competing efforts to define what a good Muslim is – efforts that arenow that increasingly madeon socialmedia. Inadditionto thecreationand maintenance is – efforts Muslim a good what define to efforts competing The multiplicity ofactorswithinCambodia’s Muslimminorityhas ledto Introduction , social divides , media, Keywords: media. social on debates muting largely of effect the have discord, social discourages strongly state the where setting, authoritarian an in fields religious the and political the between connections close the how shows It posts. their of style and contents the formulate they which in ways the inform that politics language and factors sociopolitical the explains and groups Islamic various of pages Facebook the examines particularly article The case. the is this why of question the to answers find to attempts and societies Muslim Asian Southeast other of that to compared scene media social Islamic this in absent almost is debate theological that observation the considers It particularly activities. proselytization and representations online their shape environment offline their and institutions, and movements groups, is, that minority, Muslim Cambodian the of actors Islamic between relationship the how on It focuses minority. Muslim country’s the of setting sociopolitical the about us tell they what considers and scene media social Muslim Cambodian the of structure and characteristics the explores article This Abstract: of Singapore University National Pérez Pereiro Alberto AcademyAustrian of Sciences Pall Zoltan Muted Debates Muslim SocialMediaScene:ComplexDividesand Emerging IslamicRepresentations intheCambodian yber

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259 Corresponding author: Zoltan Pall, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Hollandstraße 11-13, 1200 Vienna, Austria. E-mail: [email protected] observe theprocessesbywhichreligiouslifefindsexpressiononline. Muslim social mediascene. Islamic landscape offline is to a much lesser extent reflected in the emerging respect. In this article, we raise the question of why the competition in the groups while theCambodianMuslim socialmediasceneisrathersilentinthis Muslim various the between (especially Weng debates 2015;Nuraniyah 2017; Schmidt2018;Slama2020), of scenes lively explore Most ofthescholarsMuslimsocialmediaactivism inSoutheast Asia studies compriselittleconsiderationofda‘wa(onlineproselytization). Blengsli 2009;Bruckmayr2017;2019;PallandPérez 2020). However, these dynamics andcompetitionofCambodianIslamicmovements (Collins1996; scrutinized theIslamicreligiouslandscape,itscleavages anddivides,the Islamic movementsinthecommunity. There areanumberofstudiesthathave Cambodia. Scholarshavefocusedonthehistory, socioreligiousdivisions,and online This articlealsoaddstotheemerging scholarly literatureonIslamin their shape environment offline their proselytization activitiesintendstocontributefillingthislacuna. and minority Cambodian Muslim the of actors Islamic between relationship complex the how focus onMainlandSoutheast Asia ismissing. Therefore, ourdiscussionon research is concerned with Indonesia and to a lesser extent , while Slama andBarendregt2018;Husein2018). Yet, mostofthe cleavages ontheseplatforms(Nuraniyah2017;Schmidt2018;Nisa2018a; 2018b) andthemanifestationsofideologicaltheologicalarguments and media inSoutheast Asia’s preachingeconomy(Hew 2015;Slama2017;Nisa Most scholarlyattentionhasbeenpaidtotheemergence androleofsocial phenomenon inCambodia of thisonlineIslamicpublicforumbearcarefulstudy, asitisaveryrecent organization and formation The charge.* of free profile a create easily to to beheardastheypermitindividualswhoarenotparticularlytech-savvy platforms suchasFacebookwhichpermitmanymorenoninstitutionalvoices of webpagesbymanyIslamicorganizations, thereisincreaseduseof

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260 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro in order to match Islam with modernity (Bruckmayr 2019, 124–153). 124–153). 2019, (Bruckmayr modernity with Islam match to order in of scripturefree fromthebondoflegalschools andtherelatedscholarly traditions objective ofthe reformistIslamicmovement wastoenablethedirectinterpretation century. 20th early the The in Egypt of reformism Islamic the by influenced was Cambodian of segment minor relatively A86–89). 2019, (Bruckmayr Southeast Asian region and a body of Shafi‘i religious literature written in Malay Shafi‘i madhhabthatisdominantinthe the instruction, religious of language the the secondhalfof19thcentury, mostCambodianMuslimsadoptedMalayas process ofculturalchangethatBruckmayr(2019)callsJawization . Startingfrom Muslims intheMalayanPeninsulaandSumatra. This isaresultofsweeping The IslamicpracticesofmostCambodianMuslimsgreatly resemblethoseof smaller numbersofShi‘iand Ahmadi Muslimsinthecountry(Stock2020). their Chamheritage(Bruckmayr2017).Inadditionto these groups,thereare of context the in religion the of teachings the interprets that tradition Islamic tothe belong Krom ofMuslims ten percent Approximately school). legal (Shafi‘i is MuslimwiththevastmajoritybeingSunniandlargely followingthemadhhab dominant groupsouthofthecapital. The entireChampopulationofCambodia more numerousinareasnorthandeastofPhnomPenhtheChveabeing There areMuslimcommunitiesthroughoutthecountry, withtheChambeing adopted theKhmerlanguage. These are commonly called Chvea, descendants of Malaytraderswhosettled in thecountry generations ago and from thesoutherncoastsofcontemporary Vietnam. The restaremostly ethnic 400–800 thousand peopleinanationof16million.Ofthese,roughlythree-quartersare approximately representing Cambodia, in minority a are Muslims Background andhistoricaldevelopment Divides Complex Islamic Cambodian SceneMapping its and Contemporary the from theother(Collins1996). sharing areligionwiththeCham,eachethnicgroupconsidersitselfdistinct

Cham, an Austronesian speakingethnicgroupwhomigratedtoCambodia (Community of Imam San) which follows a separate Kan ImamSan(CommunityofSan)whichfollowsaseparate yber C

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People’s Party . Prime Minister Hun Sen has been in his positionsince structure of the state, whichis dominated by the ruling Islam in Cambodia isinstitutionalized andwell-integrated into the Islamic actorsinHunSen’s regime the CambodianMuslims. scene ofunprecedentedvariegationhasdevelopedinthe pastdecadesamong transnational Islamicmovements. As aresultoftheiractivities,religious their religiousinstitutions,alsocarriedoutmissionary work inconnectionto besides providinghumanitarianhelpandassistingMuslims inrebuilding charities fromMalaysiaandthemonarchiesofPersian Gulf. These NGOs, that many NGOsbecameestablishedinCambodia,including severalIslamic then was It 1993. in Authority Transitional UN the of withdrawal the defeat of theKhmerRouge by the invading Vietnamese, it accelerated after While somereconstructionalreadystartedalmostimmediately afterthe1979 communities (Osman2012). inhabitants displacedandresettledelsewhereinordertobreakuptheir Islamic schoolsweredestroyed.Manyofthevillagesrazedand were killedandmuchofthereligiousinfrastructureincludingmosques leaders religious Most (1975–79). under themurderousKhmerRougeregime The evolutionofCambodianMuslimreligiouslifewasseverelydisrupted which isalsotherestingplaceofpastCambodianmonarchs. saint withhisbirthdaycommemoratedatgraveonOudongmountain, name fromImamSan,a19th-centuryreligiousleaderwhoisveneratedas its takes community This 214–217). 2017, (Bruckmayr instruction religious and ChamintheIndicscriptarecentralfortheirritualpractice Arabic both in written manuscripts Cham 121–188). 2012, (Pérez practice rituals andtheinclusionofspiritpossessionceremoniesintheirreligious a different formofprayerperformedbythereligiouseliteonFridays,healing a synthesisofIslamicandChamtraditionspracticeswhichincludes follow to continuing and influences Eastern Middle and Malay both resisting The Krom Kan Imam San remained outside these religious trends, however,

