The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2006

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The Foreign Service Journal, July-August 2006 HONORING MORT ABRAMOWITZ SUMMER FICTION AFSA NEWS MOVES! AFSA AWARD WINNERS INSIDE $3.50 / JULY-AUGUST 2006 OREIGN ERVICE FJ O U R N A L S THE MAGAZINE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROFESSIONALS TRANSFORMING DIPLOMACY A Hard Sell in Foggy Bottom? CONTENTS July-August 2006 Volume 83, No. 7-8 See p. 65 C OVER S TORY FS FICTION 19 / TRANSFORMING DIPLOMACY AT STATE DAY OF THE JACKALOPE / 39 Obtaining the necessary resources to implement A diplomatic faux pas is narrowly avoided with the transformational diplomacy will be the key test of delivery of a hefty jackalope. Secretary of State Rice’s commitment to her vision. By Brian Aggeler By Shawn Zeller RAM BALRAM’S FINAL EXAM / 44 An Indian village’s history and hope are wrapped up in the struggles of a doddering but determined old man. By Rakesh Surampudi C OLUMNS D EPARTMENTS PRESIDENT’S VIEWS / 5 LETTERS / 6 Closer State-DOD CYBERNOTES / 11 Cooperation: Building MARKETPLACE / 12 on Existing Success BOOKS / 49 IN MEMORY / 52 F EATURE By J. Anthony Holmes AFSA NEWS / 65 PEAKING UT INDEX TO 30 / HONORING AN “AGGRESSIVE INTERVENTIONIST”: S O / 15 AMBASSADOR MORTON ABRAMOWITZ Run, Lemmings, Run ADVERTISERS / 90 Last month AFSA recognized the retired By David T. Jones ambassador’s many contributions to American REFLECTIONS / 92 diplomacy and his lifetime of public service. A Deep Bow to the By Steven Alan Honley Foreign Service By Ashley Wills THE MAGAZINE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROFESSIONALS OREIGN ERVICE Foreign Service Journal (ISSN 0146-3543), 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037-2990 is published J O U R N A L F S monthly with a combined July/August issue by the American Foreign Service Association, a private, non-profit Editor Editorial Board STEVEN ALAN HONLEY organization. Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and does not necessarily represent Senior Editor TED WILKINSON, the views of the Journal, the Editorial Board or AFSA. Writer queries and submissions are invited, preferably by SUSAN B. MAITRA CHAIRMAN e-mail. Journal subscription: AFSA Members - $13 included in annual dues; others - $40. For foreign surface mail, Associate Editor add $18 per year; foreign airmail, $36 per year. Periodical postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mail- KENT C. BROKENSHIRE SHAWN DORMAN ing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Foreign Service Journal, 2101 E Street N.W., Washington, D.C. Ad & Circulation Manager STEPHEN W. B UCK 20037-2990. Indexed by Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS). The Journal is not responsible for unsolicited ED MILTENBERGER ANTHONY S. CHAN Business Manager LILLIAN DEVALCOURT-AYALA manuscripts, photos or illustrations. Advertising inquiries are invited. The appearance of advertisements herein MIKKELA V. T HOMPSON JOSH GLAZEROFF does not imply the endorsement of the services or goods offered. FAX: (202) 338-8244 or (202) 338-6820. Art Director ILLIAM ORDAN E-MAIL: [email protected]. WEB: www.afsa.org. TELEPHONE: (202) 338-4045. © American Foreign Service CARYN SUKO SMITH W W. J Association, 2006. Printed in the U.S.A. Send address changes to AFSA Membership, 2101 E Street N.W., Editorial Intern LAURIE KASSMAN EIRENE BUSA JOYCE W. N AMDE Washington, D.C. 20037-2990. Printed on 50-percent recycled paper, of which 10 percent is post-consumer waste. Advertising Intern KAY WEBB MAYFIELD ANDRES VIDER CHRISTOPHER L. TEAL Cover and inside illustration by Brian Aggeler JULY-AUGUST 2006/FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 3 PRESIDENT’S VIEWS Closer State-DOD Cooperation: Building on Existing Success BY J. ANTHONY HOLMES The state of the world today, cers for expanded cooperation • Establishing a joint FSI-NDU pro- and for the foreseeable future, with our military overseas is gram to train FS political advisers dictates much closer coopera- the existing State/DOD coop- (“polads”) to military commanders tion between the State and eration programs. Particularly before they go to their assignments; Defense Departments, particu- relevant are those offered at • Assigning State officers to the new larly at overseas missions. This the National Defense Univer- 10-month Counterterrorism Fellows enhanced coordination lies at sity, the premier professional program, set up three years ago to bring the heart of Secretary Rice’s military educational institution senior military and civilian officials from transformational diplomacy initiative. in the United States. Fortuitously, around the world to the U.S. to cement Regrettably, the political-military DOD is in the process of converting contacts and to acquaint them with our function in the State Department has NDU into more of a National Security interagency terrorism programs; become marginalized over the past cou- University to strengthen interagency • Setting up a working relationship ple of decades, its appeal as a specialty between the State Department’s Office has waned, and