POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017)

Volume 35: December 2017 ISSN 2414-6633 https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.35

Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief: Jaroslava Barbieri (Italy & Ukraine)

Justinas Lingevičus (Lithuania)

Andrés Lopez Rivera (Ecuador)

Rafael Plancarte (Mexico)

Ana Magdalena Figueroa (Brazil)

Gergana Tzvetkova (Bulgaria)

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Table of Contents

Editorial Note ...... 4

Articles

Identity, Securitization, and New Norm Creation: The evolution of US normative behavior during the Global War on Terror / Filip Svítek ...... 5 Moving from a centralised to a network strategy in addressing unemployment: The Mangaung Metropolitan as a case study / Lenie Swanepoel ...... 30 What kind of foreign policy actor can the EU be defined as in respect to their sanctions regime against Belarus? / Anna Lederer ...... 52 United in Diversity: A Comparative Analysis of the Voting Behaviours of European Far-Right Political Parties in the European Parliament between 2009-2014 / Pınar Sayan ...... 72 Call for Papers ...... 89

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Editorial Note

Dear Reader,

We proudly present Vol. 35 of Politikon, the flagship academic journal of the International Association for Political Science Students.

Politikon is open to talented junior scholars regardless of their formal academic status. This can be seen from the rich variety of backgrounds of our authors, whose papers successfully passed our peer-review procedure.

Our first paper adopts a constructivist approach to examine how securitization allowed the US Central Intelligence Agency to introduce controversial tactics such as coercive interrogations and extrajudicial detention as new internal norms, without turning them into fully-fledged rules under the Bush administration. Our second contribution argues that the lack of a network approach in favour of a centralised approach to government in South Africa can explain the weak success of tackling unemployment thus far. A network approach advocates for the inclusion of private actors, which can bring valuable expertise, skills, know-how and credit at the local level. To illustrate this, our author presents the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality’s Youth Enterprise Development Programme as a case study. Our third paper evaluates the character of the EU as a foreign policy actor by looking at its restrictive measures against Belarus. For this purpose, it analyses documents issued by the European Parliament on sanctions over a ten-year period. Our final contribution also studies the European Parliament, but this time from a different angle. In fact, it analyzes the voting behavior of European far-right parties between 2009 and 2014 on economic and monetary affairs as well as immigration, but also their party programs, election manifestos, parliamentary speeches, statements and media coverage. This article shows that these parties tend to be united on salient issues, while deviations are mostly caused by country-specific reasons.

If you also want to publish an article with us, please visit our website for further information: http://www.iapss.org/wp/academics/journals/politikon/callfor-papers/

We look forward to reviewing your work!

Your Editors

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Identity, Securitization, and New Norm Creation: The evolution of US normative behavior during the Global War on Terror

Filip Svítek https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.35.1

Filip Svítek is a recent Master’s graduate from Univerzita Karlova (Charles University) in Prague. There he studied international security, and wrote his thesis on non-material motives for conflict. He has published work with STRATPOL on network-centric warfare (ISBN 978-80-972526-0-1) and indirect strategic coercion with Karolinum Press (ISBN 978-80-246-3674-0). His field experience includes praxis with the Czech Foreign Ministry in Los Angeles and the US State Department in Zagreb.

Abstract

This article explores domestic security policy and international threats through a constructivist lens, examining how the US Central Intelligence Agency functionally employs controversial tactics such as coercive interrogations and extrajudicial detention within a society that represents liberal normative democracy – one that in theory should prefer to uphold norms of human rights rather than infringe upon them. There appear to be two main concepts at play: security as an underlying cultural identity (i.e. a product) and security as a subjective act (i.e. a process). In particular, National Security Culture (the product) and securitization (the process) can together allow for the evolution of normative behavior. Empirical results show that techniques of enhanced interrogation, practiced furtively during the Global War on Terror, were introduced as new internal norms due to successful securitization. These norms, however, did not coalesce as rules, and through the President Bush administration remained a distinct “torture lite.”

Keywords

Central Intelligence Agency; culture; discourse; enhanced interrogation; identity; intersubjectivity; language; National Security Culture; norms; rules; securitization; torture

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Introduction This work aims to use constructivist theory – as a bridge between (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism – to propose the constitutional reality of what is relational. The two theories of realism and liberalism predicate the importance of international anarchy in determining world order, or in other words, the absence of a governing superstructure with the power to reward or punish. But constructivism suggests even international anarchy does not necessarily allow for unrestrained behavior (Wendt 1992). Therefore, and in light of the ongoing Global War on Terror, this paper attempts to analyze the security cultures that states build under the influence of constructivist mindsets, and apply these so-called National Security Cultures to contemporary processes of securitization. In general, the first conceptional part of this paper will focus on US National Security Culture by exploring the construction of perceptions as facilitated by norms, rules, culture, and identity; the second section explores how language transmits these concepts and in particular, how it applies to the securitized threat of terrorism within the Global War on Terror. The case study will apply National Security Culture and securitization specifically to techniques of coercive interrogation, practices that both disrupt but also reflect the normative behavior of the US Central Intelligence Agency. Overall, this work asks: how can a group such as al Qaeda provoke a radical response from the Western world; effectively, was “torture” socialized as acceptable behavior? This study finds that, vis-à-vis international security, external threats (especially combined with extreme events), exacerbated by ideas of identity, have the power to alter normative behavior – but only to a limited extent.

Methodology and operationalization The methodology employed in this paper is exploratory and interpretive. Focus rests on the social aspects of ideational orientation, from a collective (i.e. non-individualist) constructivist perspective. Ultimately, analysis relies on choice and changes, constrained by self-imposed ideals of culture. In short, the orienting framework is based on what ideas states have, and the agency of actors in using these ideas. The framework provides much substance, but less in the way of causal determinism. Constructivist theory emphasizes ideas, language, social interaction, change, collective identity, shared context, different meanings, beliefs, subjectivity, and exclusivity. The concepts used supplement – but do not supplant – traditional theories such as realism and liberalism. While analysis also borrows from poststructuralist (or rather critical, radical constructivist) ideas, especially on discourse, the framework attempts to help bridge the divide between positivist approaches, with reflectivist-as-positivist empirics. In other words, the highly subjective nature of international relations is so entrenched, it becomes objective reality. The proceeding analysis attempts to clarify this claim, and by doing so, identify the characteristics of

6 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) what comprises these objective realities. This approach blends rational and irrational ontology, as a sort of “nonrational” meaning (Suchman and Eyre 1992: 157). The level of analysis is state-based and state-group-based (e.g. the CIA) – while individuals and the international system have an impact on state preferences, ultimately it is the state that is making the decisions. Because “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992: 395; emphasis altered), state perceptions play the largest role. To simplify: ideational terms dictate the social condition of the state. Social conditioning, thereafter, determines materialistic interpretations (Wendt 1992; Mercer 1995; Katzenstein 1996; Desch 1998; Campbell 1998). The approach rests on a teleological view of identity – that there is intrinsic value in the process of identity formation and maintenance. Analysis rests on a social ontology, such as the creation of social facts via national security, and on a social epistemology: answering for “whom particular forms of knowledge are for, and what function they serve in supporting the interests of those people or groups” (Mutimer 2010: 64) during securitization. Discursive politics play a role in analysis of the formation of both national security culture and, more importantly, in securitization. This method, while allowing for various meanings, can ultimately be traced to determine – though has limits causally linking – policy choices. Concepts such as context and preferences, based on identity, are key. Ultimately, this analysis attempts to bridge national security culture and securitization in a two-step process, integrating interconceptionalization of culture (such as through intertextuality) and intersubjectivity of securitization in a reductionist approach to international security. The mechanism that is used as a bridge between national security culture and securitization is identity (and the corresponding language). These two concepts, plus the bridging process, are applied to a single exploratory case study – the interrogation practices of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) within the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This case study provides insight from the perspective of a unique American institution integral to US security. It fulfills the who, what, when, where, why, and how questions of research analysis: respectively, that the CIA uses identity during the GWOT in the US and abroad to combat insecurity through securitization. The case is typical, as opposed to critical or revelatory, and is used “to shed light upon the logic of a given phenomenon. The conclusions drawn from typical cases are informative about the processes analyzed” (Balzacq 2011b: 34). The case study was chosen due to its depth, importance, and relevance to current obsessions with national security and terror, especially since 2001. Interpretation and perspective dominate. Tautology plays a lesser role, as: “from the point of view of absolute truth a cube or a circle are invariable geometrical figures, rigorously defined by certain formulas…By perspective [emphasis added] the cube may be transformed into a pyramid or a square, the circle into an ellipse or a straight line” (Le Bon 2001:

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5). Though, naturally, many documents remain classified and prevent an all-encompassing analysis – blocking a full view of the cube or the circle – some leaked or declassified work, other reports, reviews, statements, laws, and additional sources, together provide sufficient empirics to assemble a largely complete picture of the internal machinations of the CIA with regard to national security.i (see endnote) There are three main qualitative methods used in this paper: discourse analysis, process- tracing, and content analysis. The former is used during analysis of the concept of National Security Culture – the inductive process that “map[s] the emergence of patterns of representation” (Balzacq 2011b: 39). This process produces a product of cultural identity. Process-tracing involves taking this product in its (tentatively) finalized form – identity – and locates how language prepares and transforms meanings for a certain purpose. The philosophical “what is said” transforms into the sociological “how it is said” through methods other than discourse, such as procedure (e.g. policy-making). The process-tracing involved does not identify a causal link per se, but reinforces the notion that National Security Culture is a necessary but not sufficient independent variable. The content analysis portion takes the independence of the National Security Culture product, and superimposes the process of securitization. In other words, it is a deductive procedure that analyzes how agents can manipulate meaning using the “truth” of National Security Culture. A major research question explored is how normative behavior (that is, the US structure of National Security Culture) connect with agents (that is, CIA agency) (see Checkel 1998). Empirical data draws from primary sources such US national security strategies, the USA Patriot Act, the USA Freedom Act, US Congressional reports such as “The 9/11 Commission Report,” “The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,” and the “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program,” the charter of the US Central Intelligence Agency and other founding documents, as well as the official agency website, in addition to secondary sources such as media reports, among other discursive sources documenting US President George W. Bush’s Global War on Terror since 2001, and the UN Convention against Torture and similar other declarations. The research strategy attempts to document social structures apparent in these sources, highlight correlations between the social reality and state interests, and explore the discourse of new normative tendencies (Checkel 1998). Overall, the causal linkage is tenuous but the employed operationalization allows for measurement of “degrees of congruity” within a “network of causality” (Balzacq 2005: 192). Future research can strengthen the following study both by utilizing additional cases (e.g. drone warfare and so-called “targeted killings”), as well as by considering alternative theoretical explanations.

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Defining National Security Culture National Security Culture (NSC), in short, is a type of domestic social organization, and determines preferences of action – the organization of political strategy from a global perspective. NSC is constructed of “codes, rules, recipes, and assumptions which impose a rough order on conceptions” (Johnston 1995: 45). NSC helps determine order, ideas of causality, and issues of trust, limiting action as a sort of mentality used “instrumentally to eliminate alternative institutions, ideologies or behaviors from the body politic” (Ibid.). While simultaneously accepting certain premises of both structural neorealism (such as the rational egoism of states) and neoliberal institutionalism (such as the power of institutions to dictate state policy), NSC also relaxes the realist focus on material power and liberalist focus on institutional constraints. Blending the two creates an environment of states that operate beyond physical capability and integrate the impact of institutions on states’ interests and identities (Katzenstein 1996: 8-9). NSC constructs, through social process, an assortment of invaluable norms, rules, and culture – in other words, identity – for a state. These ideals are protected values, supported by the state and its domestic constituents. The functioning of NSC can be deconstructed into three main tenents: 1) norms (perscribing current action); 2) rules (proscribing alternatives); 3) culture (preserving previous behavior patterns and predicting future allowed/forbidden actions).

Norms Norms answer the questions: “Who are we; what do we do?” In essence, norms can be defined as methods of behavior that reflect apparent societal values. Norms within an established identity (elaborated on later) can show who we are (as “constitutive effects”) and how we should act (as “regulative effects”) (Katzenstein 1996), as well as acting as “prescriptive” indicators (Finnemore 1998: 891) – this analysis conflates the three, as norms in general constitute identity at a certain point in time. Norms can also be employed for intrinsic, and not instrumental reasons – for reasons of desirability or appropriateness based on what is evaluated (subjectively) as “good” through a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1998). Ideas dominant behavior. Norms can be created, and also rejected, with relative ease. Groups, such as within the US intelligence community, act as active “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore 1998: 896), encouraging new norms within contextual environments to create consensus and promote objectives in support of national security. New norms compete with old norms in a political process involving domestic, or international, coalitions (Katzenstein 1996). But norms are only the perceptible waves of a deep ocean of social structure (Le Bon 2001). In the process of legitimizing a set of subjective norms – through consensus – states develop rules.

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Rules Rules answer the question: “Why does it matter who we are?” Rules help define models of appropriate behavior, encouraging norms and discouraging deviation. Nicholas Onuf (2014: 1-2) describes rules as “norms…by another name.” A distinction involves applicability: whereas norms constitute characteristics of an actor, rules regulate conduct and constitute the environment, not the actor. A state can and does create norms that it then translates, through rules, how a state might act into how it must act to achieve certain results (or avoid punishments). Rules help institutionalize norms. International rules, often reinforced by both customary and traditional law, shape expectations in a more coercive way. In their legal form, states make rules into laws, and countries use or follow rules to reinforce legitimacy. The assumption follows, that states operate less in an environment of anarchy than in a system of self-imposed limitations; the US, for example, is bound not only by its own domestic rules but also by a tacit, international set that moderates (whether effectively or not will later be explored) its actions. This system is reinforced by communication that either asserts, requests, or promises certain action (Onuf 2014: 4). Legal rules support the adherence to norms under state penalty. Morality also plays a large role in the construction of rules. A rule-setting state often believes it has the moral imperative to share its norms with other, “lesser” states (with major ideologies such as imperialism, communism, and capitalism as useful examples). NSC in particular relies on audiences accepting the idea that their own states have the right idea and are worth protecting – that people value the identity they are party to. These “standards of appropriateness” (Katzenstein 1996: 14) can change, and historically the world has seen major shifts. Conceptions of morality, and the corresponding rules employed, often can change within one generation. Interpretations of normative values can make rules, but interpretations change.

Culture Culture answers the question: “Who have we been in the past?” Essentially, culture is the normative, rules-based behavior of an entity in the past. Culture thus also suggests asking: “Who might we be in the future?” Peter J. Katzenstein (1996: 4) defines culture as “collective models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law.” Culture is emotional and collective; culture is ideational, domestic, and emphasizes “uniqueness” (Desch 1998: 149). Culture is the fully institutionalized identity of an actor represented by tradition, and often rule of law or morality, and gives life to the search for meaning. Culture is the epistemological approach to the reality of a nation (Geertz 1973). Culture, broadly, is comprised of “collectively shared systems of meanings” (Risse 2000: 5). Answers to the cultural question are impacted by non-universal concepts of philosophy and politics that were formed over time – in other words, the normative behavior of a

10 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) state, as constrained by its own domestic rules, compounded throughout its history. Culture is often made up of semi-conscious or unconscious assumptions, defining the environment, “enabling individuals to make much out of little” (Wildavsky 1985: 95). The properties of culture are transitive and dynamic, though at any one point they can be considered objective variables. The idea of culture borrows from institutional context as a social determinant (Katzenstein 1996). In other words, political context limits behavior, blinding societies to a universal reality and focusing on specific, subjective problems, as well as what might be appropriate solutions (Johnston 1995). Institutions and organizations, in this context, do not just produce regimes of norms and rules, but act as active cultural units in their own right. Governments can create an agency, while the same agency can reappropriate perspective and pressure the same governments – or domestic populations – into considering a shift in values. This process morphs into political action facilitated through communication. Discourse in this way allows “statesmen and societies [to] actively shape the lessons of the past in ways they find convenient” (Snyder 1991: 30).

