KEVIN07 AND THE REAL JULIA: LABOR’ S USE OF POLITICAL BRANDING IN 2007 AND 2010

LORANN MARGARET DOWNER

Masters Degree in Governance, Policy and Public Affairs

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at

The University of Queensland in 2014

The School of Political Science and International Studies

ABSTRACT

The and its leaders increasingly have been viewed as brands since their winning election campaign in 2007. This work tests claims that Labor and former Labor Prime Ministers and deliberately attempted branding in the ‘Kevin07’ campaign of 2007 and “the real Julia” campaign of 2010. Building on extant literature, I develop three tools - the concept of the brand oriented party, a model of political branding in and a Political Branding Checklist - to conceptualise, identify and evaluate political branding. I marry these tools with qualitative and quantitative data from interviews with Labor practitioners, Labor television commercials and ABC television news to evaluate planning and performance for each campaign. I conclude that Labor, or at least sections of the party, did deliberately employ branding in the 2007 and 2010 campaigns. In 2007, Labor crafted the ‘Kevin07’ brand for Rudd in a co-branding strategy with the weaker party brand, in a strategic and disciplined campaign. In 2010, Labor deployed Gillard as the dominant offering and the party had little presence. The brand strategy was hastily conceived and unevenly executed during a difficult campaign. In both cases, Labor sought a brand orientation during the campaign but failed to maintain it in government. Further, I conclude that Labor’s branding efforts contributed to the successes and failures of their campaigns and governments. These, and other conclusions, point to an overarching lesson for practitioners and researchers - the need to fully engage with the concept of branding to best employ and understand this new way of doing politics.

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DECLARATION BY AUTHOR

This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis.

I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award.

I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University Library and, subject to the General Award Rules of The University of Queensland, immediately made available for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.

I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copyright holder(s) of that material. Where appropriate I have obtained copyright permission from the copyright holder to reproduce material in this thesis.

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PUBLICATIONS DURING CANDIDATURE

Publications Downer, Lorann. 2014. ‘Case Study 2.1 Positioning for Power in Australia’ and ‘Case Study 4.3 Personal and party logos in the Kevin07 campaign’. In Political Marketing: principles and applications, 2nd ed, ed. J. Lees-Marshment. Oxon: Routledge.

Conference papers and presentations Downer, Lorann. 2013a. ‘Political Branding In Australia: A Conceptual Model’. Paper presented at the United Kingdom Political Studies Association Annual International Conference, Cardiff.

Downer, Lorann. 2013b. ‘Position, Position, Position: Labor's Presentation in the 2007 and 2010 Australian Election Campaigns’. Presentation at the New Zealand and Australia Political Marketing and Management Workshop, Auckland.

Downer, Lorann. 2013c. ‘Kevin07 and The Real Julia: A tale of two political branding campaigns’. Paper presented at Political Studies Association Conference, Perth.

PUBLICATIONS INCLUDED IN THIS THESIS

No publications included.

CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHERS TO THE THESIS

Associate Professor of Marketing, Frank Alpert, from the Business School at The University of Queensland, provided valuable comments on an early version of the Political Branding Checklist.

STATEMENT OF PARTS OF THE THESIS SUBMITTED TO QUALIFY FOR THE AWARD OF ANOTHER DEGREE

Early versions of the conceptual model of political branding in Australia, the Commercial Branding Checklist and the Political Branding Checklist were included in a paper ‘Building a Political Branding Toolkit’, which was submitted as part of a postgraduate course in Marketing Theory and Research, at The University of Queensland. Completed: Semester 1, 2010. Achieved: High Distinction. iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Sincere thanks to my principal supervisor, Dr Ian Ward, and associate supervisor, Dr Rae Wear, for their valuable advice, assistance and support throughout this project. This thesis is stronger for their perceptive criticisms and expert contributions.

Thanks to the School of Political Science and International Studies at The University of Queensland, and in particular Barbara Sullivan, for assistance and support in multiple ways. Thanks also to colleagues including Danielle, Alissa and Willem for advice, support and diversions.

I am very grateful for the support of an Australian Postgraduate Awards scholarship which allowed me to focus on my research.

Thanks to Associate Professor, Frank Alpert, from the Business School at The University of Queensland, and Professor Kevin Lane Keller, from the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, for generously giving time to discuss my ideas.

Special thanks go to the Australian Labor Party practitioners who agreed to be interviewed, thereby enriching this work.

My husband, Mark Kennard, and study buddies Sasa, Max and Poppy lovingly shared this journey.

Thanks to my extended family - especially Pam, Bob, Jill and Colin - for their interest and encouragement.

Thanks also to many friends for their interest and support especially Brendon, Colleen, Graham, LJ, Luke, Mary, Mike, Nicole and Tim.

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KEYWORDS

Political branding, political marketing, the Australian Labor Party, Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, political parties, Australian politics, Australian electoral system.

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND STANDARD RESEARCH CLASSIFICATIONS (ANZSRC)

ANZSRC code: 160601, and Politics 100%

FIELDS OF RESEARCH (FoR) CLASSIFICATION

FoR code: 1606 Political Science 100%

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DEDICATION

For Mark for everything

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TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………………………….Page

ABSTRACT….……………………..……………….…………………………………………. i

DECLARATION BY AUTHOR….……………….…………………………………………. ii

PUBLICATIONS DURING CANDIDATURE….………………………..…………………. iii Publications……………………………………………………………………………………. iii Conference papers and presentations….…………………………………………………….. iii

PUBLICATIONS INCLUDED IN THIS THESIS………………………….....……...... iii

CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHERS TO THE THESIS....……………………………………. iii

STATEMENT OF PARTS OF THE THESIS SUBMITTED TO QUALIFY FOR THE AWARD OF ANOTHER DEGREE….………………………………………………... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………………... iv

KEYWORDS…………………………………………………………………………………... v

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND STANDARD RESEARCH CLASSIFICATIONS (ANZSRC)…….……………………….…………………………... v

FIELDS OF RESEARCH (FoR) CLASSIFICATION……..……………………………...... v

DEDICATION….……………………………………………………………………………… vi

LIST OF TABLES………………………………………...……………...... xi

LIST OF FIGURES…………………...…………………………………...... xi

ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………………...... xv

CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………. 1 BRANDING IN AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE……………………………… 1 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT……………………………………………. 3 OVERVIEW OF LABOR’S CAMPAIGNS AND GOVERNMENTS…………………….. 7 The rise of Rudd…………………………………………………………………...... 7 The 2007 campaign…………………………………………………………………...... 10 The first ………………………………………………………………….. 12 The first ………………………………………………………………… 14 The 2010 campaign……………………………………………………………………………. 16 The second Gillard Government……………………………………………………………... 19

CHAPTER TWO – LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS……………………………………… 21 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………...... 21

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A DISCUSSION OF BRANDING………………………………………………...... 21 Branding in profit and non-profit organisations……………………………………………. 22 Branding in politics………………………………………………...... 23 Defining political branding………………………………………………...... 25 A NEW PERSPECTIVE………………………………………………...... 25 The traditional perspective………………………………………………...... 25 Models of voter behaviour………………………………………………...... 26 Models of party behaviour………………………………………………...... 28 The branding perspective………………………………………………...... 31 Marketing models of voter behaviour………………………………………………...... 31 Marketing models of party behaviour………………………………………………...... 32 Branding explanations of voter behaviour………………………………………………...... 33 Branding explanations of party behaviour………………………………………………...... 35 A TALE OF TWO DISCIPLINES………………………………………………...... 36 A merger of commerce and politics………………………………………………...... 37 Differences, gaps and criticisms remain………………………………………………...... 41 Differences………………………………………………...... 41 Gaps………………………………………………...... 42 Criticisms………………………………………………...... 43 A COMMON, IF IMPERFECT, PRACTICE………………………………………………. 44 America………………………………………………...... 44 Britain………………………………………………...... 45 Australia………………………………………………...... 46

CHAPTER THREE – ASSEMBLING AND APPLYING THE TOOLS…………………. 47 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………...... 47 THE CENTRAL ROLE OF PARTIES………………………………………………...... 47 NEW TOOLS………………………………………………...... 50 A conceptualisation of the brand oriented party……………………………………………. 50 A model of political branding in Australia………………………………………………...... 53 A Political Branding Checklist………………………………………………...... 59 MARRYING THE TOOLS WITH THE DATA……………………………………………. 62 Interviews and speeches………………………………………………...... 63 Television news stories and commercials………………………………………………...... 64 Components of the Political Branding Checklist……………………………………………. 68 Visual and verbal messages………………………………………………...... 69 Data analysis………………………………………………...... 71

CHAPTER FOUR – THE PRACTITIONERS TALK BRANDING AND STRATEGY… 72 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………...... 72 BRANDING……………………………………...... 72 The practitioners talk branding……………………………………...... 73 The practitioners talk motivation……………………………………...... 75 STRATEGY……………………………………...... 76 The practitioners talk strategy……………………………………...... 76

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The practitioners talk strategy in 2007 and 2010……………………………………...... 79

CHAPTER FIVE – POSITIONING THE BRAND: MARKET SEGMENTATION AND COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS……………………………………...... 82 INTRODUCTION……………………………………...... 82 POSITIONING……………………………………...... 83 Positioning in politics……………………………………...... 83 Positioning in the 2007 campaign……………………………………...... 84 Positioning in the 2010 campaign……………………………………...... 85 CORE ASSOCIATIONS……………………………………...... 86 Core associations in politics……………………………………...... 86 Core associations in the 2007 campaign……………………………………...... 87 Core associations in the 2010 campaign……………………………………...... 88 MARKET SEGMENTATION AND COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS……………………….. 90 Market segmentation and competitive analysis in politics………………………………….. 90 Market segmentation and competitive analysis in the 2007 campaign……………………….. 93 Segments in commercials……………………………………...... 95 Segments in stories……………………………………...... 100 Market segmentation and competitive analysis in the 2010 campaign……………………….. 103 Segments in commercials……………………………………...... 105 Segments in stories……………………………………...... 109 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS……………………………………...... 113

CHAPTER SIX – POSITIONING THE BRAND: POINTS OF DIFFERENCE AND POINTS OF PARITY…………………………………………………………………….... 115 INTRODUCTION……………………………………...... 115 POINTS OF DIFFERENCE AND POINTS OF PARITY………………………………….. 116 Points of difference and points of parity in politics…………………………………………. 116 Points of difference and points of parity in the 2007 campaign……………………………… 118 Points of difference in commercials……………………………………...... 120 Points of parity in commercials……………………………………...... 123 Points of difference in stories……………………………………...... 125 Points of parity in stories……………………………………...... 126 Points of difference and points of parity in the 2010 campaign……………………………… 128 Points of difference in commercials……………………………………...... 131 Points of parity in commercials……………………………………...... 133 Points of difference in stories……………………………………...... 135 Points of parity in stories……………………………………...... 137 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS……………………………………...... 139

CHAPTER SEVEN – BRAND ARCHITECTURE: HIERARCHY, LOGOS AND SLOGANS…………………………………………………………………………………... 141 INTRODUCTION……………………………………...... 141 BRAND ARCHITECTURE……………………………………...... 141 Brand architecture in politics……………………………………...... 142 Brand architecture in the 2007 campaign……………………………………...... 144 ix

Brand architecture in the 2010 campaign……………………………………...... 144 BRAND HIERARCHY AND BRAND ELEMENTS……………………………………….. 145 Brand hierarchy and elements in politics……………………………………...... 146 Hierarchy in the 2007 campaign ……………………………………...... 149 Logos in the 2007 campaign……………………………………...... 149 Logos in commercials……………………………………...... 151 Logos in stories……………………………………...... 154 Slogans in the 2007 campaign……………………………………...... 156 Slogans in commercials……………………………………...... 157 Slogans in stories……………………………………...... 158 Hierarchy in the 2010 campaign ……………………………………...... 159 Logos in the 2010 campaign……………………………………...... 159 Logos in commercials……………………………………...... 159 Logos in stories……………………………………...... 159 Slogans in the 2010 campaign……………………………………...... 160 Slogans in commercials……………………………………...... 162 Slogans in stories……………………………………...... 163 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS……………………………………...... 164

CHAPTER EIGHT – MARKETING THE BRAND: INTEGRATED MARKETING…... 167 INTRODUCTION……………………………………...... 167 INTEGRATED MARKETING……………………………………...... 167 Integrated marketing in politics……………………………………...... 169 Integrated marketing evaluations……………………………………...... 171 Integrated marketing in the 2007 campaign……………………………………...... 173 Integrated marketing in commercials……………………………………...... 174 Integrated marketing in stories……………………………………...... 176 Integrated marketing in commercials and stories……………………………………...... 177 Integrated marketing in the 2010 campaign……………………………………...... 180 Integrated marketing in commercials……………………………………...... 181 Integrated marketing in stories……………………………………...... 182 Integrated marketing in commercials and stories……………………………………...... 183 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS……………………………………...... 186

CHAPTER NINE – FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS…………………………………… 189 INTRODUCTION……………………………………...... 189 CRAFTING AND CRASHING BRAND RUDD……………………………………...... 189 DESPERATELY SEEKING THE REAL JULIA……………………………………...... 193 CONCLUSIONS ……………………………………...... 196

REFERENCES……………………………………...... 202

APPENDICES……………………………………...... 223 APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEWEES ……………………………………...... 223

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LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………..……….Page

Table 3.1. Political Branding Checklist. ……………………………………...... 60 Table 8.1. Evaluation of integration of marketing within a Labor television commercial……………………………………………………………………………….... 173

LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………………….Page

Figure 1.1. Cumulative number of newspaper articles referring to brands and branding in Australian politics between 1997 and 2013. ……………………………………...... 2 Figure 1.2. Rudd satisfaction ratings as Opposition leader and Prime Minister from 8- 10 December 2006 to 18-20 June 2010. ………………………………...... 8 Figure 1.3. Labor and primary vote from 8-10 December 2006 to 18-20 June 2010. ……………………………………...... 8 Figure 1.4. Labor’s youthful leader, Kevin Rudd offered a contrast with veteran Liberal Prime Minister, . ……………………………………...... 9 Figure 1.5. Gillard satisfaction ratings from 16-18 July 2010 to 21-23 June 2013. ……… 15 Figure 1.6. Labor and Coalition primary vote from 25-27 June 2010 to 21-23 June 2013. ……………………………………...... 15 Figure 1.7 Australia’s first female leader, Julia Gillard faced off against Opposition leader, . ……………………………………...... 16 Figure 3.1. The marketing process for product, sales and market-oriented parties. ……. 51 Figure 3.2. Strategic Brand Management Process. ………………………………………... 54 Figure 3.3. Stages in the Australian federal electoral cycle. ………………………………. 57 Figure 3.4. Steps in the political brand management process. ……………………………. 58 Figure 5.1. Examples of visual depictions of segments in Labor television commercials from 2007. …………………………………………………………………………………. 95 Figure 5.2. Visual representation of segments in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. ………………………………. 97 Figure 5.3. Visual representation of gender in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. ………………………………. 97 Figure 5.4. Visual representation of age groups in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………….. 98 Figure 5.5. Visual representation of social class in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………...... 99 Figure 5.6. Verbal representation of segments in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………..... 99 Figure 5.7. Visual representation of segments in selected ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 100 Figure 5.8. Visual representation of gender in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 101 Figure 5.9. Visual representation of age groups in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 101 Figure 5.10. Visual representation of social class in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 102

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Figure 5.11. Verbal representation of segments in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 103 Figure 5.12. Examples of visual depictions of segments in Labor television commercials from 2010. ……………………………………...... 106 Figure 5.13. Visual representation of segments in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. ………………………………. 106 Figure 5.14. Visual representation of gender in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. ………………………………. 107 Figure 5.15. Visual representation of age groups in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………….. 108 Figure 5.16. Visual representation of social class in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………….. 108 Figure 5.17. Verbal representation of segments in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………….. 109 Figure 5.18. Visual representation of segments in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 110 Figure 5.19. Visual representation of gender in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 111 Figure 5.20. Visual representation of age groups in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 111 Figure 5.21. Visual representation of social class in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 112 Figure 5.22. Verbal representation of segments in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 113 Figure 6.1. Examples of visual depiction of points of difference in Labor television commercials from 2007. ……………………………………...... 121 Figure 6.2. Visual representation of points of difference in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………….. 122 Figure 6.3. Verbal representation of points of difference in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………...... 122 Figure 6.4. Examples of visual depiction of points of parity in Labor television commercials from 2007. ……………………………………...... 123 Figure 6.5. Visual representation of points of parity in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………….. 124 Figure 6.6. Verbal representation of points of parity in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………...... 124 Figure 6.7. Visual representation of points of difference in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 125 Figure 6.8. Verbal representation of points of difference in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 126 Figure 6.9. Examples of visual depiction of points of parity in ABC television news stories from 2007. ……………………………………...... 127 Figure 6.10. Visual representation of points of parity in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 127 Figure 6.11. Verbal representation of points of parity in ABC television news stories 128

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during the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... Figure 6.12. Examples of visual depiction of points of difference in Labor television commercials from 2010. ……………………………………...... 131 Figure 6.13. Visual representation of points of difference in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………….. 132 Figure 6.14. Verbal representation of points of difference in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………….. 133 Figure 6.15. Example of visual depiction of points of parity in Labor television commercials from 2010. ……………………………………...... 133 Figure 6.16. Visual representation of points of parity in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………….. 134 Figure 6.17. Verbal representation of points of parity in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………...... 135 Figure 6.18. Example of visual depiction of points of parity in ABC television news stories from 2010. ……………………………………...... 135 Figure 6.19. Visual representation of points of difference in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 135 Figure 6.20. Verbal representation of points of difference in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election. ……………………………………...... 137 Figure 6.21. Example of visual depiction of points of parity in ABC television news stories from 2010. ……………………………………...... 138 Figure 6.22. Visual representation of points of parity in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 138 Figure 6.23. Verbal representation of points of parity in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 139 Figure 7.1. The corporate or party brand for the Australian Labor Party. ……………... 143 Figure 7.2. Labor’s branded products. ……………………………………...... 143 Figure 7.3. The individual brand and corporate brands used in the 2007 campaign. …... 144 Figure 7.4. Evolution of the Labor logo. ……………………………………...... 150 Figure 7.5. Screenshots of Labor television commercials from the 2007 election campaign showing use of logos. ……………………………………...... 152 Figure 7.6. Visual representation of logos in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. ………………………………...... 153 Figure 7.7. Visual representation of logos in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 155 Figure 7.8. Labor’s slogans in 2007: (a) ‘Fresh Thinking’; (b) ‘New Leadership’, and; (c) ‘New Leadership. Fresh Ideas’. ……………………………………...... 156 Figure 7.9. Visual representation of slogans in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. ………………………………...... 157 Figure 7.10. Visual representation of slogans in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 158 Figure 7.11. Visual representation of logos in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 160 Figure 7.12. Labor’s positive slogans in the 2010 campaign. ……………………………... 161 Figure 7.13. Variations on Labor’s negative slogans against Tony Abbott in the 2010 162

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election campaign. ……………………………………………………………...... Figure 7.14. Visual representation of slogans in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………………………..... 163 Figure 7.15. Visual representation of slogans in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. ……………………………………...... 164 Figure 8.1. Examples of good integration of the branding components within the television commercial of 22 October 2007. ……………………………………...... 175 Figure 8.2. Examples of good integrated marketing using visual images within the television commercial of 22 October 2007. ……………………………………...... 175 Figure 8.3. Examples of poor integration of the branding components within the ABC television news story of October 26, 2007. ……………………………………...... 176 Figure 8.4. Examples of poor integrated marketing using visual images within the ABC television news story of 26 October 2007. ……………………………………...... 177 Figure 8.5. Examples of good integration of the branding components in the Labor television commercial and the ABC television news story of 14 October 2007. ……..... 178 Figure 8.6. Examples of good integrated marketing using visual images between the Labor television commercial and ABC television news story of October 14, 2007. ….. 179 Figure 8.7. Assessment of integration of marketing in Labor television commercials and ABC television news stories in 2007. ……………………………………...... 180 Figure 8.8. Examples of good integration of the branding components within the Labor television commercial of July 19, 2010. ……………………………………...... 181 Figure 8.9. Examples of good integrated marketing using visual images with the Labor television commercial of July 19, 2010. ……………………………………...... 182 Figure 8.10. Examples of poor integration of the branding components within the ABC television news story of 7 August 2010. ……………………………………...... 183 Figure 8.11. Examples of poor integrated marketing using visual images within the ABC television news story of 7 August 2010. ……………………………………...... 183 Figure 8.12. Examples of good integration of the branding components between the Labor television commercial and ABC television news story of 17 July 2010. ……...... 185 Figure 8.13. Examples of good integrated marketing using visual and verbal representations between the Labor television commercial and ABC television news story of 17 July 2010. …………………………………………………...... 185 Figure 8.14. Assessment of integrated marketing in Labor television commercials and ABC television news stories in 2010. ……………………………………...... 186

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ABBREVIATIONS

Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) Australian Labor Party (ALP Global financial crisis (GFC) Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

BRANDING IN AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE Following the Australian Labor Party’s crushing defeat at the 2013 federal election, came calls to rebuild the party’s battered brand. Political practitioners (e.g. Cox 2013; McTernan 2013) and commentators (e.g. Cassidy 2010a: 176; Keane 2011; van Onselen 2010a) alike spoke of the damage inflicted on the brands of the Labor Party and former Labor Prime Ministers, Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard, over six tumultuous years. The party and its leaders increasingly have been viewed as brands since its winning campaign in the 2007 federal election, described as “the high water mark” of political branding in Australia (Utting 2012). Key figures from that campaign (e.g. Gartrell 2012; Hawker 2012; Utting 2012) said they consciously undertook a branding exercise, revitalising the Labor brand while crafting the ‘Kevin07’ brand around then-leader Kevin Rudd. As he became Australia’s most popular Prime Minister (van Onselen 2010b), commentators began referring to “Brand Rudd” (e.g. Kelly 2010; van Onselen 2010a). Rudd’s subsequent crash has been seen as the trashing of a personal brand (van Onselen 2010a), the leadership switch to Julia Gillard in mid-2010 as a failed bid at rebranding (Watson 2011), and Rudd redux in mid-2013 as an attempted reboot of a “tired” brand (Grattan 2013). A badly-damaged party brand was deemed responsible for the ever-declining Labor vote (Parker 2013; TheRightGroup 2013).

Branding has become part of the popular political lexicon in Australia. Practitioners and commentators increasingly describe parties and politicians as brands, or as using branding. A search of two major daily newspapers shows a dramatic rise in such references over the past decade (Figure 1.1). These results show the term ‘political brand’ was first used in 1998 in connection with One Nation leader, Pauline Hanson. Since then, other parties and leaders, their campaigns and governments, have been described in branding terms. Much focus has been on the country’s two major parties, Labor and Liberal. An editorial in one major newspaper in 2010 declared these parties are encouraging voters to “back the brand” such is the importance of marketing in contemporary Australian politics (The Australian 2010a).

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Figure 1.1. Cumulative number of newspaper articles referring to brands and branding in Australian politics between 1997 and 2013. Source: Factiva. Search criteria: Search terms “Politics and branding” and “(political brand) or (political branding) and (Labor Party) or (Liberal party)”; Source “The Australian” or “The Sydney Morning Herald”; Region “Australia”; Dates “all dates”. Search date: 22 February 2014.

Academic literature offers a more substantive discussion of branding in Australian politics. Several studies (e.g. Dann 2006; Dann and Hughes 2008; Hughes and Dann 2010; Hughes 2007; O’Cass and Voola 2011) consider branding endeavours by the major parties and individual politicians in specific federal election campaigns. To date, Dann and Hughes have best described how Labor and Rudd employed branding in the 2007 campaign (i.e. Dann and Hughes 2008; Hughes and Dann 2010; Hughes 2011). Other research considers how Labor has employed branding over particular periods (Hughes 2004; Neale et al 2008), how The have used branding since their formation in 1992 (Hughes 2003; Hughes 2004), and how “celebrity” candidates can boost party brands (Hughes and Dann 2005). The role of voters in building value for political brands in two state electorates (Phipps et al 2010) and the contribution of “brand loyal voters” (O’Cass 2003: 82) to a political product also have been investigated.

Both the popular and academic discourse capture a significant change in Australian political practice - a turn to branding - that has been observed in other western democracies (French and Smith 2010: 461; Spiller and Bergner 2011). Essentially, political branding involves the application of commercial branding theories and practices to politics (Reeves et al 2006: 425; Smith and French 2009: 210). A growing number of political marketing researchers see branding as a fresh way to understand contemporary voter and party behaviour in western democracies (e.g. Conley 2014; Cosgrove 2007: 24; French and Smith 2010: 472; Hughes 2007: 1118; Needham 2006: 179; O’Cass 2 and Voola 2011: 629; Parker 2012: 208; Reeves et al 2006: 425; Scammell 2007: 176). Nonetheless, political branding remains contested among political scientists because it is a merger of commerce and politics (Smith and French 2009: 210). Commercial branding is a discipline and a practice with specific concepts and tools that do not translate directly to the discipline of political science and the practice of politics, as noted by researchers from both fields (e.g. French and Smith 2010: 460; Keller 2002: 171). There are significant differences between commerce and politics. These include the nature of the organisations, their products, the exchange between producer and consumer, and the nature of the competition (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007). These differences have prompted concerns about the effects of branding on politics and democracy. Branding is charged with “narrowing the political agenda, increasing confrontation, demanding conformity of behaviour/message and even increasing political disengagement at the local level” (French and Smith 2010: 461). These differences also mean that commercial practices must be adapted for use in politics. Adaptation takes time and the political branding field is young (Smith and French 2009: 210). Much work remains to be done in translating theories and practice from commercial branding into political contexts (French and Smith 2010: 461; O’Cass and Voola 2011: 629).

Thus, the discourse around branding in Australian politics raises three issues. First, political branding is not universally accepted by Australian practitioners. Gillard (2012), for example, has argued that Labor is not a brand but a cause. Second, some Australian practitioners and commentators seem to speak about political branding without due recognition of its commercial antecedents (Feeney 2012). This raises questions about whether they are genuinely undertaking and witnessing political branding, or simply the ad hoc application of some commercial language and tactics. Finally, as noted, the political branding field is still developing. While the extant literature makes a strong case that Australian parties and politicians have sought to apply concepts and techniques from commercial branding practice, there is scope for further research.

OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT My project undertook such research, seeking to systematically and rigorously test claims that the Australian Labor Party deliberately used branding in the 2007 and 2010 federal election campaigns. Gaps in the acceptance, understanding and research of political branding in Australia prompt the question of whether Labor, Rudd and Gillard consciously and strategically undertook political branding, or simply borrowed some of the language and tactics of commercial branding. This was the overarching question which motivated this work. To answer this question, I first had to define

3 political branding, then determine how to conceptualise, identify and evaluate political branding practice in Australia. Thus, the research questions were:

Research Question 1: What is political branding?

Research Question 2: How can I conceptualise, identify and evaluate political branding in Australia?

Research Question 3: Did Labor undertake branding in the 2007 and 2010 federal campaigns? If so, how consciously, strategically and fully?

My research required a theoretical framework and an evaluation tool. The foundations were laid by reviewing key developments in the research and practice of political branding. The review drew from academic and non-academic literature on commercial marketing and branding, political marketing and branding, and party and voter behaviour from America, Britain and Australia. Extant literature offered some useful frameworks for conceptualising a party in branding terms (e.g. O’Cass and Voola 2011; Smith 2009), some valuable studies which include conclusions for practitioners about undertaking political brand management (e.g. Conley 2014: 131; Cosgrove 2014: 112-121; Lees-Marshment 2011: 66-73; Speed et al 2013: 17-18), and tools for understanding and improving brand management in profit and non-profit organisations (e.g. Keller 2008: 675) including some for politics specifically (e.g. Cosgrove 2014: 109-109; Hughes and Dann 2011; Smith and French 2011: 725-727). None of these, however, met my requirements for a theoretical framework to conceptualise branding in politics generally and in the Australian system specifically, and also a fine-grain instrument to identify and evaluate branding practice throughout an electoral cycle.

Using selected literature, I developed a theoretical framework which includes a generic conceptualisation of the brand oriented party in democratic systems, which can be applied to Australia, and a model of political branding specific to Australia’s federal system. The brand oriented party consciously chooses branding as a long-term strategy to create and sustain voter attachment and support, and enhance electoral competitiveness. This conceptualisation extends the theoretical framework of a market-oriented party model (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 697) via a concept of political brand orientation (O’Cass and Voola 2011). The model provides a heuristic of the Australian electoral system as it intersects with the dual tasks of governing and electioneering in a branding campaign throughout the electoral cycle. It combines a strategic brand management 4 framework designed for profit and non-profit organisations (Keller 2008: 39) with the concept of branding as the new form of permanent political campaign (Scammell 2007: 188). The theoretical framework provided the basis for a generic Political Branding Checklist, which includes four strategies and 17 tactics. The Checklist provides a step-by-step guide to undertaking, and therefore, identifying and evaluating political branding.

These tools were married with qualitative and quantitative data from interviews with senior Labor practitioners, post-poll National Press Club speeches by Labor’s Campaign Directors, selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 and 2010 campaigns, and Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) television news stories from each night of each campaign. The interviews were used to establish how Labor practitioners viewed political branding generally, and if they consciously and strategically sought to use branding strategies and tactics in the 2007 and 2010 campaigns. The commercials and stories were used to evaluate if, and how fully, they did so. The commercials and stories were analysed for visual and verbal messages, which relate to components from the Political Branding Checklist. The results were further analysed to evaluate the integration of marketing across the commercials and stories, and across each campaign. The results are presented in two extended case studies.

I focussed on campaigns because they matter. Campaigns are when parties make their case for election, the result of which “decides which party will govern for three years and what agenda will dominate public policy until the next election is called” (McAllister 2011: 109). Campaigns are also when many voters consider their choice, and in Australia “more voters than ever before are potentially available for conversion during the election campaign” (McAllister 2011: 101). Naturally, then, campaigns are when parties “mobilise all their resources” (McAllister 2011: 109) and apply their greatest focus. These particular campaigns were chosen for four reasons. First, they are commonly described in popular and academic literature as branding exercises. Second, tracking consecutive campaigns by the same party permits evaluation and comparison of the application and evolution of branding over time. On the face of it, these campaigns were contrasts in terms of execution and success; the generally-admired 2007 campaign which delivered government, and the often-derided 2010 effort which contributed to a . Third, they took place in different contexts; the 2007 campaign was from Opposition while the 2010 campaign was from Government. Experience and literature suggest it is harder to brand in office that in Opposition (Lees-Marshment 2009b: 118-119; 2011: 168; Spiller and Bergner 2011: 143), so evaluating Labor’s efforts in both contexts should permit richer conclusions. Finally, the campaigns involved very different leaders in

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Rudd and Gillard. Experience and literature suggest leaders play critical roles in branding (Needham 2006: 182), so studying the two was likely to enhance conclusions.

The campaigns were considered in the context of the whole electoral cycle. To do otherwise “neglects the critical analytical, planning, supporting and monitoring roles that both precede and accompany” campaigns (Butler et al 2007: 97). This work, therefore, covered the period from Rudd’s election as Labor leader on 4 December 2006 through to his re-election as leader, at Gillard’s expense, on 26 June 2013. The focus was on the twelve months between Rudd’s elevation in December 2006 and the poll on 24 November 2007, and the two months between Gillard’s ascension to the leadership on 24 June 2010 and the election on 21 August 2010. I focussed on these periods because they encompassed the informal and formal campaigns, and also made data collection and analysis manageable.

I conclude that Labor, or at least sections of the party, did deliberately employ branding in the 2007 and 2010 campaigns. In 2007, Labor crafted the ‘Kevin07’ brand for Rudd in a co-branding strategy with the weaker party brand. Labor and Rudd ran a disciplined branding campaign in Opposition but Rudd’s poor performance as Prime Minister destroyed his own brand and threatened the party’s. In 2010, Labor deployed Gillard as the dominant offering and the party had little presence. The brand strategy was hastily conceived and unevenly executed during a difficult campaign. Gillard’s brand quickly weakened and became terminal during her time in government; Labor’s went into decline once again. Further, I conclude that Labor’s branding efforts contributed to the successes and failures of their campaigns and governments. These, and other conclusions, point to an overarching lesson for practitioners and researchers - the need to fully engage with the concept of branding to best employ and understand this new way of doing politics.

This work is organised into nine chapters. This first chapter proceeds with an overview of Labor’s 2007 and 2010 federal campaigns and the subsequent periods of governance. Chapter Two discusses and defines political branding, and reviews key literature to tell the story of research and practice in political branding. Chapter Three presents the conceptualisation, model and checklist used to conceptualise and evaluate political branding in Australia, and explains how these are married to the data. Chapter Four discusses how the Labor practitioners see strategy and branding. Chapters Five and Six consider the importance of positioning a brand in relation to competitors. Chapter Seven considers how the party and leaders were branded in relation to each other. Chapter Eight evaluates the integration of the marketing across selected communication channels, namely

6 television commercials and television news stories. Chapter Nine brings together the findings for each campaign and draws conclusions.

OVERVIEW OF LABOR’S CAMPAIGNS AND GOVERNMENTS Before any evaluation can start, I must consider the key elements in Australian federal politics from December 2006 to June 2013. At its core, this is a story about voter attachment to a party and its leaders, and the efforts of the party and leaders to sustain that attachment. Voter attachment is emphatically demonstrated at the ballot box but public opinion polls provide useful guideposts in between elections. I use data from Newspoll national public opinion polls to track Labor’s primary vote and the net satisfaction ratings for Rudd and Gillard. The primary vote shows the vote before preferences are allocated, and is considered by practitioners (e.g. Gartrell 2012; Martin 2012) to be a good measure of the base vote for a party at a particular time. The net satisfaction rating, derived from subtracting the negative from the positive rating, is considered by practitioners (e.g. Gartrell 2012; Martin 2012) to be a reasonably accurate guide to voter sentiment. Of course, voters respond to and shape what parties and leaders say and do, so major events and debates are also discussed.

The rise of Rudd As 2006 drew to a close, the Liberal-led Coalition Government had been in power for more than a decade and Prime Minister, John Howard, had become the country’s second-longest leader. Labor had suffered “an historically awful defeat” at the federal election in 2004 (Jackman 2008: 1), earning just 37.6% of the primary vote (Cassidy 2010a: 3). Two years on, Labor’s standing had been further battered by policy confusion, disunity and leadership instability (Jackman 2008: 36), and recycled leader was stalling in both public and private polling (Jackman 2008: 39, 45). Meantime, Labor frontbencher, Kevin Rudd, had been building his public profile via sustained attacks on the Government, media networking and, most importantly, weekly appearances on a popular breakfast program on commercial television with “a wide audience of ‘ordinary’ Australians” (Cassidy 2010a: 5). On December 4 2006, with Julia Gillard standing as his deputy, Rudd seized the leadership from Beazley in a party room ballot. From then on, Rudd’s public popularity was “extraordinary” (Cassidy 2010a: 6) and his party’s stocks also rose dramatically (Cassidy 2010a: 7). The first Newspoll after Rudd’s rise put his net satisfaction at +31% (Figure 1.2) and the party’s primary vote at a competitive 46% (Figure 1.3).

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Figure 1.2. Rudd satisfaction ratings as Opposition leader and Prime Minister from 8-10 December 2006 to 18-20 June 2010. Source: Newspoll.

Figure 1.3. Labor and Coalition primary vote from 8-10 December 2006 to 18-20 June 2010. Source: Newspoll.

With the election of the youthful Rudd to take on the veteran Howard (Figure 1.4), Labor could frame the coming campaign as “the future versus the past” (Jackman 2008: 89). Labor’s informal campaign started with a television commercial on Australia Day, the national day of celebration on January 26. The commercial established many of the themes that Labor would hammer throughout 8 the year - a vision for Australia’s future, a strong economy, workplace fairness and an “education revolution” (ALP 2007a). Rudd was presented as a future-focussed leader, hosting a National Climate Summit and advocating a national broadband network (Jackman 2008: 106). In a post- Budget advertisement, Rudd proclaimed himself to be “an economic conservative” (ALP 2007b). He then delivered a series of speeches about “government paying attention to the home economy - as well as the national economy” (Jackman 2008: 153). These were targeted at the “Howard battlers” (Jackman 2008: 99), the “upwardly mobile” (McAllister 2011: 171) low to middle income families (McAllister 2011: 199) who had “defected from Labor” in the mid-1990s (McAllister 2011: 171). Rudd delivered part one of an industrial relations policy, which tied into a popular two- year campaign by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) against Howard’s unpopular industrial relations laws known as WorkChoices (Jackman 2008: 121). Rudd also stood up to poor behaviour by unionists (Jackman 2008: 130-132), to try to counter Government attacks on Labor’s historical links to unions. In addition, he pledged to take on State Governments, all Labor administrations, and take control of the nation’s 750 hospitals if health care standards did not improve (Coorey 2007).

Figure 1.4. Labor’s youthful leader, Kevin Rudd (a) offered a contrast with veteran Liberal Prime Minister, John Howard (b). Sources: (a) The Australian, 16 April 2014; (b) ABC, 14 October 2007.

Labor used its National Conference in April to launch a new party logo and a new slogan ‘Fresh Thinking’ (Gartrell 2012). The leader was the focus of further image-shaping; ‘Kevin07’ was introduced in August via a logo, t-shirts and “an innovative Internet campaign” (Simms 2009: 88). This new persona was teamed with a new slogan, ‘New Leadership.’, unveiled at a “faux” campaign launch (Jackman 2008: 183) the following month. Leadership, and more particularly the leadership ambitions of Treasurer , had been an issue for Howard throughout the year. Tensions peaked in September while Howard was hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. Instead of being able to showcase himself as an international statesman, Howard was forced to 9 defend his domestic leadership. He abruptly and unconvincingly announced he would step aside for Costello sometime in the next term of government (Jackman 2008: 163). Labor added to Howard’s travails by capitalising on his earlier declaration that: “Working families in Australia have never been better off” (Howard 2007). The quote, alongside Howard’s smiling visage, featured on roadside and truck-mounted billboards at 31 sites around the country (Crabb 2007). Mock-ups of the ads had provoked “visceral” reactions in focus groups (Jackman 2008: 105); Labor hoped for a similar response nationwide. Labor also started an “unprecedented advertising blitz” (Jackman 2008: 179), with three months of television commercials targeted at Queensland regions. This was a key part of a sub-campaign designed to win support in Rudd’s seat-rich home state. From mid- 2007, the Government began attacking Rudd (Jackman 2008: 146), starting with a dispute over his memories of childhood hardship and culminating in the revelation of a drunken, unwitting visit to a New York strip club three years earlier. That indiscretion only enhanced Rudd’s reputation, with voters apparently sanguine that “the ever-polished Rudd was actually fallible like them” (Jackman 2008: 151).

The 2007 campaign The formal campaign began on October 14, when Howard called the poll for November 24. Responding to Rudd’s blitz on leadership, Howard declared: “This election does not need new leadership, it does not need old leadership. It needs the right leadership” (Jackman 2008: 184). Running on the slogan “Go for growth” (Jackman 2008: 205), Howard “blindsided” Labor on day two by pledging $34 million in tax cuts over three years (Jackman 2008: 186). This announcement produced a small poll bounce for the Government (Jackman 2008: 180). By week’s end, Rudd had countered with Labor’s tax policy, which featured a refund for parents to spend on educational expenses. It also “mirrored about 90% of the Government’s policy” (Jackman 2008: 187), prompting commentary about Rudd’s “me-too” approach (Gittins 2007; Jackman 2008: 187). The Coalition started attack ads on Labor’s union links, claiming former union officials would comprise 70% of Labor's front bench (van Onselen and Senior 2008: 116). At the sole leaders’ debate on October 21, Howard announced a re-elected Coalition government would establish a fund to fight climate change, but Rudd was generally deemed the winner (ABC 2007a). At the end of the first week, Newspoll showed Rudd’s net satisfaction rating was +42% (Figure 1.2) and Labor’s primary vote was 51% (Figure 1.3).

Both Howard and Rudd were forced to defend their climate change policies in the second week of campaigning. Howard’s Environment Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, reportedly had unsuccessfully urged the Government to sign the on carbon emissions targets, sparking speculation 10 of a split within the Government (Grattan 2007). Meantime, Rudd had to clarify Labor’s policy after his Climate Change spokesman, , suggested Labor would commit to targets even if carbon-emitting developing countries did not (Jackman 2008: 198). Official figures showing a moderation in the underlying inflation rate to 3% prompted Costello to argue against an interest rate increase by the Reserve Bank, the country’s central bank (Marris 2007).

Week three of the campaign was dominated by a debate on one of the major issues - economic management - and missteps on both sides. Costello performed poorly against his lesser-credentialed Labor counterpart, (Mitchell 2007). Once again, Peter Garrett stumbled, quipping to radio shock jock, Steve Price, that Labor planned to dump its promises once in office (ABC 2007b). Price claimed it was a serious remark and the Government said it proved “the ‘me-tooism’ is just a pretence” (ABC 2007b). Meantime, Health Minister Tony Abbott achieved an unenviable trifecta in one day by having to apologise for insulting a dying anti-asbestos campaigner, arriving half an hour late to a televised debate with his Labor counterpart, , and then swearing at Roxon (Stafford 2007). Abbott’s behaviour overshadowed the Government’s $310 million health policy announcement (Stafford 2007).

Three weeks out from the poll, the Reserve Bank delivered a hammer blow to the Government’s economic credentials by raising interest rates by .25% (Jackman 2008: 205). This was the sixth rise since the last election when Howard had pledged to keep rates low (Jackman 2008: 205). Howard said he was sorry about the effect on borrowers (Jackman 2008: 206-207), while Rudd claimed the Prime Minister was “hauling up the white flag on the fight against inflation” (The Sydney Morning Herald 2007b). Two key issues, industrial relations and the environment, were the subjects of debates between relevant Ministers and their Labor counterparts. By the end of this week, Rudd’s net satisfaction rating had fallen to +35% (Figure 1.2) and Labor’s primary vote to 47 % (Figure 1.3).

Queensland’s importance was underscored when both major parties held their official campaign launches in the capital, Brisbane, in the second last week of campaigning. At the Liberal launch on November 12, Howard made “a mammoth $9.4 million in promises” (Jackman 2008: 186). This prompted Rudd to declare at his own launch two days later: “This sort of reckless spending must stop” (The Age 2007). In doing so, Rudd “was overturning Labor Party convention and making a virtue of being more tight-fisted than his conservative opponent” (Jackman 2008: 214). Rudd made $9.4 billion in education and training pledges, including a promise of a computer for all secondary

11 students in Years 9-12 (Jackman 2008: 218). The next day, Labor released a video of Tony Abbott apparently admitting that worker protections had been decreased under WorkChoices (AAP 2007).

WorkChoices continued to plague Howard in the final week. He was forced to defend Government spending of $360 million on commercials promoting this and other policies (Metherell and Peatling 2007), and was criticised over secret plans, apparently shelved, for more changes to industrial relations laws (Bachelard 2007). Worse was to come. Coalition campaigners, including the husbands of the outgoing Liberal MP for Lindsay and the new Liberal candidate, were caught distributing fake flyers linking Labor to Islamic extremism (Jackman 2008: 223-224). Labor, meantime, was finding new ways to compensate for the electronic advertising blackout imposed by law from midnight on the Wednesday before a poll until the close of polling at 6pm on Saturday (AEC 2013). In a first, the party sent more than 40,000 text messages to mobile telephones in 36 target seats and on election day it spread its message via skywriting (Jackman 2008: 193). By this last week, 100 consecutive opinion polls had put Labor ahead of the Coalition (Coultan 2007).

Throughout, Rudd had “campaigned superbly [...] exploiting John Howard’s overstay and offering up fresh hope on key issues like climate change, Aboriginal reconciliation and work practices” (Cassidy 2010a: 146). On polling day, young people, blue collar workers and women returned to Labor (Bean and McAllister 2009: 209-210). The nation-wide swing of 5.44%, the biggest to Labor since 1969 (Jackman 2008: 233), was eclipsed by a swing of 7.53% in Queensland. This massive shift in voter sentiment delivered the party an extra 23 seats. Among these was Bennelong, held since 1974 by John Howard, who became just the second Australian Prime Minister to lose his seat (Jackman 2008: 233). Labor won a total of 83 of the 105 seats in the House of Representatives, and took government for the first time in eleven and a half years.

The first Rudd Government Prime Minister Rudd “got off to a flying start” (Cassidy 2010a: 9-10). He signed the Kyoto Protocol to reduce carbons emissions as part of the global fight against climate change, apologised to the of Indigenous people who were removed from their families by government authorities during the 20th century, and held a 2020 Summit to canvas community ideas for the country’s future. Within ten months, Rudd had seen off Opposition leader, Brendon Nelson (Cassidy 2010a: 10). At first, Rudd remained an effective communicator but he “governed at a frenetic pace” (Bramston 2014: 63) and as time passed he “struggled to define his government’s purpose with a compelling narrative” (Bramston 2014: 69). Rudd centralised the Cabinet process, relying on the so-called Gang of Four - himself, Gillard, Treasurer Wayne Swan and Finance 12

Minister Lindsay Tanner - to review policies and cuts (Cassidy 2010a: 129). In doing so, he undercut his Ministers. Rudd had already undercut other colleagues, by insisting he would choose Ministers and assign portfolios, thereby overturning a century-old convention that Ministers are nominated by the Labor party room (Cassidy 2010a: 122). These decisions would have great consequences. Rudd’s first hurdle arrived with the global financial crisis (GFC) in late 2008 and for the first time voters “stopped to take stock” of Rudd’s response (van Onselen 2010b). He and Swan immediately supported banks to secure credit and funded job-creating projects, thereby averting recession (Cassidy 2010a: 11) and winning national (Bramston 2014: 67) and international kudos (Stiglitz 2013). Over time, however, voters became uneasy that the pump-priming produced a budget deficit (van Onselen 2010b), at odds with Rudd’s narrative of economic conservative. In mid-2009, Rudd and Swan were challenged again by the ‘Ute-gate’ affair but managed to repel Opposition allegations they sought favours for a Labor donor wanting funds from a government vehicle finance scheme (Cassidy 2010a: 12-19). By then, Rudd was facing pressure on other fronts. He had dumped promised programs to monitor petrol (Berkovic and Guest 2008) and grocery prices (ABC 2009), and divisive debate around asylum-seekers arriving by boat was reopened after a boat exploded off Australia’s northwest coast (NewsCorp 2009).

