Assessing the Middle East Strategic Alliance as a Counter to Iranian Influence Jonathan Deemer ince the 2016 election of President Donald scope and responsibilities remain ambiguous, as the S Trump, US-Iranian relations have steadily dete- alliance is still in its infancy. riorated, culminating in the US withdrawal from the Still, MESA’s purpose is clear: to check Iranian Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in influence in the region. Regardless of whether its May 2018.1 At the same time, regional power dynam- official documents specifically mention the Islamic ics in the Middle East, and subsequently US strategic Republic, there is little doubt about the reason for goals, have shifted from a primary focus on terrorism its creation. As a secondary objective, MESA is also to more traditional great-power competition.2 intended to reduce US involvement in the region and Because Iranian-trained, -funded, and -equipped transfer regional responsibility to its partners. militias have played such an integral role in the This report assesses MESA’s viability toward this campaign against Islamic State (IS) forces in both end and concludes that MESA is not viable at this northern Iraq and Syria, the territory once held by time. I reach this conclusion by examining the pub- the extremist group is largely being ceded to those licly available information about MESA and using same Iranian proxies, giving ever more influence research-backed conjecture and expert opinion to to an avowed American enemy. Geopolitically, the fill in the gaps. The report begins with an overview shift of these territories into the Iranian sphere of MESA’s likely organizational structure and scope, of influence cuts a Shi’a stripe across the Sunni followed by an analysis of historically successful and world, connecting Tehran to Damascus via Baghdad. unsuccessful military alliances in an attempt to illus- Ali Younisi, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s trate lessons learned and best practices. I then exam- adviser on ethnic and religious minorities affairs, ine three key MESA member states on five criteria: even went so far as to say, “Baghdad is now capital of domestic stability, military capacity, alignment of the Iranian empire.”3 national interest, economic factors, and role in the In this context, the Trump administration is alliance. Next, I outline relevant topics that pose chal- actively pursuing the formation of the Middle East lenges and present opportunities for MESA and in Strategic Alliance (MESA), a regional security struc- doing so examine the pros and cons. In conclusion, I ture including the United States, the six states of the assess MESA’s likelihood of success as outlined by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Jordan, and Egypt.4 Trump administration, as far as is known at the time, President Trump and others have informally referred followed by a brief discussion of the reasoning for the to the proposed agreement as the “Arab NATO,” but negative conclusion and possible courses of action specifics about its organizational structure and its moving forward. 3 YOUNG SCHOLAR AWARDS PROGRAM 2018–19 The Middle East Strategic Alliance To be perfectly clear, the proposed structure in this report is the product of my informed conjecture and MESA is an attempt to adapt US strategic policy to does not represent official plans by the United States shifting power dynamics in the Middle East. In the or others. To that end, Figure 1 illustrates a proposed same way that the many Western European nations organizational structure for MESA. Similar to NATO, and the United States presented the Soviet Union the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), with a united front during the Cold War, MESA is and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), intended to unify the Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan, MESA would be led by a council. The MESA Coun- and the United States against the rising Iranian cil would be responsible for leading the organization, threat. Further, transferring responsibility from the deciding the direction of the alliance, and oversee- United States to its regional partners as their capa- ing implementation of its directives. The council’s bilities evolve is consistent with broader US policy authority would be largely vested in the MESA sec- in recent decades. retary general, the head administrative position in The vision for MESA is a region in which the the organization. The secretary general and council so-called Shi’a Crescent is never fully materialized would oversee the three committees that represent and Iran’s various proxies do not have the capabil- the three ways in which MESA intends to influence ity to sow discord and advance Iranian interests.5 the region: economically, politically, and militarily. MESA is designed to meet two US goals: preventing The committees would be staffed ceremonially by the an openly hostile state from acquiring unchallenged respective member states’ defense, economic, and control of a region vital to US interests and the global foreign ministers, whereas representatives would be economy at large and reducing US involvement and chosen to conduct the majority of the work. fiscal commitment in the region. The Diplomatic Committee, as well as the MESA Because little is known about the Trump adminis- employees who comprise the MESA diplomatic corps, tration’s plan for MESA, this report pieces together would be responsible for external and internal diplo- known elements with likely structures to provide a matic negotiations. If disagreements arise between broad perspective of MESA’s ostensible organiza- member states or between MESA and external entities, tional framework. Further, it identifies the scope of these diplomatic professionals would be tasked with MESA’s operations, its regional responsibilities, and resolving conflict peacefully and responsibly. other conceivable uses for the alliance. Finally, it The Economic Committee would be designed addresses several key questions. to facilitate economic cooperation among member states. Because MESA is primarily intended to counter Likely Organizational Structure. On Septem- the Iranian threat in the region, the economic partner- ber 26, 2018, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State ship among member states is an attempt to econom- for Arabian Gulf Affairs Tim Lenderking gave an ically isolate Iran in conjunction with ever-tightening interview to the National in which he named nine US sanctions. Toward that end, the final MESA char- countries to be included in the alliance: the United ter should include provisions for a free trade agree- States, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, ment (FTA). Both the Economic Partnership Agency Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).6 and Dispute Resolution Mechanism would work to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with GCC ensure an equitable and efficient implementation of officials on October 1, 2018, to further discuss details this FTA. of MESA, but organizational details remain sparse in Finally, the Military Committee, the largest subset its early development phases.7 Because the alliance is of MESA, would handle all military matters. Because widely known to be modeled after NATO in at least MESA is modeled after NATO, which in turn is mod- a broad, conceptual manner, its organizational struc- eled after the US military, a joint staff would direct all ture is likely to be similar as well. military operations. Underneath the joint staff would 4 ASSESSING THE MIDDLE EAST STRATEGIC ALLIANCE | Jonathan Deemer Figure 1. Suggested Organizational Structure for MESA MESA Council MESA Secretary General Economic Military Diplomatic Committee Committee Committee Economic Dispute Resolution Joint Staff MESA Diplomatic Partnership Agency Mechanism Corps Logistics Missile Defense Training Naval Cyber Air Land Command Command Command Command Command Command Command Defense Technology MESA Defense Quick Reaction Force Assistance Agency College Source: Author. be seven commands to oversee each type of conflict creating a military alliance out of thin air necessi- MESA forces might encounter. Of note are three fur- tates US leadership in its beginning stages. Still, this ther subsets: the Quick Reaction Force, the Defense must be balanced with the understanding that the Technology Assistance Agency, and the MESA Trump administration’s vision for MESA is one of Defense College. decreasing US leadership (and financial commit- The Quick Reaction Force, under the Land Com- ment) paired with increased partner responsibility. mand, would be an agile and adaptable force to Because of the high quality of Saudi military technol- respond to small-scale, immediate threats to security ogy and the kingdom’s financial wealth, its ongoing or sovereignty. With the proper training, technology, challenges in Yemen clearly are the result of a lack of and scope of operations, the GCC’s Peninsula Shield effective and tested training and military doctrine. Force (PSF) could conceivably fulfill this role. The MESA Defense College, modeled heavily after the The Defense Technology Assistance Agency US Department of Defense’s National Defense Uni- would serve as a forum through which the United versity, is intended to address such shortcomings. States could supply high-quality military technology The purpose of the Defense College, much like to member states at discounted prices and provide the Defense Technology Assistance Agency, is to that technology’s specialized repairs, maintenance, provide uniformity in strategies and doctrines