Using norms, rules, and culture to define the national interest and identity Culture (as past behavior), norms (as current behavior), and rules (as prescribed behavior), compound over time into a domestic identity. This identity – with its corresponding values and interests – produces inherent meaning, but also risk, for constituents. National (or sovereign) interests involve defending against this risk to inherent value and protecting the territory, continuity, and belonging of a society from threatening elements of a social world. This national interest, and by extension foreign policy, produces boundaries (Campbell 1998). These interests manifest themselves with labels such as citizenship and ethnicity: “very much a response to the need for identity” (Roe 2010: 168). Ideational factors represent the underlying motor of this emergence. In an increasingly globalized world, however, there is greater chance of external input from other actors or events – billiard balls that bump up against one other, but also have the power to exchange information or alter perspective. Socially, power and agency lie in ideas. Major external events, threats, or attacks (actual or perceived), provide windows to change ideational values. Autonomously, actors and institutions eventually solidify the collective ideas of state – made up of norms, rules, and culture – into an identity, a bottom-up formation, through national historical experience and experimentation. According to Katzenstein (1996: 13): “The domestic and international environments of states have effects; they are the arenas in which actors contest norms and through political and social processes construct and reconstruct identities.” Internationally competing identites (and their inherent values) conflict. Not only are choices thereby influenced, but a major reinterpretation and readjustment of norms (and rules and culture)

11 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) is possible. But the ideational starting point – NSC as a product – is the basis of each state’s milieu, a packaged culture that a nation-state can represent symbolically to the world. This representation is visualized in Figure 1. Figure 1 Ideational National Security Culture (NSC) as a product

source: author

Creating Identity Identity amalgamates previous questions of norms, rules, and culture – a holistic answer to what a state does, how it does it, and its behavioral history. As an all-encompassing concept, identity is the cultural past, normative present, and rules-based future for an entity. Identity, of a nation-state for example, is thus formed and not given or dictated. Politically, this means utilizing norms and counter-norms to establish a “normal” state, as well as “normal” priorities. Collective groups form, based on a trusting relationship, and tend to expel the subjective. Organizations simplify concepts by eliminating subjective, grey areas, and provide a gathering point for individual subgroups unified towards a common purpose – subduing, dominating, or eradicating opposing views in Manichean fashion. Defining national security in this way can lead to an identity crisis in national security, not from threats but from the lack of a threatening other; US national security interests after the Cold War faced ambiguity during realignment (Katzenstein 1996). Otherwise, the “healthy” state will use identity to push congealment or eradication, whether idealizations of fiat justitia, pereat mundus or Third Reich. Establishing a descriptive “body politic” shows not only the internally held values, but also what the system might consider as disease to be purged, as a type of

12 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) ethnic cleansing justified in the eyes of the cleansers, from infanticide in Grecian Sparta, to Joseph Goebbels’ surgical analogies, to George Kennan’s “malignant parasite” of communism. A series of dichotomies illustrates the spectrum: subject/object, inside/outside, self/other, rational/irrational, healthy/sick, true/false, and others. While the former are internalized and idealized, the latter represent threats to identity: “the outcome of this is that boundaries are constructed, spaces demarcated, standards of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history privileged, and alternatives marginalized” (Campbell 1998: 65; 68). The protection of an established identity requires the co-establishment of boundaries that outline where concepts of identity lie, and where they may change. Losing identity leads to loss of purpose (especially evident, for example, in extreme nationalist ideologies, where identity is significantly more important than life). Identity, through its subjectivity, can foster fear and drive foreign policy. Identity is especially useful for states when it, through language, outlines the possible perceptions and constructions of reality in new, unprecedented situations (Wendt 1992).

Using Language Language represents and determines the way identity and “reality” are communicated. Language fulfills goals of establishing identity to transmit norms, rules, and culture to observers. Language creates the bilateral dialogue and the explanations within discourse. At its core, language typically involves two actors: one speaker and one listener. But holistically, language output can reach wider audiences with exponential effect (LeBon 2001). The same discourse (i.e. language) can have a different effect based on the audience. Because NSC is a type of cultural discourse, distributed to a particular audience, made up of writing, debates, thoughts, words, and ideas transmitted by language, it functions as a symbolic effect in society. Symbolic language can be “autocommunicative,” that is, self-affirmative and a means to justify ideas internally by creating an ideal (Johnston 1995: 56). This process helps increase legitimacy, as an agent can be labeled as a “true believer” by using the right language. Symbols can be part of an “official” language directed within a group to justify authority (Cohn 1987: 708) – a claim to legitimacy through objectivity, limiting certain types of communication and by extension behavior, where “language does not allow certain questions to be asked or certain values to be expressed” (Ibid.: 717). This method also reinforces legitimacy, by creating a homogeneous dialogue and excluding dissident opinions. Language is also projected outwards against an adversary to rationalize one’s actions and legitimize power (Johnston 1995: 56-59). Symbolic language need not even be spoken to convey meaning – uniforms, for example, transmit ideas more efficiently than words. Images, as a type of language, similarly are able to communicate these ideas. By introducing logos, language functions as a

13 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) heuristic that simplifies complex environments; because environments are subjectively constructed, language socializes. Language is thus especially useful when discussing goals and threats within a context of uncertainty or change: the ideal context for securitization.

The securitization of identity Securitization is the process that mobilizes immediate support for a decision made in response to an apparently existential threat, as communicated through cultural and societal methods such as language. As best articulated by Thierry Balzacq:

“…securitization [is] an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a reference object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development.” (Balzacq 2011a: 3; italics in original)

Securitization finds its roots in politicization. To politicize a matter is to take the topic at hand and move it beyond its latent status (Buzan et al.: 1998); in other words, finding and arguing importance, followed by offering a resolution. The process is open, and often entails debate. To proceed from politicization to securitization, an existential threat is added. This threat then has the power to legitimize the breaking of rules, acting outside of what was previously normative behavior. Issues can (and do) move along the spectrum of non-politicized, politicized, and securitized. A glaring contrast between politicization and securitization is the audience factor. Securitization involves using language to highlight risk to an audience – especially risk of losing identifying, cultural ideals. Securitization aims to convince an audience of the necessity of an offered solution to an external shock, as visualized in Figure 2. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde elaborate the dialectic process of securitization (1998: 31; italics in original): “securitization is intersubjective and socially constructed…This quality is not held in subjective and isolated minds; it is a social quality, a part of a discursive, socially constituted, intersubjective realm.” Identity does not form until interaction with the intersubjective – a self- affirming dyadic structure of alter and ego (Wendt 1992). A liberal, democratic, market-based society cannot be defined as identifying without an illiberal, anti-democratic, non-market-based antithesis. And tacitly understood intersubjective concepts will lead to collective memory, an important foundation of securitization (Balzacq 2005). The legitimacy of protecting the perceived value of a referent object is a forefront issue during securitization. The introduction of new

14 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) normative behavior during securitization is thus done under the cover of bombastic, high-stakes language such as the speech act. Figure 2 Ideational securitization as a process

source: author Speech acts The main functional aspect of securitization is the speech act. Buzan et al. (1998) cite the most successful speech acts as claiming a middle-level referent object, such as a state. This unit – including both its sovereignty and domestic culture – takes precedence, especially over system-level and micro-/group-level referent objects. When speech acts successfully convince an audience of legitimacy, securitization can solidify the status of an issue and ensure it receives precedence over others. Securitizing an issue gives it the most attention; contradictorily, once the audience has accepted the speech acts, a securitized issue also receives the least critique. By pointing to an existential risk, there is a rational implication that the threat will be stopped. Context, especially NSC, structures – and limits – both how a speech act is constructed and how an audience is able to receive it. An important assumption lies in an agent’s construction of context: “the semantic repertoire of security is a combination of textual meaning – knowledge of the concept acquired through language (written and spoken) – and cultural meaning – knowledge gained through previous interactions and current situations” (Balzacq 2011a: 11). This context draws meaning from contemporary incarnations of national identity, the national zeitgeist of security, and agents can use it both to communicate and persuade in a “pragmatic” fashion, using power through social identity (Balzacq 2005).

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Speech acts themselves are not self-referential, and are not done in a vacuum of perception, but in a discursive space filled with prior experience. The speech act can adjust, blur, or repurpose the identity that makes up this experience, and will, most often by pointing to an external threat or stimulus to justify action. The “receptiveness” of the audience can be molded to fit the context (Balzacq 2011a: 11). The power to persuade lies in the mutual, shared knowledge of culture and trust that the threat is real. An external shock will add urgency, compounded by concurrent emotional intensity (as a point of critical mass) and logical calculations that points to impending consequences (Balzacq 2005). Discourse gives agency and language mobilizes identity. The 11 September 2001 attacks in the US produced a major shock to American identity; in response, organizations within the US perceived the need for alternative normative behavior. When a collective group, such as the Bush administration during the Global War on Terror, worked to securitize this issue in its political capacity, it can – and has – utilized functional groups, such as the US Central Intelligence Agency, to offer new normative tools as a solution.

Fear and (in)security This case study was selected to shed light on an important research question: how can a score of terrorist hijackers strike terror into the hearts of hundreds of millions of relatively secure Americans? Materialistically, terrorist groups tend to have negligible capability; realist theories would dismiss them out of hand. Even al Qaeda’s largest attack on 11 September 2001, cobbled together from Afghanistan or Pakistan, used just small knives and four makeshift missiles. Only two targets were destroyed, one slightly damaged, and one left completely intact. Approximately 3,000 noncombatants were tragically killed; the event was doubtlessly a national tragedy. But statistically, in terms of major conflict, the damage was minimal. The response, meanwhile, initiated a declaration of a state of war, two major armed invasions, hundreds of thousands of casualties, other interventions, and costs upwards of trillions of dollars (Thompson 2011). The US war in Vietnam, in comparison, cost under $1 trillion adjusted for inflation (McCarthy 2015). This phenomenon is not a unique occurrence. US President Lyndon Johnson introduced a War on Poverty and a War on Crime in the 1960s, followed later by President Richard Nixon’s 1971 War on Drugs, with President Ronald Reagan declaring war on state-sponsored terrorism in the 1980s and followed only most recently by President George W. Bush’s ongoing GWOT since 2001. The framework for this newest ideational war has involved defining national security interests and has entailed military, political, and social dimensions. But unlike the defined territories, leadership, and populations of foreign nation-states in traditional wars, fighting insecurity via an abstract concept such as terror becomes a question of identity-formation and protecting that identity: “who are we” and “what threatens us” as the dominanting sociological framework.

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The Bush Administration and the Global War on Terror The framing and “interpretive dominance” (Paris 2002: 425) securitizing actors such as President Bush are able to promote during the GWOT – focusing on an eschatological outlook – create the exceptional situation that allows for exceptional solutions, especially by controlling the flow of information and meaning. Framing the threat as an existential threat to domestic culture (as later elaborated) opens the same cultural actors to reconsider what might be appropriate normative action. Coercive interrogations, in the context of US liberal democracy, as well as biblical concepts of justice, are one such manifestation. Following 11 September 2001, the fear of culturecide communicated and induced a “cultural nationalism” (Roe 2010: 172), where the preservation of Self dominated all else. “Collateral damage” – an important indicator of self- aggrandizement – became a part of everyday vocabulary (Kurtulus 2012: 48) as a price to pay for complete victory. Discourse in the GWOT activated conscious, subconscious, and emotional feelings, based on an underlying national culture, to “‘limit what we notice, highlight what we see, and provide part of the inferential structure that we reason with’” (Paris 2002: 428). Possible alternatives are discarded when US representatives claim – with democratic justification – that they are most qualified to interpret the situation and prescribe a response. The president and his administration was thus able to morph the reality of a threatening environment (whether via terrorist tribes or scheming despots) by defining the world around him in culturally identifying terms (Murphy 2003). President Bush continued the discursive construction of identity and bipolarization of domestic culture and external threat, most infamously in his 20 September 2001 speech: “This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom…We’re in a fight for our principles…The advance of human freedom, the great achievement of our time and the great hope of every time, now depends on us…Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them” (Bush 2001a). By invoking a great eternal battle between good and evil, us and them, President Bush outlined what it meant to be an American, highlighting to his audience (of Americans) the cultural traits of identifying Christian and democratic norms. President Bush made a (brave) “new world, an imagined creation that would justify his authority to act in the material world…But once unveiled, this new world demanded of the people new behavior” (Murphy 2003: 613, 614). When “‘You’re either with us or you’re against us’” (Bush 2001b), the recurring result is ostracization, fear, conflict, and post-World War II, the institutionalization of a systematic, organized approach of protecting society beyond traditional militaries. A prominent functional actor in this reorganization has been the CIA.

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Defining the US Central Intelligence Agency US President Franklin D. Roosevelt coordinated the first recognizable US intelligence community in the midst of World War II as the Office of Strategic Services. The US responded to increasing terrorist incidents with its 1972 Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, to “include such activities as the collection of intelligence worldwide and the physical protection of U.S. personnel and installations abroad and foreign diplomats, and diplomatic installations in the United States” (Nixon 1972). Important reforms came to the intelligence community in 2004 when President Bush restructured the system with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The CIA defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (USC Title 22, §2656f(d)). This mandate, to prosecute terror, is imposed on an independent and non- departmental CIA that works “primarily for the president…each White House and NSC [National Security Council] has pressed CIA and now the DNI to adapt its intelligence support and priorities to match the president’s style and interest,” whether explicitly willing or not (George 2011: 164). Historically, even “CIA directors have found themselves becoming policy advocates” (Ibid.: 172). Culturally, operatives in the CIA cultivate an “image of a can-do culture, not unlike the Marine Corps” and “a sense of independence,” both which encourage it to execute presidential directives in its own unique fashion (Ibid.: 160). On the one hand, the CIA receives orders from and reports to the US president; simultaneously, its independence gives it latitude to introduce what it might perceive to be the best solution to a threat. While instances of violent terrorism has dramatically decreased in the past decades (Jenkins 2015), the critical figure of approximately 3,000 casualties on 11 September 2001, galvanized the nation by invoking – largely through President Bush’s discursive GWOT – a perceived threat to the cultural identity of Americans. The 2001 terrorist attacks, even as a lesser threat to US civilians, refocused, through securitization, the functional agency of the CIA on a newly defined societal threat. Threats to political security were translated into an insecure society. According to the Bush administration, American identity composed a society of certain cultural values; this identity (and thus culture) were penetrated by the Other, through an alternate identity and conflicting values. The threat of terror was presented discursively by the Bush administration as an external, existential issue – our values or theirs – allowing for the introduction of radical solutions.

All-but-innocent terrorists One of the major steps to mobilize the NSC of the US and combat terror was the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), authorized by the US Congress three days

18 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) after the 11 September attacks and signed by President Bush on 18 September 2001 (later supplemented by the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq), to provide the legal justification for “prosecuting” international terror. As of 2017, the 2001 AUMF was still in effect. According to the AUMF, this allows for military and coercive action against “acts of treacherous violence” committed by international terrorist organizations, including perhaps unintentionally (15 years later) groups in the Middle East such as Daesh. Though explicitly intended to destroy the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks – cutting off the head of the snake, that is, of al Qaeda and its affiliates – the legislation has been used as an effective instrument in extrajudicially capturing enemies of the state and encouraging them to reveal information. It was the critical event of the 11 September attacks that started the search for this new normative action. Before 11 September 2001: “the idea of holding terrorists outside the U.S. legal system was not under consideration…not even for Osama bin Laden” (Priest 2005: 3). The external shock was deemed threatening enough by US leadership, and conveyed convincingly enough to a US audience, that an exceptional solution was necessary. Between 2002 and 2003, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sanctioned 24 of 35 “enhanced” interrogation methods (Bellamy 2006: 122) as a corollary to the AUMF. The CIA was tasked with applying these new norms.

Coercive Interrogation as Enhanced Torture Coercive interrogation begins with extraordinary rendition. Rendition and prolonged detention during emergency is not an unprecedented norm; US President Abraham Lincoln suspended due process for Confederate detainees during the US Civil War, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt did the same to more than 100,000 Japanese-Americans in the initial stages of World War II. And “given the large number of democracies involved in the extraordinary rendition of terrorism suspects, including several ostensibly liberal states such as Sweden, it is possible to conclude that this type of extra-legal procedures has become a normalized aspect of post-11 September counterterrorism operations of democracies” (Kurtulus 2012: 43). Locations to which suspects are rendered are widespread, and include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and Iraq in general, as well Bagram airbase in Afghanistan, the island of Diego Garcia, and Guantánamo Bay in Cuba in particular, and even mobile sites on US Navy warships and other undisclosed locations (Bowden 2003: 54; Kurtulus 2012: 43). Traditional torture is internationally banned according to numerous declarations, conventions, charters, and more, such as Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; as well as in motley

19 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) regional or other edicts – and domestically by the US Constitution and other legislation. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the midst of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, prohibited inhumane treatment of detainees (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005). The US Uniform Code of Military Justice prohibits US forces from “cruelty,” “maltreatment,” or “oppression” of detainees (Mayer 2005). President Bush declared in 2002: “‘I call on all governments to join with the United States and the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigating, and prosecuting all acts of torture…and we are leading this fight by example’” (Bush cited in Bowden 2003: 56). Torture is thusly labeled, legally and morally, as a “crime against humanity” and protected as a negative human right (i.e. the right not to be tortured). The core debate has been definitional (that is, discursive): “the key legal question in relation to torture is therefore not so much whether it is legal, but whether specific acts that stop short of causing life-threatening pain, such as sensory deprivation and placing people in so-called ‘stress positions’, are properly defined as torture” (Bellamy 2006: 127). And in a single discursive sweep, the Bush administration used the term “unlawful combatants” to exclude detainees from what might have been due legal process with a (definitive) judicial answer to the torture question. This limited coercion, in isolated places, involves methods such as positions of physical stress, sensory and sleep deprivation, forced nudity, solitary confinement, verbal beratement, loud music, exposure to excessive temperatures, drugging, general degradation, and other methods originating from the Kubark Manual on interrogation techniques. In the abstract, disrupting routine and unmooring the “anchors of sanity” (Bowden 2003: 52) are considered effective forms of enhanced interrogation. This creates fear, not necessarily of further pain, but of the collapse of the interrogatees constructed reality and beliefs – the annihilation of a fully functioning Self and erasure of identity. Interrogation is the art of breaching identity by using shared language to deconstruct a detainees social structure, as “an interrogator who penetrates that [constructed Other] secret society, unraveling its shared language, culture, history, customs, plans, and pecking order, can diminish its hold on even the staunchest believer…the most important skill for an interrogator is to know the prisoner’s language” (Ibid.: 64). Speaking the same language, and using it to create a new context, can convince even heavily indoctrinated individuals, such as Islamic fundamentalists, of the inferiority of one identity over another; in other words, asking: “Is it worth the struggle?” While language communicates similarities within a culture, it can also effectively communicate dissimilarities between cultures, and used with precision (and certain restraint) can be an efficacious tool at processing external violators and maintaining the internal codes of domestic values.

