ISSUE 134

DECEMBER 2009 Vernon Parker Oration How naval intelligence might better serve the ADF Duty, Mateship and a Sense of Adventure

Mahan & Corbett: Lessons for the RAN’s Junior Officers

Winning the battle - but how do we win the human resources war?

The Offshore Combat Vessel: Future Flexibility

Maritime Counter-Terrorism and the Evolution of the Sri Lanka Navy

The Australians at Jutland

Journal of the

Issue 134 3

R 120200Z AUG 09 Contents FM CN AUSTRALIA SIC Z4P/EUL/WUE Reader Response 4

conduct of operations at sea SUBJ: RELEASE OF CDF COI Vernon Parker Oration 5 REPORT INTO LOSS OF HMAS today. secondly, command at SYDNEY II sea is extremely complex and How naval intelligence might better challenging, even more so 1. This morning the Minister during times of war. It can be an serve the ADF 12 of Defence, Senator Faulkner, unforgiving environment even released to the Australian at the best of times. Duty, Mateship and a Sense of people the report of the CDF 5. While the inquiry process Adventure –Comparison of Motivation Commission of inquiry into the has been able to determine a for Enlistment: First World War and loss of HMAS Sydney II and her variety of facts about Sydney’s Today 16 ships company in an engagement engagement with Kormoran, with the German Raider HSK we are still unable to know Mahan & Corbett: Lessons for the RAN’s Kormoran off Western Australia exactly what CAPT Burnett was Junior Officers 19 on 19 November 1941. thinking and why, due to the 2. The COI was conducted by passage of years and the loss of the Honourable Terence Cole, everyone on-board. As MR Cole Winning the battle - but how do we win AO, RFD, QC. concludes quote it is easy for the human resources war? Positioning The release of his report is those not faced with command the ADF as an employer of choice in the a significant milestone Iin the decisions to say they would have face of a new Australian workplace 24 debate surrounding the sinking acted differently - particularly of Sydney so many years ago. knowing that CAPT Burnett’s The Offshore Combat Vessel: 3. Most significantly, it is course of action resulted in loss Future Flexibility 30 important for all those who are end quote. part of our Navy family - those 6. CAPT Burnett was an Maritime Counter-Terrorism and the who serve with us now, those exceptional officer and, Evolution of the Sri Lanka Navy 35 who have served with us in the ultimately, Sydney was past, and those who have loved successful in her assigned task - them - to know, to the extent to protect Australian shipping The Australians at Jutland 38 possible, what happened to our from German Raiders. she did Front page: sailors and officers in Sydney. stop Kormoran threatening our Australian Merchant Navy Day of 816 Squadron’s I hope that this report will trading routes. Remembrance 40 helo Tiger 80, provide a measure of closure to 7. What remains for us is S-70B-2 Seahawk, all affected by her tragic loss. to remember the courage and Naval Cooperation for the Future conducts a 4. In my view, the report sacrifice of her 645 crew, who Force 45 single personnel highlights two essential truths gave their lives, and the families winching onboard HMAS Darwin about the nature of war at sea. who love and mourn them. New in Navies photography 54 The first id that procedures Sydney will never be forgotten. and responses in battle change 8. The COI report is available Book Reviews 56 and develop over time, to the at www.defence.gov.au/sydneyII/ extent that Sydney’s action as finalreport. Visions from the Vault 59 Issue Number 134 considered in Mr Cole’s report Printed by Everbest differ significantly from the BT ANI On-line Guide 60 Printing Company

Style Notes for Headmark 61 ISSN 1833-6531 - RAYTHEON AUSTRALIA - BOOZ & company - AUSTAL - Thales naval GROUP - Defence Maritime Services - QUINETIQ Design & DTP: ANI Membership Application Form 62 Diane Bricknell - AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION - ATI - LOPAC - SAAB [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 Reader Response

Dear Sir, and professionalism of past Navy inebriated is simply untrue. As a retired naval officer I was personnel, claiming that “Command Similarly, the argument that sailors of 25 years ago were particularly interested in the thought teams (indeed whole ships) sailed little more than a group of party seekers out for an alcohol- provoking article “How does one man a from ports completely inebriated.” based good time does them little justice and demeans their Navy in the 21st Century” by Lieutenant His understanding of the RAN 25 skill, professionalism and hardworking abilities. I expect that Michael Newman, which appeared in years or so ago seems to be that it few of them are readers of this journal, and so they would the June 2009 issue of the ANI Journal. was populated by men who regarded be ignorant of the opinion’s expressed in LEUT Newman’s There is no doubt that the RAN has the service as a joke, or a vehicle for article, but in their defence I again say that I never once saw changed greatly in the past 25 years, as having a party. Such comments malign ship’s companies inebriated when their ship sailed nor did I he postulates, and recruiting methods those who served in the past and, in ever doubt their dedication to the task of serving the RAN and processes must be now innovative my opinion, are an insult to dedicated, to the best of their abilities. It should be remembered that and modern. I agree with the author’s professional and hardworking people. these men took part in fighting wars in Korea, Vietnam and conclusion that the core role of the In my experience of 35 years naval Indonesian/Malaysian Confrontation, none of which were Navy remains as it has always been, service in a variety of ships ranging “good time parties” and they acquitted themselves and their to serve and defend the nation, and from patrol boats to aircraft carriers I ships in exemplary fashion. also that the RAN needs men and never once encountered a Command While it is undoubtedly true that the challenges and women who are capable of supporting team that was not completely on its deployments experienced by the Navy today require different the training and deployments that game, and invariably sober. I cannot policies in order to recruit the personnel needed to carry ensure the maintenance of this comment upon the intensity or quality out the task I do not think the RAN can go far wrong if it objective, However, I cannot accept of ship work-ups and battle problem is able to encourage and sign up officers and sailors of the that his primary premise should go tasks in today’s Navy but I can assure calibre who served over the past 25 or 30 years. After all, the unchallenged. ANI readers that in the 1960s, 1970s, quality of today’s Navy is built upon the foundation that they LEUT Newman appears to hold the and 1980s they were serious business provided. opinion that officers and sailors of past and strict tests of a ship’s war fighting generations in the RAN joined simply ability. Many a ship had to do a final Sincerely, to have a good time, or as he puts it, “to battle problem more than once in Alan Brecht travel the world on a taxpayer funded, order to join the fleet as a fully trained Commodore (RAN) Retired life-long drinking adventure.” He also unit and the concept that personnel questions the conduct, capability involved in these activities were mostly

The Editor advises:some Letters to the Editor for this publication have not been printed because they are written in pen, and often important details are not legible. If the person - we cannot make out your name - commenting on the articles “A Bright Flame”, and “Kormoran’s construction” would like to write again we would be glad to publish your letter. Letters submitted by email are preferable to those written in cursive pen. The Editor can be reached at [email protected]

Members from the Pacific Fleet Band - Hawaii, along with members of the RAN Band, get together for a group photo on completion to the 64th Anniversary of The End of the War in the Pacific, in Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, held onboard the USS Missouri Memorial Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 5 Vernon Parker Oration

M P iCHAEL eZZULLO the stage for the movement of over half Chief Operating Officer, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service the world’s trade as well as the interests 6 August 2009 of great maritime powers – some established, some rising. It is also host to many of the world’s most strategically important shipping Seapower And Australian Defence Strategy routes and choke points, such as the Malacca, Singapore, Lombok, and Sunda straits. For example, over 60,000 ships transit the Malacca Strait each year, carrying up to one third of world trade, and half of the world’s oil (11 million barrels daily). After the interruption of the global financial and economic crisis, which has had a material impact on global trade flaws, we will see a reassumption of unprecedented growth in the volume and value of globalised maritime trade traversing the strategic choke points and dense sea lanes of our region. The other key feature of our surrounding maritime region are its fluid sea frontiers and porous borders, which makes for piracy and contra-banding activities, which involves, among other things, the illicit Tonight, I would like to discuss the strategy, insofar as it concerns movement of people, weapons, and influence and role of sea power on the control of the sea, is the prohibited goods. Australian defence strategy, as borne surface combatant, whose For quintessentially geo-strategic out by the recent Defence White Paper, day is far from over, and reasons, nations beyond the littoral Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific the submarine, whose most states of the region will continue to Century: Force 2030. significant days are yet to have a major stake as well as a long come, at least for Australia. term naval presence in these waters, In my remarks today, I would like to which the littoral states will sometimes build the following case: To such an audience as this, I dare view with concern, while the major • Australia is, and has always say that I do not need to spend much naval powers themselves will view their been, a maritime nation; time arguing that Australia is and interests through hard-nosed strategic • Sea power – the freedom to has always been a maritime nation. prisms, to which I now turn. use, and to influence others’ Geographically, Australia sits astride As the White Paper said, Australia’s Above left: The use of, the sea and the land two of the world’s most strategically strategic outlook over the coming Royal Australian beyond the sea – has always important oceans – the Indian and the decades will continue to be shaped Navy Adelaide-class guided missile been at the heart of Australian Pacific Oceans. by the changing global distribution of frigate HMAS defence strategy, whether We therefore sit in the middle of economic, political and military power, Sydney and the expressly or implicitly so; one of the great strategic theatres of and by the future role and weight of the Anzac-class frigate • At the heart of the strategy the world. An essentially maritime United States within that global system. HMAS Ballarat underpinning the 2009 environment, stretching from the We are not likely to see the emergence perform formation maneuvering with Defence White Paper is a northern Pacific to the Persian of an alternative political and economic the guided missile maritime strategy; or Arabian Gulf, it encompasses system to rival the network of liberal, destroyer USS • At the heart of maritime approximately half the globe. Today it is market-based democracies that Mahan-USN photo Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 6 Vernon Parker Oration emerged after World War II, as the Of course, the sea is our life blood to our strategic worldview. As an island communist system attempted to do as a nation. The vast majority of our nation, any physical threat to Australia last century during the Cold War. international trade by volume and must come on, over or under the ocean Globalisation will ensure that economic most of it by value is borne by the sea. and we must use the sea to deploy and interdependence acts to link states We are a significant user of merchant support our armed forces. Geography and regions together more closely. shipping (even if we do not possess a makes this so. This will not, however, prevent major large merchant marine) and we have Command of the sea is bound powers from hedging their strategic one of the world’s largest exclusive up inextricably with commercial, positions and developing the capability maritime economic zones. The oceans geographic, and military to underpin their interests with hard are a major physical resource for considerations. Commerce, and thus military power. Australia. We are a leading player in national prosperity, hinges on sea Take the Indian Ocean. These a multilateral forum concerned with power, and Australian strategy has, waters will have an increasingly shipping, the protection of the marine since Federation, recognised this strategic role to play within Australia’s environment and other maritime imperative. Everybody here would strategic outlook. This will include matters. We have a proud naval history, be very familiar with the political transnational security risks, such as and at the end of the Second World debates of 100 years ago regarding piracy, as well as growing strategic War possessed one of the world’s the establishment of what became the competition within the Indian Ocean, most significant navies. We have one Royal Australian Navy. These debates along its periphery, and through the of the most challenging maritime turned in large part on whether or not straits leading to and from it. There border protection tasks in the world, Australia saw itself in the business of are a number of significant inter-state something to which I can directly attest sea control. The Government of Prime and intra-state conflicts along its in my new role as Chief Operating Minister Andrew Fisher decided that periphery that have the potential to Officer of the Australian Customs and question in the affirmative. draw in other powers. Over time, and Border Protection Service. We are After World War II, defence in response to these factors as well vitally interested in maritime border planning consistently recognised the as transnational security issues, the security risks who, other than armed centrality of command of the sea. The Indian Ocean is likely to host a larger attack, relate to the offshore roles 1947 ‘Appreciation of the Strategical military (particularly naval) presence. and functions of my agency, such as Position of Australia’ noted that a A number of major naval powers are maritime terrorism, illegal activity at policy of isolation could only lead to likely to increasingly compete for sea such as drugs smuggling and illegal disaster, and that Australia’s security strategic advantage in this crucial fishing, and the movement of potential must be based on strategic interests maritime region. With these factors illegal immigrants. Finally, of course, which were considered in maritime in mind, and with the centrality of the we have a vital interest in defence from terms and which were associated with: Indian Ocean’s maritime trade routes armed attack, to which I will soon turn. The Indian Ocean: mainly Aus Army to the energy security of many Asian The sea of course has to be central concerned with the integrity of British Blackhawks over HMAS Newcastle states, Defence planners will need to focus increasingly on the operating conditions and demands of this region. More than ever before, short of war, Australian defence planning will have to contemplate operational concepts for the Indian Ocean region, including with regional partners with whom we share similar strategic interests. It will simply become impossible to coherently develop our defence strategies and naval plans with an exclusively Pacific bias. How are we positioned to respond to these and other like challenges? Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 7

Territories which bordered on the Indian Ocean, oil resources, the sea and air routes that constituted the shortest and best routes for air supply and reinforcement.

The Pacific Ocean; and South East Asia

Moving forward 62 years, the 2009 Defence White Paper noted that: Our strategic interests and defence posture suggest a primary focus for the ADF on tasks in a predominantly maritime operational environment. In other words, to guide defence planning, the Government decided in our military contingency planning. to safeguard our territory, critical HMAS Newcastle in the White Paper that the ADF’s Most of Australia’s reserves of oil sea lanes, pop centres and major by Chris Sattler primary operational environment is an and gas are concentrated offshore in infrastructure. inherently maritime one, which extends the north-west of Australia and the In response to these challenges, from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Timor Sea. Many of our key resource the White Paper lays out a maritime island states of Polynesia, and from the extraction facilities are remote and strategy, one in which Australia’s aim equator to the Southern Ocean. That would be vulnerable to interference, should be to establish and maintain area contains all Australian sovereign, disruption or attack. Some of our sea and air control to enable the offshore and economic territories, such offshore territories would also be manoeuvre and employment of as Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Christmas vulnerable to harassment or attack, and joint ADF elements in our primary Island, Heard and McDonald Islands, their loss or occupation by an adversary operational environment, and Macquarie Island, Norfolk Island and would represent a major strategic particularly in the maritime and littoral also waters adjacent to the Australian setback. approaches to the continent. Antarctic Territory. As part of its core business, Defence Such a strategy does not necessarily The sea-air gap to our north is at will need to continue to revise and entail a purely defensive or reactive the strategic centre of our primary update contingency plans for the approach. In operational terms, if we operational environment. It affords defence of Australia and its approaches, have to, we will need to be prepared to us an opportunity to detect and notwithstanding the imperative of undertake proactive combat operations respond to potentially hostile military managing ongoing operations. This against an adversary’s military bases incursions at sufficiently long ranges planning work should comprehend and staging areas, and against its forces to enable an effective response before especially difficult military problems, in transit, as far from Australia as an adversary could reach Australian such as establishing sea control and possible. mainland territory and, in particular, air superiority in our approaches, the This might involve using our key population centres and major defence of our offshore territories strike capabilities, including combat infrastructure. and resources, and operations on and aircraft, long-range missiles (including While this affords us an ability to around our territory. land attack missiles fired from employ defence in depth, our strategic The White Paper goes on to state submerged submarines and/or surface geography nonetheless poses major that our military strategy is crucially combatants) and special forces (most defence planning challenges. Northern dependent on our ability to conduct likely inserted from the sea). We will Australia, with its long coastline, joint operations in the approaches to aim to control the dynamics of the remote population centres, substantial Australia - especially those necessary conflict by setting the pace, scale and economic resources, and relatively to achieve and maintain air superiority intensity of operations, by dissuading underdeveloped infrastructure, will and sea control in places of our an adversary from making any attempt always command a significant place choosing, to the extent required to escalate the conflict, and convincing Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 8 Vernon Parker Oration them that such escalation would come does not have to worry overly Sea control is not these days at significant cost. about defending itself by land, principally about the engagement of The ADF would have to, as and has relatively uninhabited other nation’s main fleet, although any necessary, tailor its operations, such access to the sea. maritime power seriously interested in that we do not fight in a manner that • The length of the coast-line sea control needs the ability to engage sees a high rate of attrition and mass and the character of a nation’s in high intensity maritime conflict casualties among our forces. We will harbours. Mahan suggested if called upon to do so in credible seek to avoid battle on unfavourable that the longer the coastline contingencies against likely adversaries. terms, apply force in a precise manner, and the greater number of Today sea control is also concerned in a way that the adversary is not natural harbours, the better off with the ability to keep open sea lanes; expecting, and seek to overmatch at the country would be in terms protect commerce, and the movement decisive points in battle. of commerce and the capability of crucial energy supplies; deter In this maritime strategy – taking to support fleet actions. It and defeat illegal activities such as maritime at its fullest meaning – naval would be harder for an enemy maritime terrorism, drug trafficking, forces are of course not the only tools to blockade such a country and people smuggling, piracy, and illegal of military power, but they are the the internal and external lines fishing, and prevent the proliferation indispensable platform for success. of communication would be of weapons of mass destruction and How then should we view modern subject to less friction. prohibited goods, including those the navies in the context of our future • The size of the nation’s subject of international sanctions. conception of sea control? population, specifically As such, sea control lends itself to A.T. Mahan in his classic book the number of population being effected through international with which you would all be familiar, involved in the sea for their maritime partnerships such as we have The Influence of Sea Power Upon living. Mahan suggested that seen in the last 25 years in terms of the History 1660-1783, published in 1890, a nation cannot quickly build protection by international naval forces effectively laid out a key thesis which up an effective navy. The of commerce and energy supplies in the resonates today – the West came development and building Gulf and in a different context through to value navies as the key to global of naval capability takes the growth of counter-proliferation influence and upon this foundation years and having a crew that exercises under the rubric of the the modern world was built. Now he can maintain and fight the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). knew that sea power was more than ship requires a great deal of Intuitively this would seem to be the navy and more than control of training. a sound basis for Australian defence strategic trading routes. It meant using • The national character of a planning, alongside the equally the mobility of the sea to build a system nation, and an understanding important platform of air power (but of economic and political links and an of the value of commerce that’s another lecture). ability to project hard power on, and and an open attitude toward Alas, it is never so simple. For from, the sea if and when required. It prosperity and growth. too long, Australian defence strategy also meant using the strategic flexibility • The character of government – or should I say debate about of being an offshore power, protected and the way it pays attention Australian defence strategy – has in large measure from land neighbours to the sea with respect to been immobilised in an intellectual to pursue national ends. Mahan would commerce (which directly led straightjacket which essentially boiled not have been surprised that some 30 to national wealth) and to a down to this binary construction: we years later, empires devoid of these strong, capable navy (which should pursue either an expeditionary attributes – the Ottoman, Habsbury, directly led to the security of strategy which is founded on our Romanov and Wilhelmine – ceased to that national wealth). land forces operating in alliance or exist. By such measures, and adjusting for coalitions frameworks, most likely in At the core of Mahanian concepts the different era in which Mahan was the Middle East, Central Asia or Africa, for a nation as a sea power are: writing, Australia can be considered a or a ‘continentalist’ strategy which is • A geographic position that sea power – albeit one that is limited founded on our naval and air forces lends itself to the exercise of to some extent by the size of its operating in the defence of Australia sea power, where a nation population. from bases in Australia. This tired Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 9

construction should be laid to rest, and I believe that the 2009 Defence White Paper does so. It is possible to envisage if one looks at Force 2030, an expeditionary orientation founded on sea power, with Australian forces operating (either independently or in coalition, depending on the strategic circumstances) in a range of operational scenarios ranging from hunting and destroying submarines, protecting commerce and energy supplies, deterring and defeating pirates, interdicting the movement of WMD or goods prohibited by international sanctions, projecting land forces ashore or delivering HMAS Success by humanitarian assistance from a sea Government will double the size of directly, or coerce, intimidate or Chris Sattler base. How does that range of scenarios the submarine force (12 more capable otherwise employ military power fit within the tired old intellectual boats to replace the current fleet of six against us. straight jacket of the navy being the Collins class submarines), replace the The Future Submarine will be defender of the moat? current Anzac class frigate with eight capable of a range of tasks such as Of course it does not. As the White more capable Future Frigate optimised anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare; Paper made clear, the Government for anti-submarine warfare (ASW); strategic strike; mine detection and has set very clear force structure and enhance our capability for offshore mine-laying operations; intelligence determinants. These do not constrain maritime warfare, border protection collection; supporting special forces unduly the uses to which the ADF and mine countermeasures. (including infiltration and exfiltration might be put in the pursuit of our Let me spell out the logic behind the missions); and gathering battlespace strategic interests. submarine decision. The Government data in support of operation. To achieve its strategy, the White took the view in the White Paper that Long transits and potentially short- Paper of course establishes force our future strategic circumstances notice contingencies in our primary structure priorities for Force 2030 necessitate a substantially expanded operational environment demand high based on major surface combatants submarine fleet of 12 boats in order levels of mobility and endurance in the (destroyers and frigates), submarines to sustain a force at sea large enough Future Submarine. The boats need to and other naval capabilities, supported in a crisis or conflict to be able to be able to undertake prolonged covert by air combat (for air superiority defend our approaches (including at patrols over the full distance of our and maritime strike) and maritime considerable distance from Australia, if strategic approaches and in operational surveillance and response assets, to necessary), protect and support other areas. They require low signatures establish sea control, and to project ADF assets, and undertake certain across all spectrums, including at force in our maritime environment strategic missions where the stealth higher speeds. The Government has (including for the purposes of and other operating characteristics of ruled out nuclear propulsion for these maintaining freedom of navigation, highly-capable advanced submarines submarines. protecting our shipping, and lifting and would be crucial. Moreover, a larger Driving this project will be of supporting land forces). submarine force would significantly singular importance and I am delighted Assuming that future governments increase the military planning that RADM Rowan Moffit has been commit to this plan and that Defence challenges faced by any adversaries, given the task. ensures that it is implemented, by and increase the size and capabilities the mid-2030s we will have a heavier of the force they would have to be Turning to the surface fleet, the and more potent maritime force. The prepared to commit to attack us Government decided to proceed with Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 10 Vernon Parker Oration