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262 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro particularly important, asoneofthe basesofthe regime’s legitimacyisthatit activities and keepintracommunityfrictions toaminimum. This latter is the support Cambodian People’s Partyduringelections, refrainfromoppositional to on counted be can actors Muslim Cambodian exchange, In able tolaunchprojectsinthe countrywiththeapprovalofnationalauthorities. access tostateinstitutions and resourcesforeignIslamicNGOsbeing The situationforMuslimgroups inthecountryissimilartothem,getting 2002; Strangio2014,199–205;O’Lemmon2014). for exchange in party political quietismandkeepingmonkscriticaltotheregime inline(Guthrie ruling the to attached businessmen and politicians Cambodian People’s Party. Temples receivegenerousdonationsfrom the by patronized are factions main the of figures leading society,the the of well. In the case of Buddhism for example, which is followed by the majority Patronage andcooptationcharacterizetheregime’s relationshiptoreligionas the sympathyofruralpopulation(Milne2015). Working Groupwhicharethenusedtocarryoutdevelopmentprojectswin servants arerequiredtomakedonationsCambodianPeople’s Party’s Public Party.People’s Cambodian the to donations large make to expected networks. Today tycoonswhohavebeengrantedfavorablestatecontractsare People’s Partyattractedmostofthebusinesscommunitytoitspatronage and surveillance (Un 2005, 213–24). Starting from the 1990s, the Cambodian in theruralcommuneswhoplayedkeyrolescreatingasystemofhandouts Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party) has managed to keep its cadres Republic ofKampucheain1979,theparty(until1991undername from itsdominanceoftheruralareas.SincecreationPeople’s evolved that relationships patron–client of network a maintains regime The 89–109). 2014(Strangio scene political Cambodian the dominating been has Party was created,sincethesecondhalfof1990sCambodianPeople’s the UN Transitional Authority mandateamultipartyparliamentarysystem socialist sponsored Vietnam the of regime, thePeople’s RepublicofKampuchea leader (1979–89). Although during the became he when 1984

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Kuwaiti charity movements. The MuslimBrotherhood established its presencewhenthe for Cambodian Muslimstobecomeacquainted withtransnational Islamic Gulf monarchiesandMalaysia. These Muslim NGOsoftenserveasgateways the in based organizations Islamic are these of Several 2013). (Domashneva the countryhasoneofhighest numbersofNGOspercapitaintheworld become establishedinCambodia. Infact,witharoundthreethousandNGOs, Since the 1990s, a vast number of foreign NGOs (mostly nonreligious) have financial resourcestocarryoutvariouscharityandreligious activities. and NGOs. Through thesecontacts,he isabletoprovidehisclientswith system. The Muftialsohasstrongties toseveralMalaysianprivatedonors as religiousfunctionariesandbureaucratsinthecountry’s Islamicinstitutional large a Being resources to support and promote Muslim 189–190). leaders who fill important positions 2009, (Blengsli organization, Annikmah providestheMuftiwithapoolofsupporters andthe Malaysia of states member a schoolnetworkmaintainedbythegovernmentofKelantan,one language ofstudyandimplementthecurriculumYayasan IslamKelantan, Annikmah networkismadeupofanumbermadrasasthatuseMalayas considerably increaseshisstandingamongtheMuslimcommunity. The network andhasagoodrelationshipwithMalaysianbenefactors,which Mufti enjoystatesupport. The Muftialsooverseesthe Annikmah school the Cambodianrulingelite. The latterensuresthatprojectsinitiatedbythe state’s IslamicbureaucracyamongtheCambodianMuslimsishisaccessto The main source of the Mufti’s influence as the highest-ranking official in the the majoritySunnis. Mat Saandpossessesseparatereligiouseducationalinstitutionsfrom working relationship. The ImamSancommunityisheadedbytheOngGnur position in1996byPrimeMinisterHunSenwithwhomheenjoysagood Sunni population.OknhaKamaruddinbin Yusof wasappointedtothe There isasingleMuftiinthecountrywho,principle,representsentire 84, 98,114). is the key to stability and peaceful development in Cambodia (Strangio 2014,

yber Rahma International started its activities in Cambodia in the

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264 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro the Muslim religious landscapeof severalprovinces. Tbung Khmum province. The movement quicklygrewandtoday it dominates enabled theCambodian Tabligh toestablishamajor centerinPhum Trea in who resided in the United States (Collins 1995, 94–95). This material support efforts were financially supported by Malaysian donors, and also Cambodians movement inMalaysia the 1980sreturnedandbeganproselytizing.His Vietnamese troops, whenSulaimanIbrahim,aChamwhojoined the The Tabligh appearedinCambodia1989, afterthedepartureof practices (Noor2012). the Prophet and make more earnest efforts in the maintenance of ritual Islamize society by urging Muslims to pay more attention to the example of month onakhuruj(proselytizingtour). The movement’s goalistore- hierarchically organized, andeachmemberhasto spendthreedaysofthe India buttheyhavesincespreadworldwide. The Tabligh movementis popular IslamicmovementinCambodia.Itsoriginsgo backto1920sBritish Jama‘at al-Tabligh (orTabligh asitiscommonlycalled)perhapsthemost strong organization availablewith solid human resources. community. Involvementinpolitics willbemorefeasibleoncethereisa well-educated cadreswhointimecanbeleadingmembersoftheMuslim of number a breeding is priority movement’s the authors, the to explained stays awayfrompoliticsalmostentirely. As RahmaInternational’s director Cambodia in Brotherhood Muslim the later), (discussed Salafis the Unlike mid-2000s. their facilitationoftheproject for thanks receive to as well as approval of seal their give to appear officials charity opensaclinic,schoolorhousingareaforpoorpeopleCambodian the if example, For authorities. the with relationship good a has International clinics inruralMuslimvillages–thesearealsoopentoKhmerBuddhists. pursuing theirstudies.RahmaInternationalhasalsoestablishedseveral PhnomPenh in where 140 male twodormitories and female Muslim university students can live maintains for free while Italso students. thousand five Penh, whichsupervises25boardingschoolsthatprovideeducationtoaround