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As such, even these coercive techniques, though definitely abusive in a broad sense, are a far cry from traditional methods involving burning, cutting, shocking, pulling, screwing, branding, impaling, and other painful mutilations still used, even today, by certain other states. Instances of “full” torture, to highlight the contrast, deserve to be quoted at length:

“Saddam Hussein’s police force burned various marks into the foreheads of thieves and deserters, and routinely sliced tongues out of those whose words offended the state. In Sri Lanka prisoners are hung upside down and burned with hot irons. In China they are beaten with clubs and shocked with cattle prods. In India the police stick pins through the fingernails and fingers of prisoners. Maiming and physical abuse are legal in Somalia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Sudan, and other countries that practice sharia; the hands of thieves are lopped off, and women convicted of adultery may be stoned to death. Governments around the world continue to employ rape and mutilation, and to harm family members, including children, in order to extort confessions or information from those in captivity.” (Bowden 2003: 53)

When compared to the above, the isolating, shouting at, pushing, degrading, and other “torture lite” (Ibid.) abuse of detainees held by the US can be considered relatively mild. If the CIA employed similar methods as common in more authoritarian regimes, it could not point with sincerity to a desire to uphold liberal norms; it would have no excuse to mistreat its prisoners. But because of US ideas of culture and normative identity – as this analysis argues – even in a successfully securitized environment, the US and its citizens sanction only a lighter form of torture that might batter suspected terrorists a bit, while causing no long-lasting physical or serious mental harm. In logs of interrogation released by TIME Magazine in 2002, the “20th hijacker” detainee, Mohammed al Qahtani, receives both coercive abuse but also homemade meals and electrocardiographic, computerized axial tomographic (CAT), and ultrasound scans by a medical specialist flown-in from abroad – treatment resulting overall in not much more than moderate mental strain and gratuitous tears. According to The New Yorker, some statistics show “Guantánamo detainees got more frequent medical treatment than most Americans” and that suspected terrorists received “honey-glazed chicken” or “lemon-baked fish” as rations (Mayer 2005). In addition, al Qaeda’s own Manchester Manual – its de facto field manual – suggests Islamists “complain of mistreatment while in prison” and insist “torture was inflicted on them.” The techniques used in coercive interrogation are mild enough to be applied by the US to its own personnel – with willing, sane participants – in Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) programs nationwide. On the other hand, however, numerous suspected terrorists have perished in US custody after coercive interrogations, perhaps most notoriously when Gul Rahman died from hypothermia at the CIA “Salt Pit” in northern Kabul, Afghanistan, and when a “ghost” detainee,

21 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) unregistered (and thus unchecked by medical personnel) at Abu Ghraib, perished after wounds sustained during arrest (Johnston 2004). Others have attempted (or succeeded in committing) suicide, including at Guantánamo Bay (Mayer 2006). The power of language lubricates the sidestepping of the entire international legal system; language allows the certain activities in the interest of US cultural norms to continue, and prevents obstacles from intruding on the implementation of its national security interests and the securing of its cultural priorities. By being “unlawful” combatants, regulation regarding their torture need not apply. Historically, other state authorities have attempted similar maneuvers, with different results – French commissions on acts in Algeria (see the Wuillaume Report) and the UK authorities on Northern Ireland (see the Compton Committee) concluded that the simulated drownings and sleep deprivation used in the respective conflicts (among other similar techniques also used by the CIA), ultimately, were abusive and illegitimate. The European community confirmed this conclusion in 1976, claiming that the systematic institutionalization of torturous techniques were a violation of human rights (Bellamy 2006: 128-129). Regardless, certain European Union countries have hosted CIA blacksites where coercive interrogation took place, and countries such as the UK have refused “to rule out information extracted from torture in court proceedings” (Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch cited in Slater 2006: 213). Meanwhile, in Israel, torture under emergency circumstances is circumstantially condoned (see Landau Commission). Each state has taken a slightly different approach, while the US and Israel have lead liberal international society in liberalizing “torture” regimes. A majority of Americans (55%) agreed with this approach as it occurred, and supported keeping Guantánamo Bay even a decade after the 11 September attacks (Condon 2010). Similarly, within the GWOT, US polls confirmed widespread domestic support of the “torture” of terrorist suspects (Kurtulus 2012: 46). In places such as Guantánamo, coercive interrogation can make its impermanent mark while essentially occurring without a trace – as part serious response to domestic threat and part protection of domestic ideals.

Conclusion Because humans are social creatures, their sociological interactions – not just between themselves, but with their environments – are an important foundation in the building of historical philosophies and accumulated perspectives. Nation-states, in particular, nurture domestic identities and adapt corresponding interests. This process of socialization constructs a new rationality that transmogrifies uncertain subjectivity into clear objectives: a National Security Culture (NSC). Communication then spreads these ideas imperfectly, and in extreme situations involving the domestic NSC, state (and other) actors can securitize threats. So-called norm entrepreneurs can introduce new normative behavior as a solution for dealing with this securitized threat; in our case

22 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) study, the CIA established a new norm of enhanced interrogation within the context of the GWOT. Because of internal consensus (and secrecy), the new norm was able to advance quickly, with little public resistance, to the rule-making phase of identity formation. But even the schism in normative behavior – that securitization legitimized – only allowed a modified form of enhanced interrogation to enter (that is, ultimately, only “torture lite”). This demonstrates that ideas, along with perceptions and interpretations, play a major role in international security.

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Moving from a centralised to a network strategy in addressing unemployment: The Mangaung Metropolitan as a case study

Lenie Swanepoel https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.35.2

Dr Lenie (MP) Swanepoel, 48, from Bloemfontein (South Africa) is a graduate who received her Bachelor’s degree in “Communication” at the University of Johannesburg in 1991. In 2004 she obtained her Masters Degree from the University of the Free State’s Governance and Political Transformation Programme. She wrote her Masters Thesis on Vigilantism as a feature of political decay: Tendencies and case studies in the post-1994 South African political dispensation. In 2009 she obtained her PhD under the title “Vigilantism as a feature of political decay in the post-1994 South African dispensation: A theoretical perspective”. She lectured in the same programme during 2010 to 2015 the module “South African Governance and Political Transformation and has been a research fellow from 2009 to 2017.

Abstract

Unemployment is a challenge for the South African government, including of the Local Government. Many strategies were developed to do so, but with little success. This article argues that this is due to the application of a centralised approach instead of a network one. The centralized strategy is depleting state resources, whilst the private sector has expertise, skills, know-how and credit that could be used. The theory of network governance reiterates that partners are equal and function horizontally, which provides a safe environment for private partners in the network with the government structure retaining the responsibility of coordination and being at the centre of decision-making. This framework is applied to the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality’s Youth Enterprise Development Programme where the private sector was drawn in in line with the network approach. The article concludes that the mode of governance within local government needs to be transformed.

Keywords

Network Governance; Local Government; Policy; Unemployment

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1. Background One of the main objectives of local government is to promote economic development (RSA Constitution 1996: Section 152). With that said, one of South Africa’s governance challenges is unemployment, which also drives poverty, and with it inequality. The level of this challenge is illustrated by the fact that 60% of South Africa’s unemployed have never been employed (Schwella 2015: 145). South Africa has nearly 36 million employable people, but only 15.5 million have jobs, 5.5 million are out of work, and the rest are not economically active (eNCA money 2015). Government has developed many strategies since the country’s democratisation in 1994, but it was accentuated that unemployment remains rife by it being emphasised in the election manifestos of all participating opposition political parties in the run-up to the 2016 Local Government Elections (LGE). The failure of successfully addressing this challenge cannot be attributed to the lack of strategizing by government, as numerous policies have been developed since 1994. These policies include the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTS) and the Economic Growth Path Strategy (EGPS). It will be argued in this article that the government’s failure to address unemployment can be ascribed to a lack of networking. The governance strategy applied here addresses how the challenge of unemployment has been centralised within the structures of government, depleting resources without providing the results set out in its objectives. The article will analyse how the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality (MMM) managed the Youth Enterprise Development Programme (YEDP) as a governance structure and, as will be argued, the need for transformation in the thinking of local governments by involving the public sector when it comes to Local Economic Development (LED).

1.1 Purpose The purpose of the article is to assess the utilisation of network governance principles to address the challenge of unemployment. The principles of network governance allow for the utilisation of both public and private resources, which will increase the resource base in addressing the challenge. To assess this probability the criteria for network governance will be identified and applied to a programme with the aim of developing Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMME). One of the smaller metropolitan municipalities of South Africa was selected for this analysis, the MMM. According to the Constitution (1996: Section 155), a metropolitan municipality has exclusive legislative and executive authority in its municipal area. Mangaung was elevated to a category “A” metropolitan municipality in April 2011.

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LED is outcomes-based, with the aim of creating employment for local residents, and can be defined as a participatory, not coordinating, process. The process encourages and facilitates partnerships between local government and actors from the private sector with a joint design strategy (Canzanelli 2001: 9; Mufamadi 2000: 1; Blakely 1989: 58). Definitions of LED emphasise partnerships and support the principles of the theory of network governance. In a World Bank report (Rodriquiz-Pose & Tijmstra 2005: 5), it was determined that South Africa’s pro-poor LED strategies at local government level do not involve the local business community in developing strategies; thus, limited pro-poor strategies are implemented because of the lack of information- sharing. The SALGA position paper of March 2010 (Cohen 2010: 25) reiterated that LED projects in the Free State seldom succeed and rarely involve the private sector as an actor within these strategies, resulting in poverty not being addressed. MMM’s YEDP fell within the criteria of LED, specifically regarding the involvement of the private sector from the beginning. It also showed potential to have a long-term effect on those provided with the opportunity. This made it vital to explore for the purpose of this article to determine what mistakes MMM made and the successes achieved in its approach in addressing unemployment, using the principles of governance network theory.

1.2 Problem Statement There has been a steady increase in unemployment in Mangaung, with a decline in job creation. According to the Quarterly Labour Force Survey of the first quarter of 2016 (Stats SA a 2016: xiii), MMM provided 251 000 jobs in the first quarter of 2016 in comparison to 266 000 in 2015. This is a 5.7% decline in employment opportunities. The Free State’s official unemployment rate also increased from 30.4% in the first quarter of 2015 to 33.9% in the first quarter of 2016 (Stats SA a 2016: xiii). MMM has been unable to meet its target for job creation, as set out in its Integrated Development Plan (IDP). In fact, there has been a steady as illustrated in the following table:

Table 1: Mangaung jobs created from 2011 to 2015 (MMM a 2016: 63)

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In April 2015, the Metro launched a project to register all unemployed youth living in Mangaung on the Municipal Data Register, initiated by the then Executive Mayor. This was done through the SMME Support Division, which invited all unemployed youth from all regions to register. The aim of these efforts was directed at ensuring employment and economic participation among its young people (MMM 2015). The project fell under the IDP objective for 2014/2015 under economic development with the strategy to support viable and sustainable SMMEs (MMM a 2016: 65 & 131). The aim of this strategy was to strengthen support systems for SMMEs in Mangaung so as to create a small business sector. This would increase the sustainability of the local economy, increase the competitiveness of local businesses, generate jobs and broaden the tax base of the Municipality (Seda 2015). The question that needs to be answered is how best the local sphere of government can address the critical problem of unemployment and if the application of the principles of the theory of governance network may be considered as an effective counter measure to the problem. The value of the application of network governance within local governments will therefore be argued as a viable strategy but that the challenges the MMM experienced be presented as a guidance for future application.

1.3 Methodology A literature review was conducted to determine the efforts undertaken by MMM to address unemployment up until the 2016 LGE. The theory of network governance was studied as the framework around which the research problem of this article was developed and to develop an understanding of what role MMM is expected to play within such a network to achieve its set programme goals within the YEDP. In depth discussions were held with the team leader of the YEDP on 27 October 2016, and participants of the Programme’s three different projects: on 26 October 2016 a participant of the Fresh Produce Market’s refurbishing of trolleys, on 10 November 2016 a focus group of five participants of the Human Settlement Project, and on 14 November 2016 a participant of the Digital Migration Project who was viewed as a representative for the participants of this project based on his experience and leadership. This was done to gain an appreciation of the strategies, processes and limitations, and to determine how the theory of network governance can be applied as a possible viable option in addressing the challenge. The discussions with the participants of the projects also aimed to determine the impact the projects had on them and their experiences of it independently from that of the structure that drove the projects. The individuals discussions were held with were not provided with the research problem so as not to influence the information they provided pertaining to the YEDP.

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Criteria will be identified that will be utilised to measure the level of successful application of network governance. The criteria will be utilised to assess MMM’s YEDP so as to determine the mistakes made in the attempt to follow a network approach, and also the successes, to indicate that this approach may be more effective in addressing the challenge of unemployment as joblessness is becoming an indication that South Africa is on the path of political decay, rather than political development.

2. Theory of Network Governance South Africa shows characteristics of political decay: incompetent civil servants, corruption, and insufficient procedures and control measures that inhibit continuous and quality service delivery (Duvenhage, 2003: 47, 51-53) and government struggles to correct these symptoms. These characteristics results in a situation of “politics of survival” where government structures rely only on themselves to solve governance challenges, such as unemployment, due to the fear of losing power or acknowledgement if successes are achieved if entering into equal partnerships. Benvir (2011: 11) explain that governance involves constant movement with a dependent nature of practical political activity. Governance network according to Considine (2013: 443-444) is a structured institutional space and may assist in resolving the problem of transformational change. He concluded that the critical parties need to be included and the authorising environment must be somewhat “insulated from party-political processes”. Governance is an attempt to steer society and the economy through collective actions and forms of regulation that link values and objectives to outputs and outcomes. Governance networks can be seen as a particular mode of governance in which interdependent actors contribute to the production of public governance. Key actors involved should be from the state, economy and civil society. Governance networks are part of the transition from government to governance. It forces focus on political processes and not institutional structures (Torfling 2012: 99-101). Local Government has a degree of independence from central government and therefore ideal for the implementation of network governance. Social and political actors in governance networks should recognise their mutual dependence, although their participation is voluntary. They cooperate by sharing information, advice, knowledge, ideas, know-how and credit. Coordination and regulation of their actions are however required in order to enhance efficiency to find joint solutions to problems and challenges. The relationship is horizontal, meaning no “One” actor has the power and authority to resolve, single-handedly, disputes that emerge in the network. Outcomes are therefore due to the interaction of many actors who are interdependent. Facilitation of these actions is however needed

34 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) with a minimal structural requirement of scheduled meetings to ensure regular interaction (Torfling 2012: 101; Klijn & Koppenjan 2012: 591; Considine 2013: 442). Networks increase connectedness among participating actors, linking structures, and thus giving them access to different resources. It provides the opportunity to bridge social groups, making the network a crucial phenomenon to government (Considine 2013: 442). According to Denters (2011: 315), widespread participation provides policy makers with extensive information, which makes it easier to better gear local policies and services to the preferences of the citizenry. Therefore, governance can benefit from network governance. Interaction is through negotiations that involve conflicts, power, and compromise formation. At the beginning, there is no common constitution to regulate the negotiation. Over time, governance networks will become more institutionalised (Torfling 2012: 101). Networks that have a higher chance of succeeding therefore develop over a period of time, have regular interaction with all the actors, show a willingness to compromise and share, and are well facilitated. As Klijn & Koppenjan (2012: 591) indicate, facilitation is needed between the actors in networks, which is done by public authorities. The self-regulatory capacity of networks is therefore limited and constrained by public authorities, who often threaten to take over if governance networks fail to deliver (Torfling 2012: 102). In addition, governance networks operate in the shadow of a hierarchy (Scharpf 1994: 27), which may have a political undertone. Governance networks are stronger at the local level, where public policies are formulated and implemented in collaboration between the public and private sectors (Torfling 2012: 102). Local government authorities often seek to create sustainable new forms of governance so as to perform practical service and build new forms of capacity. Governance networks, in theory, could be applied to achieve this responsibility. This type of network is typically organised around local development. These structures are best underpinned by a “good governance” discourse so as to ensure accountability to citizens and the provision of better services to those in need (Considine 2013: 441). Torfling (2012: 103) emphasises that in a network state, powers are not reduced, but transformed and exercised in new ways. Rhodes (1997: 57) explains that the “state was always a network” as it is made up of networks of governance and societal actors. Operating in accordance of a network strategy is therefore inherent of governance. Government remains at the centre of decision-making, and plays a leading role. A motivating factor for the utilisation of governance networks is that with these networks, public participation is encouraged as private citizens and organised stakeholders play a more active role in public policy-making. It ensures a well-informed decision-making process because of the sharing of information, know-how and knowledge.

