Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia The Case of the Eastern Flood Canal, Jakarta, Indonesia

Imelda Rinawaty Simanjuntak Master of Science Program: Engineering and Policy Analysis

Master Thesis Report

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia The Case of the Eastern Flood Canal, Jakarta, Indonesia

Imelda Rinawaty Simanjuntak (St.Nr.1388150)

Graduation Committee: Pr. Sybe Schaap, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Policy Analysis Section, TU Delft, (Committee Chair) Dr. ir. Bert Enserink, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management Policy Analysis Section, TU Delft, (First Supervisor) Dr.Wim Ravesteijn, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management Technology Dynamics & Sustainable Development Section, TU Delft Ir. Niki Frantzeskaki, Faculty of Social Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam & Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, TU Delft

Delft University of Technology Faculty of Technology, Policy Analysis & Management Master of Science Program: Engineering and Policy Analysis August 2010

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Preface

In the period from February up to August 2010 I did my thesis project as part of my master study of the Engineering and Policy Analysis, Master of Science Program at Delft University of Technology. This report is my master thesis project.

This thesis would not have been possible without the support of many people. I would like to take the opportunity here to thank the people who have given me encouragement, advice and support and I would like to mention a few names in particular.

I want to thank the members of my graduation committee, Sybe Schaap, Bert Enserink, Wim Ravesteijn, Niki Frantzeskaki for assisting me to structure my thought and giving me valuable feedback.

I wish to express my gratitude to all interviewees for their time and information, especially Pitoyo Subandrio and Jimmy Pardede for their help during my visit to Jakarta . Special thanks to Wini and Andri for all discussions that brought many ideas and enlightenment to my thesis.

I am most grateful to my beloved family and my parents, who have been there all those years with their pray and motivations. To my husband, no word can describe my thankful for your endless love and faith for me. Lastly, I would like to dedicate this study to my beautiful baby, Noa, my strength and my inspiration.

Imelda Rinawaty Simanjuntak August 2010

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Executive Summary The adequate flood control infrastructure in Jakarta is important due to its position in low delta areas. However, even though flood control infrastructure programs in Jakarta have been on the agenda since 1970, most of them have never been implemented due to the political and public resistance. One of the flood control infrastructure programs which its implementation had been delayed for more than 30 years was Eastern Flood Canal. This situation implies the flood problem is still a nightmare to Jakarta until today.

Given the aforementioned explanation, this research intends to (i) identify the causes of delay and opposition regarding to the Eastern Flood Canal policy making process and (ii) recommend potential strategy to alleviate the causes of the delay and opposition .

Based on our research, we found that the decisive causes of the delay and opposition regarding the policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal are: (i) the limited involvement and support of the critical authorities during the policy making process. This factor leads to the unavailability of resources and legitimacy of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation. (ii) The decision was taken without consulting the stakeholders that were affected by the Eastern Flood canal implementation. This factor leads to the blocking reactions from the stakeholder during the implementation.

Considering the aforementioned findings, we recommend that the decision should be made after critical authorities commit and agree to bring their resources forward. The agreement should stipulated legally and declare to public to assure its accountability. Proposing multi added value of flood control infrastructure implementation such as the economic and social benefit can attract the critical actors to involve in policy process. Secondly, the stakeholder involvement outside the boundary of government and listen to their voice during the flood control policy making process should be started to practice in Jakarta to reduce the high opposition during the implementation.

The role of the policy entrepreneur (e.g. in this case is Jakarta government) to seize the windows of opportunity is also found as an important factor when gaining support from political parties to implement the Eastern Flood Canal in 2003 (as shown in figure below).

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Figure 1 Stream Model of Eastern Flood Canal

Considering this finding, we recommend to the policy entrepreneur that it is important to have a perceptive eye to sudden event (e.g. aftermaths, political changes, etc) that could create the opportunity to gain the support of the political parties for the realization of a certain policy. However, gaining only the support of the political parties without considering the rationality of the policy and conducting good assessment of the policy could lead to the implementation failure. Therefore, it is very important to carry out actual and detailed impact assessment of the flood control infrastructure policy (e.g. the institutional arrangements for the implementation, social impact, economic impact, environmental impact, benefit of the project implementation, , etc) at the design stage (so as to avoid or at least, eliminate as much as possible the implementation failure).

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Table of Content

Preface...... i Executive Summary...... ii Table of Content ...... iv List of Tables ...... vi List of Figures...... vi Part A: Problem description and Background Knowledge ...... i Chapter 1. Introduction...... 1 1.1 Problem Description ...... 1 1.2 Research Objective ...... 3 1.3 Social and scientific relevance...... 3 1.4 Structure of the thesis...... 4 Chapter 2. The research methodology ...... 6 2.1 Introduction...... 6 2.2 Research Question ...... 6 2.3 Research Framework ...... 6 2.4 Conceptual Framework...... 7 2.6 Data gathering method...... 9 2.7 Data processing method...... 11 2.8 Conclusion ...... 12 Chapter 3. Eastern Flood Canal ...... 14 3.1 Introduction...... 14 3.2 Physical Characteristic of Eastern Flood Canals ...... 14 3.3 General Geographical Profile of the Eastern Flood Canal...... 16 Chapter 4. Public administration changes in Indonesia and water sector in Jakarta ...19 4.1 Introduction...... 19 4.2 Institutional structure of Indonesia and water sector of Jakarta ...... 20 4.2.1 Deconcentrated government prior to the year 2000...... 20 4.2.2 Decentralization, the establishment Law no 22/1999...... 21 4.3 The administrative changes concerning the water sector in Jakarta...... 22 4.3.1 Master Plans Development of the Eastern Flood Canal ...... 22 4.3.2 Water management Institutions and Roles in Jakarta before and after decentralization...... 25 4.4 Analyzing the positions of the actors...... 29 4.5 Conclusion ...... 35 Chapter 5. The Round Model of the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal (study period: 1973 – 2003)...... 37

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5.1 Introduction...... 37 5.2 Source of Information...... 37 5.3 Policy Making Process Round...... 38 5.4. Overview of the policy process rounds of Eastern Flood Canal...... 39 5.4.1 Decision Rounds during the centralization period (prior to 1999) ...... 40 5.4.1.1 First Round (1970s) ...... 40 5.4.1.2 Second Round (1979 -1980s)...... 43 5.4.1.3 Third Round (1989 – 1991) ...... 44 5.4.1.4 Fourth Round (1991-1993) ...... 46 5.4.1.5 Fifth Round (1996) ...... 48 5.4.1.6 Sixth Round (1997)...... 49 5.4.2 Decision rounds after decentralization...... 51 5.4.2.1 Seventh Round (1999) ...... 51 5.4.2.2 Eighth Round (1999)...... 51 5.4.2.3 Ninth Round (1999) ...... 52 5.4.2.4 Tenth Round (2002)...... 53 5.5 Analysis of the policy process rounds of the Eastern Flood Canal...... 55 5.6 Analysis of decision process of the Eastern Flood Canal using the Stream model...... 61 5.7 Conclusion of Chapter 5 ...... 67 Part C: Conclusion and Recommendation ...... 20 Chapter 7 Concluding Remarks...... 75 7.1 Introduction...... 75 7.2. Main findings...... 76 Chapter 8 Reflection ...... 83 8.1. Reflect to the research...... 83 8.2 Reflect to the models used...... 84 8.3 Recommendation for Future Research...... 84 References...... 86 Part D: Appendix ...... 89

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List of Tables

Table 1 Description of Areas of the Eastern Flood Canal ...... 17 Table 2 Percentage of Land Use by Villages in the area of the Eastern Flood Canal 2001...... 17 Table 3 Master Plan Development of the Eastern Flood Canal...... 23 Table 4 The Actor Analysis prior to the decentralization...... 30 Table 5 Classification of interdependencies between the actors related to the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal, Jakarta, Indonesia prior to the decentralization...... 31 Table 6 The Actor Analysis after the decentralization ...... 33 Table 7 Classification of interdepencies between the actors related to the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal, Jakarta, Indonesia after the decentralization...... 34 Table 8 Overview table for classification of interdependencies during centralization period ...... 77 Table 9 Overview table for classification of interdependencies after decentralization ...... 77

List of Figures

Figure 1 Stream Model of Eastern Flood Canal ...... iii Figure 2 Research Framework...... 7 Figure 3 Conceptual Framework to analyze the delay of the Eastern Flood Canal Implementation ...... 7 Figure 4 Debit of Eastern Flood Canal, (PT Virama Karya and Associates, 2003) ....16 Figure 5 Macro Context of Eastern Flood Canal Policy Process...... 25 Figure 6 Administrative Bodies of Flood Control Management of Jakarta (Source: Adapted from Master Plan, JICA 1997) ...... 27 Figure 7 Administrative bodies of water sector after decentralization...... 29 Figure 8 Two distinct phase in the macro context of the Eastern Flood Canal policy making process...... 38 Figure 9 Overview of the different rounds that comprise the policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal, Jakarta, Indonesia...... 39 Figure 10 Implementation Round of the Eastern Flood Canal ...... 40 Figure 11 The Stream Model of the Eastern Flood Canal, Jakarta, Indonesia ...... 63 Figure 12 Two distinct phase of the Eastern Flood Canal Policy Making Process .....76

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Part A: Problem description and Background Knowledge

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Problem Description Jakarta is a city which is located in low delta areas and it suffers to flood attacks annually. Of the 65 000 ha area of Jakarta, about half is situated at flood plain(s). According to the current data of the Jakarta Public Works Agency, there are about 78 areas of Jakarta that are prone to flooding (www.pu.go.id ).

Flood problem is still a nightmare to Jakarta until today. In fact, the magnitudes of floods are amplifying on the last decade (e.g. flood events on 1996, 2002 and 2007) and the impacts have been affecting widespread areas and inducing huge economic and social damages to the city ( NEDECO 2002, Bappenas 2007 ). Given this situation, the flood control management is required to protect Jakarta from flooding in the future.

According to prior studies, one factor contributing to the worsening of the floods in Jakarta is inadequate flood control infrastructures ( Steinberg, 2007 ). Flood control infrastructure programs have been on the government agenda since 1970. However, most of them have never been implemented due to the political and public resistance. One of the flood control infrastructure programs which its implementation had been delayed for more than 30 years was the Eastern Flood Canal.

The Eastern Flood Canal project plan was first presented in the Master Plan of Drainage System and Flood Control for Jakarta in 1973. The Master Plan 1973 was constructed by Ministry of Public Works collaborated with the Dutch Government. Even though the Eastern Flood Canal design was finished on 1973 and its construction planned to be completed before 1980s ( NEDECO, 1973 ), in fact the implementation of the project was just realized on 2003.

Many contradictive opinions appear regarding the delay of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation. Through media, government claimed that the difficulty on land acquisition process was the factor holding up the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal. On the other hand, some of research documents charged that the Jakarta’s government has a significant role to the delay of the canal implementation ( Caljouw, et.al 2004, Steinberg, 2007 ). According to Caljouw, et. al (2004) the budget allocation which was not used to its purpose was the factor contributing to the not implementing the Eastern Flood Canal in the past. Steinberg (2007) claimed that the delay of

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Eastern Flood Canal implementation was due to the difficulty in attracting investors that leaded to the inadequate budget for its implementation.

The first assumption of our research is that the delay of the Eastern Flood Canal is beyond the budget limitation. In fact, many infrastructure projects in Indonesia which required high budget were implemented on the past. Therefore, according to us, it is important to find the decisive causes of why the Eastern Flood Canal policy making process was confronted with lengthy time.

Give the aforementioned explanation, the research intends to give an answer to the following research question: What are the decisive causes of the delays and opposition faced by the Jakarta’s city government regarding the Eastern Flood Canal implementation?

There are three reasons why we choose the Eastern Flood Canal as the case study: (i) The implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal has been delayed for more than 30 years and the Provincial Government wants to learn the root causes of the implementation delay from this case (ii) Issues such as lack of budget have been indicated in prior studies, none of them put attention to evaluate the decisive causes of those issues, (iii) The Eastern Flood Canal was finally implemented on 2003, and according to us it is important to investigate why finally the Eastern Flood Canal was considered as appropriate solution where in the past it was less considered.

The causes of delay and opposition are searched in two areas: (i) the transition of institutional structure in Indonesia from centralization to decentralization, and (ii) the way of that decision making process of the Eastern Flood Canal was conducted. The evaluation of the institutional structure and its changes and the policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal will indicate the issues that cause the delay and oppositions.

In addition to that, the research will also give an analysis of the reasons behind the Eastern Flood Canal got attention from government in 2002 and considered as an appropriate solution for dealing with the flooding problems in Jakarta. Understanding why the Eastern Flood Canal was eventually implemented might help us to find a strategy on how to gain supports for the realization of flood control infrastructure project in the future.

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

1.2 Research Objective The research objective is the evaluation of the Eastern Flood Canal policy making process. The research outcomes include: (i) the identification of the decisive causes of delay and opposition regarding the Eastern Flood Canal implementation, (ii) the reason behind why the Eastern Flood Canal got attention from the government in 2002 and considered as appropriate solution for dealing with the flooding problems in Jakarta and (iii) the recommendation the potential strategy to alleviate the causes so as to improve the flood defense policy implementation process in Jakarta in the future.

1.3 Social and scientific relevance Flood control management is very important function especially for Jakarta that is located in low lying delta. Flooding always poses negative impacts not only to the economy of the region but also to human life. Additionally, due to climate change and to uncontrolled human activities, extreme flooding becomes unpredictable while flood control infrastructure in Jakarta is obviously still far from adequate.

The need for flood infrastructure expansion in the future is still considered important by the government so as to reduce and mitigate the impacts of flooding in the future. Some of flood control infrastructure programs were even unimplemented yet until today due to political and public resistance.

The resistances cause a long delay of the implementation of the project related to flood control infrastructure. The delay bears a fact that impact of floods becomes worsen every year because the solution is often one behind step from the problem. Therefore, it is very important to minimize the resistances and the long delay of the flood control policy making process so as to mitigate the impact of the worsening floods in Jakarta in the future.

From a scientific point of view it is interesting to find the decisive causes of the failure and delay when implementing flood defense policy in Jakarta. Even though some of prior studies have introduced that the lack of budget was factor impeding the Eastern Flood Canal Implementation but none of the research put attention to find the decisive causes of this budget issue. This research intends to give the answer for the issue.

By having more research on policy making processes especially in facing public and political resistance combined with involving stakeholder, the research findings may aid the Jakarta’s government to learn from the

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia successes and the mistakes that have been already made and to improve the policy making process of the flood control infrastructure in the future.

1.4 Structure of the thesis In order to present the chapters of this report in a concise way, the chapters of thesis are divided to three main parts:

Part A consists of three chapters (Chapter 1, 2 and 3) includes the introductory chapter of the thesis, research methodology and background information related to Eastern Flood Canal. More particularly, Chapter 1 includes the problem description, research objective and research questions. Chapter 2 presents the research methodology (data collection and data processing method) and the theoretical background used. In chapter 3 the general information of the Eastern Flood Canal characteristic like the physical characteristic, its functions and locations and problems are given.

Part B consists of three chapters (Chapter 4, 5 and 6) presents the answers to the three research sub-questions. More particularly, chapter 4 present the evaluation and answers to the first research sub-question “How does the institutional structure can changes influence the policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal?” Chapter 5 presents the evaluation and answers to the second research sub-question “How does the policy making process concerning Eastern Flood Canal affect its implementation?”. Chapter 6 presents the evaluation outcomes and answers to the third sub question “What are the potential strategies to alleviate the causes of the delay and opposition regarding flood defense policy implementation in Jakarta?”

Part C concludes the research by presenting the concluding remarks – given in Chapter 7 and the reflection on the research given in Chapter 8. More particularly, chapter seven includes conclusions and recommendations for Local Jakarta Government to improve the success of flood defense implementation and chapter eight reflects on the choices that are made during the research as well as outlines issues for future investigation.

The fourth part of the thesis ( part D ) consists of the Appendices that complement the developed chapters not only with backing information but also present the designed observation approach. Appendix A provides detailed information on the Design Methodology developed for conducting the interviews. The different types of questionnaires designed are found in Appendix A. Appendix B includes the interview reports, and the respective

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia derivation of information that backs the observation discussions of Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Appendix C presents the brief description of the content of Each Master Plans concerning Flood Control and Drainage System in Jakarta.

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Chapter 2. The research methodology

2.1 Introduction The goal of this chapter is to outline the research space and the research methodology that is used to conduct the research study. Following the explanatory trace of the second chapter, the key research question and its sub- questions are given in section 2.2. Te research framework to answer the research question and sub questions is presented in section 2.3.

The conceptual framework to identify factors which may be associated with the delay of Eastern Flood Canal policy making process in Jakarta is presented in section 2.4. On the next section (section 2.5) the methodology to collect the data is given. The data collection method is combination of desk research and semi structured interview. The Actor Analysis, the Round model and the Stream model are the approaches to process the data in this research. The general description about the Actor analysis, Round model and Stream model are presented in section 2.6. The last part of the chapter is the conclusion (section 2.8).

2.2 Research Question The flood defense history in Jakarta emphasizes the fact that most of the flood control programs in Jakarta have not been implemented successfully. One of the programs that had been delayed for more than 30 years was the Eastern Flood Canal. The local government of Jakarta wants to learn from the Eastern Flood Canal experience and more specifically it is interested in the causes of the delay and opposition, aiming at improving the process the flood defense policy making process in the future. The main research question of the present thesis is “ What are the causes of the delays and opposition faced by Jakarta regarding the Eastern Flood Canal implementation?”

The research question has the following sub questions: 1. How does the institutional structure and change affect the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal? 2. How does policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal affected its implementation? 3. What are the potential strategies to alleviate the causes of the delay and opposition regarding flood defense policy implementation?

2.3 Research Framework In order to answer the research questions, the following research framework will be used: 6`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Figure 2 Research Framework

2.4 Conceptual Framework For the research question to be answered, a framework has been developed that identify factors which may be associated with the delay of the Eastern Flood Canal policy implementation in Jakarta. These factors and their hypothesized relationship with the implementation delay of the Eastern Flood Canal are derived from legal documents about the Eastern Flood Canal, public policy making and institutional analysis literature relating to public administration, water or other natural resource management.

Figure 3 Conceptual Framework to analyze the delay of the Eastern Flood Canal Implementation

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Eastern Flood Canal is a complex system which its realization depends on multi-actor support. We start with an assumption that the long delay of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation may be derived from the lack of support from the critical actors during the decision making process. Therefore, our analysis is started with identifying the actors affected by the Eastern Flood Canal implementation.

To identify and mapping out the position of actors, we first need to understand the institutional structure of public administration generally and water sector of Jakarta particularly. Therefore, as shown in Figure 2, to answer the main research question the first aspect that is going to be investigated is related to the institutional structure and transition of public administration and water sector of Jakarta

As stated in the introductory chapter, the design process of the Eastern Flood Canal lasted for more than 30 years and the Eastern Flood Canal was finally implemented in 2003. At some stage in the process of the Eastern Flood Canal design, the transition from centralization to decentralization of administration system in Indonesia took place in 1999. This transition brought changes in the styles and structure of public administrative system in Indonesia generally, and in the water sector in particularly ( SMERU 2001, Bhat. , et. al 2005, Bhat. and Molinga, 2009 ).

The centralization structure on the past and the institutional transition from centralization to decentralization will inevitably bring changes of the position or power of several actors affected by the (implementation of the) Eastern Flood Canal project. Understanding these aspects will help us to identify the critical actors and indicate their behavior during the policy making process. It is important to investigate actor’s attributes (such as resources and behavior) because without their support the realization of a certain policy will be impossible.

The second aspect that is going to investigate in this thesis research is the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal. After we indicate the behaviour and perception of actors based on their position, then we will affirm our indications by thoroughly looking the policy process of Eastern Flood Canal. To ease us in observing and analyzing the way of the policy process conducted, we need to structure the policy process from 1973-2003.

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The round model ( Teisman, 2000, Enserink. B, et. al 2009 ) is used to structure the policy processes. By structuring the policy process in round, we can observe why series of rounds were never continued to the implementation stages. We will affirm our findings about the actors’ position due to institutional structure and its changes whether or not have influence on the duration of the policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal.

In addition to first and second aspect, the issue about why after a long time the Eastern Flood Canal finally got attention by the Government as an appropriate solution to control flood in the eastern part of Jakarta is investigated. As introduced in Chapter 1, the Eastern Flood Canal after a long delay was finally implemented on 2003 by Central government and Jakarta government. This aspect is investigated using the stream model ( Kingdon 1982 ). Understanding this aspect will help us to indicate a strategy for gaining support for the realization of the flood control infrastructure in the future.

2.6 Data gathering method In order to find the causes of delay and blockade of the eastern canal policy implementation process, the interview will be conducted with authority officials and other stakeholders include NGOs and citizens who are living surrounding canal. The interviews were held during a one month long visit in Jakarta, Indonesia.

The semi-structured interviews to authority officials and other stakeholders were conducted with a focus on understanding the formal institutional structure and interactions at district, local and national levels that affect the implementation process of the Eastern Flood Canal and the performance of the Eastern Flood Canal, matters that were closely within the knowledge of the interviewees. The in depth interviews to citizens were conducted to get more insight and to understand the causes (and motivation) of their opposition.

