Populism: a Shape-Shifting Ghost

Home , Narodniks, Nikolay Chernyshevsky, Penal populism

School of Journalism and Mass Communications Faculty of Economic and Political Sciences

Populism: A Shape-Shifting Ghost

BY Ilker Yaman

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF DIGITAL MEDIA, COMMUNICATION AND JOURNALISM Specialization: European Journalism

Supervisor: Vasilis Vamvakas January 2019

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION 4 CONCEPTUAL HISTORY 6 LITERATURE REVIEW 12 3.1 Literature Review on the Populist Party in the United States 12 3.2 Literature Review on the Narodnik Movement in Russia 19 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 25 4.1 Civil Society 25 4.2 Hegemony 30 4.3 Intellectuals 34 4.4 Manipulative Discourses 40 CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF POPULISM 51 5.1 The Origin of the Concept of Populism 51 5.1.1 The Conceptual Approach to Populism 54 5.2 Populism in the Interwar Period 72 5.3 The Beginning of the Pejoration 80 5.3.1 The Spectre Haunting the World: Populism? 85 5.4 Populism from Latin America To Europe 89 5.5 Populism from Big P Populism to small p Populism 92 5.6 Populism from Financial Crisis to Present 101 CONCLUSIONS 105 BIBLIOGRAPHY

2 ABSTRACT

Of all “-isms” in the political science lexicon and in the journalistic discourse, populism easily distinguishes itself from others. We usually know what’s liberalism, socialism or feminism and we are able to identify who belongs to their ideological communities. However, when it comes to populism, confusion arises to pin down the concept. Neither scholarly consensus exist for the definition of populism, nor there is a common agreement on the ideological ingredients derived from the populist perspective. Closely related, populism is often asserted pejoratively and used extremely liberally. This is to the extent that populism does not get into a debate as to what the core meanings and theories of the concept are. To be more precise, the concept of populism has long been in an intellectual torture chamber from which it could not have managed to escape yet. This is an interesting phenomenon because populism was first introduced to the vocabulary as a self-descriptive term used by the adherents of the populist movement in the United States in the late 1800s. Almost at the same time, through in a different continent, an analogous political movement emerged onto stage in Russia and the members of this ideological community called themselves ‘narodniks’. Today, there is no doubt about the term ‘narodnik’ serving as a Russian equivalent of ‘populist’ and ‘narodchivesto’ that translate as ‘populism’. Having this knowledge in mind, a prominent question arises; “how is it possible that populism has become a pejorative concept?” The answer to this question is the consideration of this dissertation. It first undertakes a profound comparative analysis of the ideologies of these two political movements. Remaining in the realm of ideological debates, it then identifies the roles of intellectuals in the pejoration of the concept of populism. With these findings, the present dissertation hopes to give an accurate account to those who dedicate their endeavors to save populism from its conceptual slipperiness and assign it a genuine meaning.

1) INTRODUCTION

Although much time has passed from the moment when the term populism emerged onto stage in the late 19th century, it is still in general consensus within academia that we know “who to call populist but not what precisely constitutes populism.” (Raadt, Hollanders, Krouwel; 2004) Despite the vagueness of the concept, ‘populism’ was selected as the word of the year in 2017 by the Cambridge Dictionary, largely due to the increasing usage of the concept of ‘populism’ in popular discourses. As it is no doubt a curious phenomenon, that is the extreme usage of the concept, recently there has been several attempts to the discovery of the concept, and the media discourses about ‘populism’ have also been analyzed by scholars. (Bale et, al; 2011, Herkman; 2016, Schrauwen; 2017) The scholars revealed that the concept of ‘populism’ is thrown around liberally to the extent that even a football coach is labelled as populist in the media (Bale, et, al; 2011; 8). Thus, populism is usually used in the pejorative sense that, “when the term populism was used, its meanings were mainly constructed within negative framings.” (Herkman 2016; 157). In the meantime however, Houwen (2011) inscribed the conceptual history of the concept of populism in which he cautiously identified major time periods of the semantic innovation of the concept. According to Houwen (2011), the concept was brought from its grave back to the literature in the mid-1950s not to praise it, but to bury it. Indeed, Houwen (2011) displays how the political concept was imprisoned in the intellectual torture chamber in the 1950s and 1960s, from which it could not have managed to escape yet.

The quest of understanding the semantic changes within the definitions of populism progressed with the works of Yannis Stavrakakis. His essay, ‘How Did ‘Populism’ Become a Pejorative Concept? and Why is This Important Today?’ (2017) brings novelty to the literature for many reasons. Through offering a very detailed treatment of the ‘revisionist’ scholarship on American populism in the 1950s and 1960s,

4 Stavrakakis (2017) skilfully reminds political scientists, who have been increasingly reductionist in their essays and books, that the people who characterized themselves as populists truly existed once upon a time. With this, Stavrakakis (2017) also points out the gap between the fields of history and political science, since it has been so long that the revisionist interpretation of American populism has been revised by several academic papers. (Pollack, 1962; Nuget, 1963; Porterfield, 1965; Goodwyn, 1971, 1976, 1978; McMath, 1992; Miller, 1993; Clanton, 1991; Kazin, 1995; Postel, 2007; Formisano; 2008) Finally, Stavrakakis (2017) suggests the students of ‘populism’, to approach the Gramscian theoretical concepts to investigate the role of ‘intellectuals’ in the hegemonic struggles around populism. (Stavrakakis, 2017; 4) Stavrakakis (2017) simply indicates the adoption of a similar method that the feminist linguists developed through utilizing the Gramscian conceptual and theoretical instruments for the analysis of the derogatory uses of feminism and feminist. (Cameron, 1985; Sassoon, 1987; Connell, 1995; Kenway, 2001; Ledwith, 2009)

According to Ledwith (2009), Gramsci (1999) provided a set of new concepts for the feminist intellectuals who have developed their political analysis of patriarchy, with ‘hegemony’ being the central concept (p; 687), while other concepts, for example, the concept of ‘war of position’ was recognized as a terrain of intellectual and moral struggle in which feminists made sense of ‘personal’ as political (p; 694) and accordingly produced new feminist discourse orders to fend off the dominant language. (Ledwith, 2009; 695) Furthermore, Ledwith (2009, p. 695) reveals that Gramsci’s theory of the ‘intellectual’ provided more clear understandings of ‘activism’ and ‘knowledge’ to the feminist community around the world. From all that has been said about the collaboration between feminist intellectuals and Gramsci one conclusion emerges and requires to be stated. As expected of him, Gramsci (1999) provided theoretical tools by which feminists have used to explore the language’s relation to gender and proved how the popular discourses that guaranteed the dominant position of men and the traditional subordination of women were produced in civil society, that the negative mainstream images of feminism were directly linked to the pejoration of ‘feminist’ and ‘feminism’. (Schultz, 1975; Connell, 1987, Przybylowicz, 1990; Borkowska and Kleparski, 2007)

Therefore, the present dissertation intend to use Stavrakakis (2017) as the guidelines and to use the Gramscian theoretical tools to bring to light the role of ‘intellectuals’ in the pejoration of the concept of ‘populism’, similar to what the feminist scholars and linguistics have successfully fulfilled in their duties. In fact, this paper is first and foremost an attempt to write the conceptual history of ‘populism’, while at the same time investigating the roles of ‘intellectuals’ through ‘semantic’ changes within the definitions of populism by utilizing Gramscian political analysis. Therefore, it contains six sections in all, including this introduction section in which the purpose is to establish the content, summarize the background, and lead the readers through the general subject. The next section examines the methodology adopted, while the third section is entirely devoted for a literature review. The fourth part explores a theoretical framework mainly derived from Gramsci’s, ‘The Prison Notebooks’ (1999), and defines the relevant terminologies such as, the theories of ‘hegemony’, ‘intellectual’, ‘civil society’, etc. The fifth section analyses both the political and social contexts in which the concept of populism emerged and was used, and also explores the roles of intellectuals through the changes within the definitions of populism, from the mid-1950s to today. Finally, the last section is devoted to a conclusion.

2) CONCEPTUAL HISTORY

Conceptual history is a method used to study changes within the meanings of political concepts. As expected, it is a linguistic analysis, however, it does not indicate only surveying history of political concepts and identifying changes within definitions but also examining wider historical changes in society, which is by studying political, social, cultural and economic contexts. The principal purpose of the method of conceptual history is understanding historical setting within which the concept is situated, since it assumes language shapes and registers the processes of changes that transform every area of social life. At this point it is very easy to see parallels with the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure who reminded us of that “words were not separate from thought, nor thought from words.”(cited in, Freeden, 1996; 49) In this

6 sense, ‘historians of concepts’ incorporates with the theory of Foucault (1972, 1995) who demonstrates that there is no reality separate from words, and language is a part of historical reality itself. Indeed, White (2002) puts a strong emphasis on this at the beginning of Reinhart Koselleck’s, ‘The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History and Spacing Concept’, which is known as a holy scripture to ‘historians on concepts’; “Koselleck's work converges with that of Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida, all of who have stressed the status of historiography as discourse…” (in Koselleck, 2002; xiii-xiv)

Among the conceptual historians the most famous figure is Reinhart Koselleck, who developed a methodology of historical studies, Begriffsgeschichte , the implications of which can be seen in contemporary cultural studies, history and political science. In fact, Dutch cultural historian Pim Den Boer describes the method of ‘Begriffsgeschichte’ as the most important contribution to the writing of history in the last third of the century. (Lehmann and Richter, 1996; 18) However, it would be unfair not to mention that German scholars were not alone in showing interest in the historical evolutions of concepts. In the English-speaking world, John Pocock, Keith Baker, Donald Kelley and Quentin Skinner developed a similar methodology to examine language, political and social thought historically. As far as concerning the history of concepts, since his contributions are of crucial of importance, Quentin Skinner is among the most famous name in Anglophone academia. Quentin Skinner was a professor of political science for almost twenty years, however, his seat now belongs to history. The scholar himself admits in an interview that he receives invitations not for political science but for history and philosophy lectures. (Levy and Tricoire, 2007; Lamb, 2009) In the same vein as Koselleck, Skinner in his several works, used the linguistic contextualist method of historical understanding and it is safe to say that the details of method of ‘contextualising’, that Skinner defends, are similar to Koselleck’s views. Undoubtedly, the methodologies of both the German and the Anglophone schools converged and established a theoretical model. (Ball, 1998; 77; Houwen, 2011; 5)

7 According to Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte , as previously stated, social and political conflicts of the past could be interpreted through understanding the past linguistic usage of the political concepts because “every semantic has, as such, an involvement with nonlinguistic contents.” (Koselleck, 1985; 79). It is by no coincidence that Skinner (1998) also refers Michel Foucault when he states that his vision perceives historians of concepts as ‘archaeologists’. (Lamb, 2009) Besides the Foucauldian influence, according to Farr (1998), behind the method of conceptual history there are two ideas crucial to be reflected. They will be explained in the following, since they are very important for the present paper. The Nietzschean influence constitutes most of the first idea. Skinner (2007) himself clarifies this influence through paraphrasing Nietzsche; “the concepts we have inherited - and the interpretations we place upon those concepts - are just frozen conflicts, the outcomes of ideological debate.” (cited in an interview, Levy and Tricoire, 2007) This is also a Socratic thought, according to the story, Socrates once asked the Athens’ youth what was justice in order to show them “inconsistencies of those who analyze concepts such as justice.” (Gaus, 2000; 6) The lesson that Socrates gave in this story, according to Gaus (2000), found a body for itself in political science, when Gallie (1956a, 1956b) suggested it in his famous theory of ‘essentially contested concept’. As its name indicates, this theory explains that there are words used in political philosophy such as equality, justice, democracy, liberty or progress, that cannot have one universal meaning but their meaning are always determined by endless ideological struggles to define the concepts. (W, Gallie, 1956a, 1956b; Freeden, 1996; Gaus, 2000; Bellamy and Mason, 2003; Schmitt, 2009, Gunnell, 2017)

Despite the fact that the political concepts are philosophical and open to a number of reasonable interpretations, they are also navigational instruments of social, political, cultural and economic context of a given society. Koselleck (1985, p. 84) demonstrates it as, “a concept is not simply indicative of the relations which it covers; it is also a factor within them.” Richter then (1987, p. 255) describes what Koselleck indicates: “ [the concepts] affect political and social change because it is through concepts that a horizon is constituted against which structural changes are perceived, evaluated, and acted upon.” In short, concepts are fundamental units of political

8 thinking and part or a parcel of the world in which they exist. They acquire their meanings from their uses in their respective historical context. It is worth reminding here that this theory is the cornerstone of Freeden’s morphological approach to the analysis of ‘ideologies’. According to Freeden (1996), ideologies shall be theorised as the comprising morphologies of the ‘essentially contested concepts’, with different ideologies seeking to impose their meanings upon concepts in order to exert control over the concepts by which political reality is understood and political act is depended. (Freeden, 1996; 62) Thus, concepts reflect the socio-cultural context of society within which they are embedded and so according to ‘historians of concepts’, semantic changes in meanings of concepts can signal a change in a given society. In another words, there is direct synchrony between change of concept and change of historical patterns.

So, the first methodological claim of conceptual history is that the political concepts are used in diverse ways to meet the ends of political actors using them. The second suggestion is that, the given society changes accordingly by the changes in the definitions of political concepts, since the development of any concept characterizes the historical experiences of the given society. Therefore, the basic premise of conceptual history is to understand political and social thoughts in the civil society during different time periods through analysing the concepts. As far as this dissertation concerns, when everything is taken into consideration, conceptual history provides the researcher with an understanding of “how key concepts came into existence, were modified, or became transformed.” (Lehmann and Richter, 1996; 13). Yet, it has also its own drawbacks. The most serious one is that the methodology of conceptual history assumes that all changes in history and changes in meanings of concepts are always parallel, but Holscher (2008, p. 194) writes the point that, “This is not true. Linguistic changes follow their own pattern, they do not simply depict or reflect social or political changes.” The case of ‘populism’, as was mentioned in the introduction, reinforces this line of thought.

It is worth remembering here what we have mentioned earlier about the concept of populism. Houwen (2011) is among the first who takes a linguistic lens to discover

9 the pejoration of the concept and he concludes that the first shift in the meaning of populism did not stem from the semantic variability, but rather it was a consequence of the ideological struggles to define the concept. (Houwen, 2011; 41) Stavrakakis (2017) reinforces this finding through applying the Gramscian theory of ‘hegemony’ and putting a spotlight on the role of Hofstadter’s books: ‘The Age of Reform’ (1955), winning Pulitzer Prize for the history in 1956, and ‘Anti-Intellectualism in American Life’ (1963), which won another Pulitzer Prize for ‘nonfiction’ in 1964. Therefore, remembering us that the both books have been found ‘guilty’, by many historians and political scientists, of launching the first revisionist historical interpretation of the American populist movement. (Pollack, 1962; Nuget, 1963; Goodwyn, 1971, 1976, 1978; McMath, 1992; Miller, 1993; Clanton, 1991, 1998; Kazin, 1995; Postel, 2007; Formisano; 2008) What this indicates is that, despite the concept of populism had no organic relation with the time’s society, it was used by intellectuals in academy for their own political ends.

On the other side, Stavrakakis (2017) strongly emphasizes that Hofstadter’s books and articles were not alone in establishing the ‘anti-populist’ scientific discourse. Instead, they were a group of ‘intellectuals’. Stavrakakis (2017, p. 4) underlines, “If one attempts to construct a genealogy of the academic trajectory of anti-populist arguments, she/he shall very soon recognize that its roots can be most likely traced back to the work of Richard Hofstadter in the 1950s as well as to the writings of his liberal and pluralist fellow-travellers.” What Stavrakis (2017, p. 17) does further is to call an attention to the unusual amount of attraction to the growing literature on the concept of populism and that it still responds to these dubious writings on populism during the late-1950s and the 1960s; “Not only has Hofstadter introduced the strong pejorative meaning of populism in academic discourse; he has also managed - notwithstanding the miserable failure of his project in intellectual terms- to export it to many peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, leading to a naturalization feeding the anti-populist myth.”

It is more obvious by now that Stavrakakis’ recommendation on the application of the theory of ‘intellectual’ is complementary to ‘conceptual history’ by investigating the

10 concept of populism. Conceptual history lends assistance to analyse the emergence of the concept and its aftermath, while the theory of the intellectual helps to analyse that the academics have taken an active role in the pejoration of the concept of ‘populism’. However, Gramscian theory of intellectual refers to the theoretical framework that supports the thesis of this research study. To put it differently, nothing changes in terms of methodology, and so indeed, what is supposed to carry out in this study is a content analysis of texts. On the other hand, after the mid-1950s, the materials turn to ‘educational material’ by which one implies scientific papers and books. (Devetak and Vogrinc, 2013; 3) Indeed, the second part of the main body of this dissertation reports on the patterns of language use in the scientific textbooks, dissertations and PhD theses on ‘populism’ and offers answers to related questions; i) How do textbook authors represent scientific knowledge?; ii) Do textbook authors use the concept of ‘populism’ differently across the disciplines of science?; iii) How and in what way do textbook authors become involved in forming the ‘anti-populist’ discourse order in academia?; iv) What general form does the representation of ‘populism’ take?

It is worth repeating here that the timeframe of this present semantic analysis spans from the late 19th century to the present day and its main objective is to provide snapshots from the stories of how the concept of populism emerged onto the stage in history, and how it was extended to the completely different phenomenons during its 130 years lifespan. All are worth repeating simply because analysing the birth of the concept ‘populism’, which corresponds with the analysis of the historical origins of the ‘populist’ movements in the U.S and Russia, if not in all its aspects, are different than making sense of the conceptual change of ‘populism’. Of course, ‘conceptual history’ and ‘discourse analysis’, as methodological tools, satisfy all the needs of this study. It is also supported theoretically by a Gramscian political analysis. On the other side, researching the emergences of the populist movements in two different continent no doubt demands for a more detailed attention. It is a fact that a source analysis in history is similar to a discourse analysis in terms of methodology. (Kippling, Wadhwani and Bucheli, 2014; 312) However, the important point here is not about methodology. Analysing the linguistic birth of the concept of ‘populism’, as said

11 earlier, requires a case-oriented historical analysis of how populism manifested itself in the U.S and Russia.

It is only because of this that all common characteristics of the two populist movements would come to light, and thus, as what Canovan (2004, p. 241) points out in her article, “possibility of a distinctively populist ideological position” would then be unveiled, although it is claimed that there are not any common characteristic between two cases with the exception of, “some kind of exaltation of and appeal to ‘the people’” (Canovan, 2004; Leonard, 2006, 1303). However, there are several ideological similarities, and bringing them into the light is extremely useful for the present study, since how populist has become a pejorative concept then becomes more clear. Precisely, this dissertation engages with the historical analyses of the populist movements in the U.S and Russia, and since such a historical analysis requires an examination of a vast number of books and articles, that’s to say, a painstaking literature review, the main body of books, from which some of the ideological components of populism are obtained, must be mentioned. In the following section, all these books and essays are documented.

3) LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1) THE LITERATURE ON THE AMERICAN POPULISM

The historical research tends to see the 19th century American ‘populist’ movement in various ways. John Hick’s ‘The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party’ (1931) is widely recognized nowadays as the first serious account of the scholarship to introduce the populist movement in the U.S. (Miller; 2009) Several chapters of this important account are devoted to understanding the conditions that gave birth to ‘populism’ while others explore the inner side of the movement activities, its organizational characteristics, mobilization techniques, and above all, its demands. Taken as a whole, John Hick’s comprehensive work, as its reviewers and prudent readers have often underlined, provides an objective treatment of the American populist movement. Indeed, from this point of view, reading Hicks

12 (1931) first is still suggested as the best starting point for the beginners of the populist movement. (Ridge; 1985) In order to avoid discussing the book in detail here, it can be shortly asserted that Hicks (1931) approaches to the populist movement with a great sympathy, arguing confidently that the birth of the farmers’ movement and later the establishment of the American People’s (Populist) Party were primarily the outcomes of the economic hardships that the American farmers were facing. Moreover, the scholar represents the movement as the last attempt to save agricultural America. In the closing chapter, Hicks (1931) discloses the contributions of the populist movement to the American political scene such as women's participation in politics and introduction of the direct democracy mechanism. (Hicks, 1931; 443, 444)

The terrible events that took place during the Second World war period and the emergence of the anti-communist extremists in the early Cold War era led the notion of ‘people’, their roles in democracy, and accordingly the nature of populism to become controversial issues in the 1950s and 1960s. (Houwen; 2011, p. 18; Stavrakakis, 2017, p. 4, 16, Ryo; 2017; 105) Indeed, it was in this intellectual and political climate that the intelligentsia led by Hofstadter re-examined the American populist movement in the late 19th century and found it as ‘irrational’ mass politics. With the self-serving arguments, they established a new but negative tone for the understanding of the American populists, as they were “provincial, conspiracy-minded, and had a tendency toward scapegoatism, manifested itself as nativism, anti-Semitism, anti-intellectualism, and Anglophobia” (Miller; 1993). Here , it is needless to discuss about the misguided interpretation of the American populist movement in detail. Instead, it is enough to point out to another paper to show the differences between two different interpretations of populism. Reichelt's paper was published only six years before Hofstadter's book and it represents a very good example of the research papers stemming from the same line as John Hick (1928, 1931). By contrast with the representation of the American populism by Hofstadter (1955), as one reads it, Reichelt (1949) illustrates the populists as the adherents of the progressive agrarian movement with democratic and socialist demands. Moreover, the American populist, Reichelt (1949) argued, attempted to unify the peasants and

13 industrial workers on egalitarian principles and attracted a tremendous number of women (Reichelt, 1949; 36).