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Consequently, innovative solutions are generated, private resources are mobilised and joint ownership of new ideas is created (Sørensen & Torfling 2007: 155, 158 & 244). It must however also be noted that the risk of governance failure becomes a reality if networks are not formed spontaneously and lead to a stalemate, as well as poor and biased or lack of direction regarding decision consensus. The risk can be reduced by "the regulation of self- regulation", also referred to as meta-governance, which is to manage, facilitate and give direction to traditional forms of hierarchical command and control (Torfling 2012: 107). MMM set out with the intention of involving private actors in their YEDP from the beginning. Networks however connect governmental, private and semi-private actors, making it a complex process (Klijn & Koppenjan 2012: 592). The complex nature of networks stresses the need for a strong administrative coordinator, who has the responsibility to ensure that each actor plays his/her part, deadlines are met, and goals and aims are achieved, safeguarding success. MMM took on the responsibility of facilitation of the network it had created. The Metro also created a policy and strategic plan, which did not involve the private actors from the beginning. This indicates that the network was not formed spontaneously, and also placed the bulk of the responsibility on the MMM team to ensure the success of the Programme.

2.1 Relevance of Theory to MMM With the theory of network governance, the driving force is the recognition of the mutual dependence of all actors. It is an institutionalised formal and informal resource exchange between government and non-government actors (Davies 2011: 10). This was the reason the YEDP of the MMM was selected, as it reflected this resource exchange in its planning stage. It must also be accepted that the challenge at hand, in this case unemployment within the area of Mangaung, can only be resolved by a network of actors and not as individual actors. These actors act voluntary and cannot be forced to act or think in a certain way (Torfling 2012: 61). MMM therefore has to agree that unemployment can only be successfully addressed through networks, which it cannot dominate through its legislative and executive authority, but it has to become an equal partner with the private actors. These can be financial institutions, local business associations, training facilities and community members. Acceptance of mutual interdependence is central to the success of a network, as much as political agendas are not involved, and can transform the MMM by stimulating the local economy and addressing the high unemployment rate. MMM has acknowledged that projects initiated by the private sector failed because of a lack of coordination. Network governance theory however involves more than the mere activity of

36 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) coordination. Low voter turnout, in the case of Mangaung for the 2016 LGE an average of 57.72% (IEC 2016), indicates that all political representations are only partial representations. The network is therefore a technique or mechanism for producing “the People”, who which the elected politicians are supposed to represent (Catlaw 2009: 485), as networks increase public participation. Cohen (2019: 25) identified the “politicisation” of development as a problem. Networks must be “insulated” from political agendas, which override the greater common good. The influence of a change in political leadership, as witnessed after the 2016 LGE in the MMM, affected the relationship already cultivated within the network. In this article, network governance theory is tested against the YEDP of the MMM to determine the challenges and best practices observed. This will be done to reach conclusions and provide recommendations on how to transform the core of local governance so as to better address unemployment.

2.2 Criteria for Network Governance Through the analysis of the theory of network governance, certain criteria was identified to assist with measuring the case study in order to determine if the principles of the theory were successfully applied and which challenges/mistakes were observed. • Inclusion of Critical Key Parties from both government and private structures. They are interdependent as each brings something unique to the table to ensure success. • Participation is voluntary and the relation between the parties horizontal. Actors cannot be forced to participate and the challenge cannot be resolved by only one of the actors. • The network must be insulated from Party Political Processes. • A Division of Labour is required through the sharing of information, advice, and credit, among others. • Facilitation by Public Authorities is critical and require leadership as it is at the centre of decision-making.

3. The MMM YEDP: A Case Study of Attempted Network Governance Application The YEDP formed part of the almost 13 000 SMMEs supported, as indicated in the end of tenure report of the previous Executive Mayor of the Mangaung Metro Council for the period 2011 to 2016 (MMM b 2016: 5). In the IDP, budget and review reports, this Programme was placed under the heading SMME support. The Programme fell under the responsibility of the MMM Planning and Economic and Rural Development Directorate, and was coordinated by a team leader. The Programme was initiated by the mayor of the time and had the support of the

37 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) then MMM Executive Management Team. The Programme was a partnership between MMM, Allied Bank of South Africa (ABSA), the Central University of Technology (CUT) in Bloemfontein, and the Skills Education Training Authorities (SETA). Local media reports in the run up to the launch of the programme indicated that the main partners were presented as being MMM and ABSA (OFM News 2015; Vuk’uzenzele 2016: 4). The Programme is therefore viewed as a governance network in which public and private resources are combined, and it is an applicable example that can be analysed for the purpose of this article. Two of the most prevalent causes of general business failure amongst SMMEs in South Africa are a lack of management skills and training (Rogerson 2007: 166). Therefore it is noticeable that the ultimate aim of the Programme was to involve training for the participating unemployed youth so as to provide them with relevant skills. Mentoring, coaching and continued support to those who wanted to develop and start SMMEs were also to be provided. It was also noted in the media that one of the aims was to assist the participants to establish businesses that would operate in Mangaung (OFM News 2015; Vuk’uzenzele 2016: 4). Although the YEDP’s immediate impact was that some young unemployed people were removed from Mangaung's streets, the long-term impact was for them to be provided with the opportunity to develop micro and small businesses. These types of businesses have been shown in developing countries to be engines for private sector development and the reduction of income- based poverty. This is especially true, according to Ray (2010: 5), for developing countries where many people cannot access jobs in existing employment markets, such as in Mangaung. SMMEs have been hailed as the pillars of local development by leading development organisations and industry studies, providing an array of economic and social benefits. SMMEs represent important sources of employment and income, since small businesses are typically more labour intensive than larger enterprises. SMMEs are also sources of economic dynamism, innovation, and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, SMMEs possess an ability to draw on the local workforce, pay taxes to contribute to public investments, and provide local services and goods that are better aligned with the needs of the local market. Statistics SA views any person between the age of 14 and 35 as part of the youth of the country. According to Statistics SA’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey for the second quarter of 2016 (2016 b: 13 & 29), the unemployment rate (of working age between 14 and 65) of the Metro was 28.8%, and for the expanded definition 34.1%, while youth unemployment stood at 37.2% (Stats-SA 2016 b). The unemployment rate among the age group 15 to 19 was the highest with 66.7%, and the age group with the second highest unemployment rate, of 49.4%, 20 to 24 (Stats- SA: 2011). Adding to this, Mangaung has a young population, with the majority of its population in

38 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) the 20 to 24 year bracket (HIS Global Insight 2014). MMM used the criteria of all residents between the age of 18 and 35 as part of the youth who could register on its youth unemployed database. A total of 65% of those who registered were between the age of 24 and 31. With SMMEs the framework of the National Small Business Act 102 of 1996 is used, which bases the different enterprises on the number of employees, the annual turnover and the gross assets (Abor & Quartey 2010: 221). Micro, but formal, enterprises have a turnover less than the VAT registration limit and lack formality in terms of registration. They include spaza shops, minibus taxis and household industries. They employ no more than five people and struggles to obtain formal credit. Small enterprises have an upper limit of 50 employees, are more established. They are run by their owners and have formal business premises and meet all the registration requirements. Medium enterprises have a maximum number of employees of 200, and are mainly in the mining, electrical, manufacturing and construction sectors. These enterprises are often characterised by the decentralisation of power to an additional management layer (MacIsaac 1996: 6; Kroon 1998: 29). Turning to MMM, the YEDP’s aims were focussed on the development and the provision of support to micro and small enterprises. According to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2008: 51): “It is as yet unclear just how well individual SMME programmes are functioning and they are not as well-linked as they could be. The result is that rather than it being clear to an entrepreneur or prospective entrepreneur where support services can be accessed, it is a 'hit-or-miss' situation where they may or may not be reached by particular programmes run by separate institutions. It is therefore imperative that a mechanism be developed to coordinate the various interventions and programmes", preferably through a single programme. MMM through the YEDP developed a single well-linked programme, which supports the argument of the DTI, but also supports the research question that network governance may be a better way of addressing unemployment and providing support to SMMEs. In the IDP of the MMM for the period 2016/2017 (MMM IDP 2016/2017), under its LED strategy, it is said that it is a process by which public, business and non-governmental sector partners work collectively to create better conditions for economic growth. The establishment of SMMEs is part of this process. The aim of the YEDP was to upskill unemployed youth with the necessary technical expertise and on-the-job training with mentoring and financial support through public and private actors. There was a change in thinking in alleviating unemployment and poverty within the area of the Metro from a hierarchically organised system of governance to a horizontally organised system through a network.

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The first aim of the Programme was to unlock opportunities for skills training, nurture the skills base of the youth, and create knowledge infusion to improve the employment prospects for unemployed youth in Mangaung. The second aim was to develop youth enterprises and ultimately SMMEs. With the YEDP the governance network was simplified as the only partners were MMM, ABSA, CUT, SETA and the participating youth. ABSA, CUT and SETA signed a memorandum of understanding with the Metro, committing to their roles and functions within the Programme. The network was envisaged by the MMM as follows:

MMM R40 Million Coaching and Mentoring Incubation Programme

ABSA R360 000.00 SETA R20 Million Training in Basic Financial YEDP Provide Accredited Management and NVC Financial Support Qualifications

through Loans CUT Training paid by MMM

(Discussion YEDP Team Leader: 14 October 2016) The MMM team consisted of two permanent staff members of the Metro and five interns. The programme owner was the Executive Mayor, the programme director the City Manager, and the Programme Manager the Head of Planning and Economic and Rural Development. MMM was the sole facilitator and coordinator of the Programme. After the initial agreement, meetings with the different actors took place individually. More than one actor would only be present in a meeting if they had to work together to meet a certain objective of the Programme. Actors were informed of the different responsibilities, but did not operate as an integrated network. The Programme had a budget of R40 million, which was obtained from the maintenance budgets of the different directorates of the Metro. Each directorate was requested by the then Executive Mayor to make a contribution to the Programme from these specific budgets. MMM's Human Resource Development Unit was also to provide coaching and mentoring and the SMME support unit developed an incubation programme to prepare the graduated participants to start their own micro businesses. ABSA had to provide R360 000 for the second phase of the Programme for those attending the entrepreneurial courses and had to prepare participants to start

40 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) their own micro business through training that covered basic business management, financial literacy and personal financial management. ABSA also committed to provide loans to participants of the Digital Migration Programme after they successfully completed their training, submitted business plans, and provided proof of contracts obtained from the Department of Telecommunications. CUT was contracted to provide training, paid by MMM; CUT did however not provide any funding. SETA committed R20 million towards the Programme to provide training to 500 youth and to contribute to stipends during the periods of training. SETA was to provide recognised qualifications to the graduates and do assessments of participants who completed on-the-job training. SETA also agreed to provide New Venture Creation (NVC); NQF 2 learnership qualifications to 26 unemployed participants with no formal qualifications and a full learnership on NVC; NQF 4 to 366 participants; and an apprenticeship in plumbing, electrician, painting and decor to 206 participants. A total of 8 000 unemployed youth in Mangaung registered on the unemployed youth database coordinated by the SMME support unit of the MMM. Participants became aware of the database through local radio stations and on social media. The Programme was intended to run for three years, through different phases. The project was launched during a youth summit on 26 June 2015. Only 845 of those registered on the database attended the launch, who also became the start-up group of the Programme. Three development categories were identified, in which the start-up group were divided as follows: participants with qualifications (228/27%), participants with experience but no formal qualifications, such as on-the-job training (355/30%), and participants with no qualifications or experience (362/43%). Skills training areas were identified in which the participants were divided, according to existing qualifications, skills and interests. Participants were divided between three projects within the Programme. Digital 467

Migration participants

Human 123 YEDP Settlement participants

Refurbishing 5

Trolleys participants

(Discussion YEDP Team Leader: 14 October 2016) The first project was digital migration, for which digital terrestrial television training was provided at CUT. There is a high need for digital migration as in future certain television sets will

41 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) not be able to function without a digital decoder. It was determined that South Africa faces a major digital skills talent shortage, as there was a pool of just under 12 000 registered installers servicing a pay television market of about six million people. The majority of installers are concentrated in urban areas. With a limited period of only 18 months, at the time, 15 million households had to migrate to high definition. This emphasises the reality of a dire shortage of digital skills; hence, the MMM took the opportunity to train youth for this market. It was also indicated that the youth who were receiving this training were already receiving requests for services from the public, even before they had obtained their qualification. Some of the youth showed an interest in establishing small businesses within Mangaung, based on the demand. Unique skills were emphasised in the YEDP. This included the Fresh Produce Market trolley repair initiative and the welding and spray-painting training. One of these welding and spray- painting participants was employed by Transnet afterwards, due to the interest in this specific skill. The Programme therefore identified training in areas where opportunities for the participants would be available after completion of the training. The Digital Migration participants, in particular, obtained unique skills; however, without accreditation this skill could not be formally utilised, such as starting a SMME. Existing businesses in the digital migration sector in Mangaung will not be able to cope with the required migration. A market was thus identified by MMM to ensure the sustainability of possible micro businesses that resulted from the Programme. These micro businesses might even grow into small businesses. Under human settlement, a project for MMM building maintenance was identified in which internships in plumbing, electricity, painting and decor were offered. This involved on-the- job training. The third project involved the Fresh Produce Market’s refurbishing of trolleys. This was also a NVC learnership programme, with a NQ level 4 Qualification. Participants were to receive one year entrepreneurial training after their internship at the Fresh Produce Market. One of the participants who had completed his training was employed at Transnet as he obtained the skills also utilised by Transnet for the refurbishing of train trucks.

Aftercare was part of the strategy of the Programme, with ABSA to assist with start-up funding on credit for those who completed the digital migration training. The participants involved also had to provide proof of a contract received from the Telecommunications Department to do subsidised digital migration for those identified as indigent. With the other participants, ABSA was to assist with the opening of bank accounts and ongoing coaching and mentoring for those that

42 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) were interested in starting a micro business. SETA was also to be involved in the aftercare of the participants by assisting with the establishment of businesses.

4. Evaluation and Assessment of Programme in Terms of Network Governance Criteria The outcomes of the Programme has been summarised in the following table:

467 participants Contracts not Digital Migration allocated to start

Phase 1 Unaccredited SMMEs completed qualifications Phase 2 Unsuccessful 123 participants Human YEDP Settlement Contracts with Phase 1 Phase 2 not MMM completed implemented terminated

5 participants Refurbishing

Trolleys Stipents not Phase 1 Phase 2 paid during Successful unsuccessful training

(Discussions: YEDP Team Leader and Participants: 14 and 26 October 2016, 10 and 14 November 2016) Utilising the criteria for network governance identified, the case study of MMM’s YEDP will be measured to determine the level of successful application of the principles of the theory of network governance, as well as the challenges experienced.

4.1 Inclusion of critical key parties that are interdependent within the network MMM’s YEDP serviced the unemployed youth of Mangaung. At the time, the MMM consisted of Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. MMM and the unemployed youth were interdependent actors. The unemployed youth were dependent on MMM for opportunities and MMM had the responsibility, according to its mandate. The Programme was driven by the mayor, who had the ability to bring outside actors such as ABSA, CUT and SETA on board because of the relationship he had with them. The Metro could be strengthened with outsourcing and incorporating public actors. The CUT was a paid actor and MMM was a client of ABSA. ABSA agreed to become an actor to ensure an economically beneficial relationship with the Metro and agreed to play a certain role. SETA fulfilled its responsibility, according to its mandate, but bought

43 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) into the Programme and made certain promises; thus it was not an interdependent actor, but an invested actor. Although the actors were not classically interdependent actors, they were the critical key parties. The Metro however made the mistake of not including the Department of Telecommunications, as it was the only government department that could allocate contracts for the digital migration process. Digital migration training formed an integral part of the first project. This oversight by the Metro resulted in the digital migration project being unsuccessful, and it was moved to the second phase of the Programme.

4.2 Voluntary participation within a horizontal relation Participation of all the actors was voluntary. However, a lack of interest by most of the unemployed participants in developing their own businesses resulted in expectations that MMM would employ them on a full-time basis, which was not the aim of the Programme. The relationships among the actors was horizontal as not one actor could complete the Programme on his/her own. In hindsight, stronger managerial skills to manage the actors might have resulted in more positive results. In this new network environment public officials must know how to act. New policies therefore need to be developed by the MMM (Benvir 2011: 11).

4.3 Insulated from Party Political Processes There was, according to the team leader, no interference from political leadership in the Programme, such as who was to benefit as participants. The change in political leadership after the 2016 LGE however brought uncertainty, and the new mayor did not support the Programme. The coordinator of the network therefore changed the game plan mid-point, which resulted in its collapse.