The semi-structured interview is chosen as a method because it is flexible; it allows new questions to be brought up during the interview as a result of what the interviewee says . The interviewees include: • Representatives of Public Work Department, Directorate of General Water Resources Management • BBWSCC (Balai Besar Wilayah Sungai Ciliwung Cisadane) • Public Work Agency (Provincial Level)

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

• Representative from East Jakarta Municipality • Representative from North Jakarta Municipality • 5 citizens • 2 NGO • Representative Land Committee • Representative from Public Relation committee of Eastern Flood Canal Public • Representative from Land Affairs (East Jakarta Municipality) • Representative from land Affairs (North Jakarta Municipality) • 2 representative from Villages officials

A desk research about the history of the Eastern Flood Canal and the institutional development in Indonesia regarding water management prepared a background paper on the Eastern Flood Canal prior to the visit (field research) in Jakarta, Indonesia. The materials reviewed during the desk research were journal and scientific papers and some legal documents of Jakarta’s government (e.g. Master Plans) that provided information about the process of the policy design and implementation.

Some legal documents of government (unpublished) concerning flood control management in Jakarta that are used as key references in this master thesis are: • NEDECO, 1973, ‘Master Plan for Drainage and Flood Control’ • JICA, 1991 ‘The Study on Urban Drainage and Wastewater Disposal Project in the City of Jakarta – Master Plan Study’; • JFCAM, 1996, ‘Jakarta Flood Control Advisory Mission by NEDECO’ • JICA, 1997, ‘Study on Comprehensive Water Management Plan in Jabotabek’; • JICA, 1997a, ‘Detailed Design for Urban Drainage Project in the City of Jakarta’; • Nedeco, 2002, ‘Quick Reconnaissance Study, Flood Jakarta 2002’ • Bappeda 2003, ‘Penyusunan Rencana Kawasan Banjir Kanal Timur’ • WJEMP 2002, Drainage Management for Jakarta, Strategic Action Program Development (DKI 3-9) • JFM 2007, ‘Dutch assistance with non-structural measures Jakarta Flood Management” • Momerandum of Understanding (Nota Kesepakatan) 2002, Menteri Pemukiman dan Prasana Wilayah dengan Gubernur DKI Jakarta

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

The findings from the desk research are further verified and revised by the field research that includes the interviews of stakeholders. The following analysis of the Eastern Flood Canal case is therefore based on combination of sources, documentary materials on Indonesia and the Eastern Flood Canal and the interviews conducted during the site visit. The findings therefore emerge from a composite of data collected (desk research and interview) and analysis result.

2.7 Data processing method An Actor analysis, the Round model and the Stream model are used as methods to process the data in this thesis. Brief information about the three methods are given in this section.

Actor Analysis To categorize the critical actors concerning the Eastern Flood Canal implementation, we need to identify the resources and interest of each actors affecting by the realization of Eastern Flood Canal. We find that the actor analysis (Enserink, et. al, 2009 ) is a compatible method for this step. Actor analysis is a tool that can help us to list important actors related to certain problems and to map out the dependency between those actors.

The Round Model The round model is applied because we assume that during the policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal, interaction between different actors should took place; given that the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal depends on the cooperation of multiple actors. Since we want to be more focus on the influence of actors’ interaction in the series policy making process, we found that the round model is the compatible method. The round model assumes that several actors introduce combination of problems and solutions, and create progress through interaction ( Teisman 2000 ).

By structuring the policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal in round, we can observe whether or not in each round the critical actors are involved, and how the behaviours and actions of actors involved influence the result of each round.

According to round model, each round has a starting and concluding point. The starting point could be initiated by one or several actors who intend to adopt a certain combination of a problem definition and solution. The round could be finalized by several conditions such as when the key or powerful actors decided not to join the coalitions, when the negotiating parties reach an 11`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia agreement, or due to the establishment of a new agenda driving the focus of the negotiations to another point intentionally ( Frantzeskaki. N, 2005 ).

The Stream Model As we also stated, the decision to implement the Eastern Flood Canal was finally taken in 2002 after 30 years delay. Given this event, we consider that it is important to analyze why after a long delay the Eastern Flood Canal was consider as the appropriate solution. We assume that that the role of a window of opportunity such as problem and political window might play an important role to the realization of the Eastern Flood Canal. We consider that the Stream Model (Kingdom, 1982) is an appropriate method; since Kingdon l stated that the confluence of three streams (problem, political and policy window) is the precondition for getting a matter on the agenda.

Kingdon (1982) identified three streams: problems, solutions and political events. According to Kingdon, issues get on the agenda when “a problem is recognized, a solution is available, and the political climate makes the time right to change. The confluence of these streams at critical junctures or “policy windows” which are open only for a short time when condition are right, is the precondition for getting a matter on the agenda ( Mucciaroni, 1992 ).

Kingdon describes two categories of policy windows; problem windows and political window. The problem window stem from problems that arise exogenously to the political stream and demand a policy response. The latter occur due to political events: changes of government, shifts in the "national mood," and the rise and fall of political fortunes ( Lipson, 2004 ).

However, open policy windows do not automatically bring to policy change. There must be deliberate efforts to seize the opportunity and push the problem onto the agenda before condition change. This is done by policy entrepreneurs. "Policy entrepreneurs" play a critical role in "coupling" problems and solutions during such windows of opportunity ( Mucciaroni, 1992 ).

2.8 Conclusion In this chapter, the research questions including three sub research questions were presented. To answer the research and sub research questions the conceptual framework is constructed as shown in figure 2. There are two aspects as the focus of this thesis research to answer the research questions. They are the transition of public administration in water sector in Jakarta

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia from centralization to decentralization and the policy making processes of the Eastern Flood Canals.

We assumed that the long delay of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation is related to the actors’ influence and behaviour during the policy making process. The actors’ influence and behaviour depends on their position in network. The position of actors is indicated from the institutional structure of the public administration and water sector in Jakarta.

The Round Model and the Stream model is used as data processing approach to structure the policy making processes of the Eastern Flood Canal. The methodology including data collection and data processing approaches is presented.

The method using to collect the data is semi-structured interview by performing interview to several stakeholders both from government officer and citizens. In the next chapter (chapter 3), the general information about Eastern Flood Canal will be presented. Then, the following chapter, the first sub questions will be answered. The first sub question research is deal with the transition from centralized form to decentralized form and how it affects the decision making process of Eastern Flood canal.

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Chapter 3. Eastern Flood Canal

3.1 Introduction The goal of the chapter 3 is to give more detail description of the Eastern Flood Canal in term of goals, the physical characteristic and the geographical profile of the Eastern flood Canal.

The chapter consists of two sections. In section 6.2 the technical design of the Eastern Flood Canal is presented consisting of the general physical characteristic, the geographical and general description of the regions of the Eastern Flood Canal.

3.2 Physical Characteristic of Eastern Flood Canals The design of the canal was revised by PT Virayama and Association in 2003. The study and revision of the Eastern Flood Canal Design was done based on the following considerations: 1. Differences in field conditions since the Detailed Design Study conducted in 1989; 2. The request of the people in order to make the Eastern Flood Canal has multi function purpose like building flood control, river transportation facilities, water supply, infrastructure and location of recreational facility and harbors facility in the Cakung region.

The following are the design alternatives of the Eastern Flood canal 1. Alternative 1 – Eastern Flood Canal can be used for transportation of cargo ships from the mouth to the inlet Cipinang River throughout the year. 2. Alternative 2 – Eastern Flood Canal can be used to transport passengers from the estuary to inlet Cipinang River throughout year 3. Alternative 3 – Eastern Flood Canal can be used for transportation of cargo ships from the estuary up to the second weir and to transport passengers from Weir 2 up to the inlet Cipinang River, according to the season. Based on the minimum impact on the environment, Alternative 3 was chosen to be followed up to the Detailed Design.

Based on the new design, the Eastern Flood Canal with length of 23.575 m will function to receive run off from Cipinang River, Sunter River, Buaran River, Jati Kramat River and Cakung River and then divert the water to the sea. The canal will have a width between 100 – 300 m and along the canal there will be 18 m space outward as dry trace on the left and right hand side. 14`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

The canal can mitigate 13 inundated or flooded risk areas in the East and North Jakarta with the total of protected area to reach 16.500 ha. The canal with an approximately debit from 100 – 390 m/det 3 can withstand periodical flood every one hundred years (Q 100 ).

According to the new design, in addition to its main function to reduce flooding in 13 areas including protect the residential, industrial and warehousing in the East and North of Jakarta, the canal also serve as a water transportation facility, water conservation for the filling of land, sources of raw water, port, recreation, and is integrated with the overall development plan of DKI Jakarta.

The length of the East Flood Canal Marunda Beach, North Jakarta until sub Cipinang Besar Selatan, Jakarta Timur approximately 23 575 km and the length of the East Flood Canal in North Jakarta municipality from the Coastal Marunda until Rorotan bordering villages in North Jakarta and East Jakarta approximately 6.6 km. The width of east flood canal from Marunda village to Marunda Beach along 900 meters is 200 meters. Then the width of the canal to the south is approximately 100 meters.

Based on the Review design of Eastern Flood Canal by PT Virayama, the trace of the Eastern Flood Canal encompasses three types of cross-section, namely: • First (Weir I), a cross-section of the trace 18-100-18 meters, along 22.375 meters which will function as flood control. The first cross section will pass through the regions of Cipinang Village to East Cakung Village and Rorotan Village to Marunda Village. The width of the canal is 100 meters. • Second (Weir II), a cross-section of the trace 18-300-18 meters, will across East Cakung village along 350 meter. The second cross-section will function as recreation facilities and Marina in addition to its main functions as flood control. • Third (Weir III), cross-section of the trace 18-200-18 meters, along 850 meters in Marunda Villages from the sea to the south. The width of the canal is 200 meters which will function as a port. Under normal circumstances, Weir I, II and III will function as regulator for the water surface, the use of channel as a means of river transportation as well as to prevent reduction ground water / sea water intrusion and sedimentation of the channel.

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Figure 4 Debit of Eastern Flood Canal, (PT Virama Karya and Associates, 2003)

The tropical moonsoon climate of the canal area comprises the rainy season from November to April and the dry season from May to October. The annual rainfall on the Eastern Flood Canal areas averages 910,6 – 3006,3 mm, with over 80 % occuring in the rainy season.

3.3 General Geographical Profile of the Eastern Flood Canal Geographically, the territory of the Eastern Flood Canal is located in Jakarta Region and it adjacent with Java Sea in the north side, Tangerang District, Banten Province in the West Side, Bekasi District, West Java Province in the East side and Bogor District, West Java Province in the South Side.

The Eastern Flood Canal cut across three sub districts (kecamatan) in East Jakarta municipality and one sub district (kecamatan) in North Jakarta municipality. The three sub districts in the East Jakarta namely Jatinegara, Duren Sawit and Cakung Sub district. There are 11 villages within the three sub district that are passed over by the canal. Whilst in the North Jakarta Municipality, the canal cuts through two villages namely Rorotan and Marunda village which are under administrative Cilincing sub district. More details of the sub district and villages can be seen in table III.1

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

The general description of the Regions/areas of the Eastern Flood Canal Based on decree of Governor DKI Jakarta No. 3504/2003 the construction of the East Canal trace will be started from Cipinang Rivers to the Java Sea and will across 11 Villages in East Jakarta and 2 Villages in North Jakarta.

Table 1 Description of Areas of the Eastern Flood Canal No Villages Length (m) Municipality 1 Cipinang Besar Selatan 770 East Jakarta 2 Cipinang Muara 758 East Jakarta 3 Pondok Bambu 2072 East Jakarta 4 Duren Sawit 1705 East Jakarta 5 Pondok Kelapa 193 East Jakarta 6 Malaka Jaya 433 East Jakarta 7 MAlaka Sari 717 East Jakarta 8 Pondok Kopi 1816 East Jakarta 9 Pulo Gebang 3137 East Jakarta 10 Ujung Menteng 2884 East Jakarta 11 Cakung Timur 2019 East Jakarta 12 Rorotan 3055 North Jakarta 13 Marunda 3615 North Jakarta Source: DKI Jakarta Provincial Government

Land required for the canal development is 405.28 hectares BKT consisting of 147.9 hectares in North Jakarta and 257.3 hectares in East Jakarta (Wawan, 2007) . On the last decade, the eastern and northern area of 15 400 hectares of DKI Jakarta has developed into industrial, warehousing, and settlements. Distribution of land use for residential, industrial, and other sub-villages in the region BKT can be seen in the following table.

Table 2 Percentage of Land Use by Villages in the area of the Eastern Flood Canal 2001 No Village Land Used (%) Settlement Industry Others 1 Cipinang Besar Selatan 64,99 2,50 32,51 2 Cipinang Muara 88,44 0,35 11,21 3 Pondok Bambu 87,21 0,00 12,79 4 Duren Sawit 77,56 0,00 22,44 5 Pondok Kelapa 67,81 1,20 30,99 6 Malaka Sari 94,20 0,00 5,80 7 Malaka Jaya 71,96 0,00 28,04 8 Pondok Kopi 79,17 0,10 20,73 9 Pulo Gebang 84,00 3,00 13,00

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

No Village Land Used (%) Settlement Industry Others 10 Cakung Timur 64,19 11,50 24,31 11 Ujung Menteng 20,47 18,79 60,74 12 Rorotan 41,45 4,69 53,86 13 Marunda 21,05 10,03 68,92 TOTAL 66.35 4.01 29.64 Source: BPS Kotamadya Jakarta Timur dan BPS Kotamadya Jakarta Utara.

East Jakarta is the largest municipality among the five municipalities in Jakarta with an area of 187.73 km 2. The construction of the canals in this area will cut across 11 villages (see table 2). The areas in the East Jakarta that will be acquired for the construction of the canal are 70 % dominated by the settlement areas.

North Jakarta is a city administration in the northern part of Province of DKI Jakarta. The north location which is directly adjacent to the Java Sea is the final location of BKT. The location will function as regulator of the water discharge of the Eastern Flood Canal trace. Unlike the East Jakarta, which consists of 11 villages that are by passed by the construction of the Eastern Flood Canal, North Jakarta, consists of only two villages (see table 2). North Jakarta, which is downstream from the trace of the canal, is dominated by agricultural activities with a small portion of settlements in the surrounding area.

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Part B: Analysis and Evaluation Outcome

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Chapter 4. Public administration changes in Indonesia and water sector in Jakarta

4.1 Introduction The policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal lasted 30 years. As shown in the conceptual framework (chapter 2), the first aspect that is going to be investigated for answering the research questions relates to the institutional changes in Indonesia and in the water sector in Jakarta specifically. A starting hypothesis concerns that the delay in the implementation may bear from the way institution operate in Indonesia and in the water sector in Jakarta.

In this chapter, we elaborate on the way of the institutional change influences policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal. The goal of the third chapter is to answer the first research sub question “ How does the institutional structure and its change from centralization to decentralization affect the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal? “.

By understanding the administration structure in Indonesia and in the water sector in Jakarta, we can define the position of several actors and their interrelationships in relation to Jakarta flood control management. Understanding their position in administration structure is very important so as to analyze how their positions may influence their perceptions and interest about the flood problem in Jakarta ( Enserink, 2009 ).

We expect that the institutional shift from centralization to decentralization changed the position of the some actor in administration structure and their power or resources as well. The institutional shift may also influence their behaviour and action during the policy making process. This aspect is considered to be one factor that influenced the duration of the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal.

The fourth chapter consists of five sections. In section 4.1 the goal of the chapter is presented. In Section 4.2, the institutional structures of Indonesia and Jakarta are presented. The management concerning flood management institutions and roles are presented in the next section (Section 4.3) including the task division and the responsibility between the Central government and the Regional government (Provincial and lower level) and the coordination between the institutions. In section 4.4 the analysis on how the institutional changes affect the policy making processes of the Eastern Flood Canal will be presented. At the end of the chapter, the conclusion is presented. Those 19`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia findings are synthesized from the literature study and from the findings of the interviews.

4.2 Institutional structure of Indonesia and water sector of Jakarta The policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal lasted for many years. It started from 1970s and finally implemented in 2003; after it went through several studies and perfections. Two distinct phases can be distinguished in the macro context of the Eastern Flood Canal policy processes.

First, the Eastern Flood Canal Master Plans were constructed during Soeharto’s regimes when the government practice in Indonesia was highly centralized and autocratic and the public infrastructure development funds were relied on external loans.

Second, the decision to implement the Eastern Flood Canal was taken by Indonesia’s government after the transition from centralization to decentralization took place in 1999. The institutional shift bears better democratic practice in Indonesia.

To better explain the changes that were realized after decentralization, the general structure of the institutions and the relationship between intergovernmental bodies are elaborated in the next section.

4.2.1 Deconcentrated government prior to the year 2000 During Soeharto’s order reign (1969-1998), Indonesia’s system of government was centralized and autocratic ( Usman, 2001 ). Under his authority, Soeharto consolidated powers at the center in all sectors ( Usman, 2001 ) including the water sector ( Bhat, et. al, 2005 ) and reduced or eliminated resisting regimes and elements in society.

The Regional government responsibilities were held in check through very clear submissive roles in the name of maintaining national unity. The Provinces and Districts government, established through Law No. 4/1974 . According to this law, the Central Government set policies and regulations, provinces undertook coordination and supervision duties as agents of the center, and districts were responsible for implementation (Ferrazzi, 2000 ).

The President had authority and strong power to determine the nature of regional autonomy. The government officials of Regional level (Provincial, Municipality or District) were appointed and elected directly by the President. The President also had authority to dismiss the Governor and 20`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Head of Municipality or District (Walikota or Bupati).

The government system of Indonesia during this time was characterized by closeness, military power and elimination of resisting regimes ( Dauvergne, 1993-1994 ). The freedom of press was very limited and highly controlled by the Government. The resistance from group of people or other actions that might harm the position or interest of the central government was usually eliminated through military power. The strong centralized government was maintained until the reform in 1998.

4.2.2 Decentralization, the establishment Law no 22/1999 Decentralization includes the changes that result in transfer of the responsibilities from the central government to the local level where citizens can readily participate in decision affecting them ( Jhonson and Minis, 1990 ).

Administrators in many developing countries are increasingly performing decentralization as a strategy for addressing a number of critical government needs such as strengthen government, increased transparency and accountability and more effective and efficient production and delivery of public goods and services including in water sector services. Water management, which was previously assumed to be best undertaken through centralization arrangements, has come to be associated with the concept of decentralization, of managing water at the “lowest appropriate level” ( Mody 2001, cited by Bhat et.al, 2005 ).

In Indonesia, the shift from centralization to decentralization was initiated after the fall of Soeharto’s regime in 1998. The institutional change was performed through the establishment of the Law No 22/1999 . The establishment of this law has changed the intergovernmental relation in Indonesia. It has been said that decentralization in Indonesia has moved from strong deconcentration practice to more devolved form ( Smoke, 2007, cited by Darmawan, 2008 ).

According to this Law, additional powers and responsibilities are being devolved to regional level (provincial and district and governments) establishing a far more decentralized institutional structure compared to the co-administrated systems of the past. The responsibilities of Regional level authorities (Provincials and Municipalities) covers all sectors include water and land sector. ( Usman, 2001, Bhat. A & Molinga. P. P, 2009) .

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

As autonomous regions, provinces have the authority to manage certain issues and tasks that cross inter-district and inter municipal administration and authorities that are not (or not yet) implemented by the districts and municipalities.

The administrative power of districts and municipalities cover all sectors of administrative authority other than those of the central government and the provinces. The sectors that districts and municipalities hold responsibility include public works and infrastructure planning, health, education and culture, agriculture, transportation, industry and trade, investment, environment, land affairs, cooperatives, and manpower ( Usman, 2001 ).

The institutional change is also characterized by a free election, freedom of the press and more transparent and democratic processes for policy making. The Governor, bupati (district head) and walikota (municipal head) which before have a role as the representative of the central government in regional level has the capacity for more local autonomy after decentralization reforms (Usman. S, 2001 ). Starting from 2004, the positions of the governor and the mayor are appointed by local citizens through direct election.

4.3 The administrative changes concerning the water sector in Jakarta The decentralization reforms brought about some changes concerning the water sector management in Jakarta. In this chapter the water sector management institutions and their roles are reviewed with a focus before and after decentralization.

First, the general processes of the development of the Eastern Flood Canal master plans are elaborated in section 4.3.1. The institutional roles and responsibilities as well as the inter-relationship between the different administration bodies concerning flood control management are presented in section 4.3.2.

4.3.1 Master Plans Development of the Eastern Flood Canal The policy processes of the Eastern Flood Canal can not be separated from the Master Plans development of Flood Control and Drainage system in Jakarta (see table 3). The idea of the Eastern Flood Canal construction came from the Dutch engineering Van der Beer on 1918. His idea was to control the water volume discharged on Jakarta through 13 rivers. The run off will be diverted through the left (Eastern Flood Canal) and the right side (Western Flood

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Canal) of the city into the sea.

After the Independence Day, the flood management in Jakarta has received attention by the central government due to Jakarta’s strategic importance as an economic and governance center. In 1965, the central government established the Commando project of Flood Control (‘Kopro Banjir”) which focused on infrastructure solution. The Kopro Banjir was managed by the central government and focused on infrastructure development and fully funded and implemented by the central government.

Given the vulnerability of flooding in Jakarta, flood prevention was given priority in the initial stage of the flood Control Master Plan development. In 1970s, the idea of Van der Beer was adopted by NEDECO that collaborated with Indonesia’s government and presented in the new Master Plan of flood control and drainage system for Jakarta. In the Master Plan I, the Eastern Flood Canal was recommended to protect the flooded area in the Eastern part of Jakarta. However, even though the Eastern Flood Canal’s design was finished in 1973, this recommended solution was not directly adopted by the Indonesia’s government.