Pollack’s ‘The Populist Response to Industrial America: Midwestern Populist Thought’ (1962) is known as the first full-scale defense of the populist movement. The most important aspect of the book is to attempt to restore populism to its well-deserved place in the democratic heritage. According to Pollack (1962), the populist movement fought against many of the strongholds of capitalism, and still more, Pollack (1962) depicts the American populist movement as ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’. Finally, Pollack (1962) seems very content with seeing parallelisms between the Populist and Marxist analyses of the modern industrial society, which was not a misleading conclusion in its entirety but, as is generally accepted, Pollack (1962) went too far by depicting the American populists as Marxists (Robert, 1993). Another book from the same period which is known for its attempt to overturn Hofstadter’s revisionist narrative is ‘The Tolerant Populists: Kansas Populism and Nativism’. In this work, Nugent (1963) tests the validity of Hofstadter's charges towards the Kansas populists, and particularly, of his fascist, anti-semitist and jingoist accusations. At the conclusion of his response to Hofstadter, in view of all the evidences that he provided, Nuget (1963) concluded that the populists were ‘not guilty’, suggesting instead that the most populists were themselves immigrants, that Hofstadter’s accusations were entirely false and, therefore, not applicable. In his study where he analyzes the discourses of the populists in Alabama, Porterfield (1965) suggests that the American populists were Jeffersonian democrats (p, 47), and that although the movement had black citizens in attendance (p, 232), it could not attract black votes which were actively acquired by the Democrats. (Porterfield, 1965; p, 226)

Many highly-acclaimed books and articles that appeared in the 1960s and the 1970s continued to disprove Hofstadter’s portrayal of American populists. It is almost impossible to enumerate all these books and articles here but there are three works by Lawrence Goodwyn issued during the 1970s, each of which rightfully deserves to be mentioned; ‘Populist Dreams and Negro Rights: West Texas as a Case Study’ (1971),

14 ‘Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America’ (1976) and ‘The Populist Moment’ (1978). Among these, at the time of its publication in 1976, ‘Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America’ was acclaimed by a great number of scholars as a monumental work on the populist movement, even more sophisticated than the thick book of Hick (1931) to such an extent that it deserved to replace Hicks’s book as a standard history book of populism of the era. Goodwyn (1971,1976, 1978), first of all, speaks highly of the populist movement. Postel (2007, p. 7) believes that populists were “the last best hope for democracy” according to Goodwyn; and as Goodwyn (1976, p. 211) himself puts an emphasis on, the populists “tested the intellectual flexibility of Gilded Age America.” Writing in the post-1968 intellectual environment, Goodwyn (1976, p. 31) pictured the American populist movement to be the most elaborate example of cooperative movement culture in the American history. The Populists, Goodwyn (1976) argued, were the forward-looking radicals who sought for radical changes in the American society in which the people’s social and moral values could not be usurped by the capitalist economic organization. For the same scholar, the progressivism and radicalism of the American populist movement were the essential elements that helped the development of concerted political ideology and action. (Goodwyn, 1976; 236) It is needless to go further into details here. Presently, it is sufficient to explain two most important contribution of Goodwyn to the scholarship on populism. His ‘Democratic Promise’ provided the literature with a comprehensive body of knowledge about the American populist movement. Secondly, Goodwyn destructed the dictatorship of the one-dimensional consensus within the scholarship, that was, the American populism was an anti-intellectual, anti-semitist, fascist and totalitarian ideology.

Yet, the revisionist scholarship was by no means limited to the 1960s. While a circle of scholars showed in their works many evidences that directed the American populist movement towards ‘progressivism‘ and ‘democracy’, they were not able to surpass those who can be clustered as a family that was responsible for the manipulation of the concept of populism. So many insights from these accounts will be shared afterwards; therefore, for the sake of example, I limit myself here to touch upon Seymour Lipset and Earl Raab’s ‘The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in

15 America, 1790-1977’ (1970). The authors of this book provide the literature with valuable informations about the American far-right. Indeed, one can pull the book from shelf to overview the history of the far-right in the U.S due to its important contributions to this matter. However, it is doubtful whether the use of ‘populism’, without more precise qualifications, was applicable for the political analysis of the book. But this is not the matter in question that has to be discussed here; rather, the question is the persistence for the continuous reproduction of the same negative line of thoughts about populism from the 1950s on. That is to say, this book was one of the best pictures of the Hofstadterian scholarship in its continuous and systematic assault against the true spirit of populism. According to the authors, Adolf Hitler is a good example to the populist leaders. It is also indicated in the same page that populism is a source of conspiracy theories. (Lipset and Raab, 1970; 13) In the following pages, the populist ideology is associated with anti-Semitism. (Lipset and Raab, 1970; 95) Last but not least, Huey Long, the governor of Louisiana between 1928 and 1932, is objected against for his economic ‘populism’, which is basically a ‘nationalization’. Thus, Huey Long is portrayed as the “America’s classic welfare demagogue” (Lipset and Raab, 1970; 342)

More important contributions to the literature came out in the 1990s when three seminal works of three historians were published. Two of these books synthesised the trends of great majority of the last generation of the scholarship on American populism but one ought not dismiss these works for their contributions are important. The discussion about these books will be returned to later. The other book is Michael Kazin’s ‘The Populist Persuasion; An American History’ (1995). Although this book will be criticized for its analysis method of the concept of populism, one chapter is devoted to the first American populists; and Kazin (1995) provides powerful snapshots from the history of the American populists on the quest of hegemony. It is that Kazin (1995) finds ‘producerism’ at the core of the populist discourse (p, 13) and suggests perceiving the American populist movement as the inherent part of the history of American democracy (p, 46). Above all, the same scholar identifies in his analysis of the populists consistent discourses about American farmlands and agricultural towns that are antagonistic to urban cities (Kazin 1995; p, 44, 45).

It is time to pass on the discussion about the other two books from the 1990s, that are, Gene Clanton’s ‘Populism: the humane preference in America, 1890-1900’ (1991) and Robert Mcmath’s ‘American Populism: A Social History 1877-1898’ (1992). First of all, both scholars maintain an 'ideational' approach to populism. However, they reject to keep the existing themes alive in their own works. To put it differently, the scholars make an immense summary of the previous literature and synthesize the various arguments that had been discussed, however, they sharpen what they perceive as wrong. In the end, both scholars come with up a conclusion that the American populist movement fits very well into the panorama of American republicanism and republican ideology of producerism. (Robert, 2009; p, 21) What can be said about Mcmath in particular (1992) is that the scholar lays a strong emphasis on the concept of ‘cooperative’. This concept also appeared in his previous work ‘Populist Vanguard: A History of the Southern Farmers’ Alliance’ (1975), in which he examines, in particular, the Southern Alliance. In this book, McMath describes many local events that the Populists organized, such as picnics, and argued that the movement had a strong notion of 'community'. In this book, the title of one of the chapters is ‘Brother and Sisters: The Alliance as Community’. It can be argued that, in his new book published in the 1990s, McMath adds a new concept, which is ‘producerism’, while ‘cooperation’ and ‘community’ remain as the other two main concepts of the book.

Gene Clanton is a long student of the American populist movement. His publications include his highly-acclaimed work titled ‘Kansas Populism: Ideas and Men’ (1969), and more than two decades later, his widely respected ‘Populism: the humane preference in America, 1890-1900’ (1991), which, no doubt, provides a more elaborated picture of the populist movement than the former. His ‘Congressional Populism and the Crisis of the 1890s’ (1998) is important in terms of analysis of the populists while the populist politicians were on the floor of congress. (Parish, 2012; 23) Speaking generally, Clanton presents a very different view of the American populist movement. For example, Clanton (1991) fully rejects the claim that the People’s Party was an end result of the movement in pursuit of totalitarian regime. On

17 the other side, he does not come to terms with Pollack, who suggests that the American populists were the original socialists of the U.S. Still, Clanton (1984,p. 150) does not fully reject Pollack’s opinion: “If they were, they were advocates of a peculiar brand of socialism, the socialism of agrarianism or perhaps what one person, in another context, has called ‘grassroot socialism.” According to Clanton (1991), the American populist movement represented a new form of producerism which was borrowed from American republicanism against the new rules of commerce of the period. As a backlash to the country’s political and market systems, Clanton (1991) suggests, the populist movement sought to return the nation back to its core democratic principles, that is, the populists wanted to give the people priority over the market. (Clanton, 1991, p,xvi)

From all that have been said about the two books from the 1990s, one conclusion requires to be stated. In the 1990s, the literature on populism was affected by the debate on republican vision of producerism stressing that the movement grounded its ideology on Jeffersonian-Jacksonian points of view. Therefore, the story of the populist movement could not be separated from the line of the traditional American democratic thought (Goebel, 1997). No doubt, the conclusion came closer to truth than before in the 1990s. Yet, neither Mcmath (1992) nor Clanton (1991) put an end to the vehement debates on populism. With the turn of the millennium, more clear pictures of the American populists were acquired. Charles Postel’s groundbreaking work ‘The Populist Vision’ (2007) suggested a new identity for the American Populist movement. Only a year after Charles Postel’s masterpiece work Ronald Formisano’s ‘For the People: American Populist Movements from the Revolution to the 1850s’ (2008) reinforced such identity. Indeed, Formisano (2008) provides a better understanding for the American Populist movement viewed according to Postel’s point of view. Apart from that, he unveils how the populists developed a new system of thought inherited from the previous agrarian movements of the farmers, which also provides complementary knowledge to Postel’s work.

I want to mention particularly to Charles Postel’s book which I find a stimulating piece of work because it provides ample materials for those who desire to understand

18 the American populist movement. Compared to all other scholars, Postel (2007) introduces a different reading to such an extent that his account suggests the most original interpretation of the American populism. Such an interpretation of the populist movement had never appeared in the literature because, obviously, Postel (2007) made a significant achievement by making an objective treatment of the historical event. In fact, Formisano (2008b), as a reviewer, points out that Postel’s work “represents the culmination of the rehabilitation of the Populists of the 1890s”. The primary reason why I used Postel’s work as a primary source in my analysis can be attributed to the book’s this authentic characteristic: objectivity. The second reason is his arguments against the Hofstaderian influence. Postel (2007) puts forward many arguments that desolate those which follow Hofstadter’s footsteps and arrives at a conclusion that the American populists “looked backward with longing to the lost agrarian Eden” (Hofstadter, 1955; 62). Postel (2007) leaves no room for a doubt that the populist movement was a reform movement, but the author further adds that the populist reforms, different from other two political parties, focused on agriculture.

Still, it is worth reminding that Postel (2007) pays a considerable attention not to idealize the populist movement. Postel does not accept Hoftadter's claims that the American populists were anti-semitists and fascists. On the other hand, his critique of the populist movement about race issue is worth studying for any student of populism. Moreover, Postel does not romanticize the populist movement as is often the case in the counter-revisionist scholarship against Hofstadter's interpretation. For example, some scholars project the populist movement as the Marxist or the communist while others, like Parsons (1983), seemingly, do not like these terms, arguing that the populist movement was neither Marxist or socialist but were against capitalism from a moral point of view that arose out of their religion. Such discussions do not exist in Postel's work.

3.2) THE LITERATURE ON THE RUSSIAN POPULISM

There are already so many cliches on the importance of the Russian revolution. It is useful to point out only the fact that the significance of the Russian Revolution does

19 not only lie in the political events of the 20th century but also in future. To put it differently, it is too early for the intellectuals to make a judgement about the Russian Revolution simply because it still preaches universal theories and global meanings that are still able to mobilize masses for political action. (Laibman, 2017; Rendle; 2017, Filatova and Davidson; 2017, Torkunov; 2018) This truth has two important implications on the literature on the Russian Revolution. Firstly, it is a fascinating era of history to study, and, therefore, the literature is extremely rich in terms of sources. The other crucial implication is that the Russian Revolution has been written by the subjects of the revolution, its opponents, and then by the historians and political scientists and many others, of course, through the lenses of their own worldviews. Indeed, the partisan discourses are so clear; for example, if one reads the works of Lenin, it is almost impossible to see a pleasant comment on the Narodniks. (Pipes; 1960, 1964, Venturi; 1960) It is also a case that Tolstoy presented and supported many populist themes in his books, but still, the revolutionary Russian populists, as Souder (2010, p. 87) puts it clearly, “took a much more aggressive stance against Tolstoy.” In conclusion, it can be inferred that studying the Russian Revolution requires a careful literature review. From this point of view, I want to make mention of the main body of books on which I have grounded my analysis of the Russian populist movement. Of course, each of these books requires a few statements.

First of all, the present paper is interested in the ideological dimension of the revolution since the purpose here to detect the Narodnik opinion. In other words, the analysis of this dissertation primarily deals with the works that examine the beliefs and ideas of the Narodnik intellectuals. For this ideological analysis, both the first-hand accounts and the secondary sources were read and studied. However, before commencing with the ideologies of the populist intellectuals and what has been written about them, it should be stated that the general picture of the events that led the revolution was a requirement. Therefore, Trotsky’s ‘The Russian Revolution’ (1932) and Berdyaev’s ‘The Origins of Russian Communism’ (1937) were the books that have been studied here first. There are several reasons for the selection of these two books. Among others, two of them require special attention. First of all, both works are first-hand accounts and they describe the story of transition from the Tsarist

20 rule to the Soviet Regime. Secondly, Berdyaev's definition of the Russian Revolution is very different because the writer is mostly known as a Christian religious philosopher who was fascinated by Marxism (Shlapentokh, 1997; 304).

Following these books, Franco Venturi’s ’Roots of Revolution’ (1960) is of great prominence for this dissertation, doubtless, it is the most comprehensive works on the Narodnik movement in the literature. Franco Venturi’s book has long been recognized as a classic study on Russian populism, and as is widely accepted by the scholars, his arguments are as firm as a rock. Apart from the detailed insights on how the movement came to existence, grew up in strength and lost the ideological battle, Venturi (1960) also scrutinizes the political theories of prominent populist intellectuals such as Chernyshevsky, Nechaev, Herzen, Lavrov, Pisarev, and so forth. In short, Venturi’s description of the development of the Narodnik movement is balanced and reliable as well as comprehensive. In this respect, Franco Venturi’s magnum-opus is the primary source of the analysis of populism in Russia in this paper.

According to Venturi (1960, p, 1), “Herzen was the true founder of Populism.” Indeed, Herzen is widely known as the founder of ‘Russian socialism’ (Walicki, 2015; 203) and one of the first Russian thinkers who “saw the peasant commune as a fortunate survival in Russia.” (Barrow and Offord, 2010; 165). Then, it is very well to say that reading Herzen is extremely important for the students of populism, and his most valuable work ‘My Past and Thoughts’ (1870) is one of the most respectable examples of Russian literature having almost the same gravity with the majors works of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. The first two part of this collection, 'Childhood, Youth, and Exile' (1980) have been studied for the present study. The reason why these two of the chapters have been selected is that they summarize the story of how Herzen was born into a wealthy family in Russia but then grew up to be one of the most famous revolutionary writers, which eventually led him to find himself in exile in Europe. In short, these chapters provide a great description of the period’s Russian context and the perception of it from the lenses of the most famous populist intellectuals. Nikolay Chernyshevsky is also another actor who is widely considered

21 as one of the intellectual fathers of Narodnism. The populist elements of the peasant community and non-capitalist development are clearly provided in his writings (Walicki, 2015; 27). In his famous novel 'What is to Be Done', written in the prison, Chernyshevsky presents his idealized new man through his character Rakhmetov, who comes from a wealthy family but also is familiar with the common people, works in jobs like theirs, and above all, he is a man of soil. Whereas other heroes of the book, Pavlovna and Lopukhov, are usually guided by their self-interests which, according to them, correspond to the interests and the welfare of society as a whole. Taken as a whole, Chernyshevsky's novel presents a clear understanding of the world as seen by a populist. Furthermore, there is the presentation of the best populist world, which is described by ‘a social utopia' (Venturi, 1960; p. xxii).

Having mentioned a few of the primary sources from Herzen and Chernyshevsky, there are also a few textbooks about the populist intellectuals that deserve attention. According to the conventional wisdom, the debates concerning the capitalism in the 19th century of Russia were best explained by Andrzej Walicki. Therefore, the present paper draws a considerable amount of observations therefrom: ‘A History of Russian Thought’ (1979) and ‘The Flow of Ideas’ (2015) as well as two more books of him for only their relevant sections; ‘The Controversy over Capitalism’ (1969) and ‘The Slavophile Controversy’ (1975). Andrzej Walicki starts his survey with the intellectuals under the rule of Catherine the Great and ends with the writings of Lenin by which Walicki makes major contributions to the scholarship of the Russian populist thought. Walicki studiously examines the thoughts of intellectuals, and, in particular, of populists among them such as Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Vassily Vorontsov and Nikolai Danielson. In his recent book ‘The Flow of Ideas’, the examination of Nikolai Mikhailovsk’s sociological theory and Bakunin’s philosophical views, and the detailed treatments of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy are very valuable. However, the chapter ‘Between populism and Marxism’ is of particular interest since Walicki (2015) provides important insights about the various reactions of the populists towards Marxism. In the book ‘A History of Russian Thought’, Walicki (1979) outlines the theories of the Russian populists and identifies their main points of contacts with other philosophers, and finally engages in a polemic with

22 them. It must be definitely noted that Walicki (1979) does not approach such ideas from a professional point of view, but, still, he displays the sociocultural background of the 19th century Russia by engaging in a polemic in the political, economic and religious terrains. Thus, the author provides an excellent account of the analysis of Narodnism.

Since the investigation is on the Narodnik movement, I should also take into account Richard Wortman’s ‘The Crisis of Russian Populism’ (1967), Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Russian Thinkers’ (1978) and Frederick Copleston’s ‘Philosophy in Russia’ (1986). Though Wortsman’s book is very thin, it is a wonderful source since the book underlines the psychological dimension of Russian populism: what sort of psychological unity existed and how it was disintegrated after its failure in the late 1870s. Berlin (1978) provides a clear picture of the inner structures of the Narodnik thought, introducing the great intellectual actors of the Russian populism and making exquisite commentaries on their ideas and beliefs. Among his essays ‘Herzen and Bakunin on Individual Liberty’ and ‘Russian Populism’ are the best examples. In other work, Berlin (1968) describes the political notions of the works of Belinsky, Turgenev, Tolstoy and several others. However, the author of these books is a controversial figure. He makes no secret about what ideology he supports. For example, according to Berlin, being pluralist is enough to make something good while monistic idea is devilish. To put it differently, Berlin’s writings are explicitly and overly viewpointy. (Kelly, 1994) That said, Coplenton’s book is more reliable. It consists of fourteen chapters. However, as may be expected, not all of those chapters are dedicated to the populist thoughts. On the other hand, the book’s fourth chapter focuses on the populist intellectuals and presents their ideas and theories, such as the extensive analysis of the concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘morality’ according to Herzen. The fifth chapter discusses on the philosophical debates of the 1860s and pays special attention to the opinions of Chernyshevsky, Lavrovic and Dostoevsky. Finally, the tenth chapter tells an extremely important story, that of the rise of the capitalism and the Marxism to the detriment of the populist ideology.

23 Before dealing with one of the most important primary sources of both the Narodnism and the Russian Revolution below, it is better to comment on a work that has recently been published. Eklof’s and Saburova’s ‘A Generation of Revolutionaries’ (2017) is very valuable work for the present discussion. The authors are very well aware that the ideas of populism, right or wrong, had long been under the relentless critiques of the superior ideology in Russia. While discussing about the previous publications on the Narodnism, Eklof and Saburova (2017, p. 8) reminds the reader that “Stalinist scholarship was uniformly hostile to this cohort, and it was only in the late Soviet period that a small cluster of fine scholars provided a more sympathetic interpretation of their motivations and deeds.” After underlying this ignored aspect of the literature, the scholars investigate the Narodniks and their network of friends, families, local politicians, and educators, or, simply, ‘culture bearers’ (Eklof and Saburova. 2017; p. 10) and provide valuable knowledge about the populist beliefs and thoughts. Finally but most importantly, the work asserts following statement: “much ink has been spilled in defining this Russian Populism and distinguishing it from other variants, especially the American version, which has often been led by right-wing demagogues.” (Eklof and Saburova. 2017; p. 8) Here, the authors criticize the negative view towards the American populism. According to the scholars, such negative thought produces a prejudice in the minds of the scholars, which, in turn, prevent them even from an attempt to compare the two cases objectively. By this discussion, the authors emphasize the existence of the similarities but do not touch upon them because their book is not particularly about Russian populism but Russian thinkers.

Lenin’s own writings do not focus particularly on the Narodniks, but they are still at the center of the analysis although they provide one of the most hostile considerations against Narodnism. As is well known, Lenin was an intellectual hunter of Narodnism (Pipes; 1960, 1964). For this reason, some of the Lenin’s own writings has been studied. For example, ‘Collected Works 1’ (2008) and ‘Collected Works 3’ (2009) has been read extensively because almost all the articles are related to Narodnism. The relevant parts from his other writings are also read. For example, there are a few articles about the Russian populism in his ‘Collected Works 20’, each of which

24 attacks to it. Lenin (2011) labels populism as the ‘petty-bourgeois socialism’ (Lenin, 2011; 106) and, two pages after, suggests that populism is ’non-socialist’ (Lenin, 2011; 108). Furthermore, Lenin (2011, p. 107) demonizes the Narodnik journalists who wrote about the anniversary of the death of Mikhailovsky calling them as ‘bourgeois-democratic press.’ As the last example, the title of Lenin’s article speaks by itself: ‘The Left Narodniks Whitewash the Bourgeoisie’ (Lenin, 2011). It is very well known fact that Lenin’s manipulations towards Narodnism comes from his being himself in struggle against the Narodnik intellectuals and their social, economic and political theories. Nevertheless, in case the researcher recognizes that Lenin’s writings are entirely ideological, as is generally accepted, his writings are one of the best sources for those who intend to discover and understand the ideological debates of the late 19th century Russia, including discussions on Narodnism and the Marxist critique of Narodnism. Indeed, this is what gives a particular taste to Lenin’s collected works.

4) THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

This part of the dissertation delineates the theoretical framework that informs my critique of the pejoration of the concept populism. Its main tenets derive from Gramsci’s novel political theory whose central concept is that of ‘hegemony’. However, it should be clear that the intention here is not to offer a detailed treatment of Gramsci’s comprehensive political analysis. Instead, it is to establish a coherent framework for the semantic investigation of ‘populism’. That is to say, his theories wither away at a point when more elaborate theories are available in literature. For example, the concept of ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ (Althusser; 1969), most known as “Althusserian translation of the Gramscian notion of the ‘hegemonic apparatus’” (Thomas, 2009; 33), is more sophisticated than the framework provided in Gramsci's prison notebooks, and for this reason, while discussing the concept of civil society in Gramsci’s political analysis, the concept of ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ is employed instead of the Gramscian concept of ‘hegemonic

25 apparatuses’. It is also important to note here, that although Lo Piparo (2010, p. 21) claim in his controversial paper that Gramsci’s philosophy “should not be searched for in Marx or in Lenin or in any other Marxist, but in the science of language.”, it is very well to say that “not all scholars agree with this second point.” (Ives, 2004; 1) That’s being pointed out simply because Gramsci (1999) recognizes ‘language’ as one of the most powerful political tools, but it is also correct to claim that the Sardinian theorist does not suggest any comprehensive linguistic theory. For this reason, when the dissertation engages with the concepts and theories in modern linguistics such as ‘manipulative discourse’, ‘pejoration’ and ‘political concepts’, it borrows the terminology from other scholars, among whom Foucault (1972, 1980, 1995), Althusser (2014), Van Dijk (1995, 2006a, 2006b), Saussure and Schuls (2005) or Freeden (1996) are important to note here. To conclude, below, some of the Gramscian theoretical tools will be utilized in order to establish a framework on which the roles of ‘intellectuals’ in the pejoration of the concept of ‘populism’ will be investigated.

4.1) CIVIL SOCIETY

Before commencing with the concept of ‘civil society’, it is worth reminding here that the scope of Gramsci’s thought is far too wide. His famous ‘Prison Notebooks’ consists of more than two thousands pages, on which Gramsci (1999) engages in an enormous range of subjects, from the Italian history to the Americanism and to the October Revolution, and in the meantime he offers a theoretical framework through a set of borrowed concepts that together sum up its main traits. While doing so, however, Gramsci (1999) employs his concepts in relation to one another, and concerning the central concept to this present paper, that of ‘intellectual’, it is safe to say that it is not an exception. Simply put, the terminology detailed above, including the concepts of ‘civil society’ and ‘hegemony’, are defined to provide a general picture within which the theory of ‘intellectuals’ is situated. In this respect, ‘civil society’ is the best theoretical instrument to begin our quest for understanding of ‘intellectuals’ and their particular roles in power relations in everyday life.

26 In the first place, Gramsci (1999) theoretically takes himself apart from both the Hegelian and Marxist traditions. To broaden this important issue, Gramsci (1999) dives into Hegel to borrow from him the concept of civil society. Nevertheless, his intellectual revolt against Hegel’s theory of civil society immediately begins; Gramsci (1999) rejects Hegel’s basic philosophy that ‘civil society’ is a neutral arena in which separate individuals “learn to trust others with whom they have no blood tie.” (De Wiel, 1997; 4) Marx also objects to Hegel’s approach on philosophical ground. Civil society should not be considered simply as a private terrain. Still, Gramsci (1999) does not come to terms with the classical Marxist understanding of ‘civil society’ uncritically neither. Writing many decades later about the Marxist theory, behind the bars of Mussolini’s fascist prison, while in isolation, Gramsci (1999) rejects what Marx (1990) demonstrates in his preface to ‘A Critique of Political Economy’, “... the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy.” To put it differently, Gramsci (1999) does not internalize the line of thought that the civil society was emerged out of the whole realm of the economic sphere and it evolves out of only production and commerce. To be more precise, Gramsci (1999) does not let Marx’s economic determinism travel to his own analysis in the ‘Prison Notebooks.’

To sum up what has been said above, Gramsci (1999) opposes Hegel for his position that ‘civil society’ is a private sphere, different from the ‘political sphere’ and escapes from Marx for his argument that economic relationships are true foundations of all arrangements in ‘civil society’. Yet, Gramsci (1999) methodologically distinguishes ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’ as two different parts of ‘the State.’ After that, by contrast with Marx, Gramsci (1999) asserts that they are two different superstructures upon which the ruling group/class legitimizes and maintains its position as dominant or superior. (Thomas, 2009; 429, Boris, De Wiel, 1997; 2) What precisely superstructure means for Gramsci (1999) is ‘ideology.’ (Thomas, 2009; 99) For example, what an autonomous individual knows in his or her life is a superstructure, which is a non-definitive philosophy, “it is difficult not to think in terms of something real beyond this knowledge—not in the metaphysical sense of a “noumenon”, an “unknown God” or an “unknowable,” but in the concrete sense of a “relative” ignorance of reality….” (Gramsci, 1999; 694) Accordingly, ‘civil society’ includes

27 “‘not all material relationship,’ but all ideological-cultural relations; ‘not the whole of commercial and industrial life,’ but the whole of spiritual and intellectual life.” (Bobbio, 1979; 30, 31)

It is plausible to stop here and describe what Gramsci (1999) means by the concept of ideology, since the present paper employs the concept more or less in the same vein with Gramsci (1999). First of all, Gramsci’s redefinition of ‘ideology’ is one of his most important contribution to the area of the Marxist thought. (Freeden, 1996; 19) According to Gramsci (1999), the classical or the orthodox Marxists had failed to grasp the importance of culture-forming institutions in ‘civil society.’ To repair this important problem, therefore, Gramsci (1999) gives equal importance to ‘political’ and ‘ideological’ as ‘economic’ in determining historical outcomes in ‘civil society.’ (Thomas, 2009; 99) Furthermore, Gramsci (1999) rejects the understanding of ‘ideology’ as the singular phenomenon that only belongs to ruling class as Marx and other classical Marxists had suggested before. Instead, ‘ideology’ is conceived by Gramsci (1999) in a neutral sense. To put it differently, there is plurality of ‘ideology’ in ‘civil society.’ (Thomas, 2009; 281) It is safe to argue that every social group in civil society has its own ‘ideology.’ (Gramsci, 1999; 690, 707) Therefore, ‘ideologies’ according to Gramsci (1999) are first and foremost ‘system of ideas and beliefs’ that work as a ‘cognitive map’, without which individuals remain clueless in the world, and they are always political devices; they bind autonomous individuals for political action and navigate its water for them. Gramsci’s examples of ideologies in the ‘Prison Notebooks’ prove this point. For example, the Italian theorist writes the Mazzinian ideology (p, 223), the Fordian ideology (p, 612), and the Jacobinism when he demonstrates that some French revolutionaries imposed their own ‘ideology’ on bourgeois. (Gramsci, 1999; 243) However, Gramsci (1999) also points out to the ideological forms when he examines the literature and artworks such as theatre, arguing that some works contain ‘ideological’ elements and some others have entirely ideological-political character. (Dombroski; 1986, Holub; 1992)

The necessary insight into the concept of ‘ideology’ has been gained above, it is now time to return to to the methodological distinction between ‘political society’ and

28 ‘civil society’ to show how Gramsci (1999) remains in the ranks of Marx in terms of suggesting how the both spheres work for the same master. For this, the first thing that has to be known is that ‘political society’ in Gramsci’s mind corresponds to the State’s ‘coercive’ apparatuses such as the police, national guard or the intelligence organization, each of which has an aim of holding popular masses in accordance, through legally enforcing a discipline on groups or individuals who refuse to obey the rules that ‘the State’ sets. To give some examples from daily life; the police comes and shuts down a pirate television station or removes prohibited book from the shelves of a school library. On the other hand, the concept of ‘civil society’ refers to institutions such as churches, schools, trade unions, political parties, publishing houses and other media institutions as well as cultural industries. At first sight these institutions in civil society seem to be private or outside of ‘State’ control, but as Gramsci (1999) argues, if one removes the pastoral blinders, what becomes clear is that they produce and impose certain forms of behavior and knowledge in harmony with the State. What this precisely means is that they produce ‘regimes of truths’ that are complementary to the state system. (Gramsci, 1999; 52, 205, 453, 487, 654)

At this point, the famous Althusserian concept of ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ (ISAs) would serve to clarify what remains implicit in Antonio Gramsci’s analysis in terms of institutions in civil society. According to Althusser (2004), civil society is based on complex network of ISAs that often support and reinforce each other. However, the complexity of civil society is not only limited to the complex network of ISAs, as Althusser (2004, p. 76) describes it, “for each ISA, the various institutions and organizations comprising it form a system.” Furthermore, Althusser (2004, p. 77) warns about the complexity of inner functionings of the ISAs; “the cultural ISA: the ideology that it realizes is anchored in practices either aesthetic (the theatre, film, literature) or physical (sport) that are not reducible to the ideology for which they serve as a support.” As is clear by now, Althusser (2004) first and foremost investigates the roles of ISAs in producing ideology, and in the same vein with Gramsci (1999), Althusser (2004) suggests that the ISAs in civil society function as the ‘myrmidons’ of ‘the State’. Taken in their totality, Althusser (2004) argues that ISAs constitute as one big beast that reproduces the mindset and ethos of the ruling

29 group. They are sophisticated instruments of the State and establish a kind of ‘domination’ that can be seen as the translation of ‘physical power’ of ‘the State’ into ‘ideological’ power in ‘civil society.’ (Thomas; 2009)

Althusser’s arguments above highlight the complexity of the system. There is no need to further explore the concept of civil society because the most important point concerning the dissertation has already been specified. The ISAs are all individual pieces, however, as a whole, they create a complex system in civil society, in which they activate and shape people’s mind and act as “a determinant of historical reality’. Althusser (2004) provides a few examples of how Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) function in civil society. Reminding here that his influential essay on ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ coincided with the aftermath of the May ‘68 events, the media is “cramming every ‘citizen’ with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism, moralism, etc.” (Althusser, 2004; 144) Althusser (2004, p, 145) changes his tone to a more serious one when it comes the educational ISA; “In this concert, one Ideological State Apparatus certainly has the dominant role, although hardly anyone lends an ear to its music: it is so silent! This is the School.”

At this stage, a summary of what has been said about ‘civil society’ can be useful. The first and foremost question that Gramsci (1999) confronted in the prison cell at the time of writing the ‘Prison Notebooks’ was to discover the reasons why the Russian revolution of 1917 ended in victory but such a revolutionary spirit even failed to crystallise out in other parts of the Europe. Set his mind on the differences between the East and West, the structural organizations of ‘the States’ emerged as the fundamental question. What Gramsci (1999) concluded at the end is that ‘the States’ in the West were more complex and massive than ‘the States’ in the East. With the advent of bourgeois economic relations following the industrial revolution, as Gramsci (1999) argues, ‘civil society’ in the West became a very complex structure (p. 484) because ‘the States’ penetrated the heart of ‘civil society’ through ‘institutions’ that had been formed in the course of history. Intertwined with the State, Gramsci (1999, p. 484) describes the new shape of the State in the West; “the State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and

30 earthworks...” Gramsci (1999) called these institutions ‘hegemonic apparatuses,’ which hided behind ‘the State’, but however this concept “has not enjoyed the same popular reception as its genus.” (Thomas, 2009; 224) Thus, the Gramscian concept was explained by the support of Althusser's more elaborate notion of ‘Ideological State Apparatuses.’ The point is the same whether it is hegemonic apparatus or ideological state apparatus; through ‘ideology,’ the institutions in civil society help those who have control of the State to manufacture consent from subaltern groups, since it is only way to remain in exercising the power of the State.

4.2) HEGEMONY

Hegemony is the central Gramscian concept to which all other concepts are deeply linked, and so indeed, the concept finds its proper place in the theoretical structure within the formulations of ‘civil society’ and ‘political society.’ As explained above, Gramsci (1999) methodologically distinguishes civil society and political society. The former implies a terrain in which intellectual and moral leadership is formed through the institutions whose task are to organise, mobilise and educate the minds and hearts of people. Whereas ‘political society’ implies the State’s coercive apparatuses that discipline the people through the use of force. (Gramsci, 1999; 212) It is worth repeating that the distinction is methodological. Gramsci (1999) indicates a dialectical unity of civil society and political society, that is to say, they are practically one and the same. (Thomas, 2009; 137; Callinicos, 2009; 4; Burgio, 2007; 143) For this argument, Gramsci (1999) utilizes the concept of integral state to formulate both spheres as ‘co-extensive’ rather than two different regions. In the light of ‘integral state’, Gramsci (1999) goes beyond the Marxist understanding of ‘the State’ as the apparatus of ‘coercion’ of ruling group, but also of ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ and ‘hegemony’ in ‘civil society.’ (Sassoon, 1987; 119)

To look at concept of ‘hegemony’ more in depth, it is better to return back to Gramsci’s concept of ‘ideology.’ As previously mentioned, ‘ideology’ for Gramsci corresponds to ‘system of ideas and beliefs.’ Viewed in this way, civil society is the site of struggle for competing ‘ideologies,’ single of which or any combination

31 thereof would eventually prevail, and according to Gramsci (1999), this is the moment when hegemonic system is established. Thus, hegemony refers to the situation in which one particular ‘ideology’ is superimposed over ‘common sense’ or is infused into all other ideologies in civil society. Viewed in this way, it is very well to say that not all the ideologies in civil society are equally effective in organizing the popular consent and successful in constituting hegemony in civil society. That is to say, in any given hegemonic system, there is only one, single dominant ideology and others, which are called by Gramsci ‘subaltern,’ and the ideological struggle between these two antagonistic camps is never-ending. This is because hegemony is not a permanent state of affair for any ideology in the civil society; the consent has to be actively won and secured, but it may also be lost. From this point of view, the hegemonic group’s continuity to be ‘leading’ is highly dependent on its success of controlling the ideas and beliefs or of imposing its conception of the world to other subaltern groups. Therefore, the main objective of any hegemonic operation is to establish what Marcuse (1964) would later call as an one-dimensional world. To put it differently, hegemony is a view of the world that closes down all the avenues for the expression of alternative ideas, or as Gramsci (1999, p. 641) explains in a different approach, “produces a condition of moral and political passivity.”

Williams (1989, p.56) describes the concept of hegemony in this sense; “hegemony is then not only the articulate upper level of ideology nor are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as manipulation or indoctrination. It is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole living; our senses, our assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and world. It is a lived system of meanings and values…” Duncan Kennedy, the philosopher and the law professor from Harvard University, who led the foundation of the critical legal studies as a school of thought, describes in the same vein, that of regarding hegemony, Kennedy (1982, p. 33) puts down; “We all feel it. It’s an aspect of all of our lives that we ourselves are trapped within the systems of ideas that we feel are false, but can’t break out of.” From these points of views, the main theme in the concept of ‘hegemony’ is that men and women are not ruled only through ‘force’ but also through ‘ideology’. This is not to claim that ‘hegemony’ and ‘ideology’ become

32 synonymous. The three dimensions of hegemony as economic, political and intellectual can easily be identified in the ‘Prison Notebooks’, but however it can be observed, what comes out of all the discussions about ‘hegemony’ is the focus on ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ as the most important ingredient in the concept of ‘hegemony’. This can be observed in Gramsci’s political analysis, for example, according to Gramsci (1999), the liberal ideology had developed in the historical process powerful cultural and political weapons to protect itself from any of the attempt for revolutionary transformation. Furthermore, since its ideological activities had always been enough to keep the people in accordance, physical force against the ‘subordinate’ groups was to be approached only in particular situations.

On the other side, the ideological component of the concept of hegemony can also be identified in much of the secondary literature that employs the concept for their analysis, for example, the concept of hegemony was extended to the sphere of international relations to scrutinize in what ways the world order changed radically to a structure in which globalization came to constitute a new paradigm (Cox; 1987, Cox and Sinclair; 1996, Gill; 2008, Davidson; 2005). Moreover, Hall (1986) adopts the concept of ‘hegemony’ to cultural studies that he explains how race acts as an important social and cultural force after being politically and culturally constructed. As is previously mentioned, the feminist scholars such as Schultz (1975), Connell (1987, 1995) and Sasson (1987) was in dialogue with the concept of hegemony to investigate the construction of patriarchal domination in state and society and gendered forms of oppression. The theorists of critical pedagogy such as Freire (2000) and Aronowitz and Henry (2003) also approach to the concept of hegemony to elaborate their critical theories in education. This list can be stretched much longer but it would be unnecessary. As I read, scholars of hegemony agree that Gramsci’s hegemony is limited to be an analytical concept in social sciences, but however approaching to the concept serves to grasp how ideological leadership is formed, maintained and challenged in civil society. (Kendie, 2006; 92; Howson and Smith, 2008; 2, Watson, 1998; 29) Only with this understanding, as is generally agreed on, subaltern groups are able to elaborate “a critical and self-conscious conception of the

33 world and thus confronting the prevalent world, mechanically imposed by the external environment.” (Morera, 1990; 24)

The formulation of hegemony in this present research is similar to that in the general Gramscian scholarship. First and foremost, the concept of hegemony as a theoretical tool is used to identify the political power forces at play in civil society. To be more precise, the theory of hegemony in this instance discloses the relationship between populism as subaltern in opposition to dominant ideology. That’s to say, the ideological struggle in civil society between populism and dominant ideology falls in place thanks to the theory of hegemony. This is crucially important in terms of the first part of the main body of this study, during which it will be clear that populism emerged as counter-hegemonic social and political force, of course, in both the United States and Russia. In the second place, as previously delineated, hegemonic discourse makes things that are logical or fitting to tell ‘unsayable’, since hegemonic operations are always educational and sometimes manipulative, but either way the purpose is to architect one-dimensional thought and behaviour. From this point of view, hegemony as a critical theoretical theory is utilized to explain why the pejorative perceptivity of the concept of populism have been so internalized. In this sense, the theory of hegemony presents a model to analyse the pejoration of the concept of populism and the role of intellectuals in this manipulation. Needless to say, the existing literature supports this hegemonic analysis, in fact, among the oceans of scholars who argue in the same spirit, Postel (2007, p. 6) complains about the too-often glossed over fact at the heart of hegemonic discourse production and distribution about populism and reminds that ; “Our historical understanding of populism of what the Populist thought is largely drawn from what they protested.”

Last but not least, what is crucial of importance in terms of the theory of ‘hegemony’ is to make sense of ‘intellectuals’ in functioning as ‘organisers’ of ‘civil society’ and ‘educators’ of masses. Indeed, it is worth reminding here that the main aim of the present study is not to investigate on the ideological conflicts but the role of intellectuals in the pejoration of the concept of populism. In the following section, therefore, the concept of ‘intellectual’ will be delineated.

4.3) INTELLECTUAL

In the last two parts the concepts of ‘civil society’, ‘ideological state apparatus’ and ‘hegemony’ were mapped out. In this part, the human labor behind the practice of institutions in civil society and the connected hegemony will be further outlined. That’s to say, by bringing into discussion the ‘intellectuals’, this section investigates how ideological state apparatuses reach the capacity to educate people through the use of knowledge. Before that, however, it seems very useful to recap what has been said so far, and to do so in Gramsci’s own words;

“What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural ‘levels’: the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’, and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the State’. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of direct domination or command exercised through the State and ‘juridical’ government. The functions in question are precisely organisational and connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group’s ‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government.” (Gramsci, 1999; 145)

What should be noticed above is that Gramsci (1999) gives a precise meaning to ‘intellectuals’. However, the debates over the concept of ‘intellectuals’, its emergence as a social group and its relations to society at large and the State, have been the subject of many political scientists after Antonio Gramsci. Some skilfully elaborated and sophisticated his theorization of ‘intellectuals’ . For example, the concept of ‘specific intellectual’, which is developed by Michel Foucault, and Edward Said’s well-known theory of ‘intellectual’, have been widely recognized as more useful conceptualizations, especially concerning of the world order that we live in from the 1980s on. Thus, before engaging with Gramsci’s theorization, introducing how Foucault (1980) and Said (1994) view on intellectuals seems important to provide the readers with the essence of today’s intellectuals.