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265 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro al-Turath al-Islami (Societyfor the RevivalofIslamicHeritage). These schools throughout thecountrymaintained bytheKuwaitiJamai‘yyatIhya’ Currently, the backbone of the Salafi movement is the network of 33 religious during elections(PallandPérez 2020,261). for their institutions, they mobilize voters for the Cambodian People’s Party participation, inCambodia, inordertosecurepoliticalfavorandautonomy of the social and political context. Although Salafis often discourage political they have demonstrated a willingness inprinciple, to be pragmatic in the face of the exigencies rigid ideologically appear may Salafism While religion. with thecustomsandritualstheyconsidertheirancestors tohaveaddedthe the in mentioned explicitly not scripture asillegitimateinnovations. They insistthatMuslimsneed tobreak are which regard practices generally religious and Salafis rituals Therefore, 2018). Pall 2012; (Gauvain tradition hadith without subordinating their judgments to any particular juridical (prophetic tradition),andtheyprivilegedirectinterpretation ofcanonical the and Qur’an the of interpretation literal a advocate Salafis 2020). up educationalandproselytizingnetworksinthecountry(PallPérez Cambodia in the early1990swhenanumberofGulf-based Islamic NGOsset Salafism isthesecondlargest Islamicmovementafter Tabligh. Itappearedin celebrating themawlid(Prophet’s birthday). certain popularreligiouspracticesamongCambodianMuslims,suchas movement’s emphasisonglobalIslamicbrotherhoodandtheacceptanceof reason for Tabligh’s appealinthiscommunitygoesbacktoboththe pool of supporters mainly come from the conservative, Shafi‘i Despite being known as a puritan and reformist movement, Tabligh Jama’at’s and Terengganu., travelling toSouthern Thailand andMalaysiaforreligiousstudiesin Yala, areas frequently perform Malay speakingpartsofSouth Thailand, with Tabligh membersfromthese Tabligh communitiesinCambodiaarecloselyconnectedtoMalaysiaandthe networking activitiesinthecountry. interference inCambodianpoliticsthegovernmentalsograntsfreedomforits

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media platformwithamorelimitedInstagramand Twitter presence. Among Cambodiansingeneral,Facebookisbyfarthe mostpopularsocial Muslim Cambodian SocialThe Media Scene mediated bytheMufti. scholarships with Egypt in al-Azhar from or Malaysia, in degrees university are typically schools of the Annikmah network. Some latter The schools. private Islamic or colleges state books), Shafi‘i on based orlocal usually traditionalpondoks(madrasasthatonlyteachareligiouscurriculum Malaysian Shafi‘i ofeither the follow which institutions educational products are movements Salafi or Tabligh Most ofthereligiousspecialistsorustazwhodonotidentifywitheither (overwhelmingly theShafi‘i) into two major categories: traditionalists, or those who follow a Malay (PallandPérez2020,258). This essentiallydividedCambodianSunnis than rather English and Arabic learn to prefer and literature religious Salafi with itsliteralistapproachandtherejectionoffollowingamadhhab,read listening tomusic,prohibitionofsmoking),nevertheless,theysympathize might notsubscribecompletelytoalltherulings(suchasprohibitionof specialists, thereisanemerging communityofCambodianMuslims,who these school networks and the proselytization activities of the Salafi religious of graduates numerous the to Due 249–254). 2020, Pérez and (Pall quality curriculum andarepopularbecausetheinstructionisconsideredtobeofgood schools providebothreligiousinstructionandtheCambodiannational events online. primarily use Facebook to disseminate their information and organize also institutions and groups Muslim Cambodian 15–16). 2021, al. et (Jack their settlementinorderto prevent oppositionalactivitiesandsocialdiscord in theruralareasalsosurvey thesocialmediaactivitiesofinhabitants Center for Independent Media 2017, 10). Local leaders such as village chiefs Facebook postscriticalofthegovernmenthaveledto arrests(Cambodian Cambodian governmentpracticessurveillanceofsocial media.Reportedly, yber

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267 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro aspects ofthereligion, suchasconducting prayer inthewayprescribed bythe they carryout theirreligiousobligations incorrectly. This includes basic practice ofreligion. While mostinthecommunity knowhowtoprayandfast, its in deficient is Cambodia of population Muslim the Salafis, to According Salafis onsocialmedia online absenceofthe Tabligh. San Imam and Salafi Facebook sites, andthe ongoing online debates on the popular some examine will we sections, following worship such as the and debates occurrarely, andiftheydo,thepostingstouchissues ofritual is that communicationislargely unidirectional. Active Facebook discussions One obviousfeatureoftheFacebookactivitiesCambodian Muslimgroups floods. services offered inthecountrysideanddisasterreliefforvillagesstrickenby projects intheircommunity. These includeschoolsandwellsbuilt,medical announce theirsuccessesinattractingforeignaidandrealizingdevelopment most recentsociopolitical developments concerningCambodianMuslimsand belief andreligiouspractices.Rather, theyupdatethecommunitywith Facebook sites. Yet, thesesitesarerarelyconcernedwithissuesrelatedto numerous operate Mufti the of office the as such institutions, Government opponents, theSalafis. and someofthemregularlyfollowtheonlineactivitiestheirmain observe thesocialmediascene. They oftenhaveprivateFacebookaccounts updated since2017. This doesnotmeanthoughthat Tabligh membersdonot page whichwasatravelogueofproselytizingtrips,andhasnotbeen Facebook Tablighexplicitly Cambodian one related uncovered research Our a only have contrast, minimal onlinefootprint(forreasonsthatarediscussedinmoredetailbelow). by Jama’at, Tablighi The San. Imam smaller much Salafis are by far the most active on social media followed by the numerically do notmapontothedispositionofreligiouscommunitiesonground. Interestingly, the divisions of the online sphere among the Muslim minority

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268 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro Cham traditions, such as spirit possession rituals, are also a target of birthday). As themajorityofMuslimsbelongtoChamethnicgroup, graves ofsaints)andthecelebrationmawlid(ProphetMuhammad’s are identify Salafis that “deviation” of examples members. events intheonlinespherebytheirmoretech-engaged assistantsorfamily not be active users of social media, they can be expected to be kept abreast of might themselves leaders Muslim many Although Salafis. for patronage of lifestyles anddaily religious practices. These Facebook groupsareusually other towards Muslim groups theirfocusisdirectingCambodian Muslimstotransform their statements critical or political voicing explicitly of ones Instead the by replaced be attempts. should these scripture. reflect the groups in Facebook described Salafi The practices “incorrect” their and lifestyle According to him, young people should be educated on how to live an Islamic and moreeducatedgenerations whousesmartphonesandsocialmedia. better off spendingtheirenergy and resourcesbyreachingouttotheyoung aninterview, are Salafis counterproductive. is generations older in the with debating directly explained has preacher, Salafi young a Ahmad, Ustaz As heavily disapprovesofintra-Muslimconfrontations in the future. Furthermore, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party, which Understandably, mostMuslimswanttopreventconfrontationsfromerupting a longtimeandseriouseffort fromtheMuftitoreconcileparties. the imageofMuslimsinfrontKhmerBuddhistmajority, andittook each otherfromvillagesandurbandistricts. The violenceseverelytarnished expel and means violent in other each from over take to attempted were they cases, many followers In areas. Tabligh majority Muslim and the in Salafis influence for competing of groups time, that At 2000s. and the 1990s early of clashes Tabligh–Salafi the like confrontations violent to abovementioned practiceswouldbecounterproductiveandonlylead Salafi several As the Salafis. correct. regard Salafis which way the not and Shafi‘i madhab,

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269 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro their offlinereligiouslessons. in Forum Educational Islamic intheMuslim of preachers the by addressed or arecurrent community that discussions and debates reflect topics The Cambodia, it is often posted on Islamic Educational Forum’s Facebook page.

