshiftthe which the and forces government the between conflict Syrian also countries, in those elections the the Arab world U.S. also need to properly react on the governments bases,personnel Arab Israel.and and Duetothe in smashed which Spring regimes autocratic which will emerge after haveThe most whereforeign crucial are theirmilitary Laden, 2004). troops lands the areas (bin Islam” of lands the all of out move to armies their for in order and grip, their from in“liberate theal-Aqsagoal is [Mosque and theholy mosque[Mecca] to Mosque Jerusalem] His primary by troops. foreign the Muslimland’soccupied are the interest areas of al-Qaeda place? take actions and the should where Allah. What no need for war. Support forcrucial in war thefuture against if terrorism,because bethey will implementedthere will be al-Qaeda be will willelements These happen. to likely disappear, are which elements contains scenario “perfect” so it would terrorism of from thepeace support began mediate Israel Israel and This among Palestine. in the name of backup state, a sovereign as Palestine accept will they Arabia; Saudi bases inthe military restructuralization of country.the States United will alsoits withdrew and troops leave their instead of plundering the country, they engage infinancialwill help and total the 4.3 Defeatingal-Qaeda:Giving them whatthey want Following bin Laden’s willThe perfect scenario will be: TheU.S.troops from Afghanistan, and withdraw fatwas and the people who influenced him the most, crucialhim influenced and most, the who people the 30 CEU eTD Collection the Saudi Saudi the binArabia thaturged inhis Laden write 1996 to It was troopsin U.S. the presence of the 2004). alliance” (binLaden, by theCrusader-Zionist on Iraqi the people inflicted devastation help great “the he American calledthe United States, primary motivation of Osama bin Laden to shifthis focus from Arabs,uniting tofighting in 1990and1991was the Iraq GulfWaragainst American inthePersian Arabia. help partial just aceaseor fire. After Afghanistan, USmust give upits presence in Saudi the lands. Iraqis just theAfghanistanstart, mustbeThe next. withdrawal must be notcomplete, to lose the label crusaders, United States must continuewithdraw to soldiers from the Muslim freedom. In order as theonesdelivering not as crusaders viewed are they that United States, the for is It crucial state. Muslim of establishment achieve the to inorder States” by United both Islam” Laden, (bin Withdrawal 2004). fromof U.S.troops the lands Muslim the willfulfil mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of itwhocan in do any incountry itis which possible doit, to in toliberate… order holy the stated by bin Ladenin hisSecondfrom fatwa “an1998: individual for every Muslim duty will troops in liberation “cause” the of “holeArabia, mosque”, the which Mecca, Saudi was Theirblood was spilled inPalestinebinLaden and The Iraq” (2012). withdrawal U.S. the of in wealth of and hands as loot enemies. the became theirthe cheapest the Muslimsblood the that extent the to collaborators; their and alliance Zionist-Crusaders the by them on imposed youfrom thatthepeople of hadsuffered from iniquityIslam andinjustice aggression, Osama bin Laden (2004) wereurging in jihadists their establishment of purpose the for mandatorythe jihad issued by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. fatwas Both leaderBoth current of Ayman al-Zawahiri leader andtheformer al-Qaeda (2004), The withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the region will not cause the immediate cause the not will from region the troops theU.S. of The withdrawal issuedby binOsama Ladenwhich will weaken ideology the of andal-Qaeda also umma – Muslimthe as state, bin Laden was intended in his 31 fatwas fatwa to fight “crusader alliance led fight alliance “crusader to that “It should notbe hidden fatwas . Muslim CEU eTD Collection Israel towards the promoter of the peace. One of the reasons why George W. Bush was losing longersupport Israel, affordmust to their thus from haveshift position supporter the of the Israel. must States United change its position in the IsraeliPalestinian They conflict. can no secondpeninsula” crucial the changemustbe (binLaden,2004).Therefore, areaof policy guarantee Israel's survivaland the continuation of brutal the crusade occupation of the their to andSudanintopaper statelets andthrough and weakness Arabia, disunion Egypt, best proof of this is their endeavour to fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi The its attentionMuslims there. andmurderof occupation from Jerusalem of and state divert this alliance inhis second describes Laden Bin Muslims. of land the isplundering which alliance”, “crusader-Zionist Newrole:4.3.2 Peacenegotiator united Muslim frontfighting far against enemy. civilization, and after the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the Arab lands, there Muslim the represent will not becausedoes al-Qaeda notcivilizational,is between be al-Qaeda no causes Conflict of conflict. every root would bethe differences civilizational ColdWar, thatafter the (1996) wrote, joinHuntington Union. Samuel European the increased interest to to create allies government. For Unitedthe it States is support in crucial winnerthe to of electionsthe in order the Arab World.unite either.unlikely havingto They are