To begin with, according to Foucault (1980), there are two types of intellectuals. The figure of ‘universal intellectual’ appears as a denouncer of corruption, a defender of weak and a defier of oppressive authority. In Foucault’s thought, these type of intellectuals essentially fought against those who were in the service of the State or capital, but remained in the past, particularly in the 19th and early 20th century. On the other hand, there is a new group of ‘specific intellectuals’, which has gradually displaced the character of universal intellectual, as Foucault (1980, p. 127) strongly emphasizes, in consequence of the development of the contemporary modern society. Precisely, Foucault (1980) identifies a moment in the history in which ‘specific intellectual’ as a new social group emerged right after the Second World War. The physicists and atomic scientist Julius Robert Oppenheimer is the first, if not the best, example of a specific intellectual. First of all, Robert Oppenheimer was hounded by the political powers, but not because of his scientific discourse, but because his scientific expertise impinged upon not only the physics but the entire world (Foucault, 1980; 128). More importantly, and so indeed, the most important aspect of the example of Robert Oppenheimer is that the development of the techno-scientific network in the modern society opened all the roads for ‘intellectuals’ to be directly connected to the economic and political structures (Foucault, 1980; 131). As expected, this creates a fundamental problem such as reproduction of status quo. Since ‘specific intellectual’ is completely tied to ideological state apparatuses in civil society that produce ‘Regimes of Truths’ ministering to the hegemonic group, Foucault argues, it is not possible for a specific intellectual, who is embedded in specific work context in a specific institutions, to speak against the hegemonic discourse or philosophy. While this is already a big problem, placing a burden on contemporary society, Foucault (1980) reminds us that the figure of ‘specific intellectual’ can intervene in the public arena only on the issues that his or her specialized knowledge permits him or her to speak on with authority. They are neither free subjects nor writers of genius, according to Foucault, this restrains them to play the role of the universal intellectual, “the man of justice, the man of law, who counterposes to power, despotism and the abuses and arrogance of wealth the universality of justice and the equity of ideal law” (Foucault, 1980; 120).

Edward Said’s harsh tone on contemporary intellectual is not very different from what Foucault (1980) attached to the figure of specific intellectual. Drawing from Gramsci’s conceptualization of the intellectual, Said (1994) understands two categories of intellectual as those who are in a ‘state of exile’ and as those who are considered a new group of intellectuals that are technicians or engineers of opinions in the service of the ruling group. In Said’s thought, being in a state of exile, which corresponds to being detached from power, is what allows an intellectual to speak the truth to ‘power’. According to Said (1994), it is the first condition to be true intellectual, but yet not the only requirement. Another requirement for Said is a critical sense that is described by the theorist as “a sense of being unwilling to accept easy formulas, or ready-made cliches, or the smooth, ever so-accommodating confirmations of what the powerful or conventional have to say, and what they do” (Said, 1994; 23). As is understood through the lenses of Said (1994) ‘intellectual’ is “a marginal figure outside the comforts of privilege, power” (p. 59) and a critic of ideas, beliefs and knowledge. However, there is one more important characteristic that makes someone ‘intellectual’. According to Said (1994, p. 23), the intellectual is the one who “not just passively unwillingly, but actively willing to say in public.” To be more precise, intellectuals are delegates of movements and standpoints, and they intend to be accessible to a general public in order to express opinions. This is exactly how Said (1994, p. 11) describes it; “intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public.”

While these three characteristics are considered as essential to be an intellectual, like Foucault (1980), Said (1994) also pulls attention towards the creation of a new generation of intellectuals within the contemporary society. The rise of the mass media, Said (1994, p. 67) argues, “have broken down the closure of the traditional intelligentsia, together with its evaluative norms and its scale of values." Yet, Said’s critique is not about earning money from the media or academia (p. 69). Rather, it is about ‘specialization’ (p. 76), ‘professionalism’ (p. 80), and being ‘certified expert’ (p. 77), each of which for different reasons. For the moment, it is not really necessary

37 to discuss them in detail. However, the main argument must be presented here. According to Said (1994), the ruling ideology produces technicians for industry, scientists for technology, scholars for politics and economy, and while doing so, it educates them “in speaking the right language, citing the right authorities, holding down the right territory” (Said, 1994; 77) The same scholar further argues that the complex power relations within the institutions prevent this new group of intellectuals to be independent voice or to write autonomously (Said, 1994; 68, 69). There is no need to delve into the complex power relations within the institution here again. To come to the point, the contemporary intellectuals are always under pressure of hegemony, Said argues, they become more and more assimilated mouthpieces of the ruling ideology and arms of ideological oppression, since they are tied with or embedded within the institutions. They derive power and authority from them, and therefore, they cannot act independently. Precisely, they cannot escape of feeling that they “must please and not displease.” (Said, 1994; 119)

Now that, some of the critiques of Foucault (1980) and Said (1994) against the contemporary intellectuals have been mapped out, it is time to shift to the conceptualization of intellectuals in Gramsci’s thought. First of all, Gramsci (1999) shows uneasiness with the line of thought that intellectual activity is somehow beyond the ability of the ordinary man on the street. “All men are intellectuals”, Gramsci strongly emphasizes, “but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci, 1999; 140). What this implies is that only a group of individuals in society are afforded the opportunity to function as ‘intellectual’. To broaden this issue, for the Italian theorist Gramsci, “what defines people as intellectuals is not a particular set of mental skills, but the role they have in society. Intellectuals are not simply those who think, or think in a particular way, but those whose thoughts and pronouncements are considered to have a certain weight and authority” (Crehan, 2016; 27). The second detail that distinguishes Gramsci (1999) from Foucault (1980) and Said (1994) is that Gramsci (1999) does not examine intellectuals on a micro-level. His attention goes to the macro-level of institutions, classes or groups, social and political movements. Within this context, the replacement of the term ‘intellectual’ with the term ‘organizer’ would not make any difference in Gramsci’s formulation. For example,

38 trade-union spokesperson is not a thinker or writer but he or she is a performer of intellectual function, and therefore, according to Gramsci (1999), he or she must be counted as an intellectual. This point will be specified below.

In the same vein with Said (1994) and Foucault (1980), Gramsci (1999) divides ‘intellectuals’ into two groups. What Gramsci (1999) calls ‘traditional intellectual’ is from more of the society such as the members of clergy, doctors and teachers, who are not directly tied to the economic structure. Nevertheless, this does not come to mean that ‘traditional intellectual’ is on the side of the people in terms of ideological production and circulation. Gramsci (1999) demonstrates that they consciously or unconsciously contribute to the complex structures of the civil society in the service of ruling ideology. For Gramsci (1999, p. 138), one of the best examples of ‘traditional intellectuals’ is clergy. He argues that the members of clergy remained in the dominant position in the superstructure in many societies and for much of history. They shepherded the ‘subaltern’ groups through articulating the hierarchical relationship between feudal palace and peasants and others.

On the other side, there is what Gramsci (1999) calls ‘organic intellectuals’, and needless to say, this is the concept that this present dissertation is interested in. As said above, Gramsci (1999) perceives intellectual as both a producer and circulator of knowledge for certain groups in civil society. He suggests that every social group produces their own intellectual structures that “give it homogeneity and an awareness of its function, not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields” (Gramsci, 1999; 135). To set an example here, a trade-union activist can be seen as an ‘organic intellectual’ of the ‘working class’, whereas a scholar of think tank funded by corporate-businesses is a good prototype of ‘organic intellectual’ of the ‘ruling liberal class’. The crucial point here is the gap between the numbers of ‘organic intellectual’ that each group produces within itself. According to Gramsci (1999), the dominant group has more control over the economic, social and cultural power, and accordingly, their organic intellectuals outnumber the subaltern groups to the extent of thinking of a balance is only a laughing matter. The ruling group produces intellectuals as numerous as the stars on the sky, who are always connected to the

39 capital, bought and paid, and sealed off from the society in general, and accordingly, they perform a role that organizes the spontaneous consent and legitimates the interests of the ruling group.

As obvious as it sounds, by bringing the concept of ‘intellectual’ to the forefront of political and cultural life, Gramsci (1999) completes what remains implicit in his formulation of civil society. The formation of civil society is impossible without intellectuals because they are the organizers and educators of groups and classes. On the other hand, civil society takes its shape through the ideological struggles between the organic intellectuals of hegemonic and subaltern groups. The organic intellectuals of the hegemonic ideology organize the dominant discourse, by which they impose the opinions, values and beliefs, for example, they produce ideological discourses in the media texts, in the educational system or in the scientific domain. On the other side, the organic intellectuals of subaltern ideologies conduct counter-hegemonic struggles to change the popular discourse or to say the popular mentality. It is worth reminding that all ideological struggles take place in the realm of language precisely because it is the means by which humans communicate most. It is also safe to argue that the ground of ideological struggle can be the definition or meaning of concepts and words by the intellectuals.

Returning to the theory of intellectuals, especially the struggle between them, what is of crucial importance is that the organic intellectuals of subaltern groups does not necessarily attempt to determine the social norms and meanings ascribed by the dominant ideology. In another words, their struggles are not only against the hegemony. They also struggle against each other because the ultimate goal of any social group is always to make their meanings or views common sense. Without going into too much detail, a good example from recent history is given below in order to illustrate the struggle by the intellectuals. The concept of ‘green economy’ came into view in the 1970s and immediately after it became the core component of green ideology as the rival of economic theory of the hegemony. However, the green’s quest for the hegemony ended up in a situation in which many formerly green intellectual started to sing the praise of ‘eco-capitalism’, while some others invented a new

40 concept of ‘eco-socialism’ and became the partisans of this new movement. Of course, there are many reasons behind the failure of the organic intellectuals of green ideology, but on the other side it is also correct that the core theories of green economy have been successfully manipulated by the liberal intellectuals with the help of the ideological state apparatuses in the civil society (Unmüßig, Sachs and Fatheuer, 2012; 17, 19, 29; Babcock, 2013; 2; Neusteurer, 2016; 319; Tadzio and Passadakis, 2010; 559, 561; Rbpke, 2004; 302, Rbpke, 2005; 271). This included the semantic changes in the core meanings of the concept of ‘green economy’ (Neusteurer, 2016; 318) but also the promotions of other concepts such as the ‘environmental management’ or ‘sustainable growth’ (Unmüßig, Sachs and Thomas Fatheuer, 2017; 25) to get the consent of green intellectuals. Meanwhile, it did not take so long before the Marxist intellectuals to find material in the writing of Marx and Engels to invigorate their own ideology that promoted ‘eco-socialist’ world order. For example, Pepper (1993), Lowy (2005) and O’Connor (1998) promoted many ideas under the banner of eco-socialism that contradicted the first messages of the green ideology.

4.4) MANIPULATIVE DISCOURSES

It is clear by now that Gramsci (1999) suggests that ‘hegemony’ is a form of exercise of power, and it is organized in civil society through the ISAs that reinforce the hegemony by reproducing its ideology. As previously said, these units do not function by the touch of the magic wand, but the organic intellectuals of hegemonic group play a vital role in the operation of the hegemony. They generate ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ through educating and disciplining the entire social and cultural life in which everyday world and daily experiences are organized. However, the education and discipline of civil society takes myriad forms. To put it differently, there is a vast richness of ideological strategies for shaping minds and manufacturing consent. In order to avoid involvement in the matter beyond what is necessary for this dissertation, it is fruitful here to wither away from Gramsci (1999). The reason is not that he says nothing about manipulative discourse. In fact, he does. Yet still, the truth remains that his writings on the topic are limited in scope, and thus, it forces

41 researchers to find other sources that provide more systematic theory about manipulative discourse.

According to Van Dijk (1995, 2006a, 2006b), ideologies are produced and reproduced through the forms of text and talk of social actors as the group members. To put it differently, ideologies are always discursive, but not all discourses are ideological. Discourses function as an ideology only when they are mobilized to consolidate the system of social power. In fact, ideologies have social functions. Furthermore, they require some cognitive components that can account for the notions of ‘belief’. Thus, ideology is understood by Van Dijk (1995, 2006a, 2006b) in terms of certain views and beliefs. On the other hand, discourse is more related to speeches, phrases and statements. To set an example, one may talk about the Nazi ideology, but the Nazi-proclaimed a thousand-year Reich, which in fact lasted just over a decade, should be perceived as one of the ideological discourses of the Nazi ideology. Precisely, discourse is all kinds of semiotic activity, either it is spoken or written language, but discourse is also symbols and visual imaginary such as photography and video. When they are used to shape the social realities of the people, affect their knowledges, identities, consciousnesses of the world and their relationships between both membership group and other groups of people, then it is ideological discourse. Van Dijk (1995, 2006a, 2006b)

Now that readers have some sense of what discourse means, we pass on to the discussion about ‘manipulative discourse’. In his famous essay ‘Discourse and Manipulation’, Van Dijk (2006a) perceives the ‘manipulation’ as a form of social power abuse. Like Fairclough (1989, p. 6) who defines and describes discursive manipulation as “conscious use of language in a devious way to control the others”, Van Dijk (2006a, p. 363) thinks of any kind of manipulative discourse as “the social practices of dominant groups geared towards the reproduction of their power”. In Van Dijk’s thought, manipulation is different than persuasion. According to Van Dijk (2006a) persuasion is a legitimate act because the interlocutors are free to give their consent, whereas manipulation is mischievous act because this linguistic weapon is used by manipulators not to convince but to “exercise control over the people, usually

42 against their will or against their best interests” (Van Dijk, 2006a; p.360). The crucial point here is that manipulation is the story only the powerful tells to the weaker. What this means is that “social actors need to satisfy personal and social criteria that enable them to influence others in the first place” (Van Dijk, 2006a; 362). For example, professors in academia is able to manipulate scholarly discourse, teachers in schools may manipulate educational discourse, and journalists may manipulate media discourse.

Manipulative discourses are mobilized through a number of discursive structures and strategies (Van Dijk, 2006; Claudia, 1995; Rigotti, 2005; Saussure, 2005). For example, Blass (2005) lists a number of techniques used by manipulators to mislead the reader or listener such as distortion, minimization, exaggeration and emotional appeal. However, there are several others; fuzziness, simplification, unmotivated analogies, metaphors or vague terms, (Saussure; 2005), implication, proposition, lexicalitizion, irrelevant descriptions and abstract arguments (Van Dijk; 1995), and misuse of concepts (Herman and Chomsky; 1988). Without further analysing all these strategies in detail, as is no doubt unnecessary for the present dissertation, it is useful to focus attention on the manipulation models that haunt the concept of populism.

The first among them is conveying false information about the historical events while asserting it as truth, that’s to say, revisionism. What is mentioned here is of course not an evidence-driven revisionism, but an ideologically controlled historical rewriting. As said earlier, ‘revisionism’ is the experience of populism in the United States. In the 1950s and 1960s, populism increasingly became the subject of manipulative strategies of what Turner et al. (1975) calls ‘concealment’ and ‘distortion’. The ‘concealment’ is described as “relevant information kept from the other”, whereas “in distortion the actor gives information which misrepresents that which he believes to be accurate or true” (Turner et al, 1975; 70, 71). In the main chapter, a detailed treatment of this claim will be suggested, but still it seems useful to give an example here. Hofstadter (1955) depicted the populists not only as casual verbal anti-Semitists but he further demonstrated that they laid the foundation for homegrown tradition of the fascism in the U.S. For this argument, Hofstadter (1955) makes use of the populist politician

43 Mary Lease’s anti-Semitic language, but the same author somehow forgets to mention that the same kind of anti-semitic statements could be easily found in the discourses of the both democrat and republican politicians, adherents and journalists. Like many other American historians, Postel (2007) cites Hofstadter and complains about the ill-grounded conclusion that may emerge from a historical judgement without much consideration of the climate of opinion or shared set of value of the time. Postel (2007, p. 202) notes down; “the Populists, no less than the Democrats, represented white supremacy, as did the ‘lily-white’ Republicans.” While this is a good example, as will be clear in the main body of the work, many of the claims of Hofstadter (1955) on the American populist movement will be dismissed.

Still, it would be an injustice to the ‘end of ideology’ scholars to accuse them of deteriorating the concept of populism. One of the most salient finding from the investigation of the literature is another kind of discursive manipulation, source of which was the organic intellectuals of the Marxism, whose manipulative discourse must be classified under ‘misuse of concept’ (Herman and Chomsky; 1988, Allott; 2005) This manipulation strategy should be detailed carefully here, as will be obvious in the main body of this research, after the 1980s ‘misuse of concept’ plays a major role in the pejoration of populism. The main theme in the strategy of ‘misuse of concept’ is that the core meanings and theories of the misused concept do not arrive at hearer. However, this information can be accessed if one researches into the misused concept (Allott; 2005). This is because all the concept have ‘ineliminable’ theories (Freeden; 1996). It is impossible to delete them from the historical memory. In his inspiring dictionary about the pejorative words ‘Wicked Words’, Rawson (1989, p.5) delineates this metaphorically by suggesting the readers to think of words as bottle of wine, and then he puts down ; “The wine may change as it ages, and people may argue about whether it is really good or bad. No one doubts, however, that the bottle does contain something besides air, and it is even possible for most people to agree most of the time on the nature of what is inside.”

Chomsky and Herman (1988) and Chomsky (1989) provide their reader with a great number of examples of how the Western media misuses, uses loosely or

44 inconsistently some concepts such as ‘democracy’ to manufacture consent. However, they do not provide very detailed theoretical insights. Allott (2002, 2005) develops his theory from the works of Chomsky and propounds a more clear theoretical framework for understanding the inner workings of ‘misuse of concept’, while also suggesting several examples from the Western media. Since the concern of this study is not to develop a theoretical knowledge, there is no need to enter in the worlds of psychology or semantic that are important components of the theory. Instead, it is useful to illustrate how the manipulation by misuse of concept functions, through sharing a few different examples, each of which illustrates a different kind of strategy of ‘misuse of concept’. It is worth reminding that all the examples given below are exactly the same discursive manipulation strategies that haunt the concept of populism.

The first method of ‘misuse of concept’ involves in ‘fuzziness’, which refers to “whatever the speaker means by that” (Saussure, 2005; 116), and with this strategy of ‘misuse of concept’ the manipulator makes it impossible for the target to decode the real information that lies behind the discourse (Saussure, 2005; 128). Simply put, the information is always imprecise and uncertain. It goes without saying that ‘fuzzy use of concept’ by academics is in conflict with the scientific interest or discourse. Time will not be taken to discuss this further in detail. It is enough here to point out the example that Chomsky (1989) provides to his readers. ‘Democratizing the media’ is a daily bread in the Western political discourse, Chomsky (1989, p. 10) argues, it has no real meaning. It is only a happy word because democracy, as nobody would disagree, is a system of government. Even in this phrase democracy implies ideological meanings such as liberalization or freedom, it is still impossible for the media apparatuses to be free from power relations in the contemporary society.

Allot’s example is more critical. He points out the Bill Clinton’s line of speech; “Americans are targets of terrorism, in part, because we act to advance peace and democracy…” Allots (2005) argues that ‘peace and democracy’ here is not the ordinary understanding as it is a well-known fact that the U.S government starts wars and supports dictatorships in many parts of the world. Allot’s example proves that ‘fuzzy use of concept’ in a statement can create a fallacy or a myth. With that said, it

45 is important to point out the fact in both instances, the concepts do not provide any information. In Chomsky’s example, ‘democracy’ implies literally nothing but something good, like in Allot’s example ‘peace and democracy’. They are happy words that are used to appeal to emotions or trigger positive judgements. This phenomenon is named by Herman and Chomsky (1988) as ‘propaganda model’, meaning that intellectuals and politicians do not write and say what they mean more directly but instead use concept that have positive connotations. However, the opposite also happens, for example, ‘terrorism’ is often used to demonize political opponents as something sinister and devoid of human compassion. Concerning of the concept of populism, the second method of manipulation is frequently used. Indeed, it is safe to say that ‘fuzzy use of concept’ and ‘appealing emotions’ are the most common manipulations that haunt populism.

In a propaganda model, there is an another strategy that targets the concept of populism. In this instance, the negative connotations of the concept are selectively employed, while the essential meanings are pigeonholed. This sort of manipulative discourses fall under manipulation model of what Blass (2005) labels as ‘commission’, through which the manipulator makes the reader or hearer to acquire a belief that the former intends the latter accept. This kind of manipulation can be done either explicitly and implicitly. When the manipulation by ‘commission’ is done explicitly, the relevant information reaches at the reader or hearer in either ‘distorted’ forms or ‘half-truth’. It is never relevant information precisely because the real facts are hided. What the hearer and reader receive is only the beliefs and opinions of the manipulator (Blass, 2005; 173). When this is done implicitly, the manipulator again feeds the targets with distorted informations, but in this instance the ideas and beliefs of the manipulator is left implicit in the statements or in the general context. There are too many great examples of manipulation by ‘commission’ in the accounts of Chomsky, Allot and Blass, all of which are borrowed from the Western media, but instead of reporting them here, different examples from the Muslim world, particularly from the Egyptian political discourse, is presented below. By doing so, the only intention is not to repeat the same examples.

46 It is the story of the concept of secularism. Told and retold many times, it is the most important concept in the Muslim world, upon which the most vehement ideological struggle takes place to define the concept. Given the fame of the debates on the concept, there is little need to rehearse all the historical, social and political details here. It is adequate to point out the manipulations of the concept of secularism by ‘commission’ by Islamist intellectuals from both inside and outside of the academia. Before commencing with this, however, it is crucial to define what secularism literally means. Roughly speaking, the core meaning or theory of secularism that nobody would argue against is the separation of religion from the state (Wallach, 2007; 91; Liogier, 2009; 28, Bilgrami, 2011; 3) That' said, the term secularism is used as a pejorative in the Egyptian popular discourse to the extent that it is impossible for anyone to talk about secularism positively or for any politician to present himself or herself to be a secular spirit. If anyone does so, that person is without doubt outside of the scope of the honourable political practices and intellectual debates (Murphy, 2002; 161; Zakariyya, 2005; 24). It is because the manipulation by ‘commission’, not only in the media discourse, but even in the cases of the theological debates among the Muslim intellectuals. The core meanings of secularism never comes to the debates precisely because the concept is first and foremost defined as irreligion, and then it is represented as apostasy, atheism or paganism (Lavie, 2018; 148; Zakariyya, 2005; 21, 25, 27; Tamimi, 2011; 178).