For two years, Rudd remained very popular but in late 2009 he started to stumble. From then on, four issues - climate change, asylum-seekers, a government-run home insulation scheme and a mining royalty tax - dominated federal politics. By December, another Opposition leader, Malcolm Turnbull, had fallen; victim of his pursuit of the Ute-gate affair and pro-active climate change policies. He was replaced by Tony Abbott who used the Opposition’s numbers in the Senate to help block Government legislation for a carbon scheme. This was the Government’s key policy to combat climate change, which Rudd had previously described as “the great moral challenge of our generation” (ALP 2007c). In April, however, Rudd dumped the scheme, leaving the impression that he had “no genuine belief, no core commitment” (Cassidy 2010a: 41). Subsequent opinion polls showed this decision cost the Government the support of one million voters (Cassidy 2010a: 42), along with “its reputation for fairness, honesty, trust and accountability” (Cassidy 2010a: 41). Then, Rudd was “shattered” by his failure to “lead a global breakthrough” (Cassidy 2010a: 74) at the United Nation’s Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen.

Early in 2010, the Government began “clearing the decks” (Cassidy 2010a: 59) for a poll due by the end of the year. Rudd tightened policies against asylum-seekers arriving by boat, seeking to head off Opposition attacks and calm some of his own backbenchers but “further disappointing [a] core constituency” (Cassidy 2010a: 59). Rudd also dumped the $2.9 billion home insulation scheme 13 which was associated with four deaths and multiple house fires (Cassidy 2010a: 36), and announced a Resources Super Profit Tax which prompted a “savage” (Cassidy 2010a: 54) advertising campaign from outraged miners. Finally, Rudd’s promise for a national plan to improve public hospitals had faltered (van Onselen 2010b). By now, many voters had decided that Rudd “wasn’t the steady economic conservative” (van Onselen 2010b) they had been promised. Public support for Rudd and Labor started sliding in late 2009 and never stopped. By June 2010, just months out from an election, Newspoll showed Rudd had crashed from net +50% satisfaction ratings in 2007 and 2008 to net -19% (Figure 1.2), and Labor was on an unwinnable 35% primary vote (Figure 1.3). Labor’s private polling was even worse (Kelly 2010). On the night of June 23, 2010, Labor MPs began abandoning Rudd for his deputy, Julia Gillard, with a speed that “surprised the most experienced of the numbers men” (Cassidy 2010a: 121). At a party room meeting the next morning, Rudd stood aside for Gillard, who became Australia’s first female Prime Minister.

In his 935 days in office, Rudd became the country’s most popular leader (Van Onselen 2010b), then lost public support more quickly than any other (Van Onselen 2010b) to become the first Prime Minister dumped by his own party in his first term in office. Rudd had alienated many voters with policy back-flips and many Labor colleagues with his “autocratic” style (van Onselen 2010b). Cassidy (2010b) noted that Rudd's only support came from “the Newspoll faction”. “While it soared, he thrived. When it dived, he was all alone” (Cassidy 2010b).

The first Gillard Government Soon after the leadership switch, Gillard’s net satisfaction rating was at +19%, a turnaround of 38 points (Figure 1.5), and Labor’s primary vote was up seven points to 42% (Figure 1.6). Gillard began her Prime Ministership by saying the previous administration had been “a good Government that lost its way” (AAP 2010b) and promised to get it back on track. She announced a detente with miners (Cassidy 2010a: 108) and pledged to resolve the blockages over the mining tax, asylum- seekers and climate change (Cassidy 2010a: 110). Later, she reached agreement on a new Minerals Resource Rent Tax (Cassidy 2010a: 110) and announced a plan to establish a regional processing centre for asylum-seekers in East Timor (Cassidy 2010a: 110). A new climate change policy was held over as an announcement for the campaign. Abbott, meantime, had lost a line of attack on the mining tax (Cassidy 2010a: 111) but “refined and toughened” his asylum-seeker policy (Cassidy 2010a: 113). Gillard’s greatest ongoing problem was the public distaste about “Rudd’s political assassination” (Cassidy 2010a: 111). Gillard declined to move into the Prime Minister’s official residence, the Lodge, until she had “fulsomely earned the trust of the Australian people” (Hudson 2010a). Trust was never really won. At the National Press Club in mid-July, Gillard delivered a 14 major speech designed to “establish some credentials on the economy” (Cassidy 2010a: 115). It was torpedoed by questions, based on a leak from the Rudd-Gillard meeting the night before the leadership vote, about whether Gillard had reneged on a deal to give Rudd a chance to improve his polling. This was the first of four damaging leaks (Simms 2012: 15) which would undermine Gillard’s campaign for election in her own right.

Figure 1.5. Gillard satisfaction ratings from 16-18 July 2010 to 21-23 June 2013. Source: Newspoll.

Figure 1.6. Labor and Coalition primary vote from 25-27 June 2010 to 21-23 June 2013. Source: Newspoll. 15

The 2010 campaign Just 24 days after becoming leader, and “seeking legitimacy for her Government” (Aulich 2014: 4), Gillard called an election for August 21. Australia’s first female Prime Minister faced off against a “hyper-masculine” (Sawer 2012: 251) Opposition Leader (Figure 1.7). Starting her formal pitch to voters, Gillard used the catchphrase “moving forward” 36 times in a 31-minute media conference (ABC 2010a) perhaps to “subconsciously encourage the electorate to move on from Rudd” (Cassidy 2010a: 143). Gillard promised a Budget surplus in 2013, a fight against climate change, and a sustainable population rather than the “big Australia” supported by Rudd (Cassidy 2010a: 140-141). By the end of the week, discussion about “a sustainable country” (Cassidy 2010a: 140) merged with debate about immigration and asylum-seekers (Jupp 2012: 268). Abbott began campaigning on the slogans: “We’ll stand up for Australia. We’ll stand up for real action” (Abbott 2010a). He promised to stop asylum boats, drop the mining tax and repay national debt (Cassidy 2010a: 170-171). He declared that WorkChoices was “dead, buried and cremated” (Cassidy 2010a: 141) but in subsequent interviews gave contradictory answers about industrial relations policy (Cassidy 2010a: 142), leaving room for Labor attacks. At the sole leaders’ debate on July 25, Gillard talked up her poorly-received proposal for a citizen’s assembly to determine climate change policy (Cassidy 2010a: 154). Abbott was forced to defend a hollow promise to slash immigration numbers (Cassidy 2010a: 155-156) but was generally deemed the winner (Simms 2012: 19). The first Newspoll of the campaign showed Gillard retained a net satisfaction rating of +19%, “essentially vindicating the party’s decision to change leaders” (Cassidy 2010a: 146). Labor sat on a primary vote of 42% compared to the Coalition on 38%.

Figure 1.7 Australia’s first female leader, Julia Gillard (a) faced off against Opposition leader, Tony Abbott (b). Sources: (a) ABC, 7 September 7 2010; (b) The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 May 2010.

In the second week, Gillard’s campaign was shaken by “an unprecedented act of treachery” (Cassidy 2010a: 162), a leak out of a confidential Cabinet meeting. Gillard allegedly had opposed an increase in the aged pension and the introduction of paid maternity leave (Cassidy 2010a: 162), 16 which she defended as rigorous policy assessment (Cassidy 2010a: 166). This was followed by another claim, denied by Gillard, that a bodyguard attended security committee meetings on her behalf (Cassidy 2010a: 172). Many blamed Rudd or a supporter for the leaks (Atkins 2013; Cassidy 2010a: 163; Young and Ricketson 2014: 285), although party elder, Senator , was among Rudd’s defenders (Shanahan 2010). Rudd was back in the news when he underwent gall bladder surgery (Cassidy 2010a: 169), again when former Foreign Affairs Minister, Alexander Downer, claimed the gave Rudd information to use against his own side (Cassidy 2010a: 172), and again when a newspaper “detailed a litany of temper tantrums” (Cassidy 2010a: 172). Gillard finished the week under fire for a 13-page spread in a popular women’s magazine featuring glamour shots and discussions of her private life (Cassidy 2010a: 168). The Greens officially launched their campaign on August 1 (Simms 2012: 14), having concluded a preference deal with Labor (Cassidy 2010a: 147).

Week three began with Labor staring at defeat, according to public and private polling (Cassidy 2010a: 175). In response, Gillard declared she was taking charge of her campaign and voters would see “the real Julia” (Benson and Hudson 2010). The intent was for a circuit-breaker to re-establish Gillard’s authenticity but instead, “suddenly and remarkably, Julia had made herself a fake” (Cassidy 2010a: 175). Abbott immediately began asking: “If this is the real Julia, who have we been watching for the past five weeks?” (Cassidy 2010a: 176). Abbott, meantime, was trying to overcome a perceived “problem with women” (van Onselen 2010c), mixing with women on a bowls green (Cassidy 2010a: 177) and defending his paid parental leave policy against big business complaints (Cassidy 2010a: 177). Gillard was buffeted by a report into waste and other problems associated with a school building program which she oversaw as Education Minister (Cassidy 2010a: 181-182). Again, leaders past returned to haunt Gillard. Rudd offered to assist Labor’s campaign and met Gillard in a strained strategy session for the cameras (Cassidy 2010a: 183). On the same day, former leader turned television reporter, , confronted Gillard on a visit to a fair, thereby reminding voters of Labor’s dysfunction (Cassidy 2010a: 183-184). At the Coalition’s official campaign launch on August 8, Abbott promised to return government “to the grown-ups” (Cassidy 2010a: 187). He pledged a debt-reduction taskforce, debate on tax reform and a new asylum-seeker policy (Cassidy 2010a: 187-188). By week’s end, Newspoll showed Gillard’s net satisfaction had fallen to +2% (Figure 1.5) and Labor’s primary vote to 38% (Figure 1.6).

Gillard regained the upper hand the following week, with a “polished and witty performance” on a national television talk show and a series of announcements on education (Cassidy 2010a: 193- 194). Her pledge to build a long-awaited rail link in western Sydney, however, reminded voters of 17 similar, broken, promises by Labor Governments and permitted “powerful” attacks ads by the Coalition (Cassidy 2010a: 213). Labor produced a powerful commercial of its own, featuring Peter Costello laughing off Abbott’s economic credentials (Cassidy 2010a: 193- 194). Then, the Coalition’s announcement of its alternative to the national broadband network went badly, and Abbott subsequently displayed his limited understanding of the technology (Cassidy 2010a: 195). Broadband was now a major difference between the two parties and Labor, seizing the opportunity, “branded it a nation-building issue” (Cassidy 2010a: 195). Latham reappeared, this time confronting Abbott, but again reminding voters of his Labor links (Cassidy 2010a: 197). The week ended with a leaders’ town hall forum in western Sydney where a relaxed Abbott was judged the clear winner (Cassidy 2010a: 198).

The final week began with Labor’s official campaign launch in Brisbane on 16 August. The party “spared all expenses to present a low-key, no-frills affair” (Cassidy 2010a: 200). Gillard’s key announcement was that Labor’s national broadband network would enable online access to medical advice in regional areas (Cassidy 2010a: 202), a point she hammered during subsequent visits to several regional seats in Queensland. Having earlier rejected Gillard’s call for a debate on economic policy (Cassidy 2010a: 178), Abbott now sought a second town hall forum which was held on 18 August. This time, Gillard was seen as the winner (Craig 2012: 115). In the final days, Abbott urged voters not to baulk at throwing out a first-term Government in response to “a sentiment coming through in focus groups” (Cassidy 2010a: 211), as Labor polling showed problems in New South Wales and Queensland (Cassidy 2010a: 213-214). Gillard issued “one last, desperate” message warning of the return of WorkChoices (Cassidy 2010a: 215), while Abbott started a 36-hour blitz of Sydney seats to show he was “bloody keen” for the top job (Cassidy 2010a: 213-214).

Labor’s campaign was harmed by the leaks (Cassidy 2010a: 237) and own goals (Cassidy 2010a: 239), while the Coalition’s “risk-averse approach” (Cassidy 2010a: 245-246) did not make out an argument for office and Abbott struggled “in managing gender” (Simms 2012: 254). On election day, Labor won support from women but “fared badly” with the young and the old, and lost ground with blue collar workers (Bean and McAllister 2012: 344-345). By the end of counting, Labor and the Coalition had each won 72 seats in the 150-seat House of Representatives, producing the first hung parliament since 1940 (Bean and McAllister 2012: 341). It took seventeen days of negotiations before Gillard could form a with the support of the first Green MP elected to the House of Representatives and three Independent MPs.

18

The second Gillard Government One of the strengths of Gillard’s second term, her deal with the Greens, was also one of its weaknesses. The deal replaced the proposed citizens’ assembly on climate change with a multi- party committee to consider a price on carbon (Cassidy 2010a: 229-230). Gillard was immediately accused of breaking a pre-election commitment, in which she had said: “There will be no carbon tax under the government I lead” (AAP 2010b). Gillard argued a market-based price on carbon was not a tax but “many Australians felt betrayed” (Evans and McCaffrie 2012: 316) and Abbott relentlessly claimed she had lied (Kelly and Massola 2011). In February 2011, Gillard announced a price on carbon, which she conceded was “effectively like a tax” (Massola and Kelly 2011), and subsequently secured passage of enabling legislation, compensation for affected businesses and households, and investment in renewable energies (Maher 2011).

Gillard scored policy wins throughout 2011 and 2012, with the start-up of the National Broadband Network (Battersby 2011), the passage of cigarette plain packaging laws (ABC 2011a), the introduction of a mining tax (The Sydney Morning Herald 2012), and the announcement of a national inquiry into institutional responses to child sex abuse (Cullen 2012a). By September 2011, however, Newspoll showed Gillard’s net satisfaction had crashed to -45% (Figure 1.5) and Labor sat on a dismal 26% primary vote (Figure 1.6). While Gillard’s rating improved by the end of year, it dived again and on February 27, 2012, she faced a leadership challenge from Rudd. Gillard and other Labor MPs “unleashed on [Rudd’s] multiple failings as leader” (Uhlmann 2012), and she beat him by 71 to 31 votes in a party room ballot. Among voters, Gillard’s satisfaction rating continued to tumble, sinking to net -34% in March (Figure 1.5), while Labor’s primary vote sat at 27% in April (Figure 1.6). There were other significant set-backs. In August 2011, the High Court struck down the Government’s plan to exchange asylum seekers for processed refugees with Malaysia (Flitton 2012). The new mining tax raised much less revenue than projected (Cullen 2013) and, despite two years of promises, Treasurer Wayne Swan conceded a budget surplus was unlikely (Cullen 2012b). Labor lost power in two states - New South Wales in 2011 and Queensland in 2012. Gillard and her Government were also damaged by three issues of alleged impropriety. Gillard faced questions over a former boyfriend who was subsequently accused of misappropriating union funds, (Tingle and Skulley 2012), Labor MP, Craig Thomson, was accused of misusing union funds (ABC 2013a), and the Labor-backed Speaker of the House of Representatives, , resigned the post after a former staffer alleged sexual harassment (Coorey 2012). During parliamentary debate over Slipper, Gillard delivered the so-called speech, which flayed Abbott for his sexist behaviour towards her and became a signature moment of her Prime Ministership (Hartcher 2013). 19

In January 2013, in an unprecedented step to regain control of the political agenda, Gillard announced the election date - 14 September - eight months ahead of time (Hartcher 2013). She struggled for clear air. The following day, Craig Thomson was charged with fraud. Within weeks, corruption allegations were aired against former Labor Ministers in New South Wales, and Labor lost government in Western Australia (Hartcher 2013). Next, policy differences saw the Greens end their formal alliance with Labor (Taylor 2013). Leadership speculation continued but on March 21, despite the public urgings of supporters, Rudd refused to stand against Gillard in a ballot (Uhlmann 2012). Gillard won praise for announcing a National Disability Insurance Scheme (Hartcher 2013), but lost face when the May Budget revealed the Government had finally abandoned the pledge to return to surplus that year (Hartcher 2013). By June, Gillard’s satisfaction rating seemed stuck at around net -30% (Figure 1.5) and Labor’s primary vote had again fallen below 30% (Figure 1.6). The continuing poor polls prompted “rising panic” (Uhlmann 2012) and reignited the question of leadership among Labor MPs. Gillard announced a spill of leadership positions for 26 June. This time Rudd beat her, 57 to 45 in the party room vote (Hartcher 2013).

During her 1,282 days in office, Gillard first made her party competitive (Figure 1.5) then presided over record lows (Hudson and Johnston 2011), until Labor faced a rout at the 2013 poll (AAP 2013a). There is no doubt Gillard confronted great difficulties. She led an atypical minority Government against a “coherent Opposition led by a belligerent opportunist” (Evans and McCaffrie 2012: 319), and suffered undermining by Rudd (Evans and McCaffrie 2012: 318). In addition, gender, as Gillard noted, “explains some things” about her period as Prime Minister (ABC 2013b). It must be said, however, that Gillard created her own difficulties by failing to create “a coherent narrative” (Aulich 2014: 5) or communicate her successes (Aulich 2014: 7). In accordance with an earlier pledge, Gillard announced she would not stand at the coming election (Hartcher 2013).

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CHAPTER TWO

LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS

INTRODUCTION In order to view political practice from a new perspective - that of branding - I required a new theoretical framework and a new evaluation tool. The first step in developing this suite of tools was reviewing the research and practice of political branding. This review drew from literature on commercial marketing and branding, political marketing and branding and party and voter behaviour from America, Britain and Australia. These fields were chosen because they contributed to the body of research on political branding, and/or offer new insights into practice. While the focus was on academic literature, some non-academic works - including books, and print and online reporting and commentary - were considered because they captured contemporary practice in detail that is not yet replicated in academic literature. America, Britain and Australia were chosen because they have similar, though not identical, political systems, and a history of cross-pollination in political practice (Hughes and Dann 2010: 85; Lees-Marshment 2007: 343, 2010: 2; Mills 1986: 6- 7, 2012a: 149, 2013a).

The chapter is organised into four parts. The first discusses brands and branding, and offers a definition of political branding. Next is an overview of traditional explanations for voter and party behaviour, and an argument that political branding offers a new and valuable perspective. This is followed by discussion of the convergence of the two disciplines of commerce and political science, and the differences, gaps and criticisms of political marketing and branding. The final part is an overview of the common, if imperfect, practice of political marketing and branding.

A DISCUSSION OF BRANDING Kevin Lane Keller (2008; 2013) offers a comprehensive framework to discuss brands and branding, including in politics. Keller is a leading commercial branding researcher and consultant whose work has been acknowledged in the field with prestigious honours (AMA 2010; Tuck School of Business 2010), and has credibility and take-up in practice (Bischmann 2007; Tuck School of Business 2010). His strategic brand management framework aims “to be relevant for any type of organisation regardless of its size, nature of business or profit orientation” (Keller 2008:2). This means it can be

21 applied in profit and non-profit settings, including politics. Indeed, Keller directly applies his framework to politics (2008: 21; 2013: 45, 89) and some of his key concepts are used by political branding researchers (e.g. Cwalina et al 2011: 24-27; French and Smith 2010: 462-464; Hughes 2007: 1114-5; Parker 2012: 211; Smith and Spotswood 2013).

Branding in profit and non-profit organisations At a basic level, a brand is “a name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of them, intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of competition” (American Marketing Association cited in Keller 2008: 2). A brand can do more than identify and differentiate, however, it can also “take on special meaning to customers” (Keller 2008: 6). This is because consumers can connect with brands emotionally, as well as rationally. Brands differentiate similar products by highlighting differences that are “rational and tangible - related to the performance of the brand - or more symbolic, emotional and intangible - related to what the brand represents” (Keller 2008: 5). Therefore, a brand must appeal to “both the head and the heart” (Keller 2008: 77).

A brand is attached to a product which may be a physical good, an intangible service, retail outlet, person, organisation, place or idea (Keller 2008: 3). The product is offered to the market of “all actual and potential buyers who have sufficient interest in, income for, and access to a product” (Keller 2008: 99). The produce is offered in an exchange that ideally delivers value to both producer and consumer, in “a type of bond or pact” (Keller 2008: 8). The aim is to “satisfy a need or a want” of a consumer (Keller 2008: 3), and provide demand and loyalty for the producer (Keller 2008: 9). A branded product is offered to consumers via marketing activities which can relate to the product, price, distribution channels and communications (Keller 2008: 230). More recently, marketing has sought to “transcend the actual product or service to create stronger bonds with customers and maximise brand resonance” (Keller 2008: 194), in what is called relationship marketing. Marketing of a brand produces differences - either positive or negative - in a consumer’s knowledge of, and response to, that brand (Keller 2008: 48). Keller (2008: 48) calls this “customer- based brand equity”. Brand equity, or value, “ultimately depends on what resides in the minds of customers” (Keller 2008: 49). In other words, “customers own brands” (Keller 2008: 74). Brand equity gives marketers “a vital strategic bridge from their past to their future” (Keller 2008: 49) because past investment and results provide the direction for the future of the brand (Keller 2008: 49-51). At its core, “branding is all about endowing products and services with the power of brand equity” (Keller 2008: 37). Strategic brand management “involves the design and implementation of marketing programs and activities to build, measure and manage brand equity” (Keller 2008: 38). 22

Branding in politics Brands and branding are perceived in similar, though not identical ways, in the political sphere. As Keller (2002: 171) notes, “brand theory and best practice guidelines need to be refined to reflect the unique realities” of the different settings in which they are used. As in commerce, the political brand identifies and differentiates (Smith and French 2009: 211). For example, the name ‘Labor’ is used to identify candidates and policies of the Australian Labor Party, and differentiate from those of the Liberal Party of Australia or The Australian Greens. As in commerce, the political brand can have functional and emotional appeal (Scammell 2007: 187; White and de Chernatony 2002: 47). Functional appeal might include promising and delivering on economic management (Scammell 2007: 187), physical safety (Smith and French 2009: 216) or health and education policies (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 636). Emotional appeal might include “authenticity, approachability, and attractiveness to the ear and eye” (Scammell 2007: 187), a vision for the future (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 636) or reassurance that the party has changed (White and de Chernatony 2004: 48). The political product is “a particularly challenging concept” (Phipps et al 2010: 498). Fundamentally, the political product is “the service of governing” (Harrop 1990: 278). Delving deeper, it can be seen as the generally indivisible components of “the candidate, their party and ideology” (Butler and Collins 1999: 58). Deeper still, it may be seen as “a variable combination of politician, political party reputation, policy, ideology and active promises made to the electorate during the campaign” (Dann and Hughes 2008: 8). In short, the political offering is “a complex intangible product which the voter cannot unbundle” (Lock and Harris 1996: 15). The “central and unifying core” of the political product (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 20) is the party leader and their image (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 20-21). This is because leaders “not only deliver the service, they also personify it” (Harrop 1990: 279). The leader may be the principal offering in candidate- centred systems such as America’s (Hughes 2007: 1116), or may be offered jointly with their party in party-centred systems like Australia’s (Hughes 2007: 1116). There is a complex interplay between leader and party. Voters perceive distinct differences but also “close linkages” (Davies and Mian 2010: 332). While each may affect the other, the leader image seems to have greater affect on the party image than vice versa (Davies and Mian 2010: 345).

The product is offered to “political consumers” (Lees-Marshment 2004: 6) who encompass voters, party members and supporters, the media, business, interest groups, donors and influencers (Burkitt 2002: 7; Cwalina et al 2011: 27; Lees-Marshment 2001a: 693). Of these, voters are most important (Baines 1999: 403), with some “disproportionately more important than others” because they live in marginal seats or because they switch their support between parties (Baines 1999: 403). An exchange of value is conceptualised in politics as the exchange of “ideas and promises for electoral 23 support” (French and Smith 2010: 460). The aim is to satisfy the needs of voters and parties and meet the goals of the political organisation (Dann and Hughes 2008: 1-2), with “a profit for society” (Henneberg 2002: 103). The political exchange is more complex than the commercial exchange. First, the political exchange can occur in three different markets - electoral, parliamentary and government (Henneberg and Ormrod 2013: 93). Next, there are more participants. The main participants - parties, candidates, voters, and the media which “act as interlocutor” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 21) - may be joined by lobby groups, single-issue groups and donors (Ormord and Henneberg 2010: 385). While the commercial exchange is often immediate, the political exchange may be delayed by the need to negotiate or legislate to deliver promised policies (Brennan and Henneberg 2008: 564). Sometimes, the offering will change post-election via broken promises (Henneberg and Ormrod 2013: 93) or the formation of governing coalitions of former competitors (Butler and Collins 1999: 59). As well, governing parties must extend value to all citizens, including those who opposed them at the election (Brennan and Henneberg 2008: 564), because of normative expectations of parties as “the core actors” in representative democracies (Keman 2006: 160).

Marketing the political product involves adapting commercial concepts and techniques (Lees- Marshment 2001a: 692), and “consists essentially in projecting belief in [...] ability to govern” (Harrop 1990: 278). Political relationship marketing is not yet sophisticated (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009: 20-21) but has multiple attractions. It is desirable in democracies where voter participation is valued (Johansen 2012: 12), especially in party-centred systems where party members traditionally have had a role (Johansen 2012: xi). As in commerce, reciprocity is the key with voters “influencing the product via feedback from polls and focus groups” (Temple 2010: 265). Relationship marketing recognises an overlap of production and consumption (Johansen 2012: 10) and thus the potential for “co-creation” by parties and voters (Hughes 2013; Langmaid 2014: 6; Phipps et al 2010: 498). Relationship marketing can build trust between parties and voters (Needham 2005: 348). It can also help a party “ensure post-purchase satisfaction” (Needham 2005: 346) and maintain voter support between elections (Needham 2005: 343). The aim of marketing is to build brand equity - that is, value as perceived by the electorate (Smith and Spotswood 2013: 184) - for parties or individual politicians (Phipps et al 2010). Spiller and Bergner (2011: 35) argue that: “Every candidate markets himself or herself as a persona to the public. Every candidate becomes a brand”.

Like the commercial consumer, the political consumer is seen as the ultimate owner of the brand which is a “psychological representation [...] in the minds of ‘consumers’” (Burkitt 2002: 7). Parties 24 are said to “have inherent or instinctive strategic perspectives, whatever the degree of sophistication” (Collins and Butler 2002: 3). Arguably then, parties which employ branding seek to do so strategically (Barberio and Lowe 2006: 7, 11; Burkitt 2007: 7), that is, they intentionally formulate their objectives and do what is necessary to achieve those objectives (Barber 2005: 212 cited in Lees-Marshment 2009b: 40). Thus, a political brand strategy is about creating, communicating and managing the brand (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 8-9). It means building a relationship between voters and the brand (Burkitt 2002: 7), to develop a competitive advantage (Conley 2014: 124; O’Cass and Voola 2011:637) which “yields electoral performance” (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 634). As in commerce, political brand equity can provide a bridge from the past to the future, as the US Republicans demonstrated by developing a brand heritage which has been employed by successive leaders (Cosgrove 2014: 110).

Defining political branding With “no universal consensus about the difference between ‘branding’ and ‘marketing’” (Burkitt 2002: 7), it is important to state that I consider branding the precursor to, and driver of, marketing. This follows Keller’s (2008: 185) argument for “designing marketing programs from a branding perspective”. As this work considers political branding practice, I define political branding from a practitioner, rather than a voter, perspective. Thus, political branding is defined as a consciously chosen strategy to identify and differentiate, and instil political offerings with emotional as well as functional value, to create voter appeal and attachment and enhance electoral competitiveness.

A NEW PERSPECTIVE Political branding is an emerging perspective on contemporary voter and party behaviour in western democracies, including Australia. It is driven by a desire to better explain electoral behaviour in a time of diminished voter loyalty and engagement, and increased use of commercial concepts and techniques by practitioners. Political branding does not claim to be completely new, but draws on research from commercial marketing and branding, political science, and political marketing.

The traditional perspective Electoral behaviour in western democracies used to be viewed in the context of fixed social cleavages, with class and religion “particularly salient” (Henneberg and Eghbalian 2002: 77). People voted in line with these cleavages (Farrell 2006: 123), and party ideology (Vassallo and Wilcox 2006: 414) and organisation (Butler et al 2007: 95) emerged from them. Cleavages were “‘frozen’ into the party system” (Vassallo and Wilcox 2006: 415) which became a “transforming” and “central organising feature” (Scarrow 2006: 16) of politics in many countries. From the mid- 25

20th century, however, social cleavages weakened (Vassallo and Wilcox 2006: 415), causing a “loosening of ties between particular parties and particular segments of society” (Katz and Mair 1995: 13).

Models of voter behaviour Consequently, over the past century, political science’s explanations for voter behaviour in western democracies have evolved from social cleavages to psychological and social factors (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 20) and “material interest” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 28). The field offers two “mainstream” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 30) models of voter behaviour. The dominant one is the Michigan model (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 22), which brings together psycho-social factors. This model sees the voter as “primarily a social animal who views the world in terms of a series of group memberships and loyalties” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 21), including “a social class, an ethnic group or a political party (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 21). Voters are “non-deliberating, non- calculating individuals who vote to assert their own self-image” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 22). Attention to politics is “sporadic and highly focussed on general elections” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 21). Voting is seen as “inherently complex” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 20), requiring voters to use simplifying devices. The most important of these is loyalty to, or identification with, a party (Campbell et al 1960: 121). This “psychological identification” (Campbell et al 1960: 121) is “an enduring emotional attachment” to a party (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 20). The Michigan model suggests election campaigns “merely reinforce existing attitudes”, thereby downplaying the importance of values and issues (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 25).

The Downsian rational choice model, meantime, draws from “neoclassical economic theory” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 25). This model views voters as “utility-maximising consumers” (Downs 1957 cited in Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 25) who vote consistently “to affect politics, not to express identity” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 25). Such voters “support whichever party is perceived as most likely to benefit them most” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 26). This model rejects “habit, irrationality and error” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 26). Voters “reduce the cost of acquiring information” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 26) about parties by using heuristics such as reference to socio-economic groups, comparing parties’ ideologies rather than detailed policies, or via a “standing vote” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 26). This leaves “no room for emotion or other variables that could affect the instrumental processing of the information” (Dean and Croft 2009: 132). The economic model suggests election campaigns matter and voter choice can be influenced (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 28). Neither model is fully satisfactory in the face of declining party identification (Crotty 2006a: 502) and political engagement (French and Smith 2010: 461), and the emergence of 26 postmaterialist “expressive values” (Inglehart 1977, 1990 cited in Vassallo and Wilcox 2006: 415) in western democracies, including Australia (Bean and McAllister 2012: 343; Ward 1991: 156; Young 2004: 231).

There is general, but not universal, agreement that party identification has declined in Western democracies over recent decades (Crotty 2006a: 501-502). Mid-last century, around two-thirds of voters in America, Western Europe and Britain identified with a party (Dalton 2004: 30). Since then, the levels (French and Smith 2010: 463) and strength of identification (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 23) have continued to fall. There is “a long-term pattern of dealignment, whereby voters gradually move away from the established parties” (McAllister 2011: 40). Such “promiscuous political allegiances” (O’Shaughnessy and Henneberg 2002: xi) have led to “volatility and unpredictability” (Crotty 2006a: 501) in American and European elections. In Australia, party identification is higher and more stable than in many similar systems (Bean and McAllister 2012: 343) but there have been declines. Levels of party identification fell from 92% in 1967 (McAllister and Ascui 1988: 243) to 77% in the late 1990s (Bean and McAllister 2009: 208), but have “been very steady” since the start of this century (Bean and McAllister 2012: 343). Party identification sat at 78% in the 2010 federal election (Bean and McAllister 2012: 343). Strength of identification also has fallen, from 33% of voters reporting a strong identification in 1967 to 24% in 2007 (McAllister and Clark 2008: 9) and 19% in 2010 (Bean and McAllister 2012: 343). Australian voters are more stable in their vote choices (McAllister 2011: 38), but increasingly make decisions later in campaigns (Bean and McAllister 2012: 343) and increasingly support minor parties (McAllister 2011: 43). Young (2004: 2), citing major swings at successive federal elections, described the electorate as “shockingly volatile”. Around one in four Australian voters “report considering changing their vote during the election campaign” (McAllister 2011: 107), and most are Labor voters (McAllister 2011: 107-108).

There is also declining engagement with politics in general. Voters in Western democracies, including Australia (Altman 2012; Ward 1991: 156), have low levels of involvement in party politics (French and Smith 2010: 461) and low levels of “political information, interest and attention” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 21). The Australian Labor Party boasted around 270,000 members in the 1940s (Parkin and Warhurst 2000: 28) but now claims just 43,000 (Jones 2013), “most of whom are largely inactive except perhaps when they’re handing out how-to-vote cards on election day” (Altman 2012). In addition, some voters reject traditional parties and policies (Vassallo and Wilcox 2006: 415) as they embrace expressive issues like “gender, sexual identify, civil liberties, and the environment” (Vassallo and Wilcox 2006: 415). In Australia, for example, 27 the environmentally-focussed Greens have enjoyed increasing support since 2004 (McAllister 2011: 43). A global survey at the start of the century found contemporary parties “lack the depth of involvement and emotional and ideological attachment they commanded a century, even two or three decades ago” (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 3 cited in Crotty 2006a: 511).

Models of party behaviour Party behaviour is often explained and analysed via models of party types (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 694). As Lees-Marshment (2001a: 694) notes, chief among these are the mass party (Duverger 1964), the catch-all party (Kirchheimer 1966), the electoral-professional party (Panebianco 1988) and the cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995). Discussion of these models involves discussion of ideology and internal organisation. Ideology is variously seen as “a belief system that goes to the heart of a party’s identity” (Mair and Muddle 1998: 220, cited in Vassallo and Wilcox 2006: 414) or “a means of getting votes” (Downs 1957: 96). Organisation comprises a party’s three interactive “faces” (Key 1964: 163-165; Mair 1994: 4). These are: the party in public office, or the members in government or parliament; the party on the ground, or members and “potentially loyal voters”, and; the party in central office “which organises and is usually representative of the party on the ground” (Mair 1994: 4). Historically, ideology and organisation were tightly interconnected and dictated electoral strategy; ideology provided the motivation for electoral strategy and organisation provided the means of enacting it.

The first modern parties emerged in Europe in the late 19th century at a time of limited suffrage (Krouwel 2006: 249-254). These cadre parties were structured around elites and had little extra- parliamentary organisation (Krouwel 2006: 249). Following the Industrial Revolution, mass parties formed to “represent the claims of the emergent working class, hitherto excluded from political participation” (Rae 2006: 200). They had socialist ideologies (Rae 2006: 201) and bottom-up hierarchies (Mair 1994: 17) with large memberships (Katz and Mair 1995: 10) of “pre-defined and well-defined social groups” (Katz and Mair 1995: 6). Electoral success prompted right-wingers to emulate their “organizational form and political style” (Rae 2006: 201). As social cleavages eroded and voter support weakened from mid-20th century, the connection between ideology and organisation loosened. Parties became “catch-all” (Kirchheimer 1966: 184); that is, “trying to catch support from all classes” (Katz and Mair 1995: 10). They “increasingly fight over the middle ground” (French and Smith 2010: 461) and offer “valence policies” (Nelson 1984, cited in French and Smith 2010: 461), that is, “they all agree on the ends (such as the need to improve public services) and differ only on the means of achieving them” (French and Smith 2010: 461). As a result, they have “an indistinct ideological profile” (Krouwel 2006: 258). Party hierarchies became 28 increasingly top-down with the party in public office becoming more dominant (Mair 1994: 17). Some parties continued to evolve into electoral-professional organisations (Panebianco 1988: 264). These parties are electorate focussed (Panebianco 1988: 264), “moderate their demands for social and political transformation” (Krouwel 2006: 252) and seek “the mobilisation of support in the electorate at large” (Mair 1994: 13). In such parties, the central office is more responsive to the party in public office than members on the ground (Mair 1994: 13). Parties began replacing “the old party bosses and technocrats” (Sackman 1999 cited in Scammell 1999: 734) with new professionals skilled in opinion polling, advertising, public relations, journalism and film-making (Webb and Kolodny 2006: 342; Sackman 1999 cited in Scammell 1999: 734). These new professionals were in demand because campaigning was being reshaped by new technologies, first television and then computers (Blumenthal 1982: 18-19; Newman 1999a: 259; Panebianco 1988: 266; Scammell 1995: 37), and new and more sophisticated methods, such as voter research and media management (Mills 1986:1; Needham 2005: 344; Negrine and Lilleker 2002: 91-92; Scammell 2007: 176, 184). Some parties continued to develop into cartel organisations “employing the resources of the state to limit political competition and ensure their own electoral success” (Katz and Mair 2009: 753). Such parties have “retreated from civil society” (Krouwel 2006: 252), and run campaigns that are “capital-intensive, professionalized and centralized” (Katz and Mair 2009: 755).

Political development in post-Revolutionary America had differences as well as similarities. Persistent “public disdain for parties” (White 2006: 5) meant they were highly regulated (Epstein 1980, cited in Rae 2006: 201) and intended to be temporary (Crotty 2006b: 27). Parties survived in “loosely federated party coalitions” (Epstein 1967, cited in Katz and Crotty 2006a: 2) but there was no “true class-based political structure” (Crotty 2006a: 31) because socialism was never the force it was in Europe (Rae 2006: 201). Early parties, although not ideological (Rae 2006: 197), nonetheless became “the political arm of ethnic, religious and sectional cultures” (Thelen 1986: 23 cited in Ware 2006: 276). Mass parties had developed by the 1830s (Ware 2006: 271) and throughout that century they “mobilised specific social groups” (Ware 2006: 276). The two major parties each had a consistent “broad economic and class dimension” (Crotty 2006a: 28), with poorer citizens generally voting Democrat and the wealthier voting Republican. From the late 1800s, “the connections between specific social groups and particular parties became weaker” (Ware 2006: 276) and parties began pursuing a catch-all strategy (Ware 2006: 276). As in Europe, from the mid- 20th century a turn to electoral professionalism (Harris and Lock 2010: 298) coincided with a “long- term electoral disaggregation” (Burnham 1970, cited in Crotty 2006a: 501) and a “rise in the importance of issue voting” (Crotty 2006b: 32).

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Throughout the last century, Australia’s two major parties, Labor and Liberal, travelled a path from mass to catch-all to electoralist organisations (Ward 1991: 167, 169-170). Australia’s party-based system began with the formation of the Labor Party in 1891 and was “fully consolidated with the formation of the Liberal Party in 1944 (Marsh 2006: 2). These two “powerful mass membership organisations [...] largely dominated the political system” (Marsh 2006: 2). Social class was “once the rock of Australian electoral choice” (Bean and McAllister 2012: 346) and was seen in terms of manual or blue collar workers and non-manual or white collar workers (McAllister 2011: 1170). The Labor Party “emerged from the trade union movement in the 1890s with the goal of furthering workers’ interests in the political sphere” (McMullin 1991, cited in McAllister 2011: 158) and traditionally gained support from manual workers. The forerunners of the urban-based Liberal Party formed a “permanent coalition with the various country parties” to seek the combined support of non-manual and agricultural workers (McAllister 2011: 152). Class voting began a slow decline from the 1930s (McAllister 2011: 149). Class can still influence voter choice but is more complex, encompassing a voters’ class image, occupation, union membership and economic interests (Bean and McAllister 2012: 346; McAllister 2011: 170). Party membership and loyalty began to slide from the 1960s (Marsh 2006: 2). In response, the major parties started poaching voters from each other; Labor sought support amongst the middle class and the Liberals made gains with “upwardly mobile blue collar workers” (McAllister 2011: 153). They also broadened their policies to include women’s and Indigenous rights and the environment (Marsh 2006: 2). By the 1990s, they were being described as electoral-professional organisations (Ward 1991: 169-170) and it has since been argued they may also behave like cartels (Ward 2006: 83).

These party types, as Lees-Marshment (2001a: 694) noted in relation to British parties, “do not fully capture” contemporary practice. For example, the economic model “does not show us how parties identify the demands of the median voter and move towards the centre-ground” (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 694). Further, while some voters “do display evidence of economic rationality, many do not” (Dean and Croft 2009: 142). The catch-all model “cannot provide an adequate explanation of the entire political market” (Scammell 1999: 730). As Kirchheimer acknowledged, the model is subject to “limits set by social stratification”, is inappropriate for small parties and uncommon in small countries (Scammell 1999: 730). Further, “not all parties can or wish to become ‘catch-all’ players” and, even if they do, “there may be alternatives to the catch-all product standardisation” (Scammell 1999: 730). Some of the predictions of the catch-all model were countered by the rise of “more ideological parties of the right in Anglo-Saxon democracies in the 1980s” (Butler and Harris 2009: 155) and recent moves by British parties to increase members’ rights to participate (Lees- Marshment 2001a: 694). Some researchers (i.e. Sackman 1998: 128 and Shaw 1994: 215 cited in 30

Scammell 1999: 734) argue the electoral professional party “is insufficiently sensitive to the type of expertise introduced by the new professionals” (Scammell 1999: 734). They argue marketing managers, marketing researchers and advertisers dominated at the expense of journalists and academics (Scammell 1999: 734). In addition, Lees-Marshment (2001a: 701) has argued that Downs’ and Panebianco’s models do not explain how parties discern voter opinion. Meantime, the cartel model has been criticised as being “too static to grasp the increased intervention by the state into society” (Koole 1996) and having “limited applicability” (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 694), including in Australia (Goot 2006: 280). In sum, traditional models of voter and party behaviour no longer fully describe voter and party behaviour.

The branding perspective Political branding offers a compelling explanation of contemporary electoral behaviour. This argument is developed via discussion of the models of voter and party behaviour provided by political marketing researchers.

Marketing models of voter behaviour Political marketing models of voter behaviour “share much in common with other approaches” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 34), but differ in perceiving voters “as habitual consumers” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 33). Marketing models of voter behaviour “accept that preferences can stem both from group identities [...] and from perceptions of material interest” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 28). O’Cass (2002a: 1036) offers a “micromodel” of voter choice in Australia which incorporates demographics, voter involvement and knowledge, whether a voter influences the political opinions of others, voter decision-making confidence and satisfaction with parties and politics. Marketing models also offer “broader theories” about voter choice (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 28). They recognise, for example, the importance of variables such as voters’ aspirations and party image (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 28-29). Image “has long been recognised as an important factor in politics” (Scammell 1999: 728), and has been described as “super-important” because of the “ephemeral nature” of the political offering (Baines et al 2005: 1083). Image is created by creating and evoking associations and, thus, emotions in the mind of the voter (Cwalina et al 2011: 133). Numerous political marketing researchers note the importance of image-related evaluations like integrity and competence (Cwalina at al 2011: 145) or reputation, trustworthiness and credibility (Scammell 1995: 20). Political science models, however, “seem reluctant to build in image/ reputation as a major element” (Scammell 1999: 728), perhaps because “it is less easily modelled than policy or issue perceptions or party identification” (Scammell 1999: 728). Political marketing models do include image. One from Newman and Sheth (1985, 1987) suggested voter choice could 31 be shaped by up to seven “consumption-related variables” (Reeves et al 2006: 422). The variables were subsequently reduced to five - political issues, imagery, candidate personality, situational factors and novelty or curiosity value (Newman 1999a: 260-263). This model has been used to predict electoral behaviour in a number of US polls, including the 2000 Presidential election (Reeves et al 2006: 422). Cwalina et al (2010) extended the model with the addition of the media’s affect on voter behaviour. They argue “the media influences emotional feelings that, in turn, form voters’ cognitive domains that directly influence voter choice” (Cwalina et al 2010: 354), especially in developing democracies (Cwalina et al 2010: 351). Further, the model could help practitioners target their marketing strategies “in a particular election, and in a particular country” (Cwalina et al 2010: 366). As this argument highlights, marketing models “are not designed to produce post-hoc scientific explanations for voter behaviour but [...] a broad-brush framework within which parties and candidates can think about the development of party strategy” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 30).

Marketing models of party behaviour Political marketers seek “a fuller picture of party behaviour” (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 694) and have addressed the perceived deficiencies of traditional party models by “borrowing certain aspects” from commercial marketing (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 694). They build on the economic models of party behaviour, in particular, seeking “refinements” (Scammell 1999: 727) via commercial marketing literature which might offer “more precise and useful analytical tools for party behaviour than Kirchheimer’s ‘catch-all party’” (Scammell 1999: 726). They also incorporate political science sub-fields like communication, policy and party organisation (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 694). Thus, Kirchheimer’s thesis has been reinterpreted as using “a proto-political marketing concept that covered nearly all aspects of a political marketing strategy” (Henneberg and Eghbalian 2002: 68). From this perspective, the model is seen as “describing the transformation of party strategies from a “selling” to a “marketing concept” (Henneberg and Eghbalian 2002: 68). Moreover, “the political marketing organisation is a kind of framework, it embellishes the political marketing strategy with an organisational hold” (Henneberg and Eghbalian 2002: 81). Lees- Marshment (2001a: 695) argues that organisational structure is one of the behaviours that will change when a party adopts political marketing. A new party structure, naturally, requires a new explanation. Lees-Marshment (2001a) offers one such explanation, the market-oriented party, which adapts commercial firm typology to politics. Lees-Marshment (2001a: 692) “borrows the core marketing concepts of product, sales and market-orientation, and techniques such as market intelligence and adapts them to suit traditional tenets of political science to produce an integrated theoretical framework”. The model classifies the behaviour of parties as sales, product or market- oriented, and depicts each as a sequence of up to eight stages throughout the electoral cycle (Lees- 32

Marshment 2001a: 697). A ninth stage, maintaining a market orientation in government or Opposition, was subsequently added to the market-oriented column (Lilleker and Lees-Marshment 2005: 225). Butler and Collins (1996: 26) also view political parties “as analogous to commercial organisations in the marketplace” and adopt another established model from commercial marketing (Kotler 1994) to explain the competitive positions and strategies of parties. This model comprises four positions - market leader, challenger, follower and nicher (Butler and Collins 1996: 68; 2002: 6). This “generalist” model can be applied to multiple electoral contexts (Butler and Collins 1996: 26). Cwalina et al (2011: 74) offer an “advanced model of political marketing” which operates in a “permanent marketing campaign” (Cwalina et al 2011: 73). O’Cass and Voola (2011) offer yet another model to explain how a party marshals its resources to offer and deliver on promises. They draw on a resource-based view of the firm from commercial literature, which argues “variations in the success of firms operating within the same industry can be explained by their internal idiosyncratic capabilities and how well they utilise available capabilities” (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 631). At the turn of the century, Scammell (1999: 719) noted that “political marketing claims to offer new ways of understanding modern politics”. Today, a growing number of researchers make that claim for political branding (e.g. Conley 2014: 124; Cosgrove 2007: 48; French and Smith 2010: 472; Hughes 2007: 1118; Needham 2006: 179; O’Cass and Voola 2011: 629; Parker 2012: 208; Reeves et al 2006: 425; Scammell 2007: 176).