As anexample,IslamicEducationalForumpublishedthehadith(Figure1): various preachingactivities. other preacherswholiveindifferent regionsofthecountryandcarryout Ministry ofIslamic Affairs fromwhichheisabletopaythesalariesofnine Islamic UniversityofMedina.HereceivesfundingdirectlyfromtheSaudi by UstazMuhammadbin Abu Bakar, basedinSiemReap,agraduateofthe established was Forum Educational Islamic here. example good a is Forum, The FacebookgrouprunbyaSaudifundedNGO,theIslamicEducational food, andsociallife. are overwhelminglyfocusingonmattersoffaith,correctreligiouspractice, run by an NGO or anindividual who can be linked toanNGO. The postings

yber Figure 1:“Satan fleesthehousewhereSuratal-Baqara isread” C yber (Islamic EducationalForum 2020a).

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270 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro Gd ls you)” bless (God fik “barak to theirchildreninorderspeedrecoverywhentheyaresick. say frequently to parents urges post arguing thattheyreceivemeritfordoingthis.Citingahadith,another Muslims whatkindofdu‘a(prayer)andhadithtorecitebeforesleeping, by frequentlyrecitingversesfromSuratal-Baqara. Two otherpoststeach language. exemplary Muslims due to their dress, public behavior, and use of the Arabic Salafi discourse, visitors from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are often presented as countries (Figure2). As PallandPérez(2020,258)show, intheCambodian as thepostsoftenincludephotosthatobviouslyhavebeentakeninGulf Khmer with quotations Muslim parentingpractices. The imagesofthispageareratherinteresting hadith posts translations. Healsopostsvideoswherehespeaksaboutissuessuchas frequently Forum, Educational Salafi by run is site The Cambodia). of north the in Another FacebookgroupisMuslimStungTreng (areferencetoaprovince in happen to houses.” things people’s “weird cause can and real indeed is Satan that aware A Khmer langue explanation is provided to the Arabic text that makes people

yber Figure 2: PrayingMuslims intheGulf(Muslim Stung Treng 2020a). 15 C Muslimscanpreventhimfromenteringtheirhomes yber O rient, Vol. 15, Iss. 1, 2021 ustaz who,likeIslamic

271 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro and inmanycasesunique,Islamicpracticesarealsolegitimate. both the Tabligh and the Salafis urge the Cham to get rid of most of their of most of rid get to Cham the urge Salafis the Tablighand the both cultural identity aswell. As we havedescribedintheprevious section, the consequences ofIslamicpreaching onnotonlytheirreligious but these younguniversitystudents andgraduatesbecameconcernedabout the ImamSan,muchasit hasinotherMuslimcommunities.Someof In thepastthreedecades, aneducatedclasshasbeguntoemerge among will resultinthedisappearanceofIslamictradition theImamSan. thought of schools and movements Islamic of expansion the that community striving forstaterecognitionisaresultofthefear themembersof Sunni Muslims. The establishment oftheinstitutionalframeworkand In fact, this community has been shaped by engagement and debates with to bemorecorrectthantheirown foreigners” other and by Arabs practiced as religion “the consider not do they language andculture. While identifyingasMuslims,theyoftenvoicethat the of members Imam Sancommunity, the argue forthe retentionandcultivationofCham primarily others, Yet teachings. Islamic “proper” with to distancethemselvesfromChamtraditionsandcustomsreplacethem Muslimswhoparticipateintransnational Islamic movementstend Many Proponents ofChamtradition embrace thescriptureinordertoachievethisideal. the idealHomoIslamicusshouldlooklikeandurge thebelieverstofully social media their in conduct what define to tradition prophetic the of excavation an employ and discourse onreligious focus mostly Salafis short, In during, andafterconsumingthemeals(MuslimStung Treng 2020b). They alsopublishnumeroushadithquotationsregardingwhattodobefore, 2020b). Forum Educational (Islamic consume to halal is what and haram is what on lectures video Trengpublish Stung Muslim and Forum Educational Islamic both example, way.For Islamic an in meal the consume to how and The Salafi sites also offer advice regarding the proper Muslim diet; what to eat

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some casesEnglish(whichisobligatorytolearnatschool). standardized, therefore,theyareinmostcasesliterateonlyKhmer, andin learn KhmeratschoolandnotCham,whichisyetevenproperly they tend to use the Khmer language in written communication. They and whiletheymostlyspeaktheChamlanguageamongthemselves, study Arabic orMalayinthesamewayasotherMuslimscountry, not do San Imam the because is Khmer.This the in exclusively almost of is posts text the Interestingly, manuscripts. old of meaning the explain and traditional Chamcelebrationsandrituals,alsopresentthetranslations The Facebookpageslaunchedbythismovementregularlypostimagesof 72–79). 2012, (Pérez ago decades two about Imam San youth began organizing for the protection of their identity cultural artifactsinordertojointheummaapurestate.Someofthese the commemoration ofthefounder or 3) Figure (see about rituals such as the life. Otherpostsinclude images regarding anethicalconduct of provides elaborateinstructions the ImamSantradition also San andinformthelatterthat their quest to convert the Imam women. The and basically codesofconductformen of ancientChampoemswhichare Several postspublishedrecitations

and cultural events. They soon became active on social media as well. organizing museumvisits,discussiongroups,andpromotingreligious from thesailsofSunniMuslimsin poems aimstotakeoutthewind a virtuouslife.Popularizingthese poems teachtheChamhowtolive (The Law of Men) and other similar yber Kaboun OngChen C mawlid yber O rient, Vol. phnom, mawlid

15, Iss. procession (Cham KanImamSanof 17 Figure 3:Imam San Their activitiesincluded 1, 2021 Cambodia 2020). mawlid

273 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro are related toCham grammar, culture, andfood. The Islam relatedtopics Some religious. are posts the of all Malay.Not write to used script Jawi to modified script Arabic the of accommodate theChamlanguage,very similarbutnotidentical tothe version a Jawi, in written language Cham the into texts religious and verses Qur’an of translations are posts without theinvolvement of eitherSalafisorImamSan.Manythe The pageoverwhelmingly appearstobeaforumoftraditionalistMuslims languages that“IliketospeakChamlanguage[sic]”(Figure4). to each other and above them, in speech bubbles, it is written in five different Sunni Cham living in multiple nations. Five abstract human figures stand next posting on it. The cover photo of the page suggests this attempt to include the those who live in Malaysia, North America, and western Europe are active in of thesite,butseeminglyCambodianand Vietnamese ChamSunnis,and Language andCommunication(2013). It is unclear who are the administrators communication andeducation. The mainonlineforumforthisisCham’s Cham traditions,buttheseactivitiesarestronglyconnectedtoreligious also strivetopromotetheuseofChamlanguageandsome Some oftheChamwhoarenotImamSanfollowersbutSunniMuslims their heritage.(ChamKanImamSanofCambodia2018–20). in exclusively are explanations The Khmer, andtheyalwayscallfortheImamSanfollowersnottoforget San. Imam community, their of Figure 4: The coverphotoofCham’s LanguageandCommunicationFacebookpage yber (Cham’s LanguageandCommunication2018). C yber O rient, Vol. 15, Iss. 1, 2021 18