If one checks the writings of Ghanouncci, the Tunisian Islamist politician and thinker, there are many types of discursive manipulation. However, it is useful here to point out one of them. He never says something about the origin of the concept (Tamimi, 2011; 107), but after equating it with the Christian religion, Ghanouncci defines it as ‘la diniyah’, which refers to the exclusion or the marginalization of religion from the society (Tamimi, 2011; 107). The implication here is implicit while his discourse seems to be so intellectual. Ghanouncci implies that secularism as a political idea or philosophy promotes to live without God (Allah), but it is very well-known fact that many religious people are secular for many different reasons. Another example is from the Egyptian İslamist writer Anwar Jundi. He defines ‘ilmāniyyah’, one of the equivalent word of secularism in the Arabic language, as ‘irreligious’ suggesting that

47 this translation from the Latin word secular. On the other hand, Zakariyya (2005, p. 27) points out that the word secular is not a Latin word but an English word derived from a Latin source. The same scholar further argues that ‘secular’ does not mean ‘irreligious’ but rather ‘temporal’. In the Muslim context, however, once he defines the concept as ‘irreligion’, Anwar Jundi continues to vulgarize the meanings of the concept, putting his signatures under many types of discursive manipulations, ranging from ‘fallacy’ to ‘simplification’ to ‘mythicization’ to ‘misuse of concept’, each of which has strong influence in the minds of ordinary Muslims.

Hundreds of examples can be given about the implicit manipulation of secularism by ‘misuse of concept’, but no more pages can be separated to this. Therefore, it is time to provide a few good examples of explicit manipulation. After the concept of secularism takes a form of a noun and it comes to mean ‘irreligion’, the concept becomes subject to more explicit manipulations. Indeed, though its course the concept of secularism has been given many precise conspiratorial role by the Muslim scholars. For example, it has been represented as a plot to destroy Islam, the sources of which varies according to the background of the manipulator. It is sometimes the communists who promote materialist worldviews (Ropke, 2015; 91). In another case, Muhammad Immara presents ‘secularism’ as the intellectual ‘troy horse’ of the Jewish empire (Abaza, 1999; 103). According to Muhammad Yahya, secularism is the invention of the evangelists whose aim is to replace Islam with Christianity in the word (Zakariyya, 2005; 30, 31). Citing from very famous contemporary Islamist thinker Anwar al-Jundi, Zakariyya (2005, p. 30) provides one of the best examples of explicit manipulation; “Secularism is an original Talmudic Jewish product, which has had a lasting effect on Western thought.”

Many other methods of discursive manipulation have also been exemplified. In the main body of the work, similar strategies of discursive manipulation will be witnessed but for this time they will haunt the concept of populism. However, these methods of discursive manipulations can be seen in the literature mostly after the 1990s. Prior to that, one kind of phenomenon haunted the concept of populism, and this phenomenon must be expounded here, as is of crucial importance in the ‘simplification’ of the

48 concept of populism in the writings of contemporary scholars. This phenomenon first revealed itself in the late 1970s with Ernesto Laclau’s ‘Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory’ (1978). Then, it continued to target the concept with Laclau’s and Mouffe’s ‘Hegemony and Socialist Strategy’ (1985). The story came to an end with Laclau’s well-cited book ‘On Populist Reason’ (2005). That’s said, it is time to name this phenomenon below.

First of all, this phenomenon cannot be easily perceived as discursive manipulation because it is well-known by everybody that Laclau used the concept of populism to develop his own theory for his political ends. That’s to say, there is no covert behaviour in his linguistic communication. On the other hand, Laclau intentionally simplifies the concept of populism by reducing it to the discourse of counter-hegemonic emancipation. The reason of this ‘simplification’ is completely ideological. From this point of view, Laclau’s treatment of the concept of populism can be seen as a ‘manipulation’. Whether it is manipulation or not, the phenomenon that can be found in his accounts must be detailed, since calling it simplification would be a simplification itself. This is simply because Laclau’s simplification of the concept contributed to the pejoration of populism as much as the historical revisionism of populism in the late 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, after the meanings of concept was reduced to a superficial form of anti-elitist discourse that appealed to the people, what has been witnessed in the literature is that, as Adamovsky (2015) describes it, “almost everything and everybody can be labeled ‘Populist’”, and then the same author points out very related fact that “it has become a sort of bana accusation in the political arena, simply aimed at associating adversaries with things that are considered corrupt, illegal, authoritarian, demagogic, vulgar or dangerous.”

Indeed, by defining populism as a discourse that appeals to ‘the people’ against the established structure of power, Laclau (2005) engineered the most radical type of conceptual change in the history of populism. It may be more apt to refer to this as ‘conceptual replacement’ rather than ‘conceptual change’ due to fact that there seems little to no continuity and similarity between what meanings has been ascribed to populism prior to Laclau. In another words, it is impossible to establish conceptual

49 continuity because Laclau’s concept of populism is narrower and looser than the concept it was derived from. Without further analysing the theory of Laclau in detail, the problem in his works must be specified. Once it becomes clear, the discursive manipulations of the scholars and journalists who derive the concept from Laclau are crystalized. At this point, one common line of thought that Saussure (2005, p. 122) verbalizes has to be emphasized; “the manipulators are not always aware that the propositions they convey do not comply with reality or with the relevant scale of values.” The reason why this detail has been shared is that one can observe many examples of unconscious manipulation in the literature. It is not the intention here to explain away some of the scholars’ errors or to condemn Laclau for the later scholars’ errors. Rather, the aim is to point out the genealogy of populism in scientific discourse that most of the scholars have borrowed the concept of populism from Laclau without any critical thinking. But, as has been explained in the theoretical section, it is always the responsibility of the intellectuals to be critical of the sources that they use for their analysis, even if it is the account of one of the most famous and popular scholars of the time like Ernesto Laclau.

We shall return to Laclau’s theory to reveal how he formed a new representation of the concept of populism that is based on his interpretation rather than on facts. First of all, Laclau’s concept of populism refers to ‘people’ that is the only legitimate ‘populus’. Roughly speaking, when a series of social demands cannot be satisfied by the hegemonic class in a given society, each of the unsatisfied demands enter into relationship and crystallize around common symbols. If these demands remain unsatisfied, they come together and form a popular demand. When this is the case, the leadership of charismatic personality employs rhetorical and emotional interpellations in the Althusserian sense to bring together different social demographics whose demands are unsatisfied by the establishment. The discursive construction of a singular unified ‘people’ as a collective actor to confront the existing regime appears at this stage. It is from this perspective, Laclau (2005, p. xi) puts down; “populism is, quite simply, a way of constructing the political.” In another page, Laclau (2005, p. 67) claims that “populism is the royal road to understanding something about the ontological constitution of the political as such.”

If one considers the first manifestation of populism as the names of the social movements in the U.S and Russia, it goes without saying that none of these statements represents the truths but Laclau’s own interpretation of the concept (Stavrakakis; 2002, 2014, 2017; Woodward; 2005; Boucher; 2008, Arditi; 2010; Villacanas and Jorge; 2010; Ballaci; 2017; Aslanidis; 2015) There is another important detail that must be underlined here. Laclau’s argumentation is based on the claim that populism divides the political scene into two camps, and accordingly, populism as an empty and floating signifier is a discourse. In this way, there are two core concepts that define ‘populism’, according to Laclau (2005), they are ‘people’ and ‘elite’, both of which are ‘empty signifiers’. From this point of view, anyone who declares to represent ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ becomes a ‘populist’. The problem here is too big and clear, if one notices the fact that the representation of ‘people’ is the core of any given democratic system. Stavrakakis (2002, p. 26) skilfully explains this; “the central place of a signifier like the people does not seem enough to justify talking about a populist discourse, although it does constitute a first important criterion. If the structural location of ‘the people’ was enough to define populism then the majority of political discourses in modernity would probably belong to the populist family.” As said earlier, there is no need to delve into the theory of Laclau’s theory, since much has already been written about it. For the sake of the present discussion, it is useful to emphasize three conclusions. First of all, Laclau’s theory of populism simplifies the concept. Secondly, most of scholars derive the concept from Laclau ‘taken as granted’. Finally, Laclau’s definition contribute to the pejoration of the populism by any means.

5) THE CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF POPULISM

51 5.1) THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF POPULISM

In his fascinating account of the Russian revolution, ‘The Roots of Revolution: A History of The Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia’, Venturi (1960) gives the name of the first Populist; “Herzen was the true founder of Populism.” While this information might be criticized for its injustice to Chernyshevsky, Lavrov or Mikhailovsky, the author was nearer to the truth than most later scholars until a very recent time. Whosoever the first populist matter little since what is of crucial importance in this information is that populism did not arise first in the U.S, but rather originated in Russia in the late 19th century. Moreover, the relation between the populist movement and the socialist revolution in Russia were so profound to the extent that it is impossible to write their stories on separate pages. (Venturi, 1960; Pipes, 1960; Perrie, 1976; Clarke; 1998) Accordingly, there is one important detail that must be stated here immediately. The first populists did not call out each other ‘populists’. The simple reason of this is the fact that they were not speaking English but the Russian language. Therefore, they called themselves ‘narodniks’. This is to mean to step in the semantic minefield. Fortunately, Venturi (1960) first in his magnum-opus, and then Pipes (1964) in his classical study ‘Narodnichestvo: A Semantic Inquiry’, leave no room for doubt on the linguistic correspondences between the terms ‘narodnik’ and ‘populist’. Among several evidences, for example, the noun ‘narod’ was used in Russia as equivalent of the German ‘Volk’, and its adjective form ‘narodnyi’ stood for ‘democratic’ or ‘popular’. (Pipes, 1960; 442, 443; Venturi, 1960; 19; Fedotov, 1942; 27; Leatherbarrow and Offord, 2010; 242) Indeed, there is today no dispute over the fact that the populist movements in Russia and the U.S were two contemporaneous historical episodes of what is called today ‘populism’.

Pipes (1964) points out to the year 1876 as the exact date when the concept of ‘narodnichestvo’ and ‘narodnik emerged onto stage (p. 444), and in 1878, both terms made their first appearance in the printed media. (Pipes, 1964; 446) Such fact is supported by several other historians; for example, Venturi (1960) emphasizes in his preface that the Russian populists had often been described as socialists, communists,

52 radicals or nihilists before the 1870s. In the same vein, Walicki (2015, p. 360) underlines that the same words started to be used by the particular political group from the inner circles of the Russian revolutionary movement. According to the same author, this political group either took part in or supported the movement of ‘going to the people’ in the 1870s. At the time of its appearance, therefore, ‘narodnichestvo’ referred to either the movement of ‘going to the people’ or the set of ideas and beliefs that were shared by ‘narodniks’. Nevertheless, the term ‘narodnichestvo’ later gained pejorative connotations due to the ideological struggle between the forces within the socialist revolutionary movement. To be more precise, the term ‘narodnichestvo’ was pejorated by the Marxist-Leninist intellectuals after the early 1890s. However, the new meanings that were ascribed to the concept, as Pipes (1964, p. 458) underscores, “had no historical justification and was rejected by those on whom it was pinned.”

This is not really an extraordinary phenomenon. The narodniks were the harshest critiques of Marxism that grew suddenly in the early 1890s. Correspondingly, many of the former populist intellectuals left their ranks and joined the Marxist-Leninist political force against the Tsar. (Lih, 2008; 172) For example, George Plekhanov, despite being one of the most famous narodniks in the 1870s, became the most influential critique of populism from the point of view of Marxism. He broke many of the intelligentsia away from the ‘narodnichestvo’ and brought them into the fold of the Marxism. (Baron; 1954) There is no need to enter into detail. The long and the short of it, the populist ideology was smashed by the further spread of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and since then, as obvious in Lenin’s own writings, the ‘narodnichestvo’ become the subject of the usual forms and formats of ideological manipulative discourses. (Venturi; 1960; Swedberg, 1979; Pipes, 1964) This is not to suggest the inaccurate phrase claiming that history is written by the winners. On the other hand, as is mentioned in detail in the part that delineates the theory of hegemony, those in power have an interest in maintaining their power and are in a privileged position to treat knowledge and shape mentalities in which others are not. This is the case here. After the ideological movement quickly lost ground to the Marxism, its name ‘narodnichestvo’ was demonized by the organic intellectuals of

53 Marxism-Leninism. As will be clear below, this is also the epilogue of the story told about the American populism.

Indeed, almost in the same breath, through in a different continent, a very authentic grassroot mobilization took off as a comprehensive protest movement against the economic, political and social traumas of the time. Throughout the 1880s, the American farmers constructed numerous large and small local organizations across the United States, as Postel (2007, p. 14) describes it, “the likes of which had never before seen in the country’s history.” These local organizations of the American farmers constituted the embryo of the populist movement, so indeed, they banded together later to establish the American People’s Party in 1892. (Postel, 2007; 94) This political party was also commonly known as the Populist Party, and its adherents presented themselves as ‘populists’. Houwen (2011) unveils this fact in his semantic investigation that the term made its first appearance in an article published on November 24th, 1892, in which the term ‘populist’ referred to the members of the People’s (Populist) Party. (Houwen, 2011; 10) Until the populists became a serious challenge to the nation’s two established political parties, both ‘populism’ and ‘populist’ had been used as precise labels. The former term was always used to characterize the populist movement and the latter referred to its adherents. To put it differently, they had neither positive nor negative connotations in popular discourse. Nevertheless, after they tended to join the election race, as Houwen (2011) unveils it, they lost their denotative meanings.

For example, the Populists and the Democrats agreed upon the Democrat William Jennings to nominate as the presidential candidate and the Populist Thomas Watson as the vice-presidential candidate for the presidential election of 1896. This was a political alliance between two parties against the Republican Party. When this togetherness was certain, the Populists were presented for the first time as ‘lam-like’ and ‘demagogue’ in the articles published by the magazine ‘The Nation’ (Houwen, 2011; 10,11). However, the Republicans were not alone to talk down the Populists. When it was necessary or seemed like so, the Democrats spared no pain to revile at the Populists. Citing from the journal ‘Algemeen Handelsblad’, Houwen (2011)

54 points out the pejorative connotations of ‘populism’, which shines through the speech given by the Democrat politician; “our presence here shows the nature of true democrats, opponents of the persons who favor populism and anarchism.” This is quite a mischievous and manipulative discourse since the concept of ‘populism’ is used here as an asymmetric counter-concept of ‘democracy’ (Houwen, 2011; 10), although the first demand in the populist discourse was direct democracy. Some of the common ideas and beliefs of both populist movements will be brought into open later. For now, it is more fruitful to encapsulate what have been said so far. In both historical instances, the terms ‘populist’ and ‘populism’ were used by the adherents of the movements to describe themselves or their ideologies. Meantime, the two terms were used by the intellectuals to denominate the partisans of the populist movements or their ideologies. Precisely, the concept of populism emerged onto stage in reference to the political movements in Russia and the U.S. Yet, these two counter-hegemonic movements proved short lives, and after that the concept was the target of semantic manipulations by its opponents.

5.1.1) THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO POPULISM

The short story that has been sketched above is an answer to the question of how the concept of populism emerged and faded away from the literature in a short span of time. However, there is another important matter that should be urged upon immediately, as for its crucial importance to clarify what populism really was. In his paper that presents the conceptual history of populism, Houwen (2011) limits the scope of ‘populism’ in relation to the dichotomy between the people and the elite, while writing in more detail as he gets to ‘narodnichestvo’, but not as completely as it could have been done. To put it simply, Houwen (2011) fails to notice that he writes about two important social and political movements in history. He overlooks the important detail that these movements had several ideological components within their own discourses or ideologies. In other words, his descriptions of ‘populism’ and ‘narodnichestvo’ does not fully explain the movements and their ideologies.

55 First of all, political concepts cannot be reduced to one, single meaning precisely because they are complex ideas (Freeden, 1996; 52). To put it differently, they contain several components in their own morphology, and from this point of view, it would be a mistake to attempt to express any political concept in one definitional utterance. Moreover, they have not only ‘ineliminable’ meanings, but also, they have many other additional meanings or theories (Freeden, 1996; 65). While this already holds true for each political concept, it is worth reminding here that populism emerged onto the stage as the names of two political and social movements. This is a crucial detail because of the fact that every political movement develop their own ideologies. Indeed, it is always an “ideology” developed by movements’ intellectuals that bind together and mobilize members for political action (Della Porta and Diani, 2006; Tarrow, 2011; Jasper, 2014). In view of this, it is a simplification, and thus a huge mistake, to equate populism with only one political concept since “ideologies are distinctive configurations of political concepts” (Freeden, 1996; 4). Concerning populism, this is one of the main critiques of this dissertation; the contemporary political scientists are not interested in analysing the historical events in detail, as will be clear in the following chapters, and, therefore, they approach to populism only in relation to democracy.

After all that have been said above, it is now time to present the conclusions from the analyses of ideological mappings of the original populist movements. However, it must be indicated here in advance that it is impossible to provide a comprehensive content for populist ideology in this dissertation. One must recognize the fact that such an analysis is itself a topic for a Ph.D. thesis that requires at least a hundred pages. What is suggested in the following paragraphs is then only some of the common ideological characteristics of the populist movements in Russia and the U.S. As to be made clear soon, the approach to populism here is in the same way Freeden (1996) approaches to ideologies as a ‘conceptual morphology’. Still, it is worth reminding again that the purpose here is not to write about populist ideology to its full extent. The main purpose of this dissertation is to reveal how populism has become a pejorative concept. Therefore, only the most precise concepts are presented, which are sufficient to demonstrate that populism has become a pejorative concept. Each of

56 these concepts has gradually been wiped away after the mid-1950s to the extent that what has been remaining from ‘populism’ after Laclau (1978) is only the ‘anti-elite’ discourse.

Before dwelling upon some of the common ideological components of populism, it is adequate to make the readers acquainted with the different socio-political contexts in the U.S and Russia that paved the way for the emergence of populism. In the first instance, the American populists formed “the most powerful third-party movement since the formation of the Republican Party prior to the Civil War” (Postel, 2007; 139). The crucial point that should be noticed in Postel’s statement is that the American populism rose to the surface in a democratic state where political elections were held. On the other hand, the Russian populism emerged as the radical movement of young, middle-class, urban intellectuals, who generated one among many opposition groups against the Russian Tsar and his regime. We had better make the difference clearer by putting it more explicitly: After the Crimean War (1853-1856) Tsar Alexander II abolished the serfdom in Russia (Barrow and Offord, 2010; 249). This is a huge difference that affected the movements’ organizational structures, internal communications experiences, construction of community identities as well as their strategies for achieving political goals. For example, if one ignores the Hofstadter’s revisionist portrait of the American populists as fascists, the fact is too obvious that the populists in the United States followed democratic principles. They were never involved in violent activities. On the contrary, throughout their struggles against the authority of the Russian Tsar, the Narodniks adapted a wide range of anarchists strategies and tactics. For example, the Russian populists grew in fame immediately with the assassination of Tsar Alexander II (Berlin, 1994; 210). Nonetheless, the Russian populists acted in the name of democracy, freeing people from the oppression of the Tsar, who was perceived as an obstacle to establishing a democratic system in Russia. To put it another way, what Brecht writes in Threepenny Opera describes the Russian populist act in the best way; “we would be so good instead of being so rude, if only the circumstances were not of this kind.” (Cited, in Zizek, 1994; 5).

57 As the main critique of the paper targets the simplification of populism to a dichotomy between the people and the elite, it is relevant to begin with the two common and distinctive ideological components of the populist movements. Anti-elitism and egalitarianism seem to be central to the populist thinking. It is generally accepted among the American historians that the birth and rise of populism in the U.S. was strongly linked to both economic instability, and price and income variability. To broaden the issue, the adherents of the American People’s Party complaint about the period’s socio-economic hardship that the farmers and the industrial workers were suffering in spite of the growing industrial economy and the increasing number of wealthy businessmen. All in all, they pointed out their empty wallet and argued that they had never felt any benefits of the economic growth in the U.S. While the economy was the most vexing problem, the nation’s two established parties were too mired in a state of apathy on the farmers’ economic problems (Kazin, 1995; 27). The Populists were convinced that the ‘captains of industry’ were protecting their interests by allying themselves with the political parties. It was a strong thought among the populists and a starting point of the populist skepticism towards the politicians. Indeed, this was such a strong conviction that the theme of corruption could even be discovered in the favorite populist songs like ‘The Hayseed’ (Reichelt, 1949; 19). Yet, the corrupting power of corporate business did not only penetrate the political parties, the Populists argued; writers and journalists were also under the control of the wealthy men (Kazin, 1995; Reichelt, 1949; Postel, 2007). In short, the populists felt that they were the victims of what they saw as a corruption of the ruling class and they demonized all the individuals and groups who were seen as the opponents of the farmers’ interests.

Indeed, the American populists developed most of their anti-elite discourse in reference to the corruption of the hegemonic class. However, a distinction has to be made at this point since the populist anti-elitism, as it will be soon obvious, shared no similarity with an “anti-intellectual” worldview. The populist revolt was against the ruling group in general because their policies run counter to the interests of the majority of the people; that is to say, the farmers and industrial workers. According to the populists, the politicians were not interested in solving the economic and social

58 problems of the people, but rather some of them allied themselves with the wealthy businessmen, and some were in ignorance, while some were in ideological zeal in pursuing the development of capitalist economy. The populist verbal attacks against the penmen were for the same reasons. According to the populists, some groups of ‘men of letters’, for example, some of the journalists were king’s ‘town-criers’, whose job was to announce what the king wanted the public to know. Precisely, the populists opposed the intellectuals whose political commentaries disagreed with the populist interests. They challenged their rivals in a political competition like all other political groups did.