Branding explanations of voter behaviour Branding explains how voters increasingly perceive and respond to parties and politicians. As the traditional connection between voters and parties was lost so, too was the “shared context for receiving and interpreting messages” (Bennett and Iyengar 2008: 1 cited in Adolphsen 2010: 34). Traditional “ideological bonds with a political party” are being replaced by a relationship between individual voters and candidates (Harris 2000: 8). Voters in brand-saturated societies (Reeves et al 2006: 418) increasingly see “political parties as they do other service brands” (French and Smith 2010: 461) and are “ready to transfer and make use of their knowledge of consumer brands into the political sphere” (Reeves et al 2006: 423). Commercial and political consumers are said to form, store and retrieve brand knowledge in similar ways. Keller (2008: 51) explains the process by using a model of memory from psychology. The associative network memory model depicts memory as a network of nodes, representing stored information, and connecting links, representing the strength of associations with the information (Keller 2008: 51). In other words, “individual pieces of information [...] are linked together in memory to form a more complex associative network” (Anderson 1983, cited in Smith and French 2011: 718). Information can be verbal, visual, abstract or contextual (Keller 2008: 51). Brand knowledge is comprised of awareness, which is about a 33 consumer’s ability to recognise and recall a brand, and image, which is about a consumer’s associations of a brand (Keller 2008: 51-56). Brand knowledge can be built via appeals to reason and emotion, and most strong brands use both (Keller 2008: 60). Brand knowledge is retrieved when “when one association stimulates the recall of another, linked node of information” (de Groot 1989, cited in Smith and French 2011: 719). The associative network memory model has been employed to explain brand knowledge in voters (e.g. Burkitt 2002: 8; French and Smith 2010: 462; Smith and French 2011: 726-727). French and Smith (2010: 462) argue political brand knowledge is “an associative network of interconnected political information, held in memory and accessible when stimulated from the memory of a voter”. Just as consumers use brands to simplify choice (Keller 2008: 6), voters employ brands as a decision-making heuristic (Smith and French 2009: 217). In other words, voters, like consumers, are “cognitive misers” (O’Shaughnessy and Henneberg 2002: xviii; O’Shaughnessy and O’Shaughnessy 2003: 188). This is particularly the case when they have little involvement in politics (Popkin 1991: 7), little or no party loyalty (Needham 2006: 180), or face “an environment of proliferating choice and information” (Needham 2006: 184). Thus, “party labels relieve voters of the need to familiarise themselves with all the party’s policies” (Needham 2006: 179).

Consumers also use brands as signals of quality and characteristics in products that cannot be experienced pre-purchase, such as tyres and insurance, and to reduce risk in buying and using products (Keller 2008: 8). Political brands are “almost entirely psychological constructs from the point of view of the voter” (Burkitt 2002: 7) and parties “have little to present to electors except for manifestos, advertising and [...] their presence on the news” (Baines et al 2005: 1083). Voters can use the party image “as a proxy for their perceived future competence” (Baines et al 2005: 1083) and the leader’s image to assess “overall party competence, responsiveness and attractiveness” (French and Smith 2010: 461). In addition, voters develop emotional connections to political brands (Burkitt 2002: 5), as they do to commercial brands. Burkitt (2002: 5) argues for the “enormous importance of the intangible, the irrational and of emotional perceptions (in addition to considered opinions) in voters’ relationships with political parties”. One study found up to a third of voters “have strong feelings towards political candidates even though they know almost nothing about them” (Wattenberg 1987, cited in de Landtsheer et al 2008: 220); another that emotion has a major role in developing rationality in voters (Marcus 2002: 7). Multiple researchers have shown emotions are “strong predictors of voter preferences” (de Landtsheer et al 2008: 220), and there is an increasing acceptance of the place of emotion in politics with “the ‘affective turn’’’ in political studies in recent decades (Hoggett and Thompson 2012: 1). Voters also use political brands in an expressive way. Just as people “buy products to express the sort of person they are (or would like to 34 be), so they might vote in order to express themselves” (Bartle and Griffiths 2002: 28-29). Parties, like commercial brands, “are aspirational, evoking a particular vision of ‘the good life’ or holding out the promise of personal enhancement” (Needham 2006: 179). Bennett (2004: 3-4) speaks of “lifestyle politics” whereby “individuals increasingly organise social and political meaning around their lifestyle values and the personal narratives that express them”. In all, brands provide “a basis for long-term loyalty in an environment where products (policies) are fairly fluid” (Needham 2006: 180).

Branding explanations of party behaviour Branding also explains how parties and politicians increasingly approach campaigning and governing. Branding is said to be “crucial to strategy” (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 635). It is “the primary mechanism” (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 635) to differentiate from competitors. It “provides a conceptual framework to distinguish and fathom links between the functional perceptions [...] and the emotional attractions” (Scammell 2007: 187) of political offerings. It can “ensure effective communication between politicians and citizens” (Cosgrove 2014: 121) and can help educate citizens about politics and policy (Cosgrove 2014: 122). In short, branding encompasses “internal values, external presentation and consumer perception” (Barwise et al 2000: 75).

Branding has numerous attractions for parties and politicians. Branding emphasises image “which for politicians is pretty much the only thing of substance that they can offer to voters before election” (Scammell 2007: 188). A political brand is, after all, “made up of impressions, associations and the overall perception of a party or politician” (Lees-Marshment 2011: 66). Therefore, Burkitt (2002: 7) has argued, a political party “could, perhaps, be seen as the ultimate form of brand”. Branding also emphasises emotion, allowing “a stronger appeal to values than to specific knowledge” (Cosgrove 2014: 121), which is important in light of “practitioner and academic evidence that voters are increasingly using emotional intelligence to guide voting decisions” (Burkitt 2002; Richards 2004; Westen 2007, cited in Smith and French 2009: 218). Parties can use branding to build voter trust by emphasising “unity and coherence” (Needham 2006: 179) or communicating “brand heritage, e.g., ideological roots or long-held overarching political beliefs” (Henneberg 2006: 38). Parties can also use branding to build voter loyalty. Loyalty can be created in two ways – via the party brand as a defence against increasing choice (Needham 2006: 178) or via a branded leader as “a shortcut to sum up all the desirable attributes of a party” (Needham 2006: 182). Branding “can help unify a party” (Cosgrove 2007: 54-55, cited in Conley 2014: 127), and it can help unify a campaign. Incumbents can use their brands to develop an ongoing relationship with voters and secure “repeat purchases – re-election” (Needham 2006: 184). 35

A good brand “can create enduring ties” (Cosgrove 2014: 122) and “stimulate long-term activism” (Cosgrove 2014: 121). Branded politics is “redefining how political leaders interact with and are perceived by the public” (Conley 2014: 124). Branding is seen as “the new form of political marketing” (Scammell 2007: 176). Moreover, it is seen as the new form of the permanent campaign (Scammell 2007: 188) the “daily activity of electioneering and governing” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 19) that is a feature of contemporary politics (Blumenthal 1982: 23). In sum, branding is seen as a new psychological connection for voters and a new organising principle for parties.

A TALE OF TWO DISCIPLINES The concept of political branding is “commonplace” among political marketing researchers (French and Smith 2010: 460), but remains contested in the broader field of political science (Smith and French 2009: 210). This is due to its hybrid nature; political branding has roots in both commerce and politics. These different roots make for important differences, and also prompt some serious criticisms of the field and the practice of political branding.

Commercial marketing research began about the turn of the 20th century (Kotler and Andreasen 1995: 39) as a branch of applied economics studying the distribution of goods (Kotler 1972: 46). It evolved into a management discipline focussed on increasing sales, then became akin to an applied behavioural science seeking to understand “buyer and seller systems involved in the marketing of goods and services” (Kotler 1972: 46). This “magpie discipline” borrowed from economics, psychology and sociology (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 10). Decades of theory and concept development have produced different schools of thought (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 8), with three major paradigms of industrial, services and consumer marketing (Baines et al 2001: 48). Branding became an increasingly important sub-discipline from the latter decades of the 20th century (Aaker 1991: 7-8), and in the 1980s the concept of brand equity “elevated the importance of the brand in marketing strategy and provided focus for managerial interest and research activity” (Keller 2008: 37). Commerce now has a “diverse […] literature that defines and dissects the role of the brand” (Needham 2006: 179).

Political science, meantime, is interested in “power and conflict, the resolution of different demands, how people relate to each other and how people organise” (Lees-Marshment 2004: 6). It has borrowed from philosophy, history, law, economics, sociology, psychology, geography and statistics (Lees-Marshment 2004:7). Political science now encompasses a number of sub-disciplines (Goodin and Klingemann 1996: 3). One of these, political marketing, emerged in the 1980s 36

(Henneberg 2008: 155) and became “a coherent sub-set of the broad field” within a decade (Scammell 1999: 718). Research has focussed on issues such as translating key commercial theories and concepts into the political context, use of marketing instruments in politics, developments in political communication and political marketing management (Henneberg 2008: 15; O’Cass and Voola 2011: 640). Much of the work has emanated from America, Britain, France, Germany, Australia and New Zealand (Henneberg 2008: 156). Since the mid-1990s, branding has become more prominent in the sub-discipline, with “a steady stream of papers that have accepted political parties or politicians as brands” (Smith and French 2009: 2010). Political branding research generally has focussed on brand management by parties or consumer motivation and behaviour (Smith and French 2009: 210).

A merger of commerce and politics The term “political marketing” was first used in 1956 by political scientist Stanley Kelley (1956: 53) in his study of how commercial marketers, particularly advertisers, were “increasingly involved in political persuasion” (Scammell 1999: 723). The concept of political marketing became more sophisticated as major developments in commercial marketing enhanced the “scope for cross- fertilisation between disciplines” (Henneberg 2008: 152). In 1960, the American Marketing Association defined marketing in strictly commercial terms as “the performance of business activities that direct the flow of goods and services from produce to consumer or user” (Hunt 1976: 17). By the end of the decade, the field was re-shaped by Kotler and Levy (1969: 10) who argued for broadening the concept of marketing to non-profit, as well as profit, organisations. They argued that “marketing is a relevant discipline for all organizations insofar as all organizations can be said to have customers and products” (Kotler 1972: 46). They also made an explicit connection with politics, remarking that “political contests remind us that candidates are marketed as well as soap” (Kotler and Levy 1969: 10). Next, Kotler (1972: 46) offered a “generic concept of marketing”. He proposed that “the core concept of marketing is the transaction”, which is “the exchange of values between two parties” (Kotler 1972: 48). O’Leary and Iredale (1976) deepened the connection between politics and marketing with the argument “that an exchange relationship existed between democratic elites and their voters” (Wring 2007: 171). These and other contributions (i.e. Houston 1986; Hunt 1976; Kotler and Zaltman 1971; Sharma 1973, 1975) opened the door for American and European scholars to start working on the theoretical foundations of political marketing (Henneberg 2008: 155; Wring 1997: 651).

Key theories and concepts have been progressively adapted from commerce to politics. Among the most important is market orientation (Ormrod 2006: 110). Essentially, market, or customer, 37 orientation argues that a firm’s focus should be on its market rather than its product (Levitt 1960, cited in Ormrod 2006: 110). Modern business practice has developed in three stages from a focus on production, then sales and finally marketing (Keith 1960, cited Scammell 1999: 724). Political marketing adapted the three commercials orientations to explain the development of party orientation from “propaganda (production), to media/advertising (sales), to customer (marketing)” (Smith and Saunders 1990, cited in Scammell 1999: 726). Market, or voter, orientation applies to both parties and individual politicians (Lees-Marshment 2009a: 206). A market orientation means that parties and politicians are in touch with and respond to voter concerns, and demonstrate this via their behaviour (Lees-Marshment 2009b: 41). Market orientation has been incorporated in a number of political marketing models (e.g. Lees-Marshment 2001a; Newman 1994; Ormrod 2005: 62).

Market orientation is connected to the marketing concept, which holds that customer needs should be identified and satisfied (O’Cass 1996: 38). Political parties traditionally were viewed as more focussed on the needs of their own organisations than the needs of voters (O’Cass 1996: 40). In recent decades, however, numerous researchers (e.g. Henneberg and Eghbalian 2002; Houston 1986; Kotler 1982; Lees-Marshment 2001a; Newman and Sheth 1987; O’Cass 1996, 2001; O’Shaughnessy 1990) have applied the marketing concept to explain party and voter behaviour in America, Britain and Australia. Henneberg and Eghbalian (2002: 74) argue that the “political marketing concept” means parties will take account of voters’ needs and wants, and aim for “a high level of [voter] satisfaction”. Indeed, the marketing concept has been described as “the key to understanding political marketing” (Scammell 1999: 726). It signals “a transformation of political organisations and fundamental relationships between leaders, parties, members and voters” (Scammell 1999: 726). In short, market oriented politics “is about the party changing, rather than the public” (Lees-Marshment 2007: 338).

Political marketing research has also employed various commercial instruments to explain and analyse party behaviour. These include use of market intelligence to inform product development (e.g. Hughes and Dann 2010: 84; Lees-Marshment 2001a: 692, 2010:10, 2011: 12-15; Mills 2014: 193; Newman 1999a; Worcester and Mortimore 2005), segmentation of the market (e.g. Baines et al 2003; Hughes and Dann 2010: 85; Lees-Marshment 2011: 20-24; Wring 2002) and positioning the product (e.g. Cwalina et al 2010; Collins and Butler 1996; Hughes 2007; Lees-Marshment 2011: 60-62). Commercial marketing mix models have been widely used by political marketing researchers (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 10). Chief among these are McCarthy’s (1960) 4Ps model which encompasses product, price, planning and promotion, and the expanded 7Ps model which adds packaging, positioning and people (Booms and Bitmer 1981, cited in Lees- 38

Marshment 2009b: 30). Marketing mix models have been adopted and expanded by numerous other researchers (e.g. Cwalina et al 2011; Dann and Hughes 2008; Farrell 1996; Farrell and Wortmann 1987; Lloyd 2005; Newman 1994; Niffenegger 1989; Wring 1997). Researchers noted that practitioners increasingly sought to “integrate their use of marketing instruments into a coherent marketing strategy” (Henneberg 2008: 154). In turn, researchers began to emphasise strategy (Scammell 1999: 723). Scammell (1999: 723) has argued this is “the prime distinctive contribution of the marketing literature” because it “shifts the focus from the techniques of promotion to the overall strategic objectives of the party/ organisation”. Political marketing came to be understood as both philosophy and practice; a way of thinking as much as a way of doing (Lees-Marshment 2007: 337, 2011: 4; Savigny 2007: 41, 2008: 2; Wring 1996: 92).

In commerce, the 4Ps model in particular became viewed as “an inadequate intellectual framework for service-oriented organisations” (Baines et al 2003: 62). Services marketing theory provided a more nuanced framework, with an emphasis on “exchange relationships” rather than one-off purchases (Scammell 1999: 727-728). With this came recognition that producers and consumers could collaborate on “value co-creation” (Henneberg and Ormrod 2013: 89), thereby “blurring the old dividing line between production and consumption” (Kornberger 2010: 159). Political marketers noted the “clear similarities between long-lasting service industries and political markets” (Scammell 1999: 728), in particular the need for a customer focus and the “intangible, performance dependent” nature of offerings (Baines et al 2003: 55). Political marketers also saw opportunities in relationship marketing, which has became an increasing focus of research (e.g. Cwalina et al 2011; Dann 2008; Dean and Croft 2001; Gronroos 1990; Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009, 2010; Johansen 2012; Needham 2005). Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy (2009: 21) see relationship marketing as “probably the most important thing marketing has to offer”. They argue that contemporary “parties merely rent the allegiance of their voters [...] when they need to create converts and partisans” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009: 21). Political relationship marketing may help “refresh their membership lists and retain voters’ allegiance and trust as well as providing legitimacy to the overall party system” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009: 21). Johansen (2012: 9) argues for relationship marketing in party-centred systems, which are based on “strong membership parties that allow, encourage and facilitate the participation of their members and associated members”.

In recent decades, the commercial marketing field has been reshaped by a growing emphasis on branding. Marketing practitioners turned to branding because they realised “a respected brand translates into financial value” (Scammell 2007: 177). They also faced “the haunting truth that 39 traditional marketing is not working” (Kotler 2005: ix) in “a world of media abundance and audience fragmentation” (Scammell 2007: 177). There were also consumer-related factors; a rise in consumer power and acknowledgement of “the importance of emotional engagement in shopping behaviour, especially in explanations of repeat purchases” (Scammell 2007: 177). Practitioners and researchers saw that good branding “can add value far beyond just a single marketing campaign as each successive initiative builds on the existing strength of the brand” (Cosgrove 2014: 107). The location and management of brand equity was much debated by researchers (Barwise 1993: 96) until Keller (1993: 1) conceptualised customer-based brand equity as “the differential effect of brand knowledge on consumer response to the marketing of the brand”. This became “the dominant view” in the commercial field (Punj and Hillyer 2004: 1). Brand equity became one of six major research streams; the others being brand positioning, corporate image and reputation, brand growth and strategic brand management (French and Smith 2013: 1356; Keller and Lehmann 2006). Numerous researchers have produced works on managing brands for profit and non-profit organisations (e.g. Aaker 2008; Kapferer 2012), for nations, cities and regions (e.g. Anholt 2007; Dinney 2008), for business to business (e.g. Kotler and Pfoertsch 2006; Lynch and de Chernatony 2004), and for individuals (e.g. Graham 2001; Lair et al 2005). There is increasing recognition of the importance of emotional branding (Gobe 2009: xvii-xviii); that is, “how a brand engages consumers on the level of senses and emotions; how a brand comes to life for people and forges a deeper, lasting connection” (Gobe 2009: xviii). Kornberger (2010: xiii) argues that brands can “transform” an economy and a society. Brands, he says, are becoming “a new management framework” for organisations (Kornberger 2010: xiii) and “the dominant blueprint” for people’s lives (Kornberger 2010: xii).

Political marketing was slow to respond to “the shift [...] from a commodity focus to a brand focus” (Needham 2006: 179). Political researchers first began studying brands from a managerial perspective and, latterly, a voter perspective (Smith and French 2011: 718). To date, a number of researchers have considered branding of individual leaders or during individual campaigns (e.g. Conley 2014; Cosgrove 2014; Hughes and Dann 2010; Harris and Lock 2001; Parker 2012; Scammell 2007; Smith and Spotswood 2013; Spiller and Bergner 2011). Others have considered branding across multiple campaigns or a period of time (e.g. Cosgrove 2007; Hughes 2003; Marland 2013; Needham 2005; O’Shaughnessy 2009; White and de Chernatony 2002). Others look at how voters perceive and learn about political brands (e.g. Baines et al 2011; Needham 2006; Smith 2009; French and Smith 2013), what parties do to build, map and measure voter attachment and brand equity (e.g. Burkitt 2002; French and Smith 2010; Lees-Marshment 2009b: 111-120, 2011: 66-73) and how voters contribute to brand equity (e.g. Phipps et al 2010). Finally, some 40 researchers have considered political brand strategy (e.g. Cosgrove 2007, 2014; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Scammell 2007; Spiller and Bergner 2011).

Differences, gaps and criticisms remain Adapting work from commerce to politics takes time because of the significant differences between the two fields and practices. These differences mean “traditional marketing frameworks do not fit neatly into a political marketing configuration” (Dean and Croft 2001: 1197). Consequently, there are still gaps in political marketing and branding research. These differences and gaps have prompted criticisms of the field.

Differences The differences between politics and commerce extend from the organisation to the competition and the delivery. Most parties have membership-based organisations that differ significantly from commercial organisations in which “power devolves from ownership” (Scammell 1999: 725). Unlike firms, parties have ideologies (Burkitt 2002: 23) and normative expectations (Lees- Marshment 2001a: 693), both of which influence their ability to undertake branding. A political offering is always a “complex intangible” (Lock and Harris 1996: 15); only some commercial offerings are so. While the political leader and their image are at the heart of the political product (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 20), few firms are “so dependent on the idiosyncrasies of a public persona” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 21). It is harder to identify the needs and wants of political consumers than commercial consumers, because voters often have “irreconcilable objectives such as the desire for ‘Texan taxes and Scandinavian welfare benefits’” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 20). In addition, political offerings are often put before “several, possibly conflicting markets” (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 693). More than that, political offerings are “consumed by both the intended target market [...] and the unintended market” (Hughes and Dann 2006b: 5). Parties, unlike firms, rely heavily on symbolism and public imagery to create “visual rhetoric” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 22). They also employ open deceit and “fantasy- negativity” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 23-25), with “relatively tame comparative advertising being the nearest commercial equivalent” (O’Shaughnessy 1990 cited in Butler and Collins 1999: 67). As noted above, the exchange is more complex in politics with more actors, more mediation and more complications around delivery. Unlike parties, firms experience only limited moderation by media and consumer watchdogs (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 21) and, unlike political campaigns, commercial campaigns are rarely “challenged and distorted [...] by aggressive external actors” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 25).

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Price and purchase manifest differently in politics. While there is no monetary cost in voting, it is said to have a “social price” (Caywood and Laczniak 1990 cited in Dann and Hughes 2008: 5). For example, when a party breaks promises, voters pay in terms of “pride, frustration and the time cost of waiting for the next election to try again, or act on a changed political allegiance” (Dann and Hughes 2008: 5). Voters also pay a price in that each “has to live with the collective choice even though it might not have been his or her own preference” (Lock and Harris 1996: 15). A party or candidate can try to minimise the cost of voting for them by highlighting the positives on offer, and try to elevate the cost of voting for an opponent by highlighting purported risks (Dann and Hughes 2008: 5). Thus, the vote is seen as a “psychological purchase” (Reid 1988: 35). Almost all voters make their ‘purchase’ on the same day (Lock and Harris 1996: 14); few, if any, commercial purchases are so conducted. The nature of commercial and political campaigns also differs. Commercial campaigns generally are episodic (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 19). While political campaigns used to be episodic, they now operate permanently (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 19). Another significant difference is that “a commercial market can sustain many successes” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009: 12) while an election campaign is a zero sum game with the victory of one party meaning the loss of another (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009: 12). Finally, the political product may be “mutable”, especially if a party feels compelled to break promises or form a coalition post-election (Butler and Collins 1999: 59). In short, politics is marked by “volatility, pressure, intensity and instantaneous characteristics” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 18) that are unknown in the “slower and less scrutinised” commercial world (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 19).

Gaps Political marketing research is relatively young (Johansen 2012: 192) and there are gaps in theory (Henneberg 2008: 157). The field is dominated by analysis of political marketing instruments and their managerial applications (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009: 10), and a “reliance on (arguably) obsolete marketing concepts” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009: 8). More work is needed on market orientation and exchange (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 9), relationship marketing (Henneberg 2008: 157; Johansen 2012: 193) and strategic marketing (Baines and Harris 2011: 653; O’Cass and Voola 2011: 640). Other specific issues also need further attention including the importance of party resources (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 641), the link between lobbying and political marketing (Baines and Harris 2011: 653), party member motivations (Johansen 2012: 193), and the media’s role in “shaping the political message delivered to the electorate” (Savigny and Temple 2010: 1050). Political branding research is even younger. To date, “branding philosophies and practice have received limited attention” (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 633) and the focus has been 42 limited to a few topics (Cosgrove 2014: 123). Work continues in areas such as branding strategy (e.g. Cosgrove 2014), the interplay between party and leader brands (e.g. Hughes and Dann 2011; Speed et al 2013); brand equity (e.g. French and Smith 2013), voter perception of the quality of political brands (French and Smith 2010), and the “democratic implications” of branding (Cosgrove 2014: 123).

Criticisms These differences and gaps have prompted criticisms from both fields. Some critics accuse political marketing research of being unsophisticated (Henneberg 2004: 228; Henneberg et al 2009: 166), with much concern about the attention given to political marketing management (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009: 10). Some political scientists object to the “generally prescriptive tone of much of the literature drawn from business” (Collins and Butler 1996: 75), others argue against the use of marketing instruments in politics (Henneberg et al 2009: 166). Others focus on the ethics of political marketing practice (Henneberg 2004: 228; Henneberg et al 2009: 166), seeing it as “harmful for politics and democratic systems” (Henneberg et al 2009: 166). Critics charge it has led to more populism (Henneberg 2004: 228) and more negativity (Henneberg 2004: 228). Others fear a loss of ideology and leadership (Lees-Marshment 2001b: 1082) and “a ‘dumbing down’ of the political process” (Savigny 2003: 34). Savigny (2008: 5) goes further, arguing that political marketing “fundamentally alters the idea and nature of politics, subjugating politics to marketing”. Similarly, there are “profound concerns about the damaging effect of branding on the democratic process” (Smith 2009: 211). Branded politics is said to be “defined by its enemies and lacking ideological roots” (Needham 2005: 356). Further, it is claimed that it “fosters a politics of confrontation and differentiation, rather than negotiation and compromise” (Needham 2005: 356) and “stifles the difficult choices that might fragment voter coalitions” (Needham 2005: 356). An “over-reliance on branded communication can too easily shift into pure manipulation of the public” (Barberio and Lowe 2006: 24) and centralised branding activities may cause disengagement by voters (Lilleker and Negrine 2003) and formerly loyal supporters (Lilleker 2005: 19). Some see branding as “benefiting the political party at the expense of the political process” (Smith 2009: 211).

Political marketing and branding researchers accept some of these criticisms but reject others. Scammell (1995: xv) argues “many of the most damning criticisms of political marketing are simply not proven, or rely on a contrast with a mythical golden age of rational political debate”. Dann and Hughes (2008: 2) believe properly applied marketing that “revolves around the concept of mutual exchange” will not compromise core values or ideology. O’Cass and Voola (2011: 627) 43 defend the application of marketing instruments and concepts in politics, saying they “provide greater insight into political marketing, as well as political campaigns”. Smith (2009: 11) argues branding critics do not recognise that consumers are motivated to learn about brands as way of making choices in a complex and information-rich environment. Others (i.e. Cosgrove 2014: 22; Lees-Marshment 2001a: 699; Needham 2005: 365; Reeves et al 2006: 419) suggest marketing and branding can benefit democracy via more informed and empowered voters, and attuned and responsive leaders. Thus, branding “is doubled-edged, offering new potential and creating new anxieties” (Scammell 2007: 191).

A COMMON, IF IMPERFECT, PRACTICE Kotler (1975: 762) has argued that political “campaigning has always had a marketing character” but political marketing per se is “an almost exclusively post-Second World War phenomenon” (O’Shaughnessy 1990: 17), built on a mass electorate (Harrop 1990: 284) and mass media (Maarek 2011: 2). Political marketing is also “largely an American invention” (O’Shaughnessy 1990: 17). Researchers attribute this in part to America’s “early development of mass media and later the Internet” (Maarek 2011: 2), and a “strong commitment to market forces” (Butler and Collins 1999: 61).

America In America’s candidate-centred system, much attention focuses on presidential campaigns and behaviour. Maarek (1995: 11) argues the 1952 presidential campaign marks the start of political marketing. The winner of that contest, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was the first candidate to use television (Newman 1994: 2) and the first to hire an advertising company (Nimmo 1999: 75). Eight years later, John F. Kennedy’s “adroit” (Barberio and Lowe 2006: 9) use of television helped him beat Richard Nixon and changed political communication forever (Hendricks and Denton 2010: 13). By 1968, Nixon’s campaign team “conceived of the candidate as a product to be modified in relation to a market” (O’Shaughnessy 1990: 49), as detailed in McGinnis’ (1969) famous account of “the selling of the President”. A marketing approach “both built and sustained” (O’Shaughnessy 1990: 50) Nixon and a subsequent office-holder, Jimmy Carter. Carter’s pollster, Pat Caddell, advocated a “continuing political campaign” (Blumenthal 1982: 56), which was a “new ideology of governance [...] the permanent campaign” (Blumenthal 1982: 58). Conservative Republicans, meantime, had been building their party brand since 1964 (Cosgrove 2007: 2). From 1980, President Ronald Reagan became the party’s “face and, eventually, its heritage” (Cosgrove 2014: 113). Reagan adopted a brand management approach which was “demand-led and research-refined” (O’Shaughnessy 1990: 51). Democrat Bill Clinton demonstrated that he, too, understood branding 44 and marketing. In 1992, Clinton assembled an organisation that “resembled the best-run marketing organisations” (Newman 1994: xv), employed the marketing concept (Newman 1994: 6) and established a personal brand (Needham 2006: 183). Clinton was followed by George W. Bush who tapped into the “Reagan heritage” (Cosgrove 2009: 130). Bush’s branding efforts “ended badly” (Cosgrove 2009: 130), after policy and communication failures “led the public to feel that promises made were not promises kept” (Cosgrove 2009: 130). In 2008, the “brand called Obama” (McGirt 2008: 1) was “designed to respond to the carefully researched needs of the American public” (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 1). ’s campaign was “a unique branding experience [with] unprecedented uniformity in policy announcements, rhetoric, imagery and stylistic nuances” (Conley 2014: 128). In office, however, Obama failed to clearly brand his administration or policies (Cosgrove 2014: 115). He learned the hard truth that “governing differs from campaigning; brand management differs from brand creation” (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 145).

Britain Across the Atlantic, adoption of political marketing was slower and “met with much criticism” (Reid 1988: 36). British parties and candidates employed qualitative research from the 1970s (Burkitt 2002: 3). From 1975, under Margaret Thatcher, the Conservatives become “broadly market-oriented” (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 705). The Conservatives used market intelligence to shape “policy, leadership style, organization, communication and the [successful 1979] campaign” (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 705). Thatcher’s successor, John Major, tried but failed to develop a brand that differentiated him from Thatcher (Needham 2006: 183). The Labour Party, meantime, remained product-oriented and out of office (Lees-Marshment 2001b: 1078). At the 1997 general election, however, the party was re-branded as New Labour under new leader, Tony Blair (Lees- Marshment 2011: 67). Prime Minister Blair was himself rebranded to reconnect with disaffected voters ahead of the 2005 general election (Scammell 2007: 181). This strategy also helped revitalise the party brand which had been “contaminated” by poor perceptions of the Blair Government (Scammell 2007: 188). Blair and New Labour swapped ideas and advisers with Clinton and his New Democrats, producing a “marked parallel in […] style and substance” (Ingram and Lees- Marshment 2002: 47). Blair’s successor, Gordon Brown, did not succeed in conveying “his own ‘brand’ of Labour politics” (Lees-Marshment 2011: 69). The Conservatives, meanwhile, had appointed a Head of Brand Communications (Adolphsen 2010: 29) and new leader, David Cameron, “sought to decontaminate the UK Conservative brand with visible clear change such as focussing on environmentalism and social responsibility” (Lees-Marshment 2011: 69). The 2010 general election was notable for “the perceived market success and euphoria” around Liberal- Democrat leader Nick Clegg (Baines and Harris 2011: 651). After the poll produced a hung 45 parliament, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats created a coalition Government in “a form of brand alliance” (Smith and Spotswood 2013: 183).

Australia In Australia, Liberal Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, was “the first to seriously exploit the electronic media and cultivate a public image through extensive PR work” from 1949 (Mills 1986: 88). Campaigning was transformed by the use of television from 1961 (Parkin and Warhurst 2000: 46) and again by Labor federal campaign in 1972 (Mills 1986: 95; Ward 2003: 586). Labor employed market research ahead of the poll (Mills 1986: 19) and built its campaign around the theme ‘It’s Time’, with “long-term advertising and disciplined centralisation” (Mills 1986: 95). It was “the first recognisably modern, professional, national election campaign” (Mills 2012b). By the early 1980s, Labor was losing support because middle class voters perceived its “brand image” (Hughes 2004: 4) as too closely linked to unions. The party responded with “a new brand strategy” (Hughes 2004: 5) which included an updated logo and policies “designed to appeal to the middle class that dominated the marginal seats” (Hughes 2004: 5). From 1996, Liberal Prime Minister, John Howard, “elevated his very ordinariness into a political brand” (Grattan 2003) and became one of Australia’s “most enduring political brands” (Bonsall and Harrison 2006: 87). Howard was toppled in 2007 by the Labor campaign which “demonstrated how a strong portfolio of marketing techniques aided the ability of the party to reach the voting public, meet their needs, and deliver a positive election outcome” (Dann and Hughes 2008: 1). The ‘Kevin07’ campaign, Hughes (2011) claims, “confirmed that brand management was now more important that party ideology”. Labor and Gillard did not capitalise on the lessons of ‘Kevin07’ and “Brand Julia” (Hughes 2011) was quickly seen as compromised and unfocussed. The Labor and Liberal parties now routinely use their leaders as personal brands, “as a central political product, and as part of a co-branding technique” (Hughes and Dann 2010: 86). Not only leaders are branded; so, too, are “celebrity candidates” (Dann and Hughes 2008: 3). The Australian Greens, meantime, have “built their entire party around their brand name, much the same way as a commercial organisation would” (Hughes 2004: 1) and “position themselves on their ideology” (Dann and Hughes 2008: 2). The Labor and Liberal parties have swapped campaign staff and ideas with British and American counterparts since the 1960s (Mills 1986: 1-2, 7; Ward 2003: 586) while the Greens have learnt from their European colleagues (Oquist 2013). In both developed and emerging democracies (White and de Chernatony 2002: 46), there is an increasingly common, if imperfect, use of political marketing and branding. Indeed, the application of commercial principles and techniques has “transformed the nature of modern politics” (Cwalina et al 2012: 254).

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CHAPTER THREE

ASSEMBLING AND APPLYING THE TOOLS

INTRODUCTION The preceding discussion of theory and practice provides the foundation for developing new tools to understand and evaluate political branding practice in Australia. This chapter is organised into three parts. The first discusses the importance of parties in political branding, to explain why the tools focus on parties. The second part presents the new tools. A theoretical framework, consisting of a generic conceptualisation of the brand oriented party and a model of political branding specific to Australia, is offered. This framework is the basis for a generic checklist for evaluating political branding practice in democratic systems. The final part discusses how these tools will be married to data to produce case studies of Labor’s branding efforts in the 2007 and 2010 federal election campaigns.

THE CENTRAL ROLE OF PARTIES Parties have a central role in political branding. Parties carry ideologies (Panebianco 1988: 268) and create organisations to run campaigns (Farrell 2006: 122). Both ideology and organisation influence if, and how fully, a party undertakes branding as an electoral strategy. Parties also form governments (Keman 2006: 160) and, further, are considered critical to democracies (Crotty 2006b: 26). These roles come with normative expectations which should further influence how a party approaches branding. In addition, there is a complex relationship between party and leader which affects how parties undertake branding.

As discussed above, social cleavages began to erode and partisan loyalties began to weaken from the mid-20th century (Katz and Mair 1995: 13). In response, party ideologies became more flexible and their organisations became more top-down and professional, enabling and encouraging new electoral strategies. In Europe, the “erosion of voter loyalty and decline in party organisational strength has led to the professionalisation of political parties, and consequently to [...] political marketing” (Plasser et al 1999 cited in Butler et al 2007: 96). The same is true for Australia (Hughes and Dann 2010: 82-95). As parties become less ideologically driven, they become more voter-driven or market oriented (Reeves et al 2006: 424). However, market oriented parties, or at least some parts of them, may not wholly disregard ideology nor the traditional structures and 47 processes of their organisations. They may not be able to, because a party’s ideology and history “imposes rigidities” (Henneberg and Eghbalian 2002: 79), or they may not wish not to, because ideology and history still retain some positives. The Australian Labor Party, it is argued, “remains divided between its desire to become more market-driven and the desire to remain faithful to the original ideologies” (Hughes and Dann 2010: 88). Sometimes parties “seemingly ignore the needs of the consumer [...] and adopt a more ideologically-driven model” (Reeves et al 2206: 424). It is worth noting that marketing has been used by “the most ideologically-committed parties, the New Right in the USA and Thatcher’s Conservatives in Britain” (Scammell 1999: 730). More pragmatically, ideologies “provide a conceptual map” for leaders, activists and voters (Vassallo and Wilcox 2006: 414) and “consistent platforms [...] convince voters of [...] reliability” (Downs 1957, Budge 2003, cited in Vassallo and Wilcox 2006: 414). History also shapes contemporary party organisation. Labor operates as an electoral-professional organisation (Ward 1991: 169-170) but retains a mass structure (Parkin and Warhurst 2000: 28) in keeping with its history as the representative of the working class (Parkin and Warhurst 2000: 25). Some parties may continue to give members some say in decision-making (Mair 1994: 15) or grant new rights to some say in the parliamentary leadership (Shorten 2014), either to genuinely empower members or to “maintain at least the image of a mass party” (Mair 1994: 15). Others may see members as valuable “legitimisers” (Mair 1994: 15) of the pursuit of power, as “warm bodies which can occupy official positions” (Mair 1994: 14) or as fee generators (Mair 1994: 14). In short, ideology and organisation still influence a party’s motivation and ability to undertake branding as an electoral strategy.

A party’s “normative roles or functions” (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 693) should also influence its approach to branding. Democracy is said to be both “unthinkable” (Schattschneider 1942: 1) and “unworkable” (Aldrich 2011: 3) without parties. They are “critical to any system intending to represent and institutionalize the rule of the mass” (Crotty 2006b: 26). These normative expectations should inform changes in party behaviour, and the use of branding does change the behaviour of parties (Scammell 2007: 189). Parties “alter aspects of their behaviour including policy, membership, leadership and organisational structure to suit the nature and demands of their market” (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 695). Britain’s New Labour, for example, “emerged out of a sophisticated brand strategy” (Scammell 2007: 185) which involved “changing the party’s constitution and founding principles” (White and de Chernatony 2002: 48). The use of branding also changes the relationships between parties and voters (Scammell 1999: 739). Branding “is both a cause and effect of the shift toward a thoroughly consumerised paradigm of political communication” (Scammell 2007: 189). It continues “the process of the remodelling of the government-citizen relationship along consumer lines” (Scammell 2007: 189). Thus, branding 48 should be undertaken carefully. Not only should political marketing “be imbued with a normative aim” (Henneberg et al 2009: 29), so, too, should political branding. Overall, the ideological weakening and organisational change that accompany a party’s shift towards electoral professionalism assist it in achieving market orientation. However, a party’s ongoing commitment to some measure of traditional ideology and organisation, as well as society’s normative expectations of office-holders, work against a wholly market-driven approach.

The relationship between party and leader also affects the choices and success of political branding efforts. As noted above, voters see the party and the leader as distinct but connected (Davies and Mian 2010: 332; Hughes and Dann 2011: 1; Phipps et al 2010: 496), and the leader’s image seems to have more effect on the party’s image than vice versa (Cwalina et al 2011: 75; Davies and Mian 2010: 345; Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 21). Hughes and Dann (2011) offer a measure called “brand weight” to compare the relative influence of party and personal brands. They argue the influence is bi-directional and also affected by voters’ views about the congruence of the two brands (Hughes and Dann 2011: 1). Speed et al (2013: 18) argue the leader “requires authenticity as an advocate of the party policy platform” or risks being seen as “insincere, manipulative and artificial, all of which severely weaken the brand appeal”. Brand strategies can focus on the party, the politician or policies (Cosgrove 2014: 121). The Republicans in America, for example, have chosen to brand the party over recent decades while the Democrats opted to brand the leader, most notably in the case of Barack Obama (Cosgrove 2014: 112-114). In addition, both parties have sought to brand policies including the “War on Terror” under Republican George W. Bush (Cosgrove 2014: 114) and Obama’s economic stimulus measures (Cosgrove 2014: 116). There are benefits and costs with each approach. The party brand, as the enduring offering, has “inherent strength because it can produce customer signals that are simple, credible, salient and continuous over long periods of time” (Tomz and Sniderman 2005, cited in Smith and French 2011: 719). Focussing on the party brand delivers “consistency in messaging and efficiency in launching a new campaign” (Cosgrove 2014: 111). When a party brand strategy fails, however, the party leader and all other representatives are “tied at some level with its brand failure” (Cosgrove 2014: 114). Thus, the Republican Party was affected by the unpopularity of President George W. Bush following “a massive economic downturn, two wars and a series of scandals” (Cosgrove 2014: 114). Meantime, the leader “will often have the strongest and clearest associative meaning as his/her image/personality is more easily identifiable” (Schneider 2004, cited in French and Smith 2010: 472). Focussing on leader or policy branding means “a unique message can be crafted” (Cosgrove 2014: 111), and co-branding a new leader with an established party “can be effective for rapid repositioning of a political party” (Neale et al 2008: 5). Evidence suggests it is easier to brand new 49 candidates or policies than it is to re-position (Cosgrove 2014: 121-122), but building new brands requires a big investment of time and money and a personal brand is built around an imperfect human being (Hughes 2007: 1117). When a co-branding strategy fails, both brands are at risk (Neale et al 2008: 4). Thus, the spin and news management of the early years of the Blair Government in Britain “were not only insufficient to maintain political leadership; they ultimately “contaminated” the Labour brand” (Scammell 2007: 188). The damaged brand of one leader can also threaten the brand of their successor. Blair’s personal negatives were still associated with Labour when Gordon Brown became party leader in 2007, prompting some to suggest Brown and Labour should “distance themselves from Blair” (French and Smith 2010: 470). Smith and French (2009: 218) warn that in politics, as in other markets, “there is a shelf-life with most brands”. Personal brands may well be “short term solutions […] dependent on a planned succession of co- branded leaders who continually strengthen rather than damage the central band” (Neale et al 2008: 4). Parties must decide if “leader-based brands represent the best hope of electoral success in a media environment which personalises and simplifies politics, or whether they might be able to sustain a party brand which could be the basis for longer term repeat sales” (Needham 2006: 185).

NEW TOOLS Parties are central to political branding and therefore are at the heart of my framework for explaining and evaluating political branding from a practitioner’s perspective. This framework builds on the work of researchers from both the commercial and political disciplines: the market- oriented party model (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 697); the concept of political brand orientation (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 633-634); a process of strategic commercial branding (Keller 2008: 39), and; branding as the new form of permanent political campaign (Scammell 2007: 188).

A conceptualisation of the brand oriented party The first step is conceptualising how a party approaches the task of branding. I make the case for a brand oriented party, by building on a model of the market-oriented party (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 697) and a conceptualisation of political brand orientation (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 635).

Lees-Marshment’s model (Figure 3.1) has the concept of market orientation at its core. Lees- Marshment (2001a: 696) explains that the product-oriented party “argues for what it stands for and believes in”, the sales-orientated party “focuses on selling its argument to voters”, and the market- oriented party “designs its behaviour to provide voter satisfaction”. The market-oriented party “uses market intelligence to identify voter demands, then designs its product to suit them. It does not attempt to change what people think, but to deliver what they need and want” (Lees-Marshment

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2001a: 696). Lees-Marshment (2001a: 700) argues the model offers “a greater understanding of reality”.

Figure 3.1. The marketing process for product, sales and market-oriented parties. Source: Lees- Marshment 2001a: 697.

For my purposes, the model has two key strengths. First, it offers a framework to consider party behaviour throughout the electoral cycle, while accounting for “members, voters, leaders, policy, organisation and ideology” (Lees-Marshment 2006: 119). Second, while the model was developed to analyse British parties (Lees-Marshment 2001a: 692), it has since been applied to other countries (e.g. Fell and Cheng 2010; Gorbounova and Lees-Marshment 2009: 126-128; Kotzaivazoglou 2009: 52-53; Lees-Marshment 2007: 345, 2009a: 208; Lilleker and Lees-Marshment 2005), including Australia (Hughes and Dann 2010: 82-95). It has also been extended into a theoretical framework for market-oriented government (Lees-Marshment 2009a: 205) and a market-oriented parliament (Lees-Marshment 2003: 24). This valuable model is widely used in the field but does have its critics 51

(See Coleman 2007; Ormrod 2006; Savigny and Temple 2010). Lees-Marshment (2006: 120) has suggested the model could be developed to include branding, among other things. It is timely to do so. In the years since the model was developed, parties and politicians increasingly have undertaken branding and researchers increasingly have recognised the trend.

O’Cass and Voola (2011: 634) offer a means to extend the model via their concept of “political brand orientation”. Political brand orientation is “a proactive strategic choice that influences a party’s competitive edge and facilitates its long term survival” (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 635). It is “the degree to which the party values and its practices are oriented towards building brand capabilities” (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 635), and involves “generating and sustaining a shared sense of brand meaning across the party that provides superior value to voters and other stakeholders” (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 632). Political brand orientation is seen as one of three key capabilities, along with proactive and responsive political market orientation, in a resource-based view of the party (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 627).

I combine and adapt Lees-Marshment’s model (2001a: 697) and O’Cass and Voola’s conceptualisation of political brand orientation (2011: 635) to produce the concept of the brand oriented party. Such a party undertakes branding deliberately, with an understanding of political branding theory, and a comprehensive approach that encompasses long-term strategy and mid to short-term tactics. This party uses branding as its organising principle. It orients its core values, leadership, organisation, internal culture, external presentation and resources towards a permanent branding campaign throughout the electoral cycle. In doing so, the party actively seeks to create and sustain voter attachment and support, instead of expecting to be gifted an enduring loyalty. From this, it seeks to create a competitive advantage and achieve electoral success, however that is perceived.

The brand oriented party is, of course, a conceptual ideal. In reality, not every party that attempts branding will do all these things due to choice, organisational capacity, ongoing commitment to even a remnant ideology, or normative expectations. As discussed in Chapter Two, a party is not “a unitary actor” (Mair 1994: 4) but has three interactive parts. Sometimes a party’s central office may want to undertake branding while the leadership does not, or the party members may vigorously oppose a branding push from the top. At other times, the whole organisation may be willing but the right skills or sufficient funding may be lacking. It is worth noting here the extra resources that are available to a Government (Lees-Marshment 2009a: 210, 2009b: 199; van Onselen and Errington 2007: 90) and also the evidence that ongoing branding is more challenging in office than in 52

Opposition or as a new candidate (Lees-Marshment 2009a: 209-210; 2011: 168; Spiller and Bergner 2011: 143). For any of these reasons, a party may choose to use a few branding techniques but not an entire strategy. In addition, a party may be both market follower and market leader. A party may sometimes be driven by voter demand, and thus will be a market follower (Reeves et al 2006: 424). At other times it may be driven by an internally-cherished but otherwise-unpopular ideological position, a long-term view of electoral success that overrides short-term gain, or the normative obligations of office, and thus will be a market leader (Reeves et al 2006: 424-425). Market oriented parties move back and forth along a continuum of being market or ideologically driven (Henneberg and Eghbalian 2002: 80). So too, I argue, do brand oriented parties. A party may sit at different points along a branding continuum at different times in an electoral cycle. It may demonstrate a range of branding orientations from weak through moderate to strong. In sum, the concept of a brand oriented party is more descriptive than prescriptive. It recognises the branding efforts of political parties and individual politicians, but also makes room for the constraints of organisation, ideology and normative expectations.