After the development of flood control master plan, several studies were carried out until 2003 to formulate long term solutions for Jakarta flood control. Those studies were conducted by the central government in collaboration with several donor communities (the Netherlands and Japan).

The studies produced several perfections of previous master plan and new master plans (Master Plan II (1991), III (1997) and IV (2002)). In every master plan, the Eastern Flood Canal is always adopted as one alternative solution to control flooding in East Jakarta. During the development of the Master Plans, the design of the Eastern Flood Canal was gone through several revisions and perfections.

Table 3 Master Plan Development of the Eastern Flood Canal Year National Level Events East canal events Description 1965 Establishment of Jakarta Plan and construct of flood flood prevention Project infrastructure under authority of by the central Ministry of Public works government (“Kopro Banjir”) 1969-1998 General Suharto’s New Order Water resources and other Government in Power governmental functions consolidated to central government 1973 Master Plan I (Master Master Plan I is produced by the Plan of Flood Control Department of Public Works and

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Year National Level Events East canal events Description and Drainage System for Electricity (central) collaborated with Jakarta, NEDECO 1973) the Netherlands Engineering consultant NEDECO 1974 Water Law No. 11 According to this Law, the flood control infrastructure project was fully funded and implemented by the central government (Ministry of Public Works) 1991-1993 Master Plan II The collaboration between the Department of Public Works and the Japan International Consultant produced new master plan (Perfection of previous master plan) 1996 Severe flood inundated almost New study about Jakarta JFCAM, 1996 “Jakarta Flood Control all Jakarta’s land area flood was conducted by Advisory Mission by NEDECO” especially in North and East central government produced new study about flood in Jakarta. collaborated with the Jakarta and alternative design of Netherlands Eastern Flood Canal Government 1997 Master Plan III The collaboration between Department of Public Works and Japan International Consultant produce new master plan 1998 Fall of Soeharto’s regimes The transformation from centralization to decentralization is initiated 1999 Decentralization Law 22/1999 Eastern Flood Canal plan Change institutional arrangement in and Fiscal Equalization Law was integrated with the water sectors. Provincial government 25/1999 spatial planning of has autonomous power in arranging Jakarta 2010 regulation and policy related to water and flood management. The Eastern Flood Canal 2002 Severe flood attacked Jakarta. Master Plan IV More stakeholders involved in It was recorded that disastrous developing the Master Plan IV floods affected 10000 ha of MoU between central government Jakarta’s area and provincial government about the agreement to implement Eastern Flood Canal was signed 2003 Kick off of flood canal construction by President Megawati Soekarno Putri 2004 New water Law no 7 First direct election 2007 Another devastating flood hit Central government increased their Jakarta by one of the worst commitment to accelerate the floods ever experienced. completion of Eastern Flood Canal by allocating more budget than before.

As presented in Table 3, we can see that the policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal has been carried out for more than 30 years before it was implemented. We simplify the policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal in Figure 3. In the figure, we show what the government produced regarding the Eastern Flood Canal before and after decentralization.

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Figure 5 Macro Context of Eastern Flood Canal Policy Process

In the next section, we will analyze the impact of the actor’s position to the result of the policy making process before and after the decentralization. Before the actor analysis, we first give a general description about the position of actors who are involved in flood control management in Jakarta including their tasks and responsibilities.

4.3.2 Water management Institutions and Roles in Jakarta before and after decentralization During the development of Master Plan I, II and III when the government system in Indonesia was centralized, water resources and other governmental functions were consolidated to central government. The administrative arrangements related to water sector were characterized by command-and- control type of regulatory rules that leave administrative actors with limited discretion and flexibility ( see figure 5 ).

The water control and management was regulated based on Law No 11/1974 . According to this law, the power resides with the Central government and more specifically, with the Ministries for planning and policy making within strategic flood control management. In section 3 of this law is stated that the Ministry of Public Works has the authority and responsibility to coordinate the macro planning, technical planning, supervision, and implementation related to water resource management. Related to the flood control infrastructure development, the Ministry of Public Works has supervisory control of implementing institutions that are appointed by the Ministry of Public Works. All flood control management and activities were controlled and had to be approved by the Ministry of Public Works.

For implementing legislation of Law no. 11/l974, Government Regulation No. 22/1982 was issued. According to this regulation, the development plan on Water Resources is provided by the Ministry of Public Works. Moreover, the Ministry of Public Works had the authority to appoint and establish 25`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia institutions and organizations in national or regional level to perform certain tasks related to water management including flood control infrastructure development and management. The Regional level authorities (provincial government and lower level) were responsible to perform specific administrative task delegating by the central government.

In responding to regulation No 22/1982, several institutions were established by the Ministry of Public Works to perform several tasks related to flood control infrastructure development and management (JICA, 1997 ). The planning and constructing of the flood control infrastructure for Jakarta was under the Ministry of Public Works supervision. The day to day management is delegated by the Ministry of Public Works to the Director General of Water Resources Development. Several sub departments under the Director General of Water Resources Development were established to conduct specific tasks related to water resources development and project.

The Directorate of Planning and Programming is in charge of the feasibility study of the water resources development project and give guidance to implementation agencies in respect of program arrangement, determination of development implementation priority and funding arrangement.

The Directorate of Water Resources Management and Conservation is in charge of supervision and guidance of data collection, survey, study, investigation and master plan formulation. For construction and supervision, the Directorate of Technical Guidance and the Directorate of Implementation Guidance are in charge.

The Ciliwung-Cisadane River Basin Development Project (PBJR) is a delegated authority of the Director General of Water Resources Development to conduct the activities pertaining water and water resources management including flood control infrastructure development in the Ciliwung- Cisadane River Basin. The PBJR is managed by the central government and focuses on infrastructure development and is fully funded and implemented by the central government.

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Figure 6 Administrative Bodies of Flood Control Management of Jakarta (Source: Adapted from Master Plan, JICA 1997)

In 1999, after the fall of Soeharto’s regime, the government system in Indonesia was transformed from centralization to decentralization through the establishment of Law No. 22/1999 . This law transfers functions, personnel and assets from the central government to the province, as well as the district and the municipal governments. This means that additional powers and responsibilities are being devolved to the regional level (provincial and district and governments) establishing a far more decentralized system compared to the co-administrated systems of the past.

The Regional governments have the authority to enact their own regulations, formulate their own plans, programmes and fiscal policies, raise and retain revenue and exploit natural resources including in water sector ( Bhat and Molinga 2009 ).

The autonomy and decentralization laws put a greater pressure on the Provincial authorities in many aspects of flood control and management. The structure relation between central government and provincial government or lower level is changed from centralized and co-administration form to more

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia decentralized (see figure 6). The changes imply that the provincial authorities are now ultimately responsible for flood control management and addressing flood damage in Jakarta where before the responsibility was handled by the central government.

The Provincial authorities also have responsibility for O&M of flood protection infrastructure and for the Flood Forecasting and Warning System (FFWS). Moreover, the provincial government has the responsibility to conduct activities of all relevant agencies providing information concerning water-related and flood issues. Agreements exist between the province and the district regarding how to manage floodwaters.

In addition to that, river basins that lie inside a province and are not nationally strategic should be managed by the Province ( Bhaat, et.al, 2005 ). Related to the flood control development, the public work agency (provincial level) has authority to give permission or approval for the development plan of public infrastructure services include flood control infrastructure (Capacity Building of Drainage Management of Jakarta, WJEMP, 2002 ).

In summary decentralization implies that the Regional government has more power to direct a policy related to the flood control management. The high control and direction from the central government in formulating a policy is diminish. The legitimacy of a certain flood control infrastructure project inside the province is not decided by the central government anymore. Regional government can perform or formulate a project or policy related to flood control infrastructure without need an approval from the central government. They also become more responsible to respond about flood since their position is appointed by the citizen.

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Figure 7 Administrative bodies of water sector after decentralization

4.4 Analyzing the positions of the actors As we stated in chapter 2, the Eastern Flood Canal is a large infrastructure projects which its implementation depend on various resources. By analyzing the institutional system in the water management sector in Jakarta, we can observe that those resources are not held by a single actor. For example, the Jakarta authorities depend on the support from the central government (budget and legitimacy support) so as to implement programs related to flood control management.

The legitimacy of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation depends on the Ministry of Public Works. The Ministry of Public Works’s decision was also affected by other actors such as the Dutch government and the Japanese government. Both the Dutch and Japanese governments influence the Ministry of Public Work’s decision since they contribute to the funding of the study and to the producing the Master Plans.

In taking a decision, if the Ministry of Public Works has the willingness and commitment to decide about the plan and the management of Jakarta’s flood, it also has to consider Jakarta’s government and lower levels since they (may) know much information about the issues and aspects that relate to the floods in Jakarta.

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

The Eastern Flood Canal requires an amount of land area as presented in chapter 3. Therefore the availability of land also needs cooperation and willingness from the land owners to freeing their lands so as to be used for inundation.

Understanding the institutional structure can help us to identify the interest and perception of actors concerning the Eastern Flood Canal implementation. The resources of power, interest and perception aspects are important elements to enable us in mapping out the dependency degree of the problem to those actors ( Enserink, B, et. al, 2009). To structure the dependency of the actors related to the Eastern Flood Canal case, we use the actor analysis. In following paragraph, the map of actors dependency related to Eastern Flood Canal is presented.

What is the relation between the function of the centralized institutions and the position of actors?

In Table 4, we present the results of the actor analysis including several actors who has resources and to whom the problem owner are dependent on realizing his interests. The interest and important resources of actors was identified based on the institutional structure of water sector of Jakarta. The further explanations of the tables are presented afterwards.

Table 4 The Actor Analysis prior to the decentralization Actor’s role in Interest Important Dependency Dedicated/Non Critical/Non governance resources Dedicated Actor Critical Central Serve the Authority in High Non dedicated actor Critical Actor government, interest of his determining Ministry of authority whether or not Public Work and (President) the master plan its agencies Serve the programs is interest of required to be Donor implemented community to get financial Man Power support Authority to flood provide budget support for flood control infrastructure development Provincial Serve the Provide data and High Dedicated actor to Non Critical Government and interest of information to the problem owner Actor its agencies central help or influence (Ministry of Public government the Ministry of work) (Being elected Public Works in

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Actor’s role in Interest Important Dependency Dedicated/Non Critical/Non governance resources Dedicated Actor Critical by President) developing and flood addressing the management plan related to flood problems Municipality or Serve the Have more close High Dedicated actor to Non Critical Lower level interest of relation with local the problem owner Actor central communities and (Ministry of Public government knowledge of the Work) (Being elected area by president) flood Donor - Fund High Not clear Critical Actor community depending on the negotiations Local parliament - (Public representatives) Citizen, Land Better living Land High Non dedicated actor Non Critical owner condition Actor Free from floods

Table 5 Classification of interdependencies between the actors related to the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal, Jakarta, Indonesia prior to the decentralization Dedicated actor Non dedicated actor Critical actor Non critical actor Critical actor Non critical actor Similar/supportive Ministry of Public Provincial Ministry of interest and works government Finance objectives Municipality of government Conflicting interest Donor Land owners, and objective community Citizens, NGO’s.

We argue that due to the centralized administrative system during the first phase of the policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal (1973 – 1999), the central government as the critical actor would take control on policy making process because the power resides on him for planning and policy making relating to flood control infrastructure. Hence, the implementation of the programs in the Master Plans (e.g. the Eastern flood canal) rely on the capacity and commitment of the central government to provide budget and others legitimacy supports (such as laws, regulations, procedures, etc) to the organizations which were appointed for the implementation. As long as there were no interest from the central government in providing this support, the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal appealed impossible.

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

However, giving the instable economic condition of Indonesia during this period, the actions and decisions of the Ministry of Public Works is also might influenced by others critical actors such as the Ministry of Finance and donor community. This may be the case since in the first phase the implementation of public infrastructure relies on the availability of the external loans. These actors have the power to block or to support the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal. Their actions depend on the cost and benefit they may gain from the realization of the Eastern Flood Canal.

Regarding the position of the Regional authorities (provincial and municipality), we categorized them as the non critical actor since they do not exercise power to direct policies or decision making process concerning flood control management. The actions or behaviour of the Regional authorities during the decision making process is quite controlled since its position as the representative of the central government (i.e. Governor/Mayor is elected directly by president). Therefore, even though the regional government (provincial) might realize the important of the Eastern Flood Canal or flood control infrastructure in the Eastern part of Jakarta, it did not have much power to realize its interest or to push the implementation of Eastern Flood Canal due to their weak position.

Moreover, as we saw in the description of the institutional system the resources they have high degree of replaceability. For example, if the provincial or municipality government try to block the decision of central government, their position may or can be replaced directly by the central government who can serve the central government’s interest. Therefore we expect their attendance in decision making process only to provide data and information that might help to support the central government decisions and they will more serve or support what central government decides instead of the public interest.

In table 4 and 5 we also classify citizens of Jakarta and NGO’s as non critical actors. Even though the citizens have experienced devastating floods for many years, we assume they do not much power to speak about their voice since the government system of Indonesia during this time is characterized with closeness, military power and elimination of resisting elements in society (Dauvergne. P, 1993-1994 ). For instance, the freedom of press was very limited and highly controlled by Government.

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

The limitation of press freedom resulted in limited broadcasting of flood events in the media. There were few critics about the failure of government in providing solutions against flooding. The impact of floods to society was not much opened to debate either. All disasters related to floods were hidden by the government and the news that broadcasted in media was regulated and directed by authority. All actions that might have harmed the position or interest of central government are usually eliminated via military power.

For reducing the resisting regimes, we expect that all planning works to formulate drainage and flood control system for the City of Jakarta might carried out with only limited public participation. Community opinion was not sought directly through public consultation or open announcement but by consulting heads of regions (village or district chiefs), or by conducting meetings with local parliaments. Even though the local parliament is expected as the representatives of citizens, the voice of people during centralization period is not channeled effectively through the local parliaments because of the limited capacity of the local authorities.

What is the relation between the decentralized institutions with psotiion of actors? We argue that the institutional shift from the centralization to decentralization bears new position for several actors in network. By looking the administrative system after decentralization we can see that position of several actors is definitely changed. In table 6 we indicate several changes of resources and power and also the dependency between actors after the institutional transition.

Table 6 The Actor Analysis after the decentralization Actor’s role in Interest Important Dependency Dedicated/Non Critical/Non governance resources Dedicated Actor Critical Central Serve the Authority to High Not clear Critical Actor government, interest of his provide budget (Depending on how Ministry of authority support for flood important and Public Work and (President) control urgent the flood its agencies infrastructure problem is to the development ministry) Provincial Serve the local Determining and High Dedicated actor Critical Actor Authorities and Jakarta’s addressing flood its agencies interest problems and (Provide better flood control flood protection managements to Jakarta)

Being elected by citizens Municipality or Serve local Have closer High Non Dedicated Critical Actor Lower level community relation with local Actor

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Actor’s role in Interest Important Dependency Dedicated/Non Critical/Non governance resources Dedicated Actor Critical interest (Better communities and flood protection knowledge of the in his area) area

Being elected by citizens Donor - Fund Medium Non dedicated actor Critical actor community Citizen, Media Free from flood Have more power High Dedicated actor Critical Actor to direct government policy since they have more power to direct government position through election Land Owner Better condition Land High Non Dedicated actor Critical Actor to live NGOs Have more Knowledge and Medium Non Dedicated actor Critical Actor power to direct information about government floods and local policy community

Table 7 Classification of interdepencies between the actors related to the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal, Jakarta, Indonesia after the decentralization Dedicated actor Non dedicated actor Critical actor Non critical actor Critical actor Non critical actor Similar/supportive Provincial Ministry of interest and objectives government Public Works Municipality of government Conflicting interest and Donor Ministry of objective community Finance, Land owners Citizens, Land Owner, Media NGO’s.

If we look at tables 6 and 7 and we compared with tables 4 and 5 we can see position of several actors to be changed. After the institutional shift, several actors who before had less power after the decentralization reform can use their resources to block or support the decision.

In tables 6 and 7, we categorize the citizen of Jakarta, local parliament and land owners as the critical actors since their position after decentralization reform became stronger. They now have more power to control the direction or the action of government during the policy making process. Given the establishment of free elections, we expect that citizen or local parliament have

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia more power to influence and criticize government’s performance in handling the flood control infrastructure in Jakarta. We also expect that the local parliament have become more responsiveness to the aspirations of the local communities, and have begun to involve themselves directly during the policy making process in clarifying and following up individual grievances and demands by their local constituents about the flood problem.

The decentralization meant that the Jakarta Provincial authority is the problem owner of the flood control infrastructure and policy and is directly responsible to provide better protection to Jakarta’s citizens from floods. The Provincial authority does not want to fail the fulfilment of their task since they want the citizens to elect them in the future elections. This condition therefore may pressure the provincial government to provide better policy direction concerning the flood management and defenses in Jakarta so as to show Jakarta’s community that the current government is highly responsible when dealing with flooding as an urgent issue.

Concerning the position of the municipal authorities, they become reluctant to perform duties delegated by the provincial government when the duties are not in conformity with the local conditions. The reason for this reluctance lies on the fact that the municipality became the representative of the local community than the representative of higher level of government since the local level governments are directly elected by the citizens.

Overall, we can conclude that after the decentralization, the powers that before resided much on the central government have been shared to several actors such as provincial authorities, municipality, parliaments and citizens. The shared powers may change the directions and actions of every actor during the policy making process related to the Eastern Flood Canal and the flood problem in Jakarta. More specifically, the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal that was before much depended on limited actors (e.g. Central government) after the decentralization relied on multiple actors. Hence, support from those actors during the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal is important for the successful implementation

4.5 Conclusion In this chapter, the institutional structure of Indonesia and the water management sector in particular before and after decentralization are presented. By using an actor analysis, we analyzed different actors in the

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia network concerning the flood control management in Jakarta.

We identify that the policy making process during centralization is controlled by central government (the Ministry of Public Works) since most of power in planning and policy making of flood control infrastructure resided on central government. Other actors related to flood problems such as provincial government, municipality and citizens do not have much power to direct the decision since their position is weak. Therefore, if the Eastern Flood Canal was not implemented during this period, it was because of the lack of support from the central government.

After the decentralization, we identify that the positions and power of actors have changed. The power that was previously resided much on the central government has been shared with several actors. Citizens, municipalities and local parliaments became the critical actors who can use their power and resources to support or block decisions. The given shared powers change the directions and actions of every actor during policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal.

We conclude that, the successful of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation that before depended on limited actors (e.g. Central government) after decentralization relied on many actors (e.g. citizens, local parliament, NGOs, etc). Support from those actors during the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal unless the successful implementation can not be guaranteed.

In chapter 5, the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal since 1973 – 2003 is presented. The policy making process will be structured using the round model (Teisman, 2000). We will verify whether our findings and hypothesis concerning the influence of institutional characteristics on the policy process were experienced during the policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal in the next chapter.

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Chapter 5. The Round Model of the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal (study period: 1973 – 2003)

5.1 Introduction The policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal is elaborated in this chapter. The goal of the fifth chapter is to present the synthesis of the research results by drawing the complete picture of policy process in rounds. This chapter aims at presenting the answer of the second research sub-question “ How does the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal influence its implementation? “.

In chapter 4, we have presented our findings on how the institutional structure and changes of Indonesia and water sector in Jakarta particularly influence the power and the behavior of actors during the policy making process. The findings that we got in chapter 4 will be affirmed in this chapter.

The fifth chapter consists of seven sections including the introduction (section 5.1). Section 5.2 presents the source of information. In section 5.3, the process round in the delineation that span from 1973 – 2003 is presented. The policy process including seven rounds that are presented in detail is given in section 5.4. The section 5.5 provides the analysis result of the policy process rounds. Chapter 5.6 includes the answers about why finally the Eastern Flood Canal was considered as an appropriate alternative and was implemented after a long time. Conclusions of the analysis with the rounds and the stream model are presented in section 5.7.

5.2 Source of Information The information used to draw a decision making round concerning the Eastern Flood canal in Jakarta was derived from the government legal documents (e.g. NEDECO 1973, JICA (1991, 1993), JFCAM (1996), NIKKEN (1997), WJEMP (2002), Bappenas & LIPI (2003) ) related to the flood control management in Jakarta, literature study, and by interview response from the interviewees (The information about respondents and legal documents of government is presented in Chapter 2).

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5.3 Policy Making Process Round

Figure 8 Two distinct phase in the macro context of the Eastern Flood Canal policy making process

The policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal is structured in round. We use the round model since our research start with an assumption that the delay of Eastern Flood Canal derives from the lack of support from actors affected by the Eastern Flood Canal implementation. By structuring the policy process in round, we can observe whether or not the important actors were involved in each round. Moreover, we also need to observe in each round whether or not those actors were truly given their support during the interaction process conducted.

To keep the consistency between chapter 4 and 5 and to ease the reader in understanding the correlation between the outcome of chapter 4 and chapter 5, the figure about the policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal that has been presented in the previous chapter is shown again in this chapter (see figure 7) The policy making process is divided into two periods, before and after decentralization. Dividing the rounds in two periods ease us to observe the differentiation of interaction process in rounds before and after decentralization.

In each period, several rounds were conducted which may result different outcomes either master plans, new studies, decisions, regulations or laws. The actors involve in every round, the situation that forces the new round initiation, the interaction process between actor and the result of each round will be presented in this chapter.

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5.4. Overview of the policy process rounds of Eastern Flood Canal

Figure 9 Overview of the different rounds that comprise the policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal, Jakarta, Indonesia

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Figure 10 Implementation Round of the Eastern Flood Canal

Every round of this figure will be further and explicitly discussed in the following sections.