Today’s scholars somehow suggest that the populists were either authoritarian or fascists on the grounds that they were anti-elitist. Yet, the distinction must be made since fascist ideology is a full rejection of egalitarianism or equality. On the other hand, Kazin (1995) investigates on the worldviews within the populist anti-elite discourse, and he concludes that the anti-elitism of the American populists implied either bringing the state and the civil society “back to its roots of egalitarian principle and the harmony of social classes” (Kazin, 1995; 29) or the construction of “a moral community of self-governing citizens, not a conflict of economic classes” (Kazin, 1995; 35). Indeed, the notions of egalitarianism and equality were the clearest components of the populist discourse (Pollack, 1962; Nugent, 1963; Robert, 1993; Goodwyn, 1976; Clanton, 1991; McMath, 1992; Postel, 2007; Keyworth, 2014). The populists’ egalitarian worldviews were of crucial importance because they clearly governed most of the anti-capitalist discourses of the American populism. For example, the populist movement primarily aimed, as Formisano (2008, p. 11) underlines, “the redistribution of political or economic power downward.”

Indeed, it is a well-known fact that the American populist demanded government ownership of the means of transportation such as railroads and of communication such as telegraph (Kazin, 1995; 39; Postel, 2007; 133). While these economic demands were entirely socialist, they were not in reference to Marxism. Rather, the egalitarian demands were based on the philosophy of ‘producerism’ with its principles derived from the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy. The notion of producerism

59 will be explained later in relation to some other concepts. It seems better to conclude what has been said so far. The populists did not employ the ‘anti-elitist’ discourses from a pragmatic point of view. They strongly believed in the possibility of egalitarian society (Bell, 1972; 65). They dreamt of a ‘classless’ American society and opposed to the capitalist economic theory. According to the populists, the capitalists had intentionally created a society with class division, which helped the ruling elite group to maintain their ‘privileged’ positions, through exploiting the lower classes culturally and economically.

It is now time to return to the populism in Russia to discover the similarities of the concepts of ‘anti-elitism’ and ‘egalitarianism’. The hatred of elitism is at the core of the Narodnik ideology. Exactly like its counterpart in the U.S., the Narodniks targeted against both the political society, including the Tsar, its army, secret police, and its landlords and also the Tsar’s myrmidons in the civil society, for example, the clergy and the penmen who wrote in service of the Russian Tsar. The anti-elitism of the Russian populists was not merely rhetoric at all. It was supported by the egalitarian doctrines. Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s change in his attitudes toward the elite explains the large parts of the psychological unity among the Narodniks. Walicki (1979, p. 520) describes it as follows: “... [Dostoyevski] he became more and more obsessed by the idea that he must turn his back completely on the system of values accepted by the comfortable elite to which he belonged.” In the same spirit, the Russian populists were frustrated by what they perceived as an unworthy alliance between the political, economic and intellectual elites, arguing that this unholy togetherness had long been reproducing the social order in which the ordinary people were oppressed and exploited. Therefore, the existing social system in Russia that promoted a hierarchy of talent, wealth and social status had to be destroyed.

As mentioned earlier, it was not a pragmatic demand or yearning. The Narodniks also dreamt of avoiding growth of a new privileged group after dethroning the Tsarist regime. Indeed, like the American populists, the Russian populists rejected a society with classes. They argued that the voluntarist elements in the nature of men and women were too loud and clear, therefore, it was possible to establish a new social

60 order based on economic equality accompanied by an equal level of education (Fedotov, 1942; 36; Venturi, 1960; 6; Tolz, 2010; 206). In other words, “the central populist goals were social justice and social equality” (Berlin, 1994; 211). That said, it is worth remembering that the populist egalitarian ideal should not be understood in the Marxist sense. The Russian populists despised the Marxist understanding of egalitarianism since it was perceived as another type of vulgar socialism on the ground that Marxism gave privilege to the proletariat (Berlin, 1994; 105). There were several ideas in Marxism that horrified the Populists. Yet, the main populist critique of Marxism will be returned and underlined later in the following paragraphs.

The readers have now an approximate idea about what ‘anti-elitism’ and ‘egalitarianism’ came to mean for the American and Russian populists. It is now time to suggest a few more concepts. They are progressivism, peasantism, solidarism, cooperation, and producerism. They have been named, however, there is a very important detail that must be emphasized. Some scholars used in their writings the concepts of peasantism, agrarianism and populism synonymously (Ionescu, 1969). Some other scholars, as Jager (2016, p.34) points out, stated that populism should have been defined “as a generic form of peasantism”. These two approaches to populism have no historical justification nor have been taken seriously by the scholars of populism. There is also another issue; equating populism with peasantism would be a simplification because peasantism with its own limited principles cannot be considered as a comprehensive ‘ideology’. One of the famous scholars of peasantism in Eastern Europe, Peselj (1954, p. 108) defines ‘peasantism’ as an “outlook of the peasantry on the complex of political and socio-economic issues in which the peasants are interested and for whose solutions they are fighting.”

Therefore, it is safe to suggest here that peasantism is a political concept with its own principles embedded in the morphology of populism. Indeed, this is not only a more universal approach to peasantism, but also more accurate, even in the context of Eastern Europe, the homeland of the peasantism (Trencsenyi et al, 2016; 143). Precisely, peasantism was one of the central concepts in the ideologies of both populist movements. As mentioned earlier, solidarity, producerism, and cooperation

61 were others. Lastly, each of these political concepts requires at least a few lengthy paragraphs if one aims to write about populist ideology to its full extent. As the objective here is to write about how populism has become a pejorative concept, only the most important theories of these concepts are defined in a few sentences. Of course, the differences rooted in the social context are also emphasized.

To begin with, many scholars before Postel (2007) stood out against the scholars who depicted the populist movement as a phenomenon set apart from the history of progressivism in the U.S. Among many others, Goodwyn (1976) discussed in detail that the populist movement engaged in a kind of cultural pioneering (p. 211) and attempted to define the nature of new man (p. 273). One of the leading students of the American populism, Clanton (1991, 1998) also perceives the populist movement as a progressive force. In the same spirit, Formisano (2008, p. 5) argues that the populists in U.S. were modernist and progressive. Nonetheless, it is definitely Postel (2007) who digs too many pits for the well-circulated reputation of the American populists as ‘ignorant peasants’ who disliked to learn new things and who imagined their utopias in the ‘past’ instead of the ‘future’. In fact, Postel (2007) arms himself with a great number of sources and materials and dedicates a whole chapter to prove his thesis suggesting the populist movement internalized the Enlightenment notions of progress (Postel, 2007; 4). What the author precisely means is that the populists looked upon the modern education, science, and technology as their most effective and powerful weapons in order to shape their future (p. 49). Hence, the populists campaigned for agricultural colleges and penetrated the universities to promote scientific farming. Moreover, the populists organized self-education within their own movement. The crucial detail in Postel’s chapter on education is the populist critique of the curriculum and the distrust to the educational institutions. Reichelt (1949, p. 14) underlines the same point when he strongly emphasizes that the populists demanded changes in the educational system to improve rural schools and fought for placing agricultural lessons in the curriculum. What all these reveal is that the populists were progressive in nature. However, their desired reforms came into collision with the hegemonic understanding of reform.

62 It is obvious by now that the American populists were the advocates of social reforms, but what ought to be noticed is that agriculture was always at the heart of the populist social and political reforms. Indeed, their political agenda placed reliance in a rural modernization on science-based education (Postel, 2007’ 47). Cannon (1968, p. 46) writes concisely: “the myth of agrarian life had a dynamic quality that served to underwrite changing institutions and ideas.” Without any doubt, Cannon’s statement is very loyal to the truth. The populist dedication to the ‘soil’, both materially and spiritually, is what unites all the scholars who have some words to say about the American populism. To broaden the issue, the American populists romanticized the agricultural commune and the peasantry, glorifying the agricultural communes as the core values of life and the peasantry as the masters of purity and honesty. To put it differently, the ‘heartland’ was not “a territory of the imagination” that was constructed discursively in order for “justification for the exclusion of the demonized” (Taggart, 2000; 95). On the contrary, the ‘heartland’ was rural countryside, farmland far from commercial areas and less-populated towns. Turner (1980) first proves this fact statistically by comparing where the Democratic and the Populist received their votes. He then argues that the supporters of the American Populist Party were isolated from the rest of the society, whether it be economically, socially or culturally. As the same scholar points out it, the populists might have not thought everything from the national perspective like today’s scholars do, but also from the local point of view.

Indeed, the populists aspired after a renovation, improvisation, and modernization of rural life. While it is the truth, they did not imagine self-sufficient villages like Gandhi talked about, but rather they sought for a new society in which agricultural towns, villages and hamlets were in cooperation in a federalist structure. In this utopian society, farmers were in commitment to the republican ideology of producerism (McMath; 1992). Here, cooperation referred to solidarity among self-governing local towns, which was perceived as an embryo for their future vision of a cooperative commonwealth (Postel; 2007). That is to say, the American populists considered the agricultural towns as the smallest units that were the cores of not only the social life but also the governance. They anticipated direct integrations of local units in both federalist and national governance. This populist thesis will be detailed in the

63 following paragraphs when the debate comes to the concept of direct democracy in the populist thought. What must be mentioned for now is that “farmers parlayed a communal ethos into cooperative efforts designed to maintain egalitarian societies” (Keyworth, 2014; 90).

The notions of social cooperation and solidarity, which gain their precise meaning within the notion of agricultural community, were other populist elements of the populist future (Cannon, 1968; 53). To fully understand what cooperation and solidarity constituted in the populist mind, one must know what the republican principles of producerism for the populists were. First and foremost, producerism referred to a decentralized economy of small producers exerting strong control over the labor market. According to the populists, any intermediary was unnecessary in the labor market because once the gap between the wealthy businessmen and the people were bridged, both individual and collective welfare would be greatly enhanced. The first condition for this to happen was to destroy the existing economic system and establish a new economic order in which, as the populists sloganized, “wealth belongs to him who creates it” (Orr, 2014; 131). Closely related, producerism for the populists implied a limitation to the power of large corporations. Indeed, this was one tenet of the populist argumentation against what they saw as capitalist domination and exploitation. The main problem was that one class in the society had enormous power, and in the nature of things, they wanted to maintain their privileged positions. Contrary to this, which was unfair because it reproduced ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, cooperation could be a cement of a new society, in which the people work in solidarity and cherish a society of fairness. According to the populists, this was a healthy society precisely because there would not be any economic pain over the millions of small American producers. It is needless to give further detail about the populist revolt against the capitalist economy. Still, one important detail should be reminded. Despite the promotion of cooperation between the peasants and industrial workers, the anti-capitalist worldviews of the populists rooted in the belief that agriculture was more important to the economy than any other sectors (Mooney, 1995; xxx; Kazin, 1995; 44).

64 When it comes to Russian populism, the contextual difference must be immediately emphasized before commencing with the same concepts above. Indeed, when populism rose to the surface in the U.S., the country had already started taking its route to the capitalist society, transforming from a rural nation to an urban society. Accordingly, the cultural, social and economic impacts of this radical transformation were so evident. On the other hand, it is impossible to talk about the same level of industrial transformation in Russia at that time. There was a less increase in large-scale machine industry and in the number of industrial urban workers. This is no doubt a huge difference between two nations and it explains many of the organizational and strategic differences of the Narodniks. On the other hand, this difference did not seem to influence the intellectual ideals of the Narodniks profoundly. One good explanation of this might be that the Russian populist movement was more of an intellectual movement. Although the Narodniks did not witness or experience industrial development in their own country, they were familiar with the industrial developments, for example, on the European continent.

The Russian populists opposed to the industrial revolution. More specifically, they suggested that “Russia could by-pass the capitalist stage of development and proceed through the artel and peasant commune directly to socialism” (Pipes, 1964; 441). Here, Pipes provides one of the best definitions of the main Narodnik ideological theme. What is of crucial importance in Pipes’ definition is, however, not only the antagonism against the capitalist development but also the strong emphasis on the Russian ‘artel’ or ‘mir’ and the peasant commune. Indeed, the scholars who have wandered around the gardens of the Narodnik movement always came to the conclusion that the Narodniks possessed the mystical adoration of the peasantry and village. As mentioned earlier, the Russian populists never considered themselves as the organic part of the ordinary Russian people. Instead, they perceived their lifestyles in the cities as the gems for the peasantry in the villages. Therefore, they were in debt to the people, and this debt must have been paid unconditionally. According to the populists, this has to be the first step in a revolution that would lay the foundation of democratic culture of populism.

65 The Russian populists felt guilty for two main reasons. First, they were apart from the ordinary people. Second, they had undeserved privileges. This psychological unity among the populists manifested itself in practice with the radical movement of ‘going to the people’ in the summer of 1874. The thousands of Russian populists wore the clothes of a typical Russian peasant and invaded Russia’s rural areas (Venturi, 1960; Eklof and Saburova; 2017). The objective was to establish an organic relation with the main body of Russia’s peasantry, and if successful, they could inject the elements of populist socialism, which would bring the Russian peasants to the recognition of their economic, social, and political positions. Therefore, they could help them to escape from the exploitation of the Tsarist regime. The important detail here is that the populist thesis behind the movement should not be perceived as an elitist attitude. The Russian populists did not intend to teach the socialist theories borrowed from the academic curriculum. This was entirely unnecessary. The populists were convinced that they had to learn from the people; the ordinary Russian peasants possessed the mystic knowledge and morals, the sources of which were, according to the Narodniks, soil and ordinary life (Venturi, 1960; 435). In this sense, the Russian peasants only needed to be freed of the ideological fetters systematically imposed upon them through the cultural organizations in the civil society.

This was the main thesis of the ‘going to the people’ movement in 1874. The Russian populists believed that the ordinary people had to demand a revolution by themselves. Any fundamental social change must have depended on the consent of the people, the populists argued, it would have been naive to think of a revolution led by a group of intellectuals. From this perspective, the populists reflected their focus on the economic and social dimensions of the power relations. They preferably aimed to take control of the means of production of economy and ideas rather than provoke a revolution. Thus, they could undermine the corrupt political system bit by bit. Many scholars of the Russian revolution pointed out this strategy and argued that the Russian populists belonged to the period’s anarchists groups. This argument is far from being true since the anarchists like Bakunin never considered the peasants as a rebellious force in the revolution. Furthermore, the welfare of the Russian peasantry was not high on the anarchist list of political priorities. The love for the peasants was

66 what distinguished the Russian populists from both the anarchists and the Marxists (Pipes, 1964; 322, 446, Venturi, 1960; 429).

Obviously, the Russian populists, like their counterparts in the U.S., ventured to sacrifice all the existing cultural values for the welfare of the peasantry, whom they thought of as the source of all the wisdom and moral values, and so indeed, they left the cities for the villages in pursuit of laying the foundations of social change in the rural areas. This is not to say that the Narodniks dismissed the industrial workers; as to be mentioned later, the Narodniks promoted solidarity of worker and peasants. Still, the core of the social change had to be peasants. Otherwise, it could have been neither a revolution in a democratic form nor a socialist one from an economic point of view. As obvious, the cores of all the Narodnik ideals was the peasantry. Accordingly, the Narodnik vision for the future was grounded on where the peasantry lived. However, they did not propose any backward design of village. There is no doubt about the progressive nature of the movement. The idea of progress constituted the core of populist thinking; as Lavrin (1962, p. 307) emphasizes it, the populist vision of the Russian village was, unlike the Slavophiles, in the future instead of the past. For example, Chernyshevsky, Herzen, and Mikhailovsky, whose political analysis inspired the populist movement, suggested that the Russian village could lead the foundation of true populism, only if it was cleansed from the existing patriarchal norms and capitalist notions and only it was developed through approach to the technology and the science (Walicki; 2015; 27, 294, Venturi, 1960; 149, 172). The Narodnik faith in progressivism stood in the same spirit with the American populists. The Narodniks saw the agricultural community as the smallest unit, the core, upon which the healthy nation and society could be built. However, they strongly believed the necessity of modernizing the traditional villages based on science and technology. The populist future could not be realized unless the villages were modernized and cleansed from the sectarian spirit.

Despite their strong belief in progressive reforms, which were perceived as prerequisite for the populist future based on villages, the Russian populists were excited to explore solidarity and cooperation as the essences of the traditional

67 villages. The communal control over woodland and pasture and the periodic redistribution of land were not fantasies. They were the realities of the Russian daily life in the agricultural communes. To this respect, once the reign of the evil aristocracy was dethroned, the exploitation and the inequality would automatically come to an end, the Russian populists suggested, the well-established communal forms of agriculture then could provide waters for a spontaneous and harmonious order, that was, a classless, egalitarian, free society. In this utopian populist society, small producers could have complete control over the means of economic production. That is to say, the peasants and the industrial workers could have control over their own labors. For the Narodniks, small producers were the embryos of the future populist society. It is needless to say that this producerist worldview stood vis-a-vis to the capitalist economic theory. For example, if producers had fully owned production of labor, the populists discussed, they would have produced goods that were necessary for human welfare instead of unnecessary luxury materials that never contribute to social well-being of the society. Apart from that, the small producers were the best guarantees of social and economic welfare, that is, the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers. This was because the existence of small producers would have prevented class division, according to the Narodniks, it was the capitalist production that divorced the small producers from their means of production and destroyed the harmony of solidarity and cooperation among the artisans and small producers.

To fully understand this producerist discourse, as expected, one must return to the core of the populist worldview. The populists argued that agricultural communities lived by the principle of solidarity and cooperation that prevented the appearance of any class division. This was a moral point of view for the Narodniks. Precisely, they identified a morally responsible ‘way of life’ in the agricultural communities. According to the populist opinion, the small producer was not an exploiter. They were aware of their moral duty and the value of peaceful coexistence precisely because it was solidarity and cooperation that the small producer depended on creating his or her own goods and wealth. This was a typical portrayal of the agricultural commune, while on the other hand there was the large-scale industry which was destructive for

68 people’s body and soul, and it was leading to “degradation and dehumanisation of all those who were caught in its tentacles” (Berlin, 1994; 212).

To sum up all for the populist movement in Russia, there was a precise critique of the capitalist economy and the Hegelian philosophy. The Narodniks considered the capitalist economy as a cut-throat competition that stood in stark contrast with the populist fantasies of the solidarity and the cooperation. Furthermore, the Narodniks argued that the industrial development was an evil power of elite’s unproductive economic thesis for its own sake, which was to destroy the small producers, who were the guarantee of collectivist human welfare. Apart from that, they saw the history as something moving along a spiral in the Hegelian fashion, reproducing itself, since the generations had always been repeating their parents. The cultural norms from the past were not only killing a natural man but also taking the project of preventing its rebirth. Thus, most of the cultural norms coming from the past had to be deleted from the minds. This opinion constituted the core of the progressive nature of the narodnik ideology. Finally, the Tsar had his finger in all these developments, therefore, he had to be gone. If successful, the agricultural commune could be the core of populist society, in which nobody would extract values from small producers and individuals could work out their own constitutions and structures of government.

After all that has been said, it is clear that both populist movements had a future vision of local self-government, the agricultural commune being at its core, and eventually, the populists added their own dreams, beliefs, emotions, and myths to their future fantasies. Until so far, some of the components of these worldviews have been delineated through some political concepts. On the other hand, it is impossible for any student of populism not to take any notice of the concept of direct democracy in the populist ideology. So indeed, its exclusion would immediately bring an end to discussion about populism. It is also safe to suggest that all other political concepts in the morphology of populist ideology take their meanings in reference to direct democracy. To put it in other way, what’s the concept of liberty to liberalism and the concept of equality to socialism, in the same sense, direct democracy is to populism. The contemporary debates over populism is also a good proof of this claim. Although

69 the term populism is used in a haphazard manner and is thrown around pejoratively to the extent that some even suggest to throw the term populism into the dustbin, but yet whoever uses the term populism cannot escape from a discussion about democracy. The importance of democracy has been emphasized, however, the intention here is not to fully explain what meanings or theories were ascribed to direct democracy. Again, only a few ideological ingredients of direct democracy are underscored in reference to peasantism and solidarity, together with a new concept of ‘decentralization’, which opens a new road that goes to a richer populist world.

Firstly, the American populist movement demanded direct democracy in which everyone from doorkeepers to president joins the decision-making process (Postel; 2007; 166). From a narrow national point of view, some scholars point out this demand of direct democracy and argue that the American populists wanted totalitarian political regime under one oppressor. From the larger framework, however, it becomes more evident that the demand for direct democracy should be considered in relation to the concept of decentralization. This is definitely not to suggest that the populists intended a direct democracy evolving out of villages in the sense that Weber (1978) discusses the possibilities of direct democracy in villages. Still, the truth remains that one of the themes in the populist demand for direct democracy was local and regional concerns, while the other concerned with the decision-making process on the national level (Hofstadter, 1955; 96). If one digs more into the first understanding of direct democracy, the populists argued that all decisions relevant to the community should have resulted from individuals who belong to that community. In this way, both the individuals and communities could be protected from special interests of ‘lions and foxes’ in a Machiavellian sense who ruled the nation. The federal states’ positions had to be strengthened, and in the meantime, the direct democratic elements had to be implemented in the federal agencies, institutions, and commissions. This component of populist direct democracy was described by Elizabeth Lease who promoted the concept of ‘producers democracy’. It referred to an ideal that the farmers and the industrial workers were ready to face the elite interests in the decision-making process in a mood of solidarity (Orr, 2014; 35). Since the decision-making power belonged to local, federal governments, the populists argued,

70 it was impossible for the elite group in the urban centers to decide for the local communities.

