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Aiming to Become a Company Most Loved and Trusted by Society Table of Contents Yamato Group at a Glance
Company Profile Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2015 Aiming to become a company most loved and trusted by society Table of Contents Yamato Group at a Glance Yamato Group at a Glance ································· 01 Message from the President ······························· 05 Aiming to be Asia’s No. 1 solutions provider in distribution and lifestyle support Our Major Initiatives ······································· 09 Feature Article Aiming to become a company most loved and Company Overview (As of March 31, 2015) Delivery Business Japan International trusted by society—the Yamato Group’s CSV ··········· 11 Company name YAMATO HOLDINGS CO., LTD. Providing greater peace of mind Headquarters 16-10 Ginza 2-chome, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 104-8125 1 to elderly living alone ·························· 13 TA-Q-BIN services delivering new forms of convenience in Japan and in Asia Established November 29, 1919 Expanding the scope of the distribution 2 of agricultural, forestry and fisheries products Capital 127,234 million yen The small parcel delivery business—most recognized for our We also provide the same highly reliable TA-Q-BIN from Aomori Prefecture ························ 15 Stock Total number of authorized shares: 1,787,541,000 TA-Q-BIN services—and domestic air cargo transportation services as in Japan in many parts of Asia, including Taiwan Total number of shares outstanding: 454,684,992 Major Achievements and Results in Fiscal 2014··· 19 Number of shareholders: 37,059 business represent the driving force behind the collective where services started in October 2010, Shanghai and Safety Ensuring Long Distance Transport Safety······ 21 strengths of the Yamato Group. Singapore in January 2010, Hong Kong in February 2011, Ensuring Air Cargo Safety ······················ 23 Business lines Holds the shares of companies running various businesses including the trucking business, governs the management of those companies, and runs With a domestic network that covers every part of and Malaysia in September 2011. -
List of Participants As of 17 January 2014
Japan Meeting List of Participants As of 17 January 2014 Tokyo, Japan, 11 June 2013 Shinzo Abe Prime Minister of Japan Evgeny V. Afanasiev Ambassador of the Russian Federation Embassy of the Russian Japan to Japan Federation in Japan Nicolas Aguzin Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA Hong Kong SAR Asia-Pacific Hirotsugu Aida Columnist Kyodo News Japan Koichi Akaishi Japan Economic Revitalization Bureau Cabinet Office of Japan Japan Manager, Assistant Director Akira Amari Minister for Economic Revitalization and Minister for Economic and Fiscal Policy of Japan Jun Arai Representative Director and Chief Showa Shell Sekiyu KK Japan Operating Officer Hiroto Arakawa Vice-President, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Japan Hiroto Arakawa Vice-President, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Japan Keiichiro Asao Member of the House of Representatives, Japan William Barriga Chief of Mission International Organization for Japan Migration (IOM) Neelanjan Head, Japan Business HCL Technologies Ltd Japan Bhattacharjee Børge Brende Managing Director and Member of the World Economic Forum Switzerland Managing Board Børge Brende Managing Director and Member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway Managing Board Norway Urs Bucher Ambassador of Switzerland Embassy of Switzerland Japan Johan Cels Representative United Nations High Japan Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Adrian David Cheok Professor and Inventor, Graduate Keio University Japan School of Media Design Mitsuru Claire Chino Executive Officer, General Manager of Itochu Corporation Japan Lega l Division I-han Chou Senior Editor, Nature Nature Publishing Group Japan Sayuri Daimon Managing Editor The Japan Times Ltd Japan Katsuya Debari President and Chief Executive Officer Odyssey Communications Inc. -
Nuclear Proliferation in Plain Sight: Japan’S Plutonium Fuel Cycle–A Technical and Economic Failure but a Strategic Success
Volume 14 | Issue 5 | Number 2 | Article ID 4860 | Mar 01, 2016 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Nuclear Proliferation in Plain Sight: Japan’s Plutonium Fuel Cycle–A Technical and Economic Failure But a Strategic Success Shaun Burnie, Frank Barnaby, with Tom Clements, Aileen Mioko Smith and Kendra Ulrich Précis escalate in East Asia, Japan's stockpiling of thousands of kilograms of weapons usable th Five years after the March 11 2011 plutonium with no credible peaceful use is earthquake and tsunami destroyed fourdriving further proliferation in the region. Two reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi site, Japan's years before the extension of the U.S. Japan nuclear industry remains in crisis. Three nuclear cooperation agreement, the legal basis st reactors are operating as of February 1 2016, for the nations plutonium program, the time for a reduction of 94% of reactors since 2011. a rethink, long past, is more urgent than ever. Prospects for a restart of even half of the 54 reactors formerly operating are almost zero. Introduction For decades the center of the nations nuclear and energy policy was based on the utilization In the twilight world of Japan's nuclear of plutonium to fuel fast breeder reactors, program, where nothing is what it seems, the together with the use of plutonium MOX fuel in MONJU fast breeder reactor symbolizes a commercial power reactors. The program has nuclear policy that is based on a dangerous absorbed trillions of yen yet has utterly failed fantasy, but remains entrenched within the to deliver the energy security used to justify it. -
International Policy Forum 11 March 2014 Approval Ratings- Can You See the Pattern?