5.4.1 Decision Rounds during the centralization period (prior to 1999)

5.4.1.1 First Round (1970s) Actors Involved in the first round: The Ministry of Public Works, PBJR (The Flood Control Project of Jakarta) Organization, Directorate General of Water Resources Development, Governor, NEDECO (Netherland Engineering Consultant), Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Netherlands, Provinces civil servants (town planning board, sanitary engineering, water supply, garbage disposal and public works of municipality)

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Interaction Process during the first round: After severe flood hitting Jakarta on 1970 ( NEDECO, 1973 ), the need for expansion of the flood control and drainage system in Jakarta was considered important by the Ministry of Public Work. The PBJR organization was instructed by Ministry of Public Works to construct a new master plan for flood control and drainage system in Jakarta. The PBJR is an organization under the Central government’s Department of Public Works and Electric Power that established by the Presidential decree on 1965. The PBJR was formed to assist the Province of Jakarta in flood control development and operation.

Due to lack of human resources and skills inside the PBJR organization, the need of technical assistance was considered important by the Ministry of Public Works. The technical assistant aimed to assist the PBJR organization in studying the current condition of the flood in Jakarta and creating a new Master Plan for flood control and drainage system. Hence, in 1972, the Ministry of Public Works requested technical assistance from the Dutch Governments. In responding to the request, the Dutch government supplied technical assistance called NEDECO (Netherlands Engineering Consultant) that helped the PBJR in setting up a master plan for the drainage and flood control.

The first draft of drainage and flood control master plan contained various alternatives for several of the measures for drainage and flood control was published by PBJR in November 1972. The reason for publishing the master plan at that time was to present various alternative possibilities for consideration by the departments of town planning, sanitary engineering, water supply, garbage disposal and public works of municipality and the City Planning Board. The study was funded from an external loan from the Dutch Government.

On January 1972, the manager of PBJR requested the Director of Planning Board of Jakarta (Bappeda) to constitute a Coordinating Committee for the project. In this committee all agencies whose activities are related to drainage and flood control were to be represented by one or more senior staff members. In 1973 the draft master plan was discussed several times with the Planning Board of Jakarta, and the Municipal departments: town planning, water supply, garbage disposal, sanitary engineering and public works under the guidance of the Coordinating committee established for this purpose.

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The committee convened four times in 1972 and three times in 1973 (up to the middle of November). In particular, in many meetings with the town planning department the possible alignment of the flood diversion canals were also discussed.

On April 27, 1973, the Governor of Jakarta decided the solution which in principle was the basis for the present master plan. He stressed the importance of giving priority to the Eastern Jakarta and its industrial development by constructing the Eastern Flood Canal. He requested a preliminary cost estimation of all the main works. This was presented by the PBJR on May 1973 and was forwarded immediately by the governor to the National Planning Board (Bappenas).

Result of the first round: The series of interacting discussion that took place in first round produced a new Master Plan for Drainage and Flood Control of Jakarta ( NEDECO, 1973 ). The master plan was signed by the Ministry of Public Works and Electric Power of Directorate General of Water Resources Development, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate of International Technical Assistance, the Dutch government, PBJR organization and NEDECO.

Several programs for flood control management in Jakarta were mentioned in the master plan. The content of the master plan is given briefly in appendix C. The implementation of the programme was targeted to be completed in 1985 and planned to be implemented in stages. Based on the plan, it was decided that the first priority for implementation has been the Eastern Flood Canal. The decision about the financing sources of the construction (e.g. the domestic financing or loans from foreign sources) was given to the Indonesia’s government.

However, the annual budget that the central government allocated for the project in the mid 1970s was only approximately Rp1.5 million. According to the central government, some efforts were taken by Directorate General of Water Resources Development to find the soft loan for supporting the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal, however there were no investors interested to involve.

Concluding remarks from the first round: In first round there are several actors who involved in the decision making

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia process. In this round, the involved actors were dominated by the government actors (central and province government) with few non governmental actors (i.e. NEDECO). The first round produces a new master plan of flood control management in Jakarta. The brief content of the Master Plan is given in Appendix C . The round was initiated because of several reasons: (i) The severe floods occurred in 1970 (ii) The initiation taken by the Ministry of Public works about the demand to produce a new master plan due to inadequate flood control and drainage system management in Jakarta The round was ended because of several reasons: (i) The key actor (central government) who held the power/resources to realize the decision did not give high commitment or priority to provide the resources and support for solving the flood problem in Jakarta. For instance when the cost of all works set up in the 1973 master plan amounted to Rp 592 million, the annual budget for the project in the mid 1970s was only approximately Rp1.5 million (Soenarno and Sasongko, 2000 ). (ii) The failure of the higher authority (Ministry of Public Works) to propose budget schemes for the realization of the Master Plan. (iii) There were no external loans or investors interests to involve

5.4.1.2 Second Round (1979 -1980s) Actors Involved in the second round: NEDECO, the Ministry of Public Works, the Directorate of General Water Resources Development, PBJR Organization

Interaction process during the second round On 1979, severe flood hit Jakarta again ( Soesanto & Soesangko.D, 1998 ). The Ministry of Public works commanded the PBJR organization to study and identify the causes of the floods. After several studies assisted by NEDECO’s consultant, it was concluded that the most inundated area was the western part of DKI Jakarta. Considering this situation, the study recommended to change the priority program of the Master Plan 1973 by proposing to construct the Western Flood Canal first. The study report then submitted to the Ministry of Public Works.

While the development of the planned Western Canal extension was progressing, the cost of land and price estimation of it was needed for the canals increased. Hence the plan had to be modified.

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Result of the second round: The Ministry of Public Works decided to abandon the programs of Master Plan 1973 and build a completely new floodway, the Cengkareng Floodway. The Cengkareng Floodway was constructed in 1981-1982 as an alternative to bear the increase of capacity of flood control infrastructure in Jakarta.

Concluding remarks from the second round: The starting forces of the second round were the severe floods that occurred in Jakarta on 1979. In this round there were several actors involved in the policy process who were dominated by the central government actors with only few non governmental actors (i.e. NEDECO). The second round was ended with the decision from the Ministry of Public Works to abandon the programs presented in the Master Plan 1973. The consideration for the decision might be the financial situation and the lower cost for the land acquisition compared to the alternatives proposed in the master plan 1973.

5.4.1.3 Third Round (1989 – 1991) Actors Involved in the third round: The Provincial Government (Governor) and its agencies (town planning board, sanitary engineering, garbage disposal and public works of municipality), The Ministry of Public Work, the Directorate General of Water Resource Development, Nikken Consultant (Japan Consultant), the Japanese government.

Interaction Process during the third round: The third round started in 1987 by the Province authority of Jakarta (Governor). By considering the ineffectiveness of the flood control infrastructure in Jakarta (especially in the Eastern part of Jakarta), Governor established Governor Decree DKI Jakarta No 121, 1987 to implement the flood canal construction ( Prakoso, 2008 ).

The socialization of the construction and land procurement were started in 1990 ( Prakoso, 2008 ). However, most of the lands that should be designated to the construction of the canal have been changed to the settlement and industry area. Thus the land acquisition process was without progress and the cost for land procurement became very expensive. Considering the difficulties on land acquisition, the province decided to implement first the drainage system program.

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The province of Jakarta then sent a report to the Ministry of Public Works and requested financial support so as to implement the program. Several discussions were conducted between the Ministry of Public Works and the Provincial level. After the discussions, it was identified that urban growth had swallowed much of the area covered by the 1973 drainage master plan and the flood control master plan of 1973 was felt to have become obsolete. The Ministry of Public Works decided that it was necessary to review and revise the design of drainage system of the Master Plan 1973.

The Ministry of Public Works sent a request for technical assistance to the Japanese Governments on 1989 to assist the Province of Jakarta in reviewing the Master Plan 1973. In 1988, special technical assistance, NIKKEN consultant was sent by the Japanase government to assist the Jakarta’s province. The review study was funded from the OECF (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund) and was conducted from 1989 – 1991.

The purpose of the study was to review the design of the Master Plan 1973 and to study the feasibility of the two alternatives (namely the Eastern Flood Canal and Rivers rehabilitation) to control flooding in the eastern part of Jakarta. Several study and interactions between Nikken Consultant, and Public works province was conducted in 1989 until 1991.

After several discussions, it was identified that the current capacity of existing drainage channels were insufficient and this was the causes of floods. Nikken proposed the improvement of the drainage system capacities in the areas of East Jakarta and the construction of more pump stations so as to replace the function of the Eastern Flood Canal.

Result of Third Round: The third round produced a new master plan called “The Study on Urban Drainage and Wastewater Disposal Project in the City of Jakarta” (NIKKEN, 1991) . The brief content of the Master Plan is given in Appendix C.

The new master plan was submitted to the Ministry of Public Works on 1991. The new drainage master plan study, which was combined with a master plan study for waste water disposal, formulated for major drainage system only, was designed to meet requirements up to the year 2010. For the eastern part of Jakarta, it was proposed that an increase of the flood control capacity by the rehabilitation of 5 rivers can replace the function of the Eastern Flood Canal.

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Concluding remarks from the third round: In third round a new actor enter the arena. The new actor from international NGOs, Japan Consultant or JICA proposed a new solution to the flood management in the Eastern part of Jakarta (i.e. existing river rehabilitations to change the function of the Eastern Flood Canal). The actors from national government in the round were still dominated by the central government and the province government. The initiation forces of the round were started by several reasons: (i) The initiative from province government (Governor) in responding to the establishment of master plan 1973 by establishing a decree. (ii) The decision from the Ministry of Public Works stated the previous master plan needed to be revised due to the implementation delay of the most master plan 1973 programs. The delay made the previous program design (master plan 1973) incompatible with the current spatial condition of Jakarta The round was ended due to: (i) The weak position of the regional level to authorize the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal (ii) The decision from theMinistry of Public works to conduct several studies to compare the two schemes that proposed by the by JICA in collaborated with PBJR organization in the new master plan (Master plan 1991)

5.4.1.4 Fourth Round (1991-1993) Actors involved in the fourth round: Governor (Province), Ministry of Public Work, Directorate General of Water Resource Development, Nikken Consultant (Japan Consultant), Japanese government, PBJR organization, Jakarta Town Planning Board.

Interaction process during the fourth round: The fourth round was the continuation of the third round. The purpose of the study was to conduct further evaluation and compare between two schemes: Rivers rehabilitation in Eastern part of Jakarta and construction of the Eastern Flood Canal. After several studies from 1991 to 1993, it was found that the cost of river rehabilitation was 70% higher than canal construction cost. It was hence recommended that the Eastern Flood Canal remained as a component in the eastern flood control system.

Following the decision of the Ministry of Public Works, PBJR organization through the Directorate General of Water Resource Development sent a request to the Ministry of Public Works that special technical assistance is 46`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia needed to build and perfect the detailed design of the Eastern Flood Canal. The Ministry of Public Works then sent a requested to Japanese Government to assist PBJR in producing a detailed design of the Eastern Flood Canal construction; especially for finding several alternatives to reduce the amount of land acquisition in constructing the Eastern Flood Canal.

During the study, several discussions were conducted between NIKKEN consultant, PBJR organization and province government’s agencies (town board planning, public work agency) from 1991 until 1993 in aiming to produce several alternatives. Three trace alternatives of the Eastern Flood canal and five alternatives of the construction materials were proposed and studied further ( see Appendix C for more information about alternatives ).

Result of Fourth Rounds: In 1993, several alternative designs of the Eastern Flood Canal were produced by NIKKEN consultant and PBJR organization. The detailed design was then submitted to the Ministry of Public Works through the Directorate General of Water Resources Development. In the detailed design, one alternative was chosen (alternative design based on master plan 1973) based on the lowest cost for land procurement and physical construction. However there was no respond from Ministry of Public Works regarding the realization of the Eastern Flood Canal.

Concluding remarks from the fourth round: The fourth round followed the previous round (third round) and aimed at finding and optimal alternative by comparing two schemes that were proposed in the previous round. The expected outcome of the fourth round was to find an answer to dealing with problems (i.e. the difficulties process of land acquisition) that were experienced in implementing the previous master plan. The alternatives for improving technical design by considering the land acquisition issues were produced in this round.

The actors involved in the fourth round were the same with the actors involved in the third round. The round ended because there was no respond from the Ministry of Public Works about alternatives proposed by JICA and PBJR. The reaction from the Ministry of Public Works might bears from the fact that the alternatives did not provide an answer to the land procurement problems.

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5.4.1.5 Fifth Round (1996) Actors involved in the fifth round: The Ministry of Public Works, NEDECO, The Dutch Government, the Directorate General of Water Resources Development, PBJR organization, the provincial government.

Interaction Process during the fifth round: When the implementation of the Master Plan 1993 was implemented yet, severe floods hit Jakarta on 1996. Floods hit Jakarta twice on 10 January and 6 February 1996 ( Adhi, 2010 ). After the severe flooding, the new study about the Jakarta flood management was carried out with the collaboration of the Jakarta and Dutch governments called, JFCAM Studies (1996) .

JFCAM reviewed the flood situation in Jakarta following the approach NEDECO preliminary study carried out by 1973 and the condition of the existing residential neighborhood. The Dutch government provided an aid fund so as to conduct a study about the flood conditions during flood events on 1996. The proposed solution more or less was similar to the master plan 1973 with several changes in the design of the Eastern Flood Canal.

Result of the fifth round: The result of the fifth round is a new study about Jakarta’s flood called “Jakarta Flood Control Advisory Mission by NEDECO”. According to this study the main cause of flooding identified by the flow of flood water in the catchment area upstream of the river, a puddle caused by local rainfall and high tide, that was caused by land subsidence. Strategies taming the flood of their respective causes were identified as follows: 1. Diversion of flood water through the flood channel, the Eastern Flood Canal and the Western Flood Canal. 2. Improvement of existing rivers, including the rehabilitation of rivers and drainage canals and interconnection of the rivers in the lower reaches; 3. Polder constructions.

Some alternatives proposed to modify the plan of the Eastern Floodway with the intention to reduce the amount of land acquisition. The proposal is to construct the floodway channels with revetment (sheet piles or concrete walls) so that the same discharge capacity can be obtained with less channel width. This would increase construction costs, but decreased social problems related to land acquisition.

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Concluding remarks from the fifth round: The flooding occurred in 1996 and the same actor (NEDECO) entering the arena again can be seen as the propelling factors for the Eastern Flood Canal were put on the agenda again. In this round, the discussions were conducted to study more and provide new alternative design for the Eastern Flood Canal such as trace alternatives and material alternatives for physical construction in aiming to reduce the cost and the land amount.

5.4.1.6 Sixth Round (1997) Actors Involved in the Sixth Round: The Ministry of Public Work, the Ministry of Construction, Directorate General of Water Resource Development, Nikken Consultant (Japan Consultant), Japanese government, PBJR organization, Province government (Governor) and its agencies (e.g. Jakarta Town Planning Board, Public works Agency).

Interactions Process during the sixth round: After the severe floods that took place in 1996, the discussion about flood control in Jakarta started again. The need for studying the causes of the 1996 floods and producing a new master plan for flood control was re-considered important by the Ministry of Public Works.

The Ministry of Public Works sent a request to the Japanese Government for technical assistance to help PBJR organization so as to conduct the study. The purpose of the study was to review the Master Plan 1973. The master plan 1973 was necessary to be reviewed because urbanization had extended beyond the city’s administrative boundaries since 1990.

Satellite towns had emerged, and completely different environmental conditions prevailed. The unfinished flood control Master Plan of 1973 had become obsolete. Land use over upper watersheds had changed with fewer vegetative cover. Riverbanks and flood plains had become more crowded and land value had escalated. This led to a review study in 1995-1996. In this study Jakarta was treated as a part of a larger ecosystem ( Soenarno and Sasongko, 2000 )..

In responding to the request, the Japanese government sent JICA consultant to assist Indonesia in producing a new master plan for Jabodetabek water management. Several discussions and studies were conducted between JICA, PBJR organization and Jakarta’s Province to provide alternatives for controlling flooding in Jakarta. After the final discussion between JICA, the 49`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Ministry of Public Works and Jakarta Governor, the new master plans was established in 1997.

Result of the Sixth Round: The sixth round produced a new master plan “ Comprehensive river water management in Jabodetabek ” ( JICA, 1997 ) including “Detailed Design for Urban Drainage Project in the City of Jakarta ”. The resulting flood control master plan was not only for the City of Jakarta but for the whole Jabotabek, i.e. Jakarta and its satellite areas that include the towns of Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi. The master plan consisted of seven projects and it was decided that each project will be done in stages.

After several meetings between JICA and Ministry of Public works it was decided that the priority is given to the Western Canal expansion and the construction of two tunnels in upstream areas to divert debit from Ciliwung River to Cisadane River which planned to started on 1997. The Eastern Flood Canal was planned to be built in 2003.

The final master plan then submitted by JICA to the Ministry of Public Works and to Jakarta’s Provincial government. Several discussions followed and held by Jakarta Province Government and Bogor government to negotiate further about the realization of the Master Plan Programs (the tunnel constructions). However, there was reached no agreement between Province Government and Bogor government. The construction of the tunnels faced resistance from the Bogor community due to the need for land procurement and people’s evacuation. The Bogor community claimed that there were no benefits for them by the construction of the tunnels. Due to these conditions, the programs had to be changed and the need for the Eastern Flood Canal to control the flooding in Jakarta became more necessary. The brief content of the Master Plan is given in Appendix C .

Concluding remarks from the sixth round: Severe floods occurred in 1996 and were triggered new master plan to be produced. The resulting flood control master plan concerned not only for the City of Jakarta but also the whole Jabotabek, i.e. Jakarta and its satellite areas including the towns of Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi (upstream areas). Due to the damages floods created, it was considered that the priority program in the Master Plan should be implemented without delay. However, the negotiations between Bogor Community and Jakarta Government reached no agreement and the program implementations had to be postponed. The sixth

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia round ended due to the fact that the negotiations between Bogor community and Jakarta government were without any outcome.

5.4.2 Decision rounds after decentralization

5.4.2.1 Seventh Round (1999) Actors Involved in the Seventh Round: Province Level (Province Government (Governor) and its agencies (Public Works Agency, Spatial Planning Agency)

Interaction Process during the seventh round: In the beginning of 1999, severe floods hit Jakarta again, swamped many houses, evacuated more than thirty thousands and killed six people (Kirmanto, 2010 ). This condition resulted in Jakarta’s government taking immediate actions by including the East Flood Canal Development plans into the DKI Jakarta Province Regulation No. 6 Year 1999 concerning Spatial Plan areas in DKI Jakarta Province 2010. The Jakarta Province claimed that the Eastern Flood Canal is the comprehensive solution for Jakarta’s floods issue.

Results of the seventh round: The result of seventh round was the integration of the Eastern Flood Canal Implementation Plan to the Spatial Plan Regulation of DKI Jakarta 2010 on Flood Control Infrastructure and Drainage System Development Section.

Concluding remarks from the seventh round: The pressure force of the new round was the severe flooding that occurred in 1999. The result of the seventh rounds is the integration of the Eastern Flood Canal Plan with the Spatial Plan of Jakarta 2010.

5.4.2.2 Eighth Round (1999) Actors Involved in the Eight Round: Central government (Ministry of Public Works), Parliament (A Commission), Province Government (Governor), Public Works Agency.

Interaction Process during the eighth round: Following the establishment of the Spatial Planning Plan of Jakarta 2010, the Jakarta province established the Governor’s decree No 2615/2001 on administering the lands area that designated to the Eastern Flood Canal Construction. The purpose of the decree was (as the basis regulation) to start the land inventorization by the Land Affairs Agency. After the decree establishment, the province government lobbied with the central government

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia so as to provide budget support for the realization of the Eastern Flood Canal. The Jakarta Province requested the central government to increase the annual budget that was related to flood management because previous budget allocation was considered far from adequate.

However, there was no response from the central government and the realization of the Eastern Flood canal had to be postponed again. The non response from the central government might have occurred due to the economic crisis of Indonesia during that time (after the fall of Soeharto in 1998) and due to the lack of urgency since the flood events already passed and people already forgot about them.

Results of the Eighth Round: The eighth round is the continuation of the previous round (Round 7). The round was initiated by the Province of Jakarta that started lobbying with the central government in order to increase annually the budget for flood management and infrastructure development. The round ended because there was no response from the central government.

5.4.2.3 Ninth Round (1999) Actors Involved in the ninth round: Public Works Agency, Land Procurement Committee, East Municipality, Villages

Interaction Process during the ninth round: Parallel with the Eight Round, the socialization rounds to citizens about the Eastern Flood Canal construction plan were taken place in 1999. The land procurement (P2T) committee consisted of officers from the municipality of East and North Jakarta and they were established by the Governor. The purpose of the establishment of the committee was to start the socialization and negotiation with the land owners that lived in areas surrounding the canals. The P2T collaborated with the Head of Villages and arranged several meetings by inviting citizens surrounding canals to negotiate about the land compensation.

Despite these efforts, only few citizens agreed to free their lands and most of them asked for higher compensations that the ones proposed. Most of the negotiations conducted between P2T and citizen were fruitless. The land owners charged high compensation for their land and the budget for land procurement become very costly. The land procurement process during this time was without progress. 52`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Result of the eighth round: Due to the opposition from citizens about the compensation schemes and the limited budget support from the central government, the land procurement processes were stopped and the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal was postponed again.