4.4 Division of Labour Although there was a clear division of labour from the beginning, as illustrated above, the facilitation and administrative part of the network fell behind. This result in ABSA withdrawing from the Programme, leaving a vacuum regarding their labour tasks that were not being performed. MMM boasted of success with the third group, who received on-the-job training. The success was based on improved facilities of MMM, as participants of the human settlement project assisted with the maintenance, revamping and building of municipal property. The contracts of these participants were however terminated shortly after the 2016 LGE and they could not complete the second phase of the project, which would have provided them with the tools to start

44 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) up a SMME. This brings us back to the issues of “politics of survival” not supporting the efforts of the previous leadership and not building on it.

MMM Planning

MMM Facilitation

MMM Financing ABSA SETA payment of stipents

CUT MMM on-the-job training with contractors

Training SETA accreditation

Coaching and MMM incubation center Mentorship to start SETA management skills SMME ABSA business finances

(Discussions: YEDP Team Leader and Participants: 14 and 26 October 2016, 10 and 14 November 2016)

4.5 Facilitation The facilitation of the Programme was the responsibility of the MMM, who was also the initiator of the entire programme. MMM developed a new Youth Development Policy (YDP) in 2015. The aim of the Policy was to guide the Municipality in doing its planning and budgeting, and to provide guidelines on how best to take into account the priorities of youth development, as required by the National Youth Development Act (NYDA) (MMM YDP 2015: 3). Although a policy was developed, the Programme was not reflected in the IDP of the Metro on its own but added to the responsibilities of the Planning and Economic and Rural Development Directorate under the function of SMME support. There was also no budget for the Programme and all departments had to contribute to the R40 million needed for the Programme from their allocated budgets under maintenance, as instructed by the mayor. This begs the question of how well planned the Programme really was and if it was a spontaneous request from the mayor. Meetings among actors took place individually, and not as a collective network. The lack of regular scheduled meetings with all the actors attending is viewed as a challenge to the coordination function of the MMM within the network. This resulted in actors not playing the role set out in the strategic plan, and some even withdrawing.

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The Programme had the support of the mayor and the Executive Management of the MMM. However, insufficient human resources were allocated to the project and reiterates the fear of losing power or giving acknowledgement to a private partner causing a threat to LED. This complex situation resulted in stipends not being paid on time and unaccredited qualifications being awarded to participants. There was sufficient funding available to complete the Programme. However, poor facilitation, lack of communication, insufficient administrative capacity, strategic planning falling behind, ABSA withdrawing, qualifications not accredited and SETA not being able to pay stipends due to poor administration on the side of the MMM left the Metro as the only remaining actor within the network as CUT had completed its role.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Network governance is a possible solution to governance problems due to the access it provides to private resources and skills. In the case study under discussion, ABSA, SETA and CUT provided financing and specialised know-how. Networks have to be initiated by government as it is unnatural for the private sector to seek out government to form a network to address governance challenges, as the private sector is profit driven. Government must however ensure a strong facilitation team to hold the network together and ensure its aims are achieved. Motivation must be provided to the private sector to become involved in a governance network, apart from it being a social responsibility. Within MMM, the mayor had good relationships within the private sector and could therefore make requests to his contacts to become part of a network to address one of the region’s biggest challenges. Government facilitators will however have to pick up their pace when it comes to such networks and keep to deadlines as in the private sector “time is money”. On the positive side, this can provide momentum to projects. The massification of the YEDP was identified as one of the main reasons the project had limited success. Numbers were pushed to make political impact, whilst negligible social impact occurred. Opportunities should be provided to smaller groups at a time and participants should be identified on the grounds of interest and ambition to have his or her own business. If this was not done, the Municipality may be left with large groups of youth demanding to be employed on a permanent basis; this could lead to social instability. The public and private resources used for participants that have no interest in the objectives of the Programme is wasted. Such programmes, broadly speaking, should therefore be streamlined with private actors playing a more active role as they will be stimulating the participants in becoming part of the business sector, striving to make a

46 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) profit, instead of only earning a salary. Moreover, the success of such government projects should be measured according to impact and not numbers. No SMMEs flowed from the Programme. Participants felt abandoned as they were under the impression that they had a contract with the MMM, and thus were employed by the Municipality. From the discussions, it was clear that it was not the ambition of the majority of the participants to become the owners of SMMEs. Due to the high unemployment rate, they made use of the opportunity afforded to them, although the objectives of the Programme were clear to them from the onset. Although a network is a way to attract greater public participation in governance programmes, the YEDP lacked a strong administrative structure. The administration of such a network can be enhanced by bringing private actors on board with these tasks. Although government has the main role of facilitating and coordinating, lack of human resources can be outsourced to other actors. Some power over the project will then have to be released but, in turn, government will obtain expertise and skills to ensure a higher success rate. Therefore, the private sector must be roped into facilitating and driving projects to address governance challenges, such as unemployment, in order to make a noticeable impact. There must be little or no political interference in governance networks so as to ensure success. The programmes must be beneficial to the affected communities, and not to politicians. The change in political leadership after the 2016 LGE and the lack of interest in programmes initiated by the previous leadership illustrated a lack of interest in the needs of the communities. More regular interaction between all the actors is needed in order to determine as soon as possible that an actor is not keeping to the agreement reached or is experiencing challenges. The facilitator must be in the position to ensure that the agreements are met; this can best be done if all the actors are more regularly involved in strategic meetings as one actor's slackness can result in the programme failing. The failure of the programme means that the resources made available by the private actors have been wasted. This will also result in the private actors being reluctant to be involved in such a network again to assist with resolving governance challenges, such as unemployment. Networks that have a higher chance of success therefore have regular interaction with all the actors. This interaction did not exist with the YEDP as the Municipality took on most of the responsibilities, which it was unable to handle. Although government should remain at the centre of a network, it must drive the process with energy and with a commitment to succeed. The MMM attempted network governance, but it did not apply the basic requirements, which resulted in an unsuccessful YEDP. The high number of SMMEs reflected in the mayoral end of tenure report 2011 to 2016 therefore rather reflected attempts to develop SMMEs, and not

47 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) actual successes. In regard to the YEDP, the network unravelled as ABSA withdrew before completing its involvement, SETA was not managed properly, the Metro had insufficient administrative ability, and CUT was only a paid partner, whereas its resources could have been better utilised. In conclusion, it is recommended that managers and political leaders at local government level be trained on how to develop and utilise network governance to the benefit of their constituencies and address the challenges for which they need outside assistance. The private sector need to be included when addressing governance challenges, especially with a challenge such as unemployment that might affect social stability in the long run. The core of governance therefore needs to be transformed to strengthen the state.

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Abbreviations

Allied Bank of South Africa (ABSA)

Central University of Technology (CUT)

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)

Economic Growth Path Strategy (EGPS)

Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)

Integrated Development Plan (IDP)

Local Economic Development (LED)

Local Government Election (LGE)

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Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTS)

Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality (MMM)

National Youth Development Act (NYDA)

New Venture Creation (NVC)

Skills Education Training Authorities (SETA)

Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMME)

Youth Development Policy (YDP) Youth Enterprise Development Programme (YEDP)

51 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017)

What kind of foreign policy actor can the EU be defined as in respect to their sanctions regime against Belarus?

Anna Lederer https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.35.3

Anna Lederer, 23, from Munich (Germany), is a Master’s student of International Relations in Berlin, having previously graduated from the University of Kent in Politics and International Relations (2016). She wrote her Bachelor’s thesis on German military interventions, and currently interns at the European Parliament. Her interests include security studies, terrorism studies, Eastern European studies and democratic transitions. She has previously worked for think tanks and consultancies focusing on terrorism research and Eastern Europe.

Abstract The aim of this paper is to assess the character of the European Union as a foreign policy actor through examining its restrictive and proactive measures vis-à-vis Belarus, a country often branded as ‘Europe’s last dictatorship’. For this purpose, documents of the European Parliament are examined throughout a ten-year period, allowing for a coherent policy assessment of European Union decision-making. By depicting the Parliament’s impetus behind each decision to impose or lift sanctions and behind introducing other foreign policy tools, this analysis will gain some insight on the principles guiding the European Union as a foreign policy actor. The comprehensive approach further allows us to draw conclusions on the coherence and structure of the European Union’s foreign policy towards Belarus, as well as on the type of actor the European Union can be defined as in light of their policies.

Keywords Belarus; EU; foreign policy; sanctions; restrictive measures; normative power

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Introduction How do you approach the “last dictatorship in Europe”? This phrase labelling Belarus like no other has many implications for the citizens of Belarus, but also for the European Union (EU) and its strategy towards the country. It inevitably resonates disapproval and a certain sense of ‘otherness’, which requires a specific policy on behalf of the EU that also determines the character of the European Union itself. While the EU could ignore internal politics of Belarus, namely the civilian dictatorship and the violation of human rights, the mere focus on such internal affairs through the ‘last dictatorship in Europe’ label, negates this solution. Rather, the emphasis on internal political developments of Belarus drives the foreign policy of the EU towards the country. The aim of this paper is to assess the character of the EU as a foreign policy actor through examining its restrictive and proactive measures vis-à-vis Belarus and to conclude whether this approach, and therefore the character of the EU, is one of coherency. Thus, this paper discusses theoretical underpinnings of the EU as a foreign policy actor, by including different perceptions and theories on ‘actorness’ of the EU. Further, it takes a look at sanctions as a foreign policy tool, how and when they work and sets a frame in which to analyse the EU’s policy towards Belarus. The methodology consists of a qualitative, as well as a quantitative content analysis, in order to maximise accuracy when assigning certain attributes to the drivers of this policy. Thus, six European Parliament (EP) documents are coded into five variables, as well as checked textually for the main arguments of when the EU decided to impose or lift certain sanctions regimes. These arguments are checked for the years of 2006, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2015 and 2016, as they represent the years of significant shifts in the EU’s approach towards Belarus. We are thus firstly drawing upon the developments in Belarus in the respective year, then assess which sanctions have been imposed or lifted and then go on to discuss the different variables that drove the decision for the imposition or lift of sanctions. In case of imposing or widening the sanctions regime, the author will also discuss the aim of these measures via Giumelli’s classification of the use of sanctions (Giumelli 2013: 21), in order to check the policy for coherence and strategy. This will be done in the last sequence via a policy evaluation of the EU towards Belarus of the years 2006-2016, in which not only the coherence and strategy of the policy are evaluated but also possible shortcomings of the research design are discussed, which might affect the conclusions on EU ‘actorness’ and policy coherence.

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1. Theoretical underpinnings 1.1 The EU as a foreign policy actor The EU has been a much debated actor since its creation. There is little agreement among the scientific community which study the EU about what role conception best fits its complexity, or even whether the EU can be called an actor in the international arena (Biscop and Coelmont 2013). However, most scholars seem to agree that the EU is an institution ‘sui generis’ (Mann 2009), meaning there is virtually no other power to compare the EU to, and hence it is a unique form of actor. There are naturally many theories to claim they capture the true nature of EU actorness. More traditional theories focus on the economic power of Europe and argue that the EU is an actor primarily in and through trade (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006), meaning their ability to influence world affairs can be traced back solely to the vast economic leverage the EU has. As such, many scholars argue that the EU pursues its economic interest as a means in itself (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006), oftentimes at the expense of its self-prescribed values. However, those scholars that have focused solely on the objectives of the EU in influencing international affairs, rather than their means to do so, have come to a different conclusion. Two theories have become particularly prominent in that respect, explicitly the EU as a civilian power and as a normative power. The concept of the ‘Civilian power Europe’, first put forward by François Duchêne in 1972, although being kept very vague and open for interpretation, stresses the ideational influence of the EU in respect to its governance and objectives, such as human rights or public goods, fostered by international interdependence (Orbie 2006: 126). As the militarisation of EU foreign policy progressed, however, this concept has been under scrutiny (Bull 1982) for an apparent contradiction between the use of military power and the essence of being a civilian power, only to later be revised by Ian Manners, who depicts the EU as a ‘normative power’, arguing that most of the EU’s actions are clearly aimed at fostering good governance and human rights, based on a case study of abolishing the death penalty (Manners 2002). The dichotomy of economic versus values- based theories of the EU as a foreign policy actor therefore lies within the analysis of the EU’s foreign policy objectives. Thus, the analysis of EU objectives vis-à-vis Belarus can help foster a better understanding of the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor.

1.2 Sanctions as a EU foreign policy tool While the EU has a variety of foreign policy tools at hand, one of the most commonly used instruments is that of sanctions, or ‘restrictive measures’, usually linking economic power and foreign policy. The European Commission has described ‘sanctions [as] an instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature which seek[s] to bring about a change in activities or policies such as violations of international law or human rights, or policies that do not respect the rule of law or

54 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) democratic principles’ (European Commission 3 2017). Most of these sanctions or restrictive measures are targeted sanctions, meaning they are designed to harm only individuals or entities responsible for undesirable policies or actions (European Commission 3 2017) and are oftentimes combined with other foreign policy tools aimed at encouraging dialogue and cooperation, thus resulting in a ‘dual-track diplomacy’. The official key objectives of the EU in imposing such restrictive measures are ‘safeguarding EU’s values, fundamental interests and security, preserving peace, consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’ (European Council 2017). Among the targeted restrictive measures, four categories can be distinguished: arms embargoes, travel bans, economic measures and financial measures (Giumelli 2013: 22). The question of whether sanctions actually achieve what they intend to has been controversially debated, although most scholars attribute ineffectiveness to sanctions as foreign policy tools, measuring them solely by their ability to change a target’s behaviour (Pape 1997). Given this frail narrative of the success of sanctions, one would assume the EU would abandon this policy at once. However, restrictive measures remain one of the most used tools for EU foreign policy objectives. In the Chaillot Papers, Francesco Giumelli attempts to give an explanation for this phenomenon, by focussing on three different purposes of sanctions: coercing, constraining and signalling, with signalling, closely followed by constraining, covering by far the most often-cited purpose (Giumelli 2013: 21). Sanctions’ purposes, nature and the EU’s explanations for imposing them therefore reveal a great deal about the character of the EU as a foreign policy actor.

2. Methodology The method deployed in this analysis is a content analysis of both quantitative as well as qualitative nature. This allows us to interpret more accurately the decisions taken by the EU vis-à- vis Belarus. The data around which the argument is constructed consists of the resolutions adopted by the EU Parliament concerning the political atmosphere in Belarus. While the procedure for imposing sanctions is one originating within the Council of Ministers, then being drafted by the Commission and the HR/VP and implemented by a vote of the European Council (UK Parliament 2017), using the official documents of the EP is the most reasonable element of examination in many respects: The official documents of the Council of Ministers concerning implementing sanctions are usually one-page decisions that do not make clear the rationale behind the decision-making. The documents of the European Commission are very technical and focus on the specificities of the sanctions, rather than the reasons for implementing them, while the HR/VP or the EEAS only release press reports, rather than official documents. Thus, the official

55 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) resolutions of the EP, due to the lengthy discussion of all EU member states and the EP’s position as a consultant and initiator of sanctions regimes, are the favourable documents in examining the EU’s foreign policy objective towards Belarus. The content analysis will contain six EP resolutions, out of which three advocate a renewal of sanctions towards Belarus, whereas three advocate the lifting of previously implemented sanctions. The time frame thus starts with the first benchmark of implementation of sanctions (Gaidelytè 2010) in 2006 and end with the decision to lift most sanctions in 2016. The quantitative analysis is operationalized by five variables, namely ‘Democracy’ (referring to violations of democratic principles by Belarus), ‘Human rights’ (referring to breaches of human rights by Belarus), ‘Relations’ (referring to the wish for tightening cooperation), ‘Economy’ (referring to the wish for economic cooperation) and ‘Security’ (referring to the need for cooperation in order to enhance security). The resolutions are systematically searched for explanations on the lifting/tightening of sanctions in accordance with those five variables. The amount of references to one of the five variables is then counted, in order to grasp the reasoning behind the decision. A variable is only counted as such, if it represents a solid and concrete reason by the EP in influencing the decision to impose/lift sanctions. The qualitative analysis focuses on the types of measures that are implemented. As mentioned before, sanctions constitute but one policy instrument for the EU, hence it is vital to account for the ‘dual-track diplomacy’, including both restrictive and proactive measures, in order to get a better picture of what exactly the EU aims to achieve and how. Additionally, it helps in accounting for some aspects of the variables that would be left out by purely counting their frequency. The content analysis, through the analysis of the agglomeration of the variables, allows us to draw conclusions on the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor, because the variables depict the dichotomy between the interests-based narrative (‘Economy’, ‘Security’) versus the values-based narrative (‘Democracy’, ‘Human rights’), checked by ‘Relations’ for the kind of cooperation encouraged by the EP. Additionally, we draw upon Giumelli’s classification of sanctions according to their purpose (Giumelli 2013: 21), which allows us to make inferences of the EU as a foreign policy actor, as well as examine the EU’s broader strategy towards Belarus and check it for incoherence, incredibility or path dependency, the biggest threats to EU’s foreign policy (Leenders 2014: 8).