International Policy Forum 11 March 2014 Approval Ratings- can you see the pattern? 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Source: NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute Abe’s approval ratings: better than last time 70 60 50 40 A be 1 A be 2 30 20 10 0 Source: NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute In comparison to past prime ministers 80 70 60 A be 50 N oda Kan 40 H atoyam a 30 Aso Fukuda 20 10 0 Source: NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute Approval rating – LDP and Cabinet 90 Cabinet Approval Rating Ruling Party Approval Rating 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Source: NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute Abe is performing on par with Koizumi this far 90" Koizumi" 80" Abe1" Abe2" 70" 60" 50" 40" 30" 20" 10" 0" Source: NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute But still dependent on New Komeito in the upper house LDP Komeito Your Party DPJ SDP Japan Future Party Daichi 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% LDP Komeito Your Party DPJ SDP Japan Future Party 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Bills for the 186th diet session Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Cabinet Office Communications Industry • Revision of Radio Act to • Bill to extend export credit • Bill to Establish Medical adjust fees for use of radio insurance coverage to trade Strategy Promotion Bureau frequency with overseas subsidiaries • Bill to reform Nuclear • Revision of the Broadcasting • Promotion of city centers - a Damage Liability Act and Radio Act to add new boost for retail? Facilitation Fund (to add Internet broadcasting as a • Introduction of registration system for electricity suppliers ability to fund duty of NHK and to ease decommissioning) (first step towards retail conditions for receiving liberalization) and a system broadcasting license Time: End February • Various measure to promote for trade in electricity futures “e-governance”. -
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Can Japanese Nuclear Power Be Restarted Sooner? A Simulation of Alternative Scenarios Saleh Al Muhanna, Imtenan Al-Mubarak, Brian Efird and Faisal Al-Ghamdi October 2019 Doi: 10.30573/KS--2019-DP72 Can Japanese Nuclear Power Be Restarted Sooner? A Simulation of Alternative Scenarios 1 About KAPSARC The King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center (KAPSARC) is a non-profit global institution dedicated to independent research into energy economics, policy, technology and the environment across all types of energy. KAPSARC’s mandate is to advance the understanding of energy challenges and opportunities facing the world today and tomorrow, through unbiased, independent, and high-caliber research for the benefit of society. KAPSARC is located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This publication is also available in Arabic. Legal Notice © Copyright 2019 King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center (“KAPSARC”). This Document (and any information, data or materials contained therein) (the “Document”) shall not be used without the proper attribution to KAPSARC. The Document shall not be reproduced, in whole or in part, without the written permission of KAPSARC. KAPSARC makes no warranty, representation or undertaking whether expressed or implied, nor does it assume any legal liability, whether direct or indirect, or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information that contain in the Document. Nothing in the Document constitutes or shall be implied to constitute advice, recommendation or option. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views or position of KAPSARC. Can Japanese Nuclear Power Be Restarted Sooner? A Simulation of Alternative Scenarios 2 Key Points his study assesses whether there are politically plausible paths to more quickly gain support for restarting Japanese nuclear power plants and considers alternative scenarios. -
The Limits of Forgiveness in International Relations: Groups
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations E-ISSN: 1647-7251 [email protected] Observatório de Relações Exteriores Portugal del Pilar Álvarez, María; del Mar Lunaklick, María; Muñoz, Tomás The limits of forgiveness in International Relations: Groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and political tensions in East Asia JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations, vol. 7, núm. 2, noviembre, 2016, pp. 26- 49 Observatório de Relações Exteriores Lisboa, Portugal Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=413548516003 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative OBSERVARE Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa e-ISSN: 1647-7251 Vol. 7, Nº. 2 (November 2016-April 2017), pp. 26-49 THE LIMITS OF FORGIVENESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: GROUPS SUPPORTING THE YASUKUNI SHRINE IN JAPAN AND POLITICAL TENSIONS IN EAST ASIA María del Pilar Álvarez [email protected] Research Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Salvador (USAL, Argentina) and Visiting Professor of the Department of International Studies at the University T. Di Tella (UTDT). Coordinator of the Research Group on East Asia of the Institute of Social Science Research (IDICSO) of the USAL. Postdoctoral Fellow of the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET) of Argentina. Doctor of Social Sciences from the University of Buenos Aires (UBA). Holder of a Master Degree on East Asia, Korea, from Yonsei University. Holder of a Degree in Political Science (UBA). -