the acquisition of three Air Warfare that the White Paper placed greater be larger than the current Armidale Destroyers (AWD). The AWDs will be emphasis on our capacity to detect and class patrol boats, with an anticipated equipped with: respond to submarines in the ADF’s displacement of up to 2,000 tonnes. • the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) primary operational environment This concept relies on the long-range anti-aircraft missile, through the acquisition of the Future use of modular unmanned with a range of more than 200 Submarine, and enhanced ASW underwater systems for both mine nautical miles (370 kilometres). capabilities in the surface combatant countermeasures and other tasks. • A sophisticated Cooperative fleet, the naval combat helicopter and These systems are envisaged to be Engagement Capability (CEC), the maritime patrol aircraft which will containerised and portable modules which enable each vessel to replace the P3COrion fleet. capable of being used in any port act as part of a wider ‘grid’ of As we develop our information or loaded onto any of the Offshore sensor and weapon platforms superiority capability, situational Combatant Vessels or other suitable that can share surveillance and awareness in the undersea domain will vessels. targeting information. become relatively more important. The future Offshore Combatant • The Government will continue The Defence Science and Technology Vessel will be able to undertake to assess the capability need Organisation (DSTO) will enhance its offshore and littoral warfighting roles, for a fourth AWD in the research into underwater sensors and border protection tasks, long-range future against further changes networking to give greater emphasis to counter-terrorism and counter- in the strategic assessment underwater situational awareness. piracy operations, support to special and, consistent with that I should say something about the forces, and missions in support of assessment the most rational Offshore Combatant Vessel. The security and stability in the immediate public investment in further Government decided to rationalise neighbourhood. Defence will examine defence platforms. the Navy’s patrol boat, mine counter the potential for these new ships to The Government has also decided measures, hydrographic and embark a helicopter or UAV, to allow to acquire a fleet of eight new Future oceanographic forces into a single a surge in surveillance and response Frigates, which will be larger than modular multirole class of around capabilities without the need to the Anzac class vessels. The Future 20 Offshore Combatant Vessels deploy additional ships. This increased Frigate will be designed and equipped combining four existing classes of capability will also ensure that major with a strong emphasis on submarine vessels. surface combatants are free for more detection and response operations. This has the potential to provide demanding operations. As the Chief They will be equipped with an significant operational efficiencies and Operating Officer of the Australian HMAS Kanimbla by integrated sonar suite that includes potential savings. The new vessels will Customs and Border Protection Chris Sattler long-range active towed-array sonar, and be able to embark a combination of naval combat helicopters and maritime Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). In terms of naval aviation, the Government decided to acquire a fleet of at least 24 new naval combat helicopters to provide eight or more aircraft concurrently embarked on ships at sea. These new aircraft will possess advanced ASW capabilities, including sonar systems able to be lowered into the sea and air-launched torpedoes, as well as an ability to fire air-to-surface missiles. In terms of the undersea domain, it will not have escaped this audience Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 11

Service, I will be taking a very close defend themselves and accomplish terrorism, weapons proliferation and other illicit or illegal interest in the evolution of this project. their missions.) Submarines will activities. Naval forces are particularly suited for undertaking It has the potential to revolutionise the be increasingly used across a wider such a wide range of mission - which have less to do with way in which we undertake offshore range of roles and missions and will imposing one’s will (although they can do that) and more maritime patrol and response and I significantly complicate an adversary’s with shaping behaviour. We need increasingly to think in have directed our staff to engage very planning calculations. such terms and to post one example have probably only closely with Defence. Let me conclude by tackling head on just begun to think about the shaping effects of an Australian I should round out this survey by one of the fundamental misconceptions expeditionary amphibious group based around a LHD touching on our future amphibious about the White Paper’s approach to standing ready to provide humanitarian assistance and/or capability. The Government decided to sea power. The fundamental role of sea intervene to protect our nationals from a sea base. In our enhance our amphibious capability by power in Australian defence strategy part of the world that would be environment shaping sea acquiring a large strategic sealift ship to is to shape the strategic environment power. move stores, equipment and personnel. in which we will operate. In order to My concluding point then is this: let us place sea power to Based on a proven design, the new deny at sea, we must control at sea. its rightful place at the centre of Australian defence strategy, ship will have a displacement of 10,000 That is why the White Paper avoided and as we build the most powerful navy in the Southern - 15,000 tonnes, with landing spots a one dimensional approach to sea Hemisphere let us develop the skills and intellectual for a number of helicopters and an power, as was recommended by those frameworks with which, and through which, to think about ability to land vehicles and other cargo proponents of a narrow sea denial sea power as a tool of national policy. without requiring port infrastructure. strategy which, being based on a large I have every confidence that the Australian Naval Institute The new ship will provide ongoing force of submarines (18 in the case will argue this cause very passionately and I will watch the sustainment support for deployed of one commentator), would shape process with very great interest. I thank you most sincerely forces, allowing the LHD ships to too narrowly an adversary’s strategic for giving me the opportunity to address you tonight.  remain in areas of operations in direct perceptions through the uncertainty support of the land force ashore. created in that adversary’s mind by that Further, the plan will introduce six force’s location and disposition. Sea new heavy landing craft with improved denial is of course a critical component Mr Michael Pezzullo ocean-going capabilities, able to of the exercise of sea power, and the Deputy Secretary transport armoured vehicles, trucks, Force 2030 plan to acquire 12 large Strategy stores and people in intra-theatre lift conventional submarines should be tasks to augment the larger amphibious seen in that light. But there are other Michael Pezzullo took up vessels. missions and roles to be performed, the position of Deputy such as protection of shipping lanes Secretary Strategy in What are the key strategic and amphibious manoeuvre, which the Department of features of this future rely on sea control in its broadest sense, Defence in January fleet? and in relation to which a narrowly focussed sea denial force would be an 2006. In this role, he is In this force structure, surface over indulgent waste of money, and responsible for defence combatants will continue to be the unfit for purpose. strategy and planning, platform most applicable to the widest As most of you would be aware, the force structure development, the strategic policy aspects of range of maritime tasks, including 2007 US maritime strategy document, st Australian Defence Force operations, Defence’s international sea control, power projection, visible A Cooperative Strategy for 21 Century deterrence, border protection and Seapower, emphasises humanitarian security relationships, and delivering national security territorial security, although they assistance and disaster relief as among programmes in areas such as export controls, counter- will be challenged by increasingly the core missions for US maritime proliferation and Defence cooperation with other countries. sophisticated anti-ship weapons and forces, alongside sea control, power He also oversees the Department’s ministerial support systems. (Nothing however that is projection and strategic deterrence. and public affairs programmes. Mr Pezzullo joined the new in the eternal cycle of measure The US strategy also elevates other and counter-measures, with surface forms of naval ‘soft power’ including Department of Defence as a graduate in 1987. ships able to increasingly rely on exercises, training and partnering being part of networked systems to with foreign navies to combat piracy, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 12 How naval intelligence might better serve the ADF BL Cy iEUTENANT ommander Tom Lewis

2 Navy Intelligence is “a prime the French coast. This worked well – essential for modern warfare.” in fact so successfully that when the 6 A Failure of Maritime Intelligence Fleet Admiral Ernest Joseph King, June landings began the main defender, - Omaha Beach, D-Day, 1944 There were five main beach landing spots for D-Day, Commander in Chief, United States General Rommel, was convinced that to be stormed by the British (2), the Canadians (1), Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations it was a feint. What today is called and the Americans (2). When the US forces landed during World War II. “Information Operations” was a at Omaha Beach, the entrenched defenders had small subset of the whole intelligence not received enough naval gunfire support (NGS), s naval intelligence important for the planning process. and they were alive in sufficient quantity to make Australian Defence Force? For an This type of intelligence analysis the landing extremely dangerous – as the first 20 minutes of the movie Saving Private Ryan shows. As Iarmy, naval intelligence has often been demands people who have expertise in well, cloud cover had obscured imagery analysis, and essential. In the earlier years of WWII the maritime environment, although it a German division was holding defensive exercises 1 it was understood that sooner or later also necessitates careful coordination in the location at the time. The US forces lost many there would have to be an invasion of with those who are planning the land men, and nearly failed to storm the defences. Better Europe. But getting combat-equipped component of the attack. Knowledge analysis of the defences, the gunnery necessary to smash them, and what assets remained after the soldiers ashore on the beaches might of tidal systems, wave patterns, how NGS would have saved the day. not be that easy. What if the beaches certain types of weather affect the sea, were too soft, or too steep? What and how ships will behave in it – all of The Americans failed to ensure sufficient operational if the landing craft got stuck too far this and more needs naval people. But intelligence was gained before committing to the out, exposing wading soldiers to any what must be emphasized is that the assault. defenders not dead? What was needed cooperation with land intelligence staff was information on those beaches. So the British Broadcasting Service was asked to put out a request over its airwaves for holidays photographs of beaches all over Europe. Thousands poured in, and careful analysis of gradients, seawalls and more was 1 begun. As the Allies prepared to storm the Normandy landings for D-Day, the intelligence work done beforehand became of essential importance. The strategic plan in essence was elegant in its simplicity: pulverize the defences, land on the beaches, and consolidate for a push into Europe. Intelligence enabled the planners to ensure success at the strategic, operational and tactical levels by pre-planning for success. Of course, letting your adversary know exactly which areas you were interested in would let the cat out US troops near a of the bag, so to speak, and undo is of primary importance, and so must and how it has been in the past, is that target beach on the efforts of the planners. So a the acknowledgement that navies are air and sea operations support land D-Day (US Army) disinformation campaign of carefully not an isolated force – they support campaigns. But was not the battle of placed “leaks” was established, which armies, for it is from armies that Trafalgar fought at sea, with no flow- suggested the landings would come at victory comes. on effect to the land? Not so – once Calais, a considerable distance away This point must be expanded Trafalgar in 1805 was won, as Nelson from the intended Normandy sites on further, for the name of the game today, lay dying on Victory, with the shattered Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 13

Potential TG 79.4 TG 79.1 and 79.2 at the hands of (3 frigates) (aircraft carrier Actual 250 de Mayo Wellington. It has and 2 escorts always been this way, and always will HMS Splendid be so, no matter patrol area

what air power HMS Spartan patrol area: Air strike theorists argue in spotted TG 79.4 attempted April 29 May 2 A-4Qs battlefields such unable to take o­ with as Kosovo. They enough fuel for 80nm argued airpower Total exclusion zone range (200nm radius) was all that was TG 79.3 (cruiser General Belgrano Engraving of the Battle of Salamis showing Greek warships destroying and two destroyers Falkland needed beforehand, Islands Persian warships at close range British Task Force but after the Kosovo May 1-2 patroling Sea Harriers air campaigns it detached approaching carrier group A Failure of Maritime Intelligence was necessary to Rio Grande at Salamis 480BC send in a land force Air base to stabilize the Burwood Bank In this fight between the Persians (today’s Iranians) Isla de los and the Greeks, the latter were outnumbered by a situation. So too it Estados battle proven fleet. Persia’s ships – triremes carrying was in 1945 – only Belgrano sunk fighting marines armed with spears, bows, and 19.00 May 2 HMS Conqueror infantry can break swords – numbered around 800, while the Greeks through into the had around 300, with the fighting troops being hoplites armed with sword and spear. Both sides bunker and find the force of two aircraft carriers and an used a tactic of ramming and boarding. The Greek war is over for they amphibious assault force south. leader, Themistocles, took new measures to give have found Hitler’s The war was indeed a failure of himself an edge. He had his men trained to swim body and confirmed intelligence, at the grand strategic level. – an unusual ability in those days – and he sowed he is dead. Despite various indicators, Britain false intelligence amongst the Persians by stories So how best should that morale in the Greek camp was terrible and they had not pieced together the picture naval intelligence would probably flee. Finally, he chose on the day of enough to understand that Argentina serve a total force? the battle a narrow channel of water which would would indeed do what it had politically We have already not allow the superior numbers of the Persian ships 1 established that signaled it wanted for many years. to outflank him. When battle was joined, Greeks by being the The invasion could have been deterred thrown into the water by impact or combat simply source of best simply by sending an exercise force swam to the nearest friendly vessel. The Greek’s information on the high morale was boosted even further by this and south well beforehand: the sight of an intelligence needs they fought superbly in their chosen battlespace. aircraft carrier; a few nuclear powered of an amphibious Greece was saved. operation, and armed submarines, and a host intelligence is vital. of surface craft showing their muscle The Persians failed to assess they could be But sometimes sea off the coast would probably have manipulated by their enemy; failed to choose their operations, isolated 2 battlespace wisely, and lacked critical information convinced the Argentines of the folly into the maritime about their foes of their course of action. But it was not battlespace, are a to be, and in the ensuing war hundreds vital precursor to joint operations. To 1 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins remains of the French and Spanish illustrate this we turn to the Falklands note that the Foreign Office in Britain had fleets around him, then he spoke his War. a dominance over the Joint Intelligence Committee that resulted in information last words “Thank God I have done my In 1982 Argentina invaded the being blocked, and also that “...the JIC told duty”. His duty had been to annihilate British-governed Falkland Islands off Mrs Thatcher little to suggest an imminent crisis in the South Atlantic.” Battle for the the enemy at sea, so Napoleon could be its coast. A spirited defence by a small Falklands (330, 336) contained, and a land campaign could force of Royal Marines failed to deter 2 According to a “senior Argentine official”…”we simply never dreamed for then be fought. Now Napoleon was them, and once in situ, Argentina made one minute you would send a task force. prevented from using the sea again, and it clear that it was not going to leave Had we known…the sceptics would have so ten years later he met his Waterloo through diplomacy. Britain sent a task had powerful evidence to counter Anay’s proposals for invasion”. Ibid 337. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 14 How naval intelligence might better serve the ADF

of people died to as an indicator that countries often do not look into the right areas for their information needs. But the intelligence failure was not all British. The strategic plan gradually took shape: the two carrier British force would travel down the eastern side of South America, and remain to the east of the Falkland islands, thus putting the task group at the extreme end of Argentine aircraft range. It would then close the islands with its aircraft protecting an amphibious landing force. A useful indication of how a need for operational naval intelligence reaches down from the political to the battlespace is given by the one-sided fight later in the Falklands war between the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano D-day allied assault and the British. the Conqueror inflict – there would officer to a maritime force. Note that routes The sole Argentine aircraft carrier be a lot of difference in the political there is a need for both embarked Vincennes de Mayo emerged from ramifications if 10 lives were lost than personnel and also shore-based port behind the British, and with her 1000. What danger was there protection force took up station to their to the boat once she had fired north. To the south, the Belgrano and – one cruiser damaged for the her two destroyer consorts began to possible loss of one nuclear- move north towards the British. The powered submarine was an task force, caught in the middle, was unequal equation. Should all looking at fighting in two directions at three ships be sunk or just once. However, a solution was at hand. one? Was it possible to sink all The submarineHMAS Conqueror had three? And so on. been shadowing the Belgrano force, This sort of intelligence is and would be in a position to provide a something only a specialized firing solution. naval officer could provide. Picture the type of military In the event, the data came intelligence Prime Minister Margaret flowing through, and Cabinet took the members in these capacities: the shore- Classic Intelligence failure-HMS Thatcher and her advisors would need, decision, and a few hours later Belgrano based organization acting as a conduit Glamorgan was and how much of this is specialized was hit, sinking quickly for the loss of for information and requests to flow hit by an Argentine 3 maritime information. 368 lives. The escorting destroyers, in backwards and forwards between the Exocet fired from The range ofConqueror ’s weapons a humane gesture, were left alone by strategic home and theatre command land, Only first-class was easily enough known, but Commander Chris Wreford-Jones, the based on ships. damage control saved the ship then comes the demand for much Conqueror’s commanding officer, for Is there a third role? Around the more precise data. How long, and he assessed the two remaining ships world are scores of countries with below what sort of sea state could would be in no condition to fight once navies of hundreds of vessels. Are these the submarine keep track of the they had carried out multiple rescues. navies a threat to our country? How do three ships? What was the threat to So far we have two major roles for you measure that? What do we mean Conqueror – what sort of weapons did the intelligence officer. They are: a) by a force’s capability? What would a the Belgrano group possess; how usable provide specialized naval intelligence to “red force’ have to contribute to the were they, and how proficient were an amphibious force, and b) act as the final picture? Understanding such the crews? What sort of damage could strategic and operational intelligence equations needs research, analysis, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 15

References: and the ability to present the findings worked in naval intelligence already in a coherent, usable form. This third know – but this paper articulates Belchem, Major-General David. Victory in Normandy. London: Book Club Associates, role, therefore, is one of shore-based the roles. As the Royal Australian 1981. research and analysis into foreign Navy turns more towards the littoral, Hastings, Max and Jenkins, Simon. Battle for the Falklands. London: Michael forces. with the establishment of a more Joseph, 1983. We can go further still. There amphibious-related force, naval Office of Naval Intelligence. “Our Mission”. http://www.nmic.navy.mil/ are other possible roles for naval intelligence will indeed grow in value mission.htm 16 June 2007. intelligence. The American agency, for the ADF as a whole.  Parry, Dan. D-Day – Reflections of Courage. London: BBC Books, 2004. the Office of Naval Intelligence, has Reed, Harrison P. “The Development of overhauled itself since 9/11. They now the Terrain Model in the War”. Geographical Review, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Oct., 1946). have as a primary mission, to: Saunders, CDR (Sel) Richard L., USN. …provide intelligence support “Preparation of the US Navy Intelligence Officer” for joint expeditionary warfare as http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/saunders. envisioned in the Navy strategy htm

“Forward...From the Sea.” Naval (Footnotes) Intelligence--with Marine Corps 1 The assault was helped a few hours later when eight US and three British destroyers Intelligence, Coast Guard, the closed the beach and provided more NGS. Drug Enforcement Agency, and See Belchem, Victory in Normandy, pp. 84, U.S. Customs-- has also devoted an Lieutenant Commander Tom Lewis, 90. increased effort to nontraditional OAM, RAN, is the author of six history (Endnotes) maritime intelligence missions. 1 Parry, Dan. D-Day – Reflections of HMAS Sheean books, and holds a PhD in Strategic Courage. London: BBC Books, 2004. (17) conducting their These have included expanded Studies and an MA in American Cold 2 Belchem, Major-General David. reporting and analysis of merchant ship Victory in Normandy. London: Book Club Air Sea Safety War Literature and Politics. He has Associates, 1981. (pp. 33-37). Assesment off activity linked to maritime aspects of 3 Battle for the Falklands (p. 150) worked for several years as a naval Garden Island in weaponry and technology proliferation, 4 Office of Naval Intelligence. “Our Western Australia Mission”. http://www.nmic.navy.mil/ and counternarcotics activity as intelligence officer, and is the current mission.htm 16 June 2007. with HMAS well as support to efforts to enforce editor of Headmark. Adelaide’s SeaHawk environmental treaties protecting vital Helicopter 4 ocean resources. In simplified terms, we need naval intelligence officers to study maritime- related terrorism and crime. This too is a shore-based situation, and one that demands careful management of relationships between other authorities such as Customs and policing forces.

We have arrived at four roles for naval intelligence: • provide support for amphibious operations; • provide support for naval operations; • provide analysis of naval threats, and • provide analysis of maritime terrorism and crime.