Concluding remarks of the ninth round: The Ninth Round was the continuation of the seventh round. The round was initiated by the Jakarta’s province by starting the negotiations to citizens about land procurement. The round ended with the oppositions from citizens.

5.4.2.4 Tenth Round (2002) Actors involve in the Tenth Round: In 2002, severe flood hit Jakarta again. The flood paralyzed the city of Jakarta and caused economic losses up to Rp 9.2 trillion. The realization of the Eastern Flood Canal construction was re-sounding with the occurrence of floods in 2002. The demand for a new master plan about flood control management in Jakarta re-appeared.

Interaction Process during the Tenth Round: In 2002, severe flood hit Jakarta again. The flood paralyzed the city of Jakarta and caused economic losses up to Rp 9.2 trillion. Realization of the Eastern Flood Canal construction was re-sounding with the occurrence of floods in 2002. The demand for a new master plan about flood control management in Jakarta re-appeared.

The Ministry of National Development Planning National then conducted workshop (“ Lokakarya Nasional Upaya Penanggulangan Banjir di Indonesia ”) on 2002 to discuss about more alternative solutions for flood management in Jakarta. The workshops were attended by various stakeholders (stakeholders), both the government (central and local) and non-government organizations (NGOs, experts from universities, professional associations, and international agencies). The workshop resulted in several new approaches for controlling and managing flooding in Jakarta ( The brief description of the workshop result can be seen in Appendix C ).

Several meetings followed and were conducted between the Central government and Province governments. On February 27, 2002, an agreement of cooperation between the central and local governments was reached. The agreement was embodied in a Memorandum of Understanding on the

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Regional Flood Control in the Greater Jakarta (DKI Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi) and Bopunjur (Bogor, Puncak, Cianjur). Brief description of the MoU is given in appendix C.

In this round not only the province of Jakarta was involved, but also the provincial governments from Jakarta’s adjacent such as Bogor, Bekasi, Tangerang and Banten (Jabodetabek).

Result of the Tenth Round: To follow up of the master plan, a Memorandum of Understanding between the central and local governments was formulated and it contained the division of duties and responsibilities of the development of all activities mentioned in the master plan.

The concept master plan contained details of activities and the amount of funds required (referring to the short term, medium term and long term) that reached Rp 18.29 trillion, (including funds of the program, amounted to Rp 16.67 trillion and of, the center and a regional program of Rp 1.62 trillion). The Eastern Flood Canal realization as part of the river management aspect became one of the components of the Master plan 2002 that have to be implemented.

Therefore, the decision to implement the Eastern Flood Canal project is the agreement of central government and local governments, in this case the Public Works Department that conducted the physical construction at a cost of Rp 2.5 trillion, with the government of DKI Jakarta Province to be responsible for implementing land acquisition, and requiring funding of Rp 2.5 trillion in return.

After having reached a Memorandum of Understanding, President Megawati announced the Eastern Flood Canal development on July 10, 2003. In the same year the detail design of the canal then revised by PT Virayama Work and Associates. The design was used to implement the Eastern Canal development today.

Concluding remarks from the Tenth round: The series of interacting discussion on ninth round produced an agreement between central and province government by signed the memorandum of understanding about the implementation of the canals. The agreement reached about the division of tasks and responsibility between central and

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia regional government included the following important decision aspects:

The Central Government represented by Ministry of Public Works will be responsible to the completion of the physical construction of the canal. The physical construction of the canal acquires approximately 2.5 trillion rupiahs and the budget will be provided by the Central government which will be budgeted on Revenue Expenditure Budget of Province DKI Jakarta (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah Provinsi DKI Jakarta). The fund resources will be given in stages within fiscal year 2003 -2009

The Provincial government will fund the land procurement for the Eastern Flood Canal project. The cost will acquire approximately 2.5 trillion rupiahs which will be budgeted on Revenue Expenditure Budget of Province DKI Jakarta (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah Provinsi DKI Jakarta). According to the plan the construction of the canals will be carried out in stages. Scheduled execution of development will be completed less than seven years.

5.5 Analysis of the policy process rounds of the Eastern Flood Canal After we structure the policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal using the Round model, we observe the interaction process between actors and the behaviour of actors involved during the policy making process. Based on our observations in all rounds, we notice that several critical actors were not involved in the process.

Our second observation is the central government dominated the interaction process in most of the rounds and gave limited support to the realization of the Eastern Flood Canal. We also observed that the donor community played an important role in directing the project priority that made the Eastern Flood Canal sometimes to become or not to become a priority.

Our third observation is that after the decentralization, there were no significant changes in the way the policy making process was conducted. Even though several stakeholders were involved only after the decentralization, participation of multiple stakeholders was very limited.

In sum, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, the success of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation requires supports from multiple actors. On the contrary, based on the observations we identify that several important actors or critical authorities were not involved in the policy making process. At the

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia same time, the critical actors who were involved in the policy making process gave limited support to the realization of the Eastern Flood Canal. Therefore, we implied that the limited involvement and support of the critical actors and stakeholders is one of the root causes of the unavailability of the resources and opposition during the implementation phase of the Eastern Flood Canal. The further explanation of our observation and how they influence the implementation delay of the Eastern Flood Canal are elaborated as follows:

1. Lack support from decision maker As our analysis in chapter 4, we expect that the central government prior to 1999 period would take control on policy making process because the power resides on him for planning and policy making relating to flood control infrastructure. He is a strategic actor who has important role in bringing the direction of the decision and the possibility of the policy change. We can see this condition in aforementioned policy rounds. Most of the decision in each round was taken control by the Ministry of Public Work.

With regard to the delay of the Eastern Flood Canal, as we mentioned in chapter 4, the follow up of the programs in the Master Plans (e.g. Eastern Flood Canal) depended on an approval from the Ministry of Public Work. As we present in the policy making rounds, most of the rounds were ended because lack of support from the Ministry of Public Works which lead to the illegitimacy and delay of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation.

For example, the first round which resulted several program for controlling the Jakarta’s flooding problem were not followed up by the central government. In the second round, we also see that the round was ended by the decision from the Ministry of Public Works to abandon the previous programs of master plan 1973 by constructing a completely new floodway. In the following rounds, we found other fact related to the lack of support from the Ministry of Public Works such as responding the Provincial Government request about supports (e.g. project approval, budget) for canal implementation with conducting a new study. Due to these facts, the follow up of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation during the 1973 – 1997 rounds were not implemented.

In addition to our findings from using the round model, we also find several factors that are related to lack of support from decision maker by looking at the contextual condition during the periods and from interviewees. Those 56`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia factors are the following: 1. Given the political condition during Soeharto’s regimes, the government did not perceive the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal as urgent because most of the decision taken was done to serve the government’s interest and not public’s interest. Therefore, it is difficult to gain political support during this time, if the project only proposed to serve the public interest. Given the fact that the Eastern Flood Canal only provides flood protection to 20 % of the areas of Jakarta ( MPW, 2002 ) where low incomes household are settled (NGO’s interviewee ), the government saw that the construction of the Eastern Flood Canal did not give any benefit to the government. 2. The priority for implementing the Eastern Flood Canal at the level of the national government was low because the national government was not convinced right away that the Eastern Flood Canal was a promising alternative to control flooding in Jakarta. This is the result of the fact that the flooding in Jakarta was caused by many factors and the Eastern Flood Canal could only provide protection to part of the Eastern Jakarta. Moreover, only 5 rivers are included inside the Eastern Flood Canal system when flooding in Jakarta was caused by many rivers. Additionally, the implementation of the canal implied that many people and houses have to be removed from the canal areas and this works -according to central government- was not easy and was of high cost ( Province interviewee ). 3. The issues about the lack of maintenance. The lack of attention of operation and maintenance of the existing flood defense canals was a factor that impeded the construction of the Eastern Flood Canal. According to the central government and also to the water resources observer, the decision to implement the Eastern Flood Canal has to be followed and integrated with the provincial plan that is related to the river management that will cut through the canals and spatial plan. According to the central government, the province was lacking the capacity to maintain the existing rivers and if this lacks of capacity continues, the realization of the Eastern Flood Canal will be in vain or the canal will fail to control the water discharges in Jakarta. The central government expects the province to take the initiative to provide a framework for operation and maintenance of the rivers and other basins. The past experience of the lack of maintenance creates skepticism to the central government to support the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal (interviewee with the representative from Ministry of Public Works)

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

2. The absence of key actors (critical actors) during the decision making process In the above presented policy process rounds, it is observed that several key actors (critical actors) are not involved in the decision making rounds. Through observation of every round, we can list several key actors that should have been involved but unfortunately were absent in every round. They include: the Spatial Planning Agency, the Ministry of Finance, Local government levels (municipality). These actors have resources and their support is very important to assure the success of the Eastern Flood Canal Implementation.

According to De Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof (2008) key actors who are not involved during the decision making process will try to use their resources or power to block the decision. They might try to redefine the decision, postpone implementation or implement the decision in a different way from the one intended. Moreover, they might also adopt a passive attitude and do not give much attention and support during the implementation phase. Such a behaviour of the critical actors was also observed (and evinced) during the implementation phase of the Eastern Flood Canal.

More specifically, the absence of some key actors such as land owner caused high opposition during the implementation phase. The land owner tried to block the government’s decision by holding their land (see appendix B). Since the land owners know that the Eastern Flood Canal could not be implemented without the availability of land, they used this condition to realize their interest by requesting very high compensation from the government.

Another example on how the absence of key players delayed the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal can be derived from spatial planning aspect. The plan to implement the Eastern Flood Canal has been decided since 1973. However, this plan was not integrated to the spatial planning of Jakarta. Consequently, areas or lands that should have been designated to the construction of the Eastern Flood Canal changed and became settlement and industrial areas.

3. Limited public or stakeholder participation in the decision making process As we saw in every round, the decision making process from planning works and formulating the drainage and flood control master plan for Jakarta was 58`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia carried out with limited public participation.

In each round of the master plan development, the working groups were dominated by the actors from the government without participation from the community such as citizens, NGOs, local parliament. This shows the limited stakeholder participation during the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal.

Moreover, the result of the master plan was only accessible to the central government and the provincial government without declaring them to the public (interviewee with the citizens and NGO’s). This is shown the lack of transparency and the openness of the decision making process regarding the flood management in Jakarta which lead to the lack of accountability of the policy process result.

Consequently, high opposition from citizens rose when the decision to implement the Eastern Flood Canal was published. As we mentioned, the decision taken was done during the transition from centralization to decentralization that resulted in people having more power to speak about their voice and their rights.

However, during the interviews it was found that the government has a reason why the master plan was not available to the community. The reason is that disclosure of a master plan or parts of it would amplify physical development along construction routes and trigger land speculation in the surrounding areas. (Interviewee with the representative from Provincial, Public Works)

Landowners would hold on to their lands and refuse to sell or accept fair, market-price compensation. When people knew that an area would be protected from floods, they would buy land and build houses on it before other people did the same. In many cases, the situation worsened because people built anything just before the project started, so that they could claim higher compensation. This is shown that the awareness of the citizens and public about the flooding are very low.

4. The low commitment from the province to push and to promote the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal In each round we can see that the province was involved in the policy making process. Since the province is knowledgeable about the flooding problem of

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Jakarta, it is expected that its attendance in decision meetings could imply exercise of pressure to the decision maker to take actions regarding flood issues in East Jakarta. On the contrary, as we observe in every round, the regional level authorities had very limited influence in the decision making process.

For example, even the province government initiated to establish the governor’s decree to implement the Eastern Flood Canal but this action could not be followed up due to the Ministry of Public Work’s direction (see third round). This fact implies that the province government did not have much power to push the central government due to their position is high degree of replaceability.

In other rounds, we also observe the province government when attending meetings to discuss and find more alternatives to the problem were only for formalities. The notion of formalities can be perceived from the fact that the province government did not provide adequate data and information about Jakarta spatial during the development of master plan.

The aforementioned statement is supported with the fact that content of the majority of the master plans studies are similar and only consider technical design revision (see appendix C). Even several studies were conducted but the new studies or master plans were not provided alternative solution such as how to solve the problem related to land issues.

This lack of commitment from government may bear from the finding that we present in chapter 4. Prior to 2002 the provincial government saw themselves as the representatives of the central government and not as the representatives of the citizen. This situation made the province less interested in providing better public services to their community.

5. New actors entering new arena and proposed another alternatives program As we saw in every round, it is observed that there are two different actors from foreign countries who were involved in the policy making process of the flood control management in Jakarta, the Japanese and the Dutch governments. Both these actors provided technical assistance and funding to produce the master plan for flood control management in Jakarta.

In each round we can see that both the Dutch and Japanese governments gave different priority in implementing several projects related to the flood control

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia management. For example, in the first round, the Eastern Flood Canal was the first priority event though in the master plan. It is claimed that this decision was taken based on the decision of the Governor to give a high priority to the development of the Eastern Flood Canal.

For the next rounds (second, third round and fourth round) where new actors entered the arena, like the Japanese government, the priority given to the implementations of the project was different. In the master plan 2 (second round), high priority was given to the waste management in order to decrease the flooding in Jakarta. In the fourth round (Master Plan 1997), it was found that the highest priority was given to the Western Canal project and to the Cisadane River project.

This fact affirms what we presented in chapter 4, that the Ministry of Public Works was influenced by other actors such as the Dutch government and the Japanese government. Both actors could influence the Ministry of Public Work’s decision since they contribute to the funding of the study and to the producing of the Master Plans.

5.6 Analysis of decision process of the Eastern Flood Canal using the Stream model If we look at on the tenth round, we see that after the flood aftermath 2002, the Eastern Flood Canal eventually agreed to be implemented by the Indonesia’s government. The agreement about the division tasks and responsibility between the central and provincial government making the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal become possible.

However, there was no clear explanation why the Eastern Flood Canal was finally considered as an appropriate solution during this period. From the actor involvement and the way of interaction process conducted, there were no much significant changes compared to previous round. This condition emerge a question what contextual condition during this period that bring government attention to the Eastern Flood Canal.

We may start with the assumption that the round was finally reached a progress and followed up to the implementation stages due to the flood aftermath 2002. However, according to our analysis, considering only one factor (the flood aftermath 2002) as the critical event appeals inadequate to explain why the government finally implemented the Eastern Flood Canal. Before 2002, severe floods had hit Jakarta several times (e.g. flood 1979, 1996)

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia but during the periods, no decision was taken by the central government to construct the Eastern Flood Canal.

Therefore, in this section we intend to specify the mechanisms by which the flood in 2002 became a unique event which brought huge government’s attention and response compared to previous flood events. We indicate that the decision to implement the Eastern Flood Canal in 2002 is related to the contextual conditions during this period.

To analyze the contextual conditions in 2002, we employ a stream model to explain how the Eastern Flood Canal came to be considered as an appropriate solution to the Jakarta’s flooding problem for which it had previously been less considered.

Drawing on Kingdon’s model, this section explains the decision of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation as the result of the presence of policy entrepreneurs along with a solution stream (the Eastern Flood Canal), to a problem stream (Severe flood events) in the context of a policy window created by the institutional shift of Indonesia from centralization to decentralization that settled a better democratic system with increasing society power.

5.6.1 A Stream Model of the Eastern Flood canal Using Kingdon’s three stream framework for analyzing the Eastern Flood Canal Policy Process, the evolution of the Eastern Flood Canal can be explained in terms of the coupling, within policy windows, of problem (regular severe flood events (e.g. 1970, 1979, 1996, 2002), solutions (eastern flood canal which was first presented on master plan 1973) and politics (the institutional shift) streams.

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Figure 11 The Stream Model of the Eastern Flood Canal, Jakarta, Indonesia

Every streams of the figure including the role of policy entrepreneur will be further and explicitly discussed in the following sections.

5.6.2 Problem Stream The flood problem in Jakarta has been recognized for many years. The regular severe flood events (1970, 1979, 1996, and 2002) hit Jakarta and paralyzed the city for days. The disastrous floods have claimed victims and caused huge economic looses.

There was a general agreement that the impacts of flooding in Jakarta increased significantly and a widespread concern rose for Jakarta’s flood defenses. In addition to that, the areas that were exposed to floods increased and that was also recognized as a serious aspect of the problem. During the floods in 1996 and 2002, the figure of 78 areas of Jakarta’s without flood protection was widely discussed.

The situation drew attention of the policy maker of Indonesia to flood management in Jakarta that led to the development of problem streams. The severe flood events are an example of a focusing event that opened of policy window.

5.6.3 Policy Stream The first additional insight is that the alternative of the Eastern Flood Canal had existed long before being placed on the political agenda of the Cabinet in 1973. Already in 1918 this idea has been proposed by the Dutch consultant

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia engineer Van Der Beer. According to him flooding in Jakarta can be controlled by diverting the water flow from rivers by constructing a Western and Eastern Canal.

Years later, the Eastern Flood Canal as an alternative was taken up again by the Dutch consultant (NEDECO) on the development of the new Master Plan of flood control for Jakarta. After the severe floods in 1970s, Jakarta was assisted by the Dutch government that provided a solution for the Jakarta’s flood. Although the Eastern Flood Canal’s design was finished in 1973, it was not directly adopted by the Indonesia’s government as a recommended alternative.

After the development of the flood control master plan, several studies were carried out until 2003 to formulate long-term solutions for Jakarta’s flood control. Those studies were conducted by the central government in collaboration with several donor communities (the Netherlands and Japan).

The studies produced several perfections of previous master plan and new master plans (Master Plan II (1991), III (1997) and IV (2002)). In every master plan, the notions of acquiring flood control infrastructure appeared and the Eastern Flood Canal is always adopted as one alternative solution to control flooding in East Jakarta. During the development of the Master Plans, the design of the Eastern Flood Canal was gone through several revisions and perfections.

With regard to the policy stream, we can categorize the policy process round from 1973 – 2002 that we showed in previous chapter as the policy stream of the Eastern Flood Canal. The Eastern Flood Canal was often come up as the alternative every time the flood events occurred in Jakarta. The regular flood events can be conceptualized as the problem window to the appearing of the Eastern Flood canal on the Jakarta’s flood management agenda. However, there were no links with politics until 2002 and the Eastern Flood Canal proposals were turned down by the central government.

The proposals were not get attention may links with the political conditions during the policy stream development. During the period, most of the decision taken was done to serve the government’s interest and not public’s interest. The government saw that the construction of the Eastern Flood Canal did not give any benefit to government because its function was only to provide flood protection to 20 % areas of Jakarta (MPW,2002 ) where

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia dominated by poor settlements areas ( interviewee with representative from Ministry of Public Works ). Hence, if the Eastern Flood Canal could only protect people, it became not interesting anymore to government.

5.6.4 Political stream The institutional shift from centralization to decentralization which followed by the better democratic system in Indonesia and characterized with shared power between inter-governmental, direct election, freedom of press and increasing of society power can be conceptualized as elements in the political stream.

The shared power between inter-governmental bodies open the political window within which the problem of uncontrolled flooding was linked to the Eastern Flood Canal solution by the Province government. The changes of the provincial authorities’ position enable them to push the central government to give the support for the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal. The provincial government emphasized that the central government should contribute to the realization of the Eastern Flood Canal with budgeting support.

The freedom of press was also important to link the flood problem with the solution. The discussion of Jakarta’s floods between intergovernmental bodies, academics, and professionals were also held several times in the media. During the flood event in 2002, various media (e.g. television channels, Newspapers) published the reality of the flood impacts and criticized the government’s failure in providing adequate public flood infrastructure in Jakarta.

The increasing of the society power due to the direct election can be also conceptualized as element in the political stream. We can see this by the fact that that the agreement between central and government were done in 2002 and the Eastern Flood Canal were kicked off by the existing government in 2003. The time for taking decision and kicking of the Eastern Flood Canal construction is quite close to the first direct elections.

According to us, the direct election event which conducted in 2004 might increased the commitment of the government to show the public that the current government has both the willingness and the commitment to speed up the implementation of flood control infrastructure for ensuring Jakarta’s protection against flooding in the future. This decision served as a good

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia campaign for next election. 5.6.5 Policy Entrepreneur In Kingdon’s model, coupling of issues within a policy window is accomplished by policy entrepreneurs – advocates of particular policies who will seek to advance them on the policy agenda. Policy entrepreneurs are strategic actors. Kingdon’s claim that disparate actors can play the role of policy entrepreneur, and that different actors will play this role at different times and in different decision settings, is consistent with the Eastern Flood Canal policy process in the 1973 – 2002 periods.

In this research, we identify three sources of initiatives of policy entrepreneurship promoting the Eastern Flood Canal as an alternative to the Jakarta’s flooding problem. We identify the first source of initiatives is the Dutch consultant. As mentioned previously, two master plan studies (1973 and 1996) were produced by Indonesia’s government that collaborated with the Dutch government and promoted the Eastern Flood Canal on the master plans as priority alternative to the Jakarta’s flood.

The second source of initiative is the Jakarta authorities requesting the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal to be done immediately after the flood 2002. We categorize them as an important political entrepreneur in the revival of the Eastern Flood Canal. After decades of lack of political support, in 2002 the central government began to shift toward a supportive posture. The central government began to advocate more expansive use of the Eastern Flood Canal as an alternative for Jakarta’s flood. This shift bears from the negotiation between the central and province government initiating by the province government which led to the establishment of the MoU about the Eastern Flood Canal implementation.

The media also acted as a problem entrepreneur. Even though the media did not directly promote the Eastern Flood Canal, the “media effects” in broadcasting the reality of the impact of floods and management in Jakarta helped connect the flood event 2002 to the Eastern Flood Canal alternative.