3. EU sanctions regime against Belarus 3.1 Background 1991-2006 Since the official recognition of Belarus’ independence by the EU in 1991, EU-Belarusian relations have had a somewhat rocky path. While relations remained largely intact until 1994, the

56 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) election of Lukashenko to serve as Belarus’ new President set in stone a decade-long alienation between the two entities. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Belarus was signed in 1995, but due to constitutional changes incited by Lukashenko, which resulted in mass protests and ultimately gave Lukashenko the power to engage in the legislative process, finally suspended the PCA’s ratification in 1997. The following years saw EU-Belarusian cooperation on a halt, while Russia and Belarus strived for ever-closer integration, resulting in several region-building efforts, incorporated by many regional organisations. Thus, focusing on Belarus’ lack of democracy and violent human rights abuses, as well as a lack of rule of law, the EU saw relations deteriorate to the benefit of Eurasian region-building projects. In 2004, after Belarus blocked investigations into the disappearance of four men linked to the opposition and after an election that saw the opposition completely driven out, while allowing Lukashenko to run for President for an unlimited amount of terms, the EU imposed their first set of wider sanctions (BBC 2017). However, these sanctions were restricted to mere travel bans of a number of senior officials responsible for human rights abuses and rigging the election and fit within previous incidents of EU travel restrictions against the Belarusian political elite (European Council 2 2017).

3.2 2006 As elections drew closer in 2006, the Belarusian government ordered the arrest of dozens of opposition demonstrators and continuously harassed journalists, student organisations and campaign activists (BBC 2017). Thus, the election result proclaimed Lukashenko as the renewed President, again sparking mass demonstrations in Minsk, which were once more met with a violent response on behalf of the government. The EU responded by finally implementing restrictive measures not limited to travel bans. Also implemented were financial measures (European Commission 2 2017), meaning the ‘freezing of funds of certain individuals, entities or restrictions on[…] financial transactions, export credits or investments’ (Giumelli 2013: 22). These financial measures included freezing the assets of Lukashenko, his close advisers and other Belarusian authorities (European Parliament 2006). The justification for implementing said sanctions on behalf of the EP is strictly focused on the abuse of human rights and the lack of democratic governance by the Belarusian authorities (European Parliament 2006). In their resolution they speak of Belarus’ abuse of human rights in five different paragraphs (Table 1), drawing upon the crackdowns before and after the election perpetrated against different groups and on different occasions. The lack of democracy is accounted for in seven different paragraphs (Table 1), referring to Lukashenko’s dubious referenda, the lack of independent press reports and the lack in standards of the election among others. The EP also expressed their sympathy towards the Belarusian population to defend democratic

57 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) principles by going out to protest. Thus, they also urged the Commission to increase financial support to NGOs and citizens initiatives, support news feeds, facilitate the visa process and to fund additional exchange programs. They further note that Russian engagement in Belarus is of concern, since it undermines the effectiveness of EU policies and restrictive measures through lending decisive support. Interesting here is the complete lack of reference to ‘Relations’, ‘Economy’ and ‘Security’, which leads to assume that EU foreign policy here was guided mostly by moral concerns, thus perfectly fitting the normative power description. Table 1. Arguments 2006

Source: Author Now we can apply the EU strategy to Giumelli’s classification of the use of sanctions (Giumelli 2013: 21). This approach cannot be described as coercing, as it does not incite a behavioural change on Belarus’ part. It can neither be described as constraining, as the aim is not to undermine the capabilities of the Belarusian government to achieve their policy objectives (Giumelli 2013: 18), since they can still be carried out after a freezing of funds. Thus, the EU sanctions policy objective is ‘signalling’, meaning a target is to be influenced in different ways than merely through material damage. This accounts for the mix of the use of sanctions on the one hand and the use of proactive measures, such as the visa facilitation and financing NGOs.

3.3 2009 The years from 2006 to 2009 saw human rights abuses decline, with a number of individuals released from prison. The parliamentary election still fell short of international standards according to European observers, but nonetheless improved since 2006 (BBC 2017). The EU welcomed this behaviour as “positive steps taken by Belarus” (European Parliament 2009) and in turn decreased the restrictive measures in place. Thus, the EU decided to lift the travel ban

58 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) of most Belarusian officials, including Lukashenko, for six months, except for those involved in the disappearance of the four men in 1999. However, financial measures remained largely intact. The justification of the EP for this approach is more varied than the one for implementing the sanctions. While they still focus on on-going human rights abuses in four paragraphs (Table 2), as well as on democratic deficits in three paragraphs (Table 2), the focus for lifting the travel bans is set on ameliorating relations, with five paragraphs dedicated to this aim (Table 2). Noted here is the emphasis of the EP on the improved conduct of Belarusian authorities towards the civil society, thus encouraging over and over again tightening relations in areas of energy, environment, customs, transport, food safety and cross-border cooperation. The hope for closer cooperation also caused the EP to debate ‘Economy’ and ‘Security’, in a paragraph each (Table 2). The EP therefore encourages the European Investment Bank (EIB) to invest in Belarus’ energy transit infrastructure while simultaneously stressing the importance of participating in the privatisation process (European Parliament 2009). The focus on ‘Security’ merely concerned the plans of a new nuclear power plant in Belarus, for which the EU offered to help out financially in order to keep up international energy security standards. The readiness of the EU to switch positions and deepen cooperation with Belarus is worrying in the context of the on-going human rights abuses and lack of democracy. However, only some travel bans have been lifted, while the financial restrictive measures remain in place and further help to civil society has been stressed. Thus, this approach would still fit to theorise the EU as a normative power, albeit it being quick to adapt to minor changes in political repression in Belarus. Table 2. Arguments 2009

Source: Author

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3.4 2011 In the run-up to the election in 2010, Lukashenko’s regime once again resorted to grave violations of human rights. After the vote, which was called rigged by the opposition and Western observers, more than six hundred people were arrested after protests were broken up by force (BBC 2017). Unsurprisingly, Lukashenko was declared the winner of the election and thus entered his fourth term in office in January 2011. The EU swiftly responded by significantly widening their sanctions regime. While travel bans remained largely suspended, financial measures expanded to include a freeze of micro- financial aid via the IMF as well as the EIB and EBRD, the ENP and other national assistance (European Parliament 2011). Further, the EU also introduced economic measures for the first time, by banning exports of equipment for internal repression as well as banning the provision of certain services (European Commission 2 2017). The EU’s restrictive measures in 2011 consequently included three different types. The justification by the EP for the renewal of sanctions focuses once more mainly on the abuse of human rights, with six paragraphs (Table 3) dedicated to the repression and arrest of different groups and individuals on different occasions, as well as the lack of a fair trial and broader fear campaigns (European Parliament 2011). Violations in the ‘Democracy’ sector are accounted for in two paragraphs (Table 3), deprecating the serious irregularities on voting day as well as the lack of any international standards in procedures. In order to maximise EU policy efficiency towards Belarus, the EP encourages ameliorating relations to both Russia and Ukraine, which it sees as threatening the effectiveness of EU policies. In accordance with the previous approach, the EP continues to advocate support for the Belarusian civil society, although in a somewhat more restricted sense, such as financing education opportunities abroad (European Parliament 2011). Thus, the policy here seems to be guided by moral principles once more. While in 2009, the EU showed a willingness to cooperate and to ease up their restrictive measures, they increased all sanctions by a significant margin, signifying that crackdowns on human rights and democratic principles still score highest in EU priorities. Hence, once more the attribution of the EU to the concept of normative power is justified. Applying the EU strategy to Giumelli’s classification of the use of sanctions (Giumelli 2013: 21), we once again would have to discard ‘coercion’, as the restrictive measures are not sufficient in changing Belarus’ behaviour. However, the nature of the sanctions, which now include economic measures such as banning the export of equipment for internal repression, has changed. Thus, the aim has altered to include constraining the Belarusian authorities from certain policies.

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Since this part of the sanctions nevertheless remains relatively small, the major aim remains signalling, where the EU tries to influence Belarus through different means. Table 3. Arguments 2011

Source: Author

3.5 2012 While Belarus was struggling with its Russian partner over gas prices, anger was also voiced about the EU sanctions of 2011, leading Lukashenko to threaten retaliation. Belarus continued its repression among the citizenry, arresting and imprisoning political opponents and activists. A new law got put into place, which severely restricts access to foreign Internet sources and requires owner of Internet cafés to report anyone visiting foreign websites (BBC 2017). In response to the developments in Belarus, the Commission reinforced those sanctions already in place against Belarusian officials, such as travel bans and financial measures against certain individuals as well as continuing the afore-mentioned economic measures. Additionally this time however, the EU also instigated an embargo on arms and related material, now taking advantage of all four types of sanctions possible (European Commission 2 2017). In their justification, the EP once more places its main concern on democratic deficits, with nine paragraphs devoted to it (Table 4), and human rights abuses, with six paragraphs devoted to it (Table 4). These concerns mainly centre on the lack of rule of law, as well as different aspects surrounding the election in combination with the continued use of the death penalty (European Parliament 2012). A wish for more cooperation with Belarus is also expressed four times (Table 4), in which the EP stresses the need to leave the possibility of dialogue open for the Belarusian society, thus focussing less on the regime than the population. However, the EP also remarks that it is ready to decrease any measures once Belarus complies with certain steps, such as releasing

61 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) prisoners, promoted by the EU (European Parliament 2012). There is one remark each on both ‘Economy’ and ‘Security’, with the note on ‘security’ mainly focussing on the planned construction of the nuclear power plant. For ‘Economy’, the EP calls ‘on the Council and the Commission to consider measures to improve the business climate, trade [and] investment’ (European Parliament 2012). This approach is in line with advocating the proactive measures, which show a significant increase in actions compared to the previous years. Specifically, the financial support of Belarusian opposition organisations is promoted, encompassing a long-term program. Support for media organisations in Belarus, in the wake of the crackdown on media freedoms, also show a significant increase (European Parliament 2012). As relations between the EU and Belarus reach its worst point, the EU paradoxically seems to want to increase its ties to Belarus more than in previous years. However, as the rights abuses of Belarusian authorities are also unprecedented, it seems as though the EU had to make a decision between pushing Belarus even further towards Russia, which could ultimately lead to completely isolating Belarus and the Belarusian society, and trying to counter the developments even stronger than before. The latter seems to be the case, and thus, parallel to their condemning human rights abuses and a lack of democratic institutions, this approach appears to be in line with the normative power principle. Table 4. Arguments 2012

Source: Author According to Giumelli’s classification of the use of sanctions (Giumelli 2013: 21), ‘coercion’ can once again not be regarded as a main objective, as the sanctions are not broad enough to have a devastating impact. Thus, since the restrictive measures now include all four types of sanctions, the EU approach remains a mix of constraining, via the arms embargo and ban

62 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) on equipment for internal repression, and signalling, via strongly supporting the civil society of Belarus.

3.6 2015 The crisis in Ukraine has plunged the region into uncertainty as well as created a standoff between the EU and Russia. After NATO boosted its troops in the Baltic, Belarus asked Russia to deploy military equipment onto the Belarusian territory (BBC 2017). Simultaneously though, Belarus also spent efforts on maintaining stability and peace in the region, offering to host peace negotiations ultimately leading to the Minsk II agreement, freezing the conflict in the Donbas. Belarus furthermore resumed cooperation with the EU, participating more actively in numerous programs, including resuming the EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue (European Council 2 2016). Responding to these developments, the EU decided to temporarily suspend a significant number of one hundred and seventy travel bans and asset freezes against certain individuals and entities. Thus, the restrictive measures now only include a travel ban and an asset freeze against the four individuals involved with the unresolved disappearances, as well as the remaining financial as well as economic measures (European Commission 2, 2017). In their justification on lifting sanctions against Belarus, the EP emphasises this specific constructive role Belarus played in the on-going conflict in Ukraine and stresses the fear among the Belarusian civil society of a similar destabilisation (European Parliament 2016). It is striking, that the variables ‘Democracy’ and ‘Human rights’ still score highest (Table 5), constantly criticising Belarusian authorities’ conduct vis-à-vis political opposition and activists. In the face of the Ukrainian crisis and the need to establish closer ‘Relations’ (Table 5), there seems a dichotomy developing. Judging from the still unresolved human rights abuses and lack of democracy that have triggered previous sanctions regimes, the swift lifting of asset freezes and travel bans for a grave number of individuals seems like a rash decision, not well fitting into the previous approach. One must therefore assume that the extraordinary circumstances of the Ukrainian crisis have led the EU to quickly adapt their sanctions regime to crisis mode – containing the crisis in Ukraine under all circumstances. The case of whether this approach fits into the normative power Europe theorem is somewhat more difficult to assess, as human rights violations and democratic deficits, albeit scoring highest, do not seem to guide EU’s policy here. However, it is questionable whether the EU could have responded differently in face of the Ukrainian crisis, as the goal was ultimately not to destabilise the region any further. Thus, the notion normative power is still applicable, albeit it is being adapted to crisis-mode.

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Table 5. Arguments 2015

Source: Author 3.7 2016 Throughout the year 2015, Lukashenko released a number of political prisoners, widely observed as an attempt to convince the EU to decrease their trade barriers (BBC 2017). During the election, which took place in October 2015, the Belarusian regime mostly restrained from cracking down on political opposition and activists, although this is also due to a big part of the opposition having emigrated North and the election not allowing for any opposition candidates to stand for office (BBC 2017). The EU’s approval of these ‘non-violent’ developments is embodied in its new approach, which lifts most restrictive measures against Belarusian officials. However, the arms embargo rests in place, effectively making embargoes the only sanction currently upheld against Belarus (European Council 1 2016). As the EU sees progress in Belarus’ behaviour, the importance of issues deviates from previous priorities (European Parliament 2016). Economic and security issues rise in importance, the need for good relations is generally emphasised and promoted and ‘Democracy’ and ‘Human rights’ are for the first time also used in positive terms, with the EU acknowledging Belarus’ attempts to ameliorate the situation (European Parliament 2016). ‘Economy’, which was mentioned in two paragraphs (Table 6), addresses the possibilities for EIB and EBRD financing of trade- and assistance-related fields for Belarus, as well as criticises the heavy financial burdens for supporting NGOs in Belarus. ‘Security’, which scores extraordinarily high with five paragraphs (Table 6), focuses mostly on the Ukrainian crisis and fear of Russian aggression as well as instability in the region, stressing once more the positive role Belarus has played during the Ukrainian

64 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) conflict. Simultaneously, Belarus’ participation in ‘Zapad’ joint military manoeuvres with Russia has evoked concern for security on behalf of the EU. In face of these issues, the EU has doubled its bilateral assistance to Belarus via the ENP. The shift of issues at the heart of EU decision-making reflects their change of priorities in the region. With the Ukrainian conflict still unresolved, the struggle with Russia for influence in the region under these circumstances has become a top priority, emphasised through a much more benevolent policy and economic bait. Although the classic paradigm of a normative power cannot be transferred completely, given the current circumstances, one can argue that the EU approach nevertheless seeks to reduce the impact on human rights violations and democratic deficits by stabilising the region and not letting it become a war theatre, which would have far more devastating consequences. Table 6. Arguments 2016

Source: Author

4. Policy evaluation and conclusion The most important conclusions of this paper derive from an evaluation of the overall strategy of the EU. Throughout the ten years, the emphasis on human rights concerns and lack of democracy has been a constant in all EP resolutions, scoring the highest out of all variables (Table 7), closely followed by highlighting the wish to ameliorate relations. The restrictive and supportive measures the EU adopted in response have been mostly coherent and systematic, in that there has been an increase in restrictive measures when human rights abuses and undemocratic development were particularly high (See Annex 1) and there has been a constant support for citizens and programmes directed at strengthening the civil society. However, the continued statements on hoping to improve relations are pursued even when human rights and democratic reforms are still

65 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) mostly neglected, with only slight improvements in those areas (See Annex 1). Despite this quite ready-to-respond approach, the policy still seems coherent and systematic, in that the initiative to use restrictive measures stems from abuses of human rights and violations of political power. The restrictive measures in itself also seem to be applied systematically, as the aim of the sanctions regimes has always been to send a signal to Belarus, or to constrain it from cracking down on its population. However, from 2014 onward, EU policy shifts quite significantly, as emphasised by the constant references to the Ukrainian crisis and the switch in EU priorities in the region (Table 7). Conveniently, this focus shift towards security concerns coincides with a slight amelioration of the human rights situation in Belarus, justifying the EU’s readiness to lift restrictive measures due to less internal crackdown. Nevertheless, the policy still seeks to strengthen Belarusian civil society more than at any point before, while continuing to constrain the Belarusian government from crackdowns on human rights via the arms embargo and giving the government an alternative to closer integration with Russia. One should also bear in mind that in 2014, the EU revised its foreign policy vis-à-vis Belarus under the European Neighbourhood Policy, introducing a new financial instrument, the ENI (European Commission 1 2017). Thus, the question arises, whether one should re-evaluate the EU’s approach towards Belarus from the time of implementation of the new policy. This can account for some of the major shifts of the EU’s approach towards Belarus and will be of particular importance, if the EU fails to make the Belarusian government understand that they have had said policy shift in 2014. Thus, in order not to lose credibility via an incoherent approach, the clear communication of how the abuse of power in the domains of democracy and human rights will trigger restrictive measures will be of immense significance. In case of unclear transmittance of the signal the EU wants to send, it is likely that Belarus will continue to or even worsen human rights and democratic institutions in the future, as it will deem consequences by the EU as not credible. One of the main shortcomings of this paper is that it focuses solely on EU-Belarusian relations, therefore not taking into account its environment. In order to assess coherence of restrictive measures, taking a broader look might also be useful. The regime in Azerbaijan for example also consists of a civilian dictatorship, in which human rights violations are even more severe than in Belarus (Our World in Data 2017), yet the EU has not to this date imposed sanctions due to these circumstances. Thus, assessing EU policy towards Belarus within this setting might lead to very different conclusions about the EU as a normative power, but also about policy coherence. For this paper however, which focuses solely on EU-internal reasons to implement restrictive measures against Belarus solely, we can conclude that it is mostly following a normative

66 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) power frame, as well as being both coherent and systematic, albeit the shift of priorities in 2014 (Table 7). Table 7. Influence on policy decision

Source: Author

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Annex 1. Dataset

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Annex 2. Abbreviations

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EEAS European External Action Service EIB European Investment Bank ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument ENP European Neighbourhood Policy EP European Parliament EU European Union HR/VP High Representative/Vice President (of the EEAS) NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

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United in Diversity: A Comparative Analysis of the Voting Behaviours of European Far-Right Political Parties in the European Parliament between 2009-2014 Pınar Sayan https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.35.4

Pinar Sayan, 32, from İstanbul (Turkey) obtained her PhD on the European Union Politics and International Relations from Marmara University. She holds MS degree on Comparative Politics from London School of Economics; MA degree on Political Science and International Relations from Bogazici University; and BA degree on Political Science and International Relations from Marmara University. She is the country director of the Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation in Turkey and the co-founder of Roman Medya. Her focus is the rights dimension of ethnic politics especially in Europe and Turkey.