In fact, many of these tasks are already performed, as those readers who have Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 16 Duty, Mateship and a Sense of Adventure – Comparison of Motivation for Enlistment: First World War and Today BL J y iEUTENANT ulian O’Shea

“The first fine rush to enlistment brought to the 1st Australian Division a class of men not quite the same as that which answered any later call… all the romantic, quixotic, adventurous flotsam that eddied on the surface of the Australian people concentrated itself within those first weeks upon the recruiting offices of the A.I.F.” – C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918

he Royal Australian Navy is currently facing the most Tsignificant recruitment and manpower RAN Bridging Team challenge in decades. With this in prospect of war and that Australia’s The documents used by recruiters Officers and Petty mind and with 2008 having been the armed forces might be called upon. to encourage people to enlist shed Officers at Gallipoli 90th anniversary of the end of the First The mood throughout the country was some light on the motivations of these World War, it is fitting to consider one of almost total support, from both potential recruits. One such leaflet the motivations of those who served sides of government and the wider displays a Federation Star boldly Australia in her first major conflict – a community. proclaiming: ‘Enlist’. On each of the period which saw 416,809 men enlist to When the war was announced seven points are reasons to sign up, serve in the Australian Defence Forces. Australia responded by offering the ‘For Australia’, ‘For the Empire’, ‘For Throughout the years of war they vessels of the Royal Australian Navy Home’, ‘For the Right’, ‘For Justice’, ‘For saw service from the shores of Gallipoli and pledged a force of 20,000 for Honour’ and ‘For all we Love’. The to the Western Front and on the decks service wherever they were required. theme of this particular piece was of HMAS Sydney and beyond. Their For the first time as a nation, Australia values: patriotism, loyalty and honour. courage and actions shaped the Anzac was at war. These were important motives for legend and their willing response forms Brigadier-General William Bridges enlisting members and will be explored a significant chapter in Australia’s was responsible for raising this force further, but were not the only reasons history. This article explores the that he named the Australian Imperial for signing up. motivation of these young Australians, Force; a title which reflected both the This national attitude of 1914 differs examines why they chose to enlist and national connection and strong link to greatly to the public attitude today fight for their country and compares the British Empire. The initial response towards the war in Iraq, which saw their motivations with those who enlist by Australians was truly remarkable. hundreds of thousands of Australians to serve in the Royal Australian Navy Thousands of young men applied in involved in protests prior to Australia of today. recruiting centres around the nation committing troops. In 2007 the to be part of the first division of Australian Labor Party was elected The Call to Service deployed troops. Recruiters were spoilt nationally and with a strong majority As tensions increased in Europe during for choice as men rushed enrolment on the platform of withdrawing all 1914 the Australian public began to officers around the nation, resulting in combat troops from Iraq. realise that Great Britain faced the real high physical and personal standards. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 17

Patriotism: ‘For Australia’ Australia was a young nation when it was drawn into the First World War. Indeed the federated Commonwealth of Australia was younger than the people signing up to fight for her. It has been said that whilst 1901 saw Australia created by law it was not until 1915 that Australia truly become a nation – born on the shores of Gallipoli. There was intense national pride at this time, as one returned digger explained, “It is impossible to put into writing the intense feeling of patriotism felt by the majority of my age at the time, and the greatest punishment that could be given to any of us was to be sent back to join a later regiment.” Bosuns Mates Australia has changed over the past to enlist wrote, “To a greater extent… sense of duty not only to the nation and onboard HMAS 90 years and the events of the First was the desire to help the Motherland Empire but also on a personal level to Brunei-mateship is World War gave the nation a stronger in her hour of need. Unfortunately, to their families and community. more than a title identity but we remain proud of our me, this attitude does not apply today When men enlisted to serve during shared history and achievements. to any extent. Our affinity with the this period they did so locally, and went Much of the exposure the public has Homeland from which the Kith and on to fight with men from the same to the work of the Australian Defence Kin of most of us originally came does state or area. This strengthened these Forces reinforces this; events such as not appear to hold any or very little bonds of mateship and provided a Anzac Day and Remembrance Day interest.” degree of competition between various where the emotional link between This is an accurate reflection in regions. Serving soldiers increased this patriotism and the services still remain the shift of attitudes of Australians, feeling through letters from abroad strong. particularly younger people who no which spoke of their experiences as longer have a personal sense of loyalty well as expressing the desire that other Loyalty: ‘For the Empire’ to England. Service to ‘the Empire’ no men from their own area enlist. The mood at the time was that longer remains a motivating factor for The theme of mateship in the Australia was very much part of the sailors within modern Australia. services is as important today as it British Empire and national actions was in 1914 and continues to be a would directly reflect this. This was Mateship: ‘For Honour’ significant part of the culture of the clearly enunciated by Andrew Fisher, Whilst many great bonds were forged Australian Defence Forces. Modern Australia’s Prime Minister for the first abroad, it was even before many young recruiting techniques use this as a two years of the war who after hearing men had signed up that stories and the selling point and the teamwork aspect that war was imminent announced, concept of mateship was firmly in their of Naval (and other military) service “Australians will stand beside our own mind. One of the recurring images continues to draw individuals to enlist. to help and defend her to our last man used by recruiters during the war was and our last shilling.” the importance of a national identity Sense of Adventure: ‘For all we Love’ This attitude towards England and mateship. This was strongest Whilst many of the attitudes have shifted over the course of the twentieth portrayed by the image of the ‘diggers’ changed among young Australians over century and although the ties and focussed on the landing of the the past 90 years there is one which remain, Australia has become a more Anzacs at Gallipoli. remains as strong now as it did then: independent nation and has carved This was an era where the concept a sense of adventure and desire to see out her own identity. One returned of duty was strong and very real. Many the world. serviceman reflecting on his motivation letters from servicemen spoke of the Recruiters capitalised on this spirit Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 18 Duty, Mateship and a Sense of Adventure – Comparison of Motivation for Enlistment: First World War and Today of adventure promoting travel as one of young Australians, however, making the benefits for enlistment. One such the decision to leave their families and pamphlet was in stark contrast to the loved ones behind must not have been one previously mentioned and looked an easy task. like a travel brochure. It offered: ‘Free For whichever reasons compelled Tour to Great Britain and Europe – The these young Australians to enlist it is Chance of a Lifetime’. This approach their service and sacrifice which we focussed on the sense of adventure remain thankful. The human cost of and for many this would be their first the war was incredible. By the war’s opportunity to see Great Britain and a end over 220,000 Australian service real chance to see the world. personnel were killed or injured. This Whilst reading the letters and was a terrible toll on a small nation. The reports from the enlisted men the ceremonies and the various memorials Lieutenant Julian O’Shea is the excitement that existed was truly around Australia, notably Anzac Day, Manager and Weapons Electrical inspiring. Robert Antill, a young provide an important reminder to all of Engineering Officer of the West Head English migrant who would go on us of the sacrifices made and the brave Gunnery Range in Victoria. Julian to enlist described it in a letter to actions of the men and women who completed his Telecommunications his parents, “We have all got the have served their nation with honour. war fever… I would love to get back Many of the motivations which Engineering degree at the University and have a bit of a go in.” There were drew thousands of young people to of Adelaide and has a Masters degree thousands of young Australians who enlist during the First World War in Engineering Management from the got caught up in this emotion, the ‘war exist today, while some no longer University of New South Wales. His fever’. hold relevance in modern Australia. most recent sea posting was to HMAS Australia is a nation of travellers, Today there are other reasons why particularly among young people. people choose to join, including Newcastle. The ease of access to travel, however, quality training, exposure to advanced References: has changed a great deal and many technical systems and for lifestyle people take ‘gap’ years or undertake changes. While Australian society Bean, C.E.W., The Official History of long periods abroad, particularly to has changed greatly over the past Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Vol 1, Sydney, 1936 England and Europe. An interest in 90 years, the challenge of recruiting Dawes, J.N.I., Robson, L.L., Citizen to travel is a part of the appeal of the sufficient quality people into the Soldier – Australia before the Great War, Recollections of Members of the First A.I.F., Royal Australian Navy today, but a Australian Defence Force remains Melbourne University Press, Carlton, diminished one compared to years and as an organisation we must strive Victoria, 1977 Forrest, Alison, Milling Around Outside gone by. By conducting overseas trips to be an employer of choice and to the Town Hall – Motivations for Enlistment and promoting these to potential communicate the many benefits that of the First A.I.F., Melbourne Historical Journal, Melbourne, Victoria, 1987 recruits there is scope to improve Naval service to potential recruits.  McQuilton, John, A Shire at War – enlistment numbers. Yackandandah, 1914-1918, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, ACT, 1987 Complex Motivations McQuilton, John, Enlistment for the First World War in rural Australia: The case The individuals who enlisted in the of north-eastern Victoria, Journal of the Australian Defence Forces during the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, ACT, 2000 First World War, as do those who sign Robson, L.L., The First A.I.F. – A Study up today, did so for a range of reasons. of its Recruitment 1914-1918, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 1970 Every person took with them a mix of Thomson, Alistair,Anzac Memories – personal and national motives. Some Living with the Legend, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Victoria, 1994 identified with the duty to serve their White, Richard, Motive for Joining Up – country and the Empire. Others were Self-sacrifice, Self-Interest and Social Class 1914-1918, Journal of the Australian War drawn to the call of supporting those Memorial, Canberra, ACT, 1986 already overseas, spurred on by the sense of adventure. For each of these Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 19

TRALIAN ST N U SSAY W N Mahan & Corbett: Lessons for the RAN’s A E AA

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he recent release of the Defence whose navy was the most powerful in unbreakable rule to 2 White Paper, with its apparent the world; he sought to provide a more Mahan. Corbett, Tconnotations of maritime expansion, specific framework for the application conversely, went has seen some defence academics and of that power, and guidance for future to great length to elements of the wider media attempt development at a time where reform explain that there to relate Australia’s maritime and naval was necessary but difficult to achieve in were “no laws or policies, and the related force structure, a climate still dominated by aspirations rules” in strategic to classical maritime-strategic thought. for Trafalgar-like major fleet actions. study. “Such laws…” One oft quoted line is that “Mahan is These differing environments he wrote, “can only dead!” Or even that “this is the time of therefore shaped the views and wants mislead in practice, Corbettian power projection!” These of these two strategists in different for the friction to commentators, however, are somewhat ways, leading to differing objectives which they are missing the point, and their sometimes and differing outcomes. Mahan’s subject from the simplistic editorialising is diminishing writings seem sometimes to have come incalculable human the apparent value that can be gained right from the heart of a passionate factors alone is such that by studying and understanding these naval officer, whereas Corbett’s more the friction is stronger 3 two fathers of maritime strategy. This systems-like approach reflects ideas than the law.” paper seeks to redress some of this shaped in the mind of a Cambridge- Corbett instead balance by explaining just what it is that educated barrister. How do these viewed strategic Mahan and Corbett believed, what we two strategic approaches shape up study as a method should try to learn from them, and why one hundred years on? And what of determining the they remain relevant. does this tell us about the essential cause and effect of The writings of Mahan and Corbett characteristics of maritime strategy. certain factors; to, as are often compared and contrasted to he said, “determine the the point where one feels compelled to History as Strategy normal” and assess the choose between the one or the other. Both Mahan and Corbett viewed opportunities which Mahan & Corbett Rather than argue for one point of view, history as a way of identifying strategic may present to depart from that 4 however, it is far more beneficial to trends and principles. Mahan especially normal. Where Mahan was following attempt to understand what each has set the foundations of the historical the tenets of Jomini, Corbett was given the field of study and what one maritime-strategic field of study: placing maritime strategy within the can take from each of them and apply whereas before him there existed sphere of Clausewitz, and in doing so to the modern world. It is also evident analyses of campaigns and battles, he placed both naval and maritime that in these comparisons critics after Mahan the foundation was laid strategy within the context of the sometimes fail to fully comprehend for understanding naval and maritime ‘nature of war’. From this Corbett the relative aims of the writers in their strategy in its wider context, a point too was then able to develop theories different periods and political climates. often neglected by his critics. regarding ‘limited war (by object)’ Mahan, for instance, writing in the Mahan and Corbett did however and ‘limited war (by contingent)’, United States in the late nineteenth have differing perspectives on how which presented options for the use of century, was effectively seeking to to apply the lessons of history. As a combined naval and military power in ‘sell’ the benefits of naval power with a student of the Swiss military strategist intricate contingencies with specific simple and easy to understand mantra Antoine-Henri Jomini, Mahan aims. It may even be said that with which would encourage political believed in certain ‘invariable scientific these theories, especially with regard 1 leaders to invest in particular types of principles’ in war, for example his to the identification of limited aims, capabilities (something that would not mantra regarding decisive battle critical requirements and critical go astray in 2009 perhaps?). Corbett, and the need to avoid division of vulnerabilities, Corbett had come upon conversely, was writing in a country forces to achieve it was almost an a planning process something akin Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 20 Mahan & Corbett: Lessons for the RAN’s Junior Officers

to what is known today as the Joint potential had encouraged a spirit of advantage. These claims, so eloquently Military Appreciation Process. This is mercantilism in England and how this and simply put, transformed thinking something that Mahan did not attempt in-turn affected the nature of society, regarding maritime power. with any real vigour, instead placing diplomacy and international relations. Thanks to Mahan, the fundamental naval strategy within the context of Mahan effectively raised thinking on principles and capabilities of maritime economics and geography. Both, sea power to the macro-scale where power in relation to the strategic however, used England as the major its ability to influence the strategic environment were well understood focus of their historical investigations, environment and to prosecute national when Corbett came to set out his and both agreed that the relationship aims became clear to national leaders framework, and as such Corbett owes between maritime power and strategic the world over. him a great debt. Corbett did outline communication was central. Mahan outlined six ‘general the importance of maritime strategic 6 7 conditions affecting Sea Power’ communications , but this point did The Sea as a Strategic which illustrated the factors which not need to be laboured. Instead, Highway encouraged states towards maritime Corbett’s profound contribution here Mahan and Corbett viewed the world preponderance. Without restating was to elucidate a far more thoughtful as a single entity, connected through them here, Mahan argued that a state theory on a concept which, in fairness, 5 8 the highway of the oceans. In Mahan’s with natural advantages in geography, Mahan at times struggled with : how time especially, this was a powerful population, people and government this strategic communication was notion. Previously there had been a could pursue international expansion secured. tendency to view the sea as a barrier, a through colonies and build its trading frontier to be ‘conquered’ rather than potential and mercantile culture. Command of the Sea as a means for expansion. Mahan’s This would lead to greater wealth, The sea, as Corbett pointed out, is HMAS Sydney arrives in New York, writings were therefore essentially expanded naval forces to protect the not owned and is not susceptible to steaming up the maritime-strategic visions extending communication system and further ownership outside territorial waters; Hudson river, Sunday from the Renaissance. More than expansion and building of wealth. one cannot exclude neutrals from it, July 19, 2009, this, Mahan was able to demonstrate Such a state would then become nor subsist one’s own forces upon accompanied by 9 how the strategic communication economically dominant and could it. The goal of navies in war was, United States Navy warship USS Mahan enabled by sea power and its economic shape the strategic environment to its therefore, to secure the use not the

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 21

possession of the sea, and to deny such especially true if the enemy adopted a command of the sea (against the enemy use to an adversary – and on this both defensive attitude and did not wish to battle-fleet), however without detached Mahan and Corbett agreed. In the give battle. cruisers and flotilla there was nothing methods to be employed, however, In describing this scenario, available to actually exercise such they varied greatly. Corbett even makes a half-hearted command (against enemy commerce While Mahan spoke always of criticism of Mahan, writing that “The and their detached commerce raiders). the need for a decisive fleet battle misconception [that a weaker force With a concentrated, battleship- 10 to secure command , Corbett will have to give battle] appears to heavy fleet, Britain was sacrificing devoted entire chapters to the have arisen from insistence on the much of her potential for command varied types of command and the drawbacks of defence by writers of the sea and attacks on the enemy differing methods which might be seeking to persuade their country to in order to pursue the Mahanian employed in differing situations. prepare in time of peace sufficient decisive battle. Acknowledging that Like Mahan, Corbett agreed that naval strength to justify offence from the security function carried out by 13 because sea lines of communication the start.” the battle-fleet was important, and may generally be common to both In essence, Corbett was making also citing the new dangers posed to belligerents, an offensive strategy will the simple point that defeating an the battle-fleet through the torpedo also assist in the defence of one’s own enemy fleet does not in itself win the boats of the flotilla, Corbett, like communications. Corbett, however, war – battles are merely the means of Mahan, drew on the experiences of the believed that command of the sea “enabling you to do that which really French Revolutionary and Napoleonic was far from absolute and was more brings wars to an end – that is, to Wars to devise a theoretical solution: complex than simply pitching one’s exert pressure on the citizens and their a deliberate balance between 14 entire concentrated fleet against the collective life.” “It is commerce and concentration of the Fleet to provide enemy in an attempt to secure it. To finance,” he wrote “which now more security for the command of the sea Corbett, Mahan’s use of Nelson as an than ever control or check the foreign and to defeat the enemy when required; example of the effects of decisive battle policy of nations.” Without targeting and dispersal of cruisers and the flotilla and its outcomes after Trafalgar were this, he said “Defeat the enemy’s fleets to actually exercise command of the sea re-enforcing a dangerous precedent as we may, he will be but little the and attack the enemy’s vital economic within the Royal Navy. While worse.” Considering the preponderance interests. The important aspect was acknowledging that “it is impossible of the British Fleet, Corbett urged communication between the elements for a [maritime] Power either to that this be done at once following the of the fleet to enable the right balance establish its defence or develop fully outbreak of war. of concentration and division. Dividing its offence without securing a working This strategy, however, would the fleet was of course anathema 15 command of the sea by aggressive require a change in the makeup and to Mahan , yet Corbett knew that 11 action against the enemy’s fleets,” disposition of the British Fleet, one that victories were achieved by taking Ready to attack the he was very careful to point out that First Sea Lord Admiral Jacky Fisher was measured risks, and that dividing the land from the sea… such command “may exist in various fighting to bring to states or degrees, each of which has its fruition. In the three- special possibilities and limitations. It tiered makeup of fleets may be general or local, and it may be at the time (which 12 permanent or temporary.” may still be relevant Considering then that command of today), the Mahanian the sea was unlikely to be absolute, and doctrine called for also considering that the goal of navies the battle-fleet as the in war was to secure the use of the sea focus. Cruisers were to for one’s own purposes and to deny it to act as the ‘eyes of the the enemy through commerce raiding, fleet’ with the flotilla why then, Corbett asked, did one not in support roles. The wish to concentrate on actually using battle-fleet was in and denying such use when battle was essence providing not immediately forthcoming? This was security for the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 22 Mahan & Corbett: Lessons for the RAN’s Junior Officers

16 Fleet was the most effective risk. to ensure that the resulting condition nature of maritime power? It is certainly well overdue. That is not to say, however, that is satisfactory, one generally requires Corbett’s lucid and comprehensive theories of sea control, Mahan and Corbett did not agree on all physical presence and influence. so well understood now in the United States and even the methods of maintaining command of Corbett’s theories regarding limited United Kingdom, are also poorly appreciated in Australia. the sea. They both believed (to differing war and local sea control therefore The most recent Defence White Paper for instance, while extents) on the efficacy of the blockade, enabled him also to develop and refine claiming a sea control focus, in fact outlines a sea denial and likewise they generally looked a holistic theory of joint amphibious force based on submarines and cruise missiles, along with 19 positively at the concept of a Fleet-in- operations . It is this holistic approach a significant attempt at exploiting the control we cannot Being, especially for those states which to strategy, without codifying tactics, provide: through power projection in the form of aircraft 20 were unable to match the capabilities of that makes Corbett so relevant today. carriers without aircraft – Corbett would surely disapprove. the major seagoing nations. In conclusion, Mahan and Corbett encouraged people The Lasting Legacy the world over to think about the sea and its importance to Navies in the Joint Force Both Mahan and Corbett left us civilisation. The analysis, debate and development of thought As mentioned, one of Mahan’s aims valuable lessons and, despite some of that their writings inspired is perhaps their greatest legacy in most of his writings was to argue Mahan’s concepts appearing dated, of all. That we might passionately disagree with an element the case for naval power in order both remain relevant to modern of policy is sometimes only made possible because we have to encourage his political leaders to maritime strategy. Above all, both benefitted from the passion, vision and insight of Alfred invest in maritime capability. As such, taught us that history is a tool of Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. It is this passion, vision his arguments can in some cases strategic thought and that without and ability to see the ‘bigger picture’ that the modern RAN appear one-dimensional, sometimes considering the strategic lessons of should seek to foster.  even evangelistic. Corbett, on the history we are simply bound to repeat other hand, was writing in a different the errors of the past. As Corbett to environment and, as a civilian, was some extent predicted, the British able to argue certain points which concentration on decisive battle many naval officers found unappealing. during the Great War and the failure One of his major contentions, and to understand the varying conditions one that is plainly evident today, is of sea control led to operational and that navies cannot hope to win wars strategic losses that were unnecessary; as independent forces. To put it a more accurate and measured simply “Since men live upon the land understanding of Nelson’s true and not upon the sea, great issues objectives prior to and at Trafalgar between nations at war have always would have opened the eyes of those been decided – except in the rarest who were hoping to relive the defeat of cases – either by what your army can Napoleon. That the Royal Navy should Lieutenant Fairall-Lee joined the RAN College in January do against your enemy’s territory and have again failed to heed the lessons of 2000, graduating from ADFA in 2003 with a BA majoring in national life, or else by the fear of what the Great War and neglect its convoy history and politics. In 2005 he received his Bridge Warfare the fleet makes it possible for your role during the early years of World 17 Certificate in HMAS Newcastle and, following a posting to army to do.” This view is entirely War II must surely prove a point. the Defence Signals Directorate, completed Principle Warfare consistent with Corbett’s association Mahan and Corbett also gave us an with the philosophies of Clausewitz, understanding that maritime power Officer course in 2008. Lieutenant Fairall-Lee is currently the who made it clear that war is not only is something more than naval power, Gunnery Officer in HMAS Stuart. about destroying the enemy’s fielded and that maritime strategy is a far military forces, war is an instrument of more comprehensive concept than 18 policy, a social activity. just how to employ navies. The subtle ALI STR IAN War is about changing the status links between the sea, communication, U SAYW N A S A A E I A N V

quo, and whilst isolating an enemy will economies and societies is something V

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T T E I E T T I U T T his aims and enable you to project to fully comprehend. Perhaps we need U power against him, to ensure the defeat a modern Corbett or Mahan to find occurs within a reasonable period and a way to demonstrate the long-term Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 23