parliamentary elections, new the which generate will Turkey is willing Libya,like of Countries series the are through whichwentrevolutions, Egypt, and Tunisia, to join the Westernhighly forces, unlikely withAfghanistan,like and Iraq, arehighlyPakistan divided between tribes,different it isand its that theseShia and Sunni muchMuslims are bigger then between Muslims Countriesand United States. countries isfrom world tribe suffering amonghuge groups. Struggles eachstate, or between differences are willing to unite to fight against the far enemy. Both Osama binLadenAyman (2004)and referring al-Zawahiri (2004) are tothe fatwa from 1998: “the Americans'... aim is to serve the Jews' petty aim serve theJews' is“the to Americans'... from 1998: 32 CEU eTD Collection United States. from sideof the with beparticipation active the will signed Israel and between Syria peace the help With of Syria. the to back the Heights Golan the return would UnitedIsrael simple: very is conflict this to States, solution The Syria. and Israel between Golan is conflict conflict Palestinian Israeli besides Heightsconflict would becomesuch First allies. their and countries Muslim between disputes, the down settle be to will a demilitarized peace of the asapromoter State, UnitedThe role the of Laden, 2004). Muslim” (bin every zone, and the death of“Americans and their allies -civilians and military,” tobe “an individual for duty inis for the his second fatwa calling (2004) Binare involved. Laden allies of States United entry to them at all times. cleared a have to have which Muslims, to returned been have must Islam of sites holy These Islam practicedby located SunniMuslims,inhearth isin the which the the of Jerusalem. fatwa second his in Laden Bin negotiations. the to invited be to have Hamas the of members the since2007,so Gaza is controlled by Gaza Hamas because difficult, around maybequite strip negotiations The Palestinians. West tothe Bank the and Gazastrip return the to interest it ispersuade have within have whichthem United that States Israel,they even to onthe their supporter of oppression the of Muslim people in holy their lands. Through influencetheir scholars, and importantly most of supporters the al-Qaeda, that United States islonger no the Islamic states, Muslims all other towards message be aclear will This state. sovereign earlier byBillClinton. which wasinitiated and Palestine, between Israel negotiations Condoleezzathepeace abandoned Rice State the of Secretary the later and Advisor Security National his he and that was terror on war his is urging Muslims to liberate the“al-Aqsais Muslims urging Mosque”,whichholiestto is place thirdthe of It will also be the role of the United States to mediate peace in the other regions where asa of Palestine be acceptance will Israel support towards lost sign of the First 33 CEU eTD Collection IRA, their members will incorporate in the society. The more problematic will the will problematic more The society. in the incorporate will members their IRA, have would and not as crusaders affiliates same as al-Qaeda anysupport andthe imperialists, network, which operate in the Muslim countries. If the U.S. and their allies will notbeen seen insecond crucial step process the of the undermining ideology. al-Qaeda be will the Syria, and Palestine and Israel between in theconflicts peace and promoting Laden’s bin of will premise crucial second the asovereign state, deny as of Palestine acceptance seen as a crusader. The is whereAmerica supporters and their in of eyes Islamists the U.S. radical of the perception shift in the change the will troops U.S. the of U.S.Withdrawal Islam. of lands Holy foreignthe from military foreign policy especiallyLaden’s towards Israel, with Saudi Arabia from thecomplete and withdrawal fulfilIraq will partof both first bin the the al-Qaeda Withdrawal group soldiers andits activities. Afghanistan U.S. from of and the only change the face of the earth conflicts, but also it will influence ideologythe of a terrorist be conflict. in involvedthem to armed the territory inKashmir,a demilitarized zone will which preventandthem, alsocreating among reachingboth side the compromise towards involve conclusion, thewill division which of the the push be to would conflict in this States United the of role The region. Kashmiri the over Pakistan. Such situation is unlikely happento because India is also demanding the full control the to whole Kashmir area give beif would would ideology India al-Qaeda the discrediting ideal area Kashmir.from the over of Chinese conflict viewpointThe of the situation and Indian will Pakistani the resolve be to States United for thepeace-making challenge The lost of ideology of al-Qaeda will have immediate influence on the al-Qaeda on the influence immediate have will al-Qaeda of ideology The lost of Change in foreign the policy Unitedthe of States towards middlethe not Eastwill third the conflict, Syrian Israeli and conflict Palestinian Israeli the mediating After fatwas, fatwas, which is which urgingjihad for amandatory all Muslims in toget order ridthe of which are the base for the al-Qaeda ideology. Losing the support of Israel 34 CEU eTD Collection world which fight for the establishment of forof establishment the the fight world which the differences among the Muslims.Muslim Society, establish Great major goal