Thus, the source of policy entrepreneurs promoting the Eastern Flood Canal as a solution varies from case to case, and can lie in the international donor, the media, and the initiative of province government.

5.6.6 Conclusion concerning Stream Model of Eastern Flood Canal The stream model is used as a model to show how finally the Eastern Flood

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Canal got attention and was considered as an alternative by the government. While we agreed that the flood aftermath 2002 as one factor accounting for the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal came up, the stream model of adds to our understanding of how the flood event of 2002 contributed to the evolution (and adoption) of the Eastern Flood Canal.

We can see three stream identified by Kingdon related to the Eastern Flood Canal implementation. The decision to finally implement the Eastern Flood Canal emerged through the coupling with the problem of flood events and severe floods (problem stream) and the development or construction of Master Plans that provided several alternatives to cope with the flood problem in Jakarta (solution stream) and the freedom of press, the society movement to speak more about their voice and direct election after the fall of Soeharto’s regimes (political stream). The Provincial government and media can be characterized as policy entrepreneurs who tried to take the opportunities and coupling those three streams so as to push the central government to see the urgency of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation.

5.7 Conclusion of Chapter 5 By structuring the policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal in rounds, we identified that the limited involvement of critical actors combined with the limited support from critical actors involved during the interaction process are the root causes of low progress of the policy process to step to the implementation stages. This aspect bears the unavailability resources for the Eastern Flood Canal implementation.

The stream model was used as a model to show how finally the Eastern Flood Canal got attention and considered by the government. We can see the three streams identified by Kingdon related to the Eastern Flood Canal implementation. The flood events and severe floods that hit Jakarta can be categorized as problem stream that opened a problem window. The development or construction of Master Plans that provided several alternatives to answer the flood problem in Jakarta can be characterized as the solution stream. The freedom of press, the society movement to speak more about their voice and the direct election after the fall of Soeharto’s regimes can be seen as the political stream. The Provincial government and the media can be characterized as policy entrepreneurs who tried to take the opportunities and to couple those three streams so the central government was forced to see the urgency of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation.

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Part C: Conclusion and Recommendation

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Chapter 6. Policy Recommendation

6.1 Introduction After analyzing the causes of the delay and opposition regarding policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal, in this chapter we will provide the answer to the third sub question “What are the strategies to alleviate the causes of the delay and oppositions regarding flood defense policy implementation in Jakarta?”

The sixth chapter consists of three sections. First, factors for the delay during the decision making process of the Eastern Flood Canal are represented in section 6.2. Following, in the next chapter recommendations for those factors are provided to alleviate the causes of the delay and opposition in the policy making process of flood control infrastructure in Jakarta. The conclusion of the chapter is presented in section 6.3.

6.2 Factors causing the delay and opposition The factors causing the delay and opposition that were found from the Eastern Flood Canal case study in its policy making process are: (i) The lack of support from the decision maker that led to the project illegitimacy; (ii) The absence of several critical authorities from the policy making process who had the power to release resources thatin return led to the unavailability of resources and support (e.g. budget, land) to implement the Eastern Flood Canal; (iii) New actors entering new arena led to different recommendation of the program priority, (iv) The limited stakeholders involvement (e.g. property owners, NGO’s) in the decision making process led to the project blocking during the implementation phase and the unwillingmess (and demotivation) of stakeholders to contribute to the succeeding of the flood control infrastructure implementation.

In the next chapter recommendations for those factors are provided with the aim to alleviate the causes of the delay and opposition in the policy making process of flood control infrastructure in Jakarta

6.2 Strategy to alleviate the causes of the delay and opposition 6.2.1 Lack of support from decision maker The lack of support from the decision maker occurred due to (i) the impact of 68`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

Eastern Flood Canal to control flood in Jakarta not convincing, (ii) the limited value or benefit of the Eastern Flood Canal, and (iii) the issue of inadequate maintenance on existing flood control infrastructures

Given the factors above, to alleviate the lack of support from decision maker we recommend to the Provincial Government or actors who propose the project to carry out an actual and detailed impact assessment of the project (e.g. social impact, economic impact, environmental impact, benefit of the project implementation, etc) at the design stage so as to increase the support from the decision maker.

The Jakarta’s government can involve the independent expert, consultants, academics or professional in conducting the assessment to bring more alternative solutions and benefits (i.e. multi added value) of the realization of flood control infrastructure. By proposing a flood control infrastructure project which has multiple added values or purposes, we might gain or increase the support from the decision maker and we can also attract investors or external loans to get project funds.

Another issue such as the inadequate maintenance of existing canals by the provincial authority also bears bad experiences to the decision maker (that is the central government) and makes him reluctant to commit to be involved in flood control infrastructure project proposed by the Provincial Government. The Provincial Government as the institution which responsible to perform this task should respond actively to this maintenance issues. The Provincial Government should provide the answer to this problem so the bad experience on the past will not be repeated again in the future.

During the interview it was found that Provincial Government is difficult to provide the fundamental solution for the maintenance issue because the variety of the problem causes. According to Provincial Government, the causal factors of the inadequate maintenance vary ranging from corruption issues, lack of citizens awareness, weak enforcement of regulations, lack of human resources, lack of equipments, lack of budget allocation, etc. Due to the variety and complexity of the problems, the Provincial Government encounters difficulty to define starting point of solution for the maintenance issue.

Therefore, we recommend the Provincial Government to start with conducting an evaluation to find the fundamental causes of the maintenance

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia problems. The evaluation of inadequate maintenance should be carried on honestly and with highly commitment. Another suggestion is to involve independent analysts for conducting the assessment with good skills and expertise so as to produce a good assessment and to find the root causes of the maintenance problem.

6.2.2 The absence of several critical authorities in policy making process By referring back to the previous chapters, it becomes clear that to assure the success of the flood control infrastructure implementation, the actor who proposes a certain project of flood control infrastructure need other actor resources and power to support them in implementing the project. Taking a decision without the support from critical authorities who hold the resources to which the project realization are highly dependent bears the delay or even failure of the project realization.

Therefore, we recommend to the Provincial Government, in taking a decision of certain project to ensure that all critical actors are involved in the decision making process. Their involvement should not be limited to formalities but realized with strong commitment.

The practice of only submitting the final report of the Master Plan Programs and requesting the resources support from critical actors without giving them a chance to realize their interest in the decision making process should be abandoned. If this practice continues then the master plan programs will only be stacked on shelves and will not be read (neither supported) by the critical actors or authorities.

As we stated in the previous chapter, the willingness of an actor to use his resources depends on how much cost and benefit he can gain by the implementation of a certain decision. Bringing only a single purpose like we saw in the Eastern Flood Canal (i.e. only to control flood) will restrain the commitment from actors. Hence, it is important to provide multiple values of the project implementation or to attract the interest of the critical actors by involving them in the decision making process. For instance, given the economic condition of Indonesia, there is a possibility that the budget support from the Ministry of Finance might be difficult to gain. Therefore, Jakarta’s province should also broaden the issues to gain support from the Ministry of Finance. Bringing issues on how the Eastern Flood Canal can benefit on micro or macro economic could be raised during the negotiations.

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The decisions should be made after all critical authorities commit to and agree upon bringing their resources forward. Then, the agreement should stipulated legally and declare to public to assure the accountability of the agreement.

6.2.3 The limited stakeholders involving in policy making process Another important factor that caused the opposition of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation is the limited stakeholders’ involvement in the policy making process. We can see this in the case of the Eastern Flood Canal. The non-involvement of affected stakeholders resulted in the high opposition. The opposition consequently impeded the construction of the canal and can not be completed on time and the cost of the project was overrun.

Therefore, Indonesia’s government should realize that given the decentralization in Indonesia, the traditional top down practice such as making or deciding certain policy without taking the interest of stakeholders into account is not compatible anymore. It is important to let stakeholders participate in policy making process to give them a chance to realize their interest and therefore it will increase their support to the implementation of the proposed project. The implementation of the flood control infrastructure must include the involvement of a wider circle of participants in the decision making process outside the boundary of governmental actors only and the respective bureaucracy.

In essence, stakeholder participation is a condition which has to be fulfilled to make flood control implementation and management effective. Programs planning related to flood management without the involvement of the beneficiaries or the affected have a reduced chance of fulfillment. The decisions should be made after all interests have been looked at or at least after stakeholders were offered the opportunity to bring their interests forward.

However, stakeholders’ participation should be done with well prepared arrangements and positions from both participation facilitators and participants. It is noteworthy that the more parties involved, the more interests must be accommodated and hence, too much bureaucracy inter-path (red-tape), so that the process of cross-sectoral coordination and implementation of activities (development) is likely to be hampered, or even canceled.

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Concerning the level of stakeholder participation, there is a limitation that not all flood control infrastructure activities can be done by all stakeholders up to the level of empowerment. Thus, the degree of interest, influence, power, resources and importance of each stakeholder should be identified in advance in order to determine the extent to which stakeholders can be involved.

Therefore, formulation of stakeholder participation can not be done without careful arrangement of the position and the urgency of each stakeholder because the ability of a stakeholder to use his power and resources depends on the position of the stakeholder in the network. The willingness of an actor to use his resources whether or not to support the decision depends on how much cost and benefit he can gain by the implementation of a certain decision.

However, we realize that involving stakeholders is not an easy step to conduct in Jakarta giving the long practice of command-and-control in decision making. The participatory approach is new to Jakarta’s community. During the interviews we found that most of the officers of the regional authorities are not familiar with the stakeholder approach (the participatory policy making). This is the reason why the negotiation of compensation schemes of the Eastern Flood Canal was fruitless.

Due to this condition, we recommend the Provincial government to conduct a comparison study of the participation policy making practices that exist in several countries so as to learn from existing practices and learn about the best practices of participatory processes. To increase the understanding of the officer of the Provincial government about the participatory process, several workshops could also be conducted. The provincial government could request assistance from experts from other countries to train them about organizing and facilitating a participatory process.

6.2.4 The low commitment from Provincial government The low commitment from the Provincial Government to address the flood problems generally and flood control infrastructure implementation specifically is due to their position as the representative of the Central government on the past. The transition from centralization to decentralization structure increased the commitment of the Regional government to provide answers for the flood problems in Jakarta due to the condition that the citizens now contribute to evaluate the performance of government in dealing with flood problem. Therefore, the Government needs to show that they have

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia high commitment to do something about the flood problem otherwise they will not be elected in the future. For this reason, we recommended to keep the decentralization practice in Indonesia so the government will give more concern to the public issues such as flood problem in Indonesia.

6.2.5 Other findings By using the stream model, we find that the role of windows of opportunity and policy entrepreneurs is critical to the decision event of the Eastern Flood Canal in 2002.

The role of policy entrepreneurs (e.g. in this case is Jakarta government) to seize the opportunity by coupling the political window (increased power of society due to transition from centralization to decentralization) with policy (e.g. several studies (1973 – 2002) produced several master plan) and problem window (e.g. flood aftermath 2002 and regular severe flood events) led to the increased support from political parties to implement the Eastern Flood Canal.

When the political window opened (the institutional shift from centralization to decentralization), the media seized the freedom of press to broadcast the reality of flood aftermath 2002 in Jakarta. The Jakarta government utilized the free elections event to gain budget support from the central government. For being (re-)elected, it is important for the government to show to the people that they take action in coping with the floods and thus, promoted the Eastern Flood Canal as an alternative. The Eastern Flood Canal was kicked off in 2003, one year before the first direct election was conducted.

Considering this finding, we recommend to the policy entrepreneurs to have a perceptive eye to sudden events (e.g. aftermaths, political changes, etc) that could open the opportunity to gain the support of the political parties for the realization of a certain policy. However, in seizing the opportunity, it should be considered that gaining only political support because of the opened windows of opportunity without conducting good assessment of the program implementation could also lead to an implementation failure.

This is also found in the Eastern Flood Canal case. The political reason such as showing people that current government takes action for resolving the flood problems (e.g. by kicking off the Eastern Flood Canal one year before the elections) in order to be elected without a good assessment (e.g. social and environmental impact, current field condition) and preparation on how to

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia implement it, it can lead to the many problems during the implementation. Therefore, it is very important to carry out an actual and detailed impact assessment of the implementation of the flood control infrastructure project (e.g. social impact, economic impact, environmental impact, benefit of the project implementation, etc) at the design stage.

6.3 Conclusion The important strategies to improve the policy making process of flood control infrastructure in the future involve the increase of professionalism, the involvement of academics and experts to conduct an impact assessment of the flood control infrastructure project to enlighten the importance of the project to decision maker and to increase his support for the realization of the project. In dealing with maintenance issues, we propose the Provincial government to conduct an evaluation by involving independent experts/consultants to provide an unbiased/objective assessment and exploration of the root causes of inadequate maintenance.

We recommend the Province government to identify the critical actors who hold the resources and involve those critical actors in decision process. To attract the critical actors involving in the process, we suggest to broad the issues such as bringing the economic and social aspect during the interaction process. The decision should be taken after all critical authorities commit to and agree upon bringing their resources forward. Then, the agreement should stipulated legally and declared to the public so as to assure the accountability of the agreement.

The third recommendation is to keep the decentralization practice in Indonesia so the government will give more concern to the public issues such as flood problem in Indonesia.

And the last recommendation is to involve a wider circle of participants in the decision making process outside the boundary of government and bureaucracy (e.g. land owners, NGO’s, Jakarta’s community forum). However, given the long lasted centralization and autocratic practice in Indonesia, most of the officers of the regional authorities are not familiar with participatory approaches. Due to this condition, we recommend the government to conduct a comparison study so as to learn about the organization and realization of participatory processes by examples/cases from different countries and to explore existing practices.

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Chapter 7 Concluding Remarks

7.1 Introduction The objective of the research is to identify the causes of the delay and opposition regarding Eastern Flood Canal implementation. In the previous chapter, we have found that the delay of Eastern Flood Canal implementation occurred not simply because of budget limitation during the implementation phase. As we presented in chapters 4 and 5, the institutional form of the water sector in Indonesia and the way of the Eastern Flood Canal policy making process conducted play an important role to the root of the unavailability vital resources during the implementation phase. Several factors that cause the delay and opposition of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation from the policy making process have been analyzed in chapter 5.

To answer our research questions, several steps have been completed so far. First the problem under investigation and the research objective was formulated (Chapter 1). The research aims to identify the causes of the delay and opposition regarding the Eastern Flood Canal implementation and to recommend strategy to alleviate the causes so as to improve the flood defense policy making process of Jakarta in the future.

The causes of the delays and the opposition regarding the implementation of the Eastern Flood canal are rooted in the two aspects: the influence of institutional shift from centralization to decentralization to the decision making process and the influence of policy making process to the implementation delay of Eastern Flood Canal.

Second, to achieve the research objective, the data were gathered from desk research including from Jakarta’s government legal documents related to Eastern Flood Canal, literature, interview and previous research works. Then the collected data were interpreted and structured using three models, the actor analysis, round and stream model.

The actor analysis was used to analyze the position of actors related to the before and after decentralization and how their position affects their behaviour during the policy making process. Two models were used to structure the policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal, the round model and the stream model. The round model was used to evaluate the influence of actors on policy making process and the stream model was used to analyze why after a 30 years delay the Eastern Flood Canal was consider as the

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia appropriate solution.

These are the answers of the research sub-questions that have been presented in detail in previous chapters (Chapter 4 and 5) and are also presented briefly in the sixth chapter. After that the strategy to alleviate the causes of the delay and opposition were given in chapter 6.

In this chapter, the findings and the conclusion for this research are presented. The main findings are presented in Section 7.1. Following, the conclusion for this research is presented in Section 7.2.

7.2. Main findings 7.2.1 The influence of institutional structure and changes to the policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal. The policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal had been took place for many years. Based on our findings, two distinct phases can clearly be distinguished in the macro context of the Eastern Flood Canal policy processes.

First, the Eastern Flood Canal Master Plans were constructed during Soeharto’s regimes (prior to 1999) when the government practice in Indonesia was highly centralized and autocratic including in water management sector and the public infrastructure development funds were relied on external loans.

Second, the decision to implement the Eastern Flood Canal was taken by Indonesia’s government after the transition from centralization to decentralization took place in 1999 (see figure 11). The institutional change in Indonesia bears more democratic processes and characterized by a free election, freedom of the press and more transparent.

Figure 12 Two distinct phase of the Eastern Flood Canal Policy Making Process

In this research, we use actor analysis ( Enserink, et. al, 2009 ) to evaluate the influence of the institutional structure and changes to the policy making

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia process of the Eastern Flood Canal. The following table summarizes the findings concerning the influence of the institutional shift to the position of actors and the explanation of the findings is presented afterwards.

Table 8 Overview table for classification of interdependencies during centralization period Dedicated actor Non dedicated actor Critical actor Non critical actor Critical actor Non critical actor Similar/supportive Ministry of Public Provincial Ministry of interest and Works government Finance objectives Municipality of Ministry of Social government Affairs Conflicting Donor Land owners, interest and community Citizens, NGO’s. objective

Table 9 Overview table for classification of interdependencies after decentralization Dedicated actor Non dedicated actor Critical actor Non critical actor Critical actor Non critical actor Similar/supportive Provincial Ministry of interest and objectives government Finance Ministry of Public Works Municipality of government

Conflicting interest and Donor Ministry of Media, NGO’s objective community Finance, Land owners Citizens, Land Owner

We argue that given the centralized administrative system during the first phase of the policy process of the Eastern Flood Canal (1973 – 1999), the central government as the critical actor would take control on policy making process prior to 1999 because the power resides on it for planning and policy making relating to flood control infrastructure.

As we present in table 8, we identify several critical actors in which the successful of Eastern Flood Canal implementation is highly depend on. They are the central government (e.g. the Ministry of Public Works) and Donor community. The remaining actors (e.g. Province, Municipality, etc) are categorized as non critical actors by considering that they did not exercise to direct policies or use their power during the centralization period. Their

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia position is quite controlled by the central government as we explained in chapter 5. The support from the critical actors is very important to the successful of a certain policy to be implemented, ( Enserink, et. al, 2009 ). Based on our analysis, we hypothesize that the unimplemented of the Eastern Flood Canal project on 1973 – 1999 period may derive from the inexistence or unsupported of the aforementioned critical actors during the policy making process.

As long as there was no interest from the critical actors in providing their support, the implementation of the Eastern Flood Canal appealed impossible. However, it does not mean that the non critical actors should be ignored because they might have a resource which may important to support the implementation of certain policy. Therefore, we also hypothesize that some of the non critical actors may have resources but they might not have a capacity to use their resources or they might not be willing to use their resources to influence the policy direction of the Eastern Flood Canal.

Based on our analysis, some changes of the actor positions are existed after the institutional shift from centralization to decentralization (see table 8). After decentralization, we argue that that the powers that before resided much on the central government have been shared to several actors. Due to this shared power, we can observe that several actors such as Province, Municipality, Land Owners, Local Parliament and citizens included as critical actors (see table 9).

We expect that the existence and support of these additional critical actors during the policy making process after decentralization become critical to the successful of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation. Since the decision to implement the Eastern Flood Canal was taken after decentralization we hypothesize that the delay and opposition during the implementation phase of the Eastern Flood Canal occurred because the decision was taken before all critical actors agreed or commit to release their resources.

7.2.2. The influence of the policy making processes of Eastern Flood Canal to its implementation delay and opposition. The second aspect that is analyzed in this thesis is the influence of the policy making processes of the Eastern Flood Canal to its implementation delay and opposition. The policy making process of the Eastern Flood Canal was structured with round model.

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Based on our observations in all rounds, we notice that several critical actors were not involved in the process. Our second observation is the central government dominated the interaction process in most of the rounds and gave limited support to the realization of the Eastern Flood Canal. We also observed that the donor community played an important role in directing the project priority that made the Eastern Flood Canal sometimes to become or not to become a priority.

Our third observation is that after the decentralization, there were no significant changes in the way the policy making process was conducted. Even though several stakeholders were involved only after the decentralization, participation of multiple stakeholders was very limited.

As we present in previous section, the existence and support from actors who hold resources are important to the successful implementation of the certain policy. By combining our findings about the position of actors before and after decentralization to our observation result from the policy rounds, we conclude that the delay of the Eastern Flood Canal derived from several factors as following: (i) The lack of support from the Ministry of Public Works as one of the critical actors which lead to the project illegitimacy, (ii) The absences of several critical actors which lead to the unavailability of resources in which the Eastern Flood Canal implementation is highly depend on. (iii) Stakeholders involvement who were affected by the Eastern Flood Canal implementation was very limited in the policy making process which lead to the high opposition during the implementation phase. (iv) The interaction process in each round is not conducted with high commitment especially from the province government. This may happen because of their position as the representative of the central government which lead to the less interest to serve the public interest (e.g Eastern Flood Canal)

In sum, the success of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation requires supports from multiple actors. On the contrary, based on the observations we identify that several important actors or critical authorities were not involved in the policy making process. At the same time, the critical actors who were involved in the policy making process gave limited support to the realization of the Eastern Flood Canal. As a result, we implied that the limited involvement and support of the critical actors and stakeholders is one of the

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia root causes of the unavailability of the resources and opposition during the implementation phase of the Eastern Flood Canal.

7.2.3 By using the stream model , the absence of link between Eastern Flood Canal Solution and Flood problem with the political stream lead to the weak political will to implement the Eastern Flood Canal. According to our findings, several factors bearing the delay of policy making process that we find by using round model such as the lack of support from decision makers and critical actors (low political support) and limited stakeholder involvement bears from the absence of political window on that time.