Bibliography Smith, Hugh, ‘Clausewitz: Apostle of p.138. Modern War’, in Smith, Hugh (ed.), The 9 Corbett, Some Principles…, pp.87-90. Baer, George W., One Hundred Years of Sea Strategists, Australian Defence Studies 10 Alfred Thayer Mahan,Sea Power in Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990, Stanford Centre (Canberra: 2001), pp.27-38. Its Relation to the War of 1812 Vol II, Haskell University Press (Stanford: 1993). House (New York: 1903), p.51, cited in Corbett, Julian S., Some Principles of (Endnotes) Philip A. Crowl, ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Maritime Strategy, Longmans, Green and 1 Antoine-Henri Jomini, Traité des Naval Historian’, in Paret, Makers of Modern Co. (London:1911). grandes opérations militaires, contenant Strategy…, p.458. Crowl, Philip A., ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan: l’histoire des campagnes de Frédéric II, 11 Corbett, Some Principles…, pp.28-29. The Naval Historian’, in Paret, Peter comparées à celles de l’empereur Napoléon; 12 Ibid, p.102. (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From avec un recueil des prencipes généraux de 13 Ibid, p.105 Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,’ Princeton l’art de la guerre, 2nd ed., (Paris:1811), p.312, 14 Ibid, p.94. University Press (Princeton: 1986), pp.444- cited in John Shy, ‘Jomini’, in Peter Paret 15 According to Mahan ‘If the Naval 477. (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From War College, “had produced no other result Department of Defence, Defending Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,’ Princeton than the profound realization by naval Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force University Press (Princeton: 1986), p.146. officers of the folly of dividing the battle- 2030, Department of Defence (Canberra: 2 John Reeve, ‘Mahan, Corbett and fleet, in peace or in war, it would by that 2009). Modern Maritime Strategy’, in Hugh Smith alone have justified its existence and paid Friedman, Norman, Seapower as Strategy: (ed.), The Strategists, Australian Defence its expenses.’” See: Alfred Thayer Mahan, Navies and National Interests, Naval Studies Centre (Canberra: 2001), p.43. Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted Institute Press (Annapolis: 2001). 3 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of with the Principles and Practice of Military Mahan, Alfred Thayer,The Influence of Maritime Strategy, Longmans, Green and Operations on Land, Sampson Low (Boston: Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783, Dover Co. (London:1911), p.6. 1911) p.6, cited in Crowl, ‘Alfred Thayer Publications (New York: 1987). 4 Ibid. Mahan…’, p.458. Padfield, Peter,Matitime Power and the 5 Alfred Thayer Mahan,The Influence of 16 Corbett, Some Principles…, p.134. Struggle for Freedom: Naval campaigns that Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783, Dover 17 Ibid, p.14. shaped the modern world 1788-1851, John Publications (New York: 1987), p.25 & 18 Hugh Smith, ‘Clausewitz: Apostle Murray (London: 2003). Corbett, Some Principles…, p.89. of Modern War’, in Hugh Smith (ed.), The Reeve, John, ‘Mahan, Corbett and 6 Mahan, The Influence…, pp.29-82. Strategists, Australian Defence Studies Modern Maritime Strategy’, in Smith, Hugh 7 Corbett, Some Principles…, pp.94-100. Centre (Canberra: 2001), pp.32-33. (ed.), The Strategists, Australian Defence 8 Mahan used ‘command of the sea’ 19 Corbett, Some Principles…, pp.285- Studies Centre (Canberra: 2001), pp.41-53. and ‘sea power’ with overlapping meanings. 310. Shy, John, ‘Jomini’, in Paret, Peter His best definition of command of the 20 See: Department of Defence, (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From sea is: “the possession of that overbearing Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Columbia’s Training Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,’ Princeton power on the sea which drives the enemy’s Century: Force 2030, Department of Ship ARC GLORIA University Press (Princeton: 1986), pp.143- flag from it, or allows it to appear only as Defence (Canberra: 2009). -photo by Chris 185. a fugitive…” See: Mahan, The Influence…, Sattler

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 24 Winning the battle - but how do we win the human resources war? Positioning the ADF as an employer of choice in the face of a byL P iEUTENANT aul Hardman new Australian workplace

he modern Australian workplace Evolution of a new has been transformed by a tide Australian workplace Tof societal and cultural change. Swept The modern Australian workplace is by demographic shifts and catalysed a reflection of the changes that have by high standards of living and low occurred in Australian society over unemployment, employers have had the last 30 years. In particular, it is the to find new and innovative ways to embodiment of an expectation of a fair compete for their most important and equitable workplace, with fewer asset, their people. but more highly skilled staff who have Human resources in Australia are an increased reliance on technology competitive markets where employees and global markets. with modern expectations demand Today’s workplace is also a more from their employer even manifestation of labour and skills in times of economic uncertainty. shortages where employers are More than ever before, job seekers aggressively competing to attract and weigh up their potential employer retain employees especially those based upon a package of benefits that possess technical or trade skills. including work life balance, corporate Importantly this same environment culture, personal satisfaction and is being shaped by an uneven the ability of the workplace to fulfil demographic transition as the baby their potential. Remuneration and boomers exit and generation Y enters promotion although still important, the work force. are no longer the decision makers they once were particularly for the younger Evolution of employers of generations. choice A new breed of employer, the Employers of Choice have evolved Employer of Choice, has recognised through competition in today’s tight the need to be competitive in this new HR marketplace. These employers People join for age. Through a range of measures have typically identified and made the culture of the new Australian exciting times - a Employers of Choice are attracting changes in their workplaces that workplace. Without exception Peruvian Sailor and retaining more quality employees provide them with a high affinity they offer a fair and equitable work assigned to a maritime interdiction whilst other employers are finding it for their target demographic. They environment where gender, race, operation group increasingly difficult to recruit and generally offer a tailored package of sexual harassment and bullying do not fast-ropes from a retain their core asset. benefits, but as a minimum provide a exist. They mentor their junior staff Peruvian AB-212 Defence, one of the nation’s largest work environment where people are and identify and nurture talent with Pantera helicopter employers, has risen to the challenge treated well according to clear and the aim of growing an organisation of onto the flight deck of the guided-missile with new and innovative ways of current values in society. They have a successful managers and role models frigate USS Doyle engaging and recruiting an expanded reputation for providing challenging, who have good people skills regardless (FFG 39) target demographic. But the challenge satisfying work but are also able to of their primary expertise. is now to retain these new people by offer a flexible work life balance and These employers genuinely try to delivering on recruitment promises a program for realising employee appreciate and respect their employees and meeting the expectations of the potential. and understand that people work best new generations. Employers of Choice have embraced when they are confident in what is Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 25

expected of them, are rewarded for Defence as an employer of choice, flexible work schedules; meeting or exceeding goals, and are not offering challenging and rewarding f. Tasks must be challenging and 3 worried about an unsafe workplace or careers.” rewarding; being placed under undue stress. Employers of Choice need to know Figure 1-ADF Full Time g. Need structure, supervision what their workforce is thinking so that Recruiting Performance but immediate gratification and 4 internal problems can be addressed 1997-2007 feedback; before they turn into crises where Historically Defence has not needed productivity or personnel are lost. to be as responsive as other employers h. Feel that they are getting along with Because of this, they have a highly to changes in the Australian HR their manager and that person is developed two way communication marketplace. However as Figure 1 enabling them to grow; system utilising both formal and illustrates, Defence has not been able informal tools to communicate intent to reach its recruiting target for more i. Need to know they have the and receive feedback from their people. than a decade. The then-Minister opportunity to learn more, and In summary, Employers of Choice for Defence Mr Joel Fitzgibbon, offer a flexible work life balance understood the plight and indicated j. Be consulted with, when making tempered with good corporate culture. “We must become more creative decisions. They place emphasis on personal on the recruitment front, talking to satisfaction and the ability to bring out generation Y in their language through Defence Force Recruiting, to its full potential. Good remuneration and the mediums they rely upon for their credit, has risen to the challenge in career path development are expected information will be crucial to making adapting and appealing to its target 5 along with environments where people gains” demographic, for example hiring are treated well and challenging, Recruiting Generation Y has proven people like marketer Mr Richard satisfying work that is valued by the to be a challenge for Defence. The Howarth, formally from FOXTEL and community is offered. group is characterised by a “live now Coca-Cola Amatil as their national work later” mentality and expects more marketing manager in December 7 Recruiting from their employers. For Defence, 2005. This financial year Defence is the Generation Y is a vastly different It is important to note that it is employer looking for the largest cohort to the generations before with not all doom and gloom for attracting number of people in Australia with some motivators that at a first glance Generation Y to a Defence job. Richard 1 a target of enlisting 10,700 recruits. do not easily align with Defence ideals. Howarth is convinced that, “We offer a To compound the problem a modern Kristin Gissaro from Generational career choice to a Gen Y that is a great Defence force needs to be specific in Recruiting, highlights the following fit; we’re offering something in their who it recruits particularly from the attributes that are important to and life and something in their job that is 17-28 year age group. Former Director motivate Generation Y6 beyond just financial reward.”8 General of Defence Force Recruiting Recruiting has now completely Figure 1 BRIG Gould indicated: “We are after a. Must have access to 2 both quality and quantity.” technology; To meet the challenge, Defence has had to increase funding, widen b. Teamwork its target demographic and alter environment; entry standards. The then-Minister for Defence Science and Personnel c. Jobs that allow them announced: “The Australian Defence to multitask; force will look to generation Y, women, Indigenous Australians and our diverse d. Want to be respected ethnic communities as a source of for their level of new recruits under a $148.7 million education; funding package. This is in addition to work that is well underway to promote e. Need freedom and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 26 Winning the battle - but how do we win the human resources war? Positioning the ADF as an employer of choice in the face of a new Australian workplace

revamped its approach to reaching experienced people. its target market and the changes are Ensuring that people do starting to pay off. The ADF online not leave the ADF when recruiting campaign, created by they are of most value Melbourne agency Visual Jazz, was is a priority concern for 13 awarded the honour as “the country’s the Government.” best digital marketer.9” The new Separation rates for Defence job’s website, full of virtual the ADF have remained tours, streamed interviews of serving relatively constant since members, and interactive games 2004 holding between designed to communicate with the 10 and 12%. The new generations. The then-Minister combined rate for 2007- for Defence Science and Personnel 8 of 9.8% showed some said: “While more has to happen to improvement however, attract and retain young people in the this figure was largely understood. The Defence attitude Joining up for forces, it is critical to the future of the due the good result in Air Force at 7.2% and exit surveys have identified exciting times - ADF that Generation Y and beyond while Army and Navy reported 10.6 both chronic and acute reasons for Chilean Navy Special Forces can access and interact with recruiting and 11% respectively.14 Importantly separation of Defence personnel information via the technology they are Navy continues to bear the brunt of at different stages in their careers. comfortable with.10” personnel shortfalls continually owning Chronic reasons include the ability Defence has also changed the the highest separation rate while at the to make a career change while still products it offers to potential recruits. same time proving the hardest service young enough, the desire to stay in one A new Defence Technical Scholarship to recruit. The ideal separation rate for place, and the desire for less separation Program, designed to bridge the Defence is 7% that allows for personnel from family. Acute reasons include technical trade gap in the military, has renewal, keeps the workforce from lack of control over life, better career been established and the ADF Gap year stagnating and prevents a loss of skills prospects in civilian life, and lack of job program, which commenced in January and corporate knowledge.15 satisfaction.18 Significantly, money is 2008, has been a great success. All no longer a key retention factor with 700 places for the gap year intake were Figure 2 - ADF Permanent a prime example being the lower than filled from a total of 1500 applicants, Force Enlistment and expected uptake of the Navy capability 16 with women making up half of the Separation Rates allowance since its introduction.19 applicants for Navy, a quarter for army The peak periods for exit in Defence To reach the retention goal, and a third for Air Force.11 Additionally, are in the first 12 months primarily for retention initiatives must be tailored central to the 2008-2009 budget is medical and administrative reasons, to each of the generations within the continuing with the advertising and after four and 10 years as the initial workplace and appeal to their own marketing campaigns to enhance the period of minimum service expires diverse motivators. On top of this image of Army, Navy and Air force.12 and finally after 20 years which has people in different life stages have been the traditional exit point of ADF different priorities and therefore again 17 Retaining our Existing personnel. require different retention initiatives. Workforce Reasons for separation are well For example, personnel with families Figure 2 Retaining Defence personnel is absolutely essential to meeting the capability objectives set by the government. The 2000 Defence White Paper said, “To be a knowledgeable organisation, Defence must retain skilled and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 27

will be retained with stability, whilst Just like the revolution undertaken in routine, and reduced duty watches younger single members value travel. recruiting, Defence needs to do the are examples of how thinking outside It is much smarter, easier and more same in promoting itself to its own traditional lines can improve the cost effective for Defence to improve employees. A good example of this is work life balance and retention of its its overall retention than to spend the number of people who following members without affecting capability the hundreds of millions of dollars in attending transition seminars express at sea. attracting, recruiting and training their the wish to have known about defence replacements. benefit schemes earlier. Realising potential and expectations Positioning the ADF as an Factors that Affect In general, Defence jobs are appealing employer of choice Retention and offer a huge opportunity for In terms of the characteristics personal satisfaction. They provide identified earlier as what defines an Work life Balance challenging, satisfying work, involve Employer of Choice, Defence not Flexible work life balance in the the use of teams to achieve goals only meets but sets a market leading modern Australian Workplace is the and have mentoring schemes to standard in nearly all of them. Benefits ability to work hard when you have facilitate career path development. that set Defence apart as an employer to, but also the ability to take time off Career progression generally offers of choice include: when you need it. It does not mean international job opportunities, while fewer work hours but more control operations can offer the ability to a. DASS and Civil Schooling; over when and where those work contribute in an altruistic way with hours are performed. For example, humanitarian assistance. b. Free medical and dental; for parents work life balance offers Having a Defence job means you the ability to work from home or are well paid, operate in a non-profit c. Free gym, sports and recreation around a family life. In the case of the driven work environment where people facilities; baby boomer generation the ability are treated well but also where there to utilise part time or casual work is are support and safety mechanisms. d. Provision of civilian accredited a competitive edge. Importantly, for Defence is a leader in offering its training; the current X and Y generations the workforce with a fair, equitable and ability to “have a life” outside a career, safe workplace. They have established e. Will hire young, inexperienced and not a career as a life is a huge decision programs for Equity and Diversity, untrained personnel; parameter. Occupational Health and Safety, Defence jobs in general feature two Alcohol and Drug awareness, a system f. GAP Year and Trade options; extremes of work life balance. Taking for effecting fair workplace justice and Navy as an example, personnel ashore a long and respected military culture, g. Resettlement initiatives; enjoy a work life balance that can be history and values. quite good, and may feature the ability Once again, these are ideals that h. Defence home loan scheme; to conduct activities such as sport Defence needs to not only promote to during traditional working hours and the community but to itself. Not doing i. Rent Assistance; the ability to work flexible hours. so only serves to encourage the grass For members who are posted is greener on the other side attitude j. Military Super Scheme, and to ships or assigned to operations, particularly for its younger members. the work life balance can become Generation Y – Defence’s key k. Support organisations such as DCO, non existent and is possibly a large demographic – is the chop and change DFA and DHA. contributor to the higher separation generation continually shopping for the rate and the lower recruitment rate for employer that continues to meet their Perhaps the biggest criticism that Navy. The challenge for Navy is to be needs. By promoting Defence’s virtues can be levelled at Defence is that it able to change traditional attitudes, and and having the will to identify and does little to market itself and its offer innovative ways of sharing the address the issues that are important to comparative workplace riches to its sea burden. Multi-crewing on ACPB’s generation Y, Defence will continue to own people as a tool for retention. and the introduction of a fly in/fly out be an HR Market leader. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 28 Winning the battle - but how do we win the human resources war? Positioning the ADF as an employer of choice in the face of a new Australian workplace

Improved Communication resources will The Defence Attitude and Exit only serve Surveys serve as a useful tool for to frustrate higher Command, but at the coal face and alienate feedback is generally discouraged. the younger Building a culture around workplace generations. improvement at the lowest level will be crucial in improving communication Managing and involving Generation Y in the Our People decision process. It is important Communication from top to to note that bottom in Defence is excellent but Defence can be improved, particularly through managers the use of technology. Important receive little to information already available on the no formal HR Times have changed DEFWEB is lost as its content is spread training yet manage one of Australia’s of military culture such as bullying, - a female sailor out and its search engine is poor. A largest workforces in one of the most abuse or intimidation have a huge aboard HMCS wealth of information can be found challenging workplaces. Anecdotal impact on recruiting. Programs for Winnipeg stands in print media and signals, but little evidence suggests that often people promoting Defence as a new workplace watch. Credit-Capt. Adam Thomson arrives by modern means such as blogs, with poor people skills are working in is important to dispel old stigmas. web casts, or video streaming. positions where they may manage large Taking Navy as an example, the groups. For the younger generation A Forum for Improvement divisional system has served the this will be the last straw and they will Defence is continually at the forefront organisation well since inception but is quickly exit a workplace where they of generational and societal changes now in desperate need to be brought feel in constant conflict with their principally because of the age and into the 21st Century. A one stop manager. There needs to be an active number of its recruits. Defence website augmenting the divisional program to improve the people skills needs to ensure that its workforce is system would provide an ideal portal of our grassroots managers. Having a treated well according to clear and as both an information resource and graduated HR program commencing at current values of society. It can do communication forum. The site would officer entry level training, culminating this by continually assessing changes bring together existing services such as in the award of a Degree or Masters in societal expectations and rapidly PMKEYS self service, publication and is now essential particularly for those implementing those that are relevant Web form links, branch databases and that go on to work at our peak HR directly into the workplace. online training but more importantly organisations. A 20/20 style work place summit take advantage of new mediums for held on an annual basis and inclusive communication such as online chat Managing Generation Y of community and Defence members forums and U-Tube style messages Managers need to learn different could provide this input. This summit from senior staff. strategies when dealing with generation would provide a gauge on community Access to technology for the Y. Providing the big picture or “the and military workplace ideals and be younger generations is essential. Every why” including the important part they able to provide a forum to workshop recruit now expects to have access to contribute is essential to motivating contemporary issues. a computer with email, internet and this generation, as is regular and Defence is now operating in a intranet capability. This is particularly constructive feedback. Coaching and completely new HR marketplace where important for personnel who are mentoring appeals to this generation employers aggressively compete with separated from home on deployment as well as the feeling that they are being each other to recruit, poach and retain or at sea. Generation Y is more listened to and respected. We need to skilled workers. Defence recruiting has educated and technologically minded ensure our managers of generation Y now adapted to this new environment than those before. Providing computer know these things. and is expected to meet its recruitment resources will increase productivity It important to mention that any targets in the years to come.  however, having limited computer future cases involving the worst aspects Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 29

or the government intent to have a Defence 18 Competing for the Best and Brightest: Recruitment and Force capable of meeting its needs. Retention in the Australian Defence Force. Security Challenges Vol 3 Num 1. p111 19 Email CMDR David Wilson / All RAN Commanding officers Defence the Official Magazine, Issue 7, 25 June 2008 Navy Capability allowance. Recruiting now and in the future p10. 2 Defence the Official Magazine, Issue 7, Recruiting now and in the future p10. Bibliography 3 Media release, The HON. Warren Department of Defence 2008, Defence the Official Magazine, Issue Snowden MP Minister for Defence Science 7, Recruiting now and in the future and Personnel, Tue 13 May 2008. Budget Department of Defence 2008, Defence the Official Magazine, 2008-09 Meeting the ADF Recruitment and Issue 8, Defence Budget 2008-2009. Retention Challenge. Media release, The HON Warren Snowden MP Minister for 4 Department of Defence 2006-2007 Defence Science and Personnel, Tue 13 May 2008. Budget 2008-09 Annual Report p134 Meeting the ADF Recruitment and Retention Challenge. 5 Stewart, C. April 2008, Y, Your Media release, The HON. Warren Snowden MP Minister for Country Needs You. The Australian Defence Science and Personnel, Thu 10 Apr 2008. Operation Newspaper. Overwatch goes online. Lieutenant Paul Hardman RAN joined 6 Gissaro, K. 2007, Ere Blog network Media release, The HON. DE-Anne Kelly, MP Minister assisting Generational recruiting. www.ere.net/ the minister for Defence. Tue 20 Dec 2005. Marketing Guru the Navy in Jan 2003 from a Medical blogs/generational _recruiting Joins Defence Force Recruiting. 7 Media release, The HON. DE-Anne Department of Defence 2007, Department of Defence 2006-2007 Science background, completing a Kelly, MP Minister assisting the minister for Annual Report. Defence. Tue 20 Dec 2005. Marketing Guru Stewart, C. April 2008, Y, Your Country Needs You. The BSc Degree at James Cook University Joins Defence Force Recruiting. Australian Newspaper. 8 Barclay, P. Mar 2006, Defence Walters, P. April 2008. Defence to Hit recruits goal. The in 1999 and subsequently working in Recruitment crisis ABC Radio National. Australian Newspaper. Pathology Laboratories in Townsville 9 Sinclair, L. May 2008, Defence Sinclair, L. May 2008, Defence force games win awards. The force games win awards. The Australian Australian Newspaper. and Brisbane. Initial sea postings Newspaper Gissaro, K. 2007, Ere Blog network Generational recruiting. 10 Media release, The HON. Warren www.ere.net/blogs/generational _recruiting were to HMAS Tobruk and HMAS Snowden MP Minister for Defence Science Barclay, P. Mar 2006, Defence Recruitment crisis ABC Radio and Personnel, Thu 10 Apr 2008. Operation National. Labuan before being ticketed on Overwatch goes online. Department of Defence 2000, Defence 2000 White Paper - Our Hmas Parramatta in Dec 2005 on Gulf 11 Walters, P. April 2008. Defence to Hit Future Defence Force. recruits goal. The Australian Newspaper. Department of Defence 2007, Department of Defence 2006-2007 deployment. Paul posted to HMAS 12 Defence the Official Magazine, Issue Annual Report, p135-137 8, Defence Budget 2008-2009. Thomas, K. Bell, S. 2007. Competing for the Best and Brightest: Stuart as APWO after 23 months in 13 Defence 2000 White Paper, Our Recruitment and Retention in the Australian Defence Force. Future Defence Force. Security Challenges Vol 3 Num 1. Department of Defence Darwin as XO for the ACPB rotational 14 Department of Defence 2007-2008 Email CMDR David Wilson / All RAN Commanding officers 25 crew Attack II. Annual Report, p109-110 June 2008 Navy Capability allowance. 15 Competing for the Best and Brightest: Recruitment and Retention in the Australian Defence Force. Security Challenges Vol 3 (Endnotes) Num 1. p100 1 Retention remains a big area where 16 Department of Defence 2006-2007 Defence can improve. Money and career Annual Report, p 4 progression are no longer driving factors in 17 Competing for the Best and Brightest: employee retention across all generations Recruitment and Retention in the Australian in the work place. Factors such as work Defence Force. Security Challenges Vol 3 Joining for unique experiences - flight deck personnel ready a San Diego life balance, corporate culture, personal Num 1. p100 Coast Guard HH-60 for launch on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier satisfaction and the ability to bring out full USS Abraham Lincoln - photo US Navy potential are now of prime importance to today’s employees. Retention initiatives must also be diverse, appealing to the motivators of the different generations within the workplace as well as to people in different life stages. Generation Y also comes with a mixed bag of requirements. Recruiting this generation is proving to be less of a problem than what it is going to be in actually retaining them. In order to keep the new generations, Defence has to change some long held attitudes about how it treats its younger members and look at what it offers them in terms of respect, access to technology, self development, freedom and flexible work schedules. This attitudinal change will be the hardest element for Defence to adapt to especially at the mid management level. However, in relation to other government departments one thing Defence is not lacking is the funds Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 30