274 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro agree ontheway celebrationsshouldbe performed(Schussman1998). mostly regard mawlidaspermissible, althoughscholarsdonot necessarily this event (Lauzière 2015, 6, 10). Unlike Salafis, apply inmattersofworship, thereforethereisnolegitimatefoundationfor not celebratehisownbirthday. Their positionisthatbid’ahasana does not today entirelyforbidthecelebration arguing thattheProphethimself did mawlid could be celebrated (Schussman 1998, 229–230). However, Salafis Islamic reformists,asoutlinedabove,recommendedrestrictions oftheway for them,mawlidrepresentedbackwardness(Schielke2007,328–339). that a modern nation needs a rationalized system of belief and worship and struggles forcreatingmodernnation-states.Intellectuals atthattimeargued became a contentious issue in the 19th century, especially in Egypt, during festivities thesuch as drinking wine or prostitution (Schielke 2007, 326). Mawlid (praiseworthy innovation)andtheyonlycriticizedcertain elementsofthe premodern era, the majority of Muslim scholars regarded it as Mawlid ishighlycontestedinthecontemporaryMuslimworld.In mostly aroundtheissueofmawlid(thebirthdayProphetMuhammad). time, to time from occur do but few relatively are media social on Debates Contentious issues lead todiscord. They mightrecognizeeachotherfromFacebookcomments,whichcould with theImamSanorSunniswhoareproponentsofChamtraditions. patronage. Salafis and Tabligh members for example often live side by side Tabligh the openly:theattempttoavoidconfrontationandlosingofstate and traditionalists the debate not do Salafis the why reason same the un-Islamic alsorarelymakeacommentvoicingtheiropinion. This has against otherIslamicgroupsandthosewho consider theChamtraditions These abovementionedFacebookpagesalsodonotcontainmuchcriticism Cambodia, Vietnam, commentariesinCham. andMalaysia,Qur’an include religiouslecturesoftraditionalistSunniChamscholarsfrom

yber C yber O rient, Vol. 15, Iss. 1, 2021 madhhab-based Muslims bid‘a hasana

275 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro of the photos, anumber ofmenare San celebrations (Figure5).Inone during interesting setofphotoswas posted on its Facebook page. An especially every yearonmawlidcelebrations

the rest(Stock2016,791;Bruckmayr2019,190–191,330). celebrates in somecasesareligiousprocession. Today, whetherornotaMuslim the Malayworld,thatis,acommunalmealaccompaniedbyprayersand 128–132). 2012, their modeofcelebrationnowmorecloselyresembleswhatistypicalin (Pérez events religious yearly The important most the of cleavages. FortheImamSancommunity, theProphet’s birthdayisone In contemporaryCambodia,mawlidisinthecenterofintra-Muslim that observemawlid. traditionalist Muslimcommunities communal mealscommonin the mosqueratherthansimple which involves a procession to held bytheImamSancommunity, Cambodian The mostspectacularamongthe their religionandidentity, evenifthey canlookoverotherissues. not raisingtheirvoicetothemawlidwouldbesomethinglikedenying Muslim public. As several reformist minded Cambodian Muslims expressed, silent onFacebook.ItisthemostvisiblereligiouseventforCambodian differ, inthecaseofmawlid,CambodianMuslimsdonotentirelykeep Unlike inthecaseofotherissueswhereopinionsIslamicgroups of Muslimsinthecountry, social andculturaldevelopments focusing onpublishingthecurrent Muslim MediaCenter,anNGO

mawlid remainsimportanttotraditionalistSunniMuslimsalthough yber mawlid in 2015 onthe Imam is a common litmus test for distinguishing Salafis from Salafis distinguishing for test litmus common a is mawlid mawlid celebrationsis C The Cambodian yber O rient, Vol. 20 posts 15, Iss. during a 2015 Imam San mawlid celebration during a2015Imam Sanmawlidcelebration (Cambodian MuslimMedia Center2015). Figure 5: Carrying traditional Cham cake Figure 5:Carrying traditionalChamcake 1, 2021 19

276 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro

having fun a sacrifice to you?” (Cambodian Muslim Media Center 2015) Center Media Muslim (Cambodian you?” to sacrifice a fun having and cakes sharing “Is asked: and sacrifice not is picture the in happening permissible only in Islamduring‘aidal-adha.Someonerepliedthatfactwhatis is which sacrifice, a making is picture the in doing are celebrations. Another commenterwrotethatwhattheImamSanfollowers that resembles theway theProphet’s birthiscommemorated inMalaysia. (Muslim village chiefinCambodia)introduced astyleofmawlidcelebration Shafi‘i village in Kampong Cham province, young educated Malaysian Cambodian MuslimMedia Centerin2020.InRaka,anoverwhelmingly A similar debate happened on another “religious as scripts, Cham going onthere.”(Cambodian MuslimMediaCenter2015). study to woman matters areelaboratedinChammanuscripts.No blindfollowingis the urged follower San following blindlywhatevertraditiontheyinherited. An apparentImam A ChamMuslimwomanaccusedtheImamSanthattheyarejust San Imam the with wrong nothing is there their therefore, have culture,” also but scripture the “follow world the around Muslims that the called others the while preserved” well celebration deviantorentirelynotpartofIslam. While someargued that traditions “ancient as such Interestingly, severalapparentlySunniMuslimsleftencouragingcomments Media Center2015) celebrating themawlid,andthosewhoareagainstit.(CambodianMuslim the photosparkedadebateespeciallybetweenSunniswhoareproponentsof are actuallyreluctanttogiveuptheirtraditions.Nevertheless,thepostingof schools of thought intend to get ridofChamtraditions,manySunni other ritualsisnotnecessarilyunique. While themainSunnimovementsand The appearanceofaSunniMusliminphotoanImamSanmawlidor in Malaysia or the Middle East and not what Imam San women usually wear. Sunni Muslimwomaniswalkingwithaheadscarfresemblingtheonesused carrying thetraditionalChammawlidcakes.Besidethem,anapparently s o mnind n h Qra ad un, tes answered others Sunna, and Qur’an the in mentioned not is mawlid yber C yber O rient, Vol. 15, Iss. mawlid post published by the 1, 2021

mawlid hakim

277 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro

) or form of dawat is and hisCompanions. Inotherwords,the method (tariqa)orformofdawat is must beconductedinprecisely theformthatitwasconductedbyProphet however, dawat efficacious, be to order “in it, puts 57) (2018, Khan Arsalan sharing theirdailylivesprovides theraisond’êtreofmovement. As physical presenceintheMuslim communitieswheretheyarepreachingand For Tabligh, face-to-face preachingisofcentralimportance.Infact,havinga explained bythecharacteristicsoftheirprioritiesandpreocc upations. take advantage of onlineplatforms to promote their message. This can be movement intheCambodiancountryside,theyhave made fewattemptsto Islamic influential most the are Tabligh the Although latter. the in Tabligh the onlineworldonother, quicklyreveals theglaringnear-absence ofthe organizations inCambodiaontheonehand, andtheirlevelsofactivityin A cursorycomparisonofthepresenceIslamicinstitutionsand Staying offline:the Tabligh something likethisfromMalaysia. there areindigenousChamwaystocelebrateandisnoneedimport the kind ofcelebrationresponded.Others,however, whiletheysawcelebrating the against argumentspresented Salafi of consisted ofaphotoreportontheRakamawlidevent. There wereanumber Over twohundredcommentsappearedinjustafewhoursunderthepostthat andtheninthehouseofeachotherforconsumptionfood. is rathermodestwiththemembersofcommunitycomingtogetherin from theusualonesinChamSunnivillagesandurbandistrictssincelatter Muslim MediaCenter2020). This styleofmawlidcelebrationisverydifferent meals followsinoneofthecommunityspacesvillage(Cambodian prayer andaceramah(sermon)inthemosque,consumptionoflavish Cham dressandgoaroundthevillagechantingplayingmusic. After During the event, a procession occurs where the believers dress in traditional itself sacred.”