A model of political branding in Australia Building on this conceptualisation, I develop a model of political branding in Australia. The model combines Keller’s strategic brand management framework (2008: 39), Scammell’s (2007: 188) argument that branding is the new permanent political campaign, and the specifics of Australia’s political system.

Keller’s (2008: 39) strategic brand management is based on his conceptualisation of customer-based brand equity. Keller (2008: 48) believes “the power of a brand lies in what resides in the minds of customers”. Good marketing assists in developing customer knowledge of a brand, and more particularly “strong, favourable and unique associations” (Keller 2008: 39). Keller’s (2008: 39) strategic brand management process, with four steps and 16 key concepts, is shown in Figure 3.2. The first step is identifying core brand values and positioning against competitors. The next step is choosing brand elements such as names and slogans (Keller 2008: 140) and planning and implementing integrated marketing programs (Keller 2008: 185). Next, the brand’s performance is regularly and comprehensively measured and interpreted (Keller 2008: 316) and, finally, the brand is reinforced or revitalised as necessary to grow and sustain equity (Keller 2008: 433). Keller (2008: 41) says that effective brand management “requires a long term-view of marketing decisions”.

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STEPS KEY CONCEPTS Mental maps 1. Identify and Establish Competitive frame of reference Brand Positioning and Values Points-of-parity and points-of-difference Core brand values Brand mantra

2. Plan and Implement Mixing and matching of brand elements Brand Marketing Programs Integrating brand marketing activities Leveraging of secondary associations

Brand Value Chain 3. Measure and Interpret Brand audits Brand Performance Brand tracking Brand equity management system

Brand-product matrix 4. Grow and Sustain Brand portfolios and hierarchies Brand Equity Brand expansion strategies Brand reinforcement and revitalization

Figure 3.2. Strategic Brand Management Process. Source: Keller 2008: 39.

Keller’s work is a good fit with politics, for a number of reasons. First, Keller (2008: 21; 2013: 45, 89) directly applies his strategic brand management process to politics. Second, some of his key concepts are already used in political branding research. For example, the concept of customer- based brand equity (Keller 2008: 48) is employed to help measure political brand equity (French and Smith 2010; Parker 2012; Smith and Spotswood 2013) and study personal political brands in Australia (Hughes 2007: 1114-5). Other concepts find echoes in political research. Keller’s (2008: 77) belief in the importance of emotion as well as rationality in branding, for example, is shared by political branding researchers (e.g. Burkitt 2002: 5; Scammell 2007: 188; Cwalina et al 2010: 351). Keller’s (2008: 194) focus on relationship marketing fits with calls to use relationship marketing in politics (e.g. Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2009: 20-21; Johansen 2012: xi). Further, Keller’s strategic brand management process resonates with accounts of contemporary political practice globally (Lees-Marshment 2009b; 2011) and in Australia (Gartrell 2012; Hawker 2012; Utting 2012). Given the above, and the need for strategic frameworks for political branding (O’Cass and Voola 2011: 628), I argue it is appropriate to employ Keller’s branding strategy for politics generally, and the Australian context specifically.

Keller’s conception of strategic, long-term, relationship-focussed branding is also a good fit with Scammell’s (2007: 188) view of the permanent branding campaign. Scammell builds on Needham’s (2005: 347) argument that the original model of the permanent campaign “is too blunt an instrument 54 to usefully describe or evaluate incumbent communications”. Branding, however, is “particularly helpful in understanding efforts to sustain relationships and maintain loyalty during the periods between elections” (Needham 2005: 347). Scammell (2007: 188) sees branding as new version of the permanent campaign. She (2007: 188) argues: The permanent campaign focuses on the instruments of media politics; the brand concept uncovers the underlying strategic concerns of efforts to maintain voter loyalty through communication designed to provide reassurance, uniqueness (clear differentiation from rivals), consistency of values, and emotional connection with voters’ values and visions of the good life.

The permanent branding campaign is, arguably, a feature of contemporary Australian politics. The two major parties have run continuous campaigns over the past two decades (Hughes and Dann 2010: 84; van Onselen and Errington 2007: 90; Ward 1991: 170), and are increasingly using branding (Hughes 2011; Hughes and Dann 2010: 86).

Next, the mechanics of the Australian political system must be taken into account because “the political system matters” (Stromback 2010: 19-21). Majoritarian systems lead to just a few significant parties, greater use of catch-all electoral approaches and greater use of marketing than proportional systems (Stromback 2010: 20). Australia has a federal political system that is “dominated by political parties” (Marsh 1995: 4); “there can be no argument about the ubiquity, pervasiveness and centrality of party in Australia” (Jaensch 1998 cited in Marsh 2005: 36). Australia’s system is “multiparty in form, but essentially two-partisan in function” (O’Cass 2002a: 1033). The two major parties, Labor and Liberal, “consistently win over 80% of the votes cast at elections” (O’Cass 2002a: 1033). These parties compete for control of the House of Representatives, the legislative house in which a party must win a majority of seats to form government. Members are elected by preferential voting for three year terms. Only occasionally does the governing party also gain control of the Senate, the house of review, where minor parties and Independents generally hold the balance of the power (Economou 2006: 501-502). Senators are elected via proportional voting for six year terms, with half-Senate elections generally held every three years in conjunction with the House of Representatives’ elections. Australia’s system of compulsory voting results in “a relatively stable voter marketplace of approximately 95% of the registered and eligible voting population” (Evans 2006 cited in Hughes and Dann 2010: 83). This means parties do not need to invest heavily in getting out the vote as happens in countries with voluntary voting (Hughes and Dann 2010: 83), and can focus on the campaign proper. It also means parties can “rely heavily upon centralized national campaigns” (Ward 2003: 593). Although voters

55 do not directly elect the Prime Minister, in recent years the major parties have run presidential-style campaigns (Hughes and Dann 2010: 86) focussed on branded party leaders (Hughes and Dann 2010: 86).

The model of political branding in Australia is depicted in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Two cycles are used to separate the electoral cycle from the political branding process. Figure 3.3 shows stages in the three-year federal electoral cycle and how a permanent campaign overlaps with governing. There are four stages. Stage 1 represents the first two years or so period after the formation of a new Government, when governing takes precedence over campaigning. Stage 2 represents the informal campaign when obvious electioneering starts to ratchet up. By recent convention, the informal campaign generally begins about 12 months out from the likely election date (Gartrell 2012; Milner 2012; van Onselen and Senior 2008: 10). Stage 3 encompasses the formal campaign period which, by law, may range from 33 to 68 days (AEC 2011). Stage 4 spans the period from polling day to the formation of the new Government and Opposition. The new Government may be known on election night, as it was in 2007 when Labor won a majority in the House of Representatives, or much later as happened in 2010. Governing is depicted as light grey in Stages 1 and 2. The permanent campaign is shown as black in Stages 1 and 2. A complete overlap of campaigning and governing is shown as dark grey in Stages 3 and 4. The width of the ring representing the permanent campaign is a broad indicator of the extent to which campaigning overlaps with governing. Early in a new term, the focus is more on policy delivery or development and less on campaigning. This balance progressively shifts in favour of campaigning as the next poll draws nearer, until there is a complete overlap and the daily work is all about campaigning. Therefore, in Stage 1, campaigning occupies a quarter of the circle. In Stage 2, campaigning occupies three-quarters of the circle. In Stages 3 and 4, the focus is solely on campaigning. Thus, campaigning is a continuous process but the focus shifts during the electoral cycle, “from the campaign marketplace to the governing marketplace” (Newman 1999c: 110) and back again. The shift from campaigning to governing, and from promising to delivering, is a critical phase in political brand management (Conley 2014: 131; Cosgrove 2014: 115). In addition, as Mills (2014: 199) suggests, the locus of power within a party also shifts somewhat during the electoral cycle; in this case, from the party in central office during the formal campaign and the election in Stages 3 and 4, to the party in public office during Stage 1, then progressively back to the central office throughout Stage 2. With it, goes control of the brand and the branding campaign.

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Stage 1 Government/ Opposition (Period up to informal campaign)

Stage 2 Stage 4 Informal election Election campaign (Polling day to (About 12 months new Government/ out from the poll Opposition) due date)

Stage 3 Formal election campaign (33 to 68 days)

Figure 3.3. Stages in the Australian federal electoral cycle. Governing is shown as light grey in Stages 1 and 2. The permanent campaign is shown as black in Stages 1 and 2. A complete overlap of campaigning and governing is shown as dark grey in Stages 3 and 4.

Figure 3.4 shows the steps in the political brand management process. The four steps match those in Keller’s strategic brand management process. They are: Step 1: ‘Identify and establish brand positioning and values’; Step 2: ‘Plan and Implement Brand Marketing Programs’; Step 3: ‘Measure and Interpret Brand Performance’, and; Step 4. ‘Grow and Sustain Brand Equity’.

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Step 1 Identify and establish brand positioning and values

Step 2 Step 4 Plan and Grow and implement sustain brand brand marketing equity programs

Step 3 Measure and interpret brand performance

Figure 3.4. Steps in the political brand management process. Modified from Keller 2008: 39.

Two cycles are used to also demonstrate dynamism, because there are multiple possible connections between the electoral cycle and a political branding strategy. I make three arguments here. First, branding activities don’t necessarily correspond to just one stage of the electoral cycle, and may be different for a Government and an Opposition at the same stage of the electoral cycle. For example, a new Government which has just won convincingly would be in a very different position than the Opposition that had been soundly beaten. This new Government would be at Stage 1 of the electoral cycle (Figure 3.3) and Step 2 of the brand management process (Figures 3.4). It may continue to work back and forth between Steps 2 and 3, as it settles into office. Step 4 is unlikely to be used at this stage but may be needed closer to the next poll. However, the picture would be quite different for the Opposition. Even though it is also at Stage 1 of the electoral cycle, it may be at Step 4 of the brand management process. This would particularly be the case if the party decided to revitalise by going back to basics or reinventing itself. The party would then need to work back and forth through Steps 1 to 3 of the brand management process. These examples lead to the second argument regarding the connections between the cycles. Branding activities are not necessarily linear and the model is not intended to be linear. For example, a Government or an Opposition may move back

58 and forth between Steps 2 and 3 of the branding process, as it undertakes marketing (Step 2), measures the results (Step 3), re-visits the marketing programs (Step 2) and measures again (Step 3). Finally, I argue that a party may also move back and forth between steps of the branding process as it moves back and forth on the branding continuum. For example, a Government may decide on an ideologically-motivated policy that is unpopular with all but traditional supporters. In doing so, it moves towards the ideological end of the continuum. The Government may be at Stage 1 of the electoral cycle and could be expected to be at Step 2 of the political branding process. In the wake of its ideologically-motivated policy, however, it may need to return to Step 1 of the brand management process to re-establish its competitive frame of reference, then return to Step 2 to develop appropriate marketing programs. There are some matches between the two cycles that are unlikely or ill-advised, for example, the use of brand reinforcement or revitalisation from Step 4, during a formal election campaign.

The model, naturally, has limitations. First, it is a heuristic, a simplified guide to understanding a complex process. The steps in the branding activities, for example, are not necessarily distinct. Second, the model does not account for the calling of an early election, which is the prerogative of the Government of the day, and which may significantly reduce the informal campaign period. Third, it is developed to study national elections in Australia which has a party-centred system dominated by two major parties and three-year terms. With re-working of the timeframes for the terms of government and the informal and formal campaign periods in Australia, the model could fit similar party-centred systems, such as Britain’s. It would require greater reworking to fit candidate- centred systems, such as America’s.

A Political Branding Checklist This theoretical framework provides the basis for an instrument to evaluate political branding practice. I develop a fit-for-purpose instrument as existing tools do not meet my needs. Keller offers the Brand Report Card (2008: 674) which poses broad questions to help managers rate their brands and their competitors’. My work, however, requires a fine-grain instrument that draws together, and steps out, the key strategies and tactics to be used in creating and managing a political brand, and identifying and evaluate branding practice.

I develop this instrument in a two-step process. First, I create a Commercial Branding Checklist (not shown) using Keller’s four-step process (Figure 3.2) and other information from his book (2008). As discussed, commercial tools need to be modified for use in politics to take account of the differences between the two. Thus, I modify the Commercial Branding Checklist to create a 59

Political Branding Checklist (Table 3.1). Viewing the columns from left to right, the four steps from Keller’s strategic brand management process become strategies, and most of the 16 key concepts become tactics. The tools column contains information drawn Keller’s book. Each tactic is unpacked to reveal the desired outcome followed by the actions necessary to achieve it. For example, Strategy 1 is ‘Identify and establish brand positioning and values’. Within Strategy 1, there are five tactics. The first is ‘Mental map’. The aim is for a party to understand the core associations linked to a brand in the minds of voters. The way to do this is to use free-association questions to elicit core brand associations from target voters, identify top five to ten associations and use the results to create a visual depiction or mental map, such as an associative network memory model.

Table 3.1: Political Branding Checklist. Viewing the columns of this Checklist from left to right, Keller’s four steps (Figure 3.2) become strategies, and most of the key concepts become tactics. The Tools column contains information drawn from Keller’s (2008) book. This information is structured to show the desired outcome followed by the actions necessary to achieve it.* STRATEGIES TACTICS TOOLS 1. Identify and 1a. Mental map Achieve this: Understanding of core associations linked to your brand in the minds of establish voters. brand By doing this: Use qualitative techniques to elicit core brand associations from target positioning market voters. Identify top five to ten associations and use the results to create a visual and values depiction or mental map, such as an associative network memory model. 1b. Achieve this: Internal understanding of what your brand represents and how it should be Competitive positioned regarding competitors, to create brand superiority in the minds of frame of voters/media. reference By doing this: Identify target markets and segments, using a segmentation bases model and criteria for target market and segment decision-making. Then identify which products or sets of products are competitors to your brand. Analyse the competition - including their resources, capabilities and likely intentions - and identify the possible opportunities and threats for your brand. 1c. Points of Achieve this: Advantage over competitors, with points of difference that create strong, difference favourable and unique associations for your brand. By doing this: Identify the attributes or benefits - in performance or imagery - that voters strongly associate with your brand, positively evaluate and believe they couldn’t find with a competitor. Ensure voters/ media believe that the points of difference are desirable and can be delivered by the party. Use qualitative and quantitative research to develop effective marketing strategies. 1d. Points of Achieve this: Alleviation of possible disadvantages against competitors. parity By doing this: Identify the shared or similar points between your brand and its competitor/s. Use qualitative and quantitative research to develop effective marketing strategies. 1e. Brand Achieve this: Three to five word expression that can be expanded into a brand values values and statement and which provides guidance for all brand marketing decisions. mantra By doing this: Using the mental map of core brand associations, choose a word or term to depict the brand’s function, then choose a descriptive modifier and an emotional modifier. Combine these to produce a three to five word mantra, with powerful collective meaning, that captures your brand’s heart and soul and its points of difference. 2. Plan and 2a. Mixing and Achieve this: Trademarkable elements that identify and differentiate your brand. Implement matching of By doing this: Choose elements - brand names, URLs, logos, symbols, spokespeople, Brand brand elements slogans, jingles, packaging and signage - using specific criteria and tactics for each Marketing element. Programs 2b. Integrating Achieve this: Strong, favourable, unique brand associations that produce the desired brand positioning for your brand. marketing By doing this: Develop relationship marketing programs for brand experiences that activities create stronger voter/media ties. Next, develop programs for the product and its price, its channels of distribution and communications. Ensure all programs are integrated. 60

STRATEGIES TACTICS TOOLS 2c. Leveraging Achieve this: Identify your brand with other entities to borrow the associations of those secondary entities and build your brand’s equity. associations By doing this: Choose other entities - the party, countries/ other geographic regions, channels of distribution, other brands, characters, spokespeople, sporting/ cultural events, or third party sources - and link them to your brand, using specific strategies for each entity. 3. Measure 3a. Brand Achieve this: Internal understanding of brand marketing expenditures and investments. and Interpret value chain By doing this: Trace the value creation process through its four stages - investment in a Brand marketing program targeting actual or potential voters, the voters’ mind-set about your Performance brand, the brand’s performance in the marketplace, and the media’s assessment of the brand’s value and performance. 3b. Brand Achieve this: Profile of voter knowledge of the brands and products, to assist with audit strategic positioning decisions. By doing this: A voter-focussed comprehensive assessment of your brand’s health, sources of brand equity and ways to improve and leverage brand equity. Audit may involve an inventory of all brands and services, and qualitative research to learn what voters think and feel about your brand. 3c. Brand Achieve this: Consistent baseline information about the brand for short-term tactical tracking decisions. By doing this: Regular tracking studies to collect information from voters on brand performance, typically through quantitative measures such as surveys. 3d. Brand Achieve this: Improved understanding and use of the brand equity concept within the equity party. management By doing this: Establish procedures - a brand equity management system, brand equity system charters and defined brand equity responsibilities - to get the most value from research. 4. Grow and 4a. Brand- Achieve this: Understanding of the breadth and depth of the party’s branding strategy, to Sustain Brand product matrix identify relationships between brands and products and determine appropriate Equity differentiation and segmentation. By doing this: Develop a matrix representing all the brands and products offered by the party. Use the matrix to identify brand breadth; that is, brand-product relationships (the rows of the matrix) and potential brand extensions. Next, use the matrix to identify brand depth; that is, product-brand relationships (the columns of the matrix) and the brand portfolio (all brands and brand lines offered in a particular category). 4b. Brand Achieve this: Effective use, and combination, of brand elements across all of the party’s hierarchy products, to promote brand awareness and image. By doing this: Use information from the brand-product matrix to create a hierarchy of brands - the party brand, individual brand and brand modifier. This will show the common and distinctive brand elements, and the potential relationships, across all the party’s products. Determine which brand elements, and which combinations of brand elements, can be applied to which products. 4c. Brand Achieve this: Introduction of a line extension that fits the party’s branding strategy. expansion By doing this: Use the rows of the brand-product matrix to judge how effectively a potential new product extension will leverage, and contribute to, existing brand equity. Create a line extension by applying the party brand name to a new product that targets a new market segment. 4d. Brand Achieve this: Reinforcement of brand equity that has eroded over time. reinforcement By doing this: Reinforce brand meaning through consistent marketing support, and adjust marketing tactics to identify new sources of brand equity. 4e.Brand Achieve this: Rebuilding of brand equity to restore lost brand status. revitalisation By doing this: Measure brand equity, or undertake a brand audit, to make bold decisions on future brand positioning along a continuum, from back to basics to reinvention. *Modified from Keller (2008). Thanks to Associate Professor Frank Alpert, from The University of Queensland, for his comments on an early version.

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There are several differences with Keller’s work. The ‘firm’ becomes the ‘party’. Generally, ‘consumers’ became ‘voters’, although in a couple of places (e.g. competitive frame of reference) the designation is ‘voters/media’. This recognises the important mediating role of the media. Keller shows both ‘mental map’ and ‘core brand associations’ as key concepts (Figure 3.2), and later explains that a mental map is created to assist in understanding core associations (Keller 2008: 121). In the Political Branding Checklist, therefore, understanding of core brand associations appears as the outcome of producing a mental map, in Strategy 1. In Strategy 4, brand portfolio is subsumed into the brand-product matrix. This is because the brand-product matrix is an important strategic tool (Keller 2008: 433), while a brand portfolio is simply one column of the matrix (Keller 2008: 434). There are also some differences in some of the tools. In Tactic 2a: Mixing and matching of brand elements, ‘characters’ is removed from the list of possible brand elements. This is because characters, symbols that “take on human or real-life characteristics” (Keller 2008: 157), are not used in politics. In this same tactic, ‘packages’, which denotes containers or wrappers (Keller 2008: 165), becomes ‘packaging’ which denotes a politician’s physical presentation and use of imagery. In Tactic 3a: Brand value chain, the ‘investment community’s assessment of the shareholder value and brand value’ becomes ‘the media’s assessment of the brand’s value and performance’. Again, this recognises the mediating role of the media. In Tactic 4b: Brand hierarchy, ‘the corporate or company brand’ becomes ‘the party brand’. Additionally, ‘brand modifier’, such as a model of a car (Keller 2008: 446) is changed to ‘brand modifier (such as a version)’. Versions of Kevin Rudd’s brand, for example, would be ‘Kevin07’ and ‘KevinPM’.

In sum, the conceptualisation of the brand oriented party seeks to explain what practitioners really do, taking account of a party’s ideology, organisation and normative role. The model of political branding in Australian federal politics offers a heuristic, which takes account of the realities of the electoral system as it intersects with the dual responsibilities of governing and electioneering in the permanent campaign. The Political Branding Checklist provides a step-by-step guide to identifying and evaluating political branding in Australia, or similar systems. Together, they provide a fresh lens through which to view contemporary practice.

MARRYING THE TOOLS WITH THE DATA Data was obtained from four sources: interviews with key practitioners in Labor’s 2007 and 2010 federal election campaigns; post-poll National Press Club speeches by Labor’s National Secretaries and Campaign Directors; selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 and 2010 campaigns, and; ABC television news stories from every day of each campaign. Selection of the sources was a two-step process. First, I selected what I believed would be suitable sources,

62 based on academic and popular literature and my experience as an observer of, and participant in, Australian political campaigns over two decades. I checked these selections with practitioners and subsequently decide to omit official campaign launches.

Interviews and speeches I chose elite interviews to gain “insights into events about which we know little: the activities that take place out of the public or media gaze” (Lilleker 2003: 208 cited in Lees-Marshment 2011: 4). While independence must be maintained, such interaction assists researchers to “understand the complexity of practice” (Lees-Marshment 2011: 4) and “encourages a closer feel for reality” (Lees- Marshment 2011: 4). Interviewing elites is important when researching political branding because, as Cosgrove (2007: 36-37) argues, “branded politics is fundamentally a politics driven by elites”. The elites “do the research that decides what the contents of the brand will be and decide to whom the branded political product is to be sold” (Cosgrove 2007: 36). It is certainly the case that elites, central campaign teams, run contemporary Labor campaigns (Hawker 2013: 112; Hughes 2011; Mills 2014: 190-191; Young 2004: 83-86). These teams typically include the party’s national secretary and assistant national secretary, the party’s leader and a couple of their senior staff, a couple of senior MPs, and external consultants specialising in polling, focus group research, advertising and political strategy (Hawker 2013: 112-114, 117-118; Jackman 2008: viii; Mills 2013b, 2014: 190, 192). The national secretary is also the campaign director and, generally, also “the chief strategist” (Mills 2013b). Interviewing elites is important when discussing political branding in Australia because they rarely speak publicly about their campaigning (Mills 1986: 3, 2013c, 2014: 191; Young 2002: 89) and the role of central office practitioners is under-researched (Mills 2014: 191).

Potential interview subjects were chosen because they were key members of Labor’s central campaign teams in 2007 and 2010, or had been in previous campaigns. The teams are small, and so there was a small pool of potential interviewees. Of the twelve potential interviewees who were approached, six agreed to be interviewed (Appendix 1). They were: Tim Gartrell, who was National Secretary and Campaign Director from 2003 to 2008; Nick Martin, who has been Director of Research from 2005, and Assistant National Secretary and Deputy Campaign Director since 2008; Mike Kaiser, who was Assistant National Secretary from 2003 to 2004; David Feeney, who was Deputy Campaign Director in 2007, undertook preference negotiations in 2010, and is currently a Federal MP; long-term pollster John Utting, and; long-term campaign strategists Bruce Hawker and Cameron Milner. Of these, five - Feeney, Hawker, Martin, Milner and Utting - worked on both the 2007 and 2010 campaigns. Kaiser did not work on these campaigns but has two decades’ 63 experience of campaigning for Labor at federal and state levels. He was chosen because he potentially could offer more objective views about these specific campaigns and campaigning generally. Interviews were conducted in two stages. In the first stage in 2012, six interviews were conducted face to face and one by telephone. All interviews were long-form, and semi-structured in that interviewees were asked to tell the stories of their experiences (Wengraf 2001: 5). The Political Branding Checklist was used to draw up nine common questions for all interviewees and discursive discussion was encouraged to provide more detail and to uncover practices or ideas that were not anticipated. In the second stage, in 2014, an additional three questions were put to six interviewees via email. Four responded via email, and one was interviewed by telephone. Interviewees agreed to be quoted with the caveat they could confirm quotes attributed to them.

Post-poll speeches to the National Press Club in Canberra by Labor’s National Secretaries and Campaign Directors - Tim Gartrell in 2007 and Karl Bitar in 2010 - were used to supplement the interviews. Such speeches are opportunities for “explaining what happened and why” (Brent 2010: 1), for the party to “weave” their own stories (Brent 2010: 1) and “fit up” opponents (Brent 2010: 1). The speeches provide details about the campaigns from the point of view of important players, one of whom I could not interview.

The interviews and speeches served two purposes. First, they were used to “gather descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee [...to interpret] the meaning of the described phenomena" (Kvale 1983: 174). This established how the campaigners viewed contemporary campaigning generally and political branding specifically, and how they claimed to use branding in these campaigns. Next, the interviews provided evidence to support the models developed in this work (Wengraf 2001: 8-15). This approach follows the argument that “the relationship between data and theory is a two-way interaction, with theories explaining (but also shaping) the data, and with data testing the explanatory power of theories” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 15). Naturally, practitioners “are only going to give their perspective, which is their opinion, their bias” (Lees-Marshment 2011: 4). It was important for the integrity of this work to compare practitioners’ claims with data that could be independently evaluated. I undertook this evaluation by using visual and verbal messages, embedded in Labor’s public communications.

Television news stories and commercials I chose two televisual channels of communication, news stories and commercials, for five reasons. Television retains a strong influence on Australian voters, it remains a key communication vehicle for parties, it carries verbal and visual messages, offers mediated and unmediated means of 64 communication, and can be evaluated by an outside observer. Again, the selection was a two-step process. I checked my initial selections with practitioners and subsequently dropped one, commercials on YouTube.

Contemporary voters often have little or no contact with political candidates and so use media as sources of political information (Young 2002: 81, 2011: 3). Television is how many voters now encounter and connect with candidates (Harris 2000: 12), and television is “unique in its combination of reach and impact” (Harrop 1990: 288). Among political researchers, there is “broad acceptance of the agenda-influencing power of the mass media in political terms” (Butler and Collins 1999: 68). Further, the mass media is said to be “central to a modern election campaign” (McAllister 2011: 88). The mass media sets the agenda (McCombs and Shaw 1972 cited in Brox and Shaw 2006: 148), not by telling voters what to think but what to think about (McCombs and Shaw 1972 cited in Brox and Shaw 2006: 149). In other words, the media will “highlight one issue over another” (McAllister 2011: 88). Further, the media can “prime” people to use certain evaluation criteria (Iyengar and Kinder 1987 cited in Brox and Shaw 2006: 149) and “frame” an issue (Iynegar 1991 cited in Brox and Shaw 2006: 149) in a way that will “create politically significant connections in voters’ minds” (Brox and Shaw 2006: 149). Framing occurs through “selective use of content, images and evaluations” (McAllister 2011: 89). Agenda-setting may not change a person’s vote decision but may build their awareness of issues, while framing “can subtly affect voters’ judgment of leaders and political competitions” (Denemark et al 2007: 90). Coverage of politics by one mass medium in particular - television - is seen as “influential” (Butler and Collins 1999: 67) and “a critical factor in election outcomes” (Denemark et al 2007: 89). Political advertising on television also is influential, and “significantly correlates with changes in candidate appraisal” (Ansaolabehere and Iyengar 1995, cited in Brox and Shaw 2006: 151). American research has found political advertisements have “cognitive, affective and behavioural effects on voters” (Kaid and Holtz-Bacha 1995: 209, cited in Young 2002: 89). Advertising seeks to, and can, “set the agenda for both the media and the voting public” (Young 2004: 143). For these reasons, television is a key communication channel in politics (Baines and Harris 2011: 647).

Despite the recent rise of Internet campaigning (McAllister 2011: 92) and the associated opportunities for narrowcasting specific messages to specific segments of voters (Ward 2003: 595- 596), both researchers and practitioners believe television remains important in influencing Australian voters. A “broad cross-section” (Denemark et al 2007: 90) of voters source most of their political information from free-to-air television news. At the 2010 federal campaign, 77% of voters sourced information from television, compared to 62% from newspapers, 48% from radio and 29% 65 from the Internet (Bean and McAllister 2012: 342). In addition, “Australians regard television as an especially accurate and reliable source of news” (Ward 1995: 71) apparently because “the camera ‘doesn’t lie’” (Young 2004: 38). At the past four federal elections, between a quarter and just under a half of voters made their vote decision at some point during the campaign (Bean and McAllister 2012: 343). This means “a critical portion of the electorate is potentially open to the influence of TV’s political news coverage, despite the fact that many pay only passing attention to news bulletins” (Denemark et al 2007: 90). The major party leaders have “a nightly opportunity to speak to voters in their lounge room” (Denemark et al 2007: 103-104) because Australian broadcast media employs “a ‘two-horse race’ style” of campaign coverage (Denemark et al 2007: 103-104).

In addition, around 90% of Australians “are exposed to televised political advertising” (Young 2002: 81). Limited empirical evidence and a good deal of anecdotal evidence suggest many Australians do not like political advertising (Young 2004: 144-145). One study has shown that voters rely much less on paid advertising than news stories for campaign information, and also that believability is influenced by several factors including voter emotion, and involvement and satisfaction with politics (O’Cass 2002b: 72). Nonetheless, “politicians and their advisers believe that political ads work” (Young 2004: 143) and advertising is “now central to the conduct, if not the results, of modern election campaigns” (Young 2002: 92). Labor campaigners (e.g. Gartrell 2012; Hawker 2012; Martin 2012) confirmed they believe television remains the main source of political news for many Australians and, therefore, the most effective way of communicating broad messages. Not only do campaigners want to “absolutely blitz” (Gartrell 2012) television news, they also want a connection between news and commercials. As Milner (2012) explained: “Your biggest spend every night is in your commercial TV ads, and it’s critical to have your message reinforced in a media sense”. Thus, television is the focus of Labor’s campaign communications (Gartrell 2012; Hawker 2012; Milner 2012; Utting 2012).

One of the attractions of television is that it can carry both visual and verbal messages, “different, interacting [...] spoken words and sounds and various visual images” (Ward 1995: 73-74). These carry meanings of their own, and also have other relationships (Ward 1995: 74). As Ward explains (1995: 74), an image of the Houses of Parliament means ‘Parliament House’ and may also signify ‘democracy’ or ‘politics’. This “opportunity to blend audio and visual elements together provides a powerful communicative tool that can carry messages and stir emotions at the same time” (Stockwell 2005: 139). Qualter has argued that “the marketing of politics means, of course, the reduction of politics to marketable images” (1985: 138 cited in Wring 2002: 180). Generation of “rich, symbolically inscribed imagery” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 22) is an important 66 way to reach the majority of voters who are “inadvertent consumers” (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 22) of political information. Labor campaigners (e.g. Hawker 2012; Milner 2012) underscored the importance both visual and verbal messages, and achieving congruity between them in broadcast mediums.

Television news, along with other mass media, is often referred to as “free” or “earned” (Mills 2012a: 146) because parties do not pay to have their events or announcements covered. There is a cost, however, in that parties relinquish some control to journalists and editors who mediate the parties’ offerings. The media is not “merely an agent for the transmission of the messages” (Temple 2010: 263) but also an interpreter (Temple 2010: 268). In addition, the media “can be “capricious [...] malicious and are nearly always partisan” (Savigny and Temple 2010: 1055). Australian elections “are highly mediated events” (Young 2011: 3), and “mediatised” (Mills 2012a: 146) in that politicians adapt their message for the medium. Labor practitioners argued the Australian media “constantly interpret the news” (Hawker 2012) and sometimes sections of the media actively campaign against the Labor Party, as News Corp is accused of doing in 2010 (Martin 2012) and 2013 (Hawker 2013: 135). On the other hand, parties have “complete control” (Mills 1986: 132) over unmediated “paid” media, or advertising (Mills 2012a: 146). Hawker (2012) enthused that “the great thing about television ads is that they are yours, you’re in control of them - every word, every image, every nuance”. The communication channel that is least controlled by practitioners - news - is most valued by voters (Wring 2002: 177). This presents a challenge for practitioners who must try to present their visual and verbal messages in ways that get through the media filters. I tested Labor’s ability to pursue its branding objectives in both mediated and unmediated contexts by studying its offerings in television news stories and television commercials. Because the news and commercials are carried on a broadcast medium that is publicly available, they can be collected and evaluated by an outside observer.

I chose ABC television news because it was the only source for low-cost, nightly news segments for the campaign periods of 14 October to 24 November 2007 and 17 July to 21 August 2010. I obtained most stories via the ABC website, and purchased two from the ABC. Individual stories were chosen because they were the sole or main items covering the federal campaign on a given night. In total, there were 44 stories from 42 days of campaigning in 2007, and 37 stories from 35 days of campaigning in 2010. The ABC, as a publicly-funded broadcaster, does not carry commercials, therefore, people watching political news stories on the ABC would not also be exposed to Labor’s political commercials, which are designed to reinforce the stories. I argue it is reasonable to use the ABC stories as proxies for commercial stories as there is much similarity 67 between ABC and commercial news stories (Denemark 2007 et al: 99-100). In addition, using ABC news stories was the only economically viable way of obtaining a complete data set.

I obtained Labor television commercials via YouTube where they had been uploaded by the party. I investigated trying to collect every commercial from each campaign but could not be certain of capturing them all. Even if I could, the results would have been skewed by two factors. The informal campaign period was much longer in 2007 than in 2010 - 12 months compared to 24 days - which means Labor was able to produce many more commercials for Rudd than Gillard. In addition, the formal campaign period in 2007 was a week longer than the 2010 campaign which means the total number of commercials is greater in 2007 than in 2010. Given these difficulties, I selected eleven commercials from each campaign, using three criteria. First, one positioning commercial was included from the informal campaign period. Second, there was a mix of positive and negative commercials. Third, I sought commercials used on the same day as Labor’s formal campaign launches to test integration across the channels.

Components of the Political Branding Checklist I chose components of the Political Branding Checklist that were considered important by the literature and practitioners, and which could be identified and assessed by an outside observer. Selection was a three-step process. I selected what I believed would be suitable strategies and tactics, identified all the components within these tactics, then confirmed these selections after interviewing practitioners and sampling the data from the commercials and stories.

I chose three strategies:  Strategy 1: Identity and establish brand positioning and values.  Strategy 2: Plan and implement brand marketing programs.  Strategy 4: Grow and sustain brand equity (Keller 2008: 39).

I chose seven tactics:  Tactic 1a: Mental map. This helps to establish the core associations held by voters about the party or leader (Keller 2008: 39).  Tactic 1b: Competitive frame of reference. This determines the target voter market or market segments, the competition for these voters, and the way the party or leader should be positioned against competitors (Keller 2008: 98)  Tactic 1c: Points of difference. These are the advantages a brand has over competitors (Keller 2008: 98). 68

 Tactic 1d: Points of parity. These help negate a competitor’s advantages (Keller 2008: 98).  Tactic 2a: Mixing and matching of brand elements. These include logos and slogans (Keller 2008: 140).  Tactic: 2b: Integrating marketing. This means creating common and complementary content and meaning across multiple channels of communication (Keller 2008: 267).  Tactic 4b: Brand hierarchy. This helps structure relationships between products from the same producer (Keller 2008: 434), such as the party and the leader.

Together, these tactics yielded eleven components: positioning, core associations, segmentation and analysis of the competition; points of difference and points of parity; architecture, hierarchy, logos and slogans, and; integrated marketing. Each of the data sources provided qualitative information which I used to discuss and evaluate Labor’s use of each of these components. The television commercials and news stories also yielded quantitative data by which I could evaluate segments, points of difference and parity, brand elements and integrated marketing. The components were also evaluated collectively, to test for integration. The specific uses made of each component are explained in the relevant chapters.

Visual and verbal messages I chose to use visual and verbal messages because brand information is encoded in both these ways (Keller 2008: 51). I chose specific visual and verbal messages because they could be connected to a component of the Checklist, were considered important by researchers and practitioners, and could be evaluated by an outside observer. The messages are the images and quotes that practitioners produce for consumption by the voter, and communicate via news stories and commercials. Once again, I finalised my selections after interviewing practitioners and sampling the data from the commercials and stories. During this process, I decided not to include the leader’s physical appearance because of the complex, subjective assessments involved.

Practitioners seek “certainty, precision and complete control” (Young 2004: 140) in their commercials. They pay attention to the count, placement and prominence of crafted images and words. They also plan and conduct their media conferences and public events as carefully as possible, given the sometimes unpredictable nature of the media and the public. Practitioners “design, promote and run” (Stockwell 2005: 122) media events and media conferences to produce “an arresting image and an interesting quote” (Ward 1995: 55 cited in Stockwell 2005: 122). Such images and words are what campaigns need to help prosecute their arguments and also what the media, especially television, need to report news (Stockwell 2005: 123). The messages studied in 69 this work include the location or backdrop for a media event or conference, the presence of people, logos and slogans. Each message can be connected to at least one component of the Checklist. For example, when Labor wanted to appeal to Queensland voters in 2007, it produced a commercial with identifiably Queensland scenes as the backdrop (ALP 2007a). From this, an observer can conclude that the party is targeting a particular segment of voters, those in Queensland, which can be connected to Checklist Tactic 1b which includes identification of target voter segments. The location or backdrop is one key way practitioners provide visuals. The location may be “a symbolic site where the candidate is not only pictured against the colour and movement of an appropriate setting but may also be filmed showing an interest in a problem, getting hands-on experience in the issue and meeting people” (Stockwell 2005: 126). Hawker (2012) argued that “in an election campaign your backdrop should be absolutely appropriate to what you’re saying and should really enhance the message that you’re trying to convey”. Props such as a gauge that tallies an opponents’ spending (Stockwell 2005: 126) or “a colourful display with a clear message” (Stockwell 2005: 126) can help tell the story. Hawker (2012) related how, at one media conference in the 2007 campaign, Rudd wielded a laptop which he described as “the toolbox of the 21st century” (ABC Television News 2007a), to provide visual backing for his verbal message.

The presence of other people, especially when there is “physical interaction” (Stockwell 2005: 123), is a powerful way to send a message. These people may be representatives of the target voter groups (Young 2004: 10, 215-218), important figures who help tell the life story of the candidate (Young 2004: 15), or people who positively contribute to a candidate’s image (Young 2004: 15). In the 2010 campaign, for example, Gillard met blue collar workers several times because she wanted to boost support from that voter group, while Abbott often appeared with his wife and daughters to counter perceptions he was unappealing to women (Hawker 2012). A common tactic in commercials is to portray someone representing a target voter segment complaining about one of the competing parties (Stockwell 2005: 141); another is to show “white-collar workers, affluence and prosperity [...] to appeal to middle class voters’ social and economic aspirations” (Young 2004: 218).

Logos are used by parties to “promote themselves” (Young 2004: 235), although usage has declined since 1983 when the campaign focus, especially within Labor, switched from the party to the leader (Young 2004: 236). Nonetheless, Labor campaigners still believe logos have a role, sometimes an important one as was the case in 2007 (Gartrell 2012; Martin 2012). Slogans also have played a role in campaigns, especially since Labor introduced ‘It’s Time’ for its successful 1975 election campaign (Young 2004: 9). Slogans help tell the campaign’s story, and contemporary Labor 70 campaigners (e.g. Gartrell 2012; Kaiser 2012; Martin 2012) see them as important. Martin (2012) explained that “you just try to get a very simple repetition of what is working in your messaging. Of course, locations and backdrops, other people, logos and slogans can also be referenced verbally, thereby reinforcing the visual message. In addition, any of these visual or verbal images can be reinforced via a super, on-screen text superimposed onto an image, as “a way of really emphasising” the message (Young 2004: 167). Practitioners want each message to be hard-working; to connect with as many different voter groups in as many ways as possible.

Data analysis I coded brand components, then analysed commercials and stories for matches to the codes. This involved watching each item multiple times and counting each visual and verbal message. I entered the data into a spreadsheet, from which I produced figures. Ideally, data entry should be independently checked but this was not economically feasible. Instead, I checked the data allocation and data entry for 20% of all commercials and stories from each campaign, or 1,000 of the 5,000 entries. There were ten errors, which is an acceptable rate of 1%.

In sum, my work employed a combination of complementary approaches. I used a theoretical framework and new tools, and generated new qualitative and quantitative data. My approach was managerialist, in that it sought to explain brand management, and instrumentalist, in that it used tools to assess brand management. The political consumer, nonetheless, remained in the picture as the focus of political brand orientation. In all, I argue, this approach offers a compelling, new way to consider contemporary political practice.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE PRACTITIONERS TALK BRANDING AND STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION As this work considered whether Labor undertook branding and whether it did so strategically, it was important to establish what the practitioners understand by branding and strategy. This chapter proceeds in two parts. The first considers what practitioners think about branding and why parties use it. The second considers what practitioners understand by strategy, and canvasses their views about strategy in Labor’s 2007 and 2010 federal election campaigns.

BRANDING As in other western democracies, branding has its advocates and its critics on both sides of the political divide in Australia but commercial ideas and techniques may be less welcome in the Labor Party than the Liberal Party. Young (2004: 99) explains it is harder “for a labour party which professed socialist ideals to be associated with the commercial world of advertising”, which is “strongly connected to the lucrative and often Liberal-leaning corporate world”. Labor increasingly has accepted the “strong link between politics and advertising and [...] the commercial model which underpins advertising” (Young 2004: 99), but misgivings linger. Some Labor practitioners - more often politicians than campaigners - still publicly disdain branding. Branding “has a bad name in political discourse” (Keane 2011), and politicians don’t like the suggestion “their calling is on a par with washing powder” (Keane 2012). Indeed, Queensland Labor leader, Annastacia Palaszczuk (2012), rejects descriptions of Labor as a brand, saying: “I think the term ‘brand’ is marketing jargon more appropriate to selling toothpaste, biscuits or some other consumer product”. Prime Minister Gillard (2012) told Labor’s National Conference in July 2012: “Sometimes, when reforming our great party is talked about, people say there is a problem with the Labor brand. But delegates, Labor isn’t a brand, it’s a cause”. Other Labor practitioners have accepted, and even embraced, the philosophy and practice of branding. Former federal leader, (AAP 2013b), for example, has urged his party to rediscover its brand. So too has former Federal MP, Lindsay Tanner (2012: 294), who has argued that “rebuilding the brand to reflect the identity of our constituency and the realities of modern Australia is an urgent necessity”.

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The practitioners talk branding This range of opinions was reflected by the Labor practitioners I interviewed. Their attitudes to the term ‘political branding’ ranged from wholehearted acceptance through ambivalence to rejection. All of them, however, spoke in terms that fit the definition of branding offered in Chapter Two. David Feeney (2012), a former Deputy National Campaign Director, described political branding this way: I think it’s essentially the passage of marketing brand theory into a political context. As you design a campaign, you have to work out what is the brand. The critical thing is whatever your brand is - whether it be a party, an issue, or a personality, whichever it is - it obviously needs to have certain attributes and qualities that are readily and instantly understood by the audience.

Veteran Labor strategist, Bruce Hawker (2012), said: There is such a thing as brand Labor [although some] people find it a bit offensive to talk about it in those sorts of terms. And that brand is actually pretty valuable but like all political parties it gets tarnished from time to time. In a sense, it’s like looking at a product because you are selling something to the electorate, you’re selling your values to the electorate, you’re selling your policies to the electorate. And if as a brand it ceases to be shiny and comes under successful attack, then you have to do something to improve it again.

Long-term Labor pollster, John Utting (2012), offered this view: Branding has got much more to do with the actual personalities of the leaders, how you pitch them, whether they’re contemporary, dynamic, in touch, stuff like that.

Former National Secretary and National Campaign Director, Tim Gartrell (2012), was more equivocal about the language of branding, saying: Branding is just reputation. I use the term branding because everyone uses it. In the past you would have just talked about reputation, reputation of the leader, reputation of the party. And so branding is a mix of reputation, imagery, what the person or party evokes when someone sees them or hears them. That’s how I really see it.

Assistant National Secretary and Deputy National Campaign Director, Nick Martin (2012), was the least enamoured, saying: I find brand a bit of a funny term. It’s an advertising term, not really applicable and it is problematic when you’re looking at people’s long term loyalty to a political cause, particularly something that’s movement based like Labor politics.

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Practitioners spoke of the party and leader as separate brands. Gartrell (2012), for instance, spoke of “the long-standing brand of the political party that you’re the campaign director for, and the substantial but less long-standing brand of the political leader”. Former Assistant National Secretary, Mike Kaiser (2012), was among those who noted the two brands are linked, saying: “I think they’re kind of inseparable - that’s not to say one gets to dictate the other - but you can get synergy or you can get disconnect”. Another experienced strategist, Cameron Milner (2012), said: I think Julia was a lot more faithful to the Labor brand because she’s come through a Labor family, come through the trade union movement and came to Parliament that way. Kevin was assiduously not of the party and gratuitously made the effort to tell the Australian electorate that they could trust him because he wasn’t a real Labor leader.

The party brand was seen as the one that must survive whatever the fortunes of the leader, as Hawker (2012) noted: The party brand has to endure, yeah, because at the end of the day the party’s bigger than any individual. And, really, it’s incumbent upon a leader who knows in their heart of hearts that they’re not going to win the next election to do the right thing and step aside.

Kaiser (2012) was equally adamant: Leaders come and go. As a former party official, I know you can have a lot of loyalty to a leader but you need people in the party who are able to take that hard-nosed, party preservationist attitude and be completely dispassionate about it. The party always comes first.

Utting (2012), Hawker (2012) and Milner (2012) believe the major parties consciously undertake branding in campaigns and in government. Milner (2012) said: Absolutely. Endless evidence of continuous market research by both sides, continuous positioning, key themes and lines documents, messages of the day. They might sometimes lose sight of the long-term vision in the day to day thick of it but it’s an ongoing exercise.