RALI The Offshore Combat Vessel: STR IAN U SAYW N A S A

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he 2009 Defence White Paper country to invest in this technology Major systems, such as weapons, announced the Australian however; the majority of the Royal sensors, ventilation and electronics, are TGovernment’s intent to ‘rationalise Danish Navy (RDN) has some form manufactured in fully self contained the Navy’s patrol boat, mine counter of modular system fit out and the US modules that interconnect via standard measures, hydrographic and Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship program interfaces. After being fully tested by oceanographic forces into a single also incorporates similar ideas. the manufacturer the modules are modular multirole class of around 20 These existing examples allow a installed into the ship using pre-defined 1 4 Offshore Combatant Vessels (OCV). prediction to be made on what level routes. With an expected displacement of of capability may be expected from The main advantage offered by this 2000 tonnes, these vessels will replace the new class and highlight where concept is the ability to build the ship 26 currently serving vessels over four problems may arise that will require and its major systems simultaneously classes, with major systems to be a dramatic change in how the RAN and independently. As well as reducing built into ‘containerised and portable operates and mans its ships in the build time, this also allows for a clear 2 modules that will be interchangeable future. separation of responsibility between between ships. the prime contractor and system Military Sealift Although the Royal Australian Current examples sub contractors, cutting down on Command fleet Navy has already experienced some Modularity first began to appear unforseen problems and ultimately replenishment oiler of the benefits of modular design in ship design in the mid-1970’s cost. Survivability is also enhanced with USNS Kanawha (left) with the Anzac Class frigate, this when German ship designers Blohm all modules fitting onto standardised feeds a refueling rig over to littoral next generation design incorporating and Voss developed their MEKO shock mounts. When it becomes combat ship USS modular containerised systems that (Mehrzweck Kombination, or necessary to upgrade or replace Freedom during the 3 can be swapped between vessels will be multipurpose combination) concept. systems, modules can be removed and ship’s first underway a revolutionary concept, and will bring The three underlying principles behind replaced as a whole without substantial replenishment. US 5 with it a unique set of challenges that the concept are signature reduction, platform modifications, as is currently Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class must be met in order for the new class survivability and modularity, the occurring to the Anzac Class under Fofoga Sagale to succeed. Australia is not the first latter being of primary interest here. Project SEA1448 Phase Two, which

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 31

8 includes the replacement of the hours. entire mast module to incorporate Since an upgraded phased array radar commissioning 6 system. The MEKO concept does offer the first considerable time and cost savings Flyvefisken for both the build and refit phases, class in 1990 however with all modules permanently Standard Flex fitted to the ship a lengthy refit period containers have is still necessary and can include been retrofitted cutting open the ship to remove and to a number of replace modules. other classes. It The shortcomings of the MEKO has also been concept are addressed and corrected fully integrated by using a fully modular design such into the design to change mission packages at sea; Flyvefisken class 10 as that developed by the RDN. In the of the 5,800 tonne Ivar Huitfeldt class however this is yet to be confirmed. with tender (Public domain) early 1980’s the RDN found itself with frigate and the newly commissioned The LCS will also make extensive use of the need to replace an assortment 6,300 tonne combat support ship unmanned air, surface and underwater of 22 patrol boats, torpedo boats HMDS Absalon, which recently proved vehicles which will be standardised as and minesweepers with a budget the operational effectiveness of the much as possible across all mission that would not allow one for one Standard Flex concept on this scale as packages to reduce cost and increase replacement. The idea of building one the flagship of Commander Task Force commonality. multirole class capable of fulfilling the 150. Absalon is also scheduled to take requirements of the previous three over as flagship of Standing NATO The future Offshore Combat Vessel gained favour when it was determined Maritime Group One in 2010. With the lack of detail contained in that only 16 vessels would be required A similar concept to the Standard the White Paper it is impossible to 7 to achieve the same capability. Flex system will feature in the USN know at this stage what the OCV The embodiment of what became Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. will look like. However by using the known as the Standard Flex concept The program aims to deliver a high existing examples outlined previously first appeared in the Flyvefisken class. speed mission focussed surface an educated prediction may be made. Displacing 480 tonnes, the ships combatant tailored for the littoral As with both the Standard Flex and can be configured to fulfil an attack, environment and is producing two LCS projects, systems common to surveillance or mine countermeasure prototypes; the Freedom-class semi- all three packages, such as command role. Systems common to the three planing monohull commissioned and control, surveillance and self roles are permanently fitted to the in 2008 and the Independence class defence, should be permanently platform, while all others are fully trimaran to be commissioned in 2009. fitted. The remaining role specific self contained inside standardised Both classes can be configured for systems may be integrated through containers that may be fitted into specific roles using a tailored ‘mission the creation of at least three ‘mission 9 any of four wells on the upper deck. package’ , with mine countermeasure, packages’ to perform patrol, mine Containerised weapons systems anti submarine and anti surface countermeasure and hydrographic include 76mm guns, six cell vertical packages developed to date. Each missions. Additionally the Australian launch systems and quad Harpoon package is made up of a number of Government’s intent for these vessels canisters. For mine warfare variable systems that are Flyvefisken class MRV depth sonar, unmanned underwater contained within vehicles and torpedo tubes are Standard Flex style available. For peacetime operations the modules, the majority Flyvefisken can embark oceanography, of which are installed survey or anti-pollution modules. along the ships cargo Containers are easily craned on and off deck. Storage space the platform and the complete change for extra modules out process can be completed in a few may make it possible Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 32 The Offshore Combat Vessel:Future Flexibility

to be capable of littoral warfare and demonstrated already by the RDN. a likely scenario, where a ship may reducing the workload of major surface change roles from border protection 11 combatants will necessitate the Predicted issues to mine warfare, it will experience a inclusion of a more robust armament The modular design of the OCV will very substantial crew change out and that is not required for a standard necessitate large and diverse changes a change in mission and direction patrol role, such as a vertical launch in the way the RAN operates its ships. overnight. In times of high operational system equipped with surface to air The road ahead has already been forged tempo for one mission package, missiles and a medium calibre gun. by the introduction of multi-crewing which could commonly occur with These could be permanently fitted as for both the Armidale Class patrol an influx of suspected illegal entry for the LCS, however containerisation boats and Leeuwin Class survey ships, vessels for example, this may be further in the fashion of the Flyvefisken and however with the advent of modular compounded by a lack of recent sea the establishment of additional warfare systems greater change will be needed. time if the oncoming mission package ‘mission packages’ would allow greater Every system requires the personnel has not been recently used. These flexibility and an increased payload for that operate and maintain it to have factors will mean that the newly non-combat and constabulary roles. unique skills and training which is not formed ships company may require Weapon modules such as vertical necessarily transferable – although a formal working up before being launch systems by their nature must hydrographic sailor may understand available for tasking. Thus even if be fitted into upper deck wells in the basics of mine warfare, they will the physical mission package can be the same fashion as Standard Flex, not have the deep seated knowledge swapped out in a number of hours, the however others, such as command that is required to perform the role time required for the ship’s company and control modules, could be fitted satisfactorily. As such a change out of to settle in and begin performing will on the upper decks or in a mission crew will be necessary to accommodate always be the factor deciding when the cargo bay similar to the LCS. With no any system changes. ship is operationally ready. mention at this stage of a requirement To solve this issue there are two Perhaps most important crewing for a cargo carrying capability the first likely solutions. Firstly each mission issue is deciding where the command option would allow maximal below package can come with a complete team fits in. If there is to be a core deck space, as well as simplifying crew that specialise in that mission, crew responsible for the vessel then the installation process so that the in essence retaining the same crew it would make sense that the Captain only external infrastructure needed structure for the four current classes be a part of this, however this would is a crane. This will be particularly of ship but operating them as required necessitate having in depth knowledge beneficial when changing out packages from the same platform. However encompassing three separate warfare in the typically remote towns that are when a mission package is not in use officer specialisations, resulting in at found in northern Australia adjacent a large number of personnel will be best a loss of expertise and the creation to the majority of current patrol and ashore for what could be, depending on of a ‘jack of all trades’ warfare officer. A hydrographic operations. the mission package, lengthy periods. smarter alternative would be to divide As stated in the White Paper This has the potential to degrade skills responsibility between the Captain and unmanned systems will be used through lack of use as well as increasing another officer, the former responsible 12 substantially, particularly for mine the number of personnel required to for the platform and the latter for the warfare and hydrography, with operate the class. The second option mission package, thus operating in a remotely towed arrays – such as those is to have a core crew operating similar way to an aircraft carrier with planned for the LCS project – an the platform and its fitted systems, its aircraft. option. This will facilitate a reduction supplemented by those needed to The aim of delivering greater in crew numbers; both LCS variants operate the mission package. The USN operational efficiency by replacing are designed for a crew of less than plans to operate the LCS is a similar 26 vessels of different class with 20 13 14 50 depending on the mission. , fashion, with a core crew of ‘hybrid vessels of one class needs careful 15 Additionally the containerisation and sailors’ skilled across a number of consideration to ensure it is indeed subsequent ease of replacement of areas supported by specialist system possible. The multi-crewing concept major systems will provide substantial operators. has already proven successful and it is savings in both time and money for The implications of the second likely that days at sea for the OCV will construction and refit as has been option are significant. Considering easily match those of the existing four Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 33

Meko 200 frigate classes. However operational efficiency mounted sonar and retractable replaced with containerised towed of the New Zealand is measured in terms of capability as auxiliary propulsion units. These are arrays however minimum operating Navy HMNZS TE well as days at sea and the ability of not suited to containerisation and are depths are consequently increased and KAHA-photo by Chris the platform to do the assigned task too expensive to permanently fit to all this would only cater for deep water Sattler may decline. A quick study of the OCV. Additionally platform features survey. Unmanned solutions have been 16 characteristics of the four classes of such as a shock resistant non-magnetic produced and could supplement ship to be replaced will reveal vast fibreglass hull would impose design or replace survey motor boats for dissimilarities that render it impossible restrictions if integrated into the shallow water and tactical survey for one ship to be equally capable OCV. However further advancements work, operating as much as possible of performing any two of the three in unmanned systems will allow in the same manner as the mine primary roles conducted. Extensive mine detection and disposal to be warfare mission package to increase changes in how these operations are conducted wholly at a safe distance commonality and reduce cost. conducted need to occur to allow this from the ship, with the command Secondly, Australia’s surveying rationalisation. and control elements needed to requirements exceed the capacity of The patrol role will pose the least operate the unmanned systems easily the current hydrographic force and problems in increasing operational containerised. These advancements any reduction in survey days will efficiency. Converting to a modular will result in the characteristics of compound this issue. The current design will be simple as the majority the platform becoming insignificant. rate of effort could be maintained of the systems required for this role Released from these restrictions the by the OCV if a sufficient number will be common to all roles and OCV can then be designed with added of hulls are regularly fitted with the permanently fitted, leaving mainly benefits such as high speed to allow for hydrographic survey mission package, weapons systems to be containerised a fast transit to the area of operations. however if other mission packages are – this has already been proven possible These changes have the potential to surged to meet current needs at the by the RDN. As the modular concept produce substantial improvements expense of the hydrographic mission will not be an issue, the patrol role in operational capability as well as the level of output will be constantly will benefit from the theoretical efficiency in mine warfare. at risk. Looking at the other side of increase in platform numbers as well Hydrographic survey may be the the equation this could also hinder as the capability increase that a larger most difficult role to fulfil without the flexibility of the OCV as the RAN, platform will offer. losing capability for a number of through the Australian Hydrographic In contrast the mine warfare role reasons. Firstly the hull mounted Office (AHO), is charged with fulfilling will need refining. The capability of sonar of the Leeuwin Class and the Australia’s surveying obligations under the current Huon Class coastal mine Paluma Class survey craft are, as the United Nations Safety Of Life At 17 hunters is embedded in a number for mine warfare, not suitable for Sea (SOLAS) Convention and would of specialist systems such as hull containerisation. They could be require a certain number of platforms Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 34 The Offshore Combat Vessel:Future Flexibility

Scott R, ‘Flexing a snap-to-fit fleet’, in to fulfil this work. It would be a new ability to quickly change out entire Janes Defence Weekly, 07 Nov 01 strategic decision as to what level of systems and change a vessels primary Scott R, ‘MEKO re-engineered for mission modularity’, in Janes Defence operational requirement warrants the role. Unmanned systems are in some Weekly, 04 Oct 06 deferral of these responsibilities. cases the only solution to transferring Truver S, ‘Littoral Combat Ship – mix and match’, in Janes Defence Weekly, The ideal decision is to discard the same operational capability that 16 Mar 05 these responsibilities permanently, the RAN has developed today into Walter C, ‘Remilitarising the Australian Hydrographic Service’, in Headmark, 2009, thus eliminating both problems. a modular form and will result in a iss. 131, p. 10 Walter advocates the establishment significant change to the way in which (Endnotes) of a civilian survey authority under the RAN conducts its operations. If 1 Australian Government Department of the AHO who carries out all survey these issues are addressed correctly Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, 2009, p.73 work required for compliance with the OCV will deliver an increased 2 ibid., p.73 SOLAS to allow RAN survey units to capability while also providing a more 3 R Scott, ‘MEKO re-engineered for 18 mission modularity’, Janes Defence Weekly, concentrate on military requirements. cost efficient and personnel efficient 04 Oct 06 This would mean that the OCV platform, which will allow the RAN to 4 Anonymous 2003, ‘The MEKO technology, Naval Forces, special edition, mission package would not require respond faster and more effectively to pp. 42 a deep water survey capability but the tasks with which it is faced.  5 ibid., pp.42-43 6 Defence Material Organisation, could instead concentrate on tactical ‘SEA1448 Ph2 – Anti ship missile survey and support to amphibious defence’, updated 22 May 09, viewed 21 operations. In this way the OCV would Sub Lieutenant Daniel Boettger joined Jun 09, hydrographic operational efficiency 7 R Scott, ‘Flexing a snap-to-fit fleet’, in the Australian Defence Force Academy Janes Defence Weekly, 07 Nov 01 and capability of the RAN without in 2007 with a Bachelor of Science 8 ibid. threatening the AHO’s ability to fulfil 9 C Newell, ‘Littoral-minded: DoD keeps majoring in Oceanography. He is LCS program hopes alive’, in Janes Navy international survey requirements. International, 19 Mar 09 With continual pressure on defence currently progressing towards gaining 10 R Burgess, ‘Fast Swap’, Sea Power, 2006, vol 49 iss 2, p24 budgets and personnel numbers the his Bridge Warfare Certificate in HMAS 11 Australian Government Department change to a modular ship design that of Defence, op. cit., p.73 Parramatta 12 Australian Government Department can be customised to fulfil different of Defence, op. cit., p.73 missions and provide relief to the above 13 Janes, ‘Independence class Littoral combat ship Flight 0’, in Janes Fighting Ships, issues is inevitable. The small steps 2009 REFERENCES towards this future that the RAN has 14 Janes, ‘Freedom class littoral combat ship flight 0, inJanes Fighting Ships, 2009 made through the MEKO designed Anonymous, ‘The MEKO technology,Naval 15 S Truver, ‘Littoral Combat Ship – mix Anzac Class and the successfully multi- Forces, special edition, 2003, pp. 42-45 and match’, in Janes Defence Weekly, 16 Mar Australian Government Department of 05 crewed Armidale and Leeuwin Classes Defence, ‘Defending Australia in the Asia 16 G Lammons, ‘Naval community will need to be built upon substantially, Pacific Century: Force 2030’, 2009 pursues new autonomous surface vehicle’, Australian Hydrographic Office, Sea Technology, 2005, vol 46, iss 12, pp.27-29 with the examples provided by the ‘Roles and Responsibilities’, Australian 17 Australian Hydrographic Office, RDN and their successful Standard Hydrographic Service, updated 08 May 09, ‘Roles and Responsibilities’, Australian viewed 07 Jun 09, viewed 07 Jun 09, vol 49 iss 2, p24 LCS becomes fully operational it will 18 C Walter, ‘Remilitarising the Defence Material Organisation, ‘SEA1448 Australian Hydrographic Service’, in provide further guidance on how best Ph2 – Anti ship missile defence’, updated 22 Headmark, 2009, iss. 131, p. 10 May 09, viewed 21 Jun 09, Janes, ‘Independence class Littoral only be a guide and there will still be combat ship Flight 0’, in Janes Fighting Ships, ALI STR IAN a number of issues that may require a 2009 U SAYW N A S A

