Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and Hezbollah

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Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and Hezbollah Stephan Grigat Antisemitic Anti-Zionism: Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and Hezbollah As apreacher on Al Jazeera and head of the European Council for Fatwa and Re- search, Yusuf al-Qaradawi is one of Sunni Islam’smost influential intellectuals. Al-Qaradawi has gone beyond denying the Holocaust to presentingitasanex- ample to be followed: accordingtohim, Hitler was the “ultimate punishment” for the Jews, inflicted on them by Allah for theirdepravity.Inthe future, he be- lieves, the Muslims must take on the task. In 2009,hestated that, “God willing, the next time this punishment will be inflicted by the hand of the Faithful.”¹ The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in which Al-Qaradawi has his roots shaped all the later currents of radical Islam,includingthe Iranian regime and Hezbollah. While these latter are, of course, in some respects in competition with Brother- hood groups and parties, they can also cooperate with them, especiallywhen it comes to fighting Israel and with respect to ashared hostility to the rulersof Saudi Arabia,² considered by some supporters of the Iranian regimetobede- scendants of Jews. The prototypical Islamist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, was found- ed in 1928,inthe same period as the rise of the fascist mass organizations in Eu- rope. It also drew inspiration from the writingsofthe Iranian Islamists of the nineteenth century. The Nazis activelysupported the establishment of the Broth- erhood materially and ideologically. After 1945, it became the “biggest antisem- itic organization in the world,” with around amillion members.³ The rapid rise in its membership at the beginning of the 1930s—like the support for European fas- cism and Nazism but in adifferent religious context—resulted from amassive and delusional projective reaction to the crisis-ridden onslaught of capitalist modernity.This reaction against the ambivalences and emancipatory potential of modernity wasalsoone of the main grounds for the mass support of Khomeini from the 1960s onwardsinIran. J. Cáceres, “‘An den Teufel verkauft’,” Süddeutsche Zeitung,December 22, 2010,https://www. sueddeutsche.de/sport/neuer-sponsor-beim-fc-barcelona-an-den-teufel-verkauft-1. 1039090 -0#seite-2. See J. Risen, “ASecret Summit.Iran’sQuds Forceand the Muslim Brotherhood Considered an AllianceAgainst Saudi Arabia,” TheIntercept,November 18, 2019,https://theintercept.com/ 2019/11/18/iran-muslim-brotherhood-quds-force/. M. Küntzel, Nazis und der Nahe Osten: Wieder islamische Antisemitismus entstand (Leipzig: Hentrich &Hentrich, 2019), 120. OpenAccess. ©2021Armin Lange, Kerstin Mayerhofer,Dina Porat, LawrenceH.Schiffmann, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110671964-010 150 Stephan Grigat While the political programme of the Muslim Brotherhood was legitimated by referencetothe religious texts of Islam, resulting in clear differences from fas- cism and Nazism in spheres such as sexual moralityand gender politics, it close- ly resembled and still closelyresembles the radical right in Europe in crucial politico-economic respects:rejection of parliamentarianismand multi-party de- mocracy,the struggle against liberalism and Marxism, demonization of interest and proclamation of acommunity of interest between capital and labour,which has to be defended against the allegedlydestructive forces of an abstraction identifiedasJewish. In their advocacy of sacrifice, their death cult and their antisemitism,texts such as Industry of Death,issued by the Brotherhood’sfounder Hassan al- Banna in 1938, or Sayyid Qutb’s1950 tract, OurStruggle withthe Jews,recall Naz- ism, despite their Islamic orientation. Andthese wereand are not the pamphlets of isolated cranks but have been and are still being disseminated in millions of copies in some Islamic countries.Before the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Sayyid Qutb’swritingsweretranslated into Farsi by Iran’scurrent Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and continue to form one of the central ideological reference points of the Iranian Islamists.