Abstract While the rise of European far-right raises many questions, this article aims to contribute to the debate by looking at their voting behaviour in the European Parliament between 2009 and 2014. Although some of the most prominent European far-right parties try to emphasize their differences, this article shows how united they actually are on salient issues. This can be seen from their voting cohesion on economic and monetary affairs and immigration, but also their party programs, election manifestos, parliamentary speeches, statements and media coverage. The article concludes that far-right parties have similar voting preferences on the most salient issues, while existing deviations are mostly caused by country-specific reasons.

Keywords European Far-Right Parties; European Parliament; Party Cohesion; Party Politics; Voting Behaviour

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Introduction Following a serious error, Reuters suggested that I envisaged alliances with Jobbik and Golden Dawn. I have declared exactly the opposite [...], Asked ‘with whom will you not ally yourselves?’, I replied: Jobbik, Ataka and Golden Dawn among others (Marine Le Pen, the Leader of Front National) (The

Guardian 2014). Whatever Marine Le Penn is trying to do with Le Front National, anti-Semitism, is still deeply embedded in that party, and for that principle political reason, we are not going to work with them now, or at any point in the future (Nigel Farage, the Former Leader of UKIP) (UKIP East 2014). These two statements are made by the leaders of the most prominent far-right parties of Europe as a response to the questions of forming a far-right political group within the European Parliament (EP) after May 2014 European Elections. What is striking about these statements is the exclusion of certain far-right parties. Although the leader of Front National (National Front-FN) Marine Le Pen does not clearly state it, the underlying factor for her denial for a possible alliance with Hungarian Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary- Jobbik), Bulgarian Ataka (Attack-ATA) and Greek Laïkós Sýndesmos - Chrysí Avgi (Golden Dawn) is their association with Neo-Nazism and Anti-Semitism; which is precisely the same reason why the former leader of United Kindom Independence Party (UKIP) Nigel Farage rules out a possible alliance with FN at the first place. While xenophobia and/or nativism are considered as the common denominator of all of the European far-right parties by the academics and commentators alike; it seems like the ‘red lines’ exist even for them in their relationships with each other. Those red lines prevent UKIP to involve in the same political group in the European Parliament with FN, Jobbik, Ataka or Golden Dawn despite many benefits of forming a group. The far-right parties have never been thought to constitute a single model, however the recent example of the demonstration of the red lines between far-right parties revitalizes the questions of their differences one more time since their conceptions about each other are strong enough to prevent them making strategic moves that could clearly be in their benefit. In order to reach the differences of political parties, comparisons are traditionally made on the basis of ideology, organization, and policies. One right place to make such a comparison is the European Parliament by looking at their trans-European organization instead of intra-party organization; and the reflection of their ideologies to policy preferences through voting behaviour. Far-right parties have been contesting for European elections for decades and gradually increased their representation in the EP. The increasing powers of both the EU and the EP make this representation very valuable in order the have a word in the working and the future of Europe. The fundamentally Eurosceptic nature of far-right parties only makes the issue more interesting

73 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) since they contest for and work in an institution that is one the main symbols of everything they are opposed for in the European integration process. Therefore, the article aims to reach an understanding for the differences of far-right parties by analyzing their trans-European organization, ideology and policies during the term of EP between 2009 and 2014. By selecting key votes from the most salient areas for far-right; the voting behaviours of the far-right parties are compared on the basis of their political groups in order to reveal whether their conceived differences about each other are reflected upon their voting preferences about the most salient issues in. I argue that their conceived differences about each other do not reflect on the voting preferences on salient issues, and the deviations are caused by the country-specific reasons. Within the scope of this article, I firstly provide the methodology of the research; followed by a background on the far-right political parties in Europe and far-right groups within the EP. At the final part, I analyze the voting behaviour of the far-right parties and discuss the results.

Methodology The aim of this research is to compare the far-right parties within the EP in accordance with their party groupings, ideologies, and policies. The argument is that the cohesion of the two fictional groups that could be formed between far-right parties; [1. far-right members of Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) and Non-Inscripts (Independents-NI) 2. far-right members of EFD, NI, and European Conservatists and Reformists (ECR)] would be higher than the EFD, which consists of both far-right and non far-right members, for the selected votes. I employ mathematical calculations and textual analysis to analyse the data. There is not a consensus on literature for the criteria or methods to employ to identify the far-right parties. Ignazi (2006) focuses on spatial location of parties and their anti-system characteristics. Betz & Immerfal (1998), on the other hand, emphasizes on the radicalism and populism. Eatwell (2003) identifies nationalism as the central character of far-right parties, while Mudde (2007) argues it is nativism, populism and authoritarianism. As for the methods, Carter (2005), Mudde (2007), Harrison & Bruter (2011) use comparative manifesto and program studies; Kitschelt & McGann (1995) and Norris (2005) prefer the method of expert surveys. In order to identify the far-right parties for this research, I compare these studies and analyze a broad list of political parties. Among them, I select the ones that could acquire seats in the EP as a result of the European Elections of 2009.

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Table 1 – 2009 European Election Performances of Far-Right Parties Country Original Name EPG Vote Share Total Seats Seats Austria Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs NI 12.7 17 2 Belgium Vlaams Belang EFD/NI 9.9 22 2 Bulgaria Ataka NI 12 17 2 Denmark Dansk Folkeparti EFD 15.3 13 2 Finland Perussuomalaiset EFD 9.8 13 1 France Front National NI 6.3 72 3 Greece Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós EFD 7.1 22 2 Hungary Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom NI 14.8 22 3 Italy Lega Nord EFD 10.2 72 9 Latvia Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK ECR 7.5 8 1 Netherlands Partij voor de Vrijheid NI 17 25 4 Romania Partidul România Mare NI 8.7 33 3 Slovakia Slovenská Národná Strana EFD 5.6 13 1 United Kingdom United Kingdom Independence Party EFD 16.5 72 13 British National Party NI 6.2 72 2

Sources: (ParlGov 2015; European Parliament 2014; European Parliament 2015).

As a next step, I identify the MEPs (Members of European Parliament) of far-right parties by using the EP database with the exact dates of their political party and political group affiliations between 2009-14 since switches between parties and groups are a common phenomenon, and their party and group memberships during the votes have crucial importance for this research. In order to assess their voting behaviour, I select the most important issues for far-right parties by analysing their party programs and election manifestos. I observe that the recurring themes are economics, immigration, law and order, environmentalism, gender rights while economics and immigration are seen as the most important issues for the far-right parties during the 2009-14 parliamentary term. I single out six key votes for economics and immigration based on the criteria of salience and controversialness out of 6921 roll-call votes (Kreilinger 2014, p. 20).

Table 2 – List of Key Votes

Vote Date Name Number Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards for the 27 October qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 1 2011 international protection and the content of the protection granted (recast) 15 February 2 2012 Motions for resolutions - Feasibility of introducing stability bonds 12 March Economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States with serious difficulties with 3 2013 respect to their financial stability in the euro area 12 March Monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive 4 2013 deficit of the Member States in the euro area 11 June 5 2013 Social housing in the European Union 09 March 6 2011 EU strategy on Roma inclusion

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I retrieve the voting results for the key votes from Votewatch database. I calculate the Agreement Index for three situations; 1) EFD group as a whole; 2) only far-right members of EFD and Independent far-right parties; and 3) all far-right parties, according to Hix-Noury-Roland formula: Ai=(max(Y,N,A)-(0.5((Y+N+A)-max(Y,N,A))))/(Y+N+A), where Y=number of votes ‘FOR’, N=number of votes ‘NO’, and A=number of ‘ABSTENTIONS’. This calculation shows the actual cohesion of EFD and what could their cohesion be if the far-right parties could form a group together for each of the votes. In order to complement the results of the calculations, I conduct a textual analysis based on party programs, election manifestos, parliamentary speeches, and media coverage.

A Background for the Far-Right Parties The existence of the far-right political parties in the European political scene is not a new phenomenon, however their increasing support is. While a couple of far-right political parties were established during 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, their electoral success remained limited until 1990s. Since 1990s, the number and visibility of the far-right political parties in Europe have been increasing with diverse electoral outcomes. The emergence and the success of the far-right parties are tried to be understood within the terms of supply-side and demand-side theories. Demand-side theories focus on the reasons for the emergence of a demand from the society for far-right parties. The traditional approach is ‘the single-issue thesis’ which connects the rise of far-right with the increasing immigration (Inglehart 1990), however contemporary far-right parties have broad party programs which exceeds only immigration issue (Eatwell 2003; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Mudde 2007). The second one is the ‘anti-establishment’ nature of the far-right parties, which emphasizes on the ‘protest’ or ‘resentment’ votes due to the disappointment derived from conventional political structures (Betz 1994; Eatwell 2003; Ignazi 2006). The disappointment is not only related with the conventional politics but also related with the ‘new politics’ which threatens the traditional values of family and society such as same-sex marriage; or threatens the material benefits and employment prospects such as environmentalism (Norris 2005). Although far-right parties have broad political programs to attract more than resentment votes, they surely benefit from the resentment and disappointment of the electors. Among the supply-side theories, on the other hand, focus is on what is supplied to the society from the far- right parties; as Betz (1994), Betz & Immerfall (1998) suggest. By exploiting the failure of conventional politics, far-right parties demand to replace representative democracy by direct democracy in order to reflect the free will of the people and demand referendums often (Betz &

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Immerfall 1998; Carter 2005; Hainsworth 2008). They are also successful to exploit specific issues such as affirmative action, immigration, multiculturalism (Betz 1994; Betz & Immerfall 1998, p. 5). Hainsworth (2000, p. 9) defines those issues as nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-democracy, and support for a strong state, welfare chauvinism and a strong emphasis upon law and order. Kitschelt & McGann (1995) proposes a winning-formula for far-right which is consisted of the approximation of centre left and right parties; the policy of free market economy; authoritarian and ethno-centric discourse. Betz & Immerfall (1998, p. 5) also underlines the support of the far-right parties for the free-market economics unlike the classical fascism or the post-war rightist movements. Ellinas (2010) argues the role of the ‘media’ is crucial in promoting or legitimizing far- right parties. Hainsworth emphasizes on the charismatic leader who is on ‘the same wavelength as the people’, thus underlining the populist nature of the far-right parties (2008, p. 19). Apart from the demand and supply side factors, Norris (2005, p. 18) focuses on the institutional settings of the countries as the main determinant of the electoral success by constraining the ground for supply and demand side factors and regulating the nomination, campaigning, and election processes. While all these explanations have their merits, it is impossible to condense the emergence and rise of all European far-right parties to one single formula. Based on these explanations, different classifications are also suggested for far-right parties. Ignazi (2006) suggests a classification between old and new far-right parties based on their fascist past. Carter (2005) identifies five groups within the far-right; neo-Nazi parties, neo-fascist parties, authoritarian xenophobic parties, neo-liberal xenophobic parties, neo-liberal populist parties on the basis of their attitudes on immigration, racism and pluralist democracy. In their recent study, Harrison & Bruter (2011) proposes a model based on repressive-reactionary and xenophobia-populism dimensions, which is more nuanced rather than one-dimensional models since no party entirely fits one model. It is also possible to categorize far-right parties in accordance with their electoral results. In Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, and Latvia; the far-right parties secure substantial amount of votes in local, general and European elections; seats in the relevant parliaments; even positions in the government. In Austria, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria-FPÖ) enjoyed over 20 per cent of the votes throughout the 1990s under the leadership of Jörg Haider, however lost popularity after taking part in the government, which led to Haider to leave the party and set up a new rival party, Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria-BZÖ). FPÖ started to gain back its lost popularity gradually under the new leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache, and in 2013 national elections took 20.5 per cent of the votes with 40 seats in the parliament. In Denmark, Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party-DF), became the third party in the country and manages the take 12-13 per cent of the votes since 2001 elections. In Netherlands, Partij voor de

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Vrijheid (Party for Freedom-PVV) managed to get 15 seats in the parliament with 10.1 per cent of the votes in 2012 elections. In Latvia, Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK (Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK-TB/LNNK) has secured representation in Latvian parliament since its establishment and took places in the governments. In 2011, the party merged with the more nationalist Visu Latvijai! (All For Latvia!-VL) and created the Nacionālā Apvienība (National Alliance-NA) which won ten seats in the national parliament, and one in the EP. In Italy, Belgium, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania; far-right parties have lost the electoral support they once enjoyed. In Belgium, Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest-VBe), the successor of Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block-VB), was founded when the Vlaams Blok was condemned for the violation of the law against racism by the Belgian Court. VB achieved to get into the local and federal parliaments since its establishment. In Italy, Lega Nord (Northern League-LN) still manages to get seats in the parliament, although it lost significant support that it enjoyed during 1990s. In Slovakia, Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party-SNS) also secures substantial amount of votes in national elections and took part in the governments. However, SNS lost half of its seats in 2010 national elections. In Bulgaria, Ataka had managed to obtain an average of eight percent of votes and 20 seats in the parliament in general elections since its establishment in 2005. However, it lost half of its votes and seats at the general election of 2014. In Romania, the electoral support for Partidul România Mare (Greater Romania Party-PRM) was boomed in the general elections of 2000 by taking 19.48 percent of the votes and 126 seats. However, it could not maintain this success and lost its support gradually. PRM could not make it to national parliament in the last general elections. In Finland, Greece, Hungary, and Sweden; far-right political parties have significantly increased their votes and seats in the parliament recently. In Finland, Perussuomalaiset (True Finns- PS) took 19.05 per cent of the votes in 2011 elections with 39 seats in the parliament by tripling its support. In Greece, Golden Dawn increased its votes from 0.29 per cent in 2009 elections to 6.92 per cent in 2012 elections and secured 18 seats in the parliament by wiping out Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós (Popular Orthodox Rally-LAOS) from both national and European scene. In Hungary, Jobbik got 20.3 per cent of the votes and 23 seats in the national parliament in 2014 elections. On the other hand, in Germany, France, and the UK, although there has been a long history of far-right and far-right political parties, these parties find it hard to increase their votes in general elections or manage to secure seats in the national or federal parliaments. In Germany, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany-NPD), although founded in 1964, have never been represented in the federal parliament, only acquired some success at the local level. In France, Front National (National Front-FN) became the third political

78 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) force in France however never carried its relative success at the local and European level to the national level. The most important moment in the party history was the success of Jean Marie Le Pen in 2002 Presidential elections by making it to the second round. During the leadership of his daughter Marine Le Pen, FN tries to polish its image by leaving the Anti-Semitist past behind. In the UK, British National Party (BNP) and UKIP had only limited local victories and few seats in the EP until recently. UKIP gradually replaced BNP in national and European elections.