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new autonomous surface vehicle’, in Sea I E T T I U T T An evolution of the multi-crewing Technology, 2005, vol 46, iss 12, pp.27-29 U method currently in place will be Newell C, ‘Littoral-minded: DoD keeps LCS program hopes alive’, in Janes Navy needed in order to accommodate the International, 19 Mar 09 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 35 Maritime Counter-Terrorism and the Evolution of the Sri Lanka Navy byS D eRGEI eSiLVA-Ranasinghe

he recent success of the Sri Lanka infiltration. LTTE maritime operations craft. These Navy (SLN) in countering the were initially limited to smuggling and included: Tmaritime wing of the Liberation Tigers shuttling missions between Sri Lanka The 10m of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Sea Tigers, and Tamil Nadu, but in 1984 the LTTE Muraj - the serves as an interesting example of formed a dedicated maritime wing, the principal maritime counter-insurgency. Since Sea Tigers, and sought to rapidly build attack boat, the recommencement of full scale and enhance its maritime capabilities. and also hostilities in 2006, the SLN steadily The importance of establishing a used for dismantled the once formidable maritime wing was affirmed by the amphibious power of the Sea Tigers and played LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran: operations. a significant role in the defeat of the “Geographically, the security of Tamil Capable of Sri Lanka EEZ LTTE. Eelam is interlinked with that of its 40 knots, it carried a crew of ten, and Sri Lanka’s separatist Tamil seas. It is only when we are strong in had three machine gun mountings. insurgency, known as the ‘Eelam the seas and break the dominance of The 8mSudai - capable of 10 War’, began in 1983. Formed in 1975, our enemy [that] we will be able to knots, it carried a crew of six and one the LTTE ascended to become the retain the land areas we liberated and machine gun. dominant militant group among Tamil drive our enemies from our homeland.” The 6mThrikka - capable of 45 separatists, notably after the strategic During the 1990s the Sea Tigers knots, with a crew of four and one withdrawal of the Indian military stepped up their activities in the seas machine gun. It was often used for (Indian Peace Keeping Force) in 1990 surrounding the northern and eastern frogmen operations. in the face of joint Government-LTTE provinces of Sri Lanka, most notably The 6mIdayan - fitted with opposition. This pre-eminence came off the Mullaitivu District coastline. explosives specifically for suicide about largely through the military At its peak, the Sea Tigers could call operations. It was capable of 45 knots, proficiency, discipline and ingenuity of on an estimated 6,000 guerrillas. and carried a crew of two. the LTTE, as well as its fanatical belief The formation of the ‘Black Sea Also, the Sea Tigers played a role in in an ethnically pure Tamil state, Tamil Tigers’ sub-unit in 1990 for suicide amphibious operations by deploying Eelam. operations against SLN vessels and the guerrillas in LTTE offensives against Sri Lanka’s porous north-western introduction of swarming tactics gave the military bases of Pooneryn (1995), maritime borders, which run parallel the Sea Tigers a deadly advantage in Mullaitivu (1996), Elephant Pass (2000) with the southern Indian state of Tamil combat. The indigenous boatbuilding and the Jaffna Peninsula (2001). By Nadu, have always presented a major and seafaring expertise of northern Sri the mid-to-late 1990s the Sea Tigers Counter terrorism Sri Lanka/SLN security challenge. Tamil Nadu has Lankan Tamils also enabled the LTTE emerged as a significant threat to Rapid Action Boat a 1,076 km coastline, and a fishing to manufacture a variety of its own sea maritime traffic in the north-western Squadron industry that sustains an estimated 800,000 people, which offers hundreds of possible embarkation points and tens of thousands of vessels to cover Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 36 Maritime Counter-Terrorism and the Evolution of the Sri Lanka Navy

and north-eastern waters off Sri evident when the LTTE put out five operational Lanka. The area ranked fifth in the boats, we put 20 boats out to take them success with far world for incidents of maritime crime, on.” Sea Tiger combat losses were heavy less casualties. and in September 1997 the Maritime in consequence. In 2006 there were 21 Moreover, Intelligence and Counter-Piracy Centre registered encounters with the SLN; in as the SLA affirmed that “Sri Lankan waters 2007 there were 11; and in 2008, only recaptured continue to remain an extremely two. The SLN significantly curtailed LTTE dangerous area for maritime traffic the Sea Tigers’ operational flexibility controlled … They [the LTTE] do not hesitate to to launch attacks and amphibious areas they approach, board, pilfer and possibly operations, while simultaneously effectively destroy targets of opportunity.” minimising LTTE smuggling dismantled During the period of the operations between Sri Lanka and the land-based Norwegian moderated ceasefire Tamil Nadu. Sea Tiger (c.2002-06), the Sea Tigers embarked Equally important has been the infrastructure, on an unprecedented process of destruction of the LTTE logistical including boat expansion, modernisation and system. Between September 2006 and construction experimentation which included October 2007, the SLN succeeded in yards and Sea indigenously produced stealth boats destroying eight large LTTE warehouse Tiger bases on Admiral and semi-submersibles. ships containing over 10,000 tons of the north-western and north-eastern Karannagoda However, the LTTE activities at war-related material. “These vessels”, seaboard. Meanwhile, in tandem sea did not go unchallenged, and explained Admiral Karannagoda: “were with the SLA encirclement of the the SLN has since played a major carrying over 80,000 artillery rounds, LTTE in north-eastern Sri Lanka, the role in the overall success of the Sri over 100,000 mortar rounds, a bullet- SLN enforced a tight four-tier naval Lankan military’s counter-insurgency proof jeep, three aircraft in dismantled blockade that consisted of inshore campaign. Formed in 1950, the SLN form, torpedoes and surface-to-air patrol craft, fast attack craft, offshore underwent a re-invention after 1983, its missiles. There were also a large patrol vessels and gun boats which mission evolving from anti-smuggling number of underwater swimmer trapped and destroyed any remaining SLN Naval Blockade and anti-illicit immigration operations delivery vehicles and a large quantity Sea Tiger boats. Source - Sunday to combating maritime terrorism, and of diving equipment. There were Clearly, Sri Lankan sea power has Observer Sri Lanka 10 its manpower undergoing a parallel radar equipment as well as Outboard played a decisive role in defeating May 2009 increase over the years from 2960 Motors with higher horse power.” officers and sailors in 1983 to 52,000 The SLN deployed its largest ships, in 2009. According to its former three offshore patrol vessels,Sayura , commander, Admiral Wasantha Samudura and Jayasagara, supported Karannagoda, the SLN has “… by oil tankers, merchant vessels and transformed from a small ceremonial trawlers to sink the warehouse ships as unit to a fully fledged compact fighting far as 3400 km from the south eastern force.” shore of Sri Lanka, near the Indonesian The SLN made important changes and Australian Exclusive Economic in its approach when hostilities Zones (EEZ). The impact on the LTTE Location recommenced in 2006. To effectively was severe, drastically reducing the Map of LTTE counter the Sea Tigers’ dominance of ammunition and warlike material Warehouse inshore operations, the SLN employed available to sustain high intensity ships sunk - over 250 locally-built, high-speed and conflict and led to a major reduction in Source SLN heavily armed inshore patrol craft. Sri its fighting efficacy. Lanka’s Defence Secretary, Gotabaya The joint effects on the subsequent Rajapaksa explained their use: “Earlier, counter-insurgency campaign are they [the SLN] used fast attack crafts, worth highlighting. Facing fewer Dvoras. This time, they introduced artillery and mortar attacks, the Sri the small boat concept. The result is Lanka Army (SLA) achieved rapid Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 37

the insurgency and bringing the end Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe has published to the separatist conflict. Although widely on South Asian and Indian the Sea Tigers are unlikely to pose a Ocean security issues and is currently major threat to the Palk Straits, Gulf undertaking his Masters by Research at of Mannar or Bay of Bengal, LTTE Curtin University analysing: Evolution of attempts to infiltrate from Tamil Nadu using Indian fishing trawlers Australia’s Defence Policy and Strategic may pose a threat in future. To meet Interests in the Indian Ocean. this threat the SLN has resorted to laying minefields to deter LTTE cross- border operations but, more vital to long-term security, Sri Lanka has also indicated an interest in formulating an effective long-term post-conflict maritime policy. who can call on the Recently, the Sri Lanka and India agreed to greater maritime security co-operation and intelligence sharing, expertise which has led to bi-annual meetings between the SLN, the Indian Navy and of 3,500 PHDs dedicated to solving Indian Coast Guard. Such cooperation important defence technology problems? is already bringing results, but with 1,340 km of coastline, 21,700 km2 of territorial waters and 465,800 km2 of EEZ to protect, there is no doubt that the responsibilities of the SLN will continue to expand. Proud to be known as the ‘Golden Fence’, the SLN has become a credible and effective force. Additional orders for new patrol vessels will do much to enhance its role and capabilities. 

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 38 The Australians at Jutland BC y oMMANDER Greg Swinden

he Battle of Jutland on 31 May the overall command of Rear Admiral the forward turret and the flash ignited 1916 was the major naval battle William Pakenham, RN. On 22 April cordite in the magazine which caused Tof World War I. For a few short the Squadron was on patrol off the a massive explosion which blew up the hours on that day the British Grand Danish coast when they encountered ship with the loss of over 1, 000 lives Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet a thick fog bank. The ships had been (only two survivors were recovered came into contact with each other for zig-zagging regularly due to the from the water). the only time during the war. Over perceived submarine threat and at the While no RAN ship took part in 200 ships, ranging from destroyers to required time Australia altered course the action this does not mean that battleships, and 60,000 men took part to conform with previous orders. New the RAN, and Australia, was not in the battle off the Danish coast. By Zealand maintained her course due to represented. At least four members of the end of the day over 9,500 British the poor weather conditions and as a the RAN were at the battle and another and German sailors were dead and result both ships collided. Australian serving in the Royal Navy 25 ships (14 British and 11 German) Australia was badly damaged were also present (and there may have were sunk with many others badly above the waterline as a result and been more). In the grim irony of war damaged. was sent to the Naval Dockyard at of the five Australians known to have Whilst this was the largest Devonport for repairs, which were not served at the Battle of Jutland; three engagement at sea during the war completed until early June; and thus were to lose their lives and all from the it has been considered by many she missed the Battle of Jutland. New same ship. historians and naval officers to have Zealand received less damage and Chaplain Patrick Gibbons was a been inconclusive. Germany claimed so took part in the battle along with Roman Catholic Chaplain serving in a tactical victory due to the simple Indefatigable some five weeks later. HMAS Australia and following the arithmetic of ships sunk and lives collision he was loaned to old battle lost while Britain claimed a strategic The Battle of Jutland cruiser HMS Indomitable which was victory as the German High Seas Fleet This article is not intended to explain part of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron never sought to challenge them again the full history of the Battle of attached to the main Battleship and stayed in port for the remainder Jutland and its aftermath and those Squadrons. Indomitable survived the of the war. interested are encouraged to read battle with no damage or casualties but Due to a twist of fate some five one of the numerous books on the Gibbons later ministered to the dying weeks before no Australian ships were subject. Noting the heavy British and wounded Catholic sailors from the present at this great sea battle. The losses during the battle (14 ships and fleet. Gibbons had joinedAustralia in only RAN ship operating in the North over 6,000 men killed) it is perhaps 1913 and, apart from his brief sojourn Sea in early 1916 was the battle cruiser a good thing that Australia was not in Indomitable, served in the Australian HMAS Australia which was part involved. While HMS New Zealand of the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, emerged from the battle unscathed HMS Defence comprising Australia and HM Ships the Indefatigible was hit by several New Zealand and Indefatigable, under German shells. One shell penetrated

HMS Defence at Jutland (below)

HMS Indefatigable seen in 1912 HMS Indefatigable sinking at the Battle of Jutland May 31 1916 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 39

battle cruiser until 1920 when he on. But almost immediately another Greg Swinden joined the RAN in 1985 resigned from the RAN. salvo struck between the forecastle as a Supply Officer and has served at Another Australian officer on turret and the foremost funnel, and she sea in HMA Ships Swan, Melbourne loan to the Royal Navy was Gunner was lost to sight in an enormous black and Kanimbla. Shore service has been (Warrant Officer) John Henry Gill cloud which, when it cleared showed in Navy Office, HMAS Creswell, Naval who served in the Battleship HMS no signs of a ship at all.” Benbow which was the flagship of Defence was sunk with the loss of Support Command, ADFA and DNSDC– the 4th Battleship Squadron under her entire crew of 903 men. Among Moorebank. Recent service includes the command of Vice Admiral Sir those killed were Sub-Lieutenant two years as RANLO Singapore during Doveton Sturdee (who had destroyed George Paterson, RAN (a 20 year old 2003-04 and as a student on the 2005 the German East Asia Squadron at who had been born in England but had Staff Course. Greg was the FHQ Deputy the Battle of the Falklands in 1914). joined the RAN in March 1914) and Benbow fired about 100 rounds during 19 year old Midshipman Joseph Mack, Fleet Supply Officer during 2006-07 the battle with little or no effect and RAN who hailed from Berry Bank, and following 2008 promotion to CMDR escaped without damage or casualties. (near Lismore), Victoria. Both men had he became a Directing Staff member Gill was a veteran of the 1900-01 joined the RAN but were loaned to the at the Australian Command and Staff Boxer Rebellion in China where he had RN for further training. Also killed in College. He returns to sea, in Kanimbla, served in the South Australian warship the sinking of HMS Defence was Stoker HMCS Protector (SA Navy) which was 2nd Class Mortimer Hugh Froude. in December 2009. on loan to the RN. He later joined the Froude, from Balmain, had joined Royal Navy but in 1914 transferred the RAN on 1 June 1912 as a 14 year to the RAN. John Gill retired from old Boy 2nd Class and received his initial the RAN in 1921 with the rank of training in HMAS Tingira before being Notes: Lieutenant and then served as a civilian posted to HMAS Australia. He was an 1. Some authors have claimed that Flight Assistant Inspector of Naval Ordinance Ordinary Seaman when he deserted Commander Frederick Rutland (later known as Rutland of Jutland) who flew a sea from 1922 until 1946. from the RAN in June 1915, when plane from HMS Engadine during the battle Australia was in British waters. He was born in Australia but no proof of this has been found. The Loss of HMS Defence tried to join the British Army but was The three Australians who lost their rejected due to his height. Froude then 2. The author of this article would be interested to hear from readers who might lives at the Battle of Jutland were joined the Royal Navy as a Stoker and know of other Australians who served at the all serving in the armoured cruiser was posted to the cruiser Defence. On Battle of Jutland. He can be contacted on [email protected]. HMS Defence which was part of the 31 May 1916, when the smoke cleared 1st Cruiser Squadron. At 1800 the Paterson, Mack and Froude had simply Squadron, under the command of Rear ceased to exist.  Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, spotted a group of German cruisers and turned to engage them, but a few minutes later German battle cruisers appeared through the haze and opened fire on the leading British ships (Defence and Warrior). Warrior was badly damaged, set on fire and had over 100 men killed or wounded but managed to limp away. Defence was less fortunate. One eyewitness later wrote: “TheDefence was heavily engaged, salvoes dropping all around her. At 1815 a salvo hit her abaft the after turret and a big red flame flashed up. The ship heeled, then HMS Defence in port some years before the Battle of Jutland (Courtesy of Steve Johnson) quickly righted herself and steamed Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 40 Australian Merchant Navy Day of Remembrance byL iEUTENANT commander Desmond Woods, RAN

he maritime history of Australia to teach succeeding in peace and war has been until generations of Trecently a largely neglected subject. Australians about Most Australians are just not ‘sea- them. School books minded’. Though our National Anthem and history lessons mentions that we are “girt by sea” most do not mention that Australians think of the country as the merchant navy’s being “girt by beach!” This national ships were the means sea blindness has meant that after by which Australian both World Wars ended there was diggers and allied little collective memory of the scale of infantry were landed, effort necessary to win the War at Sea. sustained, armed, fed, Remembrance of the sacrifices made by reinforced and enabled sailors in war faded quickly. to fight and win their This was true for the story of land battles. the RAN at war and was even more This omission is most profoundly Australian hspital ship Centaur (below) pronounced for the less visible but true of the period of the ‘Battle for equally vital Australian Merchant Australia’ and the campaign in New Navy. The Merchant Navy of the whole Guinea in 1942. Those brutal battles British Empire, which included the on the Kokoda Track were finally won Australian Merchant Fleet, suffered because the Japanese army was cut off proportionately the highest casualties from re-supply and was starved into of any of the Allied services in World retreating. First Australian and later War II. No fewer than 30,248 of the American troops in the jungle and on 185,000 British Empire merchant the northern beaches were supplied Merchant seamen who served at sea under the with bread and bombs, bacon and Navy convoy red ensign lost their lives doing so. The bullets and fuel in vast quantities from in Atlantic Australian Department of Veterans the sea and were therefore able to take Affairs nominal roll records 3,500 the fight back to the Japanese. New Australian merchant seamen serving in Guinea was won back from the enemy World War II in Australian registered by the combination of the matchless ships. The Australian War Memorial courage and endurance of young has placed the names of 845 of them, soldiers and airman ashore and by the who are known to have died on war merchant seamen afloat who supplied service during World War II, on the them. Mariners achieved this logistical Survivors in a commemorative roll. The true number miracle despite their ships being float of Australian-born merchant seamen strafed, bombed, mined and torpedoed lost on the world’s oceans is much under them. That indisputable fact of higher and will never be known. These our modern maritime history has been 845 do not include the hundreds of often overlooked by a forgetful nation. unrecorded Australian seamen killed What has also been largely forgotten while serving in British merchant ships is that though our island continent and in the ships of the International was not invaded in 1942 its coastal Survivors of the Mentor Seamen’s Pool. Shipmates waters most certainly were. In fact they being picked up remembered them on ANZAC Day were penetrated from 1939 onwards and bereaved families remembered by an Axis maritime denial campaign. their missing fathers, brothers and sons Australian waters became a killing every day, but very little has been done zone. This carnage was initiated by Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 41

four German armed merchant raiders shelling lone merchantmen and laying minefields.Kormoran was only one of them. Her job was to sink merchant ships, not to fight it out with the cruiser HMAS Sydney. From December 1941 onwards, these surface predators were followed by dozens of long- range Japanese submarines trained to attack merchant ships with their very reliable and deadly accurate Long Lance torpedoes. They also laid mines through Australia’s busiest sea lanes. Germany and Japan worked closely together planning this campaign from 1939 onwards. In 1940 German technicians were sent to Japan to service their armed merchant raiders, and often to disguise them as Japanese merchant ships. In 1941 successful U-Boat commanders were sent to prepare Japanese submarine crews for the coming war at sea and in 1942 U Boats began operating from Penang. The mission of the Axis powers was to slice open Australia’s seaborne arteries, bleed her economy, and ships or perished later. was stopped that day, as they were Merchant losses off cut her off from the free world. The Taking merchant ships into harm’s no longer employed! They were not the east coast of primary target was the flow of men, way under these circumstances uniformed members of their nation’s Australia munitions, food and raw materials required a quiet heroism and an armed services either and so survivors being sent by sea to and from Australia uncomplaining dedication to duty were declared to be ‘DBS’, Destitute to sustain the allied war effort. Japanese that was unsurpassed by any of the British Subjects, and handed over to submarines exacted a terrible toll armed services. Merchant seaman at shore-side charitable institutions until on allied merchant ships across the war had the unreserved admiration of they were next employed. In 1942 after Pacific and Indian Ocean. Between the sailors of the world’s navies, who 33 sinkings due to mines, torpedoes December 1941 and August 1943 fifty- recognised cold courage when they and shelling, from Cairns to Bass Strait, eight Japanese submarines sank 180 saw it. Australian maritime regulations were ships and damaged 15 more. During This willingness of merchant changed to allow for a survivor’s pay this period up to 40 long range attack seamen to be of service to Australia to continue after his ship was on the submarines sank 38 merchant ships in and the Empire was not matched by bottom, but only until he was returned Australian waters. During this same any sense of obligation to them by their to the nearest port where he was given period in the Indian Ocean and South employers or the Australian maritime a fresh set of clothes and paid off. West Pacific Japanese aircraft sank 50 authorities. At the beginning of the Because they were not members of the more merchant ships and damaged war most Australian merchant seamen uniformed services they only way that another 53. By the war’s end 76 were not permanent employees of they could identify themselves to the merchant ships were lost in Australian shipping companies. They signed public as being seamen not shirkers waters to mines, torpedoes, shelling ‘Articles of Agreement’ with the master was by the small metal lapel badge they and bombing. Twenty nine of these of the ship on a voyage-by-voyage wore with the letters MN. were Australian registered and 349 basis. This meant that when their Given the mortal danger at sea and Australian seamen were killed on these ship was sunk the lucky survivors’ pay these lamentable conditions of service Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 42 Australian Merchant Navy Day of Remembrance

it would have been unsurprising if the evacuation of troops from Narvik Singapore before there had been desertions or refusal and Dunkirk. They were present it fell. Carried out of duty by Australian seamen. This in their thousands in the lethal six largely by passenger never happened. The master mariners year long Battle of the Atlantic. ships of the shipping The Commander in Chief Western companies in Approaches in 1941 Admiral Sir Percy Australian waters Noble, who was fighting the Battle of at this time, they the Atlantic, knew what the free world saved thousands of owed to the Merchant Navy. He wrote lives from capture even while the battle raged: and probable death “Day in, day out, night in, night out, at the hands of the they face unflinchingly the dangers of Japanese. The last the deep - the prowling U-boats. They ships to get away know, these men, that the Battle of the were bombed Atlantic means wind and weather, cold relentlessly at and strain and fatigue, all in the face of they steamed a host of enemy craft above and below, south and men of the merchant fleets of awaiting the specific moment to send with their not only the British Empire, but also them to death. When the Battle of the precious of the United States, Norway and the Atlantic is won, as won it will be, it human cargo. Netherlands, with stoic courage and will be these men and those who have Australian hardihood, accepted that the odds escorted them whom we shall have to sailors were were stacked against their survival. thank.” on the British Nevertheless, time and time again they The hardest convoys of the war ships that ran shouldered their kit bags, slung their were the icy Arctic ones from Iceland the deadly hammocks, loaded cargo and steamed to Archangel and Murmansk in Russia. gauntlet from back into danger anyway. Why did Ships were within range of the Lufwaffe Gibraltar they do this? The seamen of the and U-Boats based in Norway. Survival into Valetta Empire, America and occupied Europe time for men adrift in those cruel seas in Malta. signed on because they knew that could be measured in minutes. There The guts and without their ships at sea the war could was no warm welcome or gratitude determination of never be won and the world restored to for these brave seamen from Stalin’s the seamen who ran peace and sanity. They wanted to “do apparatchiks either. those fuel tankers, their bit.” Churchill put the same idea Australian seamen were on the ammunition ships at greater length in 1943. He wrote: nightly “spud run” from Alexandria and freighters “Sea Transport is the stem from which into Tobruk where the 9th Australian through endless air victory blooms. Since without supplies Division stood at bay and fought raids to keep the RAF Posters for the Merchant Navy no army is good for anything.” Rommel’s Afrika Korps panzers to a flying from that beleaguered island As many Australian merchant standstill. Those heroic diggers only fortress was all that stood between it seamen served in British as in became the “Rats of Tobruk” because and starvation and ultimate surrender. Australian vessels. They sailed in they were supplied and reinforced The British crewed tankerSS Ohio was freighters and troop ships, hospital every night from the sea. The price brought into Valetta semi-submerged ships, landing ships, tramp steamers for this campaign was a heavy toll of having been repeated hit by bombs. and most dangerously in tankers and sunken merchant ships littering the All that stopped her from sinking was ammunition ships. Many stayed in harbour and approaches to Tobruk, that she was strapped between two their civilian ships when they were and sailors’ burnt bodies washing RN destroyers. This floating bomb taken up from trade into the navy and ashore on the sands of Libya. was pumped dry of her precious fuel converted into auxiliary warships, It was the merchant navy that and then scuttled at sea. The blue armed merchant cruisers, and even moved women and children, non- Mediterranean is the graveyard of escort aircraft carriers. They were at combatants and nurses, out of countless merchant ships that like Ohio Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 43

