R026503 PUBLIC STL-18-10/PT/PTJ F0257/A07/PRV/20201215/R026503-R026688/EN/dm BEFORE THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON Case No: STL-18-10/PT/PTJ Before: Judge Daniel Fransen Registrar: Mr. David Tolbert, Acting Registrar Date: 15 December 2020 Filing Party: Prosecutor Original language: English Classification: Public THE PROSECUTOR v. SALIM JAMIL AYYASH Public Redacted Version of Annex G to F0257 "Prosecution's Submission Pursuant to Rule 91(Part 4) and the Corrigendum for the Annexes A and H to F0246 "Prosecution's Submission Pursuant to Rule 91"" - Corrected Version of the Pre-Trial Brief Office of the Prosecutor: Counsel for Mr. Salim Jamil Ayyash: Mr. Norman Farrell Mr. Emile Aoun and Ms. Anta Guisse Legal Representative of Participating Head of Defence Office: Victims (attack against Mr Hamade): Ms. Dorothee Le Fraper du Hellen Mr Nidal Jurdi Legal Representative of Participating Victims (attack against Mr Hawi): Mr Antonios Abou Kasm Legal Representative of Participating Victims (attack against Mr El-Murr): Mr Adel Nassar ,.,t•."l ~ ... .. ~ \\.t) 11.. _I_ _I_ 11..U_I__I_ VVU.:') .:')l'V_l__l_.:')V_l_VU UJ _I__I_VL.JUV1-1-U1-_l_ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••II c. BADREDDINE's ROLE IN HEZBOLLAH ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 45 1. BADREDDINE was a Hezbollah leader before, during and after the attacks ............ .45 2. BADREDDINE operated as a high level security operative in 2004-2005 ................ .47 3. BADREDDINE had ties to prominent Hezbollah members and to Hezbollah .......... .49 IV. THE USE OF COVERT TELEPHONE NETWORKS TO COMMIT THE ATTACKS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 51 A. AYYASH, BADREDDINE, AND OTHERS, USED COVERT TELEPHONE NETWORKS TO FACILITATE THE PLANNING, PREPARATION AND PERPETRATION OF THE ATTACKS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 51 1. Overview ...................................................................................................................... 51 STL-18-1 O/PT /PTJ 1 of 185 15 December 2020 Public Redacted 3. Phone numbers used by BADREDDINE .................................................................... 97 (a) Phone numbers leading to the attribution of Green 023 to BADREDDINE: BADREDDINE was the user of PMP 354, PMP 663 and Mobiles 128, 944, 195, 683 & 486 ................................................................................................................... 97 (b) BADREDDINE was the user of Network phone Green 023 ..................................... 100 D. OTHER UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS USED NETWORK PHONES, INCLUDING NETWORK PHONES INVOLVED IN THE ATTACKS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 101 VI. THE TERRORIST ATTACKS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 103 A. THE HAMADE ATTACK •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 103 1. Overview .................................................................................................................... 103 2. The preparation of the attack ..................................................................................... 104 STL-18-1 O/PT /PTJ 2of185 15 December 2020 Public Redacted STL-18-1 O/PT /PTJ 3 of 185 15 December 2020 Public Redacted R026507 STL-18-1 O/PT /PTJ F0257/A07/PRV/20201215/R026503-R026688/EN/dm I. INTRODUCTION 1. This Pre-Trial Brief sets out the Prosecution case and the evidence the Prosecution will lead to prove the allegations in the indictment, and the material facts therein. 2. As set out in the body of this document, the evidence encompasses different themes that cover a continuous period over four connected terrorist attacks extending from September 2004 to July 2005: the political context in Lebanon; the attribution of relevant phones; the nature and inter-connection of covert network and other mobile phones; and the chronology of, preparation for, and execution of the attacks, using these phones. 3. The entirety of the evidence is both inter-connected and cumulative and therefore, its ultimate weight, can only be evaluated holistically and in its entirety to determine whether the offences indicted are established beyond reasonable doubt. 1 4. The attacks targeted at Marwan Mohammed HAMADE, Georges Anis HA WI and Elias Michel EL-MURR, in addition to former Prime Minister Rafik HARIRI, are all inextricably connected by a series of factors, amongst them: the pervading political context; the common political stance adopted by the targeted victims; their temporal proximity; the use of an improvised explosive device (IED) and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED); the same criminal group using the same inter­ connected covert network phones to facilitate planning and execution for the attacks; their recurrent focus and use in areas frequented by the targeted victim occurring only in the period prior to each attack; and the pivotal role of the Accused, SALIM JAMIL A YYASH, reflected by the recurring, sequential call flows between him, Mustafa Amine BADREDDINE, and the other co-perpetrators. 