to the theirbecause They can motivateideology, the spread to continue still will list, the the on one number being small al-Zawahiri Ayman groups within the Muslim with terrorists, wanted of which the consists hardcore, al-Qaeda The world. “Western” livingin and the with Islamists radicalized the bewith al-Qaedahardcore incorporation the remain. will still threat butthe lower, willbe significantly supporters and of the of attacks these individuals fordying the non-existent problems, and ideology.numbers discredited the The “crazy” the of consists still will element third the policy, foreign U.S. in the changes the and actions U.S. the by discredited is al-Qaeda of ideology the though Even element. Pakistan,Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, etc. The biggest problem deal to with will be the third like countries Muslim other follow will procedure same hotels; Saudi the on attacks the after al-Qaeda the with Arabia dealt Saudi as Same intheir countries. attacks the terrorist tolerate not because later,would Muslimcountries thepolice of or sooner Qaeda willbe captured leadership Thecore of “common Unitedal- the States. as in enemy” against struggle the 35 umma, but they will not find the same support same the find not will they but umma, had of failed because CEU eTD Collection negotiation between Israel and Palestine. Bin Laden in his second his in Laden Bin Palestine. and Israel between negotiation Palestine.loseshouldof U.S. Israel, more overwhelming support focus the on and peacethe people. Qaeda, because the fightfrom againstthe other the parts United of is from start removing forits UnitedNextwithdrewtroops soldierstask to States Iraq. U.S. theStates Arabic was world,the uniting whatstarted Arabia. to workon U.S. when second Presidentthis Barack Obama step, United States willelement completely of the Muslim disruptAfghanistan,butalso military duetothe inpresence Middle the especiallyinEast, Saudi the ideology of al- fulfilling the goals whichis the core binof Laden’s interest in fighting for their ideas. To make their ideology irrelevant, U.S. must focus on lose the supporters ideology, musttheir make and Uniteddefeat like States al-Qaeda, defeat group terrorist the to term. inlong In order defeatit a them cannot but organization, can detention the techniques, that temporarily potential paralyze the terrorists, are of young Western Muslimsthroughout the world. plays important an role in promoting theirideology, which is influencing and radicalizing through media, since their first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. Media and Internet Al-Qaeda has deeply rooted ideology, and its message has been spread out to the world would nor itorganization, cause thedeath of Ayman contemporary leaderthe al-Zawahiri. the to cause any damage will not binLaden its leaderOsama of Death hierarchy. Conclusion Second goal is the change in the foreign policy. U.S. change their standpoint towards standpoint their change U.S. policy. foreign in the change isthe goal Second invasionslabel is “crusader”, loseof First to goal isIraq and which due the to Invasion the Afghanistankillingto Iraq, and al-Qaeda leaders,and pre-emptive andloose structure, with organization, flexible isthe Al-Qaedacomplex terrorist 36 fatwas that create ideology. al-Qaeda the create that fatwa calledthebiggest CEU eTD Collection will only enter its new its chapter. enter will only small reason to fight, theywere will kids. fight. It Withis impossiblethe defeatFLN, al-Qaeda, to Anders Behring of Breivik, whotoal-Qaeda killed 77 peoplefight in Norway, most of whom againstterrorism through Maximilien Robespierrefightingfeudal against Louis of regime XVI., IRA, PLO, thewill local not Empire, end, Roman against terroristsfighting itZealots Jewish the since here been has terrorism local hand because if they have at least Kashmir. over and Pakistan India between and Heights, Golan over Syria and Israel between conflicts other coordinating in be mustreflected nature creating peace This Muslims. ordinary and scholars, Islamic Palestine and Israel, U.S will lose the “label Zionist enemy alliance”,of Muslimsthe “crusader-Zionist alliance”. By supporting the negotiations between and it will gain support of the Al-Qaeda can be defeated, and it will be the end of a global terrorism. On other the On of ita global terrorism. end will andbethe be defeated, Al-Qaeda can 37 CEU eTD Collection 122-128. of Terrorist Campaigns How How to Tacklethem. May 29, 2012). (accessed http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/are-we-winning-the-war-on-terror/ Forum, 2001. around worldthe and ages. the throughout NewYork,NY:Reed Press, 2004.410-412. of terror: manifestos, writings, and manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other terrorists from 2012). http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html (accessed May 28, Qaeda FreeYork: Press,2001. (accessed March2012). 27, Los Angeles Times. http://articles.latimes.com/2002/nov/11/opinion/oe-benjamin11 Press, 2006. from world the around and throughout NY: ages.the NewYork, ReedPress, 2004. 426-433. Voices of terror: manifestos, writings, and manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other terrorists throughout ages.the NY:Reed NewYork, Press, 2004. 403-409. 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