Japan-China Relations in East Asia: Rivals Or Partners? CHAPTER 6
CHAPTER 6 Japan-China Relations in East Asia: Rivals or Partners? IIDA Masafumi Introduction Japan-China relations stand at a turning point. Antagonistic political relations with relatively stable economic relations between the two countries during the Koizumi administration have been improving and moving in the direction of establishing “mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests” since Koizumi’s successor Prime Minister Shinzo Abe paid a visit to Beijing and met Chinese President Hu Jintao in October 2006. Whether the improving relations between Tokyo and Beijing will continue to gather momentum for consolidation of their strategic relationship of mutual benefit or return to the path of deterioration is one of the significant factors affecting not only Japan’s security but the stability of East Asia. Chinese diplomacy towards Japan in the latest decade appears hostile and thorny from a bilateral point of view. However, observed from an East Asian regional perspective, China’s approach to Japan in the same period paints a different picture. As a matter of fact, the Chinese government made effort to maintain cooperative relations with Japan in East Asian multilateral frameworks while taking a tough stance on bilateral connections with Tokyo during Koizumi’s term of office. In this respect, multilateral structures for East Asian regional cooperation function as a stabilizer for a conflict- prone Japanese-Sino relationship. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the Chinese government considers its Japan policy in the context of its regional policy in East Asia. The future of a strategic relationship of mutual benefit between the two countries depends significantly on whether or not China’s East Asian policy will continue to play a role in stabilizing its bilateral relations with Japan. -
Further Delays at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant Ing Plant Project Should Be Cancelled Before Similar Problems Arise in Japan
TOKYONov./Dec. 2005 NUKECitizens' Nuclear INFO Information Center No. 109 3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003, JAPAN URL: http://cnic.jp/english/ e-mail : [email protected] Further delays at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant ing Plant project should be cancelled before similar problems arise in Japan. Pro- fessor Hong Seong Tae of People's Solidarity for Par- ticipatory Democracy gave a South Korean perspective on Rokkasho, stressing prolifer- ation and environmental con- cerns. Martin also spoke in Morioka (Iwate Prefecture) on the 20th and in Aomori on the 21st. The major reason for the two-month delay is modifications to the vitri- Sit-in outside Ministry for Economy Trade and Industry fied high-level waste storage n November 18th Japan Nuclear Fuel facility (see NIT 105). It was discovered that, Ltd. (JNFL) announced that active tri- due to a design error, the cooling system of als (using spent nuclear fuel) at the buildings in this facility was inadequate. The ORokkasho Reprocessing Plant will be delayed governor of Aomori Prefecture indicated that two months to February 2006. Start-up of he wouldn't give his approval for active trials Rokkasho will also be pushed back two months until this problem was fixed. JNFL now says to July 2007. that these modifications will be completed by The announcement was made while demon- the end of this year. strations were being held in Tokyo opposing the reprocessing plant in general and the CONTENTS impending active trials in particular. Sit-ins, Further delays at Rokkasho 1,2 demonstrations and public meetings were held Nuclear Policy Planning Council 3,4 from November 16th - 19th. -
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World Heritage 39 COM WHC-15/39.COM/2.Rev Paris 22 June / 22 juin 2015 Original: English / French UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'EDUCATION, LA SCIENCE ET LA CULTURE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF THE WORLD CULTURAL AND NATURAL HERITAGE CONVENTION CONCERNANT LA PROTECTION DU PATRIMOINE MONDIAL, CULTUREL ET NATUREL WORLD HERITAGE COMMITTEE/ COMITE DU PATRIMOINE MONDIAL Thirty-ninth session/ Trente-neuvième session Bonn, Germany 28 June – 8 July 2015 / 28 juin – 8 juillet 2015 Item 2 of the Provisional Agenda: Admission of Observers Point 2 de l'ordre du jour provisoire : Admission des Observateurs 2: Admission of Observers / Admission des Observateurs SUMMARY / RÉSUMÉ This document consists of two parts: I. Draft Decision: 39 COM 2 II. Requests for Observer status SECTION A: Observer requests received in accordance with Rule 8.3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee; SECTION B: NGO/IGO representatives invited by the Director-General of UNESCO in accordance with Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee. This document cancels and replaces the previous one Ce document comprend deux parties : I. Projet de décision : 39 COM 2 II. Demandes de statut d’observateur SECTION A : Demandes de statut d'observateur reçues en conformité avec l'Article 8.3 du Règlement intérieur du Comité ; SECTION B : Représentants des ONG/OIG invités par la Directrice générale de l'UNESCO en conformité avec l’Article 8.4 du Règlement intérieur du Comité. Ce document annule et remplace le précédent I. DRAFT DECISION / PROJET DE DECISION Draft Decision: 39 COM 2 Projet de décision : 39 COM 2 The World Heritage Committee, Le Comité du patrimoine mondial, 1. -