Both Feeney (2012) and Kaiser (2012) argued for practitioners to learn more about commercial marketing and branding. Feeney (2012) lamented that the term political branding “gets thrown around by people very often who know nothing about brand theory”. Kaiser (2012) suggested many practitioners focus only on the “one-day sale” of election day and Utting (2012) confirmed that many do deal in short-term marketing tactics rather than longer-term branding strategy. Kaiser (2012) said political practitioners could take a wider view of the marketing discipline:

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Among the things I don’t think political parties pay enough attention to is logo development and signage and the look and feel of things. Looking back at politics, I think there’s a lot of bullshit or kidding ourselves that we did. You get all of this with the benefit of a lot of hindsight and I’m not absenting myself from any of this. A common thing is: Polling says that Labor’s on the nose so let’s make our signs yellow not red. Could you imagine Woolworths doing that? Or Volkswagen suddenly deciding to go with a square instead of a circle with a W in it?

Kaiser (2012) identified “a huge skill gap” among political practitioners attempting branding: There are a lot of enthusiastic amateurs involved in politics and some of them have got a bit of a gift for it, but often it’s not really done with the rigour that commerce brings to these things. And as a result, I think you miss out on all those self-magnifying, leveraging benefits that branding can give you. You miss out on the one plus one equals three that branding gives you.

The practitioners talk motivation The turn to branding in Australian politics has followed some long-term and profound changes that are common throughout western democracies, as noted in Chapters Two and Three. A number of the practitioners nominated some or all of these changes when discussing why they, and their party, employed branding. Hawker (2012), for example, said: The ALP in Australia had more than half a million active members before the Second World War so you could use your party structure to get a message out across key electorates. Now we struggle to staff all the polling booths on election days. We used to make fun of the Liberals because they couldn’t do it, now it’s something that afflicts us. We live in a world where just 18 % of the electorate are unionised and most of those are in the public sector. So a lot of the traditional worldviews driven out of union affiliation and Labor Party membership, or Liberal Party membership on the other side, are starting to fall away. And quite often it’s a challenge, particularly at a state level, for voters to see a strong distinction between the two major parties because they are moving to the centre. There is a large section of the community now which is not rusted on to the Labor Party or the Liberal Party or the National Party.

Milner (2012) took up the story: I think the issue for both sides is that their core brand has become quite eroded. There is no longer that core political constituency. Arguably it’s a third, a third, a third. People identify with a party they want to support or a government they want to support, less than 30 % on both sides.

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Contemporary Labor, Milner (2012) said, has “got to respect the base but they’re not the ones who form government”. Instead, it is “a contest for the people who are fickle, change their mind, vote differently at different levels of government, the swinging middle that is getting bigger and bigger each election” (Milner 2012). Martin (2012) argued that “it’s no longer just outer suburban middle Australia that’s swinging, it’s actually swinging much more, in a much more volatile way, across all sorts of demographics, and all constituencies”. In recent elections at both state and federal levels, Labor has “maxed out the credit card by simply saying: Vote for us” (Martin 2012). Martin (2012) argued that “now we need to be talking in a much deeper way to those people about who we are, what we are and our long term plans”. This approach “has less to do with individual policy asks and gifts for one election campaign and more to do with competency, trust and values in government” (Martin 2012).

STRATEGY These understandings are fundamental to the way Labor views and woos the electorate; its strategies in campaigns and in government. Strategies are about “forming of objectives and implementing the tasks necessary to achieve those objectives with a pattern of consistency over time given the limitations of available resources” (Barber 2005: 212 cited in Lees-Marshment 2009b: 40).

The practitioners talk strategy The practitioners discussed the importance of strategies for both campaigns and government. Feeney (2012) nominated “a strategic plan” as the second most important component of a campaign, after resources. “You have to have a story and you have to then have some message discipline around it and then you need to have the people and the policies” (Feeney 2012). Kaiser (2012) said a campaign strategy must consider “what voter groups can I ignore on both sides, who do I have to go after to build a winning coalition”. He (2012) went on: Brutal as it sounds, you do have to understand who you can count on and therefore not devote resources to, who you have no prospect of winning over and therefore do not devote resources to, and then there’s the group in the middle who you decide that you have to go after.

Deciding which voters to pursue “dictates things like policy offerings within the constraints of what a party believes, individual offerings, where you spend your advertising dollars, the leader’s

76 schedule, where you send your ministry” (Kaiser 2012). Martin (2012) employed military terms to explain the mechanics of a campaign plan: If you want to put it into simple terms, it’s easy to describe it as air war and ground war. That distinction’s becoming less obvious, more complex. Essentially campaigns are structured around what we do on the ground in key target seats, in marginal seats. And then there’s what we call the air war which involves our research program, our advertising, our meta message, what we’re projecting to people through broadcast mediums.

Campaigners must decide whether to promote the party or the leader, as Feeney (2012) explained: In 1999, in a State election context, we had an Opposition Leader, Steve Bracks, who was not spectacularly well-known. So the brand was Labor and “Labor cares”. It was a very traditional Labor campaign. In another campaign context, your brand might be your leader rather than the party.

Milner (2012) made the case for the leader: To be contestable you’ve got to lead with something which people find tangible which happens to be the person rather than the party. It shouldn’t be but it is far more about what’s perceived as the individual’s values that they bring to the leadership than the party’s values.

Utting (2012) agreed, saying Australian elections are “de facto presidential campaigns”. He (2012) went further: About three-quarters of the electorate has got some basic party position or identification. So the role of the leader is often to deal with that other quarter to 30 % who are really relating on a personal rather than an ideological level.

Such a strategy has profound implications for parties, as Milner (2012) acknowledged: That’s the real dilemma for modern political parties, that as your voter base dissipates to be a third of those who have a say at every ballot box, as the electorate moves to judge quickly and not give much leeway, the life cycle of leaders becomes much shorter while popularity remains so central to a campaign.

Several of the practitioners, unprompted, spoke of strategy in branding terms. Feeney (2012), for example, said: “You can’t launch yourself into a campaign until you are absolutely razor clear on [...] what is your brand, what are your brand attributes, what is your offering”. Milner (2012) discussed the differences between a branding strategy from Opposition and from Government: In Opposition, you’ve got to overcome this huge inertia to get people to look at your brand in the first place. So you’ve got to be different enough to provide a point of interest but not 77

so different as to represent a risk. But unless you’ve already established yourself and effectively set out some markers and principles you can’t do that in one month of formal campaigning. I think government of itself is almost its own brand. You’ve got a whole series of expectations come to bear. In a campaign you want to be seen to be sufficiently different enough to get people to change their mind, in government you want to actually be for everyone. So that’s a broadening exercise rather than breaking the cookie down the 45/55 split to get yourself a bit of traction.

Like Milner, Kaiser (2012) saw branding strategy as a long-term project: Brand building in a political context occurs over a long period of time, and, in particular, is influenced by how a Government or an Opposition behaves. Then the campaign is about putting the cherry on top. If, in the campaign, you’re trying to communicate themes or messages that are inconsistent with the way the party’s behaved in office or in Opposition, then you’re pushing shit uphill, you’re facing an uphill, unachievable task of trying to turn around people’s preconceptions. But if you can find ways in the campaign of usefully reinforcing what people already think about the brand or the party and then do that consistently, you stand some chance of successfully communicating.

On this point, Utting (2012) noted an important difference between Labor and the Liberals: The conservatives don’t have to do much on their branding except maintain it and that’s been stable now for decades, almost a century. Whereas a lot of our core brand values, about being for the disadvantaged and the less well-off, are quite intact but some of our more contemporary stuff we now have to share with the Greens, that so-called social progressivism whatever that means. And there’s a bit of brand tension between the Greens and Labor on that stuff.

Practitioners also canvassed the importance of developing brand attributes and values. Feeney (2012) said that in 2007 “the brand was Kevin Rudd and he was invested by the campaign with attributes which included freshness and change, but with a reassuring level of continuity with some of Howard’s attributes”. The development of ‘Kevin07’ “had a long lead time in terms of thinking, and we’re obviously working with various advertising characters who had plenty of time to absorb the brief, and develop and then research and test a solution” (Feeney 2012). Kaiser (2012), meantime, spoke of how brand values can be evolved. “I don’t think they’re ever completely unchanging. In the concept of brand development, I think you can evolve a party’s imagery or a party’s brand. Labor used to be the party of White Australia, it’s not anymore thankfully” (Kaiser 2012).

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Gartrell (2014) said a professional and competent campaign displays “goal and role clarity around an agreed and mutually developed strategy”. Utting (2014) said: “Generally, strategy is discussed well before the campaign. That’s very clear a long way out and the campaign is much more about the tactics”. The practitioners pointed to a division of responsibilities between the party organisation and the party leadership in developing and delivering strategy. Generally, leaders will be involved in developing the broad campaign strategy (Gartrell 2014; Hawker 2014) and also “operational factors - doing media, campaigning, governing” (Utting 2014). As well as the broad strategy, the party organisation will be involved in the details of the campaign (Gartrell 2014).

The practitioners talk strategy in 2007 and 2010 The practitioners were universally positive about the development and delivery of campaign strategy for the 2007 election; less so about the effort for the 2010 election. A number of them, unprompted, discussed the campaign strategies in branding terms. Hawker (2014) said “both strategy and branding were very important” in the 2007 campaign. The campaign team worked together throughout 2007 crafting a brand strategy and narrative, and rolling out communications in coordinated stages. Gartrell (2014) said Rudd and his senior staff “were involved integrally in the development of the broader campaign strategy” while Martin (2012) described Rudd as “a key part of the broader machine and very well integrated into it”. Rudd “always had a strong sense of the image he wanted to portray” (Hawker 2014), and was “able to absorb the research and the advice of political operatives around him [...] and then to turn that into clearly communicable objectives, policies, plans” (Martin 2012).

Rudd and his staff were “far less involved in the detailed electoral strategy, such as advertising and marginal seat materials” (Gartrell 2014). This was due to time and travel constraints, but also role discipline. “I believe there was a high degree of confidence from the leader and their team in what we were responsible for (and vice versa)” (Gartrell 2014). That was just as well because “Rudd knew nothing of the ‘Kevin07’ brand until the day of its launch” (Gartrell 2014). “This was more by accident - time pressures and the chaos of that year before the 2007 election. He later told me that he was very glad he didn’t see it as he’d never have agreed to it” (Gartrell 2014). Gartrell (2014) indicated that Rudd understood the branding strategy at work. “Kevin Rudd knew what we were trying to do to modernise the Labor brand and had himself cultivated and exploited his differences as a leader from previous Labor leaders” (Gartrell 2014). Hawker (2012) said ‘Kevin07’ “became the brand” in the 2007 campaign. “We were able to present a new brand built around a personality. This was brand Labor as demonstrated by Kevin Rudd” (Hawker 2012). Gartrell (2012) said “the really good campaign is one where all elements come together, and I think [the 2007 campaign] did 79 that quite well”. “All of those things, the rebranding, the slogans, the strategic positioning, the new leader, Rudd’s personal brand, all fell into place. And that was partly good fortune but also partly by design” (Gartrell 2012).

The 2010 campaign was generally seen as less strategic. Feeney (2012) said Labor was not prepared for the campaign, describing it “one of the worst I’ve been involved in, in terms of its resources, design and its execution, and the environment as it became ever more hostile and unpredictable”. He (2012) elaborated: The election was called very swiftly, I think it’s clear with hindsight, too swiftly [after Gillard’s ascension]. And so it had the ironic effect of ambushing the ambusher because we found ourselves, in my view, to not be sufficiently ready financially or strategically, intellectually.

Kaiser (2012) said the switch meant Labor could not employ “the classic second-term campaign strategy” of seeking re-election to finish the work underway: When you go into the campaign changing leaders and effectively saying everything that’s happened before is no good and we need to start again, you lose all of the benefits of a campaign for a second term which is almost unlosable in Australian history.

Utting (2014) said “there was no strategy in place before the campaign [...] it was driven almost exclusively by tactical imperatives”. Campaigners had been working on advertisements for Rudd just a week before the leadership change; “an awful lot of Kevin ended up on the cutting room floor” (Milner 2012). “We were stuck running really a very defensive campaign [...] and trying to project the simple message of keep heading in the right direction” (Martin 2012). The focus was on Gillard “as the new broom, the new face of the government” (Utting 2014).

There are differing views about Gillard’s role in developing and delivering strategy in the 2010 campaign. Hawker (2014) said Gillard “was heavily involved in strategising” and “publicly took over the campaign from the Campaign Director and said voters would now see the ‘real Julia’”. Milner (2014) confirmed Gillard “made a number of calls such as the ‘real Julia’ moment with a small group of advisors from the travelling party” in response to the emerging demands of the campaign, but noted she was consultative and open to advice. Utting (2014) said Gillard and “relied more on the party secretary and a couple of close advisors” and was not really involved in strategy discussions. There was not enough time to cement a formal structure (Utting 2014) but the campaign had “a good travelling party, good staff at HQ” (Martin 2012). A couple of practitioners spoke of a brand strategy including Hawker (2014) who said “attempts to give Gillard a positive 80 brand were plagued by the manner in which she took the leadership”. Milner (2014) said Gillard, like Rudd, “understood what the campaign team were doing with their image and positioning”. Despite the challenges and the shortcomings, Martin (2012) argued that “it wasn’t a disastrous campaign. It was, given the context, relatively good”. Utting (2012) concurred: “When you look back, it’s a miracle that it turned out as well as it did” (2012).

Overall, five of the practitioners - Feeney, Hawker, Kaiser, Milner and Utting - spoke positively about the use of branding. Two - Gartrell and Martin - were more circumspect but spoke in terms that fit with my definition of political branding and also fit with Keller’s (2008) descriptions of strategic brand management. For example, Martin (2012) said: When you talk about branding, the projection of brand, it’s really about two things. It’s about Labor having a Labor story and a Labor message, and also having a really good vehicle to communicate those Labor values and Labor messages in a modern context. I’m thinking of leadership as the vehicle, a public product that is out there in the daily broadcast media that’s able to really put the Labor message and convince people to vote for the party.

Gillard has argued that Labor is a cause and not a brand; I argue the two are not mutually exclusive. A cause can be branded without diminishing its purpose, as the World Wildlife Fund has proven (Keller 2008: 28). In fact, I argue a cause is an ideal candidate to be branded because, like a brand, it is about long-term commitment, strongly-held core values, and emotional as well as functional pay-offs.

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CHAPTER SIX

POSITIONING THE BRAND: POINTS OF DIFFERENCE AND POINTS OF PARITY

INTRODUCTION Once a competitive frame of reference is established, brand managers can determine points of difference and points of parity. A point of difference provides a competitive advantage and a “reason “why” consumers should buy the brand” (Keller 2008: 98), while a point of parity neutralises an opponent’s advantage and provides ““no reason why not” for customers to choose the brand” (Keller 2008: 98). This chapter considers how strategically and how fully Labor employed points of difference and parity, as part of the assessment of its positioning in the 2007 and 2010 campaigns. The chapter proceeds in four parts. The first defines and discusses the importance of points of difference (Checklist Tactic 1c) and points of parity (Checklist Tactic 1d). The second considers if, and how, Labor employed these tactics in the 2007 campaign. The third considers if, and how, Labor employed them in the 2010 campaign. The final part makes conclusions about their use in each campaign. This chapter helps answer Research Question 3: Did Labor consciously undertake political branding in the 2007 and 2010 federal campaigns? If so, how strategically and how fully?

The interviews with Labor practitioners and National Press Club speeches by Labor’s National Campaign Directors were used to establish what practitioners understood by, and how they used, points of difference and parity. The Labor television commercials and ABC television news stories were studied for visual and verbal representations of these points. Points can be identified visually. For example, an image of a school represents education, while an image of a port or a business represents economic management. Points can also be represented verbally, for example, through references such as ‘health’ and ‘future’. The data was analysed in three ways: the percentage of commercials in which each point appears or is referenced; the average frequency of appearance or reference of each point across all commercials; and, the frequency of appearance/reference of each point in each commercial. Multiple points can appear in the same commercials and stories.

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POINTS OF DIFFERENCE AND POINTS OF PARITY Points of difference and parity help producers to connect with target consumer segments and build the desired brand associations in their minds. Points of difference are “attributes or benefits that consumers strongly associate with a brand, positively evaluate and believe that they could not find to the same extent with a competitive brand” (Keller 2008: 107). Points of differences can be “functional performance-related considerations, or abstract imagery-related considerations” (Keller 2008: 108). In contrast, points of parity negate a competitor’s advantages (Keller 2008: 39). Points of parity may be shared with other brands, and relate to either category or competition (Keller 2008: 109). Category points of parity “represent necessary - but not necessarily sufficient - conditions for brand choice” (Keller 2008: 109). For example, a bank must offer a minimum range of services to be considered by a consumer, but may not offer sufficient services to be chosen (Keller 2008: 109). Competitive points of parity are areas where a brand can “break even” (Keller 2008: 109) with a competitor. A brand need not be “literally equal to competitors [...] but consumers must feel it does sufficiently well so they do not consider it to be a negative or a problem” (Keller 2008: 110). Keller notes the possible negative correlations of points of difference or points of parity. For example, it is hard to position a brand as both high quality and inexpensive, although consumers may want both (Keller 2008: 115-116). Additionally, an attribute or benefit can have both negative and positive aspects, which provides opportunities for competitors seeking to achieve their own point of difference (Keller 2008: 115-116). Such challenges can be overcome by running different marketing campaigns on different brand attributes or benefits, by leveraging the positive equity of another entity such as a celebrity, or by persuading consumers the overall relationship is positive (Keller 2008:116).

Points of difference and points of parity in politics In politics, points of difference are often described as strengths and points of parity as weaknesses (e.g. Baines 1999: 414; Dann and Hughes 2008: 4; Lees-Marshment 2009b: 87, 2010: 6; Newman 2004: 658-659). They can apply to both party and leader (Kotler and Kotler 1999: 7). Political points of difference can focus on attributes or benefits (Cosgrove 2014: 109-109), which can be related to performance and have functional value, or can be related to image and carry emotional value. As in commerce, the aim is to develop differences that are strong, positive and unique (Smith and French 2009: 212). In 1992, Bill Clinton, “created an image of himself as an outsider who would bring about change in Washington” (Newman 2004: 659) to differentiate from President George Bush. Uniqueness alone will not do, as the British Conservatives discovered when voters rejected their Euro-sceptic position in 2001 and their immigration policy in 2005 (Smith and French 2009: 212). Developing points of difference may be more challenging in politics than in commerce. 116

First, the political offering, which includes politician, party and policies, is more complex. One study found divergences between “the relative strength, favourability and uniqueness of party, leader and policy” (French and Smith 2008 cited in Smith and French 2009: 213) within the Conservative and Labour brands. Second, valence politics has reduced the opportunities for significant differences on functional matters, which leaves “the ‘softer’ cultural, social and psychological functions of the brand as the main sources of brand differentiation” (Smith and French 2009: 213). Finally, voters are likely to demand more choice and more results from parties (Smith and French 2009: 219), as they try to rectify the dichotomy of being “confident consumers and insecure citizens” (Scammell 2007: 190) in the face of issues like globalisation, terrorism, environmental threats and community erosion (Smith and French 2009: 219; Scammell 2007: 190).

Competitive points of parity are commonly used in politics. These points often relate to perceived economic management, especially for major parties. “It’s the economy, stupid” was the mantra of Bill Clinton who sought equivalency with the Republicans on economic management (Smith and French 2009: 216). Similarly, Britain’s New Labour succeeded in creating a point of parity on economic management with the Conservatives in the 1997 campaign (Smith and French 2009: 216). Negative correlations are sometimes an issue, often because politicians want to deliver on voters’ contradictory desires (Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007: 20). Category points of parity, the minimum conditions for brand choice, may be especially relevant for small or new parties, which might not have sufficient expertise or policies to be taken seriously by voters. As Baines (1999: 413) has noted “a small regional party cannot lay claim to governing the whole country because this would not be credible”. Understanding points of difference and points of parity “allows the strategists to determine what the candidate or party can or cannot do” (Baines 1999: 413).

The practitioners also spoke strengths and weaknesses, rather than points of difference and points of parity. Strategist Bruce Hawker (2012) explained that parties “try to exploit the weaknesses of the other side but also neutralise their natural advantage”. All emphasised the importance of identifying differences with opponents, which pollster John Utting (2012) described as critical. “Most leaders share a lot in common, especially in a really close election. Most leaders are seen as intelligent, competent, knowledgeable. So what differentiates them becomes quite important” (Utting 2012). Former Assistant National Secretary, Mike Kaiser (2012), described his approach: You think of your own strengths in isolation, you look at their strengths in isolation, but it’s the bits of those strengths that are mirror opposites that you form a campaign around. What strengths do they have that you can jujitsu them with?

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The practitioners made clear that points of difference and parity can apply to both the leader and the party. Kaiser (2012) saw Rudd’s declaration that he was an economic conservative as an attempt to neutralise Howard’s strength in that area; the leader attempting a point of parity with his counterpart. Hawker (2012) said Labor’s promise to reverse Coalition cuts to health funding was a play to a traditional strength; the party attempting a point of difference with its opponent. Additionally, it was evident that practitioners actively worked to overcome potential negative correlations of points of difference or points of parity. For example, in 2007, Labor sought to persuade voters of the overall consistency and positive relationship between Rudd’s potentially- contradictory positions as both economic conservative and champion of fairness in industrial relations. In the commercial of 14 October, for example, Rudd (ALP 2007d) promised “a workplace that’s fair and balanced”. In other words, fair conditions for workers which would also allow businesses to turn a profit.

Points of difference and points of parity in the 2007 campaign In 2007, Labor practitioners had a clear view of the points of difference and points of parity between their party and leader, and the conservatives’ party and leader. National Secretary and Campaign Director Tim Gartrell (2012) said Labor deliberately crafted a high-level point of difference between Rudd and Howard, which boiled down to new versus old, the future versus the past. This is an imagery-related point. Labor used “values to stake out who owns the future” (Gartrell 2012) and sought to cast “Howard’s conservatism as a negative by aligning it with his backwards views” (Gartrell 2012). This point was made tangible, or functional, in Rudd’s policies on climate change, in particular. Gartrell (2012) said climate change became “a metaphor for Rudd - younger, modern leader, understands the science, gets the challenge, focussed on the future - against Howard - older leader, in denial, not wanting to accept it, not wanting to change, stuck in the past”. This issue “went very strongly to the contrast between the two leaders’ personal attributes and the associations people had in the electorate” (Gartrell 20120). Climate change was an imagery- related point that was deployed heavily throughout 2007, with Rudd calling it “the great moral challenge of our generation” (ALP 2007c). Labor developed another three points of difference. A critical imagery-related point was fairness in industrial relations. Labor’s historical association with fairness (Gartrell 2012) meant it was well positioned to capitalise on the union campaign against “unfair” Workchoices laws (Gartrell 2012). The idea of fairness was “a fundamental foundation in Australian society [...] particularly for blue collar, male workers” (Gartrell 2012). In addition, strategist Cameron Milner (2012) said “an awful lot of non-union people agreed with that sentiment so it was a very potent issue”. Gartrell (2012) said the anti-Workchoices campaign “played very heavily and very negatively on John Howard”. “That’s why we went in very hard when Howard 118 said working families have never been better off” (Gartrell 2012). Assistant National Secretary Nick Martin (2012) said the anti-Workchoices campaign “was both positive and negative in that we were talking about fairness, a traditional Labor strength, and jobs, as well as being an attack on [the conservatives]”. Workchoices, and thus fairness, became a very strong point of difference for Labor and for Rudd. Labor also campaigned on its “traditional strengths” (Kaiser 2012), the functional points of difference of education and health. On education, Rudd prepared the ground in the television commercial of 24 January by speaking of “an education revolution” (ALP 2007a). In the formal campaign, Rudd described a laptop as “the toolbox of the 21st century” (ABC 2007a) and at Labor’s official launch, he suggested that “Mr Howard seems to believe that providing our young people with computers is exotic” (ABC 2007b). On health, Rudd promised an end to “the blame game and the buck passing” (Martin 2012) between federal and state governments.

Meantime, Rudd’s “atypically conservative values” (Gartrell 2012) were deployed to create two points of parity with Howard. These were competitive points (Keller 2008: 109) designed to neutralise two advantages enjoyed by Howard. The higher-level point was the idea of “safe change” (Gartrell 2012). Gartrell (2012) explained: There were a lot of people who’d had a gutful of Howard but just didn’t want to take that last step and vote against him. And so using Rudd’s values as a reassurance, this change will be safe, change but not a lot of change, was very important.

Milner (2012) elaborated: The Sunday morning press conference outside the church was all about Kevin talking about his values and letting the electorate know he wasn’t just another union backed factional leader, which arguably had undermined the credibility of previous Labor leaders like [Simon] Crean and [Mark] Latham.

As a result, middle class voters were “comfortable that Kevin’s agenda wasn’t too far different from John Howard’s” (Milner 2012). Utting (2012) noted: “In a funny sort of way, ‘07 was much more about reflecting Ruddy as a sort of refurbished John Howard than as somebody completely new and different. It involved co-opting the Liberal brand and its values”. Feeney (2012) described it as “change with continuity, freshness, John Howard-lite almost”. Labor campaigners never publicly used the phrase “Howard-lite” because “the Howard-hating end of the spectrum, and that was a sizable bunch of the electorate, would have got pretty pissed off. And Howard-lite’s very different to safe change” (Gartrell 2012). The second point of parity with Howard was on economic management, which he had owned for a decade (Milner 2012). Labor campaigners understood they

119 had to at least break even with Howard on economic credibility, before voters would listen to anything else they had to say. In other words, it was a necessary condition for brand choice. Rudd took this head-on in the television commercial of 26 July, saying: “A number of people have described me as an economic conservative. When it comes to public finance, it’s a badge I wear with pride” (ALP 2007b). This point was underscored at the campaign launch when Rudd deliberately under-shot Howard’s election promises; “Labor was promising less than the conservatives, when did you hear about that?” (Hawker 2012). Such arguments from a Labor leader could have been seen as inconsistent, or negatively correlated, by party supporters and businesspeople alike. Rudd avoided this pitfall by coupling his message on economic discipline with an appeal to the traditional Labor value of “a fair go” in industrial relations. In sum, the key points of difference were: new and future-focussed (Rudd), fair (Rudd and Labor); climate change (Rudd); education (Rudd and Labor), and; health (Rudd and Labor). The key points of parity were: safe change (Rudd), and; competent economic management (Rudd).

I test how well these plans were put into effect by assessing the visual and verbal representation of points of difference and parity in the sample of Labor television commercials and ABC television news stories from each night of the formal campaign.

Points of difference in commercials First, the television commercials were analysed for evidence that Labor did represent the five points of difference identified above. The points were coded as: ‘new/ future’; ‘fair’; ‘climate’; ‘education’, and; ‘health’. Visual and verbal identification is fairly straightforward for most points but the visual representations of ‘new/future’, ‘fair’ and ‘climate’ require some explanation. ‘New/future’ was visually depicted, for example, in the commercial of 14 October (Figure 6.1a), and was verbally referenced via “Australia needs fresh ideas” and “a positive plan for our country’s future” in the commercial of 15 October. ‘Fair’ is visually depicted in the commercial of 14 November (Figure 6.1b), and was verbally referenced as “a workplace that’s fair and balanced” in the commercial of 14 October. ‘Climate’ was visually depicted (Figure 6.1c) and was verbally referenced as “global warming” and “climate change” in the commercial of 22 October.

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Figure 6.1. Examples of visual depiction of points of difference in Labor television commercials from 2007. (a) ‘new/future’ from commercial of October 14; (b) ‘fair’ from commercial of 14 November, and; (c) ‘climate’ from commercial of 22 October.

Analysis of visual representations shows Labor did represent the nominated points of difference. ‘New/future’ and ‘fair’ appear most frequently at 46% each (Figure 6.2a). ‘Climate’ and ‘education’ are each seen 36% of the time, and ‘health’ just over 18%. A different pattern emerges when average frequency of appearances per commercial is considered (Figure 6.2b). ‘New/future’ is by far the most common, at an average 6.6 times per story and ‘climate’ is next at 3.1. Points of difference are shown in six commercials (Figure 6.2c). ‘New/future’ appears in five, and ‘fair’, ‘climate’ and ‘education’ feature in four apiece. Overall, Labor did well in presenting ‘new/future’, the high level point of difference sought by Rudd, and ‘fair’, an important point for both leader and party. Also well represented are ‘climate’ and ‘education’. These were two signature policies designed to differentiate Rudd from Howard and make tangible his claim to be new and future- focussed. There is evidence that Labor identifies and represents the nominated points from the start of 2007. For example, the first commercial of the year, from 24 January, introduces the two high- level points of ‘new/future’ and ‘fair’, along with ‘education’. The commercials of 26 June and 14 October, the day the election was called, present all five points. There is evidence Labor uses different tactics at different stages in the formal campaign. On 22 October, for example, Labor uses just two points of difference, ‘new/future’ and ‘climate’, thereby isolating the high-level point and connecting it to the point that makes it tangible. Finally, there is evidence that Labor coordinates the appearance of points of difference in commercials and public events. One of Labor’s strongest commercials, which showcases “The difference between John Howard and Kevin Rudd” (ALP 2007e), ran the same day as the party’s official campaign launch, which highlighted many of the same differences between the two.

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(a) (b) (c) 50.0 7.0 60 Point of difference 50 6.0 New/Future

40.0 40 ) Fair

5.0 shots)

30 of

Climate change 30.0 4.0 20 Education frequency commercial) Frequency

3.0 10 Health commercials

20.0 (number per

Frequency of

0 2.0 (%

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0.0 0.0 Point of Point of Date of commercial difference difference Figure 6.2. Visual representation of points of difference in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each point across all commercials, and (c) frequency of each point in each commercial.

Analysis of verbal representations shows Labor deliberately seeking to establish its points of difference. ‘New/future’ is represented most frequently at 72% of the time, followed by ‘fair’ at 64%, ‘climate’ and ‘education’ at 37% each, and ‘health’ at 18% (Figure 6.3a). When average frequency per commercial is considered, ‘education’ is most common at 2.2 times, closely followed by ‘new/future’ at 1.9 times (Figure 6.3b). Points of difference are represented in nine commercials. Of these, ‘new/future’ is mentioned in eight, and is the sole point in one (Figure 6.3c). ‘Fair’ is mentioned in seven, including one in which it was the sole point, and ‘climate’ and ‘education’ are mentioned in four each. These results underscore the importance of ‘new/future’, ‘fair’ and ‘education’, in particular. In each of the six commercials that carry both visual and verbal points, there are very good matches between the two. (a) (b) (c) 80.0 2.5 25 Point of difference

70.0 20 2.0 New/Future ) shots) 60.0 Fair

of 15

50.0 Climate 1.5 10

Frequency Education frequency commercial)

40.0

(number commercials 5 Health

per 1.0

Frequency of 30.0

(% 0 20.0 Average (shots 0.5 10.0

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of Date of commercial difference difference Figure 6.3. Verbal representation of points of difference in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point is referenced (b) average frequency of reference to each point across all commercials, and (c) frequency of reference to each point in each commercial. 122

Points of parity in commercials The television commercials were also analysed for evidence that Labor represented the key points of parity identified above. Points of parity were coded as ‘safe change’ and ‘economic’ (competent economic management). ‘Safe change’ is visually depicted, for example, in the commercial of 15 October when Rudd symbolically turns off the Liberal’s “scare campaign” against him (Figure 6.4a), and it is verbally referenced as “getting the balance right” on industrial relations in the commercial of 16 October (ALP 2007e). ‘Economic’ is visually depicted (Figure 6.4a), and verbally referenced via “my plan to secure Australia’s long-term prosperity” in the commercial of 24 January (ALP 2007a).

Figure 6.4. Examples of visual depiction of points of parity in Labor television commercials from 2007. (a) ‘safe change’ from commercial of 15 October and (b) ‘economic’ from commercial of 24 January.

In visual representations of points of parity, ‘economic’ appears most frequently at 64% of the time while ‘safe change’ appears 37% (Figure 6.5a). When the average frequency of appearances is considered, ‘economic’ appears three times as often as ‘safe change’ (Figure 6.5b). Looking across the commercials, economic appears in seven and is the sole point in three (Figure 6.5c). Safe change appears in four. These results highlight the importance of economic management. Both points of parity make a strong showing, especially as ‘safe change’ is challenging to represent visually. There is evidence that Labor identifies and represents the nominated points from the start of 2007, and that it uses different tactics at different stages. The first three commercials - including the first of the year on 24 January and the first of the formal campaign on 14 October - feature only ‘economic’. Once this point is been established, Labor adds ‘safe change’. It does not show ‘safe change’ alone in any commercial in the sample. This indicates that economic credibility is important on its own, and also as means to make tangible the idea of safe change.

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(a) (b) (c) 70.0 2.0 8 Point of parity 60.0

6 Safe change ) 1.5 shots)

50.0 Economic of

4 40.0 1.0 Frequency frequency commercial)

2

commercials 30.0

(number per

Frequency of

20.0 0 (% 0.5 Average 10.0 (shots

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of Date of commercial parity parity

Figure 6.5. Visual representation of points of parity in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each point of across all commercials, and (c) frequency of each point in each commercial.

Analysis of verbal representation of points of parity further underscores the importance of economic competence. ‘Economic’ is referenced 82% of the time and safe change 28% (Figure 6.6a). When the average frequency is considered, ‘economic’ appears 3.2 times per item while ‘safe change’ appears 0.25 times (Figure 6.6b). Of the nine commercials in which points of parity are referenced, ‘economic’ appears in all, up to eight times (Figure 6.6c). ‘Safe change’ appears in three commercials and, as in visual representations, is always represented with ‘economic’.

(a) (b) (c) 90.0 3.5 8 Point of 80.0 parity 3.0

6 70.0 Safe change ) shots)

2.5 Economic 60.0 of

4 50.0 2.0 frequency commercial) Frequency

40.0 2

commercials 1.5

(number per

Frequency of

30.0 1.0 0 (% 20.0 Average (shots 10.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 Point of Point of parity parity Date of commercial

Figure 6.6. Verbal representation of points of parity in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point is referenced (b) average frequency of reference to each point across all commercials, and (c) frequency of reference to each point in each commercial.

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Points of difference in stories The news stories also were analysed for evidence that Labor represented the nominated points of difference. Visual and verbal depictions were similar to those in commercials (see Figure 6.1). Analysis of visual representations shows Labor does well in getting through the media filter and achieves a good showing of most points of difference, especially ‘new/future’. This point is seen most frequently at 78% of the time (Figure 6.7a). ‘Education’ and ‘health’ are represented 27% and 20% of the time respectively, while ‘climate’ comes in at 17% and ‘fair’ at 2 %. A similar pattern is evident when average frequency is considered (Figure 6.7b). A point of difference is shown in 39 of the stories (Figure 6.7c). ‘New/future’ is shown in 34, including 15 where it is the only point. ‘Education’ is shown in 12 and ‘health’ in nine. ‘Climate’ is shown in seven and ‘fair’ in just one. There is evidence that Labor identifies and represents the nominated points from the start of the campaign, and uses different tactics at different stages. Looking across the commercials, ‘new/future’ is fairly consistently represented throughout the campaign while ‘climate’ is clustered around the centre. ‘New/future’ is the sole point in the first and last stories; thereby bookending the campaign with Labor’s overarching point of difference. The single representation of ‘fair’ is perhaps indicative of the difficulty of visually representing an abstract, especially in a mediated channel. Finally, there is some evidence of Labor matching media events with television commercials. The commercial of 3 November shows a young mother worrying about interest rate rises which have “stretched us to the limit” (ALP 2007f). The commercial started to air just before a widely-anticipated rate rise on 7 November which put pressure on Howard’s economic credentials. Overall, this is further evidence of Labor’s good planning and execution.

(a) (b) (c) 80.0 4.5 30 Point of difference 70.0 4.0 25 New/Future

3.5 60.0 Fair ) 20 shots)

3.0 Climate change of 50.0 15 Education 2.5 frequency commercial)

40.0 Frequency Health commercials

(number 10 per 2.0

Frequency of

30.0 (% 1.5 5 Average (shots 20.0 1.0 0 10.0 0.5

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of difference difference Date of story

Figure 6.7. Visual representation of points of difference in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of stories in which each point appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each point across all stories, and (c) frequency of each point in each story.

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Analysis of verbal representations of points of difference in television news reveals a slightly different pattern. The most frequently represented point of difference is ‘new/future’, at 43% of the time (Figure 6.8a). ‘Climate’ comes second at 27%, followed closely by ‘education’ at 23%. ‘Fair’ and ‘health’ are each represented 14% of the time. When average frequency per story is considered, ‘climate’ on 0.9 times is closely followed by ‘education’, with ‘new/future’ next (Figure 6.8b). ‘Fair’ and health are shown just 0.5 times per story. Points of difference are represented in 30 stories (Figure 6.8c). ‘New/future’ appears in 19, including nine where it is the sole point, ‘climate’ is in 12, and ‘education’ in 10. There is some evidence that Labor coordinates the visual and verbal messages for particular events. For example, the two stories about the formal campaign launch of 14 November, includes 18 visual representations (Figure 6.7c) and three verbal representations (Figure 6.8c) of ‘new/future’. It also has four visual representations and 14 verbal references of ‘education’, and four visual representations and nine verbal references to ‘climate’. Overall, Labor does well in verbally representing its foremost point, ‘new/future’, and supporting it via mentions of climate change.

(a) (b) (c) 30 45.0 1.0 Point of difference 40.0 25 New/Future

0.8 35.0 20 Fair )

shots) Climate

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of 15 0.6 Education 25.0 frequency commercial) Health

10 Frequency

commercials 20.0

per (number

0.4 Frequency of 5 15.0 (% Average (shots 0 10.0 0.2 5.0

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of Date of story difference difference

Figure 6.8. Verbal representation of points of difference in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point is referenced (b) average frequency of reference to each point across all commercials, and (c) frequency of reference to each point in each commercial.

Points of parity in stories Analysis of the television news stories provides evidence that Labor represents the nominated points of parity, visually and verbally. ‘Safe change’ is visually depicted via Rudd attending church with his family in the story of 14 October (Figure 6.9a), and verbally referenced via Rudd’s criticisms of a unionist in the story of 26 October. ‘Economic’ is visually depicted in the story of 4 November (Figure 6.9b), and it is verbally referenced via Rudd’s statement: “Mr Howard can no longer be trusted on interest rates” in the story of 7 November (ABC 2007c).

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Figure 6.9. Examples of visual depiction of points of parity in ABC television news stories from 2007. (a) ‘safe change’ from story of 14 October and (b) ‘economic’ from story of 4 November.

Labor is reasonably successful in getting though the media filter to visually communicate its points of parity. ‘Economic’ is most frequently shown, at 32% of the time, with ‘safe change’ shown 12% (Figure 6.10a). A similar pattern emerges when average frequency per story is considered (Figure 6.10b). A point of parity appears in 18 stories, with ‘economic’ dominant once again (Figure 6.10c). It appears in 14 stories, including 13 in which it was the sole point. These results shows Labor seeking to represent its points of parity throughout the campaign, however, the relatively low recording for ‘safe change’ demonstrates the challenge of visually communicating this point. Interestingly, four stories, including the first and last, show ‘safe change’ alone, unlike the commercials where Labor is careful to pair it with ‘economic’.

(a) (b) (c) 35.0 2.5 15 Point of 30.0 parity 2.0 Safe change

10 25.0 ) Economic shots)

of 1.5 20.0 frequency commercial) Frequency

5 commercials (number

15.0 per 1.0 Frequency of

(% Average 10.0 (shots 0 0.5 5.0

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of Date of story parity parity

Figure 6.10. Visual representation of points of parity in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of stories in which each point appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each point across all stories, and (c) frequency of each point in each story.

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Greater success is achieved in verbal representation of points of parity. ‘Economic’ is referenced most frequently, at 66% of the time, compared to ‘safe change’, at 29% (Figure 6.11a). On average frequency per story, ‘economic’ is five times more common than ‘safe change’ (Figure 6.11b). A point of parity is mentioned in 33 stories (Figure 6.11c), which shows good planning and message discipline. ‘Economic’ is mentioned in 29, and is the sole point in 20 of these. ‘Safe change’ is mentioned in 13, including four in which it is the sole point. Overall, these results are higher than those recorded for visual representation of points of parity. This indicates it is easier to verbally represent these points in a mediated channel.

(a) (b) (c) 70.0 2.5 16 Point of 14 parity 60.0 Safe change 2.0 12

Economic 50.0 ) 10 shots)

8 1.5 of 40.0 6 frequency commercial)

30.0 Frequency commercials 4

per 1.0 (number

Frequency of 2

(% 20.0 Average (shots 0 0.5 10.0

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of parity parity Date of story

Figure 6.11. Verbal representation of points of parity in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point is referenced (b) average frequency of reference to each point across all commercials, and (c) frequency of reference to each point in each commercial.

Points of difference and points of parity in the 2010 campaign In 2010, practitioners demonstrated a clear understanding of the points of difference and points of parity between Labor and the conservatives, and their leaders, Gillard and Abbott. In another sign of the complex and challenging nature of this campaign, there was also evidence they understood the need for points of difference and parity between Gillard and Rudd. Labor sought to craft a high- level, imagery-related point of difference between Gillard moving forward and Abbott going backwards. Bitar (2010) said Labor’s strategy was “to make the election a clear contest between Prime Minister Gillard’s positive plan to move Australia forward and Tony Abbott who would take Australia backwards”. Labor believed “Abbott’s personality and his conservative views on a whole range of issues” (Hawker 2012) lent themselves to this line of attack. Abbott’s position on a National Broadband Network (NBN) “was a very backward focussed vision, very negative, very 1950’s” (Hawker 2012), while Gillard saw it as “our road to the future [...] a great nation-building

128 thing” (Hawker 2012). Hawker (2012) described the NBN as Gillard’s “strongest suit”, and it was developed as a major functional point of difference. Australia’s first female leader also had an opportunity to differentiate on Abbott’s reputed problem with women (van Onselen 2010c). Some women were “concerned about misogyny, his very conservative attitudes about reproduction, about birth control, basically being a bit of a yobbo” (Hawker 2012). Labor did not fully exploit this opportunity, however, and by the end of the campaign Abbott “had managed to surround himself with his wife and his daughters and put out a policy on paid parental leave, all of which served to soften that negative image” (Hawker 2012). Labor deployed three more functional points of difference. Gillard played to Labor’s traditional strengths in education and health (Bitar 2010), while claiming Abbott planned to cut these and other “vital services” (ALP 2010b). Education was particularly important for Gillard, as the former Education Minister. Although not specifically nominated by campaigners, it is clear from the data that Gillard also sought to retain Labor’s advantage on environmental protection. Gillard regularly spoke of renewable energy policies (e.g. ALP 2010c) and sustainability (e.g. ALP 2010d). As in 2007, Labor sought to develop a competitive point of parity with the Liberals around economic management. Labor’s success in steering the country through the global financial crisis was a strength (Martin 2012), but it yielded only modest electoral benefits (Bitar 2010). Bitar (2010) argued voters did not fully appreciate the danger and, consequently, did not fully appreciate the Government’s response. However, Hawker (2012) said Labor could not capitalise on this, and other economic achievements from the Rudd era, because of the public rancour over Rudd’s removal and Gillard’s comment that his Government had lost it way. “We had this bizarre situation where we were silent on some of our strongest suits because they were from his period as Prime Minister” (Hawker 2012).

Interestingly, the campaign also sought to establish points of difference and points of parity with Rudd. Utting (2012) said the 2010 campaign “was all about trying to project Julia as something completely different from Ruddy”. Although not articulated in interviews, there is evidence the campaign sought to differentiate Gillard from Rudd on three policy issues - border control, population, and environment. In the commercial of 19 July, for example, Gillard said: “I’m committed to stronger borders, cracking down on people smugglers. And a new approach on population. Not a big Australia but a sustainable Australia, with major investment in solar and other renewables” (ALP 2010e). Thus, she repudiated Rudd’s policies on border control and people- smugglers, and his support for a bigger population. The pitch on border and population control was designed to appeal to the so-called suburban electorate, especially in western Sydney. Gillard then segued into discussing population in terms of “a sustainable Australia”, followed by references to renewable energies. This pitch was designed to appeal to inner-city and other environmentally- 129 conscious voters. In just a few sentences, Gillard neatly differentiated from Rudd on three points and appealed to two different voter segments.

The campaign did want Gillard to be like Rudd, however, on the matter of legitimacy. The way Gillard assumed power created “a problem with legitimacy with a large section of the community” (Hawker 2012). Feeney (2012) described legitimacy as a significant but slow-burning issue. Gillard “obviously felt uncomfortable with the lack of a mandate, which underwrote her decision not to move immediately into [the Prime Minister’s official residence] The Lodge” (Cassidy 2010a: 239). There was evidence that Labor understood legitimacy was a category point of parity for Gillard, the price of entry to the political game, and they worked consistently throughout the campaign to reinforce her authority. For example, Gillard featured in six of the 11 television commercials in the sample, and in all six she was shown in the Prime Minister’s office. In five, the Australian flag was present. Given the time and financial pressures on the 2010 campaign, it was no doubt convenient and cheap to film in the Prime Minister’s office but other low-investment options would have been available. The choice of two symbols of authority, the leader’s office and the nation’s standard, was deliberate and consistent. In the leader’s office, the desk is “an important prop. It signals their importance as well as how professional and trustworthy they are” (Young 2004: 166). There are differing views about the value of the flag. It has been used as “a prop to communicate patriotism” (Young 2004: 166), and to lend authority to political leaders in “increasingly ‘presidential’ politics” (Ward 2012: 80). Ward argues, however, that voters “see through and see past” such usage (2012: 79), and that the “institutionalised” use of the flag delivers no political advantage (2012: 80). Labor practitioners, nonetheless, seemed to believe the flag would assist with projecting legitimacy. Gillard’s bid for legitimacy, however, was damaged by “the real Julia” incident. Utting (2012) said this was an attempt to “relaunch” Gillard that went wrong, which Bitar (2010) seemed to confirm when he said “the way the ‘Real Julia’ story ran” was a mistake. Milner (2012) agreed “the pivot point was what was needed but it was so obvious and clumsy that the message got lost in the process debate about how you arrived at this”. Worse, “it fed into the general campaign being run the Coalition and by Kevin’s supporters that we don’t really know who she is, this is someone who became Prime Minister by deceit” (Milner 2012). The Rudd-related points of difference and parity also carried a potential negative for Gillard, by reminding voters she had toppled him. In sum, the key points of difference were: moving forward (Gillard); National Broadband Network (Gillard and Labor); education (Gillard and Labor); health (Gillard and Labor); border control (Gillard); population control (Gillard), and; environmental protection (Gillard and Labor). The key points of parity were legitimacy (Gillard) and competent economic management (Gillard and Labor).

