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Challenges in the Struggle Against Violent Extremism: Winning the War of Ideas

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Challenges in the Struggle Against Violent Extremism: Winning the War of Ideas Proceedings from the Bantle-INSCT Symposium March 29-30, 2006 Challenges in the Struggle Against Violent Extremism: Winning the War of Ideas Editorial Team: William C. Banks Corri Zoli Catherine Baker Symposium Organizers: Administrative Support: Melissa Kim, Claudia Sawyer Technical Support: Matt Coulter, Tom Fazzio, and the Information and Computing Technology Group Graduate Student Support: Members of the Student Association on Terrorism and Security Analysis (SATSA) and National Security Studies Program interns Published by the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism Suite 402 MacNaughton Hall Syracuse University (315) 443-2284 Website: http://insct.syr.edu All rights reserved © Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism 2008, 2014 This edition cover design and layout by Martin Walls. Preface A fruitful collaboration between the Louis A. Bantle Chair in Business and Government Policy, the National Security Studies Program at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, and the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism led to the March 2006 Symposium reproduced here: Challenges in the Struggle Against Violent Extremism: Winning the War on Ideas. With the extraordinary leadership of Bantle Chair holder General Montgomery Meigs, the sponsors succeeded in attracting a distinguished international group of scholars, public servants, and policy and business experts to explore the ongoing struggle against violent extremism. The contributors and abstracts of their papers appear in the next pages. The Louis A. Bantle Chair in Business and Government Policy was established in 1990 by Louis A. Bantle and UST, Inc., designed to support research and teaching at the intersection of business and government policy. This Symposium is emblematic of the core interests of the Bantle family and of the Chair that their generosity created. All the contributors to the Symposium share the view expressed by Bantle Professor Montgomery Meigs that successes in the struggle against violent extremism will occur only when government and the private sector combine forces. Business models and private sector leadership and management solutions will help develop the technologies and ideas that will support government in its ongoing efforts to combat extremist forces. The confluence of the Bantle family’s recognition of the importance of business and government collaboration and the hard work of the academic partners at Syracuse University produced a truly enlightening Symposium. This set of Proceedings will make a lasting record of their achievements. William C. Banks Director, INSCT Contents ABSTRACTS 1 Introduction to Challenges in the Struggle against Violent Extremism: 5 Winning the War of Ideas Adm. Edmund Giambastiani Jr. REDEFINING THE THREAT: A GLOBAL COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE INFORMATION AGE The Gentrification of Suicide Terrorism 21 Nasra Hassan Countering Insurgent Strategy in the Global Jihad 33 Col. Lior Lotan Luncheon Keynote: Developing a Global Strategy to Combat Violent Extremism 50 Raymond F. DuBois Jr. COUNTERMEASURES & COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE Twenty-First Century Challenges in Warfare: 66 Operational Asymmetry & Idiosyncratic Tactics Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs (Ret.) Updating the Countermeasures & Counter-Countermeasures 74 Games for Asymmetric Warfare: The Role of Technological Innovation & “Social Physics” Richard A. Games Seeking Symmetry in Fourth-Generation Warfare: 85 Information Operations in the War of Ideas K.A. Taipale WINNING THE WAR OF IDEAS Public Diplomacy & Winning the War of Ideas: 111 The Battle for World Opinion Col. F. William Smullen Change and the Struggle against Violent Extremism: 120 Winning the War of Ideas Harold C. Pachios ABOUT THE SPONSORS & CONTRIBUTORS 132 3 Abstracts Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., advises against the current kinetic approach towards extremists, which involves “killing people and breaking things.” Instead, he argues, we must understand the enemy’s perspective, which includes factoring in the conflict that is going on between the radical Salafist extremists and the wider Islamic community around the world. We must understand the acceptance of the Salafist interpretation of Islam, as this is the heart of the war of ideas in which we are engaged today. Giambastiani also notes that it is crucial that we remind ourselves of who our adversary is, what his goals are, and how he intends to achieve those goals. Because the enemy flies no flag, defends no borders, keeps no standing army, and occupies no defined territory, we must identify the source of his support, and how he is able to operate. Nasra Hassan, Director of the United Nations Information Services, identifies the factors that influence suicide bombers to carry out their objectives. Hassan notes that the adoption of suicide terrorism is preceded by discussion, and, in addition to there being a ‘cause’ that drives suicide terrorists, there must also be a charismatic figure, a sponsoring group, and a network. Another important aspect is interoperability, which allows different groups to operate together, not necessarily in unison, but in parallel, to meet short-term objectives. Col. Lior Lotan, Managing Director of Homeland Security for Cukierman & Co. Investment House, Ltd. addresses the core issues of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and why we must win in these types of engagements. Lotan focuses on the importance of perception to warfare of the information age. A battle in the information age is really a battle about information and ideas. In this era, if an opponent controls information, he also controls the battlefield. Lotan identifies the basic features of insurgencies: the importance of the idea; the structure behind it; the leadership, the leader must be a military person who understands and has courage to enter into battle; and finally, the asymmetric nature of insurgencies must be understood. The efforts to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the adversary should not concentrate only on the soldier, but also on the surrounding society that supports the insurgents. Without understanding these aspects, we cannot win. Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Raymond F. DuBois Jr., argues that we must reexamine the entire interagency process, notably between the State Department and the Department of Defense, to come up with something more effective than what exists today to fight radical extremists who want to harm the United States. DuBois notes Congress’ resistance to reconfigure how it deals with national security and homeland security after September 11th. He calls on former secretaries 4 and vice chairman of different committees to speak out and try to convince Congress that protecting their committee and subcommittee turfs and fighting turf battles will not further our aims at home or abroad. He notes further that The Quadrennial Defense Review (2006) process was significantly different from previous rounds and that more could have been done regarding reforms in management, governance, and decision-making in the Defense Department. Finally, he expresses the importance of recognizing that the global war on terrorism will not be won solely on military terms, but rather, it will be won by economic development, reconstruction, foreign exchange, and foreign investment. The global war on terrorism, if we do not succeed, is simply a precursor to a much larger conflict. Gen. Montgomery Meigs (Ret.) , argues that defining the current situation in Iraq as ‘asymmetric warfare’ is inaccurate. In operational terms, asymmetry means the absence of a comparable capability, which suggests that asymmetry involves a degree of commensurability. However, commensurability is lacking in Iraq. Instead, we are dealing with two cultures with two very different approaches to warfare that do not fit together. Meigs argues that the relationship is idiosyncratic rather than asymmetric, and a good example would be the attack on the World Trade Center. It was not directed towards the military, but rather at American political will and economic foundations. This action requires a different way of thinking about just what our opponent is thinking and what their next move may be, and how to counter it. To deal with this type of situation, we must go after not only the sniper, but we must deal with the society in which these extremists are supported. Our enemy is adaptive and has developed a variety of means to carry out an attack. We must understand these idiosyncratic aspects to warfare today and utilize this understanding to produce favorable results. Richard Games, Ph.D, chief engineer for MITRE Corporation’s Center for Integrated Intelligence Systems, focuses on the changing face of warfare from symmetric force-on-force situations, characterized by defined parameters, and today’s wars, which involve tactics and technologies that are played out in an asymmetric context. Games argues that we must move from an exclusively reactive to a more offensive posture to level the asymmetric playing field. To do so, we must act as the enemy acts; our actions must be unexpected, small scale, and local. Further, we must not rely solely on information technology as our only assets. Instead, we must understand the social science behind war and mix this aspect into the technological know-how in order to succeed. Founder and executive director of the Center
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