⁴ Just like the Nazis, even if less successfully, the Sunni jihadists and Iranian Islamists are concerned not onlywith the enlistment of apeople for the purposes of exploitation and domination but with the formationofasociety of martyrs, in which individuals sacrifice themselvesfor the umma,the community of all Mus- lims. Despite all the real and significant differences in historic context,legitimat- ing references,economic and political structures and military capability,the hate objects of the Islamic Jihadists resemble those of Nazism:communism and materialism, liberalism and Western “plutocracy,” individualism, emancipa- tion, and Zionism. After 1946,Hassan al-Banna showered praise on Aminel-Husseini, the rab- idlyantisemitic Mufti of Jerusalem,who had collaborated with the Nazis and resided in Berlin after 1941. He managed to evade prosecution by the Allies after the Second World Warbyfleeing to Cairo, where, in 1946,al-Banna, todaystill arevered figure, declared of him: See Y. Ünal, “Sayyid Qutb in Iran: Translatingthe Islamist Ideologueinthe Islamic Republic,” Journal of Islamic and Muslim Studies 1, no. 2(2016): 35–60. Antisemitic Anti-Zionism: Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and Hezbollah 151 What ahero, what amiracle of aman […]who defied an empire with the help of Hitler and Germanyand foughtagainst Zionism. Germanyand Hitler arenomore, but Amin Al-Hus- seini will pursue the struggle.⁵ Recently, the German-Egyptian writerHamed Abdel-Samad has brought the term “Islamic fascism” back into the discussion,⁶ emphasizing the links between Is- lamismingeneral and the Muslim Brotherhood in particularwith fascismand Nazism, albeit on the basisofadubious religious exegesisrather than an ideo- logical-critical understanding of antisemitisminwhich modern Islamic Jew-ha- tred is decoded as aprojective repudiation of anew,ambivalent and potentially emancipatory form of society:asaform of modern anti-modernism.Moreover, the specific qualityofthe Islamic antisemitism characteristic of the Brotherhood and Iranian regime needs to be emphasized, since “onlyhere do we find the de- grading anti-Judaism of earlyIslam fused with modern conspiracy-theorizing an- tisemitism.”⁷ Today, use of the term Islamic fascismexcites kneejerk reactions,particular- ly in parts of the Left.However,itisvirtuallyunavoidable when it comestodeal- ing with authoritarian antisemitic massmovementswith aleader cult and mar- tyrdom ideology, that wagepermanent campaigns against groups deemed threatening to the unity of the umma,use unrestrained brute forceagainst polit- ical opponents, and advocate a “third way” between capitalism and socialism, East and West. Amore serious question is whether the fixationonthe term fascism does not tend to underplaythe antisemitic dimension, since the centrality of antisemitism in all variants of the Islamist discourse make it far closer to Nazism, despite all the differences in other spheres,than to classical fascismofthe Italian variety. This centralityisespeciallyclear in the case of the Islamist ideologyofthe re- gime that has ruled Iran since 1979 and its allies such as Hezbollah, which todaypresent one of the main threats to Israel. The Government of the Gangs and Antisemitism Three main pointsneed to be addressed in relation to the Iranian regime’san- tisemitism: firstly, the traditional Jew-hatred that is especiallyapparent in, but J. Herf, “Hitlers Dschihad. Nationalsozialistische Rundfunkpropaganda für Nordafrikaund den Nahen Osten,” Vierteljahrshefte fürZeitgeschichte 58, no. 2(2010): 285. H. Abdel-Samad, Der islamischeFaschismus: Eine Analyse (Munich: Droemer,2014). Küntzel, Nazis und der Nahe Osten,34. 152 Stephan Grigat not confined to its founder, Khomeini, who is still revered by the regime’ssup- porters;secondly, the denial and relativization of the Holocaust; thirdly, the ex- plicit threats to destroy Israel and the regional policiesthat resultfrom it.While all these aspects are present at all stages of the history of the Islamic Republic, at certain times particularones have come to the forefront. Explicit Jew-hatredisespeciallymarkedinKhomeini’spre-revolutionary writings, but even after 1979 it continuallybreaks through and todaydetermines, alongside traditionalIslamic laws, discriminatory practices against Iran’sJewish minority. Verbalattacks on Israel and the support for anti-Israelterrorist groups have been aconstant feature of the Iranian regime’sideologyand practice and have been voiced and translated into action since 1979 by all factions of the re- gime. Hatred of the Jewish state is one of the coreelements of the Islamist ideol- ogyand is by no meansonlya“means to an end.”⁸ The heydayofHolocaust de- nial came duringthe presidency of Ahmadinejad, who placed it at the centre of his policy and rhetoric, but both his predecessors, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammed Khatami, werealso Holocaust deniers, as is the current Supreme Leader,Ali Khamenei. Since 2013,the current president and his foreign minister, MohammadJavad Zarif, have toned down the Holocaust denial somewhat,but even under Hassan Rouhani, Iranian official bodies have been involved in Hol- ocaust denial events. The relativization of Nazi crimes has been promoted by the Rouhani admin- istration itself—an example being Zarif’sstatement that, “we condemn the Nazis’ massacre of the Jews. And we also condemn the massacresofPalestinians committed by the Zionists.”⁹ Herehenot onlydowngrades
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