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Once again, Labor’s strategy is tested via assessment of the sample of Labor television commercials and ABC television news stories from each night of the formal campaign. I looked for visual and verbal representations of the points of difference and parity that have been nominated.

Points of difference in commercials Analysis of television commercials provides evidence that Labor did represent the seven points of difference. These were coded as: ‘forward’; ‘NBN’ (National Broadband Network); ‘education’; ‘health’; ‘environment’ (environmental protection); ‘population’ (population control), and; ‘border control’. Most points are straightforward but the visual representations of ‘forward’, ‘population’ and ‘border control’ require explanation. ‘Forward’ was visually depicted via a super (Figure 6.12a) and verbally referenced via Gillard’s statement:’ I’m committed to moving Australian forward” (ALP 2010d) in the commercial of 17 July. ‘Population’ was visually depicted (Figure 6.12b) and verbally referenced via Gillard’s promise of “a new approach on population” (ALP 2010d) in the commercial of 17 July. ‘Border’ was visually depicted (Figure 6.12c) and verbally referenced via Gillard’s commitment to “cracking down on people smugglers” in the commercial of 17 July.

Figure 6.12. Examples of visual depiction of points of difference in Labor television commercials from 2010. (a) ‘forward’ from commercial of 17 July (b) ‘population’ from commercial of 17 July, and; (c) ‘border’ from commercial of 17 July.

Labor does seek to establish the nominated points of difference via visual messages. ‘Forward’ is by far the most frequently seen at 82% (Figure 6.13a). ‘Education’ and ‘environment’ are each shown 27% of the time. ‘NBN’, ‘health’, ‘population’ and ‘border control’ are each shown 18% of the time. ‘Forward’ is again the dominant point of difference when average frequency per commercial is considered, followed by ‘education’ and ‘environment ‘(Figure 6.13b). Looking across the ten commercials in which points of difference were shown, ‘forward’ appears in nine including four in which it is the sole point (Figure 6.13c). ‘Environment’, ‘population’ and ‘border control’ are brought together in two commercials, on 17 and 19 July. There is evidence that Labor identifies and represents the points from the start of the campaign, and also that it adopts different tactics at 131 different stages. In the early commercials, Labor shows up to five points of difference as it stakes out its campaign themes. Thereafter, the most consistent showing is of ‘forward’. Interestingly, ‘NBN’ is rarely shown. Finally, there is evidence that Labor coordinates the appearance of points of difference in commercials and public events. The commercial of August 8, which coincides with the Coalition’s official campaign launch, attacks the purported risk posed by Abbott. This was the negative flipside of the ‘forward’ point of difference. As noted, Labor apparently did not run a commercial to coincide with its own campaign launch on 16 August.

(a) (b) (c) 90.0 4.0 25 Point of 80.0 difference 3.5 20 Forward

70.0

) 3.0 15 NBN shots)

60.0 of

2.5 10 Education 50.0 2.0 Health frequency commercial) Frequency 5

40.0 Environment commercials

1.5 (number per

Frequency of 30.0

0 Population

(% 1.0 20.0 Border control Average (shots 10.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 Point of Point of Date of commercial difference difference

Figure 6.13. Visual representation of points of difference in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each point across all commercials, and (c) frequency of each point in each commercial.

Analysis of verbal representations of points of difference underscores the importance of ‘education’ for Gillard and Labor. This point is referenced most frequently, at 55% of commercials (Figure 6.14a). ‘Environment’, ‘health’ and ‘forward’ follow on 37% each, with the others on 18% each. The pattern is similar when average frequency per commercial is considered (Figure 6.14b). Education is referenced in six of the nine commercials in which points of difference are mentioned (Figure 6.14c) and forward in four. Again, ‘NBN’ is not well represented. Once again, ‘environment’, ‘population’ and ‘border control’ are brought together in three commercials, on 16, 17 and 19 July, thereby meshing the verbal and visual messages. Overall, there is a good correlation between the verbal and visual messages with very close matches in five commercials: 17, 19 and 25 July, and 2 and 13 August (Figures 6.13c and 6.14c).

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(a) (b) (c) 60.0 2.5 30 Point of difference 25 50.0 Forward

2.0

) 20 NBN shots)

40.0

of Education 15 1.5 Health 30.0 10 frequency commercial) Frequency

Environment commercials

1.0 (number 5 per

Frequency of Population 20.0

(% 0 Border control

Average 0.5 10.0 (shots

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of difference difference Date of commercial

Figure 6.14. Verbal representation of points of difference in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point is referenced (b) average frequency of reference to each point across all commercials, and (c) frequency of reference to each point in each commercial.

Points of parity in commercials Television commercials were also analysed for visual and verbal evidence that Labor represented the two points of parity identified above. These points of parity were coded as ‘legitimate’ and ‘economic’ (competent economic management). Visual and verbal depictions of ‘economic’ are straightforward but ‘legitimate’ requires some explanation. ‘Legitimate’ is represented via the Australian flag and the Prime Minister’s office in the commercial of 25 July (Figure 6.15), and verbally via Gillard’s statement: “I look forward to the election campaign and the judgment of the Australian people” (ALP 2010a) in the commercial of 16 July.

Figure 6.15. Example of visual depiction of points of parity in Labor television commercials from 2010: ‘legitimate’ from commercial of 25 July.

Labor does well in visually representing these points in television commercials (Figure 6.16). ‘Legitimate’ appears most frequently, at 55% of commercials, with ‘economic’ on 45% (Figure 6.16a). This is a good showing for both, especially ‘legitimate’. When the average frequency per 133 commercial is considered, ‘economic’ appears three times and ‘legitimate’ 1.5 times per commercial (Figure 6.16b). Looking across all eight commercials in which a point of parity appears, ‘economic’ is in five commercials, is the sole point in two and the dominant point in three (Figure 6.16c). It appears a maximum of 17 times per commercial, which is the highest single visual representation for any point of parity across the two campaigns. ‘Legitimate’ appears in six commercials, including three in which it is the sole point. There is evidence Labor identifies and represents points of parity from the start of the campaign, and some strategic intent is discernible. For example, ‘legitimate’ is the sole point in the first commercial, kicking off the attempt to establish Gillard as leader.

(a) (b) (c) 60.0 3.0 20 Point of parity 50.0 2.5

15 Legitimate ) shots)

40.0 2.0 Economic of

10

30.0 1.5 Frequency frequency commercial) 5

commercials

(number per

Frequency of

20.0 1.0 0 (% Average 10.0 (shots 0.5

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of Date of commercial parity parity

Figure 6.16. Visual representation of points of parity in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each point across all commercials, and (c) frequency of each point in each commercial.

Analysis of verbal representations of points of parity show Labor focuses on ‘economic’. This point is represented most frequently, at 82% of commercials, and ‘legitimate’ just 9% (Figure 6.17a). When average frequency is considered, the pattern is similar with economic mentioned almost 3.5 times per item and legitimate 0.1 times per item (Figure 6.17b). A point of parity is referenced in nine of the 11 commercials, with ‘economic’ shown consistently throughout (Figure 6.17c). Only once are both points of parity shown in one commercial. These results underscore the importance of economic management for Labor and the challenge of verbally representing the idea of legitimacy.

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(a) (b) (c) 90.0 3.5 10 Point of 80.0 parity 3.0 8

Legitimate 70.0 )

shots) 6 Economic

2.5 60.0 of

50.0 2.0 4 frequency commercial) Frequency

40.0 2

commercials 1.5

(number per

Frequency of

30.0 1.0 0 (% 20.0 Average (shots 0.5 10.0 0.0 0.0 Point of Point of Date of commercial parity parity

Figure 6.17. Verbal representation of points of parity in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point is referenced (b) average frequency of reference to each point across all commercials, and (c) frequency of reference to each point in each commercial.

Points of difference in stories The stories were analysed for visual and verbal evidence that Labor represented the nominated points of difference. Their depictions in news stories were generally similar to those in Labor’s commercials, however, it is worth illustrating how ‘forward’ was represented. ‘Forward’ was visually depicted, for example, via this shot from a Labor attack ad which was shown on the news on 20 July (Figure 6.18). This shows the negative flipside to the positive message; that Abbott would take Australia backwards with a return to extreme Workchoices laws. ‘Forward’ was represented verbally when Gillard said she wanted “to move Australia forward” in the story of 17 July.

Figure 6.18. Example of visual depiction of points of parity in ABC television news stories from 2010: ‘Forward’ from story of 20 July.

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Labor does attempt to represent its points of difference visually, with mixed results. ‘Forward’ is most frequently seen at 25% of the time followed by ‘education’ on 22% (Figure 6.19a). However, ‘education’ has the highest average frequency per story, followed by ‘health’ (Figure 6.19b). Looking across the 22 stories in which a point of difference appears (Figure 6.19c), ‘forward’ is shown in nine and ‘education’ in eight. Clearly, Labor identifies and seeks to establish its overarching point, ‘forward’, and an important policy difference, ‘education’. However, another signature policy difference, ‘NBN’, barely registers and not once does Labor manage to represent the three-part point of difference on border control, population and environment in one story. There is evidence that Labor identifies and represents its points of difference from the start, with ‘forward’ the sole or dominant point in the first three days. Some strategic intent is discernible. For example, on the day of its formal campaign launch, 16 August, Labor achieves its best result in inserting points of difference into stories. ‘Education’, ‘health’ and ‘NBN’ are featured, totalling 48 shots in that night’s news. On 8 August, the day of the Coalition’s formal campaign launch, Labor achieves a very small showing for ‘forward’. However, the impact of the leaks in week two from 26 July to 1 August, and the ‘Real Julia’ and Latham incidents in week three from 2 to 8 August, is evident in the poor results for these periods. In addition, there is less narrative-building over the course of the campaign when compared to 2007. Overall, the figures are very low when compared to those in 2007.

(a) (b) (c) 25.0 1.5 50 Point of difference 40 Forward 20.0

NBN shots)

) 1.0 30 Education of

15.0 Health Environment frequency commercial)

Frequency 20

Border control (number per commercials

10.0 Frequency of

10 0.5 (% Average (shots

5.0 0

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of Date of story difference difference

Figure 6.19. Visual representation of points of difference in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of stories in which each point appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each point across all stories, and (c) frequency of each point in each story.

Analysis of verbal representations of point of differences reveals a different pattern. As with verbal representations in television commercials, ‘education’ is most frequently represented at 25% of the time, followed by ‘forward’, ‘health’ and ‘NBN’ each on 19% (Figure 6.20a). ‘Education’ is also

136 the most commonly mentioned point per story, at 1.2 times (Figure 6.20b). A point of difference appears in 26 stories (Figure 6.20c). Education is referenced in nine stories, including two in which it is the sole point. Labor has more success in verbally deploying the three-part point of difference on border control, population and environment; ‘environment’ and ‘population’ are referenced together in two stories and are linked with ‘border control’ in a third. Labor achieves good match- ups between the visual and verbal points on day one of the campaign, 17 July, and on the day of its formal launch, 16 August. On 8 August, the day of the Coalition’s formal campaign launch, Labor performs well by getting three policy differentiators – ‘education’, ‘health’ and ‘NBN’ - into the news. Points of difference are proportionally referenced less often and the figures overall are low when compared to the same results from 2007 (Figure 6.8).

(a) (b) (c) 25.0 1.2 14 Point of 12 difference Forward 20.0 1.0 10 NBN

)

shots) Education

0.8 8

15.0 of Health 6 Environment frequency commercial) 0.6

Frequency commercials

4 Population

10.0 per (number

Frequency of 0.4 Border control

(% 2 Average 5.0 (shots 0.2 0

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of difference difference Date of story

Figure 6.20. Verbal representation of points of difference in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point is referenced (b) the average frequency of reference to each point across all commercials, and (c) frequency of reference to each point in each commercial.

Points of parity in stories Stories were further analysed for evidence that Labor represented the two points of parity, visually and verbally. Their depictions in news stories were generally similar to those in Labor’s commercials, however, it is worth illustrating how ‘legitimate’ was represented. In the story of 17 July, ‘legitimate’ is visually represented by Gillard, flanked by flags, in the Prime Minister’s Courtyard at Parliament House to announce the election date (Figure 6.21), and verbally represented via her statement: “Today I seek a mandate from the Australian people” (ABC 2010a).

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Figure 6.21. Example of visual depiction of points of parity in ABC television news stories from 2010: ‘Legitimate’ from television commercial of 17 July.

Visually, Labor focuses on ‘economic’. It appears most frequently, at 55% of the time, while legitimate appears 22% of the time (Figure 6.22a). The proportions are similar for average frequency per story (Figure 6.22b). Points of parity appear in 25 stories; ‘economic’ in 20, including 17 in which it is the sole point, and ‘legitimate’ in eight, including five in which it is the sole point (Figure 6.22c). There is evidence that points of parity are identified and deployed from the start of the campaign and that different tactics are used at different stages. ‘Legitimate’ is the sole point shown in the first three stories; to bolster Gillard’s credentials in the opening days of the campaign. ‘Economic’ is the sole point in the last three stories; Labor closing out the campaign with a focus on economic management. Overall, the figures are higher than the same results from 2007 (Figure 6.10).

(a) (b) (c) 60.0 4.0 25 Point of parity 50.0 20 Legitimate

3.0 Economic ) shots) 40.0 15

of

frequency commercial) Frequency

30.0 2.0 10 commercials (number

per

Frequency of

(% 20.0 5 Average (shots 1.0 10.0 0

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of parity parity Date of story

Figure 6.22. Visual representation of points of parity in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of stories in which each point of parity appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each point across all stories, and (c) frequency of each point in each story.

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Analysis of verbal representations of points of parity again shows a focus on economic management. ‘Economic’ is referenced 69% of the time and ‘legitimate’ 22% (Figure 6.23a). Economic is referenced on average three times per item while legitimate is referenced 0.8 times (Figure 6.23b). The points are referenced in 28 stories (Figure 6.23c). ‘Economic’ is referenced in 25 stories and is the sole point in 20. ‘Legitimate’ is the sole point in the first and last stories thereby bookending the campaign with statements about Gillard’s validity, and providing evidence that different tactics are used at different stages. There is evidence, too, of some degree of coordination with ‘economic’ the sole point both visually and verbally (Figures 6.22 and 6.23, respectively) on the day of Labor’s official campaign launch on 16 August.

(a) (b) (c) 70.0 3.0 18 Point of parity 16 Legitimate 60.0 2.5 14 Economic 12 50.0 ) 2.0

shots) 10

of 40.0 8 1.5 frequency commercial) 6

30.0 Frequency commercials

per

(number 4

Frequency of 1.0 2

(% 20.0 Average (shots 0 10.0 0.5

0.0 0.0 Point of Point of parity parity Date of story Figure 6.23. Verbal representation of points of parity in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each point is referenced (b) average frequency of reference to each point across all commercials, and (c) frequency of reference to each point in each commercial.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Labor practitioners demonstrated their understanding, and use, of points of difference and points of parity during the 2007 campaign. The interviews and the data from the commercials and stories show they used research to understand their strengths and weaknesses as well as their opponents’. They prepared strategies to update the narrative of historical points of difference, build new points of difference and neutralise their opponents’ points of parity. In both commercials and stories, Labor consistently represents the ‘new/future’ point of difference and the ‘economic’ point of parity. There is evidence of conscious and strategic representation of points of difference and points of parity within an item, across each channel throughout the campaign, and between the two channels. For example, Labor shows all five points of difference in its commercial of 14 October, the first day of the formal campaign. Labor achieves a strong showing of its high-level point of

139 difference ‘new/future’ verbally across all commercials and visually in stories. There is good consistency between the channels with, for example, ‘new/future’ as the sole point of difference shown in both the commercial and news of 22 October. The ‘economic’ point of parity is well deployed visually and verbally in both the commercial and story of 18 October, to coincide with the release of a gloomy report on housing affordability in Australia. Good planning and consistent messaging across both channels ensured a coherent narrative about Labor’s claim to economic competency. Labor performs well in both commercials and stories. In sum, I argue that Labor’s 2007 campaign team consciously, strategically and fully deployed points of difference and points of parity. Further, I argue that the party demonstrated a very strong branding orientation in relation to these components.

Labor practitioners in the 2010 campaign also demonstrated their understanding, and use, of points of difference and points of parity. This is borne out by the interviews, and also data from commercials and stories. Across the commercials and new stories, Labor represents ‘economic’ about half the time, and ‘education’ and ‘forward’ each about a quarter of the time. Labor achieves higher showings for visual points of parity in stories in 2010 than in 2007, but some points, such as ‘NBN’, are barely represented. Altogether this shows less consistency than in 2007. Nonetheless, there is evidence of conscious and strategic representation of points of difference and points of parity within an item and across each channel throughout the campaign, and between the two channels. In the commercial of 17 July, the first day of the campaign, Labor shows four points of difference; ‘forward’ and the three-part point of border control, population and environment. Across the commercials, there are some good matches between the visual and verbal messages. In the commercial of 2 August, for example, the ‘economic’ point of parity is well brought together visually and verbally. There are some examples of good consistency between the channels. Legitimacy, for example, was critical when Gillard announced the election date on 17 July. This point of parity has a small showing in the commercial of that date, coupled with good representations both visually and verbally in the story. Overall, there is less consistency between the two channels, than in 2007. Labor performs reasonably well in the commercials but less so in television news where, as well as mediation, it faced outside disruptions and thus competition for airtime. In sum, I argue that Labor’s 2010 campaign team consciously deployed points of difference and points of parity, however, execution was not as strategic or full as in 2007. Further, I argue that the party demonstrated a strong branding orientation in relation to the concept of points of parity and points of difference, but understanding was not matched by execution. Thus, the overall branding orientation is moderate to weak.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

BRAND ARCHITECTURE: HIERARCHY, LOGOS AND SLOGANS

INTRODUCTION Brand architecture provides the structure for relationships between products from the same producer. Architecture assists brand managers in deciding how to market products, and it assists consumers in understanding the offerings. This chapter considers how if, and how, Labor employed brand architecture in the 2007 and 2010 campaigns. It proceeds in three parts. The first defines and discusses the importance of brand architecture (Political Branding Checklist Strategy 4). The second part deals with two components of brand architecture, hierarchy and elements. It defines and discusses the importance of brand hierarchy (Political Branding Checklist Strategy 4, Tactic 4b), then defines and discusses the importance of brand elements, in particular logos and slogans (Political Branding Checklist Strategy 2, Tactic 2a). It considers if, and how, Labor employed logos and slogans in the 2007 campaign and the 2010 campaign. The final part draws together findings about the use of architecture in each campaign.

The interviews with practitioners were used to establish what they understood by brand architecture and if, and how, they used hierarchy, logos and slogans. The television commercials and news stories were analysed for logo and slogan use in four ways. These were: frequency of visual appearance across all commercials or stories; average frequency within a commercial or story; frequency of shots per commercial or story, and; relative prominence which considers the position and size of appearance. Multiple logos and slogans can appear in the same commercial or story. This chapter helps answer Research Question 3: Did Labor consciously undertake political branding in the 2007 and 2010 federal campaigns? If so, how strategically and how fully?

BRAND ARCHITECTURE Brand architecture is valuable for both brand managers and consumers. Architecture defines “the various relationships among brands and products” (Keller 2008: 433). It determines “which brand names, logos, symbols and so forth to apply to new and existing products”, which products share a brand name and how many variations of that name should be used (Keller 2008: 433). It also helps “maximize transfer of equity to/ from the brand to individual products” (Keller 2008: 433).

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Architecture “can help consumers understand [a firm’s] products and services and organise them in their minds” (Keller 2008: 433). It helps build brand awareness among consumers by promoting understanding of products and by communicating similarities and differences between products (Keller 2008: 433). Commerce commonly uses the terms “branded house” and “house of brands” to clarify brand architecture (Keller 2008: 433). A firm which operates a branded house uses “an umbrella corporate or family brand for all its products” (Keller 2008: 433), while a firm which operates a house of brands has “a collection of individual brands with different names” (Keller 2008: 433). All the branded products offered by one firm in one category constitute a brand portfolio (Keller 2008: 434). For example, the Ford brand portfolio has a number of branded products, including the Lincoln and the Land Rover, in the automobile product category (Keller 2008: 442). Ideally “any one brand in the portfolio should not harm or decrease the equity of the others” (Keller 2008: 434).

Brand architecture in politics Brand architecture is used in a similar way in politics. Architecture can help define the relationships between the brands and products of the party and the leader (Cosgrove 2014: 111), and determine the use of names, logos and symbols (Cosgrove 2014: 113). It can be employed to boost voter knowledge of, and equity in, the party or leader brands (Cosgrove 2014: 114). America’s conservative Republicans “focus on their high-level partisan brand” (Cosgrove 2014: 111), which is the branded house approach. The Democrats “put more emphasis on the individual platform and product brands” (Cosgrove 2014: 111), thereby offering a house of brands. The Republicans worked to fit their leaders and policies into the party brand, and between 1980 and 2006 they “had a long run of success” (Cosgrove 2014: 114). A series of stumbles and scandals under George W. Bush led to “brand failure” (Cosgrove 2014: 114) and “harmed the party’s electoral fortunes” (Cosgrove 2014: 114).

The Australian Labor Party has a federal structure and “the fundamental units of party organisation” (Mills 2013a: 7) are the state and territory-based branches. In general, federal Labor operates like a branded house. It has a corporate or party brand, currently represented as ‘Australian Labor’ (Figure 7.1). It also has branded products such as ‘Queensland Labor’ (Figure 7.2a), ‘’ which is the youth wing (Figure 7.2b), ‘Country Labor’ which is the country wing of the New South Wales branch (Figure 7.2c), and ‘Rainbow Labor’ which is the gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans-gender and intersex association of various state branches (Figure 7.2d). When there is an individual brand for a leader, it is generally campaign-specific and co-branded, like ‘Kevin07’. Labor’s brand portfolio is relatively small. 142

Figure 7.1. The corporate or party brand for the Australian Labor Party. Reproduced with the permission of the Australian Labor Party.

Figure 7.2. Labor’s branded products including (a) Queensland Labor, (b) Australian Young Labor, (c) Country Labor, (d) Rainbow Labor. Reproduced with the permission of the Australian Labor Party, and the New South Wales and Queensland branches of the Australian Labor Party.

Although they did not use the phrase, all of the Labor practitioners spoke in terms that indicated they see brand architecture as important. They recognised the need to clarify and communicate the relationship between the party and leader brands. They also recognised the capacity of this relationship to communicate points of difference and parity, and to transfer equity between brands. National Secretary and National Campaign Director in 2007, Tim Gartrell (2012), for example, talked of “working with two, hopefully, complementary brands”. Practitioners spoke of the deep connection between the images of the party and leader in the minds of voters, and consequently, of their brands. Strategist, Bruce Hawker (2012), said the images “can’t sit independently from one another”. He stressed that “you may emphasis the leader much more than the party but they can’t be separated. At the end of the day they are voting for the Labor candidate or the Liberal candidate, wherever they are” (Hawker 2012). Former Assistant National Director, Mike Kaiser (2012), said the two brands could provide synergy or a disconnect. Pollster John Utting (2012) described the interplay: If you’re standing as a Labor candidate you have to be in tune with those baseline Labor values. But the trick is to have the leader’s image more to the centre [of the political spectrum] than the party image so it acts as an attractor. A leader doesn’t have to be definitely in synch with the party’s image, a bit out of synch actually reflects some of those other values. As long as they don’t break with the party, that’s probably the sweet spot you want to be in.

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Brand architecture in the 2007 campaign In 2007, the party used the corporate brand, ‘Australian Labor’ (Figure 7.1), and also introduced an individual brand for Rudd, ‘Kevin07’ (Figure 7.3a). Occasionally, the two were used together (Figure 7.3b). Once in office, ‘Kevin07’ was replaced with ‘KevinPM’ (Figure 7.3c).

Figure 7.3. The individual brand and corporate brands used in the 2007 campaign: (a) the individual ‘Kevin07’; (b) co-branding of the corporate and individual brands, and; (c) the individual brand used in office. (Reproduced with the permission of the Australian Labor Party).

‘Kevin07’ was used to communicate similarities and differences with Labor, and to transfer positive equity to “polish up” the party’s brand (Hawker 2012). Kaiser (2012) explained: Kevin was probably inconsistent with the traditional view of the Labor brand but in so many ways it was synergistic because he was able to describe a modern inception of Labor. His language and rhetoric around fairness, the way he linked it to his own biography and to Workchoices, the way he used his foreign language capabilities to talk about internationalising Australia - this was all Labor in a modern incarnation. He was able to get synergy between his imagery and what the party stood for.

Utting (2012) said Rudd was closer to the political centre than many other Labor leaders “and that’s what you want, a leader who drags over the extra voters into your tent”. Assistant National Secretary, Nick Martin (2012) believed Rudd’s appeal added five points to Labor’s base vote. After two years in office, however, Rudd had inflicted “a lot of brand damage” on both the ‘Kevin07’ and Labor brands, according to strategist, Cameron Milner (2012). “Prime Minister Rudd wasn’t the candidate people voted for. Part of Kevin’s problem was the disconnect between what he promised and built up in terms of the values of the brand versus what he then did in government” (Milner 2012). This disconnect was best demonstrated by Rudd campaigning for a carbon emissions trading scheme in Opposition, then walking away from it in Government.

Brand architecture in the 2010 campaign In 2010, the Labor campaign again employed a leader and party brand but the strategy was very different. Gillard was a logo-free individual offering and the party had little presence. The Gillard- Labor connection was quite different to the Rudd-Labor connection because of the way she gained 144 the leadership and some of her personal attributes. “Neither the leader nor the brand were particularly popular” (Hawker 2012) and “neither party brand nor party leadership could really bridge” (Martin 2012) voter distaste over the manner of Rudd’s dispatch. Hawker (2012) went further, saying it was “problematic [...] when somebody who hadn’t been elected to the prime ministership was associated with brand Labor”. Unlike Rudd, Gillard was to the left of the political centre and “was probably too close to the centre of gravity where our supporters were, not where the centre of gravity of the whole electorate was” (Utting 2012). In addition, some personal attributes came into play as Hawker (2012) noted: Quite disgracefully, the Opposition and other groups [...] started to challenge her fitness for the position of Prime Minister because she didn’t have any kids and because she’s unmarried and she’s godless, as if any of those things are a disqualification to high office.

This merger of concerns about Gillard’s personal choices and her treatment of Rudd “became campaignable” for the Opposition (Milner 2012). Opposition attacks on Gillard also hurt the party, because of the inseparability of the two. Hawker (2012) explained that “the way in which they tarnished her, allowed them to tarnish brand Labor”. Gillard’s initial poll bounce translated into improved support for her party (Martin 2012) but in a short space of time, she transferred negative equity to Labor.

BRAND HIERARCHY AND BRAND ELEMENTS Two critical components of brand architecture are hierarchy and elements (See Figure 3.2. Strategic Brand Management Process). In commerce, a brand hierarchy is used to show “the number and nature of common and distinctive brand elements across the firm’s products, revealing the explicit ordering of brand elements” (Keller 2008: 434). At the top of the hierarchy is the corporate brand, followed by the family brand, the individual brand and, finally, the modifier (Keller 2008: 446- 447). The corporate brand is often used as the only brand for a product or used in conjunction with a family or individual brand (Keller 2008: 447). The family brand can be used on more than one product category, the individual brand is restricted to one product category, and the modifier is used for a specific model of a product (Keller 2008: 447). Keller (2008: 446) offers the example of General Motors (corporate brand), Buick (family brand), Park Avenue (individual brand) and Ultra (modifier). A corporate brand can be “a powerful means for firms to express themselves in a way that isn’t tied to their specific products or services” (Keller 2008: 449). The corporate brand might be linked, for example, to how the firm “treats its employees, shareholders, local neighbours” (Keller 2008: 449). Corporate brand image can affect a company’s reputation, potential sales, and performance in good and bad market conditions (Keller 2008: 449). A corporate brand can also

145 carry a range of associations which “can have an important effect on the brand equity and market performance of individual products” (Keller 2008: 449). The individual brand’s chief advantage is that it can be customised, as Keller (2008: 451) explained: The name, logo and other brand elements, as well as product design, marketing communications programs, and pricing and distribution strategies, can all focus on a certain target market. Moreover, if the brand runs into difficulty or fails, the risk to other brands and the company itself is minimal. The disadvantages of creating individual brands, however, are the difficulty, complexity, and expense of developing separate marketing programs to build sufficient levels of brand equity.

Brand elements are the “trademarkable devices that serve to identify and differentiate the brand” (Keller 2008: 140). They include: names, URLs, logos, symbols, characters, spokespeople, slogans, jingles, packages and signage (Keller 2008: 140). Elements can help make the brand memorable, meaningful and likeable (Keller 2008: 140). Additionally, they can be transferred between brands in a portfolio, can be adaptable over time, and can be protected legally against copying or derivation by competitors (Keller 2008: 140-144). Logos indicate “origin, ownership or association” (Keller 2008: 155). Logos can be updated so as to remain contemporary but this should be done carefully to retain brand equity (Keller 2008: 156). Slogans “communicate descriptive or persuasive information” (Keller 2008: 159) and can “function as useful ‘hooks’ or ‘handles’ to help consumers grasp the meaning of a brand” (Keller 2008: 159). Thus, they can build both brand awareness and imagery (Keller 2008: 160-161).

Brand hierarchy and elements in politics Brand hierarchy is often employed in politics. Cosgrove (2014: 113) argues that the Republicans in America used a brand hierarchy between 1980 and 2006, focusing on the central brand, or party, followed by its products, or candidates and policies. As noted in Chapter Three, and in line with Keller’s observations, a strong party brand can lend associations and equity to individual brands, such as those for leaders, candidates and policies (Cosgrove 2014: 111), while a new leader brand permits a new message (Cosgrove 2014: 111) and also helps reposition the party (Neale et al 2008: 5). As noted in Chapter Three, and in contrast with Keller’s observations, a tainted party brand may harm everyone and everything associated with it (Cosgrove 2014: 111) and a damaged leader brand can tarnish the next leader as well as the party (French and Smith 2010: 470; Scammell 2007: 188). This difference results from the more complex relationship that exists between the brands of parties and leaders.

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Brand elements, including logos and slogans, are widely used in politics. Visuals such as these are used by parties and politicians “to communicate their branded message in a quick manner” (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 47). Britain’s Labour Party, for example, signalled change by progressively replacing the party symbol of a cloth cap with a red rose, modifying its name to New Labour and launching the slogan ‘New Labour, New Britain’ (Lees-Marshment and Lilleker 2001: 209). Logos “represent a brand to its audience” (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 47). They help identify and promote a party or a candidate, and build awareness, familiarity and equity for a brand (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 47). In Australian, parties may use logos, rather than their names, to promote themselves (Young 2004: 235) because “they don’t want to draw attention to the partisan nature of Australian politics or their own identity” (Young 2004: 234). Candidates use logos because their party affiliation “will still be the major determinant of their electoral success” (Young 2004: 233). At times, however, the party’s unpopularity may mean neither the party nor some of its candidates display the logo (Young 2004: 233).

Slogans aim to convey the brand and it’s positioning, and provide a contrast with competitors (Cwalina et al 2011: 123). Effective slogans are “positive, catchy, and memorable” (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 41-42). Australia’s most famous political slogan (Young 2004: 8) was ‘It’s Time’, produced for Labor’s winning campaign in the 1972 federal election. The result of extensive market testing, ‘It’s Time’ was “a slogan a TV ad, a song and a mantra for change at a time when Australia was ripe for it after 23 years of conservative government” (Young 2004: 80). It was “as near to perfect as they come” (Mills 2012b). Until 1972, slogans were “used sporadically in a few newspaper advertisements” (Young 2004: 9); afterwards, they were indispensible (Young 2004: 9). In Australia, slogans have been used to emphasise leadership, positives in a leader’s image, broad campaign themes and doubts about a competitor (Young 2004: 237-240).

Although they did not use the phrase brand hierarchy, all seven practitioners spoke in terms that indicate they see this as important. Gartrell (2012), for example, talked of the “Labor brand” and “Rudd’s personal brand”, saying that “depending on the campaign circumstances you’ll dial one up and dial one down”. Martin (2012) implicitly spoke of hierarchy when discussing how neither the party brand nor party leader could overcome public unhappiness about Rudd’s removal in 2010. Deciding which brand is emphasised is, according to former Deputy Campaign Director, David Feeney (2012), “essentially a marketing decision about what brand you’re going to put into the marketplace, you can only invest in one at a time”. A critical factor is “whether the leader is held in better odour than the party, and to what extent you are able to promote the leader to the exclusion of the party” (Hawker 2012). The ‘Kevin07’ brand was “the obvious one” for the 2007 campaign 147 because the party brand had suffered during a decade in Opposition (Hawker 2012). Both quantitative and qualitative tools are used to calculate this relationship, as Martin (2012), explained. We have quant measures not dissimilar to what you see in Newspolls, namely vote, but also favourability measures on leaders and parties. So a simple question could be: Do you feel favourably or unfavourably towards the following people? It might be [putative Opposition leader] Joe Hockey, [former Opposition leader] Malcolm Turnbull, Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, the federal Labor Party and the federal Liberal Party. Which gives you a straight out comparative analysis of the standing of a leader versus a party in a quantitative sense, which then gives you an opportunity to do the much more important work which is to look at the reasons why through qualitative research. And you do find that gap between a leadership contender and a party-based vote.

Another important factor in deciding which brand to emphasise is whether the party is in Opposition or Government, as Hawker (2012) explained: I have a view that for Labor to come from behind and out of Opposition after a period of time, its leader really has to be bigger than the party. Because our elections are very presidential, voters look to the leaders to give expression to the values that they believe in. Once you’re in government, I think it’s a different story because the whole machinery of government comes in behind you in subsequent election campaigns.

Labor practitioners variously viewed logos and slogans as “very important” (Gartrell 2012; Kaiser 2012), less critical than they once were (Hawker 2012) and “over-rated unless you make a big mistake” (Utting 2012). Kaiser (2012) said: I think they’re really important, understanding more now than perhaps I ever did about commercial marketing. Labor’s logo is usually designed by a party official somewhere with some crayons whereas it ought to be carefully thought through and designed to reinforce Labor’s brand, like they do in the commercial world, that really leverages what people instinctively believe the party’s already about.

Of slogans, Hawker (2012) said: “I think if everything else is working the slogan sort of falls in behind them and acts as a nice full stop to whatever the message”. Gartrell (2012) said that in the 2007 campaign “slogans were very important but were developed after the strategy work had been done and we’d agreed on the central strategy”.

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Hierarchy in the 2007 campaign In the brand hierarchy, the individual brand generally preceded the party brand which was, nonetheless, also well-represented. As Feeney (2012) noted: “There was an appropriate emphasis on Labor, but Kevin Rudd was the offering”.

Logos in the 2007 campaign Labor launched its revamped party brand and logo in April 2007, then launched the ‘Kevin07’ individual brand and logo in August. The Labor logo was updated, first and foremost, because the party “copped a lot of damage” during eleven years in Opposition (Gartrell 2012). A secondary consideration was that its old-fashioned look didn’t fit with the global “labour family” (Martin 2012). Among some voters, Labor was seen as fiscally-risky, union-dominated and outdated (Gartrell 2012). The party “had to demonstrate that we were new and different and reassuring” (Martin 2012), and one way to communicate change was to rework the party’s imagery (Gartrell 2012). As Gartrell (2012) noted: “Political parties as institutions in Australia are not the most popular things so there’s only so far you can go with that, and that’s why it was the ‘Kevin07’ campaign”. The ‘Kevin07’ logo was designed to simultaneously showcase the new leader and freshen up the party (Gartrell 2012).

The revamped party logo (Figure 7.4c) and the ‘Kevin07’ logo (Figure 7.3a) share some important design elements, and provide a link to labour traditions, national and global. Between 1980 and 2010, Labor has had three different logos. The first (Figure 7.4a), used from 1980 to 1993 (Young 2004: 235), was a rectangle that featured a fluttering Australian flag in full, and the party name in full. The second logo (Figure 7.4b), used from 1996 to 2006 (Young 2004: 235; Gartrell 2012), “still relies heavily on the Australian flag as a patriotic, nationalistic symbol” (Young 2004: 236). It retained the colours and the Southern Cross detail, but omitted the British Union Jack to reflect the republican views of then Labor Prime Minister (Young 2004: 236). The party name was contracted to ‘ALP’, picked out in white against the blue of the flag. The colours were more contemporary and the design was modernised with a stylised flag in an upright rectangle. The third logo (Figure 7.4c), introduced in 2007, retained the Southern Cross but now carried the name ‘Australian Labor’ with the second word larger than the first. The overall design was striking, with two blocks of colour in a rectangle.

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Figure 7.4. Evolution of the Labor logo: (a) 1980; (b) 1996, and; (c) 2007. (Reproduced with the permission of the Australian Labor Party).

Speaking of the 2007 logo, Martin (2012) said “all the design elements - the red and blue squares, nice clean lines, very simple geometry - are great for materials”. Research confirmed the logo looked “clean and fresh and nice to voters” (Martin 2012). Labor hoped the voters’ view of the logo would inform their view of the party, thereby building equity for the party’s brand. The new logo also sent a message globally. “The red square is a logo used by New Labour in Britain and by a lot of European parties so it was really about [...] a reassertion of a labour identify as well” (Martin 2012). Thus, the new logo sought to restate Labor’s identity as a party with roots in the labour movement, and differentiate with its competitors. It also aimed to contribute to brand equity by presenting Labor as a contemporary party. Labor used its new logo to undertake “a complete rebranding exercise” (Martin 2012), with style guides developed so local campaigns throughout the country could replicate the design and use (Martin 2012).

Shortly after the launch of the party logo, Labor started crafting another for the leader. The ‘Kevin07’ logo (Figure 7.3a) was an oblong with ‘Kevin07’ squarely in the centre. ‘KEVIN’ was in white and ‘07’ was in red, against a solid blue background. The oblong shape and the background colour effectively acted as a frame for the leader’s name. Overall, the design made for a strong image. The logo was designed to be “something catchy, new and different” rather than “the typical, clinical” offering from parties (Gartrell 2012). It was meant to appeal to middle Australia, and young people especially (Gartrell 2012). Using Rudd’s first name identified and differentiated him from his competitor, John Howard. Using a contraction of the election year made it contemporary and purposeful. These factors, plus the serendipitous rhyming of name and year, made the logo memorable, meaningful and likeable. The logo debuted on t-shirts, which became “the must-have accessory for Labor supporters” (Ireland 2012). It featured on an eponymous website, car bumper stickers (Jackman 2008: 159) and the homepages of major news websites for the last two days of the campaign (Jackman 2008: 193). It was referenced in the “K07 community” online (Jackman 150

2008: 159) and election-day skywriting which appealed for “Kev4PM” in every state except Queensland where the call was “Qlder4PM” (Jackman 2008: 193). As Hawker (2012) noted: The whole ‘Kevin07’ line of products was part and parcel of the sense of momentum that Rudd was able to create in the lead up to and during that election campaign. It’s exciting, it’s new, it’s full of hope and we can leave the sad old days of John Howard and his conservative mates behind us.

As Keller (2008: 451) noted, creating an individual brand is difficult, complex and expensive. The ‘Kevin07’ brand emerged out of a long period of discussion and testing (Feeney 2012). It also took a lot out of Labor’s coffers, which would have consequences for the 2010 campaign (Feeney 2012; Martin 2012).

I tested how and how well Labor employed its logos in each campaign by assessing their visual representation in the sample of Labor television commercials and in ABC television news stories from each campaign.

Logos in commercials The eleven television commercials were analysed to see how Labor used logos in lead-up to, and during, the 2007 campaign. The Labor logo was used. The ‘Kevin07’ logo was not used but the ‘Kevin07’ (Figure 7.5c) web address was and so was treated as a logo. Two other identifiers, ‘‘Kevin Rudd - Labor Leader’ ’ (Figure 7.5a) and ‘Vote Labor’ (7.5d) also appeared. Although these are not logos and ‘Vote Labor’ is a call to action to voters, their use stamps the names of the leader and the party on a commercial. Therefore, they were included under the logo rubric. The logos were coded as: ‘Labor’ (Labor Party); ‘Kevin07’ (‘Kevin07’ web address); ‘Kevin Rudd - Labor Leader’, and; ‘Vote Labor’.

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Figure 7.5. Screenshots of Labor television commercials from the 2007 election campaign showing use of logos: (a) on 24 January; (b) on 26 July; (c) on 22 October, and; (d) on 22 October.

Analysis of visual representations of logos in television commercials reveals that ‘Labor’ appears most frequently at 65% of commercials, with ‘Kevin07’ on 47%, ‘Kevin Rudd - Labor Leader’ at about 28% and ‘Vote Labor’ at 19% (Figure 7.6a). The pattern is replicated when average frequency per commercial is considered (Figure 7.6b). Logos are shown in eight commercials (Figure 7.6c). ‘Labor’ appears in seven, ‘Kevin07’ in five, ‘Kevin Rudd - Labor Leader’ in three, and ‘Vote Labor’ in two (Figure 7.6c). Each logo appears just once per commercial, but seven commercials use multiple logos. Two, from 14 and 22 October, show three different logos, and the remaining five commercials each show two logos. Six use ‘Labor’ as well as the ‘Kevin Rudd- Labor leader’ tag or ‘Kevin07’website address. The commercial of 14 November, the day of Labor’s formal campaign launch, shows both ‘Labor’ and ‘Vote Labor’. Together, the Labor logo and ‘Vote Labor’ total nine appearances, and ‘Kevin Rudd - Labor Leader’ and ‘Kevin07’ total eight.

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(a) (b) (c) 70.0 0.7 3.0 Logo Labor

60.0 0.6 shots)

) 2.0 Kevin07

50.0 0.5 of

40.0 0.4 Kevin Rudd

Frequency 1.0 frequency commercial)

Labor leader 30.0 (number commercials 0.3 per

Vote Labor Frequency of 0.0 20.0 0.2 (% Average (shots 10.0 0.1

0.0 0.0 Logo Logo Date of commercial

Figure 7.6. Visual representation of logos in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each logo appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each logo across all commercials, and (c) frequency of each logo in each commercial.

When considering the relative prominence of logos by their position and size of appearance, all seven appearances of the ‘Labor’ logo are in the foreground and of medium size (data not shown). All five appearances of the ‘Kevin07’ web address are in the foreground, with four of medium size and one small. ‘Kevin Rudd - Labor Leader’ and ‘Vote Labor’ are all in the foreground and are small.

There is evidence that Labor consciously and strategically uses logos from the start of 2007, used different tactics at different stages, and seeks to transfer positive equity from Rudd to the party. For example, the commercial of 24 January which introduces Rudd to the electorate shows only ‘Kevin Rudd - Labor Leader’ (Figure 7.6c). This tag is used to identify Rudd to people who do not recognise him, to build brand awareness, and to start the transfer of any positive equity from Rudd to the party. The commercial of 26 July shows both ‘Kevin Rudd - Labor Leader’ and ‘Labor’. This usage strengthens the association between Rudd and Labor. It also seeks to transfer to Labor the positive equity that Rudd hopes to build with his declaration that he was “an economic conservative” (ALP 2007b). The first commercial of the formal campaign, of 14 October, shows ‘Kevin Rudd - Labor Leader’, ‘Kevin07’ and ‘Labor’, to remind voters of the connection between Rudd and his more charismatic ‘Kevin07’ persona, and between Rudd and the party. The web address is also shown to drive voters to the site, where they might form a deeper relationship with the ‘Kevin07’ brand. Three more commercials from early in the formal campaign - 15, 16 and 18 October - all use ‘Kevin07’ and ‘Labor’. This shows that Rudd’s ‘Kevin07’ persona is strong enough to be uncoupled from the ‘Labor leader’ tag, and also that it has positive equity to lend to the Labor brand. In the commercials of 16 and 18 October, Rudd rebuts Howard on union domination of Labor and economic management respectively. In both, the ‘Kevin07’ web address is 153 followed by the ‘Labor’ logo. The aim is to transfer Rudd’s positive equity on these issues to the party. The commercial of 22 October, which focuses on climate change, shows ‘Kevin07’ ahead of ‘Labor’, and then introduces ‘Vote Labor’. It seeks to harness Rudd’s positive equity on climate change to drive the call to action for people to vote Labor. The commercial of 14 November features the differences between Rudd and Howard on several key issues, alongside headshots of each. Here, with Rudd the dominant identity, a ‘Labor’ logo is used for five seconds rather than the usual two to three, followed by ‘Vote Labor’. This indicates the party brand is a positive. Again, the aim is to transfer Rudd’s positive equity to the party, while ensuring Labor has a good showing. There is also evidence that Labor uses logos in commercials, with an eye to public events. For example, the commercial of 14 November, the day of Labor’s formal campaign launch, shows both the ‘Labor’ and ‘Vote Labor’ tags. This is the only commercial in which the party logo and identifier are shown without a Rudd tag. In all other others, the party brand appears with the individual brand.

There is further evidence of the strategic deployment of logos and identifiers, in the way Labor protects its brands. Labor is prepared to associate the ‘Kevin07’ and party brands with two commercials, of 16 and 18 October, that are mildly negative against Howard and also deal with key issues. There is, however, no branding on the three explicitly negative commercials - of 3, 6 and 15 November. Rudd does not appear in these, and neither does his name or website. There is no mention of Labor, apart from the legally-required authorisation at the end. Clearly, Labor does not want to tarnish either the individual or central brand with a connection to a strong negative. Finally, there is evidence of strategic use of brand hierarchy via logos, as can be seen in the balance between the party and individual brand. Rudd’s name is bigger and is positioned before the party name in all ‘Kevin Rudd - Labor Leader’ tags, and the ‘Kevin07’ web address is positioned before the Labor logo in all five commercials in which they appear together. Rudd is the dominant talent in all eight commercials that do not feature actors or voiceovers, and in a number of cases (i.e. Figure 7.5d) Labor logos and identifiers are positioned across his chest as though he is physically carrying the party brand. Together, these factors may give the impression that Rudd’s is the dominant brand, however, the Labor logo and name leads the Rudd identifiers on all measures. Thus, as Feeney (2012) suggested, Labor positions the individual brand as the central offering while also ensuring a strong showing for the party brand.