Once the window of opportunity open (congruence between three windows as shown in figure), the political support was eventually gained and the Eastern Flood Canal became considered by the government as appropriate solution for flood in Jakarta.

In this thesis we find the role of windows of opportunity and policy entrepreneur to the realization of the Eastern Flood Canal. The decision to finally implement the Eastern Flood Canal emerged through the coupling with the problem of flood events and severe floods (problem stream) and the development or construction of Master Plans that provided several alternatives to cope with the flood problem in Jakarta (solution stream) and the freedom of press, the society movement to speak more about their voice and direct election after the fall of Soeharto’s regimes (political stream).

The Provincial government and media can be characterized as policy 80`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia entrepreneurs who tried to take the opportunities and coupling those three streams so as to push the central government to see the urgency of the Eastern Flood Canal implementation.

7.2.4 The strategies to alleviate the causes of the delay and opposition 1. Lack of support from decision maker which lead to the project illegitimacy Recommendation: Carry out actual and detailed impact assessment of the flood control infrastructure project (e.g. social impact, economic impact, environmental impact, benefit of the project implementation, etc) at design stage to increase the support from decision maker. The result of such studies should not be compromised. The Jakarta’s government can involve the independent expert, consultants, academics or professionalism in conducting the assessment to bring more alternative solutions and benefits of the realization of flood control infrastructure. In dealing with maintenance issues, we propose the Provincial government to conduct evaluation by involving independent assessor to provide honest assessment and good learning about the root causes of inadequate maintenance on the past. 2. Absence of critical authorities in decision making process Recommendation: Identify the critical authorities who have means of power or resources to realize the implementation of the flood control infrastructure and involve them in decision making process with strong commitment. Provide multi value of the project implementation (e.g. economic benefit) to increase the willingness of the critical authorities to involve in decision making process. The realization of the flood control infrastructure such as canal highly depends on vital resources (e.g. budget, lands). The inexistence of vital resources will lead to the delay or even the failure of the project implementation. The decisions should be made after all critical authorities commit and agree to bring their resources forward. The agreement should stipulated legally and declare to public to assure the accountability of the agreement. 3. The limited stakeholders involving (e.g. Land owners, NGO’s, community forum) in policy making process Recommendation: Implementation of flood control infrastructure must include the involvement of wider circle of stakeholders in the policy process outside the boundary of government and bureaucracy (e.g. Land owner, NGO’s, community forum). Given the transition to decentralization form and increasing power of society, the limited stakeholder involvement in policy making process of flood control infrastructure is not compatible anymore. Therefore, give space to the

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stakeholders to realize their interest and listen to their voice during negotiations is very important. All affected stakeholders should gain and realize the benefit from the implementation of a certain decision unless high opposition and blocking during implementation could impede the successfully of the implementation. Stakeholder involvement could also increase the rationality of implementing a certain project. 4. Lack of commitment from Provincial Government Recommendation: The transition from centralization to decentralization form increase the commitment of Regional government to provide answer for the flood problems in Jakarta due to the condition that the citizens now contribute to evaluate the performance of government in dealing with flood problem. Therefore, Government needs to show that they have high commitment to do something about the flood problem unless they will not be elected in the future. For this reason, we recommended to keep the decentralization practice in Indonesia so the government will give more concern to the public issues such as flood problem in Indonesia. 5. Additional recommendation We also recommend to policy entrepreneur that it is important to have a perceptive eye to suddenly event (e.g. aftermaths, political changes, etc) that could open the opportunity to gain political parties support of a certain policy realization. However, in seizing the opportunity, it should consider that gaining only political support because of the opened windows of opportunity without conducting good assessment of the program implementation could also lead to the implementation failure. This is also found in the Eastern Flood Canal case. The political reason such as showing people that current government do something about flood problems (e.g. by kicking off the Eastern Flood Canal one year before the elections) in order to be elected without good assessment (e.g. social and environmental impact, current field condition) and preparation on how to implement it lead to the many problems during the implementation. Therefore, it is very important to carry out actual and detailed impact assessment of the flood control infrastructure policy (e.g. the institutional arrangements for the implementation, social impact, economic impact, environmental impact, benefit of the project implementation, , etc) at the design stage (so as to avoid or at least, eliminate as much as possible the implementation failure).

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Chapter 8 Reflection

8.1. Reflect to the research This research intends to evaluate the decisive causes of the policy implementation delay. The answer to the research question has been given. However, there are many aspects that actually may contribute to the policy implementation delay in this study such as the corruption issues, the cultural aspects, the socio economic condition of Jakarta, etc. However, due to the time and data limitation, this study did not give much attention to those aspects.

During data collection activities, we also faced some limitations in collecting data and information related to the flood control infrastructure delays. During the literature study and review, most of the articles found were related to the flood problem in Jakarta in general and very few discussed a specific case related to the delay of flood control infrastructure in Jakarta. Therefore we found difficulties to asses our findings with previous work.

There is also some data limitation that we got from interview. Since the research study span from 1970s – 2003, most of the respondent already forgot the real process during that period. Therefore, during the interview most of data we got only describe the current condition of the Eastern Flood canal and less information about the past situation. Information about the policy process on the past was only gathered from legal governmental documents.

However, we indeed feel that meeting directly the respondent and the public works government easing us to access their legal documents. We think that it will be different if we do not directly visit Jakarta in conducting the data collection. Building communication and trust make them more opened and trusted us to access the legal documents government related to our case. Those data that we got from legal documents of government did help us to build a strong argument in analyzing the policy process of our research case.

Choosing the right method to analyze the policy process of a policy is also nightmare for the researcher. There were so many methods and understanding them all was impossible due to the time limitation. Some problems were found during the analysis especially when using the actor analysis. The researcher found difficulties in categorized the critical actors and also problem owners. The definition or the provision in categorizing the critical actors it was not really clear. But the actors analysis it did help us to find the weaknesses of the way of policy round were conducted and ease us

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia to related them to the delay of implementation. The researcher also did not have much background on public policy analysis. We just learn and study of public policy on master study.

The strength of our research is that we did not hired specifically by the Indonesia’s government. We think that this condition can limit the bias of our analysis. But after we read the complete report, we do feel that there were few biases during the research. We also got some limitation related to the opposition from the citizens. The areas of the Eastern Flood Canal consist of many regions, and we only interviewed five citizens. If we interview more citizens and NGO’s, we might find different opinion related to the opposition issues.

8.2 Reflect to the models used In this research, we use round model to structure and depict the policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal. We want to focus on the influence of actors’ behaviour and interactions to the duration of the policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal.

Round model can be use to structure the complexity of the Eastern Flood Canal policy process. It help us to structure the process in series decision making activities and ease us to observe who actors involved in each round, what their actions in each rounds and how their actions influence the duration of the policy making process. The round model

But according to us, to analyze the interaction process of each round in policy process, it is better to understand first the position of actors in network so we can have deep understanding why the actors during the interaction process might or might not behave like they did.

The actor analysis can be use to evaluate the position of actors and formulate hypothesis their perception about the problem and how the might behave during the decision making process. The actor analysis has been proven to be a useful tool in modeling actor position in the network. Additionally, actor analysis can be used to analyze and investigate the dependency between actors and help us in building strategy to improve the policy making process.

8.3 Recommendation for Future Research This research investigates the causes of the delay and opposition regarding Eastern Flood Canal Implementation. The main concern is focusing on the

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affect of institutional transition from centralization to decentralization to the decision making process and actors during the interaction process of policy making process of Eastern Flood Canal. Many aspects are not included in this research such as the affect of external factors (economic condition, corruption issues, culture etc). This is because of the limitation in time and information. The connection from the above aspects could be included in the further research so that the evaluation of the causes of the delay and opposition is more plausible.

The first further research should be performed by including the affect of external factors to the delay and opposition to the Eastern Flood Canal implementation such as the economic condition and political stability. The second further research could be to find the decisive causes of the inadequate maintenance of existing flood canal infrastructure so to provide recommendation to Jakarta Government on how to deal with this problem. The third further research could be to provide strategy and recommendation on how to apply the participatory process in Jakarta in a right way related to flood problem generally and flood control infrastructure specifically given the condition that the Indonesia has been practice centralization and autocratic for a long time.

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References

• Bappeda 2003, Penyusunan Rencana Pengembangan Kawasan Banjir Kanal Timur, Jakarta, LIPI ITB. • Bappenas 2007, Direktorat Pengairan dan Irigasi – Kedeputian Sarana dan Prasarana Kementerian Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional Penanggulan Banjir Jakarta. • Bhat. A, et. al, 2005, Institutional and Policy Analysis of River Basin Management, The Brantas River Basin, East Java, Indonesia • Bhat. A and Mollinga. P. P, 2009, Transition in Indonesian water policy: policy windows through crisis, response through implementation • Caljouw. M, et. al , 2004, Flooding in Jakarta Towards a blue city with improved water management. • Cybriwsky. R, 2001, City profile Jakarta, Department of Geography and Urban Studies, Temple University, 309 Gladfelter Hall (025-26), 1115 West Berks Street, Philadelphia, PA 19122-6089, USA Larry R. Ford San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA • Dauvergne. P, 1993 – 1994, Pasific Affairs, University of British Columbia, The Politics of Deforestration in Indonesia • Darmawan. R, 2008, University of Twente, the Netherlands, The practices of decentralization in Indonesia and its implication on local competitiveness. • Drijver. C. A., 1991, People’s participation in environmental projects in developing countries • De Jong. M. W, 1999, Insitutional Structure and Variation of Information: An International Comparison of Transport Infrastructure Decision Making • Enserink. B et. al, 2009, Policy Analysis of Multi Actor System • Ferrazzi, G, 2000, Federalism in Indonesia’s Decentralization Discourse • Government Regulations No 22 of 1982 • Hans & Ernst, 2008, Management in Networks on multi actor decision making • JFCAM, 1996, ‘Jakarta Flood Control Advisory Mission by NEDECO’ • JFM 2007, ‘Dutch assistance with non-structural measures Jakarta Flood Management” • JICA, 1991, The Study on Urban Drainage and Wastewater Disposal Project in the City of Jakarta – Master Plan Study

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• Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 1997, The Study on the Comprehensive Management Plan for Jakarta, Final Report, The Republic of Indonesia: Ministry of Public Works, Directorate of Water Resources Development • Jhonson. R. W and Minis. H. P, 1990, Toward Democratic Decentralization: Approaches to Promoting Good Governance • JICA, 1997a, ‘Detailed Design for Urban Drainage Project in the City of Jakarta’; • Kingdon. J 1985, Agendas, alternatives and public policies. • Law No. 5 of 1974 on “The principles of Regional Government” • Law No. 11 of 1974 • Law No. 22 of 1999 on “Local Government” • Lipson. M, 2005, A Garbage Can Model of UN Peacekeeping • Michaels. S, et. al, 2006, Policy Windows, Policy Change, and Organizational Learning, Watersheds in the Evolution of Watershed Management • Mody, J. 2001, Literature Review: Management of River Basin System through Decentralization. • Momerandum of Understanding (Nota Kesepakatan) 2002, Menteri Pemukiman dan Prasana Wilayah dengan Gubernur DKI Jakarta • Mucciaroni. G, 1992, The Garbage Can Model & the Study of Policy Making: A critique • Nasir. H, Flood since Batavia until Jakarta (1614-2008). • NEDECO 1973, Master Plan for Flood Control and Drainage System of Jakarta. • NEDECO, 2002, Final report quick reconnaissance studies flood JABODETABEK 2002, Main report, 10 July 2002. • NIKKEN Consultants & NIPPON KOEI Co. 1997, The study on comprehensive river water management plan in JABOTABEK. 8 Vols. March 1997. • Presentation, Presentation ‘Outline of East Jakarta Flood Control Project (East Banjir Canal)’. Ciliwung-Cisadane River Basin Development Project Office, June 2002. • Purnama. D, 2003, Reform of the EIA process in Indonesia: Improving the Role of Public Involvement. • Prakoso. A, 2008, Pembebasan hak atas tanah dalam pembangunan banjir kanal timur. 87`

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• Rudyanto. B, et. al, 2007, Community Based Flood Mitigation Project: The case study of Bandung City, Indonesia. • Soenarno and Sasongko.D, 1998, “Participatory planning and management for flood mitigation and preparedness in the city of Jakarta. • Steinberg. F, 2007, Jakarta: Environmental problems and sustainability, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Manila, Philippines • Soncini-Sessa. R, et. al, 2007, Integrated and Participatory Water Resources Management • Tambunan. M. P., 2007, Department of Geography, University of Indonesia, Flooding Area in the Jakarta province on February 2 to 4 2007 • Teismann, 2000, Model for Research into decision making processes: On Phase, Stream and Decision Making Rounds. • Udanjaya, W. W., 2007, Proses Pembebasan Tanah Untuk Proyek Banjir Kanal Timur: Suatu Pendekatan System Thinking • Usman. S, 2001, The SMERU Research Institute, Indonesia’s Decentralization Policy: Initial Experiences and Emerging Problems • WJEMP, 2002 “Drainage Management for Jakarta: Strategic Action Program Development (DKI 3-9)” • WJEMP, 2000, capacity building of Drainage Management of Jakarta • www.pu.go.id

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Part D: Appendix

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Appendix A. Factors that causes the delay from decision rounds

Round Factors that cause the delay of Due to the decision making process Round I Lack of support from decision Incompatibility of the maker (i.e. there strong financial programs/policy design commitment from decision with the financial situation maker are very low the annual of Indonesia budget did not follow the master plan schedule There were no investors attract to Due to the uninterested invest for the realization of the purposed/single value. The Eastern Flood canal purpose of the Eastern Flood Canal were only to provide flood protection. No benefit can gain by investors for the implementation of the canal Round II The decision of the decision High cost and difficulties for maker to leave/ revised earlier land acquisition program by build completely new program (eg. Cengkareng drain) No benefit for government by implementing this canals Round III The previous planning becomes Construction delay increase more irrelevant project cost due to inflation and swelling of land acquisition cost The uncontrolled urbanization growth and the absence of spatial planning cause the implementation of the eastern flood canal faced difficulties. Most of the lands which should be designated to the eastern flood canal construction have been changed to settlement areas

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Round Factors that cause the delay of Due to the decision making process and industrial areas. Planning becomes irrelevant. The programs of master plans do not integrated into regional spatial planning agencies and vice versa The priority at the level of the national government were low because they were no convinced right away that the eastern flood canal was a good solutions to control flood in Jakarta This reason bears from the fact that the flood in Jakarta caused by many factors (many rivers). Meanwhile the Eastern Flood Canal can only divert flood from 5 rivers. Lack of capacity from regional Weak position (institutional level to push government or to barriers) of regional gain support from government government. If he tried to block government decision or to push government, his position may e threated and changed by other people. Round IV The new master plan only Most of the institutions who provides consider technical deal with flood problems issues to answer problem about only have skills in technical cost reduction for land issues meanwhile the acquisition. implementation of eastern flood canal is socio technical issues where could be only successfully implemented by combining or integrating the social and technical aspect

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Round Factors that cause the delay of Due to the decision making process No response from ministry of Financial capability is not public works due to the openly, honestly considered alternative design did not give as a constraint. Involvement answer to problem about budget of financial authorities in the and land acquisitions issues planning process is limited to formalities, i.e. attending meeting/discussion and ceremony without actual commitment Round V and IV No budget available from central Economic crisis and political government instability after the fall of soeharto The lateness of regional government to seize the opportunity (problem windows) This lateness make the issues of floods were not attracted and get attention anymore and people already forgot about floods The issues about the in Lack of capacity and buget availability of data and allocation from central information about Jakarta government topography were also directly available from authority agency.

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Appendix B Interview Design

Interview: Citizens 1. Introduction • Introduce my self: Name, Student of TU Delft, etc • Explain the purpose of the interview: the purpose of the interview is to get the information about the eastern canal and the opinion of citizens surrounding about the implementation of this canal. The information will be used for master thesis project • Organizational of the interview: i. The interview will take 30 – 45 minutes ii. Ten questions iii. Ask permission for using tape recorder iv. Anonymous report List of questions 1. What do you know about the construction of east canal? From whom (Media, internet, letter, friends, etc) 2. According to you to what extent that people live surrounding canal realize the importance of the canal? 3. To what extent do you agree or disagree of the construction of the canal? And why? 4. Have you ever been invited for discussing about eastern canal? 5. Did you invite for negotiation about land acquisition? 6. If yes, who were involved/invited in the meeting? 7. To what extent do you agree or disagree about the way of negotiation conducted between citizens and government? Why? 8. How close the result of negotiation between public and government is implemented in reality? 9. Are you willing to move from this canal area? Why? 10. To what extent do you agree or disagree about your land acquisition? Why? 11. How the procedure to get compensation about land acquisition? 12. How is the process or procedure to give feedback or opinion to government regarding east canal implementation? 13. What do you think the government should improve in introducing the flood defense policy? Closing: • Thank respondent for his/her cooperation

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• Conclusion about the result of interview • Explain the purpose of the interview: the purpose of the interview is to get the information about the eastern canal and the opinion of citizens surrounding about the implementation of this canal. The information will be used for master thesis project • Ask for another person that could be interviewed

Respondent Name: Policy Designer/Central government 1. Introduction • Introduce my self: Name, Student of TU Delft, etc • Explain the purpose of the interview: the purpose of the interview is to get the information about the design phase and institutional structure of flood defense policy: eastern canal. • Organizational of the interview: i. The interview will take 45 – 60 minutes • How does communication/negotiation conduct with citizen surroundings canal and what is the result? • How does communication/negotiation conduct with citizen surroundings canal and what is the result? i. Ask permission for using tape recorder • Anonymous report 2. List of questions: Policy Design phase: 1. How the eastern canal’s design was developed (1973-2003)? • First design: 1973 • Design perfection: 1991-1997 • Design perfection: 2002 For each phase the following questions will be asked: • Who was involved? • How the outcomes of a policy design process were communicated to the public: • What was the goal? • What were the motives? • What were the policy alternatives? • What elements were considered when choose eastern canal as one of the policy tools to manage the flood risk in Jakarta?

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• What were the targets? • What were the results of the activity? • Is there any relevant documents? (Policy documents or description of eastern canal design) Kick off of construction: 2003 2. The first design was finished on 1973 and the implementations faced delay for more than 30 years. Was there any adjustment done to the previous design? (For instance: adjustment of requirement, resources, goal, political feasibility, behaviour assumption about the target population, etc) 3. Eastern flood canal construction was started on 2003. Was there any urgency for east canal construction at that time? - Election - Extreme flood 2002 4. In your opinion, is eastern canal needed in Jakarta? And why? 5. What according to you the main reasons that the canal construction target is not reached? 6. In your opinion, how does the long delay affect the implementation of eastern canal nowadays? 7. According to your experience as policy designer, what are the strategies to minimize the long delay of the transition from design to implementation? Institutional setting: • Institutional structure • Organization structure (number of organizations involved to implement the eastern canal) • Task distribution • Control and monitor • Communication style • What are the affect of institutional changes (centralization – decentralization in 1999) to the task distribution, communication style control, etc? • What are the affect of institutional changes to the informal institution and to east canal implementation? 14. Closing: • Thank respondent for his/her cooperation • Conclusion about the result of interview • Explain the purpose of the interview: the purpose of the

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interview is to get the information about the eastern canal and the opinion of citizens surrounding about the implementation of this canal. The information will be used for master thesis project • Ask if sending the interview report is needed • Ask for another person that could be interviewed

Interview: Policy implementer / Local government 1. Introduction • Introduce my self: Name, Student of TU Delft, etc • Explain the purpose of the interview: the purpose of the interview is to get the information about the eastern canal and the opinion of citizens surrounding about the implementation of this canal. The information will be used for master thesis project • Organizational of the interview: i. The interview will take 30 – 45 minutes ii. Eight questions iii. Ask permission for using tape recorder • Anonymous report List of questions: Policy implementation: 1. Who/which organizations are involved in the eastern flood policy implementation? 2. What is your role in the eastern flood canal policy process (designer, implementer, controller, etc)? 3. What are your duties in eastern canal policy implementation? 4. What is the goal of flood management risk in Jakarta? 5. In your opinion, how eastern canal can achieve the goal/outcomes of Jakarta’s flood management risk? 6. What is the specific task of your organization related to eastern canal? 7. In your opinion, how far does your organization reach the task? 8. In your opinion, is eastern canal needed in Jakarta? And why? 9. What kind of support needed to the success of the canal construction and from whom? 10. What do you think about eastern canal construction currently? 11. Under which circumstances east canal construction is possible? 12. What according to you the main reasons that the canal construction target is not reached? (Land acquisition, etc)

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13. According to you to what extent that people live surrounding canal realize the importance of the canal? 14. How citizens were informed about the implementation of the canal? 15. What kind of information is delivered to citizens? 16. What are the responds of citizens about canal construction? 17. How does communication/negotiation about land acquisition conduct with citizen surroundings canal? 18. How do citizens communicate their feedback or opinion about canal construction? 19. According to you, what is the most reason for citizens oppose the construction of the canal? 20. According to you what are the factors that impede the land acquisitions for the canal? 21. In your opinion, what are the strategies to minimize the delay of the canal construction? Institutional setting: 1. Institutional structure 2. Organization structure (number of organizations involved to implement the eastern canal) 3. Role of each organization 4. What are your tasks? 5. Is there any communication needed to other departments to implement the task? 6. Task distribution 7. Control and monitor 8. Communication style 9. What are the affect of institutional changes (centralization – decentralization in 1999) to the task distribution, communication style control, etc? 10. What are the affect of institutional changes to the informal institution and to east canal implementation? 11. How does communication/negotiation conduct with citizen surroundings canal? 12. How does communication/negotiation conduct with other stakeholders? 13. Why is the implementation of the canal facing delay? 14. What is the role of central government in flood defense policy making process?