were lost to the violence of the enemy heavy lift necessary to get the job done those in the engine rooms, if while holding open its critical sea lanes, and the war won. they were torpedoed, would until Italy surrendered. Thirty thousand seamen of the probably be drowned before The merchant navy was there when Empire’s merchant navies paid for this they reached the engine room the tide of war turned in 1943. They logistics chain with their lives. The steps...” were at the North African landings and ocean floors of the world are strewn Even in peace time it was again at Sicily. They endured the deadly with the wrecks of their broken, burnt a hard, physical life at sea glider bombs that blew their ships apart ships and the remains of the men and consequently merchant during the landings at Salerno and who went down with them. Not for seamen were mostly young. Anzio. They supplied the British and them the exhilaration of being able to Many were just teenaged Indian troops of the 14th “forgotten” fight back, or to steam at speed into boys, with all their lives ahead army in Burma locked in murderous action. When war broke out their ships of them. War aged them jungle battles with the Japanese at carried worn out World War I guns quickly. They all wanted to The George Cross Kohima and Imphal. An estimated without range finding. Later the RAN live long lives in the peaceful 2000 Australian sailors were among the supplied naval gunners to Defensively- Australia that we have enjoyed. They 80,000 merchant seamen who put the Equipped Merchant Ships (DEMS) hoped to grow allies ashore in Normandy on D Day. and thirty-eight of these gunners lost old with us and Australian ships carried the diggers their lives alongside their merchant to be our fathers who landed to liberate Borneo in 1945. navy comrades. These lumbering and grandfathers. General Douglas MacArthur wrote merchant ships were not “greyhounds They knew fear of the merchant navy in the Pacific war: of the deep”, they were more like fat St and they wanted They have brought us our lifeblood and Bernards bringing sustenance where desperately to live. they have paid for it with their own. I it was needed through storm and They hoped that saw them bombed in New Guinea and tempest. Mostly they proceeded at the theirs was a lucky Allied tanker the Phillipines ports. When their ships speed of the slowest ship in the convoy, ship and that death at sea was what torpedoed were not blown out from under them often less than ten knots. By day men happened to other sailors. They lost by bombs or torpedoes, they delivered strained their eyes ahead looking for their lives because their cargoes to us who needed them the semi-submerged magnetic mines they chose not to so badly. In war it is performance that which could tear out their ships’ shirk their duties. counts.” bottom plates. By night in darkened, Faced with mortal The merchant navy fuelled and fetid, vessels they waited to be attacked danger at sea, and supplied the British Pacific Fleet and by torpedoes which could turn their safety ashore, they the RAN which depended on its mess deck from a floating home into a boarded their ships tankers to be their fleet supply train fiery death trap in seconds. and went resolutely in the vast wastes of the Pacific as the After the war Lord Mountbatten to war. Massive damage to merchant ship allies advanced on the home islands wrote: “Those of us who have escorted The following posthumous George of Japan in 1945. Finally they brought convoys in either of the great wars can Cross citation is for an 18 year old home the thousands of sick, emaciated never forget the days and especially the apprentice who managed to get clear allied prisoners of war who had nights spent in company with those of his burning ship, though mortally survived four years of brutal captivity. slow-moving squadron of iron tramps - injured. Let his harrowing story Thirty seven Australian merchant the wisps of smoke from their funnels, stand for countless other examples of seamen died while POWs. the phosphorescent wakes, the metallic youthful heroism. It is true to say that wherever there clang of iron doors at the end of the When the painter was cast off the was a hard, unglamorous, dangerous night watches which told us that the boat drifted back towards the burning but vital task to be done the red ensign Merchant Service firemen were coming ship and it was clear to all on board was there. The ‘red duster’ supported up after four hours in the heated engine that it would require a tremendous the white ensign and the troops and the rooms, or boiler rooms, where they effort to pull it out of danger. Most of airmen of the United Nations in arms had run the gauntlet of torpedo or the occupants, however, were so badly in the world’s cause. The Merchant mine for perhaps half the years of the burned that they were unable to help, Navy provided the muscle power and war. I remember so often thinking that but Apprentice Clarke took an oar and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 44 Australian Merchant Navy Day of Remembrance

pulled heartily for two hours without can ever repay. But all that their elderly sacrifice with humility and gratitude. a word of complaint. It was not until shipmates, still among us, ask from us, They are not forgotten in Australia, the after the boat was clear that it was is our recognition of their friends and land they loved, and they never will be. realized how badly he had been injured. comrades who never made port and His hands had to be cut away from who now have no grave but the sea. All They need no dirge, for time and the oar as the burnt flesh had stuck that their families ask is to share their tide fills all things, with tribute to it. He had pulled as well as anyone, loving recollection of their menfolk unto them. The warmth of a although he was rowing with the bones who did their duty, never grew old, and summer sun, the calm of a quiet of his hands. Later when lying at the never will. bottom of the boat his thoughts were In October of 1945 the British sea, the comforting arm of night, still with his shipmates and he sang to House of Commons passed a the generous soul of nature and the keep up their spirits. Next day he died, resolution that read: power of a seabird’s flight. having shown the greatest fortitude. By “That the thanks of this House his supreme effort, undertaken without be accorded to the Officers and Blow golden trumpets blow, thought of self and in spite of terrible Men of the Merchant Navy for mournfully for all the golden youth agony, Apprentice Clarke ensured the the steadfastness with which they and shattered dreams that lie where safety of his comrades in the boat. His maintained our stocks of food God has lain his quiet dead for all great heroism and selfless devotion and materials; for their services in were in keeping with the highest transporting men, munitions and fuel the world to see, upon some alien traditions of the Merchant Navy. to all the battles, over all the seas; and ocean bed. Those who were lost, and those for the gallantry with which, though a who finally came home, scarred civilian service, they met and fought Ron Wylie – Merchant Seaman physically and mentally by battle, but the constant attacks of the enemy. alive, have left an enduring legacy of That this House doth acknowledge service above self for us to learn from. the Merchant Navy with humble Many gallant actions and incredible gratitude and the sacrifice of all Lieutenant feats of endurance after sinkings are those who have given their lives, Commander recorded, but the deeds of those who that others today may live as free Desmond Woods perished in boats that were never men, and its heartfelt sympathy has served found cannot be known. Both the with their relatives in their proud in the New heroism and the tragedy should now sorrow. We shall never forget them.” take a more prominent place in the Our presence today at this cenotaph Zealand Navy, the annals of Australians at war. This story on Merchant Navy Day is our tribute Royal Navy, and should be taught to our young people to those lost seafarers of the heroic the British Army. to ensure that their ancestors’ gallant, generation, now passing. But we are He is currently a stoic story is not forgotten. These men also mindful of all those who have Training Officer held Australia’s and the world’s future served, and are still serving, in the freedom in their gnarled hands for Australian Merchant Navy in the six with the RAN, nearly six years and they never let go decades since 1945, in peace and war. posted to the their grip. That capacity for endurance We particularly remember those who Staff College in of the common man facing uncommon have lost their lives not to the violence Canberra. danger is a lesson that every generation of the enemy but to the ever variable needs to learn afresh. and dangerous sea itself. What is the purpose of any national1 May all our fellow countrymen ceremony? What do we owe to these here commemorated, those who were men who served at sea in a war that killed in action and those who survived 1 Originally drafted by Des Woods for started seventy years ago? Quite simply the wars of last century but who have an Australian Merchant Navy Day Of we owe them more than sixty years since died, wheresoever they may Remembrance, at Mosman Cenotaph, 3rd September 2009, and presented by of peace and liberty and our material lie, rest in peace. We remember their Commander Michael Hickey, Commanding prosperity. We owe them more than we steadfastness, their bravery and their Officer of HMAS Penguin Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 45 Naval Cooperation for the Future Force BM Gy r. GeORGE aldorisi; Dr. Stephanie Hszieh (Unite e d Stat s Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific) andD r. DaRREN Sutton ar(M ritime Ope ations Division Defence Science and Technology Organization)

Perspective shore land areas, demands even closer heavily technologically dependent .”4 cooperation between and among The need for effective C4ISR “Australia’s defence policy…entails Commonwealth navies and other systems as critical enablers for the the maintenance of alliances and navies they seek to partner with. But Royal Australian Navy (RAN) – a international defence relationships that like globalization, rapid advances in navy that will participate in coalition enhance our own security and allows technology – especially the command, naval operations as the norm, not the control, communications, computers, exception – was highlighted in The us to work with others when we need to intelligence, surveillance and Australian Defence Force (ADF) Future pool our resources…this defence policy reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies – Maritime Operating Concept – 2025: means that we must have the capacity that link these navies together, present Maritime Force Projection and Control, to lead military coalitions where we a challenge that must be reckoned which noted: have shared strategic interests at stake with if these navies seek to achieve the The effectiveness of the maritime interoperability necessary to operate force can be improved through with others…and make tailored together seamlessly at sea in peace information and decision superiority contributions to military coalitions and war. As pointed out by Dr. Chris [quantity and speed]…C2 systems must where we share wider strategic Rahman in The Global Maritime be able to deliver superior battlespace interests with others.”1 Partnership Initiative: Implications awareness and management through Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific for the Royal Australian Navy, “To decision speed and quality thus function effectively, the 1000-ship Navy controlling operational tempo…The Century: Force 2030 (the precursor name for the Global maritime force must also develop a Maritime Partnership)3 will not only high level of interoperability with likely he statement by Joel Fitzgibbon, require high levels of international coalition maritime forces and future Tthe former Australian Minister political support to foster the necessary architectures must provide a cohesive of Defence, captures the importance levels of cooperation, but also will be and comprehensive system through of coalition interoperability to the nation’s navy. Concurrently, Minister Fitzgibbon’s statement also validates the importance of coalition operations in a globalized world. Commonwealth naval cooperation over the past century is universally- recognized as the most successful international grouping of its type and is a model for what has evolved over the past several years into what we now call the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP). In 2006, Vice Admiral Russ Shalders, the-then Royal Australian Navy Chief of Navy, announced the adoption of the GMP concept as one that would best represent the way the Royal Australian Navy will likely 2 The Australian destroyer HMAS Brisbane (DDG 41) and the US Navy destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) cruise side operate in the future. by side in Australian waters during Operation Exercise Tandem Thrust 2001. Tandem Thrust is a combined U.S. and Globalization and the presence Australian military training exercise held in the Shoalwater Bay Training area off the coast of Australia. More than 27,000 of a new generation of threats on the Soldiers, Sailors, Airman and Marines participated with Canadian units taking part as opposing forces. (US Navy Photo by high seas, the littorals, and the near- Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Andrew Meyers.) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 46 Naval Cooperation for the Future Force

NCW [network centric warfare] to achieve complete battlespace awareness and control.5 The rich maritime traditions shared by Commonwealth navies and the navies they will most likely partner with suggest that policy or doctrinal differences that might impede seamless interoperability between and among these navies can be overcome. What is less certain is whether the technological challenges of linking navies that pursue different paths of technology development, insertion, and refresh can be successfully dealt with. The coalition forces face victory or Brazilian Navy continuing challenges these navies have Past is Prologue defeat. For example, as nations – and aircraft carrier BNS in working together at sea – especially especially navies – adopted new Sao Paulo comes alongside USS Ronald over the last decade – suggest that “When John Fisher became First Sea technologies, they found that often the Reagan as the ship solutions to these technical issues Lord in 1904, his main pledge was technological promise of a new system transits around remain elusive. to solve this intractable problem… was accompanied by unintended South America to its new homeport But today, with the Australian Fisher in effect invented picture-based consequences that sometimes made Defence Force on the brink of the the net result a negative rather than a of San Diego. (US warfare. He created a pair of war Navy photo by most substantial naval investment positive. rooms in the Admiralty, one built Photographer’s Mate and upgrades in over a generation, As one especially significant 1st Class John Lill.) RAN naval forces have an opportunity around a world (trade) map, the other example, the introduction of the to achieve seamless interoperability around a North Sea map.”7 telegraph, promised instantaneous with coalition partners as part of the Dr. Norman Friedman communications across vast distances. GMP. Plan Blue, the RAN’s strategic No longer would messages take months “ Netting and Navies: Achieving a Balance” assessment shaping the future of the to traverse continents as telegraph Navy puts the requirement in stark Sea Power: Challenges Old and New cables and networks made it possible terms: for messages to be relayed in days. The The Future Navy must be able The rich history of naval cooperation Royal Navy found the telegraph to be to exchange C2 and targeting over the past century has an equally an important tool in communicating information within a joint and coalition rich history of networking at sea, with its global fleet, but that ease and environment. The Future Navy must enabled by such innovative practices speed of communications came with possess the Command, Control, as First Sea Lord John Fisher’s use a price. During times of tension, fleet Communications, Computers (C4) of “picture-based” warfare at the commanders were often found on their capabilities required to maintain beginning of the last century. And command ship docked at port in order interoperability with coalition forces in further spurred by the exigencies of to have access to telegraph messages the future. This is particularly the case the two global wars of the past century, rather than out at sea with their ships.8 when operating with US forces.6 wars in which naval forces played a The telegraph also had an At issue is the question: can dominant role. Commonwealth navies unintended impact on the message Australia, the Australian Defence Force, and their close allies such as the United itself.9 Victorian Britons living overseas and, specifically, the Royal Australian States Navy readily – and even eagerly eagerly embraced the telegraph Navy use current information and – adopted new technologies that as something that was “faster and communication technologies to meet helped these navies coordinate their better” than waiting for newspapers the challenge of providing effective efforts at sea. via ship that often took more than a naval cooperation and interoperability? But it is how this technology is month to arrive. However, this new Some think it cannot. We believe it applied that determines not only technology had a downside: telegraph can. how effective it is, but often, whether transmissions were expensive and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 47

messages were often truncated to the bare essentials. Additionally, transmissions were fraught with error due to the relay system that depended on operators at each relay station retyping the information — the error rate increased when it was handled by operators with little understanding of English. The net result was that when the news finally arrived it was truncated, error-prone and often bore little resemblance to the initial information that was transmitted.10 The advent of wireless technology also brought the promise of better and speedier communications between command and fleets at sea. Navies were no longer bound by land-locked out of the way – or stay at home… Royal Australian telegraph cables and signals could Naval forces today have embraced Navy Lieutenant The ‘need for speed’ in network-centric reach out into the vast expanse of the information communication Commander Bryan sea allowing for central command technologies like the Internet and operations places the whole notion of Edwards, Australian to better track their forces. This satellite communications to maintain multinational operations at risk”12 Fleet Battle Staff liaison officer, looks centralized control at the Admiralty situational awareness and track their Professor Paul Mitchell – Canadian Forces on as Lieutenant level allowed for better vectoring of fleets. However, much like the Royal College Commander fleets based on a central information Navy in the days of the telegraph and Gary Larson, of “Small Navies and Network-centric system, but also made it harder for fleet wireless communications, navies must Expeditionary commanders to manage their ships. deal with the challenges posed by these Warfare: Is There a Role?” Strike Group 7, pulls up information Professor Rodger of the University of new technologies. The challenge now Naval War College Review Spring 2003 on a computer Exeter tells of an incident in 1942 when is how can these navies ensure that screen depicting the commander of the Royal Navy’s their substantial investment in C4ISR information about Home Fleet, Admiral John Tovey, asked technologies result in more, not less, Clearly, the available evidence suggests integration events the Admiralty to take command of his interoperability? To understand the that like-minded peace-loving nations between US and ships as he had lost track of them while challenges, as well as the opportunities, – especially the RAN and its likely Australian forces as part of Talisman at sea.11 facing the Royal Australian Navy coalition partners – recognize the Saber 2007. (Navy And like the telegraph, wireless (RAN) we must first understand how importance of coalition networking NewsStand) had its downside. While wireless well the RAN and other navies are able and that naval operators of all nations technology helped commanders reach to interoperate today. recognize it perhaps more so than far-flung units and communicate others. Looking to examples in the in real time, enemy units could also navies we represent – and extrapolating receive these same transmissions and H ow Big a Challenge is Naval these examples to Commonwealth gain the tactical advantage over the Coalition Networking? navies and their likely coalition forces communicating via this wireless partners – is an important first step technology. History is replete with “Is there a place for small navies in in understanding the challenges to examples of navies and other forces network-centric warfare? Will they be effective coalition networking at sea. suffering defeat because the enemy able to make any sort of contribution From the perspective of the Royal intercepted wireless communications. in multinational naval operations of Australian Navy, Australian Maritime None of this “downside” was Doctrine is clear in describing the the future? Or will they be relegated anticipated when the new technology challenges of greater interoperability was initially developed and placed on to the sidelines, undertaking the most among naval force, noting: naval units. menial of tasks, encouraged to stay Interoperability can never be Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 48 Naval Cooperation for the Future Force

assumed and requires substantial and and exchange data, navies may even sustained effort to achieve common stop attempting to operate together. doctrine, common procedures and He raises what is perhaps the most common ommunications. The greater important question regarding coalition the commonality in equipment and naval communications – what level of methods achieved the less duplication communications and networking is of resources and the fewer delays required to make coalition operations in achieving operational results at sea effective. when nations come together in As Professor Mitchell noted in his contingencies.13 article, the experience of Canadian How important is coalition ship commanding officers, as well as resources, political legitimacy, or Left to right: JDS Samidare (DD 106), networking and what is the “state the experience of others working with both. This led him to conclude that USS Chung-Hoon US naval forces in NATO exercises in a dynamic coalition environment, of play” of this networking today, (DDG 93), and especially when US Navy combat or operations, was that the “need for because of the impact of slower USS Denver (LPD formations attempt to communicate speed” in network-centric operations networks or non-networked ships, the 9). All three ships and share data with Commonwealth may result in the exclusion of even prospects of the United States Navy participated in navies and other coalition partners and close allies. Thus, he notes, while the keeping “in step” with Commonwealth RIMPAC 2006. (www.navy.mil) achieve “shared situational awareness?” guiding principle of network-centric navies as well as with other likely Some would say that it is not yet where warfare (NCW) is to increase the speed coalition partners, is not high – absent it should be. As Professor Mitchell and efficiency of operations, coalitions enlightened efforts by all governments 14 noted in his article in the authoritative are rarely concerned about combat concerned. Naval War College Review, absent efficiency. Rather, they are always While some might say this is merely more effective means to network about scarcity in terms of operational anecdotal information, for these

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 49

authors and our colleagues from other and acquisition bureaucracies For navies working with the US Navy, navies — especially Commonwealth increasingly driven by the rules the technical challenges to effectively navies — the situation Professor of the marketplace – measures of network are not trivial especially when Mitchell describes represents the effectiveness, return on investment the US Navy that has invested heavily reality of current coalition operations and best business practices – the lack in current information communication at sea and indicates that there is of measures to quantify the benefits technologies to fully-network its force. important work yet to be done. derived from effective coalition The challenge for the Royal Australian If this is such an important issue networking auger against spending Navy and other medium sized navies then why have naval professionals not scarce research and development, is how to best co-evolve maritime worked harder and more vigorously and especially acquisition, dollars to networking systems in a way that to solve it and why have we not found enhance something that has not yet enables maximum networking among a solution yet? Part of the problem been effectively quantified. partner ships and other platforms. The lies in the relative success that navies However, it is a process that must issue of co-evolution is an important have had networking at sea. Even in take place if Commonwealth navies one because for navies determined the days of signal flags, ships at sea and their likely coalition partners to work together with other – often found a way to communicate to some are to operate at sea effectively smaller – navies as global maritime degree. As technology advanced for next century. Serendipitously, partners, a cooperative arrangement from flashing lights, to radio Morse the Commonwealth military regarding technology development code, to tactical radio voice circuits, establishments – as well as that of the is crucial.16 This implies early and to the initial tactical data links, ships United States – have well-developed frequent cooperation and collaboration at sea often had it better than forces military laboratory organizations at the grass-roots level by scientists and ashore on expanded battlefields. The able to work on coalition networking engineers. fact that “we’ve communicated at sea challenges and also have well- Government defence laboratories in the past and we’re doing so today,” developed processes for dealing with in the Commonwealth nations and in often obscures how well we could sister laboratories among the five the United States are ideally positioned communicate and exchange data if AUSCANNZUKUS nations. And to lead the effort to co-evolve C4ISR the right technology, doctrine, tactics, given the technological challenges of capabilities that will enable their techniques, and procedures were in effectively networking these diverse navies to effectively network at sea. place. navies, the military laboratories of Government defence professionals There is another, perhaps more these five nations must pursue this as a have been at the forefront of developing important, reason that an effective matter of priority. today’s C4ISR systems and thus have solution still eludes the operators who the talent and the pedigree to lead this want to solve this issue. For a host of effort in the future. reasons, coalition interoperability does Defence Laboratories: An Australian and US labs have not fit neatly into any requirements Important Part of the Solution been working together with other “bin” for Commonwealth navies, Commonwealth nations to ensure for the US Navy, or for other likely “The DSTO mission covers the full that their navies can network coalition partner navies. It does not fly, spectrum of science and technology seamlessly together. Several notable float, or operate beneath the seas. It support for Defence…The DSTO technical exchange programs have does not strike the enemy from afar like will continue a significant portion of been established to begin the task of cruise missiles. It does not enhance engineering interoperability among research into forward-looking enabling readiness like spare parts or training. It the five AUSCANNZUKUS nations— just does not always have the requisite technologies such as hypersonics, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, degree of high-level advocacy. computer security, electro-optics and United Kingdom, and the United Part of the reason for this lack of smart materials which impact future States. Examples that the authors are advocacy and difficulty in reorienting Defence capability.”15 familiar with are discussed below as the requirements and acquisition work provides insights into the efforts Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific practice is the inability to quantify at the grassroots, laboratory level to the “goodness” derived from coalition Century: Force 2030 begin the discussions on achieving the networking. With naval establishments required technological interoperability Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 50 Naval Cooperation for the Future Force

for navies to operate together on in the global maritime commons.