Logos in stories The ABC television news stories also were analysed for evidence of how Labor used logos during the 2007 campaign. Analysis shows that only the ‘Labor’ and ‘Kevin07’ logos appear in television 154 news stories, and that ‘Labor’ features most prominently overall. ‘Labor’ logos appear most frequently at 41% of stories compared to ‘Kevin07’ on 14% (Figure 7.7a). ‘Labor’ leads by a similar proportion when average frequency per story is considered (Figure 7.7b). Logos are shown in 19 of the 44 television news stories (Figure 7.7c). ‘Labor’ appears in 18 and ‘Kevin07’ in six. Of the latter, all are on t-shirts worn by candidates and supporters and, in one case, a dog. ‘Labor’ appears a total of 50 times, and ‘Kevin07’ a total of 13 times. On five occasions - 19 and 21 October and 10, 19 and 24 November - both logos appear in a story. Logos are mostly positioned in the mid ground or background and are usually medium or small sized (data not shown). ‘Labor’ is more often in the background and of medium size, whereas ‘Kevin07’ is mostly in the mid ground and of medium size (data not shown).

(a) (b) (c) 1.2 12.0 40.0 Logo

10.0 1.0 Labor shots)

8.0 Kevin07

30.0 of

) 0.8 6.0 story)

Frequency 4.0 frequency stories

per 0.6

20.0 (number of

2.0 Frequency (% 0.4 (shots 0.0

10.0 Average 0.2

0.0 0.0 Logo Logo Date of story

Figure 7.7. Visual representation of logos in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of stories in which each logo appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each logo across all stories, and (c) frequency of each logo in each story.

There is evidence of conscious and strategic use of logos. Logos appear in more than half of all television stories. In six, however, Labor logos appear with the logos of other parties on graphics of opinion polls that were created by the ABC, which is obliged to include all party logos for impartiality. Labor cannot take credit for these appearances but it can take credit for the logo’s appearance in another 12 stories. In these cases, the logo appears because of its placement in shot at a media conference or event involving the leader or another party figure. This is a satisfactory outcome for earned media. Labor’s use of ‘Kevin07’ t-shirts is clever because people, and dogs, are more mobile and therefore more easily placed in shot than a static corflute or sandwich board. In addition, a person, but perhaps not a canine, wearing such a t-shirt is lending much-valued personal support to Rudd. On 14 November, the day of Labor’s formal campaign launch, the news ran ten

155 shots of the party’s logo, providing a nice match with the television commercials for that night. As in the commercials, the ‘Labor’ logo dominates the ‘Kevin07’ logo.

Slogans in the 2007 campaign Contemporary Labor uses “a number of campaign slogans in any election campaign” (Hawker 2012) and the party deployed three throughout 2007. The first, ‘Fresh Thinking’ (Figure 7.8a), was launched at the national conference in April and the second, ‘New Leadership.’ (Figure 7.8b), was unveiled at the “faux” campaign launch in September (Jackman 2008: 183). The two slogans - ‘New Leadership.’ and the slightly changed ‘Fresh Ideas’ - were brought together on the backdrop and lectern on the stage at the official campaign launch in November (Figure 7.8c). The slogan was in white to stand out against a red backdrop at the national conference (Figure 7.8a), and against grey on lecterns (Figures 7.8b and 7.8c) and blue pull-up banners (Figure 7.8b). The slogan appeared in aqua against a rich blue background at the official campaign launch (Figures 7.8b and 7.8c).

Figure 7.8. Labor’s slogans in 2007: (a) ‘Fresh Thinking’; (b) ‘New Leadership’, and; (c) ‘New Leadership. Fresh Ideas’. Sources: (a) The Canberra Times 27 November 2012; (b) The Sydney Morning Herald 31 January 2009; (c) The Telegraph 23 November 2012.

Gartrell (2012) said ‘Fresh Thinking’ was as a result of us saying this conference has got to look different, Rudd’s got to look new and fresh but he’s also very smart and has ideas for the country”. As the informal campaign gathered pace, Labor also looked for “a reassurance message as well” (Gartrell 2012). Martin (2012) explained: We toyed around with just ‘Leadership’ but that was very much like [then Prime Minister Paul] Keating in ‘96. There were a few others that we bounced around and put into focus groups to have a look at but ‘New Leadership.’ was the one we settled on.

Gartrell (2012) elaborated: The slogan ‘New Leadership.’ was a combination of ‘new’, something that all advertisers want to try and get because people want new things, and also ‘leadership’, a word that was 156

reassuring and about our readiness essentially. When you use the word leadership it’s a reassuring word, it has gravitas, it indicates you are ready.

Gartrell (2012) wanted the slogans to do double-duty - “to say something that the other side can’t claim” and also “play very strongly to our negative depiction of Howard”. ‘Fresh Thinking’ “was about Rudd being new and fresh, but it was also the opposite of Howard who was old and stale” (Gartrell 2012). The positives in the slogans “were things that Howard just could not claim” Gartrell (2012).

Labor’s slogan strategy was tested by studying the visual representations in sample of their television commercials in addition to the ABC television news stories from each night of the campaign.

Slogans in commercials Analysis of the television commercials shows the ‘New Leadership.’ slogan is the only one used. It appears in six of the 11 television commercials (Figure 7.9a), and once only per commercial (Figure 7.9c). Slogans are always positioned in the foreground, and are mostly medium sized (data not shown).

(a) (b) (c) 60.0 0.6 1.2 Slogan 1.0

50.0 0.5 New Leadership. shots) )

0.8 of

40.0 0.4 0.6 Frequency frequency commercial) 0.4

30.0 0.3 (number commercials per 0.2

Frequency of 20.0 0.2 0.0 (% Average (shots 10.0 0.1

0.0 0.0 Slogan Slogan Date of commercial

Figure 7.9. Visual representation of slogans in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each slogan appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each slogan across all commercials, and (c) frequency of each slogan in each commercial.

There is evidence that Labor consciously and strategically uses slogans during the 2007 campaign. Five of the six commercials in which the slogan is used are wholly or mostly focussed on points of difference which marry nicely with the ‘New Leadership.’ message. The sixth commercial, from 12 November, has Rudd promising to control interest rates, a key negative for Howard. Thus, the ‘New Leadership.” slogan fits. The slogan is absent from five commercials, for good reasons. The first 157 commercial of the year, 26 January, was produced before any slogan was developed. The second, on 24 June, cast Rudd as an economic conservative and sought a point of parity with John Howard. This does not lend itself to a slogan which spoke to a point of difference. The commercials of 3 and 6 November are critical of Howard, and Labor clearly does not want to associate its ‘New Leadership’ slogan nor its new leader with negatives.

Slogans in stories Analysis of stories shows that two slogans, ‘New Leadership.’ and ‘New Leadership. Fresh Ideas’, appeared. ‘New Leadership.’ appears most frequently at 54% of the time, compared to ‘New Leadership. Fresh Ideas’ at 16% (Figure 7.10a). On average frequency per commercial, ‘New Leadership’ appears 2.2 times and ‘New Leadership. Fresh Ideas’ just over 0.5 (Figure 7.10b). Slogans are shown in 23 of the 44 stories (Figure 7.10c). ‘New Leadership.’ appears 97 times across 18 news items and ‘New Leadership. Fresh Ideas’ appears 23 times across seven news items. On relative prominence, ‘New Leadership.’ is small around half the time and is most often positioned in the background. ‘New Leadership. Fresh Ideas’ is usually in the mid ground and size is almost equally distributed between medium and small (data not shown).

(a) (b) (c) 60.0 2.5 30.0 Slogan

25.0 50.0 New Leadership. 2.0 shots)

20.0 of

) 40.0 15.0 New Leadership. story) 1.5 Fresh Ideas Frequency

frequency 10.0 stories

per

30.0 (number of 1.0 5.0 Frequency (%

20.0 (shots 0.0 Average 10.0 0.5

0.0 0.0 Slogan Slogan Date of story

Figure 7.10. Visual representation of slogans in ABC television news stories during the 2007 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of stories in which each slogan appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each slogan across all stories, and (c) frequency of each slogan in each story.

There is evidence of conscious and strategic use of slogans throughout the campaign, and the use of different tactics at different stages. For example, ‘New Leadership.’ is well deployed at Rudd’s media event on 14 October, the day Howard called the election, and it appears in 12 shots in that evening’s news story. In the two stories from 14 November, the day of Labor’s official campaign launch, both slogans appear for a total of 26 shots, which is an outstanding result (Figure 7.10c). Thereafter, Labor changes tack, using the ‘New Leadership. Fresh ideas’ slogan only in the last ten

158 days of the campaign. In two of the three days subject to the mandatory electronic advertising black-out from 22 November, the slogan is shown in television news stories (Figure 7.10c).

Hierarchy in the 2010 campaign In 2010, Labor employed a similar brand hierarchy as in 2007, but with an important difference. The individual brand crafted around Gillard preceded a party brand whose name was mentioned as little as possible.

Logos in the 2010 campaign In 2010, Labor retained the party logo used since 2007 (Figure 7.4c) and developed no personal logo for Gillard. The party employed a very different approach to logo use in this campaign, as is evident in the data from the sample of Labor television commercials and ABC television news stories from this campaign.

Logos in commercials The Labor logo does not appear in any of the 11 commercials in the sample, and neither does the Labor name beyond the mandatory authorisations. This was a deliberate strategy, as neither lack of time nor resources can account for this omission. The logo was unchanged from that used in 2007 and, therefore, was available for immediate inclusion in a commercial. As Feeney (2012) noted, however, “there are campaigns where you run away from the Labor brand” and Young (2004: 233) has argued there are “some solid reasons why the major parties might want to conceal their own identities”. The most likely reason in this case, was that Labor sought to disassociate a new and initially popular leader from a party that had, once again, become unpopular.

Logos in stories Labor logos do appear in some stories, but probably not because of any strategic intent on Labor’s part. The logo appears in seven of the 37 stories or 19% (Figure 7.11a), with an average frequency of just 0.22 appearances per story (Figure 7.11b). The only time it appears more than once is on 2 August. The logos are mostly positioned in the foreground and are usually small (data not shown). Six appearances of the Labor logo are with other party logos on ABC-generated graphics related to opinion polls and, therefore, not engineered by Labor. The final appearance is a shot of party letterhead in a story about the Labor and Liberal campaign directors exchanging testy letters over debate dates. Although Labor may have given its letter to the media, this does not constitute a serious attempt at logo placement. There are no images of Labor logos on pull-up banners, lecterns, placards or even t-shirts. At Labor’s 2010 campaign launch, Gillard was “spruik[ing] a no-name 159 brand” (Hudson 2010b); the party name was nowhere in sight and was mentioned just twice by Gillard (Hudson 2010b). Even allowing for reduced time and resources available to campaigners, it is inconceivable that they could not produce enough branded material and employ enough skill at some point in the campaign to ensure that the Labor logo appeared in shot with the leader. After all, they had managed to produce and properly position pull-up banners bearing slogans from 28 July. It takes some planning, in fact, to ensure that a party logo does not appear in shot. This is especially so when leaders are mingling with candidates and supporters, who may wear or display Labor logos, and who have advance knowledge of a public event such as Gillard’s walk through a busy Sydney train station with the New South Wales Premier and Labor candidates on 11 August. This is evidence of a deliberate, and well-executed, strategy.

(a) (b) (c) 20.0 0.25 2.0 Logo

Labor 0.20 shots)

15.0 of

) 1.0 story) 0.15

Frequency frequency stories

10.0 per

(number of

0.10 Frequency (% (shots

5.0 Average 0.05 0.0

0.0 0.00 Logo Logo Date of story

Figure 7.11. Visual representation of logos in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of stories in which each logo appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each logo across all stories, and (c) frequency of each logo in each story.

Slogans in the 2010 campaign In 2010, Labor started with the positive slogan ‘Moving Forward’ in Gillard’s media conference on 17 July announcing the poll date. In the television commercials that began that day, the slogan evolved into ‘Let’s move Australia Forward’. The background colour was a vibrant aqua with the first three words in white and the final word, ‘Forward’, in a darker blue and in capitals (Figure 7.12a). This slogan was repeated on pull-up banners used at media conferences from 28 July. Here, the background colour was a more muted blue, with the words picked out in white (Figure 7.12b). Finally, ‘Stronger Economy, Better Hospitals & Schools’, was used at the official launch (Figure 7.12c). The colours changed again, with pale blue words picked out against a vibrant blue background.

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Figure 7.12. Labor’s positive slogans in the 2010 campaign. (a) ‘Let’s move Australia forward’ from ALP television commercial 17 July; (b) ‘Let’s move Australia forward’ pull-up banner from ABC Television News 6 August, and; (c) ‘Stronger Economy, Better Hospitals & Schools’ backdrop from ABC Television News 16 August.

Martin (2012) said slogan development happened in the same way as in 2007: Essentially, looking at what were our strengths as a party and as a campaign. And our strength was really to reiterate the core Labor message, that we have to get on with the job. We’re getting on with the job, there have been hiccups and problems but we’re getting on with it. That’s what moving forward meant. It wasn’t what some people have said, which was it about moving on from Rudd.

Hawker (2012) said “the full slogan was forwards not backwards, a juxtaposition between Gillard and Abbott, that was the intention”. The slogan was meant to lay the foundation for the narrative of the campaign and the next government (Martin 2012). Kaiser (2012) argued: “This was a reasonable strategic approach, wrapped up in a couple of words. You could see them building a campaign from that, but they never really did”. Feeney (2012) was more critical, adamant that the slogan “didn’t say enough”. Martin (2012) acknowledged its shortcomings in such a difficult context: It was fine as a simple catch phrase but once you actually get into the cut and thrust of a campaign where there are all these issues that are floating around unanswered – like, leadership change, why? - that’s not going to carry you over the line.

Gillard’s repetition of the slogan at her media conference announcing the election date was criticised as “too confected” (Feeney 2012) and “just overdone” (Hawker 2012). The slogan, and Gillard’s repetition and delivery, were ridiculed by some commentators and voters (Cassidy 2010a: 143-144). Milner (2012) said of this episode: “We’ve got a communication problem, not necessarily a message problem, but certainly a communication problem”.

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As in the 2007 campaign, the positive slogan was also designed to play to the negative depiction of the opposition. Hawker (2012) noted: “You’ll have negative slogans if you’re attacking the other side - ‘Don’t risk them, don’t let them take you backwards’”. Labor used variations of these words in a number of its television commercials against Abbott, including ‘Don’t Risk Tony Abbott’ (Figure 7.13a), ‘Don’t go backwards’ (Figure 7.13b) and ‘He’s just too big a risk’ (Figure 7.13c). The risk theme ran in commercials in the sample from about mid-campaign through to the electronic advertising blackout at midnight on 18 August. Four of the commercials are strong negatives against Abbott. All feature an unflattering black and white headshot of Abbott, and three end with a negative slogan stamped in black and red over his mouth, as seen in Figure 7.13a and 7.13c.

Figure 7.13. Variations on Labor’s negative slogans against Tony Abbott in the 2010 election campaign: (a) ‘Don’t Go Backwards’ from ALP television commercial 28 July; (b) ‘Don’t Risk Tony Abbott’ from ALP television commercial 14 August, and; (c) ‘He’s Just Too Big a Risk” from ALP television commercial 17 August.

As before, I test what Labor practitioners said they sought to do against what they achieved. I assess the Labor television commercials and the ABC television news stories for visual representations of the slogans nominated above.

Slogans in commercials Altogether, the commercials use four different slogans: ‘Let’s Move Australia Forward’, ‘Don’t Risk Tony Abbott’, ‘Don’t go backwards’ and ‘He’s just too big a risk’. ‘Let’s Move Australia Forward’ appears in 55% of commercials with the other three appearing less than 20% each (Figure 7.14.a). The relative proportions are the same when average frequency per commercial is considered (Figure 7.14.b). ‘Let’s Move Australia Forward’ appears in six commercials, ‘Don’t Risk Tony Abbott’ appears in two and the rest appear in one each (Figure 7.14.c). Slogans only appear once per commercial. Slogans are always in the foreground, and usually of medium size (data not shown). Slogans appear in ten of the eleven commercials. The sole commercial without a 162 slogan is from 16 July, the day before Gillard announced the poll. There is some evidence of conscious and strategic use of slogans, and use of different tactics at different times. For example, ‘Let’s Move Australia Forward’ appears solely in the first three commercials of the formal campaign, thereby establishing a positive message for Gillard and providing a contrast for the subsequent negative messages about Abbott. The anti-Abbott slogans become progressively more negative with the strongest, ‘He’s just too big a risk’, closing out the television advertising campaign.

(a) (b) 60.0 0.6 1.2 Slogan 1.0

50.0 0.5 Let's Move Australia shots) ) 0.8 Forward

of

40.0 0.4 0.6 Don't Risk Tony Abbott 0.4 Frequency frequency commercial)

30.0 0.3

(number Don't go backwards commercials per

0.2

Frequency of

20.0 0.2 0.0 (%

Average He's just too big a risk (shots 10.0 0.1

0.0 0.0 Slogan Slogan Date of commercial

Figure 7.14. Visual representation of slogans in selected Labor television commercials up to and including the 2010 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of commercials in which each slogan appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each slogan across all commercials, and (c) frequency of each slogan in each commercial.

Slogans in stories There are fewer slogans and fewer appearances in news stories. Just two slogans - ‘Let's Move Australia Forward’ and ‘Stronger Economy Better Hospitals & Schools’- appear in 22% and 2.5% of stories, respectively (Figure 7.15a). When average frequency of appearance per commercial is considered, ‘Let's Move Australia Forward’ appears 0.6 times and ‘Stronger Economy Better Hospitals & Schools’ appears 0.5 times per story (Figure 7.15b). Slogans appear in just nine stories. ‘Let's Move Australia Forward’ appears in eight stories and ‘Stronger Economy Better Hospitals & Schools’ in one (Figure 7.15c). Slogans are usually in the mid or background and size ranges across the three categories (data not shown).

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(a) (b) (c) 25.0 0.6 15.0 Slogan 0.5 Let's Move 20.0

shots) Australia Forward

of

10.0 ) 0.4

15.0 story) Stronger Economy Frequency frequency 0.3 Better Hospitals &

stories per 5.0

(number Schools of 10.0 Frequency (% 0.2 (shots 0.0 Average 5.0 0.1

0.0 0.0 Slogan Slogan Date of story

Figure 7.15. Visual representation of slogans in ABC television news stories during the 2010 federal election campaign. (a) percentage of stories in which each slogan appears (b) average frequency of appearance of each slogan across all stories, and (c) frequency of each slogan in each story.

There is some evidence of conscious and strategic use of slogans but also missed opportunities. For example, there is no slogan in any news story for the first eleven days of the formal campaign. Labor may have decided against using ‘Let's Move Australia Forward’ at early media events following criticism of its first outing. More likely the omission was because the short interval between Gillard’s ascension and the calling of the election meant campaign materials simply were not ready in time. If so, it represents a wasted opportunity to send a positive message via television news and to coordinate with television commercials. Labor also misses opportunities to have slogans appear in stories during the electronic advertising blackout. ‘Let's Move Australia Forward’ appears a total of 21 times (Figure 7.15c). When it does appear, it is in small numbers, reaching a maximum of seven appearances in one story. Labor does better with the second slogan. ‘Stronger Economy Better Hospitals & Schools’, appears 17 times in the one story on 16 August, on pull-up banners behind Gillard at the official campaign launch (Figure 7.15c).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Labor figures from the 2007 campaign clearly understood the importance of brand architecture and hierarchy, and the use of logos and slogans. This was established in interviews and borne out by data from commercials and news stories. On brand hierarchy, for example, Labor’s campaign did have “an appropriate emphasis” (Feeney 2012) on the party but was “very heavily dialled up on the leader” (Gartrell 2012). Hence, the exclusive use of the ‘New Leadership.’ slogan in the commercials. There is strong evidence of conscious and strategic use of logos and slogans within an item, across each channel throughout the campaign, and between the two channels. The commercials of 14 and 22 October, for example, each feature three logos, and the story of 14 November shows two slogans a total of 26 times. There is a discernible pattern in the use of logos and identifiers across the commercials. After Kevin Rudd is established as Labor leader, the Labor 164 logo is introduced. Next the ‘Kevin07’ logo is introduced, and the use of ‘Kevin Rudd - Labor Leader’ tapers off. In the latter stages of the campaign, ‘‘Vote Labor’’ is introduced. In a sign of good coordination between the two channels, the ‘New Leadership.’ slogan appears in all commercials during the formal campaign. It also appears in stories until Labor’s official campaign launch on 14 November, which introduces the slogan ‘New Leadership. Fresh Ideas. That night’s story shows both slogans, and, thereafter, only the latter; this is evidence of careful planning by Labor to consistently present a message around leadership in both channels, and to transition from one slogan to another in stories. The same level of strategic thinking invested in developing the logos and slogans is applied to their deployment in commercials and news. For example, the commercial that was prepared for the day of the announcement of the poll date features three logos and the first outing for the ‘New Leadership.’ slogan. Labor performs very well in commercials, where it had complete control, and also did well in news, which is mediated. In sum, I argue that Labor’s 2007 campaign team consciously, strategically and fully deployed brand architecture, hierarchy, logos and slogans. Further, I argue that the party demonstrated a strong branding orientation in relation to these components.

The interviews showed that practitioners in the 2010 campaign also understood the importance of brand architecture and hierarchy, and the use of logos and slogans. They used a very different strategy and overall achieved less success than in 2007. The party deploys brand hierarchy by featuring Gillard exclusively; Labor has no planned presence beyond the mandatory authorisations at the end of commercials. There is evidence of a defensive strategy in the decision not to run party logos or identifiers for Gillard, in either commercials or media events. While there are no logos, there are multiple slogans. There is evidence of conscious and strategic use of slogans across the commercials. Although there are four discrete slogans in the sample, twice the number in 2007, they relate to two key themes. The commercials start with positive messages for Gillard and thereafter are interspersed with increasingly-negative messages against Abbott. There is less evidence of strategy within an item, although Labor is very successful with the ‘Stronger Economy, Better Hospitals & Schools’ slogan on 16 August. There is less meshing between the two channels. As noted, use of slogans in media events got off to a slow start. Rudd had slogans on pull-up banners behind him from the first day of the formal campaign in 2007, even though he was Opposition leader and did not get to name the date. Gillard, who did get to name the date, did not have pull-up banners at her events for eleven days. Finally, the appearance of slogans in news stories is patchy, and there are no discernible match-ups between commercials and stories. The lack of logos is no doubt due to the unpopularity of the Labor Party. The missed opportunities and poor success rate with slogans is likely due to lack of time before the election was called and some poor planning 165 thereafter. Overall, Labor performs much better in commercials than in news. In sum, I argued that Labor’s 2010 campaign team was conscious of brand architecture and hierarchy, logos and slogans, and did demonstrate some strategy. However, they fell well short of full deployment. Further, I argue the party demonstrated a moderate to weak branding orientation in relation to these components.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

MARKETING THE BRAND: INTEGRATED MARKETING

INTRODUCTION Good marketing makes “the biggest contribution” to brand equity by building brand knowledge (Keller 2008: 40). It can “enhance brand awareness, improve the brand image, elicit positive brand responses, and increase brand resonance” (Keller 2008: 185). Marketing should, therefore, be designed “from a branding perspective” (Keller 2008: 267). Good marketing also is effective and efficient, with the whole greater than the sum of the parts (Keller 2008: 267). Marketing should, therefore, be integrated (Keller 2008: 267). This chapter examines the integration of Labor’s marketing activities in the 2007 and 2010 campaigns. It proceeds in four parts. The first defines and discusses integrated marketing (Checklist Tactic: 2b Integrating marketing). The second part explains how integrated marketing is assessed, and provides an example. The third and fourth parts consider if, and how, Labor employed integrated marketing in the 2007 and 2010 campaigns. The final part draws conclusions about each campaign, and about Labor’s use of branding in general.

Labor’s television commercials and ABC television news stories were evaluated for how well the party integrated its marketing in each campaign. I used a combination of objective and subjective evaluations for each commercial and story, throughout each channel and across each campaign.

INTEGRATED MARKETING The recent focus on relationship marketing means the marketing mix approach “may not fully describe modern marketing programs” (Keller 2008: 194) but marketers still must decide “what they are going to sell, how (and where) they are going to sell it, and at what price” (Keller 2008: 194). Thus, marketing activities still encompass the product, price, distribution channels and communications (Keller 2008: 230). I focus on communications because political marketing literature and Labor practitioners stressed the importance of communications, and because televised communications can be captured and measured.

Communications are “the means by which firms attempt to inform, persuade and remind consumers - directly or indirectly - about the brands they sell” (Keller 2008: 230). Communications build brand

167 equity by “creating awareness of the brand; linking points-of-parity and points-of-difference associations to the brand in consumers’ memory; eliciting positive brand judgements or feelings; and facilitating a stronger consumer-brand connection and brand resonance” (Keller 2008: 230). Communications options include advertising, publicity and public relations, personal selling, promotions, event marketing and sponsorship (Keller 2008: 230). As discussed in Chapter Three, this work focuses on advertising and publicity, particularly aimed at television. Advertising is “any paid form of non personal presentation and promotion of ideas, goods or services by an identified sponsor” (Keller 2008: 235). A number of empirical and case studies point to “the potential power of advertising on brand sales” (Keller 2008: 235), although “specific effects are often difficult to quantify and predict” (Keller 2008: 235). Publicity is “non personal communications such as press releases, media interviews, press conferences, feature articles, newsletters, photographs, films and tapes” (Keller 2008: 264). “Well-conceived and well-executed” publicity can support advertising, and should be “a routine part” of marketing communications (Keller 2008: 264).

Keller (2008: 267) recommends that marketers choose a variety of options that “share common meaning and content but also offer different, complementary advantages so the whole is greater than the sum of the parts”. I focus on broadcast communications that share common meaning and content, because these were what practitioners identified as most important. Keller (2008: 267) nominated six criteria for creating an effective and efficient marketing program: coverage, contribution, commonality, complementarity, versatility and cost. I focus on coverage, contribution and commonality, again because practitioners stressed their importance. Coverage describes the “proportion of the audience reached by each communication option, as well as how much overlap exists among communication options” (Keller 2008: 267). Using two options in tandem can create “interaction or multiplicative effects” (Keller 2008: 267). Each communication can make a unique contribution to consumer knowledge about a brand, and all communications can contribute to common, consistent brand image (Keller 2008: 268-269). Common content and meaning throughout all communications can “create a consistent and cohesive brand image” (Keller 2008: 269). Generally, consistent information is more readily learnt and recalled than inconsistent information, and multiple communications may create multiple memory retrieval routes and therefore enhanced recall (Keller 2008: 269). In addition, consistency of execution, such as the repeated use of a symbol to convey a message, can improve recall (Keller 2008: 269). Generally, “inconsistency [...] leads to uncertainty” (Light 1994 cited in Keller 2008: 269) but “the unexpectedness of inconsistent information sometimes can lead to more elaborate processing and stronger associations” (Keller 2008: 269). In sum, Keller argued that every marketing

168 communication should be judged on how it contributes to creating and sustaining strong, favourable and unique brand associations (2008: 272), and how it matches and enhances others (2008: 273).

Integrated marketing in politics Marketing for a political brand is viewed in similar ways. The brand should be “the main prism through which the party interacts with and is understood by the public” (Conley 2014: 131) and is “the key communicative tool of contemporary politics” (Cosgrove 2014: 121). In other words, the brand should drive the marketing, and communication is about building brand equity. Political marketing activities can relate to the product, price, distribution channels and communications (Cwalina et al 2011: 47; Henneberg 2002: 125). Communication techniques are “the most important political marketing instruments” in general (Henneberg 2002: 127), and the main instruments used in a campaign (Henneberg 2002: 131). Communication can help build brand awareness (Phipps et al 2010: 500), and a high level of awareness translates into a high level of brand equity (Smith and Spotswood 2013: 185). Communication can also develop and maintain associations for both a candidate and party. A powerful political brand, like a commercial one, will have strong, favourable, and unique associations (Smith and Spotswood 2013: 192). Communication can “create, influence or distribute” the image of the political product (Henneberg 2002: 127), assist with name or brand identification (Henneberg 2002: 120), “project the ability or inability of the party to govern” (Dann and Hughes 2008: 3), and influence the political agenda (Henneberg 2002: 127). In all, communication provides information which assists voters in making their choice (Henneberg 2002: 120).

Political practitioners can select from a range of communication options including advertising (Henneberg 2002: 120) and public relations (Dann and Hughes 2008: 4). Each communication channel “has its own unique strengths” (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 81) in marketing a political band. Political public relations is “especially advanced both strategically and tactically” (Butler and Harris 2009: 156), and is “as much a defensive activity by parties against critical journalism as an offensive of self-serving publicity’ (Brissenden and Moloney 2005: 1006, cited in Butler and Harris 2009: 156). Advertising is especially useful for building brand awareness (Phipps et al 2010: 500) and crafting brand image by generating emotional appeal (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 83). Dann and Hughes (2008: 4) warn that communications “can showcase ability or inability, and will do so with equal levels of efficiency”. Consistency is seen as critical (Butler and Harris 2009: 156; Cosgrove 2007: 7, 2014: 121; Spiller and Bergner 2011: 38) because “the story around the brand helps the audience know whether or not they should be interested in the product being promoted by the brand” (Cosgrove 2007: 2). As in commerce, political marketing is most efficient and effective 169 when it is integrated. Since the 1980s, parties have become more disciplined in pursuing “a consistent campaign across media” (Harrop 1990: 286). Using multiple channels in tandem can have a powerful impact (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 80). There is “mounting evidence on the ways that news, political ads, and other campaign activities work synergistically to change the priorities and preferences of voters” (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 81).

Labor practitioners echoed many of the general and specific points made by Keller. They believed communication contributes to building voter awareness, enhancing the image of a politician or party, eliciting responses, and encouraging votes. Strategist Bruce Hawker (2012), for example, spoke of building voter awareness throughout the electoral cycle: You’ve got an electorate that’s generally not particularly engaged until about 10 days out from the election. So we have to find ways of getting the public to engage long enough to get, at the very least, an impression of our main message, and later in the campaign a clear message about the policies and so forth.

Practitioners stressed the need for consistent and clear communications. Former Deputy Campaign Director, David Feeney (2012), said: “You have to have a story and you have to then have some message discipline around it”. Importantly, as former Campaign Director, Tim Gartrell (2012), noted “the whole has to make up more than the sum of its parts”. Labor sought commonality in several ways. First, the party presented the same messages in paid and earned media. Strategist Cameron Milner (2012) stressed that a campaign “can’t have an incongruent advertising message with the news cycle” and pollster John Utting (2012) said “if you’ve got the ads and the news basically saying the same thing you’re on a real sweet spot”. Commonality was pursued through repetition of a message. Former Assistant National Secretary, Mike Kaiser (2012), said parties “can’t expect to build a theme or build an understanding in a population base of around 20 million people without drumming into them the same things over and over and over again”. Commonality also was sought in the components of a message. Hawker (2012) described consistent use of brand elements, such as logos and slogans, as “extremely important”. He also highlighted the importance of including representatives of the target voters in communications, and integration of the visual and verbal messages (Hawker 2012). For example, he (2012) said: I’ve always believed that wherever you are doing a stand-up in an election campaign that your backdrop should be absolutely appropriate to what you’re saying and should really enhance the message that you’re trying to convey.

All practitioners spoke of the importance of a comprehensive and integrated marketing plan for their offerings. Kaiser (2012) described integration as consistency throughout campaigns and 170 governments. In a campaign, Gartrell (2012) noted it’s “really, really important” to integrate marketing as much as possible “from the flagship campaign launch, and the leader, and national advertising, down to the pamphlets going into letterboxes at the local level”. Utting (2012) said “there’s always a huge effort” to integrate communications across the various channels. “The main engine is the TV advertising so stuff has to be driven by what works on TV” (Utting 2012). What works on television is short and sharp. “The TVC is the discipline of the campaign message, if you can’t say it in 30 seconds it’s not worth saying” (Milner 2012). This discipline “informs the creative process that goes to longer ideas on YouTube and the like” (Milner 2012). As noted in Chapter Three, practitioners said television advertising and news remained the most important communication channels. They said they carefully considered the coverage of various communications channels. Television commercials were seen to offer an effective and unmediated means of communicating with a mass audience (Hawker 2012; Martin 2012). Hawker (2012) said “nothing is more important than good television advertising”. Practitioners acknowledged, however, that many people were reluctant consumers of political advertising (Milner 2012). They hoped to reach these people via television news; an effective, though mediated, means of mass communication seen by the audience as a credible information source. Hawker (2012) explained that “some stories by their nature are much better communicated through print media, particularly if they’ve got levels of complexity, but nine times out of ten I would say if you win the TV news, you’ve won the day”.

Integrated marketing evaluations I evaluated the commercials and stories using three measures proposed by Keller (2008: 267) and endorsed by the practitioners - coverage, contribution and commonality. First, I discussed how practitioners considered the coverage offered by each communication channel. Next, I evaluated the contribution of each commercial and story. I did this by assessing how each: created awareness of the Rudd, Gillard or Labor brands; enhanced the image of the individual or the party, and; elicited positive brand judgements or feelings (Keller 2008: 230). Finally, I evaluated commonality within each commercial and story. I did this by counting and assessing the consistency of visual and verbal appearances of segments, points of difference, points of parity, logos and slogans. The results for each commercial and story were tallied and summarised, and each was given an integration assessment. Assessment was on a five-point scale: low, low to moderate, moderate, moderate to high and high. In making the assessment, I looked at how the party brought together the five brand components that have been assessed individually to this point; that is, segments, points of difference and parity, logos and slogans. In a well-integrated communication, these will be tied together. A single visual or verbal message may be linked to multiple brand components. For example, when 171

Rudd described a laptop as “the toolbox of the 21st century” (ABC Television News 2007a) he was talking to two points of differences - ‘new/future’ and ‘education’. These messages were directed at two segments - young people and families who wanted a future-focussed leader and, in the case of families, a good education for their children. Further, I considered if the commercial or story looked and sounded coherent and authentic. Gillard, for example, looked genuine and comfortable meeting and joking with construction workers at a building site, which provided the perfect backdrop for her announcement of support for trade apprentices (ABC 2010c). In this story, Gillard talked to the point of difference on education, via her verbal message of support for apprentices, and the point of parity on economic management, via the visuals of the construction site which points to economic well-being. In doing so, she reached out to two segments - blue collar workers via the announcement on apprentices and families who looked for evidence of economic competence. All these things contribute to a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts. The full evaluation of the television commercial of 22 October 2007 is shown as an example (Table 8.1).

In addition, I evaluated integration in each channel in each campaign. I did this by tallying the integration assessments for each commercial or story, and scoring integration within each channel using the same five-point scale. I also assessed how commercials and stories were used in tandem on individual days, and how they were meshed throughout each campaign. Six evaluations are discussed in detail, as examples. For each campaign, I selected one strong and one weak example of integration within one item, and one example of good integration between a commercial and a story. Finally, I evaluated overall integration within each campaign by assessing and discussing all these data. This chapter helps answer Research Question 3: Did Labor consciously undertake political branding in the 2007 and 2010 federal campaigns? If so, how strategically and how fully?

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Table 8.1. Evaluation of integration of marketing within a Labor television commercial. Viewing the columns from top to bottom, this table shows: the count of the visual and verbal representations of segments, points of difference and parity, logos and slogans in the commercial; followed by a ‘Summary description’ which is an objective and subjective analysis of the coverage, contribution and commonality of marketing within the commercial, and ‘Integration assessment’ which is an evaluation, based on a five-point scale, of integration of marketing within the commercial.

SOURCE: Labor television commercial DATE: 22 October 2007 Segments: Family Blue Young Queensland Visual count 0 0 28 0 Verbal count 0 0 0 0 Points of difference: New/Future Fair Climate Education Health Visual count 28 0 28 0 0 Verbal count 2 0 6 0 0 Points of parity: Safe change Economic Visual count 0 0 Verbal count 0 0 Kevin Rudd Logos: Labor Kevin07 Vote Labor Labor leader Visual count 1 1 0 1 New New Slogans: Leadership. Leadership. Fresh Ideas Visual count 1 0 Very strong contribution to creating awareness of the ‘Kevin07’ brand, including use of slogan, and link to Labor brand. Very strong contribution to linking: ‘new/future’ and ‘climate change’ points of difference, especially visual. Very strong contribution to eliciting positive brand judgements and feelings (contemporary policy and use of technology, purposeful, confident, future- focussed). Very good commonality with common content between ‘new/future’ and Summary description ‘climate change’ visual and verbal points of difference. Overall, very well scripted and produced, whole greater than sum of parts (rich visuals perfectly matched with verbals; empowering of voter via Rudd’s statement: “In a very real sense, you're voting for the future"; very rich final visual showing Rudd and the world; inspirational). One of Labor's strongest commercials. Very strong contribution to the ‘Kevin07’ brand. Integration assessment High

Integrated marketing in the 2007 campaign Practitioners were universally positive about the marketing in the 2007 campaign. Assistant National Secretary Nick Martin (2012) noted that “07 was textbook stuff” with a centralised, tightly co-ordinated approach which produced “complete integration from top to bottom”. Quantitative research helped shape the advertising strategy and the meta-messages. These and the daily messages were refined by qualitative research, as Martin (2012) explained: We had the research which Tony Mitchelmore and I would do with focus groups every night. That fed into message development each morning which was then pumped out into the 173

hands of the key spokespeople including the leader, who was briefed by phone every day or in person. The same message was seamlessly rolled out across all platforms - what we were getting in press conferences through to what we were putting into television advertising and radio advertising each day - and into talking points for marginal seat candidates.

The Queensland sub-set of the campaign “had a lot of Kevin’s brand and image, emphasised and nuanced for Queensland” (Milner 2012). Hawker (2012) said “the branding [of Rudd], the paraphernalia that went with that, the advertising, the sloganeering all went to enhance the message”.

Integrated marketing in commercials The commercial of 22 October is one of the best from the 2007 campaign, and a very good example of high integration within a commercial. It focuses on climate change, spelling out the policy differences between Rudd and Howard. The data tells part of the story (Figure 8.1 from left to right). Young voters are very strongly represented, as are the ‘new/future’ and ‘climate change’ points of difference, especially visually. Both the personal and party brands are employed via the ‘Kevin07’ logo, the Labor logo and the ‘Vote Labor’ call to action. The slogan ‘New Leadership.’ also features. Screenshots from the commercial (Figure 8.2) further contribute to the story. Figure 8.2a shows Rudd in front of images of parched and burning landscapes. These, and other images in the commercial, help make tangible the threat of climate change. Next, are headlines from newspaper stories about Howard ignoring warnings about climate change while Rudd says: “For our long-term future, there is no more important difference between Mr Howard and myself than on climate change” (Figure 8.2b). This shot is important because it uses independent sources to criticise Howard’s policy position while Rudd politely points out what he would do differently. The third screenshot (Figure 8.2c) is the final shot from the commercial. It is an inspirational visual featuring Rudd in front of an image of Earth, suggesting he would help save the planet. It is also a rich visual, stamped with the Labor logo and identifier, and the ‘New Leadership.’ slogan.

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Segments Points of difference Points of parity Logos Slogans 30 35 1 1 25 30 25 20 20 Verbal 15 15 Visual 10

Frequency 10 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 Safe change Economic New New Leadership. Leadership. Fresh Ideas

Category

Figure 8.1. Examples of good integration of the branding components (left to right) segments, points of difference and parity, logos and slogans within the television commercial of 22 October 2007. The number of visual and verbal representations of each component within the commercial is shown.

Figure 8.2. Examples of good integrated marketing using visual images within the television commercial of 22 October 2007. (a) Rudd with images showing climate change effects; (b) Rudd with newspaper headlines about Howard ignoring climate change warnings, and; (c) the final inspirational shot of Rudd and the planet.

While the individual components are strong, the whole of this commercial is greater than the sum of its parts. The commercial makes a very high contribution to creating awareness of the ‘Kevin07’ brand, by strongly linking Rudd to action on climate change, associating him with former American Vice-President and climate change campaigner, Al Gore, and by using the ‘Kevin07’ logo. It also seeks to involve the voter via Rudd saying in the last shot: "In a very real sense, you're voting for the future". There is also a good contribution to creating awareness of the Labor brand. The commercial makes a very strong contribution to eliciting positive judgements and feelings for the ‘Kevin07’ brand in several ways. Rudd seeks to connect with the target segment of young people with a future-focussed climate change policy presented in a contemporary and accessible manner via giant graphics. There is much common content between the visual and the verbal messages on the ‘new/future’ and ‘climate change’ points of difference. The commercial is well scripted and produced. Overall, it is purposeful, confident and future-focussed. I gave it an integration assessment of high.

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Integrated marketing in stories The story of 26 October was one of the weakest in this campaign. It reports Rudd seeking the expulsion of a trade unionist from the Labor Party, Rudd attacking Howard over interest rates, and the appearance of former Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating at the campaign launch of a high- profile Labor candidate. The data (Figure 8.3 from left to right) shows the ‘family’ segment has low representation, as does the ‘education’ point of difference. While the ‘safe change’ point of parity is reasonably well-represented visually and verbally, it is not wholly positive. Rudd had sold himself as a safe change partly on the basis that he was not beholden to unions. This claim was undermined when Rudd had to call twice for his party to expel unionist Joe McDonald, after a video emerged of McDonald swearing during a workplace meeting. On 26 October, Rudd’s request was met but it seems Rudd is forced to act while under attack from Howard and even as McDonald promises to return. There is a weak link to the ‘economic’ point of parity, with Rudd attacking Howard over interest rates. Screen shots amplify this story. The first (Figure 8.4a) is from the video of McDonald, the thuggish union boss from central casting. The second shot (Figure 8.4b) shows Rudd criticising McDonald at a media conference in a school classroom. There is a disconnect between the visual and verbal messages in this shot; it is clear the McDonald story has hijacked the announcement that had been planned for a classroom setting. The final shot (Figure 8.4c) shows Keating greeting supporters at a campaign launch. While popular among some Labor loyalists, Keating carries some negative associations, particularly on economic matters from his time as Treasurer. His appearance allows the conservatives to attack Labor on economic credibility and may cancel out or dilute Rudd’s positive messages on the economy. The contribution to the ‘Kevin07’ and Labor brands is weak, largely due to the appearance of McDonald. There is a small contribution to eliciting positive judgements and feelings for the brands via Rudd’s attack on interest rates. I gave it an integration assessment of low.

Segments Points of difference Points of parity Logos Slogans 10 5 7 6 8 4 5 6 3 4 Verbal

4 2 3 Visual

Frequency 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Safe change Economic New New Leadership. Leadership. Fresh Ideas

Category

Figure 8.3. Examples of poor integration of the branding components (left to right) segments, points of difference and parity, logos and slogans within the ABC television news story of 26 October 2007. The number of visual and verbal representations of each component within the commercial is shown. 176

Figure 8.4. Examples of poor integrated marketing using visual images within the ABC television news story of 26 October 2007. (a) union boss Joe McDonald swearing at a workplace meeting; (b) the McDonald story hijacks Rudd’s media conference at a school, and; (c) former Prime Minister, Paul Keating, carries negatives as well as positives.

Integrated marketing in commercials and stories The commercial and story from 14 October provide a good example of Labor using consistent communications to boost overall effectiveness. This was the day that John Howard announced the election date, and Labor clearly was prepared. The data tells some of the story. The commercial (Figure 8.5a from left to right) focuses heavily on the ‘family’ segment, visually and verbally, but also targets blue collar workers, young people and Queenslanders. All five points of difference are represented, with the overarching ‘new/future’ and ‘education’ the strongest. ‘Economic’ is the only point of parity shown. The ‘Kevin07’ and Labor logos and ‘Kevin Rudd - Labor leader’ identifier are all used. The ‘New Leadership.’ slogan also is used. The story (Figure 8.5b from left to right) features the ‘family’ segment, visually and verbally, and the ‘new/future’ point of difference. Both points of parity are represented, with ‘safe change’ shown three times as often as ‘economic’. No logos are shown, but the ‘New Leadership.’ slogan makes a strong showing, at 12 times.

Screenshots enlarge the story. The critical ‘new/future’ point of difference is represented in the commercial via images of a reef that presumably would be protected as part of Rudd’s “plan for the future” (Figure 8.6a) and in the story by Rudd’s attendance at church (Figure 8.6d). The ‘family’ segment is represented in the commercial by images of Rudd talking with young families (Figure 8.6b) and in the story by images of Rudd surrounded by his own family as he chats with people of various ages (Figure 8.6e). The slogan is shown prominently at the end of the commercial (Figure 8.6c) and multiple times on a lectern and a pull-up banner in the story (Figure 8.6f). It lays out most of Rudd’s offer, excluding ‘safe change’, to all of the target segments. The commercial is a reprise of the one from 24 January - shot in some of the same locations, with the same messages, even the same background music. The story backs in four key points - the ‘family’ segment, the ‘new/future’ point of difference, the ‘economic’ point of parity, and the ‘New Leadership.’ slogan. It includes the

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‘safe change’ point of parity, in response to Howard’s “warning of the risk of a switch” to Rudd (ABC 2007b).

Overall, the commercial makes a very strong contribution to the ‘Kevin07’ and Labor brands, and the story makes a very strong contribution to the ‘Kevin07’ brand. I gave both an integration assessment of high. Viewed in tandem, the commercial and the new story make for a strong communication. Rudd is saying: “I offer families a new way of doing things, with a focus on both future-focussed policies like environmental protection and the kitchen table economics of today. I will bring change, but safe change. I am a Christian, family man. I am a new kind of Labor leader and a new kind of political leader”. There are two indicators Labor put some preparation into its communications for the day of the announcement of the election date. First, the commercial is a polished, highly-produced and strategic offering that speaks of an investment of time and money. Second, pull-up banners bearing the campaign slogan were ready to be placed behind Rudd at his first media conference of the campaign, even though he did not get to name the date.

(a) Segments Points of difference Points of parity Logos Slogans 18 12 6 1 12 16 10 5 10 14 12 8 4 8 10 Verbal 6 3 6 8 Visual 6 4 2 4

Frequency 4 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 Safe change Economic New New Leadership. Leadership. Fresh Ideas Category

(b) Segments Points of difference Points of parity Logos Slogans 6 18 12 1 12 16 10 5 14 10 4 12 8 8 Verbal 10 6 3 6 8 Visual 6 4 2 4

Frequency 4 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 Safe change Economic New New Leadership. Leadership. Fresh Ideas Category

Figure 8.5. Examples of good integration of the branding components (left to right) segments, points of difference and parity, logos and slogans between (a) the Labor television commercial and (b) the ABC television news story of 14 October 2007. The number of visual and verbal representations of each component within the commercial is shown.