What has been said above was the first component of direct democracy ideal. However, it was also the first half of the bottom-up society building strategy. For the second part, a new structure of the State based on the business-like model was offered. This business-like model democracy, as Postel (2007, p. 142) describes it, “shaped by and in service to the commercial, managerial, and antiparty requirements of business politics.” The American populists aimed at reducing the state’s works to economic dimension, implying a situation in which the president corresponds to the CEO of the business company, but this description should not mislead the readers since the populist demanded a welfare state. The state’s responsibility was to defend the small producers but not to guide the civil society. Therefore, the state’s works had to be limited to the economic dimension. In short, the populist democratic state embraced producerism, which rooted in the labor theory of value, and its role was small, dealing only with the economic issues, and finally, it was directly against democracy of plutocracy (Link, 1970; 59, Kazin, 1995; 41). To broaden the latter, the antagonism between decentralized and centralized state was clear in the populist discourses. The former referred to the people’s democratic state, whereas the latter implied the state of a few, a state of plutocracy. However, this antagonism against the elite’s democracy did not come into being due to only economic concerns. The populist democratic ideal rooted in the strong faith in the capacity of the people. The populists argued that the wisdom of the majority could solve all the problems facing the society. It was the rejection of the idea that “government should be by the best men” (Ridge, 1973; 298).

These underpinnings are enough to demonstrate the irreconcilable ideological conflict between the Populist Party and the nation’s two other political parties. Apart from that, there is a very big difference between direct democracy theory of the original populists and what today’s scholars understand about populist direct democracy. To underline differences further, a few more points can be mentioned. First of all, even if it was not a monolith, the populist direct democracy thesis resulted in the most

71 powerful third-party movement after the creation of the Republican Party in the history of the U.S. (Postel, 2007; 139). In short, it was able to mobilize millions of people. Interestingly, it mobilized women more than any other movement or party of the time. Indeed, the women’s interest in the movement has to be mentioned for two reasons. First of all, a similar attitude can be easily explored in the populist movement in Russia, too. Accordingly, women’s mobilization may indicate the true colors of the populist democracy that was based on solidarity and equality (Orr, 2014; Postel; 2007). Citing from novelist Hamlin Garland, Postel (2007, p. 70) demonstrates that “no other movement in history had appealed to the women as much as Populist did.” Another important conclusion about populist direct democracy can be found in the work of Bowler and Donovan (2006) who investigate the history of direct democracy in the U.S. Their conclusion from their research is on the same page with Gain and Miller (2001) and Carter (2011), whose findings also turn the revisionist scholars in their graves, for the reason of, portrayal of the populist democracy as an authoritarian model. Bowler and Donovan (2006. p. 649) writes; “the adaption of the most directly democratic forms of the initiative in states where Populist forces were strongest in the 1890s.”

When it comes to the Russian populist movement, the first obvious feature is that they disliked the idea of a centralist government, even more than the American populists. They thought that any kind of central government was doomed to create bureaucracy and encourage the ruling group to use the state apparatuses for their own benefits. This opinion was coming from the fact that the Narodniks nurtured enmity towards Tsar’s monarchy. This hatred even manifested itself against the Marxist-Leninist centralism, which was perceived as the new source of repression in the name of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. All the political and social reforms, the populists argued, must have derived from a popular mandate. The rule of the people could not have been left to the desire of any minority, and, therefore, no special role could have been assigned to the industrial workers, especially when there was the group of peasantry.

72 Like the American populists, the Narodniks believed in a popular consent, but it is safe to argue that the American populists were more successful to develop a theory of democracy; even so, it also failed. However, there were many other Narodnik intellectuals who came very close to the American populists. Among many others, for example, Tkachev and Herzen suggested that the provincial landed nobility could be put out of action and replaced with the provincial councils that could represent the peasants and the workers (Venturi, 1960). To be more precise, the idea of decentralization referred to “adopting a loose, federal structure composed of self-governing, socialised units both of producers and of consumers” (Berlin, 1994; 213). Of course, the core of the Narodnik direct democracy was agricultural commune. It was open to all its members; in that, any of its members could take part of the decision-making process, the Narodniks pointed out, democratic mechanisms in small agriculture communes were closer to the core democratic principles (Karaomerlioglu, 1996).

Nevertheless, the Narodniks failed to build a democratic state theory or, more precisely failed to agree on any of democratic state theory (Venturi, 1960; 454). However, many of the ideological components of direct democracy were similar to their American counterparts. There is no need to repeat the antagonism against plutocracy and the strong populist faith in the ordinary people. It is enough to write that all these ideals can be observed in the Russian and American populist movements. What should be pointed out is the fact that almost all the scholars tend to close their eyes. The egalitarian ingredient of the Narodnik direct democratic discourse attracted numerous supporters among the women in Russia. According to the records, oceans of young women left behind their homes in the urban centers and settled in the rurals. Like the Russian peasants, they performed the same agricultural work and they lived in the same poor material condition. What attracted and mobilized all these women were no doubt the Narodnik discourses of equality and democracy. Indeed, it was a strong conviction among the Narodniks that men and women were equal comrades (Heitlinger, 1977; 82). The Narodniks paid a particular attention to the question of women. For example, Pyotr Lavrov, as Venturi (1960, p. 452) underlines, advises to Elpidin and Bakunin that “there were two, and only two

73 ideas which needed dealing with; the increase in workmen’s wages and the emancipation of women.” Interestingly, this particular attention to women question was a special character of the populism. Heitlinger (1977, p. 83) writes to the point: “the neo-narodniks' zeal for personal emancipation, and the resulting sexual democracy and high female participation within the revolutionary movement, is much less noticeable in the Marxist social democratic movement."

5.2) POPULISM IN INTERWAR PERIOD

It has been made clear above that the term populism first emerged like most of the other words were born, that’s to say, organically and with a precise meaning. In this case, it was the name of two social movements and their ideological expressions. Through comparing these two political movements in the U.S and Russia, the political concepts in the populist ideological morphology have also been discovered. However, it is worth reminding that the main aim was not to analyse the total ideological manifestation of populism in the U.S and Russia. Only some of the political concepts, each of which must be considered as a building block of the ideologies of the populist movements, have been suggested in order to identify political theories, ideas, beliefs, emotions, utopias, future fantasies and myths of populist ideology. With all these findings, it is going to be clear that the concept of populism has lost most of its meanings and theories in the course of the history.

It is now time to continue to follow Houwen’s precious work that offers the conceptual history of populism chronologically and elaborate the discussions that are considered necessary for the aim of the present paper. As is mentioned in the previous part, the populists movements, like all subaltern groups in civil society, underdeveloped and unorganized, both socially and politically, were first defeated, and in the nature of things, they suffered from the ideological domination of what they had fought against and lost. Since language is the most important terrain in which the ideological struggle takes place, not only their ideological manifestations were subjects of harsh criticism, but also their names started to be used in pejorative sense. However, after a while, the terms gradually disappeared from the political

74 discourse. Indeed, they were almost absent from the political lexicon until the mid-1950s (Houwen, 2011; 17). During the period, populism was entirely the subject of the historians who studied the historical populist movement in the United States and Russia.

Houwen (2011) indicates that some other terms were being used as equivalent to the concept of populism. However, the author makes a mistake by pointing out Gramsci’s uses of the concept of ‘popularism’. Therefore, this claim requires a discussion that will be provided below. On the other hand, Houwen (2011) unveils very interesting detail about the term ‘populism’ previously hidden in the literature. He reveals that in the late 1920s, “populism becomes a self-description of a group of French novelists” (Houwen, 2011; 17). This discovery needs to be saluted for its important contribution. It will be clear in the below that there are some similarities between the French populist literary movement and the historical populist movements in the U.S and Russia. Finally, Houwen (2011) blinks the fact that populism was one of the main tenets of the ideology of the Turkish revolution that changed the course of the history in the Muslim world. Therefore, in the below, after the discussion about Houwen’s claim that Gramsci’s concept of ‘popularism’ corresponds to ‘populism’ and after the elaboration of the populist literary movement in France, the final task of this section will be explaining of what kind of ideas populism constituted in the minds of the Turkish intellectuals.

To begin with the first discussion, Houwen (2011, p.17) suggests that Gramsci uses the concept of ‘popularism’ to describe the ideology of the Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano) in Italy. While it is correct, Houwen (2011) is wrong to argue that Gramsci refers to ‘populism’ when he uses the concept of ‘popularism’. In another saying, the two concepts does not correspond each other correctly. In the first place, it is impossible for the Italian theorist not to be acquainted with the terms ‘narodnik’ or ‘narodnichestvo’, considering the fact that Gramsci is often portrayed as the intellectual continuation of Vladimir Lenin (Thomas, 2009), who wrote too much about the ‘narodniks’. From this perspective it becomes impossible that the two term are used by Gramsci interchangeably precisely because Gramsci describes a political

75 party that did not adapt any of the original ‘narodnichestvo’ ideas or beliefs. For example, neither the Popular Party supported agrarian reform nor roused the peasants (Gramsci, 1999; 193). Further to that, the Popular Party was an extremely centralized Catholic political party whose founding members were aristocrats, bankers, big landowners, press magnates, etc (Farrell-Vinay, 2010). If one considers the social status of the founding members, the Narodniks, as explained in detail in the previous part, hated and fought against them in dream of egalitarian society. In another words, the Popular Party had almost no common feature with the populist movements. Apart from all these, the translators of ‘The Prison Notebooks’, Hoare and Smith (1999, p.733) also demonstrates that the Italian word ‘popolaresco’, which is a derivative form of ‘popularu’ (popular), does not really correspond to the term ‘populist’. According to the authors, the fitting term for the ‘narodnik’ is ‘populista’.

It is now time to set out to discover the populist literary movement in France. The information about the movement is mainly derived from Rosemary Chapman’s research on the proletarian literature between 1920 and 1939, and Elsabe Einhorn’s exceptionally exciting investigation on the populist movement. Einhorn (1952) based her study upon the information that she collected through interviews and correspondence with French populist authors. Therefore, she provides a detailed understanding about the worldviews of these self-described populist writers. This is of crucial importance because most of the names in the literature are labelled ‘populist’ by others than the those who call themselves as ‘populists’ on their own. Indeed, these writers considers themselves populists, and, as will be obvious, the political character of this literary movement is too explicit to the extent that Einhorn (1952) cannot escape from writing many pages about the political ideas and beliefs of the French populists. At this point, even though it is the beginning, it feels useful to present two conclusions from the research. First, the French populists writers belonged frankly to the left side of the political spectrum, but like the populists, they had some distinct idea-complexes that separated them from other left groups. Second, the French populist literary movement seems like a best imagining of cultural movement of populist ideology. The reason why this is suggested will become clear in the following paragraphs. To begin with, for the writers of the populist literary

76 movement, “populist” referred to “pertaining to, or inspired by the lives and surroundings of the common people” (Einhorn, 1952; 138).

The populist literary movement was founded by the two authors and critics, Andre Therive and Leon Lemonnier, whose insurrection was declaredly against romanticism, which according to Lemonnier, “forgets the real and seeks the ideal” (cited in, Einhorn, 1952; 34). To broaden the issue, the populist writers found romantic writings ideological and argued that romanticism was the literature of aristocracy. According to the populists writers, the romantic writers intentionally erased all the truths of daily experience from their novels to impose their own aristocratic social and political doctrines (Einhorn, 1952; 16). For example, the French populists criticized that the romantics intentionally described wordly upper classes. They tended to use unusual vocabulary and appealed to abnormal psychologies and sensations because, as the populist authors argued, the romantics had no purpose of moving the people toward truth. Conversely, the romantics’ writings were vehicles for preconceived ideas in service of the upper class (Einhorn, 1952; 20). Thereagainst, the French populist writers decided to throw out from their writings any inhuman presentations of the lower classes. They promoted writing realist novels bespeaking everyday experiences of the common man and woman. The French populist writers perceived realism as truthfulness; life on the page. However, they were not in the same mood of the American realist Mark Twain because, as Byrne (1999, p. 41) describes it, “his disappointment in humanity and society could lead nowhere philosophically but to despair.” Precisely, the populists believed in the ordinary people. They considered writing about the daily experiences of common people as a responsibility to raise spiritual and intellectual level of these ordinary people.

Indeed, although the populist writers rejected affiliation with any political ideology in their own manifestation, it was obvious that they were ideologically motivated. In parallel with the stormy political atmosphere of the 1930s, Einhorn (1952) points out the intellectual debates among the leftists intellegentia and distinguishes three different groups of writers that were interested in the ordinary people and the working-class. The first group was the communists, the second was the socialists, and

77 as Einhorn (1952, p. 98, 99) points out, “to the right of this second group there was still larger third group of writers... the populists belonged chiefly to this group.” The same author adds a few more important details about the political expressions of the French populist literary movement. First, they were in an awkward position within the left intelligentsia because they “overlapped to the left and right” (Einhorn, 1952; 99). Second, they had disagreements with the proletariat writers (Einhorn, 1952; 72). However, Chapman (1992, p. 60) describes the disputes between the two groups with the adjective ‘shallow’. She explains that the dispute was not about the content; truth it was because the terms ‘populist’ and ‘proletariat’ created some confusion in the minds of the public. Thus, the two groups criticized each other in the press in pursuit of distinguishing themselves from the other. For example, Poulaille, known as the leader of the time’s proletariat writers, argued that the proletariat literature must have been written only by the working-class writers, not by the well-educated populist writers who usually belonged to the upper classes (Chapman, 1962; 21). This says a lot about the mood and motivation among the populist writers that seems like the psychology of the narodnik intellectuals. As mentioned earlier, Dostoyevsky, who was himself from the upper class, suggested going to the people and writing truthful descriptions of the life of the people while criticizing the Russian aristocracy in every aspect. Dostoyevski saw the lifestyles of aristocracy as gems for the common people. The French populist writers were in the same spirit as Dostoyevsky.

There is one more characteristic of the populist literary movement that requires a statement. The populists writers pointed out the rising fascist movement in the 1930s and argued that it was the common danger for everybody. Therefore, they attempted to stimulate other authors, especially the those from the left side of the political spectrum, to come together in unification against the growing fascist threat. In an article published in the early 1930s, Einhorn (1952, p. 101) writes, “Lemonnier discussed the political differences that separated the three groups, but urged that they should be forgotten.” Nevertheless, the populist authors’ efforts for cooperation failed by the reason of the ideological differences and the competitions between the communist, socialist and populist groups. The proletariat writers also rejected to join the populists because they did not want to be assimilated by the middle and upper

78 class populists. Thus, the so-called shallow dispute between proletariat and populist authors and the many ideological differences between the leftist groups did not let the dreams of populists to be realized.

There is no doubt that some of the ideas and beliefs of the original populists were present in the discourses of the populist literary movement in France. However, as previously mentioned, not only in France but also in Turkey there were populist ideological elements in the 1920s and 1930s. To begin with, the concept of populism in Turkish context first emerged from the idea of ‘Halkcilik’ (Dumont, 1984; 31), and the concept was introduced and popularized as one of the six core principles of Kemalism, which implies the set of ideas and beliefs of the founder of the modern-secular Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal (Zürcher, 2004; Alaranta; 2014). ‘Halkcilik’ first appears in the proposal presented to the Turkish assembly ‘Halkcilik Programi’ (Program of Populism) on April 24, 1920 (Köker, 1990; 139). It is the conventional wisdom that Mustafa Kemal preferred to use the concept of populism instead of republicanism in order not to bring out his intention to establish democratic state against the Sultan’s regime (Köker, 1990; 139). This discussion will be returned to in the following paragraphs. It is noteworthy to mention that the concept of populism can be seen earlier in the writings of the Ottoman intelligentsia. Indeed, there were some populist magazines such as ‘Halka Doğru’ (Going to the People) that was first published during the First World War (Toprak, 1984; Zürcher, 2005; Dumont, 1984).

Nevertheless, the expression of populism in political discourse gained momentum only after the domination of Sultan’s religious establishment was extinguished and replaced by the democratic institutions. After that, during the Turkish revolution between 1923 and 1938, it is safe to argue that populism referred to the various idea-complexes of different periods. It must also be noted that the concept was not used as a rhetorical device to justify the Kemalist reforms. This thesis is often suggested by today’s Islamist intellectuals who are driven by their ideological emotions, like today’s staunch Kemalists who aspire to convince that the concept of populism had a single definition that must be accepted by everyone. Populism, like all

79 other concepts in the Kemalist ideology, constituted many theories in the Kemalist thought. One may make a very long list out of them but that would be unnecessary for the present discussion. From the first stage of the concept’s manifestation in the Turkish political context, it is easy to distinguish three precise meanings of populism which are the most important ones. These will be delineated below.

The concept of populism entered into the Turkish political literature from two different sources, one being the Western and the other being the Russian narodnism (Zürcher; 2005). Indeed, the theoretical supremacy of the Rousseauian philosophy of democracy is evident, and it is safe to say that it was the main property of populism. Simply, populism corresponded to the democratic government, whose legitimacy was created and sustained by the will of the people, referring to the classical formulation of ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’. This ideal can be found in many speeches of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk, 1961; 90; Karal, 1991; 61). In the historical and socio-cultural contexts, the concept’s connotation was that the Sultanate did not represent the people. On the contrary, the secular-modern Turkish state was the people’s state, that was, a state of the people. Therefore, the government and its members must always have kept in mind that they were not other than the people. They only represented the people and the people were the true masters. This meaning was never abandoned during the revolution period. In other words, the concepts of populism and democracy were always used interchangeably.

The second main property of populism was a classless society where there were no privileges. (Alaranta, 2014; 118; Zürcher, 2005; 21; Dumont, 1984; 32) For the Kemalists, the nation was made up of “solidarity, closely interdependent occupational groups” (Dumont, 1984; 37), and they demonstrated that “corporation had to be the basic cell of economic, social, and political organization” (Dumont, 1984; 32). This ideal was directly borrowed from narodnism, and in the minds of the Kemalist intelligentsia, it drew a picture of egalitarian Turkish society based on solidarity rather than class interests. The 1934 law that abolished the honorary Ottoman titles such as Efendi (Lord), Bey (Sir) or Pasa (Pasha) can be considered as one the best examples of the egalitarian notion of populism. It is also very well to say

80 that the equality notion of populism opened new doors to women. The women in Turkey gained equal rights to vote and run for the parliament before other European women did (White; 2003). Doubtless, these legislations and others such as the encouragement of women to unveil and enter to universities and professions are done in the name of populism (Aytemur, 2007; 63). Last but not least, the populist notions of egalitarianism and solidarity were engaged with producerism. The Kemalist intelligentsia desired to construct a social and economic structure that would be consisting of occupational groups rather than economic classes. The occupational groups would be working in solidarity with each other but not vice versa. To put it differently, they desired that Turkish economy was based on an economic structure that would not allow any economic group to exploit any other and not bring along any winners and losers (Dumont, 1984; 33; Alaranta, 2014; 118).

It is by no luck that the most important component of populism was superiority of the peasants. Like the American and Russian populisms, the pesantist component of populism was suggested as an alternative to capitalist urbanization and industrialization. In this sense, the peasantry was the origin of the Turkish nation, and accordingly, the villages were the places where the Turkish people’s culture could be found (Karaomerlioglu, 1999; 76). Thus, the villages in the periphery had to be modernized, and according to the Kemalist ruling class, this could be achieved only through solidarity. In the 1930s, there were many state-sponsored campaigns which resembled the narodnik movement of ‘going to the people’ in appearance. All these campaigns came with the discourse that the Kemalists intelligentsia were to bridge and repair the gap between the peasants and the urban intellectuals that had been previously separated economically, culturally and geographically by Ottoman Sultans (Karaomerlioglu, 1999; 71). However, as compared to the original populists who were persuaded that peasants were living with wiseness and dignity, the Kemalists intellectuals found the peasants uneducated and superstitious. Therefore, they had to be enlightened by the urban intellectuals who received Western education. In another words, the Turkish peasants were seen as objects of social engineering (Karaomeroglu; 1999; 72). As is well known, the betrayal to the solidarity and

81 egalitarian ideals of populism resulted with the failure of the Kemalists to achieve what they had taken as goals for villages.