5. All four attacks took place amongst historic, tumultuous and polarised political tensions regarding Syria's ongoing role and influence in Lebanon. On the one hand, there were those, amongst them Hezbollah and the Syrian regime itself, who strongly supported maintenance of the status quo; on the other, there were those, including all four of the targeted victims, who supported and promoted change in favour of greater Lebanese sovereignty. It is in this context, that AYYASH and BADREDDINE, Hezbollah E.g. ICC, Lubanga Dyilo Appeal Judgement, para.22; ICTRNchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para.213. STL-18-1 O/PT /PTJ 4of185 15 December 2020 Public Redacted R026508 STL-18-1 O/PT /PTJ F0257/A07/PRV/20201215/R026503-R026688/EN/dm affiliates both, oversaw and coordinated the three attacks that underlie the five indicted counts. 6. HAMADE was attacked on 1 October 2004, between 09: 11 and 09: 13 on Henry Ford Street in Beirut. A VBIED exploded approximately one meter from his vehicle as he left his home travelling to Parliament. He and [Redacted] were seriously injured, and his security officer Ghazi ABOU-KARROUM, the other occupant of the car, was killed. 7. HARIRI was attacked on 14 February 2005, at 12:50, near the St George's Marina in the middle of downtown Beirut. A very large, suicide VBIED, directed into position moments before by (the ) covert network phones, exploded as his security convoy sped past the St George's hotel. HARIRI and 21 others were killed, 226 others were injured, and the smTounding infrastructure devastated. 8. HAWI was attacked on 21 June 2005 around 09:48 on Habib Abi Chahla Street in Beirut. An IED placed under his own vehicle, exploded shortly after he had left his home as he drove past the Zouhairi petrol station. HAWI was killed, and [Redacted] and [Redacted], an employee of the petrol station, were injured. 9. EL-MURR was attacked on 12 July 2005 at around 10: 18 on Second A venue in Rabieh. A VBIED exploded as EL-MURR drove to his office. The explosion injured EL­ MURR, [Redacted], [Redacted], 12 bystanders, and killed Khaled MOURA, a passing motorist. 10. Several phones used to plan and coordinate all of these attacks, many forming part of the inter-connected covert networks, are attributed to A YYASH. These phones are attributed through their call patterns and co-location with his personal phones, so frequent and over such an extended period of time, that any suggestion of the co­ location being coincidence can be readily dismissed. 11. The evidence demonstrates that AYYASH with BADREDDINE and other unidentified participants acting under their direction, were behind the three attacks against HAMADE, HAWI, and EL-MURR just as they were behind the HARIRI Attack. These attacks were all prepared, planned and executed by the same core group of participants: using the same inter-connected covert network phones and mobile phones; utilising surveillance and patterns of phone use adapted to the circumstances of each victim; all STL-18-1 O/PT /PTJ 5 of 185 15 December 2020 Public Redacted R026509 STL-18-1 O/PT /PTJ F0257/A07/PRV/20201215/R026503-R026688/EN/dm of which was directed towards the effective placement and detonation of IED and VBIEDs. 12. The recurrent association, over a ten month period, of the same inter-connected covert network and mobile phones co-ordinated by A YYASH, with each of the victims' movements and crime scenes, and only within unique, specific periods preceding each of the four attacks, leaves no room for doubt that their association cannot sensibly be coincidence or innocent. Rather, this pattern of conduct points inexorably to the knowing involvement of the same criminal group in each of the series of connected terrorist attacks. Further, the degree of planning and sophistication, and the method of each attack, inter alia confirm the existence of a conspiracy or criminal association, the relevant intent to kill, the intent to create a state of terror and, ultimately, AYYASH's criminal responsibility for each of the five counts indicted. II. POLITICAL CONTEXT A. Overview 13. AYYASH, together with BADREDDINE and unidentified users of covert Network phones, planned, coordinated and executed the attacks against HAMADE, HARIRI, HAWI, and EL-MURR. This