4Th Meeting (February 27, 2007) (PDF:130KB)
Provisional Translation Minister’s Summary by Minister Ota 4th Meeting (February 27, 2007) (1) Towards a Productivity-Boosting Program 1. Overall picture of productivity improvements and strengthening growth potential 2. "Innovation 25" 3. Reform of undergraduate and graduate schools 4. Utilization of IT Hiroko Ota here. Today, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) held its fourth meeting of the year and discussed “Innovation 25,” the reform of undergraduate and graduate schools, and the utilization of IT as a step toward a Productivity-Boosting Program. Prior to today’s discussions, I presented a draft for the proposed Productivity-Boosting Program, which will be finalized by the end of April. Based on the idea that even a rough sketch could help CEFP members to understand the program, I merely highlighted an approach available to us at the moment. Deliberations as to its formal title and the program’s contents will be conducted by the CEFP until April. As for numerical targets, we adopted as an indicator of productivity increase the growth rate of per-hour added value produced by workers. The average figure during the past decade was 1.6%. We are now aiming to increase this figure by one-and-a-half times to 2.4 % over the next five years. The plan will be an attempt to increase added value produced by each person amid the declining population. The Prime Minister gave us instructions to set easy-to-understand targets such as doubling productivity. Since doubling productivity over five years is a very difficult task, we will aim for a 50 % increase. -
1 GR JAPAN Update on the Appointment of Prime Minister Suga
GR JAPAN Update on the appointment of Prime Minister Suga and the Suga Cabinet 17 September 2020 Executive Summary • As expected, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga easily won the election for leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on 14 September, taking over 70% of the vote. His premiership was cemented by the formal votes in the Diet on 16 September, where Suga received 314 of 465 votes in the House of Representatives and 142 of 245 in the House of Councillors. • After serving as Prime Minister Abe’s right hand as Chief Cabinet Secretary for nearly eight years, Suga is expected to be a “continuity” Prime Minister who will carry forward very similar policies, but he is seen as less of an ideologue and more focused on practical reforms. • The decisiveness of his victory gives Suga a solid platform within the party, helping him to push ahead with his own agenda and limiting internal dissent. • Suga’s Cabinet appointments reflect his commitment to continuity on the whole, with strategic appointments to further his plans for reform. • Policy priorities will focus on domestic issues, primarily economic recovery and Covid-19 pandemic mitigation, but the new Cabinet will also face tough diplomatic challenges. • Suga has indicated that he will continue Abe’s efforts to place a strengthened US- Japan alliance at the centre of Japan’s foreign policy, but also that he wants to achieve “balanced” relations with China. Yoshihide Suga as party leader As the new prime minister, Suga is stressing political continuity, but also talking about his commitment to administrative and regulatory reform as key priorities for his government. -
Outline of Duties, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan
Ministers, Senior Vice-Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries Ministers Prime Minister Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo ABE Yoshihide SUGA Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister of State for Disaster Management Akira AMAR I Keiji FURUYA Minister of State for the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Minister of State for the Corporation in support of Compensation for Nuclear Damage Nobuteru ISHIHARA Toshimitsu MOTEGI Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Minister of State for National Strategic Special Zones Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy Minister of State for Decentralization Reform Minister of State for Space Policy Ichita YAMAMOTO Yoshitaka SHINDO Minister of State for Regulatory Reform Minister of State for Consumer Affairs and Food Safety Minister of State for Measures for Declining Birthrate Minister of State for Gender Equality Tomomi INADA Masako MORI i Senior Vice-Ministers Senior Vice-Minister Senior Vice-Minister Masazumi GOTODA Yasutoshi NISHIMURA Senior Vice-Minister Senior Vice-Minister Hiroshi OKADA Masakazu SEKIGUCHI Senior Vice-Minister Senior Vice-Minister Kazuyoshi AKABA Shinji INOUE Parliamentary Secretaries Parliamentary Secretary Parliamentary Secretary Yoshitami KAMEOKA Shinjiro KOIZUMI Parliamentary Secretary Parliamentary Secretary Takamaro FUKUOKA Fumiaki MATSUMOTO Parliamentary Secretary Parliamentary Secretary Tadahiko ITO Yoshihiko ISOZAKI Parliamentary Secretary Tomoko UKISHIMA *as of January 31, 2014 ii Contents ○Overview Office for the Public Interest