mawlid acceptable,criticizedthewayitwascelebrated. They argued that yber

C yber O rient, Vol. 15, Iss. mawlid, andthosewhodefendthis 1, 2021 21 21

278 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro

the Office of the Mufti, are more likely to present recent challenges and recent challenges present to achievements ineconomic andsocial development inMuslim communities. more likely are Mufti, the of Office the like thosepages associatedwithnational-level Muslimintuitions, suchas on oneencounters the Facebookpagesoftraditionalist Muslims. Traditionalist Facebookpages what with sharply contrasts Salafis the by practice and The useofsocialmediato disseminateinformationaboutreligiousbelief andpracticed believed ofIslam) generations Islam. To dothisanyvehicle isacceptableincludingonlinetools. three first the ancestors, transmittinguncorruptedknowledge;thewaysalaf(pious Salafis chiefly For 2014). (Iqbal groups Muslim larger even other, In worldwide. fact, theywerethepioneersofcarryingoutda‘waonlinewellahead online active exceptionally are Salafis Tabligh, the Unlike Discussion Conclusion: and Absence Debates their and significant a have role inthecomplexpoliticsofCambodia’s Muslimsocialmediascene. not does Tabligh this, of Because 2021). issue; special article ofKuncoroaboutthesocialmediausesIndonesian Tabligh inthis the movement,evenasmanyofthemmaintainpersonalpages(seealso Cambodian Tablighis haveascarceFacebookpresenceasparticipantsof why explain might this and activities, media social with replaceable hardly them, theProphetdid(Khan2018,57). This typeofproselytizationis visiting locals, with homes, andcounsellingpeopleonworldlymatters,justas,accordingto food preparing – life local of aspects mundane more religious obligations,the Tabligh preachersimmersethemselvesinthe Besides providingreligiousinstructionandreminderstoobserveone’s and Battambang. to Thailand orgo northwardstoKampongCham, Tbung Khmum,Pursat, take thesouthwestroutetowardsKep,Kampot,andKohKongbeforecrossing either then and Phenh Phnom into Usually,fly communities. they Muslim in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia,Bangladesh,andPakistantocarryoutkhuruj In Cambodia,participantsof Tabligh arrivefromarangeofcountries,suchas markaz (center)oramosquewhilethewomenstayinsomeone’s house.

yber 22 Wherever they stop, the men collectively stay in the local C yber O rient, Vol. 15, Iss. 1, 2021 da‘wa means

279 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro back to the interpenetration of Cambodia’s religious field by the state the by field religious Cambodia’s and theruling partyandthelatter’s treatmentofaminority religion. of a interpenetration of the existence to the back despite case the be should diverse andfragmentedIslamic sceneinthecountry. The answer goes this why consider to us from its lies inthefactthattheological debatesarealmostmissing. This invites dynamics different shows counterparts inIndonesia andMalaysia. The moststrikingdifference phenomenon, significant a become Cambodia’s Islamicsocialmediascene,whichhasonlyrecently phases ofbuildinguptheirnetworkinthecountry. presence asamovement in Cambodiasincetheyarestilltheearly development- Muslims. The reasonisthattheBrotherhoodhasnotannouncedits of kinds the – food focused presentation of the organization common among traditionalist of distribution school, a opening country. These usuallyincludephotosandshortcommentariesabout sporadic postsaboutnewsrelatedtotheirhumanitarianactivitiesinthe oriented websites.OnlyRahmaInternationalhasasitethatconsistsof The MuslimBrotherhoodalsohasnotsetupanyCambodianda‘wa as Salafis, the (perhaps community Muslim the MuftihimselfisShafi‘iandknowntobeclose the Tabligh). of to segments counterproductive some it make oftheestablishment may This publish theologicalpositionsonsocialmediathatmightalienate 2014). theumbrella Sonyka and under (Mohan Tabligh the and Salafis the unites theCambodianMuslimcommunityandhasmadeefforts tobring Furthermore, theMuftihasalsopositionedhimselfasapersonwho which enableshimtoimplementdevelopmentandeducationalprojects. prime ministerofCambodiaandhisdensesocialnetworksinMalaysia This isnowondersincetheMufti’s powerliesinhisconnectionstothe

organizational structurehasbeenestablished (al-Anani2016,99–117). puts among thelarger populationonlystartswhen a solidnucleusofthis movement the explain, elsewhere its mainemphasisonhavingarobustorganization. Proselytization Brotherhood Muslim the of yber C yber O rient, Vol. 15, Iss. 1, 2021 23 As observers

280 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro

war ofwordsandthusseemtobetoleratedbytheregime. kind. These debates neither resulted in offline clashes nor prolonged online sympathizers postcriticalcommentsandtraditionalist Muslimrespondin which does inspire serious and at times heated debate with Salafis and their the implementation ofhumanitarianprojects ratherthanonlineda‘wa . sees itsactivities inCambodiaasbeing in abuildingphasewith focus on of interactionimpracticalor impossible. As fortheMuslimBrotherhood, it type this make restrictions travel COVID-19 as however change may This their expanding in interest little shown have reason this for the face-to-facemethodof proselytization asconductedbytheProphet,and Not all Islamic groups have a significant online presence. The Tabligh privilege of exception notable the with another by group one of criticism language written in Arabic characters. All of this occurs without the direct on social media, while some Cham Sunnisstrive to preserve the Cham should The ImamSanfocusonpreservingandrevivingtheirreligioustraditions howMuslims with themselves conduct theirlivesinaccordancewithunderstandingofthescripture. concern Salafis disagree. they without referencetotheotherIslamicgroupsincountrywithwhich Those whoproselytizeonlinetendtolimitthemselvesgeneralissues efforts tomaintainthestatenarrativeoforderandsocialharmony. media postsbythestateandreligiousauthoritiesaspartofthesebroader made manifestintheonlinerealmbecauseofsurveillancesocial is complexity This Party. People’s Cambodian the of graces good the in actors inordertoavoidcomingundersuspicionorinvestigation,andstay weaken thisnarrative,keepingsocialharmonyintheinterestofallIslamic would clashes or dissent Intra-Muslim violence. extreme of history recent its rulebytheclaimthatitassuressocialharmonyinacountrywith connected; closely groups depend on the patronage of the ruling elite. The latter legitimizes are fields Islamic the Islam isinstitutionalized,andtheIslamicestablishmentdifferent and political The affected. setting inacountrywithviolenthistorywhereMuslimswereparticularly The Muslim minority in Cambodia has to deal with an authoritarian

yber C yber O rient, Vol. 15, Iss. 1, 2021 da‘wa online.