A chieving Coalition Networking

“The ADF [Australian Defence Force] must continue the transition to a force with fully integrated services that is interoperable with other agencies of government and its coalition partners and allies…The future force will need assured access to other agency, coalition, and open source information capabilities…We have a strong record of meeting the challenges of Quartermaster 1st interagency and coalition operations, up through the leadership levels of Class Jory Mason of both as a leader and a participant. The these laboratories, scientists and The Technical Cooperation Program Chicago, and Royal future will present more challenges in engineers are keen to use these (TTCP) is a forum for defence science Australian Navy Seaman Andrew 17 bilateral DEAs or IEAs to facilitate and technology collaboration between this regard.” Smith of guided- their work with their fellow scientists the five AUSCANNZUKUS nations. Joint Operations for the 21st Century missile frigate HMAS and engineers in laboratories in the It is one of the largest collaborative Newcastle review a other AUSCANNZUKUS nations. defence science and technology chart aboard guided- Few would argue that the challenges But the task of devising a DEA or activities in the world. The aim of missile destroyer to achieving effective networking at IEA and then getting it approved TTCP is to foster cooperation within USS McCampbell as part of a personnel sea and to devising and co-evolving through a substantial review chain the science and technology areas cross-deck exercise C4ISR systems for navies – even in the respective nations involved needed for national defence. The series. McCampbell navies with such similar traditions, is not a trivial task. Fortunately purpose is to enhance national defence was underway with platforms and technologies as the five AUSCANNZUKUS nations have and reduce costs. To do this, TTCP the Essex Strike AUSCANNZUKUS nations – are put in place a network of agreements provides a formal framework that Group in support of simple to solve or demand anything that enable exchanges of scientific scientists and technologists can use the bilateral training exercise Talisman less than a concerted effort on the part and engineering information at the to share information amongst one Saber 2009. (US of government defence laboratories laboratory level. Our personal and another in a streamlined manner. Navy photo by Mass working together. professional experience is primarily As noted in Defending Australia Communication However, the scientists and focused on our years-long work on in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force Specialist 2nd Class engineers working in these government Technical Cooperation Program teams. 2030, TTCP is the prime multilateral Byron C. Linder) defence laboratories also recognize that science and technology relationship the ways and means for them to work T he Technical Cooperation Program used by the Australian Defence with their colleagues in other nations Force.19 TTCP operates by sharing must be well-developed and robust “Our prime multilateral science and the output from existing national enough to ensure a coordinated effort. technology relationship is through The science and technology programs for A primary means for accomplishing Technical Cooperation Program with the greater benefit of the participating this work is through bilateral the United States, United Kingdom, nations. It is therefore fundamentally agreements between two nations in the a bottom-up organization, with Canada and New Zealand.”18 form of Defence Exchange Agreements collaborations occurring only where (DEA) or Information Exchange Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific national programs and a willingness to Agreements (IEA). Century: Force 2030 cooperate already exist. At the principal researcher level Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 51

One-Example of Commonwealth Labs – Plus the United States – Finding Networking Solutions “The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), a longstanding forum for defence science and technology cooperation between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, has, for example, established an initiative to consider the ‘FORCEnet Implications for Coalition Partners’”20 Dr. Chris Rahman

T he Global Maritime Partnership Royal Australian Initiative: Implications for the AG-6 was the follow on to the work open architecture and open standards Air Force Flight Royal Australian Navy of AG-1 and drew upon the Navy’s that other nations can leverage with Lieutenant Catherine FORCEnet Capstone document, minimal investment. An analogy Rubin works with Action Group 1 (AG-1) Net-Centric FORCEnet: A Functional Concept familiar to most nations in the Pacific Operations Specialist Maritime Warfare Study for the 21th Century, to build the Rim involves Singapore. 1st Class Ennis In response to a mutually perceived study approach. Concurrent to the In 1998, Singapore made an Hooker in the combat direction center need, the five allied countries of TTCP study, the AG-6 members shared enormous investment in the Singapore aboard the aircraft Maritime Systems Group established the “technology on-ramps” of their ONE project, which provided carrier USS George Action Group One (AG-1) in 2001 capability development and acquisition broadband infrastructure of high Washington during to conduct a three-year (October communities to find those windows capacity networks and switches, with a Talisman Saber 2001 to September 2004) “Network- where similar technological capabilities the goal of providing broadband access 09 exercise. (US Navy photo by Mass Centric Maritime Warfare (NCMW)” could be inserted into their naval to the entire nation. Singapore then Communication collaborative study. C4ISR systems. By modeling the went out to the international business Specialist 2nd Class The objectives of this study were planned capabilities of these “on community and said, in essence, “Come John J. Mike) to provide guidance and analysis ramps” against their study, the impacts join us. We have made the investment on the implications of NCMW for and value of alternative coalition in building a world-class infrastructure. coalition maritime force capabilities, network structures was assessed. The This is a great home for your business.” C4I interoperability, and to help shape study’s results are currently being Attracted by that world-class national acquisition strategies. used by AG-6 members to support infrastructure, those businesses did As a result of AG-1’s study and C4ISR technology procurement come, and Singapore’s standing as a coupled with the US Navy’s planned recommendations in their respective hub for international business and as a investment in its fleet wide network countries. strong node in the Asian economy is a known as FORCEnet, the TTCP The advantages that can accrue to matter of record.21 The question AG-6 leadership directed the standup of a the world’s peace-loving nations by raised – and a question that the MAR new action group to focus specifically leveraging the tremendous investment leadership still wants to address by a on the impact of the US Navy’s the US Navy is making in FORCEnet potential successor group – is whether FORCEnet environment will have on cannot be overstated. Far from a US FORCEnet can play a similar role in coalition partners. Navy-only standard, FORCEnet – and the development of maritime coalition especially a currently-fielded prototype capabilities. Action Group 6 (AG-6) FORCEnet called “Composeable FORCEnet – is a Beyond the strong endorsement Implications for Coalitions publish-and-subscribe system based on by the TTCP principals to continue Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 52 Naval Cooperation for the Future Force

the AG-1/AG-6 efforts for another the best possible C4ISR systems – three years, the initial reviews of TTCP and most importantly – systems MAR AG-1/AG-6’s work within the that are compatible with other naval and defence establishments of AUSCANNZUKUS navies as well as the five nations has been very positive. with other likely coalition partners. As AG-6 transitions to the future, the There are many extant “five-eyes” TTCP model continues to provide a organizations and taxonomies that means for the laboratory communities greatly facilitate cooperation among the in the nations that will likely work partner nations. But at the science and together at sea to analyze technical engineering level, TTCP offers arguably communication and networking the best forum for this ongoing Stephanie Hszieh is a Strategic Analyst needs in an operational framework. cooperation. The experience of the in the Corporate Strategy Group at the The application of the TTCP model TTCP group MAR AG-1/AG-6/AG-11 Space and Naval Warfare System’s Center, to current and future efforts to build offers a bedrock and a best-practices Pacific--the US Navy’s ‘s C4ISR laboratory effective coalition communication example as a way ahead to ensure that and Center of Excellence. She has co- networks can be an important step in Commonwealth/AUSCANNZUKUS enabling Commonwealth nations to naval operations in this century are the authored numerous articles on the US operate and cooperate at sea in this most effective they can possibly be.  Navy’s ‘s Global Maritime Partnership century. including one published by the US Naval Institute. Dr. Hszieh received her A Way Forward? doctorate in Political Science from the University of Southern California. “A new idea is first condemned as ridiculous and then dismissed as trivial, until finally, it becomes what everyone knows.” William James – 1879

As the AUSCANNZUKUS nations take a leadership role in securing the global commons as part of the nascent Global Maritime Partnership, effective networking among these allied and coalition nations will be an Darren Sutton is the acting Research absolute requirement if the navies of Leader Surface Ship Operations - these nations are to achieve anything George Galdorisi is Director of the Maritime Operations Division (MOD) worthwhile beyond just showing up in Corporate Strategy Group at the in the Defence Science and Technology the same oceanic area at the same time. Space and Naval Warfare System’s Organisation (DSTO). He served as Head, We firmly believe that if the five Center Pacific, the US Navy’s ‘s C4ISR AUSCANNZUKUS nations turn to Strategic Directions/MOD; the Science laboratory and Center of Excellence. their defence science and technology and Technology Adviser to the Air organizations as primary stewards of Prior to joining the lab as a Navy Warfare Destroyer Project; and conceiving compatible C4ISR systems civilian, he served for 30 years as for their respective nations, this will a naval aviator, commanding two the Navy Scientific Adviser. Dr Sutton has result in the best possible results as helicopter squadrons, USS Cleveland a doctor of philosophy in science (laser these government defence laboratories (LPD-7) and Amphibious Squadron diagnostics for hypersonic flows) from have a shared responsibility to deliver the Australian National University. naval operators of the partner nations Seven. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 53

(Endnotes) proceedings of the 2006 Royal Australian Australia, 24 and 26-27 July 2007, p. 10. 1 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Navy Sea Power Conference. Dr. Friedman 12 Paul Mitchell, “Small Navies and Century: Force 2030 (Canberra, Australia, is an internationally-recognized expert Network-centric Warfare: Is There a Role?” Australian Government, Department of on naval matters who speaks frequently Naval War College Review, Spring 2003, pp. Defense, 2009), Executive Summary, Pages at international symposia on network- 83-99. 12-13, accessed at: www.defence.gov.au. centric operations. As Dr. Friedman points 13 Australian Maritime Doctrine 2 Chris Rahman, Papers in Australian out, Admiral Fisher used the information (Canberra, Australia, Australian Maritime Affairs, No. 24,The Global gleaned from shipping reports and reports Government, Department of Defense, Maritime Partnership Initiative: from his own fleets to build a tactical picture 2000), p. 106.. Implications for the Royal Australian Navy of where pirates were attacking British 14 Paul Mitchell, “Small Navies and (Canberra, Australia, Sea Power Centre, merchant ships. Information from these Network-centric Warfare: Is There a Role?” 2008). sources was fed into two different war Naval War College Review, Spring 2003, pp. 3 “A Global Network of Nations for rooms—the first war room tracked ship 83-99pp. 88-89. a Free and Secure Maritime Commons,” movements around the world while the 15 Defending Australia in the Asia Report of the Proceedings of the 17th second war room tracked ship movements Pacific Century: Force 2030, pp. 131-136. International Seapower Symposium, 19-23 in the North Sea. Armed with this “picture- 16 Van Hook, “How to Kill a Good September 2005, accessed at: www.nwc. based” view of the world, Admiral Fisher Idea,” p. 33. Captain Van Hook, drawing navy.mil/cnws/marstrat/docs/library/ was able to direct warships to the spots on his experience as a destroyer squadron ISS17web.pdf >. where British ships were being attacked commander where he worked with coalition 4 Rahman, The Global Maritime by pirates. See also, Norman Friedman, partners, emphasized the importance of Partnership Initiative: Implications for the Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies a cooperative approach to instantiating Royal Australian Navy, p. 6. Learned to Fight Smarter through Three the global maritime partnership, noting 5 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) World Wars (Annapolis, Maryland, Naval that the US should; “Encourage regional Future Maritime Operating Concept – 2025: Institute Press, 2009). maritime security arrangements to form Maritime Force Projection and Control, 8 N.A.M. Rodger, presentation at the at the grassroots level, without overt US pp. 15-16 (Canberra, Australia, Australian Royal Australian Navy King-Hall Naval leadership.” Government, Department of Defense, History Conference, Sydney /Canberra, 17 Joint Operations for the 21st Century 2009). Australia, 24 and 26-27 July 2007, p. 6. (Canberra, Australia, Department of 6 Plan Blue 2006 (Canberra, Australia, 9 .N.A.M. Rodger, presentation at the Defence, 2007), pp. 3 and 30-31. This Australian Government, Department of Royal Australian Navy King-Hall Naval publication provides a window on how the Defense, 2006), pp. 16-17. Not coincidently History Conference, p. 6. It is difficult to Australian Defence Force intends to fight with respect to the themes of the 2009 overstate the importance of the invention of in 2030. ‘King-Hall’ Naval History Conference, in the the telegraph. For the first time ever, it was 18 Defending Australia in the Asia Foreword to Plan Blue 2006 Vice Admiral possible to move information faster than Pacific Century: Force 2030, p. 136. R. E. Shalders, RAN Chief of Navy, notes; people or goods. Therefore it is not difficult 19 Defending Australia in the Asia “In considering our future, we must not to understand how proponents – as well as Pacific Century: Force 2030, p. 136. forget the lessons of our past. The Royal users – of the telegraph did not thoughtfully 20 Rahman, The Global Maritime Australian Navy has played a crucial role consider the unintended consequences of Partnership Initiative: Implications for the in securing Australia’s national interests at its use. Royal Australian Navy, p. 36. home and aboard for over 100 years.” 10 Rodger, presentation to King-Hall 21 Intelligent Nation 2015 Steering 7 Norman Friedman, “Netting and Conference, Canberra, January 24, 2007 Committee, “Innovation. Integration. Navies, Achieving a Balance,” in Sea (from Galdorisi notes transcription). Internationalisation,” June 2006, http://www. Power: Challenges Old and New (Sydney, 11 N.A.M. Rodger, presentation at the in2015.sg/pdf/01_iN2015_Main_Report.pdf Australia, Halstead Press, 2007), pp. Royal Australian Navy King-Hall Naval (Accessed 10 July 2007). 185-186. This publication provides the History Conference, Sydney /Canberra,

816SQN Seahawks flying over Ayers Rock (ULURU) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 54 New in Navies photography by Michael Nitz

he Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), type 052B destroyer PLANS Guangzhou (168). The destroyer participated in the Sail Bunaken Indonesian Fleet TReview off Manado and Bitung.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 55

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 56 Book Reviews

In my own limited experience at provides a fascinating insight for those least, this is not an uncommon reaction who have inherited such automation as from seasoned naval officers about a normalcy in naval operations. But this NCW, particularly those who have is more than a technical history. Whilst been using a fused, computerised there is the potential for the layman tactical picture based on information to become lost in the sheer amount of from combat data systems, linked to acronyms and terms used in the latter organic and non-organic sensors for all half of the book, Friedman’s manner of their professional lives. of explaining concepts through more This is the line of argument that simple analogies does provide a great Norman Friedman takes in his book – deal of accessibility to aspects of NCW what he believes should more correctly that have shrouded it with a perhaps be termed picture-centric warfare has undeserved aura of complexity. On been in practice since Admiral Sir the other hand, the detail of the book John Fisher harnessed the advantages – most noticeable in the length of the of proliferating radio technology at footnotes – adds a depth to Network- Network-Centric Warfare: the turn of the last century. Friedman Centric Warfare that should prove How Navies Learned to Fight terms this the Radio era and through interesting to readers with a desire to Smarter Through Three his War Room tactical plot at the pursue their own study of such aspects World Wars Admiralty, Fisher was able to use this of naval operations. fusion of multiple sources (including by Norman Friedman intelligence) to command and control Reviewed by (Acting) Sub-Lieutenant the movements of friendly vessels and Mark Karow is a MPhil Candidate, xxi, 592 pages, illustrations, acronyms, track those of other navies over the UNSW-ADFA notes, index entire globe. Following on from these Naval Institute Press, 2009. developments, the Radar era in World War II saw both the exchange of RRP AUD$75.00 information and its accurate fusion into the tactical picture become vital to the conduct of operations – particularly in air defence. Indeed, Reviewed by SBLT Mark Karow the spiralling problems of air defence against massed jet aircraft provided The concept of Network-Centric no small impetus for the onset of the Warfare (NCW) has become Computer era. Computerisation of the something of a ‘buzz word’ in recent fusing of the tactical picture, not only times. Indeed, it is a challenge to find assisted in countering the air threat, those involved or with an interest in but facilitated the design of systems contemporary military affairs who are and assets capable of engaging in not aware of NCW. Over the Horizon-Targeting (OTH-T) What is perhaps less widely known against surface threats, or acting as is the disputed nature of this concept, interceptors over the vastness of the for there are those who assert that ocean expanse in order to prosecute the basic premises of NCW – the sub-surface threats. harnessing of Information Technology This discussion of how navies have (IT) to enable military operations – evolved the way they fight over more may not be as a much of a Revolution than a century is an enlightening read. in Military Affairs (RMA) as some Merely as a technical history of certain works might suggest. Cold War era systems, Friedman Norman Friedman Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 57

Armidale Class Patrol Boats leave Darwin Harbour in formation at the commencement of the sea phase of the Minor War Vessel Concentration Period detailed tactical charts, and statistical tables of each force). As the title suggests the book describes the major carrier battles of the Pacific (Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Santa Cruz, and the Philippine Sea). Whilst this is interesting in itself the focus is on the method and thought process of each commander’s decision making to shape and ultimately win these battles. The book does not develop the individual characters or stories of heroism that are encountered in many other titles written about the largest naval campaign seen to that date and after. It also provides only limited Carrier Battles — Command insight into the decision making Decisions in Harm’s Way process of the Japanese officers during these battles. It is a book focused by Douglas Vaughn Smith, 346 pages, on analytical assessment of the US US Naval Institute Press. naval commanders who achieved extraordinary success, and on how that ISBN 1591147948 success was derived from their officer training. The book provides great insight into the performance of commanders Reviewed by LCDR Bradley Smith in battle and how their training shaped their decision making and tactical Carrier Battles is a book that has been thinking. A recommended read written for those who have an interest for those wanting to gain a greater in both US Naval history during WWII, understanding of the importance of and the art of decision making and making sound military decisions under influence of officer training on those pressure, and of the value which a decisions. The author has attempted professional military education can to analyse the key carrier battles provide. during this period to demonstrate that superior training produced by the US Naval War College enabled the US to overcome a Japanese naval force initially greater in both number and technological capability. The book is a good read for those who simply wish to gain a greater understanding of the scale of the numerical advantage that the Japanese had at the beginning of this period, and the success of the US in battles against these forces, with detailed descriptions of the events and outcomes of each battle (including Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Shipyards: Australia and USA Email: [email protected] Fax +61 8 9410 2564 Tel: +61 8 9410 1111

WWW.AUSTAL.COM Issue 134 59 Visions from the Vault VisionsVisions from from the the Vault Vault

aving served in Korea and witnessed the British atomic testsH at the Monte Bello Islands during 1952, the aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney (III) continued her busy program into 1953. In March she left Melbourne for England, having embarked the Australian service contingent to the coronation of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. Sydney left Australia in company with the cruiser HMNZS Black Prince and sailed via Fremantle, Aden and Malta. Arriving in Portsmouth in early May she remained to take part in the Coronation Review at Spithead the following month. Sydney returned to Australia via the United States, Panama and New Zealand, but spent just a month alongside before beginning preparations for a further deployment to Korea. This photograph shows the carrier firing a salute while at Portsmouth.

Coronation Contingent 1953

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 60 ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.

Our new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the Changing your details previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion When your account is created, only your member ID and password are forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change you take full advantage of the new features. your details, login and click the “Change Your Details” menu item (figure 5). Then select the “change” link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the “save” button (figure 7). Figure 1 The personal information that you provide will be visible to other Obtaining an account members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off- browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), line records. then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member ID and password.

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 134 61 Thinking of Making a Contribution? Style Notes for Headmark

In general, please present your work publication: publisher, year of that Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack Aubrey, or Reverend James with the minimum of formatting. edition. Moodie. At the end of the article, please supply full honours So: - Lieutenant Commander Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - unless Paragraphs: Adkin, Mark. Goose Green. London: you would prefer not to use them. Then please supply a Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Leo Cooper, 1992. paragraph on yourself, to a maximum of 50 words, including Separate paragraphs by one line. Single Adler, Bill (Ed.) Letters from Vietnam. any qualifications you would like listed, and any interesting spacing only. Use one space only after New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967. biographical aspects. If possible please supply a colour or stops and colons. Articles use quotation marks around greyscale head and shoulders e-photo of yourself for use Conventions: their title, which is not in italics. alongside the article title. Use numbers for 10 and above, words If citing web sites please use the Illustrations: below. Ship names use italics in title convention: Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without case; prefixes such asHMAS in capitals Australian Associated Press. “Army sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use and italics. Book and Journal titles use admits mistakes in SAS investigation”. a minimum of 300 dpi. We are keen on colour images but italics. 17 February, 2004. Please send to the Editor on Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use So, web site name. Article title. Full footnotes to explain any points you date of accessing the site. Full URL. Editorial considerations: want the reader to notice immediately. Bylines: The Editor reserves the right to amend articles where Book titles follow Author surname, Supply your everyday title for use at the necessary for the purposes of grammar correction, and to first name, title if any. Title. Place of beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant delete tables or figures for space considerations.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 62 Australian Naval Institute

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Forecastle part-of-ship hands heave in lines as HMAS SUCCESS prepares to depart form Singapore for the commencement of Exercise Bersama Shield 2009