the number of FSOs in of Stabilization and Reconstruction the PM Bureau has shrunk markedly. Promoting a more and NDU’s Strategic Gaming Center. At a time when DOD is playing a much productive engagement NDU’s widely acclaimed Gaming Cen- larger role in both foreign affairs and the with the military will ter could prepare, facilitate, and host the conduct of diplomacy, it is important strategic scenarios for this State entity; that State both increase its understand- come with a price tag. • Establishing a jointly-run FSI- ing of the U.S. military’s values and cul- But it is one worth NDU program to train civilian and mil- ture and try to impart to our military an paying. itary personnel to participate in Provin- understanding of what drives State cial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, Department approaches and why we Afghanistan and other post-conflict situ- see the world differently than they do. collaboration and increase professional ations; The reality remains that only the education to more civilians and military • Creating closer contacts between State Department sees the entire fabric officers. NDU’s three affiliated regional centers of our relations with other nations, and The State Department has long par- and the State Department by assigning only State is responsible for managing ticipated in key NDU programs, includ- a senior FSO to serve as a deputy direc- and maximizing the totality of these ing the highly valued, but limited, stu- tor at each; and relationships. While the “long war” may dent and faculty slots at the National •Extending current State Depart- dominate relations with some countries, War College and the Industrial College ment faculty assignments at NDU to it is not the only element in any of our of the Armed Forces. With the provi- two years with an option for a third. bilateral relationships. The other sion of some modest resources and While the ideas above are a mix of aspects simply have to be factored in as additional billets, NDU can play a sig- old and new, all of them would well. One example of this is the signifi- nificantly greater role in preparing State increase State/DOD understanding cance of Iran and Iraq in terms of glob- Department personnel to meet some of and cooperation. Admittedly, promot- al economic and energy interests. the new national security challenges. ing a more productive engagement An obvious place for State to focus in New initiatives worthy of considera- with the military will come with a price order to prepare Foreign Service offi- tion, according to senior State officials tag. But to advance transformational presently assigned to NDU, include: diplomacy and achieve the results J. Anthony Holmes is the president of the • Doubling the number of FSOs Secretary Rice wants, that price will American Foreign Service Association. who attend the War College and ICAF; have to be paid. I JULY-AUGUST 2006/FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 5 LETTERS “The Other Side of the of Household who are interested in type of challenge in their Foreign Unaccompanied Tour”: participating. Service careers. For more informa- FLO Responds Once FLO receives the contact tion on FLO’s programs in support of We were pleased to see the article information, Nan, a trained social unaccompanied tours, please visit our by FSO Deborah Sisbarro (May AFSA worker, maintains regular communi- Web site at www.state.gov/m/dghr/flo, News), who served two years in Mos- cation with family members, providing or contact Nan Leininger directly at cow as a public diplomacy officer and information, referrals and guidance, [email protected] or (202) 647- extended for one year while her hus- developing programs to serve both 1076. band served in Iraq. Ms. Sisbarro adults and children, and advocating Ann DeLong Greenberg noted that being able to remain in for services as needed. The goal is to Director Moscow during this period provided create an interactive “virtual commu- Family Liaison Office continuity and stability for her family; nity” of mutually supportive families Washington, D.C. allowed her son to stay in the same who share the same situation. FLO school and maintain the same friends has reached out by developing the Support Career Development and nanny; and enabled her to contin- HomeFrontUS listserv, establishing a As a Foreign Service office man- ue working with supportive supervi- 24/7 hotline for referrals and making agement specialist who has been in sors. In addition, it was easier for the various relevant publications available the Service since 1986, I think the family to meet at a halfway point in online. Nan also presents information OMS career development plans sound Europe when her husband was able to on FLO’s support services to the DS great. However, they don’t help us take R&R. Iraq course each week. She recently much if we do not have support from However, Ms. Sisbarro expressed visited Baghdad and Riyadh to see the post management and, most of all, disappointment that, as the spouse of physical environments and speak with from our supervisors.
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