mawlid

281 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro al-Albani, MuhammadNasiral-Din.2004. References fields decreasestheexpressionofdiverseopinionsonsocialmedia. for themomentcloseconnectionbetweenpoliticalandreligious do in other Southeast Asian countries with a sizable Muslim population, but potentially could become reflected in the online sphere clearly do exist, as they communication. Nevertheless,thetheologicaldividesincommunitythat remain largely mutedandaresupersededbyunidirectionalformsof We canconcludethatfornow, debatesonCambodia’s socialmediascene al-Anani, Khalil.2016. Riyadh: MaktabatMa‘arifal-Riyad. Prophet Muhammad (PBH) on23December 2015].” [Cham BaniCommunity inCambodiacelebratingthe MaulutNabiinthememorialof the 23 khaethnūchnāṃ 2015msilmiñneḥknungkol paṃṇangraṃlẏkṭal’ cāp’ phṭoemprārabvbidhīpuṇym”āvlotṇābī pracāṃchnāṃ2015hoeykālbīthngaibudhdī Cambodian MuslimMediaCenter. 2015.“sahagaman˚cāmp”ānīknungpradeskambujā bān Challenges-for-Independent-Media-2017-English.pdf. Accessed [September10,2020]. Cambodian CenterforIndependentMedia.2017. Script, andIslamicFactionalismfrom the19thCenturytoPresent . Leiden:Brill. Bruckmayr, Philipp.2019.Cambodia’s MuslimsandtheMalayWorld: MalayLanguage,Jawi New IslamicCongregationinCambodia.” Bruckmayr, Philipp.2017.“TheBirthoftheKanImamSan:OnRecentEstablishmenta edited byRobert W. Hefner, 172–204.Honolulu,HI:UniversityofHawaiiPress. Cambodia.” In Blengsli, Bjørn Atle. 2009.“MuslimMetamorphosis:IslamicEducation andPoliticsinModern York: OxfordUniversityPress. yber Making ModernMuslims:ThePoliticsofIslamicEducationinSoutheast Inside theMuslimBrotherhood: Religion,Identity, andPolitics C yber https://www.ccimcambodia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ O rient, Vol. Journal ofGlobalSouthStudies Siffat Salatal-Nabi Challenges forIndependentMedia 15, Iss. Facebook 1, 2021 [Details oftheProphet’s Prayer]. photo,December 24. Accessed byākārīmūhaṃmāt’’ 34(2):197–224. . Report. . New Asia,

282 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro Monarchies. New York: OxfordUniversityPress. Freer, Courtney. 2018.RentierIslamism: TheInfluenceoftheMuslimBrotherhood inGulf complicated/. December 3. Accessed [June7, 2017]. https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/ngos-in-cambodia-its- Domashneva, Helena.2013.“NGOs inCambodia:It’s Complicated.” Collins, William.1996. 27 (4):378–397. and ImpactofOnlinePoliticalBehavioursinan Authoritarian State.” Chunly, Sereyvichet.2019.“Facebookand political participationinCambodia:Determinants https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1728879587173842&set=p.1728879587173842. Communication Facebookpage. Cham’s LanguageandCommunication.2018. The coverphotoofCham’s Languageand https://www.facebook.com/groups/552602971455960. Cham’s LanguageandCommunication posts/798390757393689. Accessed [November8,2020].https://www.facebook.com/ChamKanImamSanInCambodia/ Kampong Tralach district,KampongChhnangProvince].” ‘ūrṝassī srukkaṃbang’ traḷāckhettkaṃbang’ chnaṃng[ImamSan Cham KanImamSanofCambodia.2020.“m”ālutcāmkrumkanīmaṃsān’ 11, 2020].https://www.facebook.com/ChamKanImamSanInCambodia. Cham KanImamSanofCambodia.2018–20. cammcenter/photos/a.843670425657280/3937453496278942. Facebook Cambodian MuslimMediaCenter. 2020.UnconventionalmawlidcelebrationinRaka. [November 9,2020].https://www.facebook.com/cammcenter/posts/1134451606579159. yber photo,October29. Accessed [November3,2020].https://www.facebook.com/ C The ChamsofCambodia.PhnomPenh:Centerfor Advanced Studies. yber O Facebook rient, Vol. . 2013–20.Facebook photo,March10. Accessed [November9,2020]. Facebook 15, Iss. communitypage. Accessed [October Facebook group. Accessed [October1,2020]. 1, 2021 mawlid procession, photo, November8. South East Asia Research The Diplomatwebsite, naubhūm

283 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro Officials.” Proceedings of the Authoritarianism attheEdge: The DigitalandPolitical Transitions ofCambodian Village Jack, Margaret C.,SopheakChann,Steven J. Jackson,andNicolaDell.2021. “Networked Indonesia.” Iqbal, Asep M.2014.“Internet,Identity andIslamicMovements: The CaseofSalafismin www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=916653488844909&id=246422312534700. Prohibited FoodinIslam].” Islamic EducationalForum.2020b.“Prabhedāhārhāraṃnauknong sāsanāislām[T posts/650694348969929. photo, October7. Accessed [October9,2020].https://www.facebook.com/ief.cambodia.3/ fihi suratal-baqara[SatanfleesthehousewhereSuratal-Baqarais read].” Islamic EducationalForum.2020a.“Inna-l-shaytanyanfiruminal-bayti alladhituqra’ Anxieties onIndonesianSocialMedia.” Husein, Fatimah,andMartinSlama.2018.“OnlinePietyitsDiscontent:RevisitingIslamic and CarolaRichter, 198–221.Baden-Baden:Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. and Socio-Cultural Activism amongChineseMuslimsinMalaysiaandIndonesia.”In Hew, Wai Weng. 2015.“Dakwah2.0:DigitalDakwah,StreetDakwahandCyber-Urban National ElectionsofCambodia Guthrie, Elizabeth.2002.“Buddhist Temples andCambodianPolitics.”In Gauvain, Richard.2012. oJJYE. html?fbclid=IwAR2Y5eGu_7OHAQqMw6VWNIiL_h_WwNe20K41xLSgdYjbTdW_KY 17, 2020].http://www.freshnewsasia.com/index.php/en/91602-2018-07-02-08-52-04. poor familiesinKandalprovince].” jūn gruasārkrīkranaukhettkaṇṭāl [Mr.HunManethands100modelvillagesoverfor Fresh News.2018.“Lokh’unm”anaetañjoeñsambotbhaṃgaṃrūcaṃnuan100khnang yber Islamika Indonesiana1(1):81–105. Dynamicsin Asia andthe Arab World , editedbyNadja-ChristinaSchneider C Salafi RitualPurity:InthePresence ofGod yber Facebook ACM on Human-Computer Interaction , editedbyJohnL. Vijghen, 59–74.PhnomPenh: ECR. O rient, Vol. Fresh Newswebsite,July2. Accessed [October post, September14. Accessed [October11, 2020].https:// IndonesiaandtheMalayWorld 46(134):80–93. 15, Iss. 1, 2021 New MediaConfigurations . New York: Routledge. 50 (1):1–25. Facebook People andthe1998 ypes of