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Figure 8.6. Examples of good integrated marketing using visual images between the Labor television commercial (a, b, and c) and ABC television news story (d, e, and f) of October 14, 2007. The ‘new/future’ point of difference shown (a) in the commercial via images of environmental protection and (d) in the story by Rudd’s church attendance; the ‘family’ segment represented in the commercial (b) by images of Rudd talking with young families and (e) in the story by images of Rudd and his family talking with others, and; the slogan shown (c) in the commercial and (f) in the story.

Analysis of the data from all commercials and stories shows Labor performs well overall in 2007 (Figure 8.7). It integrates very well in television commercials, which are unmediated, achieving a ‘high’ score 64% of the time and ‘moderate to high’ 9% of the time. In news stories, which are mediated, Labor still performs well, scoring ‘high’ or ‘moderate to high’ more than 40% of the time, and ‘low’ or ‘low to moderate’ around 18% of the time (Figure 8.7).

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100 2007 Integrated 80 Marketing Assessment items) 60 of

High (%

Moderate to High Moderate 40 Low to Moderate Low Frequency 20

0 Television Television Commercials News (n=11) (n=44)

Figure 8.7. Assessment of integration of marketing in Labor television commercials and ABC television news stories in 2007. Integration is assessed against a five-point scale: high, moderate to high, moderate, low to moderate and low. The total number (n) of commercials and television news stories is shown in parentheses.

Integrated marketing in the 2010 campaign Practitioners were more critical of marketing in the 2010 campaign. Martin (2012) said a direct comparison with 2007 would be unfair because the leadership change caused “great disruption” to campaign staffing, preparations, and message development. Just a week before the change, for example, the party was making and testing advertisements featuring Rudd; much of this had to be junked (Milner 2012). Milner (2012) said the content of subsequent commercials “massively changed” during a campaign which was characterised by “guerrilla-style trench warfare”. Clumsy communication was also a problem. On day one, Gillard overplayed the slogan ‘Moving Forward’. Then, “the real Julia” comment overshadowed announcements about the economy, education and health (Milner 2012). There were some positives, including a capable central communications team which “smashed the news cycle each day” (Martin 2012) and ensured Labor was “right on top of the Liberals” in the free media throughout the first fortnight (Martin 2012).

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Integrated marketing in commercials The commercial of 19 July is one of the best from this campaign. It sketches Gillard’s personal story and policy agenda. The data (Figure 8.8 from left to right) shows the ‘family’ segment is the main target, with small showings for ‘western Sydney’, ‘Queensland’ and ‘inner-city’. Five of the seven points of difference are moderately represented, including the three-part point on border control, population control and environmental protection. Both points of parity are represented, with an emphasis on ‘economic’. The slogan ‘Let’s Move Australia Forward’ appears once, and the Labor logo not at all. More can be gleaned from screenshots of the commercial. Among these is a family photograph from Gillard’s childhood (Figure 8.9a), which contributes to her personal narrative and helps the connection to the ‘family’ segment. The image of an Australian Customs boat on patrol and the super ‘Stronger Borders’ (Figure 8.9b) make tangible the promise to protect borders, especially against asylum-seekers arriving by boat. The final shot (Figure 8.9c), a visual display of the slogan as it is verbally delivered by Gillard, is a strong link to the ‘forward’ point of difference. This is a solid commercial whose whole was greater than the sum of its parts. It makes a strong contribution to creating awareness of Gillard’s brand, and a good contribution to eliciting positive judgements and feelings about Gillard. There is good commonality between the visual and verbal points of different and the ‘economic’ point of parity, while the use of the Australian flag and Prime Minister’s office go to the ‘legitimate’ point of parity. In all, this commercial is well-scripted and reasonably well-produced. It gives an upbeat and purposeful statement of Gillard’s personal history, motivations and agenda. I gave it an integration assessment of moderate.

Segments Points of difference Points of parity Logos Slogans 20 8 6 1 5 15 6 4 Verbal 10 4 3 Visual 2 5 2 Frequency 1

0 0 0 0 0 Legitimate Economic

Labor risk

a

Better

Abbott

Forward big

backwards Schools

too & Tony

go

Economy

Category just Risk

Australia

Don't He's Hospitals Don't Move

Stronger

Let's Figure 8.8. Examples of good integration of the branding components (left to right) segments, points of difference and parity, logos and slogans within the Labor television commercial of July 19, 2010. The number of visual and verbal representations of each component within the commercial is shown.

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Figure 8.9. Examples of good integrated marketing using visual images with the Labor television commercial of July 19, 2010. (a) a family photograph from Gillard’s childhood; (b) an Australian Customs boat and the super ‘Stronger Borders’ make tangible the promise to protect borders, and; (c) the positive slogan.

Integrated marketing in stories The story of 7 August is the worst of the stories for Labor in this campaign. Campaign Director, Karl Bitar (2010), called it “the worst night of news for the Labor Party in a campaign I’d ever seen”. The story focuses on Gillard’s humiliating rapprochement with Rudd and a run-in with former Labor leader Mark Latham. The data (Figure 8.10 from left to right) shows the ‘Queensland’ segment is strongly represented and ‘family’ makes a small showing. Reporting of the “Labor sideshow” (ABC 2010b) means Gillard did not get up any points of difference. The ‘legitimate’ point of parity is strongly, but negatively, represented. Voters with concerns about Gillard’s legitimacy are reminded of their doubts every time Rudd is shown. The first screenshot (Figure 8.11a) is from the meeting of Gillard, Rudd and Queensland campaigners. Ostensibly to discuss how Rudd could contribute to the campaign, the meeting is really intended to stop the damaging leaks against Gillard and neutralise the Rudd factor. The second shot (Figure 8.11b) shows Gillard, flanked by smiling supporters, attempting to put the best face on the meeting. The final shot (Figure 8.11c) is of Latham confronting Gillard as she attempts to walk through and greet people at a fair in Brisbane. Latham asks Gillard why Labor has complained about him working for a commercial news station, then suggests: “If you want to make complaints, you really should make them about Rudd who’s the one who’s sabotaging your campaign” (ABC 2010b). The reappearance of Rudd and Latham remind voters of the party’s messy dispatch of one leader and poor choice of another. This story makes a very poor contribution to the brands of both Gillard and Labor. There are strongly negative links to the ‘legitimate’ point of parity. This story elicits strongly negative judgements and feelings about Gillard and Labor, as all images and messages are about Gillard asking Rudd to join the national campaign, and Gillard being confronted by Latham. Together, these two former leaders create a truly terrible night’s news for Labor. I gave this story an integration assessment of low. 182

Segments Points of difference Points of parity Logos Slogans 14 1 14 1 1 12 12 10 10 Verbal 8 8 6 6 Visual 4 4

Frequency 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 Legitimate Economic Labor risk

a

Better

Abbott

Forward big

backwards Schools

too & Tony

go

Economy

just Risk

Australia

Category Don't He's Hospitals Don't Move

Stronger

Let's Figure 8.10. Examples of poor integration of the branding components (left to right) segments, points of difference and parity, logos and slogans within the ABC television news story of 7 August 2010. The number of visual and verbal representations of each component within the commercial is shown.

Figure 8.11. Examples of poor integrated marketing using visual images within the ABC television news story of 7 August 2010. (a) an awkward but necessary meeting between Gillard and Rudd; (b) Gillard tries to move on, and; (c) Gillard is confronted by Latham.

Integrated marketing in commercials and stories The commercial and story from 17 July are good examples of Labor using consistent communications to boost overall effectiveness. This is the day that Gillard named the election date. Both the commercial and story show evidence of Labor’s preparation. As the data for the television commercial shows (Figure 8.12a from left to right), the ‘family’ segment, the most important for Labor, is strongly represented. ‘Western Sydney’ and ‘Queensland’ also have reasonable showings. The ‘forward’ point of difference makes a satisfactory showing and is used at the start and finish to bookend the commercial with the overarching message. The three-part point of difference with Rudd on borders, population and environment is well represented, both visually and verbally. The ‘economic’ point of parity is satisfactorily represented both visually and verbally, and ‘legitimate’ is well represented visually. The slogan ‘Let’s Move Australia Forward’ is shown once at the end of commercial, in a super stamped across Gillard’s upper body. The Labor logo does not appear. The first of the screenshots (Figure 8.13a) shows one of the visual depictions of the ‘family’ segment 183 and the visual appeal to the ‘inner-city’ segment via the ‘environment’ point of difference. The second shot (Figure 8.13b), is the last image in the commercial and features the slogan. The third shot (Figure 8.13c) shows Gillard in the Prime Minister’s Office with the Australian flag in the background. Both these symbols of authority were designed to boost her legitimacy. The commercial is a clear statement of much of Gillard’s agenda. I gave it an integration assessment of moderate.

Three key elements are repeated in the visual and verbal messages from the news story, as shown in the data (Figure 8.12b from left to right). The ‘family’ segment is very strongly represented. The ‘forward’ point of difference is well represented verbally, and the ‘legitimate’ point of parity is even more strongly represented both visually and verbally. The first of the screenshots (Figure 8.13d) shows Gillard meeting people at a cafe and shopping precinct, to represent the ‘family’ segment. The next (Figure 8.13e) shows Gillard talking about “moving forward” during her media conference to announce the election date. While making a strong link to the ‘forward’ point of difference, Gillard’s repetition of the slogan was criticised as overdone. The third shot (Figure 8.13f) shows Gillard’s media conference in the Prime Minister’s Courtyard at Parliament House, flanked with flags. The setting and the standard are designed to lend authority and contribute to the ‘legitimate’ point of parity. The story makes a good contribution to Gillard’s brand and to eliciting positive judgements and feelings about her. I gave it an integration assessment of moderate. Viewed in tandem, the commercial and the new story make for a solid, complementary communication. They present Gillard as the nation’s leader but also one seeking “a mandate from the Australian people” (ABC 2010b). Gillard is saying: “I am asking for your trust and support, to get on with the job of governing. Families can count on me to protect their quality of life by managing the economy well, ensuring workplace fairness and providing good education for their children. I acknowledge, and will act on, the valid concerns of other people about environmental sustainability, unregulated population growth and unregulated migration. I am neither Kevin Rudd nor Tony Abbott; I can take this country forward.” There is evidence of good research and planning on Labor’s part. Both communications play strongly to the themes of legitimacy, trust and delivery, especially the category point of parity in legitimacy.

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(a) Segments Points of difference Points of parity Logos Slogans 18 12 20 1 1 16 10 14 15 12 8 10 Verbal 6 10 8 Visual 6 4 5 Frequency 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 Legitimate Economic Labor risk

a

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Forward big

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Category too Tony &

go

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(b) Segments Points of difference Points of parity LogosLet's Slogans 18 12 20 1 1 16 10 14 15 12 8 10 6 10 Verbal 8 6 4 Visual 4 5 2 Frequency 2 0 0 0 0 0 Legitimate Economic Labor risk

a

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Abbott

Forward big

backwards Schools

too & Tony

go Category Economy

just Risk

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Let's Figure 8.12. Examples of good integration of the branding components (left to right) segments, points of difference and parity, logos and slogans between the Labor television commercial (a) and ABC television news story (b) of 17 July 2010. The number of visual and verbal representations of each component within the commercial is shown.

Figure 8.13. Examples of good integrated marketing using visual and verbal representations between the Labor television commercial (a, b and c) and ABC television news story (d, e and f) of 17 July 2010. The ‘family’ segment shown in (a) the commercial with images of people in a park and (b) in the story via images of Gillard meeting people; the slogan was represented in (a) the commercial via a super and (b) in the story by Gillard verbally, and; (c) the ‘legitimate’ point of parity is shown in (a) the commercial via Gillard with the flag in the Prime Minister’s Office and (b) in the story via Gillard flanked by flags in the Prime Minister’s Courtyard. 185

Labor achieves lower scores for its efforts in integrating its marketing in 2010 (Figure 8.14), than in 2007 (Figure 8.7). The party performs reasonably well in its commercials, achieving a ‘moderate to high’ score 27% of the time and ‘moderate’ 64% of the time. Unlike 2007, it did not achieve a ‘high’ score and it registered some low scores. Performance in 2010 is much lower in the news stories compared with commercials. The ‘moderate to high’ score is much lower at 11% and the ‘low’ or ‘low to moderate’ scores rise to almost 36%.

100 2010 Integrated 80 Marketing Assessment items) 60 of

High (%

Moderate to High Moderate 40 Low to Moderate Low Frequency 20

0 Television Television Commercials News (n=11) (n=36)

Figure 8.14. Assessment of integration of marketing in Labor television commercials and ABC television news stories in 2010. Integration is assessed against a five-point scale: high, moderate to high, moderate, low to moderate and low. The total number (n) of commercials and television news stories is shown in parentheses.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Labor practitioners from the 2007 campaign demonstrated their understanding, and use, of integrated marketing. From the interviews and the data from the commercials and stories, it is evident that marketing was designed from a branding perspective with the aims of enhancing voter awareness of the Rudd and Labor brands, improving their image, and generating positive voter responses. From the first commercial, the campaign made clear that Rudd and Labor were the 186 offerings, positioned against Howard and the Liberals. Consistent, careful marketing led voters to develop positive views of both as evidenced by the development and increasing use of Rudd’s persona ‘Kevin07’, and the increasingly-strong presence of the Labor Party throughout the campaign. Neither brand would have been so marketed if they had not resonated with the public. Labor sought to turn these positive views into behaviour change. In a number of communications, Labor directly elicited responses, asking people to visit the ‘Kevin07’ website and vote Labor on election day. Throughout, the practitioners sought to ensure the whole was greater than the sum of the parts, as they did in the commercial on climate change of 22 October (Figure 8.2). They were especially successful at integration in the commercials, both individually and as a whole, and also did very well across both commercials and stories throughout the campaign. For example, the ‘New Leadership.’ slogan - which summed up Rudd’s offer - was extremely well deployed from day one of the campaign. On 14 October, the day Howard called the election, the slogan was shown prominently at the end of the commercial. It was also prominent at Rudd’s media event on the same day and was shown in 12 shots in that evening’s news story. Thereafter, the slogan was the only one shown in Labor’s commercials (Figure 7.10.c) and appeared in 18 out of 44 television news stories (Figure 7.11c). Labor performed very well in both commercials and stories. Overall, Labor’s marketing communications were well-matched and generated strong, favourable and unique associations for the ‘Kevin07’ and Labor brands. In sum, I argue that Labor’s 2007 campaign team consciously, strategically and fully employed integrated marketing. Further, I argue that the party demonstrated a very strong branding orientation in relation to this tactic.

In the 2010 campaign, practitioners demonstrated they understood the importance of integrated marketing, but use was inconsistent. It is evident that the marketing was considered from a branding perspective with the aims of enhancing voter awareness of Gillard’s brand, improving her image, and generating positive voter responses. The commercial of 16 July made clear that Gillard was the offering, and provided a solid if unspectacular introduction for a new Prime Minister. The commercials improved thereafter, notably with the offering of 19 July which outlined Gillard’s personal history and political agenda. It was evident that she was positioned against both Rudd and Abbott. Consistent marketing of Gillard’s policy agenda throughout the campaign aimed to develop positive voter views of both the leader and her platform. Inconsistent marketing of Gillard, most notably via “the real Julia” incident, muddied voter views. In addition, there was often inconsistency in the news stories, caused by factors such as Labor’s failure to have pull-up banners behind Gillard for the first eleven days and by the interventions of Rudd or his supporters and Latham. Gillard sought to elicit voter response with her invocation: “Together, let’s move Australia forward”, which was not as direct as the call to action to vote Labor in 2007. In a number of 187 instances, the whole was greater than the sum of the parts of the communications. One example is the news story of 18 July which showcased Gillard as she cooed over babies at a community function and discussed her vision for a sustainable country for future generations. Labor was more successful at integration in the commercials, both individually and as a whole, than in stories. Overall, Labor’s marketing communications were often well-matched but sometimes very poorly- matched. This generated strong and unique associations for Gillard, and indirectly for Labor, however, these associations were a mix of positive and negative. In sum, I argue that Labor’s 2010 campaign team consciously sought to employ integrated marketing and demonstrated some strategic intent, however, they fell short of full deployment. Further, I argue the party demonstrated a moderate to weak branding orientation in relation to integrated marketing.

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CHAPTER NINE

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION This work offers a systematic and rigorous evaluation of Labor’s political branding efforts across two federal campaigns, the first such investigation in Australia. It contributes to our knowledge of an increasingly-used but under-researched practice in this country. The results of the case studies are drawn together in this chapter and paint a picture of two very different branding efforts; the 2007 campaign which was strategic, disciplined and consistently well-executed, and the 2010 campaign which had strategic intent but suffered from uneven execution and severe disruption. Further, the results show Labor does consciously attempt strategic branding throughout the electoral cycle, with a focus on campaigns, but fails to maintain a brand orientation in office.

The chapter proceeds in three parts. The first synthesises findings from the Rudd era, and the second synthesises findings from the Gillard era. I discuss how Labor performed against the definition of a brand oriented party offered in Chapter Two, the model of political branding offered in Chapter Three (Figures 3.3 and 3.4.), and the selected components of the Political Branding Checklist (Table 3.1). The third part offers conclusions about Labor’s use of branding, lessons for practitioners and suggestions for researchers.

CRAFTING AND CRASHING BRAND RUDD At first, the brand was king. From December 2006, Labor’s National Secretary, Tim Gartrell, drove a co-branding of the party and its new leader, Kevin Rudd. Rudd’s personal brand was carefully crafted and managed, while the party’s central brand was simultaneously refreshed and repositioned. This brand strategy was at the heart of a disciplined and consistent year-long campaign to regain the government benches. In office, however, brand discipline progressively slipped, leaving voters with a severe case of “post-purchase dissonance” (de Chernatony and McDonald 2000: 74).

Rudd’s elevation to leader dovetailed with the start of the informal campaign period, which is Stage Two of the Australian federal electoral cycle (Figure 3.3). This meant Labor had time to develop

189 and implement a brand strategy from scratch (Figure 3.4). Labor demonstrably did choose a branding approach, when its words and actions are measured against the definition of a brand oriented party (See Chapter Two). First, the party - or at least the party in the central and public offices - undertook branding deliberately, and with a good understanding of branding principles. This was evidenced by practitioners’ discussion of branding and branding-like approaches especially Feeney’s (2012) definition of political branding, Gartrell’s (2012) description of “the personal brand essence of Rudd versus Howard”, and discussion of Rudd and Labor as distinct but connected brands (Gartrell 2012; Hawker 2012; Milner 2012). The party used branding as its organising principle, with both the leader and the organisation put into the service of the brands. The practitioners made clear that Rudd was involved in devising and delivering a co-branding strategy. The leader and the organisation were united and focussed on developing and delivering the strategy, with Rudd integral to the campaign team. Further, Rudd behaved like a brand by marketing himself as a persona to the public (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 35), for example, when he claimed to be an economic conservative and by participating in the marketing of ‘Kevin07’. All available resources - including time, money and expertise both in-house and bought-in - went toward the development and implementation of the brand strategy. Labor had a long-term co- branding strategy, to establish a new leader brand and rebuild the party brand. The aim was to make the leader and the party attractive to voters, and win enough support in the right seats to form government. Short to mid-term tactics were deployed in pursuit of this aim.

The strategy began in earnest with the commercial of 26 January, 2007, in which Rudd presented his personal story and his political offer to the electorate. The commercial established much of the brand strategy to be used throughout the year. For example, it was clear that Rudd was the principal offering. Although Labor’s presence would progressively increase throughout the campaign, the leader preceded the party in the brand hierarchy. The brand positioning was established as a modern Rudd versus the outdated Howard, and a refreshed Labor Party versus a tired Liberal Government. Rudd’s pitch revealed his target segments - families, blue collar workers, young people and Queenslanders. It also staked out many of his key points of difference, particularly the overarching ‘new/future’ point, and also points of parity. Both brands were evolved throughout the year. The campaign invested Rudd with functional value, casting him as an economic conservative in the commercial of 26 July (ALP 2007b), and emotional value, as the leader who would restore workplace fairness (ALP 2007a) and help combat global warming (ALP 2007g). Labor’s core values were recast to fit the brand narrative. For example, Labor’s historical commitment to education was told through Rudd’s story of advancement through education, and also through the prism of prosperity which was code for good economic management. Logos and slogans were 190 evolved at critical points, to ensure the visual and verbal rhetoric were matched, and together would communicate change. The Labor logo and the slogan ‘Fresh Thinking’, unveiled in April, signalled to voters that both party and leader were thinking anew and, therefore, were worth considering anew. The launch of ‘Kevin07’ in August heralded the start of an intensified period of relationship marketing. Finally, the ‘New Leadership.’ slogan, used from September, was designed to visually assert the key offering. By then, the brand was strong enough to withstand, and even benefit from, inconsistencies such as revelations about Rudd’s visit to a strip club. The external presentation was wholly brand focussed. Brand marketing programs were devised, implemented, measured and refined. This was evidenced by broadcast communications which were consistent and complementary, as exemplified in the commercial of 22 October. This commercial, rich with visual and verbal rhetoric, perfectly positioned Rudd as voice of the future and Howard as the voice of the past.

By Stage Three of the electoral cycle (Figure 3.3), when the formal campaign began on 14 October, Labor was fully prepared. The campaign had systematically worked through Steps One to Three of the political brand management process (Figure 3.4). Overall, Rudd’s offer to the electorate was a government which would act on voters’ immediate concerns, like interest rates and workplace fairness, and also their longer-term aspirations, like quality education for their children and combating global climate change. It was an offer with both functional and emotional appeal, which perfectly met the needs and wants of the target market segments. It also delivered on the party’s aim to win office. Throughout the year, Rudd’s brand did three critical things - it caused media and voters to take notice of him, it earned positive equity, and it transferred positive equity to the party’s brand. Rudd’s brand carried the weaker Labor brand until it was healthy enough to stand alone and by the end of the campaign each had accrued strong, unique and favourable associations. Together, the two brands were an election winning combination. Labor’s reinvigoration lifted the party’s primary vote to a competitive level, and Rudd’s positioning added several vital percentage points.

I gave the 2007 campaign a perfect assessment on each of the eleven branding components considered in this work; positioning, core associations, segmentation and analysis of the competition; points of difference and points of parity; architecture, hierarchy, and logos and slogans, and; integrated marketing. Each component was assessed as consciously, strategically and fully deployed. On each component, I evaluated Labor as demonstrating a very strong brand orientation. Accordingly, I argue that Labor behaved like a brand oriented party throughout 2007.

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Despite this result, Labor failed to maintain a permanent branding campaign throughout the three- year electoral cycle and, thus, failed to retain voter support. Brand discipline dissolved throughout Stage One of the new electoral cycle, the period when a new administration settles into office and governing takes precedence over campaigning (Figure 3.3). As noted, this is a critical time in political brand management (Conley 2014: 131; Cosgrove 2014: 115). This is when parties have to adapt “from the campaign marketplace to the governing marketplace” (Newman 1999c: 110), and the locus of power and control of the brand and the branding campaign shift somewhat from the party in central office to the party in public office. The brand strategy and management, the personal and party brands and the brand communications must be evolved for the new context of government. This did not happen under Prime Minister Rudd.

In the early days, Rudd delivered on some of his brand promise. Rudd’s signature on the Kyoto Protocol to reduce global carbon emissions was emblematic of new, future-focussed leadership. Similarly, his apology to the Stolen Generations - hugely important to the families involved and to the nation’s image of itself - clearly differentiated him from Howard. At first, it seemed Rudd was undertaking continuing relationship marketing (Dann 2008: 14). The first false note appeared with Rudd’s response to the global financial crisis. Rudd morphed from economic conservative to pump- priming Keynesian without properly evolving the brand positioning and narrative. Further, the Government was perceived as being wasteful with some of the stimulus measures, while voters were facing increases in costs of living which Rudd had promised, and failed, to lower. Brand Rudd was not delivering for its core constituency of working families and voters began showing the first signs of post-purchase dissonance, concerned that the leader they voted for was not the leader they got (van Onselen 2010b).

By the start of 2010, with the electoral cycle at Stage Two and the informal election campaign underway (Figure 3.3), Labor had begun preparing for the coming election. Ideally, Labor should have worked through all four steps of the Political Brand Management Process (Figure 3.4), and should have been back at Step Two, planning and implementing brand marketing programs. Ideally, Labor should have been ready to reposition the two brands and build a bridge from the last election campaign to the one ahead. Instead, Rudd’s personal brand was about to go into freefall, taking the party’s with it. Rudd’s increasingly tough approach on asylum-seekers arriving by boats, reminiscent of Howard era policies, was inconsistent with his brand promise of new leadership and fresh ideas. The deal-breaker was when Rudd walked away from action on climate change in April, 2010. This act of self-harm destroyed Rudd’s authenticity, and cost Labor the support of a million voters (Cassidy 2010a: 42). Rudd had failed to deliver on his brand promise and, thus, failed to 192 provide post-purchase reassurance (Needham 2006: 184). In return, via the opinion polls, voters made clear they were not interested in a repeat purchase (Needham 2006: 184). Labor’s brand also suffered because it was closely linked to Rudd’s in the co-branding strategy of the 2007 campaign. The party’s hard-won equity dissipated, demonstrated in a primary vote of just 35% (Figure 1.3). Having so carefully nurtured their brands in Opposition, Rudd and Labor neglected their strategy in office. In the space of two and a half years, their brands had been trashed, and Rudd paid the price with his leadership.

DESPERATELY SEEKING THE REAL JULIA With the ascension of Gillard, Labor once again adopted a branding approach to present a new leader and revitalise the party, this time in a bid to retain power. The brand strategy for 2010 was markedly different than that of 2007. Instead of an explicit co-branding, Gillard was the dominant, if logo-free, offering and the party had little presence. Instead of 12 months, as in 2007, campaigners had just 24 days to construct and market the leader’s brand before an election was called. Three early, self-inflicted injuries, coupled with damage by others, meant Gillard’s brand did not remain strong for long, and Labor’s went into decline once again.

Gillard became leader in the final days of the informal campaign, or Stage Two of the electoral cycle (Figure 3.3). Ideally, she and the party should have been well into Step Two of the political brand management process; that is, implementing carefully-prepared marketing programs (Figure 3.4). Instead, they were rushing through Step One; that is, identifying and establishing the brand’s positioning. When Labor’s words and actions are measured against the definition of a brand oriented party (Chapter Two), it is evident the party - or at very least the party in the central office - did deliberately attempt a branding approach with a good understanding of branding principles. This was made clear by some of the practitioners (e.g. Feeney 2012; Hawker 2012, 2014; Milner 2012; Utting 2014). However, the unusual circumstances - the repudiation of Rudd and the rush to the polls - meant the campaign had to condense the brand development phase into just 24 days and try to establish Gillard’s brand without building a bridge from Rudd’s (Feeney 2012; Hawker 2012; Martin 2012).

Branding was used as the organising principle but there was not enough time to fully develop and deliver a strategy. Nonetheless, both the leadership and the organisation and were put into the service of the brands. Notwithstanding Gillard’s public opposition to description of Labor as brand, and the implied opposition to descriptions of herself as a brand, I argue that Gillard did contribute to devising and delivering a brand strategy in the 2010 campaign. Most significantly, Gillard played a 193 role, presumably a major one, in deciding to present herself as “the real Julia” mid-campaign. In doing so, she was attempting remake her public persona and, thus, was behaving like a brand (Spiller and Bergner 2011: 35). In addition, some practitioners from the 2010 campaign (e.g. Hawker 2012; Milner 2012; Utting 2012) explicitly spoke of Gillard as a brand or of attempts to craft a brand strategy around her. All available resources - including funding and internal and external skills in areas like research and target seat campaigning - were applied to realise the strategy. Of necessity, the goal was more near-term than in 2007; to make Gillard attractive enough to carry the campaign and retain government. No doubt, central office campaigners also looked further ahead, to rebuilding the standing of the party, but at the time their focus would have been firmly on polling day.

The formal campaign, and Stage Three of the electoral cycle (Figure 3.3), began on 17 July with Gillard’s announcement of the election date. The commercial from this date established Gillard was the offering, albeit without the careful brand development that had accompanied Rudd. It also established her positioning. Neither her competitor, Tony Abbott, nor her predecessor, Kevin Rudd, were mentioned but it was clear that Gillard was positioning against both. For example, she immediately promised “a strong economy” (ALP 2010d), which is a play to one of the Liberals’ strengths, and then pledged “stronger borders, cracking down on people smugglers” (ALP 2010d), in contrast with Rudd’s perceived failure. In speaking to her policy agenda, Gillard revealed four of the five target segments - families, Queenslanders, western Sydney and inner-city residents. She also laid out several of the points of difference and points of parity. This commercial revealed the importance of legitimacy for Gillard; it was the first of five commercials in the sample which would feature shots of Gillard in the Prime Minister’s Office with the national flag to one side. The campaign sought to invest Gillard with functional value as a capable manager, especially on economics, and emotional value as a genuine leader. Labor’s core values were, once more, recast to fit the brand narrative. Again, education and economics were brought together. This time it was Gillard who used her story to illustrate the transformative power of education (ALP 2010e), and cast it through the prism of prosperity. Slogans were evolved throughout the campaign, as the narrative developed. The first, ‘Moving forward’ was intended to signal that Labor was getting on with the job of governing (Martin 2012). It was evolved to “Let’s Move Australia Forward” (ALP 2010b) as the frame for Gillard’s offer and the purported risks associated with Abbott. The final slogan, ‘Stronger Economy, Better Hospitals & Schools’, stripped back the campaign offer to the basics. External presentation was brand focussed but, once again, execution was sometimes clumsy.

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Legitimacy and trust became slow-burning issues for Gillard because of the failure to properly explain Rudd’s removal. This was the first, and fundamental, mistake. The second was a failure of communication - the repetition of the slogan “Moving forward” at the media conference on 17 July - which invited ridicule of Gillard and her campaign. Moreover, it drew attention to her greatest weakness, her despatch of Rudd, and reinforced one of her most negative associations, that of disloyal deputy. The brand strategy and its hard-won gains were shattered by the third mistake, “the real Julia” incident. Gillard’s move was strategically sound - to re-set the campaign - but poorly executed. The strategy became the message, and it was a negative message that amplified voters’ associations of Gillard as a deputy, and a politician, who could not be trusted. Worse, it broke all the rules of authenticity in branding. By suggesting there was a fake Julia, as well as the real one, Gillard surrendered much of her authenticity and brand appeal (Speed et al 2013: 18). This kind of reinvention can be part of Step Four of the political branding process, but should happen well before the formal campaign. Gillard’s brand was, of course, also seriously challenged by the damaging leaks and Abbott’s strong and strongly negative campaign. Unlike Rudd’s in 2007, her brand was not resilient enough to withstand such assaults. At first, Gillard’s brand provided cover for the once-more unpopular party brand, however, it rapidly developed negative associations and negative equity. By campaign’s end, both the leader and party brands carried strong and unique associations which were a combination of positive and negative. Labor’s branding efforts barely met voters’ needs and wants, but did assist the party to remain in the game. Careful positioning to western Sydney voters, for example, saw Labor hold seats there and, thereby, retain a hold on the government benches.

I gave the 2010 campaign a mixed assessment on the eleven branding components considered in this work. Nine components - positioning, core associations, segmentation, analysis of the competition, architecture, hierarchy, logos, slogans and integrated marketing - were assessed as consciously deployed with some attempt at strategy. However, full deployment was not achieved and there was a moderate to weak brand orientation. The remaining two components - points of difference and points of parity - were consciously deployed with some attempt at strategy. Once again, they were not fully deployed but the party achieved a moderate brand orientation. In short, execution was not as strategic nor as full as in 2007. These results must be weighed against the extraordinary campaign circumstances and so I argue that Labor behaved like a moderately brand oriented party throughout the 2010 campaign.

As in 2007, Labor did not maintain a permanent branding campaign throughout the electoral cycle. Gillard’s brand sustained further serious damage even before her second term began when, in Stage 195

Four of the electoral cycle (Figure 3.3), she signed a deal with The Greens and three Independents that would allow her to form minority government. The deal raised three issues which required urgent and ongoing attention. First, Gillard’s already wobbly authority was further undermined by the alliance with The Greens and Independents. Feeney (2012) argued “the political stage now looks too cluttered” leading to perceptions “that this is a confused and fragmented operation in contrast to what normally prevails”. Further, Labor’s partners in minority government made demands or proposed ideas that were not on Labor’s agenda. Feeney (2012) was scathing of the Greens whom he saw as “ravening savages chewing away at our innards every day”. Voter perceptions can be damaged by “an unexpected coalition which leads to unexpected policy shifts” (Butler et al 2011: 682). The third issue was that Gillard’s acceptance of the Greens’ demand for a price on carbon prompted accusations she had broken a promise. Like other politicians before and since, Gillard’s brand promise proved mutable post-election (Butler and Collins 1999: 59). None of these issues was satisfactorily addressed via a repositioning of the leader and party brands, nor a refreshed brand narrative. Once again, a new Labor Government did not evolve its brand strategy for the new context of office, made even more challenging by the unusual minority arrangement. Gillard did deliver of some of her brand promise, most notably on the National Broadband Network. Yet this and other policy successes were never fully woven into a brand narrative, never fully employed to boost the brand equity of Gillard or Labor.

From a branding perspective, the 2013 election year appeared to be a replay of 2010 for Labor. The start of the year was also the start of the informal campaign period (Figure 3.3). Once again, Labor had failed to effectively reposition the leader and party brands over the previous two years. Once again, the leader’s brand was plunging off a cliff and taking the party with it, prompting a bid to reset the agenda. Where Rudd had dumped signature policies, Gillard announced the election date eight months early. Thanks to a combination of undermining from within, relentless negativity from without, and her own failures of judgment and communication, Gillard never earned legitimacy with voters. Her personal brand was at rock bottom with dire satisfactory ratings in opinion polls (Figure 1.7). Gillard retained the loyalty of her colleagues for much longer than Rudd but, again, the party made a desperate, last-minute decision to dump a leader. With the resurrection of Rudd, Gillard joined ‘Kevin07’ in the political trash.

CONCLUSIONS Six conclusions stand out from this evaluation of Labor’s use of branding. First, the ‘Kevin07’ campaign of 2007 was the high point of political branding in this country while “the real Julia” campaign of 2010 was a low. Labor’s 2007 campaign was strategic, disciplined, well-resourced, 196 very well-marketed and achieved its goal. The campaign of 2010 had strategic intent but was rushed, under-resourced and unevenly executed in a difficult environment, and only just achieved its goal. Second, the leaders were critical to the branding campaigns. Each brought unique associations which shaped their relationship with the party’s brand, their presentation to the electorate, and their campaigns. Rudd was seen as new and fresh, and could be co-branded with his party in a dual offer which voters viewed as authentic and appealing. Gillard was seen as capable but conniving. She was, nonetheless, the focus with the party a silent partner in an offer that confused and alienated voters. The leaders also brought different perspectives and skills which impacted their ability to undertake branding. Rudd was fully committed to the development and communication of a brand strategy, and showed considerable skill and consistency in doing so. Gillard participated in delivering a brand strategy but was an inconsistent communicator. The third conclusion is that Labor generally has sought to function as a brand oriented organisation since 2007, adopting a brand orientation that has moved along a continuum from strong though moderate to weak. Both the party in central office and the party in public office - that is, the campaigners and the leader - demonstrated a strong branding orientation during the informal and formal campaign periods of 2007. The leader, in particular, demonstrated an-ever weakening orientation throughout the first term in government. The campaigners and the leader demonstrated a moderate branding orientation throughout the informal and formal campaign periods of 2010. This subsequently swung between moderate and weak throughout Gillard’s time in office. Fourth, Labor demonstrated strategic intent but inconsistent execution of its brand strategies. Intent and execution were both strong throughout 2007, but gradually weakened during Rudd’s first term. Intent was moderate during the informal and formal campaign period under Gillard and fluctuated during her second term. Fifth, Labor, and most importantly the leaders, failed to maintain a brand orientation in government. This is evidenced by the failure to evolve the leader brands, in particular, and also the brand narratives throughout the Rudd and Gillard governments. Finally, political circumstances may constrain a brand strategy. From Labor’s perspective, the circumstances of 2007, while demanding, were much less hostile than in 2010. The 2007 campaign was up against a determined opponent and hit bumps like the news of Rudd’s strip club visit and negative interventions by unionists, but the 2010 campaign faced many more opponents within and without and was severely disrupted by the trauma of the leadership transition and the leaks against Gillard.

These conclusions point to an overarching lesson for both political practitioners and political researchers - the importance of fully engaging with the concept of branding. For practitioners, there are six specific lessons. This first is that branding is powerful, if it done well and also if it is done badly. Labor’s 2007 campaign is proof of the benefits of a strong brand strategy. Rudd’s travails 197 after dumping the emissions trading scheme and many of Gillard’s troubles during and after the 2010 campaign are testament to the risks from branding done badly. Good branding means consciously making the choice to brand, learning about commercial branding principles and techniques, and adapting them for each context (Keller 2002: 171; Henneberg 2008: 155; Stromback 2010: 19-21). It means adopting branding as an organising principle and directing all resources toward a brand campaign. Good branding means adopting a long-term and strategic approach, and implementing the brand strategy as fully as possible given the constraints of organisation, ideology and normative responsibilities. It also means accepting that both the leader and the party must be branded whatever brand hierarchy is deployed, especially in Australia where party politics remains dominant. This lesson confirms insights from other branding experiences in Australia (e.g. Hughes 2004) and overseas (e.g. Conley 2014; Cosgrove 2014; Scammell 2007; Spiller and Bergner 2011). In short, practitioners should “take the brand premise more seriously” (Conley 2014: 132).

The second lesson is that branding requires an ongoing investment in time, money and expertise. This was well-understood during the 2007 campaign but disregarded during Rudd’s Government and throughout the Gillard era. It takes time to craft a brand, it takes time to build brand equity, and it takes time to reposition or revitalise a brand. Branding requires proper funding for market research and communications, among other things. It also requires particular skills - in brand management, marketing, communicating in an increasingly diverse, fragmented and hostile media environment, and use of increasingly important and sophisticated technologies. All this means accepting that branding is a permanent choice, not a fix for one election. This lesson confirms findings from Cosgrove’s investigation of the four decade-long brand strategy of conservatives within the Republican Party, which propelled them from the fringe to “a central position in American political life” (Cosgrove 2007: 1).

The next, and related, lesson is that branding requires ongoing discipline, consistency, and authenticity. These were hallmarks of Ronald Reagan’s brand (Cosgrove 2014: 113-114), which has since become the heritage brand for conservative Republicans (Cosgrove 2014: 113). A disciplined approach to brand strategy and maintenance was vital to Rudd’s success throughout 2007, but was lost in government. Rudd’s brand looked inconsistent when he transformed from economic conservative to economic pump-primer in response to the global financial crisis. Rudd’s authenticity was shattered when he dumped the emissions trading scheme. Gillard’s brand looked inconsistent when she chose to govern in minority with The Greens and Independents after the 2010 election. Her authenticity was shattered when she announced a price on carbon, without properly 198 explaining how this fit her promise for no carbon tax. The brands of Rudd and Gillard, and by association Labor, suffered from a lack of discipline. A brand that is not well-tended by its creators will be shaped solely by its consumers and competitors. A brand that is inconsistent will confuse voters, and a brand that is inauthentic will alienate voters.

Having said that, a brand must also be evolved. The lesson here is that a brand strategy must evolve when a party moves from Opposition to government or into a position of power-sharing or balance- of-power. Such evolution proved challenging for Rudd and Gillard, as it was for others including Tony Blair (White and de Chernatony 2002: 49), George W. Bush (Cosgrove 2009: 130) and Barack Obama (Cosgrove 2014: 115-116; Spiller and Bergner 2011: 145). There are several important differences between branding in Opposition and in government. First, a party in Opposition must work hard to attract media and voter attention, while attention is guaranteed, and sometimes overwhelming, for a party in government. Second, the party’s understanding of the market must change, as the party in office has to represent all, and not just some segments of society. This means the brand position and marketing communications must change. Third, the locus of power shifts somewhat from the party in central office to the party in public office, especially in the first stage of the electoral cycle when governing takes precedence over campaigning. While campaigning from Opposition, the party in the central office will have a significant say in how branding is conducted because it has the necessary organisational and fundraising capacity. Once in office, parliamentarians will still rely on the central office but can also draw on the resources of government which can be applied to branding. These include political staff like media advisors and budgets for government advertising campaigns, events and promotions. Fourth, the views of more people must be accommodated. In Opposition, a small team of campaigners and politicians will have a say in how a brand is managed. In government, many more voices will matter as Ministers, senior staff and others seek to exercise influence. Fifth, tensions may arise because the party machine will necessarily take a long-term view of branding, that of survival of the party, while the parliamentarians may take a shorter-term view, that of surviving a difficult media cycle. Finally, in Opposition, the central campaign committee is essentially the brand manager for the party and leader brands. In government, a party should retain the function if not the form of this collaborative brand management. One way to achieve this is to go even further than the British Conservatives, who appointed a Head of Brand Communications, and formally assign the responsibilities of brand management to an individual or a small team who can work between the party machine and party leadership.

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Lesson Five is that a brand that has developed significant negative associations must be decontaminated. This was one of the most important learnings from Blair’s rebranding in 2005; he had to cleanse the New Labour brand of the contamination from excessive spin and news management (Scammell 2007: 188). This lesson was ignored by Rudd when he failed to explain the dumping of the emissions trading scheme in 2010, and by Gillard when she did not deal with the problems caused by the introduction of a price on carbon.

Finally, branded politics may mean party leaders have a relatively short lifespan. Branded politics accepts that voter loyalty will be won, not gifted, and also that loyalty can be won over by another, more attractive offer. There are fewer and fewer rusted-on party loyalists. Voters increasingly perceive parties and politicians as brands, and parties and politicians increasingly present as brands. When they behave like brands, they are treated like brands; if they do not live up to the brand promise, consumers will look elsewhere. This means leaders are given less latitude when they are not authentic, inconsistent, not up to the job or simply no longer novel. This lesson has serious implications for both leader and party. Any leader who undertakes branding must accept that he or she will have a shelf-life (Smith and French 2009: 218), perhaps just two to three terms. After that, they may well be rejected by the people or the party, or may need to stand down for the good of their party. The party must accept it will have to invest significant resources – time, money, expertise – in branding a leader who may only be around for a few terms. In addition, it must accept that if it uses a co-branding strategy, the party brand is at risk if the leader brand goes bad. Therefore, the party, collectively, must be prepared to sacrifice a leader who cannot be redeemed, and must also be prepared to invest in maintenance of the party brand. This lesson goes some way to answering the question posed by Hughes (2007: 1118) about the life span for a personal brand.

For researchers, there are four suggestions. The first is that political branding has become a new way of thinking and doing in contemporary Australian politics. Branding is increasingly being employed by the Australian Labor Party and, arguably, by other parties, leaders and individual politicians. This thesis shows that Labor, or at least two parts of its organisation, have been attempting to apply strategic branding since 2007. Some of the practitioners interviewed for this work are adamant their competitors are doing the same. This leads to the second suggestion; that any significant change in political practice is worthy of serious study, whether researchers see it as an opportunity or a threat to democracy or something in between. There is no doubt that branding can significantly change political practice in other countries (Scammell 2007: 185; White and de Chernatony 2002: 48), and this thesis contributes to the evidence that branding is changing practice in Australia. When they employ branding, parties and individual politicians are importing, and 200 hopefully adapting, strategies and tactics from the very different field of commerce. Branded politics means parties actively and constantly seek voter support. Branded politics employs a market orientation and the marketing concept so that the offerings - the party organisation, leadership and policies - are crafted to meet the needs and wants of voters, as well as the party. Branding also significantly changes relationships between parties, politicians and voters (Conley 2014: 124; Cosgrove 2014: 122; Scammell 2007: 189). Voters increasingly apply the knowledge, confidence, sophistication and expectations they gain as commercial consumers to their political choices. All this turns the traditional understanding of politics on its head. Thus, the third suggestion is that if researchers do not acknowledge political branding, whether or not they accept it in a normative sense, they will not recognise or understand a new way of doing politics that is re-shaping democracies. They will miss opportunities to influence academic debate and real-world practice. This thesis tells part of the story of political branding practice in this country but much more remains to be told, so my final suggestion is for more research on political branding in Australia. We have much to learn about how parties use branding in government, how branding is accepted and undertaken by the party on the ground, and the opportunities and challenges of various communications channels especially social media.

In summation, I argue for practitioners and researchers alike to take political branding seriously. Practitioners who fail to do so will miss opportunities to make long-term connections with voters, or may misuse branding at a risk to themselves and the polity generally. Researchers who fail to do so will miss, or misunderstand, what is really happening in contemporary Australian politics, and that can only be to the detriment of our democracy.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEWEES

David Feeney:  Deputy Campaign Director, Australian Labor Party, responsible for marginal seats in the 2007 federal election.  Preference negotiations with minor parties and fundraising for the Australian Labor Party in the 2010 federal election. o Interviewed at Parliament House, Canberra 11 October 2012 o Interviewed via email 2 June 2014.

Tim Gartrell:  National Secretary and National Campaign Director, Australian Labor Party, in the 2007 federal election. o Interviewed via telephone 15 March 2012. o Interviewed via email 2 June 2014.

Bruce Hawker:  Campaign strategist for the Australian Labor Party in the 2007 and 2010 federal elections. o Interviewed in Brisbane 12 March 2012. o Interviewed via email 2 June 2014.

Mike Kaiser:  Assistant National Secretary, Australian Labor Party, 2003 to 2004.  Chief of Staff to New South Wales Premier, Morris Iemma, 2005 to 2007  Chief of Staff to Queensland Premier, , 2007 to 2009. o Interviewed in North Sydney 11 September 2012.

Nick Martin:  Director of Research for the Australian Labor Party in the 2007 federal election  Assistant National Secretary, Director of Research and Deputy Campaign Director for the Australian Labor Party in the 2010 federal election. o Interviewed in Canberra 11 October, 2012.

Cameron Milner:  Campaign strategist for the Australian Labor Party in the 2007 and 2010 elections. o Interviewed in Brisbane 20 September, 2012. o Interviewed via email 2 June, 2014.

John Utting:  Pollster for the Australian Labor Party in the 2007 and 2010 elections. o Interviewed in Bondi Junction 10 September, 2012. o Interviewed via telephone 2 June 2014.

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