European Parliament and Far-Right Parties Throughout the years, the EP has managed to increase its limited powers notably to legislative, budgetary, and supervisory powers. Especially with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the decision-making powers of the EP increased significantly from less effective decision- making procedures of consultation and consent to co-decision (ordinary legislation) procedure which gives equal rights to the EP with the Council of Ministers. The increasing powers of the EP made European elections even more important. When the EP first established, MEPs had dual mandate from their national parliaments. Since 1979, direct elections have been held to elect the members of the EP. European elections are one of its kind as being the first and only international elections conducted simultaneously in all member states. The EP elections are being held in every five years, and so far, eight elections have been held. The number of the MEPs was 410 from 10 member states in June 1979, and the current number of the MEPs is 751 from 28 member states. European elections are, usually, accepted as the ‘second-order elections’, that they come after the main national elections as local elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). MEPs are dependent on the performances of their national parties rather than their political groups in the EP; and the main area of contestation is the performance of governments rather than the performance of European political groups. Due to this nature of the European elections, during the election campaigns ‘national’ rather than ‘European’ issues are debated. However, recent studies suggest that because of the economic crisis, the attention to European matters have been increased and the thesis of ‘second-order elections’ do not grasp the whole picture anymore (Nissen, 2014, p. 13). Thus, the main differences between European and national elections can be summarized as ‘lower turnout than national elections; better performance of small parties; possible electoral losses of incumbent national government parties; better results for parties with strong European dimension either positive or negative’ (Nissen 2014, p. 13). Within the EP, political parties form European Political Groups to organize better to defend their ideological positions by an efficient division of labour. Forming groups in the EP has several benefits for the political parties such as more funding, more talking times, more committee

79 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) memberships with key committee positions, and better chances to exert influence on policies. Because of these advantages, far-right parties have been involved in the efforts for forming groups within the EP. However, these efforts failed many times. In 2009, after the failed attempts of forming technical group of FN; the rules were changed for forming groups. Before 2009, 20 MEPs from five member states were sufficient to form a group but in 2009 it was changed to 25 MEPs from seven member states, which made it hard for FN-led alliance to form a group. Since Marine Le Pen replaced his father Jan-Marie Le Pen as the leader of FN; she tries to polish the image of FN by detaching the party from its Anti-Semitist past (BBC 2014). As a first step, FN left the ‘Alliance of European Nationalist’ in 2011, a network organization formed between Jobbik, FN, Tricolour Frame, SND, Belgium’s Front National (National Front) and BNP. Instead, FN joined the ‘European Alliance for Freedom’, which consists of the members of FPÖ, VB, LN, and PVV. On the other hand, UKIP, LAOS, and LN formed a softer far-right group of EFD with the inclusion of non far-right Eurosceptic members in 2009. However, the establishment of the party groups do not necessarily mean cohesion in the policy preferences. In the next part, the cohesion based on the voting behaviour of the far-right parties for the selected key votes for 2009-2014 term is discussed in detail.

The Voting Behaviour on Key Votes Far-right parties are inherently Eurosceptic; however their opposition to European integration differs. Most of the far-right parties do not have any objection for intergovernmental economic cooperation among similarly structured European countries. Their objection is mainly directed to increasing competences of the supranational institutions of the EU, and the growing areas of supranational cooperation. They claim that the legitimacy of the unelected institutions of the EU is highly questionable, thus its policies do not reflect the true will of the people. They call for radical reforms to restore the national sovereignty of the member states and give power back to true representatives of the people; to national parliaments. They are strongly against any path leading to federalism. They often use the term ‘Europe of the Nations’ first employed by Charles de Gaulle to underline his vision of Europe with sovereign states rather than a federal ‘United States of Europe’. Most of them favour the renegotiation of the treaties in accordance with their national interests, and to secure the supremacy of national constitutions over the community law. They threaten to withdraw from the EU if it will not happen. During the 2009-14 term of the EP, the subjects of economics and immigration gained significant importance due to the economic crisis and increasing immigration to the and within the

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EU. These two subjects are also one of the most important common themes of the European far right and their main reasons to oppose to European integration in supranational terms. Thus, the agreement index for the key votes about these subjects are calculated in order to analyse the cohesion of the far-right parties. Table 3 shows the results that are discussed in detail in the next parts.

Table 3. Agreement Index for the Key Votes

Key Votes EFD EFD+NI EFD+ECR+NI 1 0.30 0.66 0.66 2 0.43 0.60 0.61 3 0.52 0.79 0.75 4 0.48 0.75 0.72 5 0.65 0.72 0.72 6 0.51 0.70 0.66

Source: (VoteWatch 2015)

Economic and Monetary Affairs There is a difference between the attitudes of contributor and recipient member states for the subject of economic and monetary affairs. The far-right parties from net-contributor member states defend a rebate from their contribution to the EU budget (FPÖ 2014; FN 2014; VB 2014; PS 2014); the others also demand to negotiate the unfavourable clauses for their national interests (Ataka 2014; Jobbik 2014). PVV (2014), on the other hand, would not like to contribute to the EU budget at all. The ‘rebate’ issue first made into the EU agenda in 1980s with the UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. She demanded a rebate from the British contribution to the EU budget, and she could finally secure it in 1984. Thus, it is not a surprise that the far-right parties of the net-contributor member states demand a rebate. They believe that their states are paying the misconduct and the mistakes of other states. This conviction has especially increased with the economic crisis. The EU policies of the common currency of Euro and Eurozone; financial institutions; and politicians are highly criticized as the reasons of the economic crisis. The EU policies of bail-outs are opposed fiercely, and following monetary discipline and budgetary surveillance plans are only approached with more opposition and doubt. Far-right parties that do not benefit from the European Stability Mechanism calls for the end of the policy of bail-outs. They use the common discourse of ‘spending tax-payers money’ for saving ‘irresponsible and lazy states’ (SNS 2014, p. 2), or blaming ‘politicians, bureaucrats, bankers’ as stated in the UKIP MEP Godfrey Bloom’s speech on behalf of the EFD group, ‘The day must surely come when politicians, bureaucrats and central bankers must be called to account by a fiscal crimes tribunal and sent to prison for a very long time’ (Bloom 2012).

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All of the far-right parties from Eurozone demand the re-introduction of their national currencies. They see Euro as a ‘failed experiment’ (LN 2014); the slogan of ‘Euro is not money, it costs money’ is used by both PVV (2014) and VB (2014). The example of Iceland to devaluate its own currency to overcome economic crisis often cited by the far-right. VB (2014) suggests a less strong currency that would be used only between the member states with similar economic structures. LAOS also suggests the re-introduction of the national currency, parallel to Euro but only within the national borders and without leaving Euro (2014). TB/LNNK, on the other hand, fully supported the Latvia’s entry to Eurozone on 1 January 2004 (Latvian News 2014). The EU plans of economic and budgetary surveillance of member states, correction of budget deficits, and the introduction of stability bonds are also not welcomed by most of the far- right parties. They are mostly seen as the infringement to national sovereignty like Jean-Marie Le Pen (European Parliament 2012) stated during the parliamentary speech: We are losing our budgetary sovereignty and our freedom to choose our policies forever, with Parliament’s collusion, although the people have not been consulted. Once the European bureaucratic, technocratic and totalitarian state has gradually – imperceptibly – become fully established, we will have lost our freedom as a people once and for all. In March 2013, the amended reports for economic supervision of Eurozone members were voted in the EP. The greatest agreement index for EFD is achieved for the resolution on economic and budgetary surveillance of member states with 0.52 (3). It is higher with 0.79 for EFD+NI and 0.75 for EFD+ECR+NI. Within EFD, only LAOS and VB; and within Independents only Jobbik and PRM voted in the favour of the resolution. TB/LNNK voted for ‘Yes’, although majority of its group abstained. The rest of the far-right parties voted against the resolution. For the resolution on monitoring on budget deficits of the member states (4), the agreement index is 0.48 for EFD; 0.75 for EFD+NI; and 0.72 for EFD+ECR+NI. Within EFD, LAOS and VB voted in favour of the resolution, and SNS abstained; within independents Jobbik and PRM voted in favour of the resolution. TB/LNNK is abstained. One of the solutions for sovereign debt problems of the member states was the introduction of the ‘Eurobonds’, which is a collective bond to regulate financial flows (2). In February 2012, the motion for the resolution on the introduction of stability bonds was voted in the EP. Similarly, the agreement index is also low for this resolution as 0.43 for EFD. It increases to 0.60 for EFD+NI and 0.61 for EFD+ECR+NI. Within the EFD, only LN; and within independents, only ATA and PRM voted in favour of the motion. For all of the items in this area, the agreement index is higher for the EFD+IND and EFD+IND+ECR groups than EFD group, which means far-right members of EFD have more

82 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) agreement with other far-right party members for these resolutions rather than with their own group members. The voting behaviour of LN is the main reason of this result since it has six members. LN (2014) did not oppose the introduction of stability bonds as being alternatives for the crisis, and supported the idea of maintaining balance of the monetary policies of the member states in order to prevent the Greek case happening again.

Immigration Immigration constitutes the rasion d’etre of most of the far-right parties. Adopting a strongly nationalist discourse, most of the far-right parties have their own reasons to fight against several aspects of immigration ranging from pure xenophobia to economic consequences. For the non- EU immigration, far-right parties defend a strong border control. For the intra-EU immigration, wealthy member states often blame others for welfare tourism and demand a renegotiation of the free circulation clauses. For both types of the immigrants, they complain about the integration costs. The increasing numbers of non-EU immigration to the EU, and the disproportionate distribution of the immigrants among member states constitute one of the main problems of the receiving member states. In addition to the weaker efforts of preventing immigration to the EU by trying to deal with the root causes; since 1999, the EU has been trying to build a Common European Asylum Policy (CEAP) to guarantee the common standards among member states for immigrants and asylum-seekers by harmonizing their legislations; and to make them share the responsibility and burden. With the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, immigration and asylum policies have been communitarized, and the EP acquired ‘co-decision’ power for the whole area. The communitarization of the asylum policies has not been welcomed by the far-right parties. Far-right parties argue that the immigration is a national matter and must be solely under the national control. They believe that the CEAP made asylum applications easier, and gave rights to asylum-seekers they do not deserve as Daniël van der Stoep from PVV stated ‘…if it were up to Europe [Union], we would throw all borders wide open and Europe would become a paradise for fortune seekers and profiteers, as if it were not one already’ (2011). What the far-right suggests is a harder asylum policy with strict border controls; keeping asylum-seekers in detention centres when necessary; zero tolerance to undocumented immigrants and immigrants with criminal records and quick expulsion of them; no wider healthcare and family reunion for immigrants. As coming from border countries, only LN (2014) and LAOS (2014) defend solidarity between member states and cooperation with the sending countries. As a part of the CEAP, ‘Qualifications Directive’ (1) was renegotiated, and the recast version was voted in order to clarify the grounds for granting international protection. The

83 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) agreement index for EFD is 0.30, and it is 0.66 both for EFD+NI and EFD+ECR+NI. While Jobbik and PRM voted in favour of the directive, LAOS and two of the UKIP members voted for ‘abstain’. During the debates of this directive, Nikolaos Salavrakos (2011) from LAOS explained their support as the need for European solidarity in the area of immigration, and they see it as a step towards further burden-sharing actions among member states. Apart from non-EU immigration, far-right parties also have strong opinions on intra-EU immigration. According to Community Law, EU citizens have the freedom of circulation, which entitles them to move, work or benefit from social security systems as the EU citizens. Especially after the CEECs enlargement, the intra-EU immigration numbers increased dramatically. In fact, Romania and Bulgaria were not given the free circulation right during their accession. They faced with derogations, which were only fully removed as of 1 January 2014. When the increasing migrant flows coincided with the economic crisis and economic troubles for the receiving countries, the magnitude of the opposition also increased. Although not being a EU member state, Switzerland had a free circulation of people with the EU. During a recent referendum in 2013, the far-right party of Switzerland achieved with a very small margin to introduce the quota system for the EU immigrants. Far-right parties from receiving countries demand either exit from this system, or they seek the Swiss formula. The opposition of the far-right parties to EU immigration is not only derived from employment concerns but also from their burden on the welfare system. They believe that the EU immigrants cause an economic burden to schooling, healthcare, social housing expenses, and unemployment despite several studies proved otherwise (Dustmann 2014). PVV clearly states it as: Some countries regard accession to the EU as an unlimited access to an ATM. In Rumania, they laugh until tears run over their cheeks, because the stupid Dutch continue to transfer money. In Greece they drink another ouzo thanks to ‘Henk and ‘Ingrid’. In Bulgaria they are more than happy that their Roma population starts to inhibit our streets (2014, p. 13). UKIP (2014) suggests social housing only for those whose parents and grandparents were born locally. FN (2014) demands family allowances to be reserved for families with at least one parent is French; social security to be given only after a continuous residency and contribution to the system; and the priority for French families for social housing. These views found their reflection on the voting for the motion for the resolution for the social housing in the EU in order to tackle poverty and promote social inclusion and cohesion (5). While most of the far-right parties voted against the motion; LAOS from EFD, and Jobbik and PRM voted in favour of it. Still, the agreement index is 0.65 for EFD, while it is 0.72 both with independents and ECR. The motion had a very strong Roma perspective, as it is the most

84 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 35 (December 2017) marginalized group of the EU. This was another reason of its rejection by the far-right parties. Claudio Morganti (European Parliament 2013) from LN made it clear that his party prefers to make investments for their own nationals rather than Roma. Dimitar Stoyanov (European Parliament 2013) from ATA also denoted that Roma do not deserve these investments since ‘they ruin them regularly and do not pay their obligations as citizens’. Out of estimated 10-12 million Roma population in Europe, 6 million live in the EU, which makes them the largest minority group of the EU. With the CEECs enlargement, Roma problem became a EU wide problem since they have significant Roma population and problems related to it. Roma is the most discriminated minority in the EU and continues to be the target of the far-right of both CEECs and Western European countries due to the intra-EU immigration. They are often associated with unemployment due to laziness; exploiting welfare system; high absence levels at the school; high birth rates, low hygiene; and crime. Jobbik suggests forming a specific police force to prevent Roma crimes (2014, p. 12), so does ATA. SNS suggests establishing boarding schools for Roma children to force them to continue their education (2014, p. 8). This situation is reflected upon the votes of Roma Strategy of Europe (6); the agreement index of EFD is 0.51, and it is 0.70 and 0.66 respectively for EFD+NI and EFD+NI+ECR. Similarly, from the EFD, only SNS, LAOS, and PS voted in favour of the strategy while PRM from independents and TB/LNNK from ECR also voted in favour.

Conclusion An intriguing puzzle is the starting point of this research. During the election campaigns for 2014 European elections, several far-right leaders denounce the possibility of alignment with each other due to their conceived racism. These convictions prevent them to form strategic and beneficial cooperation in the EP. Based on a counterfactual question, this article investigates whether the cohesion of a fictional far-right group that would be formed between all of the far- right MEPs; woud be higher than the EFD group that some far-right members preferred to form by aligning with some non-far right parties. The article shows far-right members of EFD are more compatible with independent far- right members in ideological terms according the findings of the key votes from the areas of economic and monetary policy and immigration. The agreement index, thus the cohesion is higher in all cases when the votes of far-right members of EFD group and Independents are calculated. This finding is important since it proves that their conceived differences about each other that prevent them to form a group together do not reflect to the policy level. They share the similar policy preferences for the most salient issues.

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Although some of the most prominent Europan far-right parties try to emphasize more on their diversity, this article shows how united the European far-right parties in their diversity, however in a fundamentally different sense they originally suggest. The diversity of the European far-right parties is not derived from their conceived differences about each other like they claim, or to put it another way, their racism levels. In fact, their voting behaviour on salient issues proves they are united in that sense. The diversity is derived from the country-specific reasons. Thus, it is more than fair to employ the motto of European Union for European far-right parties: ‘United in diversity’.

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Betz, H-G. (1994) Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe. Houndmills: Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23547-6

Betz, H-G. & Immerfall, S. (1998) The new politics of the right: Neo-populist parties and movements in established democracies. New York: St. Martin’s.

Bloom, G. (2012) Feasibility of introducing stability bonds. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20120214&secondRef=I TEM-014&language=EN&ring=B7-2012-0016

Carter, E. (2005) The extreme right in Western Europe: Success or failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press.

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Eatwell, R. (2003) ‘Ten theories of extreme right’ in Merkl, Peter H. and Leonard Weinberg (eds) Right-wing extremism in the twenty-first century. pp. 47-73. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

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1 All online sources were accessed in the period from June to August 2015.

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Call for Papers Politikon

Politikon is the flagship publication of the International Association for Political Science Students. It publishes papers submitted by undergraduate and graduate students with the usual frequency of four issues per year.

Politikon publishes:

• Full academic papers with original research based on new primary data or review of existing literature with strong personal input (see Instructions for Authors) and the length of up to 6,000 words

• Research notes based on field work notes, raw data and observations with first level of analysis and the length of up to 2,000 words

• Book reviews of the length of up to 600 words.

Papers for publication are accepted on a continuous basis. The next deadline for submissions to an individual issue is 15 February 2018. All articles should respect the formal structure and all requirements stated in the “Paper submission guidelines” at the publisher’s website. The Editorial Board will contact the authors in order to communicate results of each evaluation (1st Editorial Board Evaluation, 2nd Peer Review), proposed changes and the planned date of publication.

The Editorial Board will not evaluate articles by authors who already (co-)authored other articles currently under evaluation.

Submissions are to be sent exclusively in electronic format to [email protected].

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