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284 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro Piety MovementinPakistan.” Khan, Arsalan. 2018.“PiousMasculinity, EthicalReflexivity, andMoralOrderinanIslamic were%209.70%20million%20social,at%2058%25%20in%20January%202020. e5giegydh9cYatVT9LlbJPgoOvCKuiMNzTROYQPbk1ZVrbMADC-LY#:~:text=There%20 [October 5,2020].https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-cambodia?fbclid=IwAR1ryb Kemp, Simon.2020.“Digital2020:Cambodia.” to beGodafterEating].” Muslim Stung Treng. 2020b.“51-karsarsoerarguṇ álḷoaḥpandápbīparibhoḡhār[51-Praised facebook.com/MuslimStungTreng/posts/2831019597134780. pleased withhim].” Muslim Stung Treng. 2020a.“‘anab-l-darda’ radiyaallah‘anhu[from Abu Darda’,Godbe com/53362/-grand-mufti-no-radical-deviationists-here/. Khmer Times website,December22. Accessed [October17,2020].https://www.khmertimeskh. Mohan, T., and Va Sonyka.2014.“Cambodia’s GrandMufti:NoRadical ‘Deviationists’ here.” Shadow of Transnational GovernanceandInvestment.” Milne, Sarah.2015.“Cambodia’s UnofficialRegimeofExtraction:IllicitLogginginthe York: ColumbiaUniversityPress. Lauzière, Henri.2015. among Tablighi Jama’atinIndonesia.” Kuncoro, Wahyu. 2021.“Ambivalence, Virtual PietyandRebranding:SocialMediaUses Female Muslim Youth inIndonesia.” Nisa, EvaF. 2018b. “CreativeandLucrativeDa’wa: The Visual Culture ofInstagramamongst Day OneJuz)inContemporaryIndonesia.” Nisa, EvaF. 2018a.“SocialMediaandtheBirthofanIslamicSocial Movement:ODOJ(One www.facebook.com/MuslimStungTreng/posts/2821872444716162. yber Facebook The MakingofSalafism:IslamicReforminthe Twentieth Century C Facebook yber photo,October8. Accessed [October9,2020].https://www. Anthropological Quarterly O rient, Vol. post, September28. Accessed [September30,2020].https:// Asiascape: Digital Asia (5):68–99. CyberOrient 15(1). Indonesia andtheMalayWorld 46(34):24–43. Datareportal website,February17. Accessed 15, Iss. Critical Asian Studies 47(2):200–228. Critical Asian 91 (1):53–78. 1, 2021 . New

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286 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro may bemadeofthe informationitcontains. article reflectsonly theauthor’s viewandthe Agencyis not responsibleforanyusethat This 838474. No agreement grant Sklodowska-Curie and Marie the research under 2020 programme Horizon innovation Union’s European the from funding received has project This * Notes South East Asia Research 26(3):219–234. Vong, Mun,andKimheanHok.2018.“Facebooking: Youth’s EverydaypoliticsinCambodia.” 1993–2003.” AsianPerspective Un, Kheang.2005.“PatronagePoliticsandHybridDemocracy:Political ChangeinCambodia Strangio, Sebastian.2014. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UniversityPress. Transnationalism andMultilocality from CambodiatoIran.”In Stock, Emiko.2020.“For‘AliIsOur ChamSayyids’Ancestor’: Shi’a Trajectories that’s howwesaythatChamsandKhmersareonethesame.’” Stock, Emiko.2016.“Two Rituals,aBitofDualismandPossiblySomeInseparability:‘Andso 3–31. Asia: InBetweenReligiousPoliticsandPopularPiousPractices.” Slama, Martin,andBartBarendregt.2018.“Introduction:OnlinePublicsinMuslimSoutheast Concepts ofPower.” Archiv Orientalni Slama, Martin.2020.“ImaginingIndonesianIslamasaCenter:NewMediationsandOld of Indonesia’s IslamicPreacherEconomy.” Economic Anthropology 4(1):94–106. Slama, Martin.2017.“A SubtleEconomyof Time: SocialMediaandthe Transformation edited byDietrichJungandKirstineSinclair, 121–146,Leiden:Brill. yber C yber Hun Sen’s Cambodia.NewHaven: Yale UniversityPress. Shi’a MinoritiesintheContemporaryWorld: Migration, 29(2):203–230. O rient, Vol. , editedbyOliverScharbodtand Yafa Shanneik,227–256. Supplementa 15, Iss. XII: 273–300. 1, 2021 Asiascape: Digital Asia 5: Sojourn 31(3):786–825.

287 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro 11 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 12 (2004). (Sedgewick 2020,121). Instagram and271thousand Twitter accounts(Kemp2020). Brotherhood, whichiscenteredaroundthe 2018; Chunly2019). expansion ofmobiledatanetworksthisnumberincreasedseventimesby2018(V Facebook accountsexistedandmostofthemwereownedbyurbanusers. Series ofinterviewsandobservationswithauthors,2010–18,Kuwait. International whosemembersandemployeesarealsoaffiliatedtoIslamicReformSociety to IslamicReformSociety. Forexample,thelatter’s headquartershosttheofficesofRahma The authorsconductedseveralinterviewswhichprovedRahmaInternational’ In2020,therewere9.2millionFacebookaccountsinCambodiacompared to600thousand We usetheterm Seriesofinterviewswithauthors,MayandJuly2017,Kampot,Phnom Penh,andBattambang. Interviewwithauthors,May5,2017,PhnomPenh. Interviewwithauthors,May5,2017,PhnomPenh. RahmaInternationalcarriesouttheoverseascharityactivitiesofKuwaitiMuslim ItderivesfromtheMalayterm Forexample,Cambodia’s Facebookusageexplodedonlyrecently. In2013,onlyonemillion Group of Tabligh members,2019,interviewwithauthors,December3,Kampong Chhnang. The mostreferredsourceinthisrespectbytheSalafisisMuhammad Nasiral-Dinal-Albani Series ofinterviews withauthors,May2017–November 2019,Cambodia. One ofthe sourcesofCambodian People’s Party’s legitimacyto ruleiskeeping thepeaceand yber traditionalist C yber followingtheself-definitionof jawi whichmeansMalay. O rient, Vol. Islamic ReformSociety 15, Iss. 1, 2021 madhhab-based Muslims (Freer2018,7–9,46,52–53).

With therecent s affiliation ong andHok .

288 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro extensively interviewedbetween2017and2019. October 24. This isalsocommonknowledgeamongSalafisinCambodiawhomtheauthors January 15, Kuwait. 22 21 Phnom Penh. ideological background)ashismainmission.SlesNazy, 2017,interviewwithauthors,May 4, Cambodia andconnectingCambodianMuslimstooverseascharityorganizations (regardlessof Its director, SlesNazy, isanintegrativefigurewhoregards providingnewsonIslamin of thought. We encounteredSalafis, Tabligh members,andtraditionalistsamongitsemployees. 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 social harmonyinCambodiaafteraviolent20thcentury. 23 often unintelligibletranslationsfromFacebook. interview withauthors,November23. metaphorical, especiallyamongtheKromKanImamSan.Sanfollower, 2020,online October 15 and November17. 15 October Seriesofobservationsandinterviews withauthors,2017–19,Cambodia. This isthetermusedinPakistanfor TheCambodianMuslimMediaCenter Seriesofinterviewswithauthors,November–December, 2020. The EnglishtextsontheCham KanImamSanofCambodia’s Facebookpageareautomatic, This mightbeareflection tothetraditionalChamconceptofSatan,whichisfrequently Onlineinterviewwithauthors,October25,2020. Oneoftheleadingfiguresmovement,2020,onlineinterviewswithauthors, Former studentofUstazMuhammadbin Abubakar, 2020,onlineinterview withauthors, Officials ofIslamic ReformSocietyandRahmaInternational, 2018,interv Group ofImamSanfollowers,2019,interviewwithauthors,December3, yber C yber O rient, Vol. da‘wa. isanNGOwhichdoesnotrepresentaspecificschool 15, Iss. 1, 2021 OuRuessei. iew withauthors,

289 Zoltan Pall, Alberto Pérez Pereiro