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Closing: • Thank respondent for his/her cooperation • Conclusion about the result of interview • Explain the purpose of the interview: the purpose of the interview is to get the information about the eastern canal and the opinion of citizens surrounding about the implementation of this canal. The information will be used for master thesis project • Ask if sending the interview report is needed • Ask for another person that could be interviewed

Interview: Group NGO 1. Introduction • Introduce my self: Name, Student of TU Delft, etc • Explain the purpose of the interview: the purpose of the interview is to get the information about the eastern canal and the opinion of citizens surrounding about the implementation of this canal. The information will be used for master thesis project • Organizational of the interview: i. The interview will take 30 – 45 minutes ii. Eight questions iii. Ask permission for using tape recorder iv. Anonymous report List of questions 1. What do you know about the construction of east canal? From whom (Media, internet, letter, friends, etc) 2. According to you to what extent that people live surrounding canal realize the importance of the canal? 3. To what extent do you agree or disagree of the construction of the canal? And why? 4. Did you invite for negotiation about land acquisition? 5. How the procedure to get compensation about land acquisition? 6. To what extent do you agree or disagree about the land acquisition and moving from the area? And why? 7. Is NGO involved in the eastern flood canal policy making process? 8. What is the role of NGO in flood defense policy making process? 9. What do you think the government should improve in introducing the flood defense policy?

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10. How does communication/negotiation conduct with citizen surroundings canal and what is the result? 11. How does communication/negotiation conduct with other stakeholders and what is the result? 12. According to you what are the reasons for people surrounding canal 13. According to you what is the most reason of the delay of east canal construction? Closing: • Thank respondent for his/her cooperation • Conclusion about the result of interview • Explain the purpose of the interview: the purpose of the interview is to get the information about the eastern canal and the opinion of citizens surrounding about the implementation of this canal. The information will be used for master thesis project • Ask if sending the interview report is needed • Ask for another person that could be interviewed

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Appendix C Brief content of the Master Plan studies

The content evaluation of Jakarta’s Flood Control and Drainage System Master Plan (1973 – 2002) Historically, the eastern flood canal (BKT) construction plan can not apart from the history of the flood control and management master plan development of Jakarta in general. Development plan of the east flood canal was first presented in 1973 in the master plan of flood control management and drainage system prepared by the Jakarta Public Works Department in cooperation with the Dutch Government and its goal was to control flood in Jakarta caused by local rainfall and uncontrolled water flow from upstream areas by constructing canals. Master plan 1973 is the cornerstone of the development master plan study in Jakarta in the next three decades. The following are the important studies as part of flood management milestones in Jakarta where eastern canals as part of them: 1. NEDECO, 1973, ‘Master Plan for Drainage and Flood Control’; 2. JICA, 1991 ‘The Study on Urban Drainage and Wastewater Disposal Project in the City of Jakarta – Master Plan Study’; 3. JFCAM, 1996, ‘Jakarta Flood Control Advisory Mission by NEDECO’; 4. JICA, 1997, ‘Study on Comprehensive Water Management Plan in Jabotabek’; 5. Nedeco, 2002, ‘Quick Reconnaissance Study, Flood Jakarta 2002’ 6. JICA, 2004, ‘Special Assistance for Project Implementation for Ciliwung-Cisadane 7. River Flood Control Project’ (SAPI-2004).

NEDECO Studies (1973) emphasized on flood control and proposed the expansion of the West Flood Canal (BKB) and the development of the East Flood Canal (BKT).

JICA (1991) identified the area deal with flooding and solutions. Bridges with insufficient high and the insufficient amount of the current capacity of existing drainage channels were identified as the main causes of floods. JICA proposed other solutions such as improving the drainage system capacities and repairing existing bridges and constructing more pump station.

JFCAM Studies (1996) reviewed the flood situation in Jakarta following the approach NEDECO preliminary study carried out by 1973 and the condition of the existing residential neighborhood. The main cause of flooding

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Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia identified by the flow of flood water in the catchment area upstream of the river, a puddle caused by local rainfall and high tide, which caused by land subsidence. Strategy taming the flood of their respective causes are identified as follows: 1. Diversion of flood water through the flood channel as BKB and BKT. 2. Improvement of existing rivers, including the rehabilitation of rivers and drainage canals and interconnection of the rivers in the lower reaches; 3. Polder constructions

JICA study (1997) covers an area larger than the administrative boundaries of DKI Jakarta. Flood control studies follow a logical approach formulated by NEDECO Study (1973). This study considers BKB and Cengkareng Drain as a key part in efforts to tackle flooding in western Jakarta. Causes of floods in the central part of Jakarta caused by flooding from rivers Ciliwung, Krukut and Cideng. Besides time Cisadane (which are outside of Jakarta area), the study proposes improvements BKB, included in this work is dredging mud and widening the channel, bridge repair and construction, and channel improvements associated drainage. Proposed Flood Canal construction in the city of Bogor Ciliwung consisting of two lane tunnel with a length of 1000 m was not accepted because of disagreement from the public and NGOs.

JICA Study (1997a) is a continuation of the JICA study (1991) emphasized changes in land use arising from rapid urbanization in the region of west Cengkareng, Sepak river and Meruya area. In the JICA study Study completed on Detailed Design for Urban Drainage Project in the City of Jakarta, which is a study for the Zone 1 (one zone in the JICA study in 1991) which covers an area approximately 38 km2. This area includes two areas namely Cengkareng subdrainase west (36.71 km2) and the region Meruya (1:27 km2).

SAPI Studies (2004), focusing on efforts to taming the floods in the middle of the city that combines the technical efforts with social aspects. The study emphasizes on improving the BKB, including sluices Manggarai, Ciliwung River Bottom, and K. Weir Cisadane new markets. Scope of study includes a review of the current channel capacity, preparation of basic design and implementation plans, and investigation of the impact of project implementation and social impacts that may arise.

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I. Master Plan I, NEDECO (1973) Master Plan I called the master plan of flood control and drainage system DKI Jakarta was designed by the Ministry of Public Works collaborated with the NEDECO, Dutch consultant in 1973. The master plan construction was funded by Dutch government. It concerned DKI Jakarta only and the 11 rivers running through it. The goal of the policy is to control the flooding that cause by local rainfall and water overflow from upstream areas by build flood control infrastructures. NEDECO Studies (1973) emphasis on flood control, and propose trace the transfer of the West Flood Canal (BKB) and the development of the East Flood Canal (BKT). The basic principle in controlling the floods was as follows: 1. Divert water of rivers: The flow of the rivers was cut before enter Jakarta city and divert it to the Sea through canals (west and east canal). The west canal which has been built in 1920 is expanded from Pejompongan to Muara Angke. The canals will be function as floodway to intercept flood flows from from K. Grogol, K. Sekretaris and K. Angke and can protect flood areas 7.500 ha. The east canal will functions to intercept flood flows from K. Cipinang, K. Sunter, K. Buaran, K. Jatikramat, dan K. Cakung and can protect 13 flooded areas 16.500 ha. The floodways were planned to contain 100-year floods, i.e. 290–525 m3/sec for the Western Floodway and 101–340 m3/sec for the Eastern Floodway. 2. The existing old river channels were considered as primary drainage, and designed to contain 25-year floods. 3. In the areas with elevation of less than 2 metres which block the entering of the drainage flow to the water then polders is used to 4. Most of the land (about 150 km 2) with elevation of less than 2 metres was considered as polders, and the rest treated as gravity drainage areas. Pumps and reservoirs would release flood water from the polders. The expected outcome by implementing the policy is to protect 7.500 ha flooded areas in west java and 16.500 ha areas (13 areas) in East and North Jakarta. The implementation of the programme was targeted to be completed in 1985. Due to the very high cost, only few works were carried out as part of the programme, but many others have yet to be implemented. Thus in 1981, the review of Master Plan 1973 was done after severe floods hit Jakarta on 1979. The most area that inundated was western part of DKI Jakarta. Due to this condition, the implementation of the west canal expansion proposed in NEDECO master plan 1973 was considered very important. However, after the development along the planned West canal extension route was already in 102`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia progress, the cost of lands which acquired for the canals had become very high which was not considered before in the previous design. After reviewed in 1981, central government decide to cancel the implementation of the west canals extensions and built Cengkareng canals as alternative. It was designed to withstand 100-year floods. It was constructed in 1981-1982 to discharge floods from the Grogol, Sekretaris and Angke rivers.

II. JICA (1991) By 1990, the population growth has been increased rapidly in Jakarta because of urbanization. The condition had swallowed much of the area covered by the 1973 drainage master plan and given this reason flood control plans in the eastern part (east of the system), experiencing the high costs of land acquisition constraints. Thus, the detail design that created by NEDECO in 1973 then reviewed by Nikken consultant, and Associates with funding from the OECF (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund) in 1989 and 1993. OECF is the agent of the Government of Japan to the affairs of foreign aid, which is now called JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation). JICA (1991) identified the area deal with flooding and solutions. Bridge with insufficient high identified as one cause of the flooding, including the less the amount of flow capacity of existing drainage channels.

This review attempts to replace BKT function by enhancing the capacity of Kali Sunter, K. Cipinang, K. Cakung, and K. Buaran combined with a master plan study for waste water disposal, formulated for major drainage system only, was designed to meet requirements up to the year 2010. It also included crossing the bridge repair and construction of pump stations. However, after the reviewed, it was concluded that increasing the capacity of rivers in the eastern part of the cost was 70% higher than construction costs so it was recommended that East Canal remains as a component in the eastern flood control system.

III. JFCAM 1996 JFCAM Studies (1996) reviewed the flood situation in Jakarta, according to the approach taken by earlier studies NEDECO 1973 and the condition of existing neighborhoods. The main cause of flooding identified by the flow of flood water from the catchment area upstream of the river, a puddle caused by local rainfall and high tide caused by land subsidence. Strategy taming floods from each cause was identified as follows:

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1. Diversion of flood water through the flood channel as BKB and BKT 2. Improvement of existing rivers, including the rehabilitation of rivers and drainage canals as well as interconnection of rivers in the downstream

II. JICA Master Plan III (1997) Planning document was prepared based on a study financed with the help of Japan for International Cooperation Agency (JICA). This document formulates the steps of handling the flood of DKI Jakarta and its surroundings. Basic principles: 1. Unit-Cisadane River Region is divided into eight sub-unit of river area 2. (Refers to the Master Plan in 1973 but the dimensions of the river / channel adapted to the latest calculation 3. Transfer of part of the flood discharge Cisadane River to River through the construction of the tunnel. Master Plan 1997 can not be implemented because of resistance facing the community so that appropriate changes are made in the form of preliminary studies: (i) Reduction of the tunnel into a (one), (ii) All days at the River Basin Development and Reservoir Ciliwung tiles / Parungbadak Cisadane River; and (iii) Improvement of Kali Sabi.

III. Master Plan III (2002) Soon after the big flood in February 2002, discussions on the implementation of master plan re-bloom. On February 27, 2002 reached an agreement of cooperation between central and local governments which are embodied in a Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Flood Control in the Greater Jakarta (DKI Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi) and Bopunjur (Bogor, Puncak, Cianjur). Coverage: (i) the structuring of space refers to Presidential Decree 114/1999 concerning Bopunjur; (ii) management of water resources in the unity of the whole river area which refers to the master plan in 1973 and 1997, adjusted, (iii) preparation of urban infrastructure that includes policies drainage, domestic waste, garbage, water, and city road network which refers to the Drainage Master Plan of DKI Jakarta (1991), Waste Water Master Plan of DKI Jakarta (1991), Solid Waste Master Plan of DKI Jakarta (1987), adjusted, and Master Integrated Transport Plan 2000 (SITRAM), and (iv) the field of housing and settlements that support environmental preservation and handling of the floods which refers to the National Policy and Strategy Housing and Settlement (KSNPP).

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To follow up the agreement is prepared draft Master Plan for Flood Disaster in Jakarta and its surroundings which include 5 (five) aspects, namely: (i) the structuring of space, (ii) housing and settlements, (iii) urban infrastructure, (iv) water resources; and (v) empowering the community with a range of time from 2002 until 2012. Short-term handling done in the year 2002, the 2003- 2004 medium-term and long term in 2005-2012. The concept master plan also contains details of activities and the amount of funds required both the short term, medium term and long term which reached Rp 18.29 trillion, which consists of the program amounted to Rp 16.67 trillion, the center and a regional program of Rp 1.62 trillion, with details are as follows:

Kebutuhan Dana (Rp miliar) No. Bidang / Pemda Jangka Jangka Jangka Total Pendek Menengah Panjang

1. Penataan Ruang 35,00 40,15 84,10 159,25 Perumahan dan 2. 25,07 583,92 1.145,87 1.754,86 Permukiman 3. Prasarana Perkotaan 568,90 1.584,51 2.414,26 4.567,67 4. Sumber Daya Air 99,50 2.123,50 7.958,00 10.181,00 Pemberdayaan 5. 3,48 2,42 3,74 9,64 Masyarakat

Sub Total Pusat 731,95 4.334,50 11.605,97 16.672,42

1. Kota Bogor 17,89 5,60 - 23,49 2. Kabupaten Bogor 28,54 158,58 0,50 187,62 3. Kota/Kab. Tangerang 11,00 739,10 660,00 1.410,10

Sub Total Daerah 57,43 903,28 660,50 1.621,21

Total Jabodetabek 789,38 5.237,78 12.266,47 18.293,63

After the flood in February 2007, made several important meetings that produce flood prevention programs in the Greater Jakarta area and stated in the draft presidential instruction. 105`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

The programs have been instructed in the draft Presidential Greater Jakarta Floods, among others: 1. Field of Water Resources that includes: (a) Acceleration of Development of East Flood Canal, (b) Strengthening Capacity BKB and Embankment; (c) Handling of Rivers in the Greater Jakarta area (outside of BKB and BKT), (d) Dredging and rehabilitation situ / polder / where / reservoirs; (e) Planning, (f) Construction of rental public housing and remodeling River flood plain, (g) Handling of emergency / urgent damage and elevation of roads and bridges; (h) land and forest rehabilitation; (i) Arrangement of space; 2. Karya Cipta field that includes: (a) the development of apartment rentals and structuring, (b) Ciliwung River in the location of Manggarai - Kp Melayu (c) China and Cawang lote; 3. Field of Highways which includes: (a) Handling of emergency and permanent National road in Greater Jakarta area, road-Cilengsi Cibubur, Cakung-Cilincing, and (b) short-term treatment with elevated roads and bridges in the Greater Jakarta area; 4. Spatial field that includes the revitalization of the utilization and control of space utilization in the region and facilitating adjustment JABODETABEKJUR RTRW in their respective regions; 5. Forestry Sector which includes planting trees and building maintenance and conservation activities in the region Jabodetabekjur precondition (implementation Gerhan)

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Appendix D Brief of Interview Report 1. Regional water policy is initiated by the provincial government and then send it to national level for the budget improvement 2. The provincial government play important role in forcing the implementation of the eastern canal 3. Change to decentralization lead to more openness 4. Flood 2002 increased the level of urgency, a. The worse flood in the last decade b. The more openness (flood broadcasting in Media) c. Free election 5. Municipalities announce/socialize the implementation of the policy 6. Content of the policy do not available to citizen 7. Experts /multidisciplinary are very critical (expert in social science or social problems) 8. Coordinate with stakeholders are very important 9. Politicians should be accountable and respect to what have been decided 10. Need for operation and maintenance institutions (law, regulation, procedure, organization, coordination, etc) 11. Lack of number of people and staff 12. Law salary can tend to do the corruption 13. NGO was not involving, provocate media and public 14. Floods events was always the initiator to re-put the eastern canal on the agenda again leading to master plan revision and implementation of the eastern canal 15. The district government/regional level has the task to communicate the plans to the public. 16. Negotiation about compensation were fruitless, compensation schemes was decided not in accordance to the procedure 17. Recommendations: a. Institutional changes b. River rehabilitation c. Etc 18. High dependency for collaboration/cooperation from upstream areas municipality 19. People react on the policy because: a. Eviction issues b. Compensation schemes c. Provocation d. Perception about the effectiveness of the eastern canal 20. Lack of expert to deal with flood management and to come up with new solution 21. Political will and the agreement between central and province play an important role in accelerating the implementation of the eastern canal 22. Delays in planning has been seen as an issues 23. There is decentralization trend 24. The province has lack of capacity to negotiate with citizen 25. Limited public participation in policy design process 26. Document do not available to public 27. Non structural measures has been realized important 28. Limited allocation budget from central government (2003-2005)

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29. Multi purpose of the eastern canal 30. Need for spatial planning of DKI Jakarta 31. Lack of resources (capital)
need a solution with low budget and low social impact (e.g. eviction) 32. Province of Jakarta insist the cooperation from upstream municipality and ask national government to provide a framework for coordination – negotiation difficult to achieve, no benefit for people in upstream area 33. District of government has a role as mediator between citizen and provincial government 34. Reforestration in upstream areas is very important but coordination is very difficult to achieve 35. Backing power for provincial to realize the eastern canal by talking to media 36. Lack of communication to the public, lack of transparency, provocation from third party (lawan politik, NGO, spekulan tanah, etc) 37. Assessment/effectiveness of the alternatives was not sufficient, economic feasibility of the measures is being questioned. 38. Bad experience about the maintenance issues 39. The regulation about land acquisition exist, the implementation is violated. 40. The citizens have more courage to speak about their voice and to critique the government’s performance in dealing with flood issues 41. The land procurement committee should be independent, but in reality the land procurement of the Eastern Flood Canal was appointed by the governor. 42. The public relation organization was established to accommodate citizen’s feedback and complaint. But the organization was just established in 2007 Implementation is partly done and will be operationalized by 2012 43. The Eastern Flood Canal could only operate well if its implementation is followed with other actions such as: a. Rivers normalization b. Waste management c. Institutional arrangement 44. People do not give much attention to the flood but to their condition after they evicted 45. The incredulity of citizen to the government emerge the citizen is apathetic about the government’s plan concerning the flood’s problem 46. Awareness that public participation is needed 47. Socio economic forces causes deterioration of floods 48. Once the Eastern Flood Canal was announced, the land owners increased the price of their land. Moreover, the land scalper take opportunities to get the benefit by buying the Eastern Flood Canal land areas. 49. The socialization of the Eastern Flood Canal was just started on 2002 50. The Eastern Flood Canal can be solved the flood problem in Jakarta need to be corrected 51. Budget was not allocated as what agreed 52. Flood protection is a topic that will remain in every agenda but the government is expected to give a solution about budget and land acquisition problem 53. Soft loan mau dikurangi karena reaksi masyarakat yang meminta pemerintah untuk mengurangi pinjama luar negeri 54. Regulation 40 % lahan Jakarta untuk menjadi lahan hijau sulit diimplementasikan (national regulation) 55. Intensive meeting tetapi hanya pada level yang sama 108`

Evaluation of the Flood Defense Policy Making Process in Indonesia

56. Tidak tercapainya kesepakatan mengenai pembagian tugas antara pemerintah pusat dan pemerintah daerah (pemerintah daerah meminta pemerintah pusat untuk juga menyediakan dana terhadap pembebasan tanah) 57. Kekurangpercayaan pemerintah pusat terhadap pemerintah daerah
saling curiga mencurigai 58. Issue of corruption
citizen merasa harga tanah diturunkan agar panitia dapat gain money /corrupt money. No transparency, lack of trust from citizen 59. Tanpa adanya normalisasi sungai, pengolahan sampah, peraturan, kerjasama masyarakat eastern canal tidak akan ada artinya 60. Radical solution (??) 61. Peningkatan jumlah porsenil dan gaji staff public works (kualitatif dan kuantitas) 62. Budget issues 63. Anggapan hanya pintar membangun tetapi tidak pintar mengelola 64. 8 contractors (private company) involving in policy implementation (construction of the canal), they are contracted by unit price contract 65. Military power is still exist, dilemma (paksaan dari public, parliament agar BKT segera selesai) 66. DPR should not provoken 67. Pengadilan negeri sedang diperiksa kasus korupsi jadi semua dana ditahan 68. Wakil presiden meminta menteri keuangan untuk menyediakan dana bagi pembangunan bKT 69. BBWSCC yg membuat action plan untuk pembangunan bKT 70. Dana yang dikucurkan a. 2004-2006: 60 miliar per tahun b. 2007: 62 miliar c. 2008: 570 miliar d. 2009: 391 miliar e. 2010: 420 miliar 71. Tumpang tindih wilayah kerja para kontraktor (hal 202) 72. Kesepakatan dengan stakeholder susah dicapai
keterbatasan dalam melakukan negosiasi 73. Belum semua stakeholder menyetujui untuk membebaskan lahan (e.g. menara SUTET, land owner, dsb) 74. Perintah dari atas (national government), seperti penggantian pejabat SUTET, undang-undang baru tetang pertanahan mempercepat realisasi pembangunan BKT 75. Pada saat melakukan design, peta lahan belum tersedia (kekurangan data)
design tidak sesuai dengan kondisi lapangan (hal 205) 76. Unpredicted di lapangan menyebabkan budget membengkak (?) 77. Informasi yang disampaikan mengenai pembebasan tanah (surat dari public works) tidak sesuai dengan kondisi di lapangan 78. Ketidakrelaan central government untuk memberikan kuasa mengenai water management to provincial government (adanya curiga mencurigai) 79. BBWSCC is the organization which will deal with eastern canal construction/implementation

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