5.3) THE BEGINNING OF THE PEJORATION (1955-1970)

The retelling of what happened in history is always an ongoing process. It is impossible to overlook this fact especially after the revisionist historians such as the Holocaust deniers that have written and published numerous essays and books. In the theoretical part, revisionism as a manipulation has already been explained, and, therefore, there is very little need to rehearse all the details here. It seems enough as a reminder that the ideologically-driven revisionism can be easily distinguished from the scientific historiography. The latter is recognized by large and heterogeneous group of historians, that’s to say, there is a general consensus among historians over the scientific writing of history. Whereas, the ideologically-driven historiography gains recognition only by a particular group of historians that are clearly identifiable. (Tucker; 2008; Marwick; 1989; Evans; 1999) In the case of populism, it is conventional wisdom that Richard Hofstadter (1955, 1962) had different objectives rather than telling of truths, for example, while writing the history of the populist movement in the U.S, he wanted to prove the hypothesis that he had already in his mind. By this, the implication is that Hofstadter (1955, 1962) researches into the the Populist Party, but instead of objectively discussing about the incident, he looks only at the empty side of the glass and masks the real features. This attempt was to the end of constructing self-serving arguments for his own political ends. (Pollack, 1962; Nuget, 1963; Canon, 1969; Goodwyn, 1971, 1976, 1978; Link, 1976; McMath, 1992; Miller, 1993; Clanton, 1991, 1998; Kazin, 1995; Postel, 2007; Orr, 2014)

Indeed, both Houwen (2011) and Stavrakis (2017) point out Hofstadter’s work and argue that the demonization of populism as a concept began in the ‘Age of Reform’ (1955), which won the Pulitzer Prize for the history in 1956; and another book of Hofstadter, ‘Anti-Intellectualism in American Life’ (1963), won the Pulitzer Prize in 1964, which was at this time not for the history but the non-fiction. (Coates; 2013) The intention is not to accuse of the Pulitzer Prize board of awarding the books that

82 are famous for their revisionist interpretations, but to reflect the social and political world that motivated some scholars to take a negative stance against populism. According to Houwen (2011,p. 18), the explanation of this is the elitist fears for the masses following after the popular support for the fascism and nazism in the 1930s. The author comes this conclusion after his analysis of the works of Edward Shils and Martin Lipset; “the term ‘populism’ has a strong pejorative connotation for Shils and Lipset” (Houwen, 2011; 20) This observation is loyal to truth, but the story of revisionism in the 1960s cannot be completed without naming Daniel Bell. His negative tendency against populism will not not be surprising, not only because Bell was the editor of ‘The New American Right’ (1964), but from a broader perspective, what becomes clear is that these names are included in the family of scholars that suggested the ‘end of ideology’ thesis (Jost; 2006). According to ‘end of ideology’ scholars, all the grand narratives or ideologies were over; either it came from right or left. This was because the Western intellectuals agreed upon the pluralistic ideal of the Welfare State (Chomsky; 1967; Jost; 2006; Brick; 2013). From this point of view, these ‘end of ideology’ scholars had several reasons to marginalize, not only populism, but all other ideologies.

Given its fame and the vast amount of literature written on the issue, it is needless to repeat how Hofstadter’s ‘Age of Reform’ (1955) interpreted the American populist movement. Miller (1993) writes down in plain English that “the best and most influential revisionist interpretation of Populism was Richard Hofstadter’s ‘Age of Reform’”, and then the same author summarizes the depiction of the populists in the book, “provincial, conspiracy-minded, and had a tendency toward scapegoatism that manifested itself as nativism, anti-Semitism, anti-intellectualism, and Anglophobia.” This extremely negative interpretation is the main tenet of the works of Edward Shills, Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell. Citing from Allcock (1971), Aslanidis (2015, p.7) writes; “Edward Shils who first recoined the term in 1954, in such a way as to portray populism as an ideological phenomenon which consists of a threat to the rule of law, a threat to democracy.” Two years later in his ‘The Torment of Secrecy’, Shils (1956) asserts that populism is ‘irrational protest ideology’ (Houwen, 2011; 18; Ellis, Lindgren and Southwell, 2016; 174), and after that he connotes it with the

83 totalitarian ideologies such as as Nazism, Bolshevism and McCarthyism. Houwen (2018, p. 18) notes; “The political concepts that Shils activates, constitute his political beliefs and preferred political action.” Shill’s mischievous suggestions about populism can also be found in the famous work of Martin Lipset, ‘Political Man’ (1960).

Lipset’s ‘Political Man’ (1960) is collection of essays that were previously published, except his final chapter ‘The End of Ideology’, which presents the common theme of the book, and Lipset makes no bones about his political stance. His view is clear in the chapter four, which is named by the author ‘Working-Class Authoritarianism’, as the name indicates, the lower classes of the society are more prone to authoritarian regimes. As is well known, according to Lipset, national wealthy, urbanization, industrialization and high level of education are prerequisite for a healthy democracy. Taken as a whole, his attempt to prove these arguments is not hard to take notice in this book. However, his failure is not even open to serious question. It is noteworthy to say that it is not a criticism but rather a self-criticism. The following passage is written by Lipset himself to a collection of conference papers on political sociology; “Year 1968 also marks a watershed in the history of the international discipline of political sociology; the violent eruption of new forces did not only challenge the models and theories of the fifties and sixties but also forced a revaluation of data-gathering techniques and analysis strategies.” (cited in, Bottomore, 2012; 19) The self-criticism must be saluted; however, it does not really withhold Lipset to continue manipulating the meaning of populism. Only two years after, Lipset and Rabb (1970) published ‘The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970’, in which the same negative attitude towards populism is very clear.

As Houwen (2011, p. 19) correctly observes, for Lipset (1960), the best example of the populist movement is not the Populist (People’s) Party but the McCarthyism. This is interesting precisely because Martin Lipset knows very well about the populist movement; indeed, he explains some of its tenets through referring to Hofstadter. Apart from that, he had already written some papers in which there are references to the farmer’s movement and the Populist Party. However, Lipset (1960, p. 167)

84 persists to manipulate the concept through the simplification and fallacy; “The Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s was a latter-day expression of provincial Populism...” No doubt, such a statement also falls under the method of manipulation by what Stavrakakis (2017, p. 2) suggests as ‘mythization’. Let’s put it in this way; Lipset (1960) maintains that the Ku Klux Klan is populist movement simply because it appealed to the farmers and small businessman against the elites in the urban centers. (p. 167) It is manipulation by simplification, because this particular worldview by itself could not determine who was populist. If so, the founding fathers of the U.S would be fascists, whereas they were not. It is manipulation by mythization owing to the fact that the Ku Klux Klan is most famous for its extralegal violence. On the other hand, the populist movement in the U.S was very peaceful and a democratic revolt, and so indeed, there is no evidence that the American populists were involved in violent action.

The manipulation by simplification and mythization are not the only strategies in Lipset’s book. The fuzzy use of concept is also evident. After his hazardous connotation of populism with the Ku Klux Klan, Lipset’s following example of populist is Huey Long, who was the governor of Louisiana. He won a seat in the senate in 1932, and his fame and success in the national scene led him to prepare himself to be the next president, but as is well known, he was assassinated in 1935. What’s curious here is that Huey Long is left of the political spectrum whose ‘Share Our Wealth’ political program is vehemently debated whether it influenced Roosevelt’s redistribute program of the Second New Deal or not. (Amenta, Dunleavy and Bernstein; 1994) Yet, Long is a controversial figure; that’s to say, he is a welfare hero to some and corrupt dictator to others. However, one thing is certain; that there is little common ground between Huey Long and the Ku Klux Klan. This is not to say only because one is politician and other is political movement, but it is also about what they presented. Indeed, Lipset (1960, p. 168) leaves all the discussions fuzzy, but with the help of another fuzzy concept of ‘extremism’, he draws together Huey Long and the Ku Klux Klan. One can argue that Long’s political and economic program can be seen as ‘extremist’ in the American context, and so indeed, he was accused of being communist that he always rejected. (Haas; 1991) But then, after

85 Long, Lipset’s new populist is Mccarthy, who is known as the ‘communist hunter’, and this leaves no room for a doubt that populism is used within the book as a vague concept. Yet, this does not contradict Houwen’s analysis that Lipset uses populism interchangeably with the fascism, nazism or any kind of totalitarian ideologies (Houwen, 2011; 20). There are just different types of discursive manipulations according to the discussion.

The marginalization of populism is very different in the works of Daniel Bell than other ‘end of ideology’ scholars. It is safe to say that the author ridicules the populist movement and depicts it as a danger to democracy, but Bell neither manipulates the concept of populism nor uses it as an asymmetric counter-concept of democracy. He is fair in his approach to populism in a sense that the concept is treated through logic brought by his own brand of philosophical analysis. By this the implication is that Bell maintains a liberal attitude, analysis the society in which he belonged to, and then makes his ideological discussions. Whether you agree with his political ideology or not, Bell presents the truths about the populist movement. Nevertheless, he openly declares that populist ideology is a danger to the essential characteristics of post-industrial society, which are highly promoted by Bell himself.

For example, in his famous essay ‘On Meritocracy and Equality’ (1972), Bell discusses and expands on equality. He examines Rousseau’s, Mill’s and Rawls’s argumentations about the concept, and at the end Bell (1972) comes to conclusion that their arguments are inadequate. According to Bell (1972), inequality is inevitable and acceptable. From this point of view, Bell (1972) rejects any call for equality of results. According to him, the question should be raised about equality of opportunity, and the model of meritocracy, by which he refers “high-scoring individuals, no matter where they are in the society, should be brought to the top in order to make the best use of their talents” (p. 31, 32), is considered as the best for the post-industrial society. According to Bell (1972), it is also compatible with equality of opportunity.

After all, Bell (1972) puts over and over that populism would be a challenge to the ideology of post-industrial society. The reason of this, as Bell (1972, p. 65)

86 demonstrates, populism desires of “wholesale egalitarianism, insists in the end on complete levelling.” Later on, Bell describes other populist ideal; “in the populist sociology, for example, the authority of doctors should be subject to the decisions of a community council.” (p. 65) Moreover, Bell (1972) argues that the populists wanted a complete, participatory democracy. Nevertheless, the author rejects populist ideals because he thinks the model of meritocracy is only way to produce a healthy society. At this point, it must be emphasized that Bell’s discussion of populism is not limited to this article. In ‘The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism’ (1976), another book of Daniel Bell, the uses of the term populism can be found. Yet again, one can not observe any kind of manipulation of the concept. To set an example here, Bell (1976, p. 38) writes that “there is now a general habit of ‘trusting the experts’ is debatable. In politics, there has been a notable populist reaction against the expert or technocrat.” No doubt, this is a populist characteristic; as mentioned on numerous occasions, the populists desired a complete balance in their minds and hearts. To conclude, it would be unjust to suggest that Bell manipulated the meanings of populism. Rather, among many other scholars, his definitions are most accurate. Still, Bell (1972, 1976) marginalizes the populism because of his own political ideology, and even his treatment is fair in a sense that the author appears as a philosophical writer, many scholars later point out his discussions and present them as the scientific truths.

5.3.1) A SPECTRE IS HAUNTING THE WORLD: POPULISM

After the concept was loaded with many pejorative connotations, especially in the early 1960s, there was a significant event, which marked a radical shift in the meaning of populism. In 1967, a conference held at the London School of Economics. After, a follow-up book was published from the conference notes :‘Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics’ (1969). As the editors put it, the main purpose of the book was to clarify the meaning of populism (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969; 5). Ten articles on populism written by ten different scholars contributed to the manifestation of the book. The author of the first chapter is Richard Hofstadter, the famous revisionist of American populism, notwithstanding the depressing winds that blow

87 over the rest of the book. In another words, almost all the articles fail to describe explicitly what they really mean by the concept of populism. Even worse, the book wrongly extends the understanding of populism from a view of ideology to a wider phenomenon of ‘the people’ centrism. Even so, all the later works about populism used this book as one of the main references. Some scholars and reviewers even defined the book as a ‘definite collection on populism’ (Taggart; 2000), ‘novel’ (Anselmi; 2017), ‘groundbreaking’ (Deiwiks; 2009), ‘classic’ (Albertazzi and Donnell; 2008), ‘seminal volume’ (Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo and Ostiguy; 2017), to name a few.

Before analysing the book, it is useful to remind one argument from the theoretical background, that is, the critique of contemporary intellectuals by Foucault and Said. After the World War II, as these two scholars strongly emphasize, there are more expertise and professionals instead of traditional intellectuals whose knowledge and spheres of interests were far-reaching. It is useful to highlight this critique because the book proves their argument by itself. To broaden the issue, almost all the books and essays written about ‘populism’ by political scientists make references to this particular book, presenting it as a classical book of populism that must be definitely read by students of populism, but curiously not often to the works written by historians who widely analyse populists movements. Indeed, the most important historians’ accounts are often absent from the reference lists of the works written by the political scientists, as it will be underscored later in the chapter. That’s said, the aim of analysing and calling attention to the flaws within the book, which are not few and minor, is to warn future students of populism not to take the easy way out by commencing their researches on populism by reading this book. It is better not to be blind to the knowledge on the nature of populism that has long been provided by the historians. Otherwise, what waits them is the danger that they intentionally or unintentionally may become manipulators. This is because this book is extremely confounding, although some authors may cling to write beautiful cantanas in the book. Of course, the second objective here is to point out the confusion on the meaning of populism within the book.

88 It is even obvious in the first sentence of the book; Ionescu and Gellner (1969, p. 1) paraphrase Marx’s and Engel’s opening line of ‘The Communist Manifesto’ (1848); “A Spectre is haunting the world - populism.” It is a bold move on the editors’ part but yet a confusing statement since the protests of 1968 that swept the globe were only one year after the conference and one year before the publication of the book. It is a conventional wisdom that it was not a ‘populist’ but a ‘socialist’ uprising. This exceedingly triggers doubt about the seriousness, but as is well-known to all scholars and students of populism, there are other details about both the conference and the book that cast doubt on their so-called positive contributions to understanding of populism. For example, the concept of ‘Cinderella Complex’, which tells the book’s own story, emerged first during the conference. The ‘Cinderella Complex’ was a genuine advice of a scholar to his colleagues at the conference; they should not be like the prince in the world-famous story who wanders around with a shoe and looks for a fitting feet. This metaphor advice was a genuine prescription for the scholars who were in a mood that “there exists a shoe - the word ‘populism’ - for which somewhere there must exist a foot” (Berlin; 1968). Another interesting phenomenon is pointed out in the conference notes of Berlin (1968). Jagger (2016, p.34) tells this story; two scholars offers that populism would be best defined as a form of peasantism, which, in turn, is rejected by the general agreement because some scholars could not find any populist movement in their regions that displayed rural focus.

Nevertheless, Berlin’s advice seems to be ignored. Indeed, some scholars show indications of the ‘cinderella complex’ in their articles within the book. For example, at the beginning of his article, Hennesy (1969) agrees on that one of the common populist beliefs were the rural values (p. 28). Then, the same author admits that the political movements that he discusses on turned their backs to the rurals (p. 28). What follows is an another confession that the Latin American scholars had created a semantic confusion on populism (p. 28, 29). After all, as if it was not him who made these statements on the notion of populism and the Latin America - Hennesy (1969) goes off the deep end. He adamantly goes on his arguments about ‘urban populism’ (p. 31). In the nature of things, Hennesy’s analysis ends up with some very comical conclusions on the nature of populism; 1) “populism does not challenge the status

89 quo” 2) “populism primarily concerned with urbanization” 3) “the most striking feature of the populist movements under discussion has been their neglect of the peasantry.” (Hennesy, 1969; 35) There are many more shortcomings in the essay, but for now it is enough to point out that, Hennesy (1969), like many Latin American scholars, understands populism in a pejorative sense. For example, populism is understood as organizational strategy to bring together diverse social groups in civil society but nothing else than this (Hennesy, 1969; 29). A detail discussion about the concept of populism in the Latin American scholarship will be returned to later. It is now time to give an example of how Hofstadter’s influence manifests itself within the articles of other scholars.

Ionescu (1969), one of the two editors of the book, focuses on populism in the Eastern Europe in a separate essay. In the first instance, Ionescu (1969) provides the reader that the ‘peasantism’ as a political movement emerged in the Eastern Europe following after the First World War. In the second part of the essay, Ionescu (1969) explains that the ideology of peasantism collapsed, and it was replaced with populism (p. 115), and it was populism that led the authoritarianism (p. 116). In the final section of the essay, ‘Fascist and Communist neo-populism’, she observes that the feeling of ‘hatred’ and the strategy of ‘revolution’ among the peasants were major identifiers of the populist parties (p. 117) After the fuzzy use of the concept as ‘neo-populism’, she equates neo-populism with both communism and fascism, as if they were not different ideologies. This was followed by the classical cliche about populism. The populism successfully demonized the Jewish people (p. 117), and according to her analysis, the Romanian Iron Guard was one of the best examples of populism in Eastern Europe (Ionescu, 1969; 117). This is no less mischievous suggestion than the description of the Ku Klux Klan as populist, and in psychology it is called as ‘chameleon effect’, a tendency to imitate another person’s attitude and style, and in this case of Ionescu, that of Hofstadter.

The last but not least, the attention is taken to the pejoratively entitled essay ‘A Syndrome, Not A Doctrine’. Many things can be mentioned about this essay, but after Hennesy’s and Ionescu’s essays, it seems enough to reveal a few flaws of this article

90 in order to prove how confusing the book is in general. It must be said in the first instance, calling any particular ideology syndrome, disorder, virus, etc, cannot be an attitude of objective analyser. On the other hand, Wiles (1969) writing is the most weaselling among all. Wiles (1969) introduces the history of populism with the Diggers and the Levellers in the 17th century, and then his list shockingly extends with the Chartists, the American Populist Party, the Narodniks in Russia, Gandhi in India, Haya la Torre in Peru, Lazaro Cardenas in Mexico, David Lloyd in Britain, Sinn Fein in Ireland, and several others, while he also states the names of populist intellectuals, for example, the urban populist Richard Hoggart and the painter Jean Francois Millet (Wiles, 1969; 174). After all the names, there is no wonder that Wiles (1969) cannot escape from presenting twenty four characteristics of populism. It is needless to say that the list draws a superficial picture of populism. On the one hand it is impossible for all these twenty four characteristics coexist in one, single case. On the other hand, one cannot understand what populism indicates in Wiles’ article that whether it is an ideology, a political movement, a type of regime, a governing style, a work of art, an economic model, a set of attitudes, a leader.

5.4) POPULISM From LATIN AMERICA TO EUROPE (1970s)

Beginning from the 1960s, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, populism as a concept became a daily bread in the Latin American scholarship (Juan; 2017). In its first wave of formulation, the concept was understood as a mode of political practice designed to mobilize support of different social and economic demographics in order to be popular in the electoral arena. More precisely, ‘populism’ was considered and defined in relation to the term ‘popular’ (Houwen, 2011; 23). In this way, populism referred to integrationist ‘strategy’ through which charismatic leaders casted themselves as ‘tribunes of people’ and seeked supports of marginalized and unorganized people against ‘political caste’, that’s to say, political establishment. The phenomenon was described as ‘populist mobilization’ (Weyland; 2001; Roberts; 2006, 2007; Jansen; 2011). When the concept was conceptualized in this sense, ‘populism’ often connoted ‘democratic’, implying the popular expression of the common people against the anti-popular elite (Houwen, 2011; 25). However, since it is a strategy or technique,

91 which is employed by charismatic leaders from the pragmatic point of view to create a broad consensus, populism also comes to mean opportunistic political strategy. Accordingly, it is assumed that populism lacks key values and political doctrines, and populist leaders are somehow demagogues. Apart from that, as the concept is reduced to simple distinction of ‘popular’ and anti-popular’, every articulation of popular demand or anyone who gets the majority of votes are labeled as populist. Juan Perón, Augusto Pinochet, Haya la Torre, Collor de Mello, Hugo Chávez, Getulio Vargas, Rafael Correa, Evo Morales, Alberto Fujimori, and Carlos Menem are all labeled as populists, although these names cannot even spend single peaceful night in the same house if they start talking about politics.

In its second wave of understanding, the concept of populism was defined in relation to market liberalism, Marxism and industrialization, while some other theories such as modernization and dependency theories were developed accordingly. There is little need to enter in details. What’s crucial of importance is that populism was loaded with too many ideological elements and used by scholars to criticize politicians whose policies they did not like. Sometimes, the concept was used to describe authoritarian military regimes that reduced to the role of the state in favor of the free market. In this way, populism became ‘neoliberal neopopulism’. In the meantime, populism was also defined in terms of a set of economic policies that supported redistribution, as Roberts (2000, p. 3, 4) points out, populism was entirely associated “with expansive fiscal policies and redistributive measures that were designed to enhance popular consumption, invariably at the cost of macroeconomic stability.” Either way, populism turned into a distorted concept without any significant conceptual legacy. As it was the case, the scholars additionally developed other theories to support their claims. Consequently, one of the greatest confusions on the meaning of populism occured in the Latin American scholarship. The following passage gives no doubt the best synopsis of the fate of the concept in the Latin American scholarship; “‘populist’ has been used as a term to describe almost any government… this has been reproduced in the academic context, sometimes making the analytical value of the concept worthless... such an essentialized understanding of populism should belong more to the domain of orientalism than that of political science.” (Grigera, 2017; 2)

Populism also was defined as rhetorical instrument or mode of political identification by some scholars (Panizza; 2005, 2013; Torre; 1998). From this group of scholars, Laclau presented the most elaborate theory. Very well aware of the problems about the conceptualization of populism in the Latin American scholarship, Laclau (1977) attempted to give positive connotations to the concept. As mentioned earlier, he suggested that populism was a discursive construction of ‘the people’ in popular-democratic interpellation against ‘the elite’ and its hegemony in civil society. It is unnecessary here to delineate Laclau’s theory yet again. It would be sufficient to remember the conclusion; Laclau’s simplification of the concept of populism for his complex ‘democracy’ theory pushed the meanings of the concept particularly far. Indeed, after this essay on populism within his book published in 1978, the concept immediately was incorporated by scholars as a vague and superficial political term. Very good proof of this claim will be given to the reader in the following paragraph. This will be also the story of how the concept of populism arrived to the European scholarship through the invention of the new concept of ‘authoritarian populism’ by Stuart Hill (1979)

In ‘The Great Moving Right Show’, Hall (1979) coined a new term ‘authoritarian populism’ to tell how Margaret Thatcher mobilized the popular votes of the wide range of political positions, including the middle and working class, for putting an end to the economic and political crises in the Britain. Hall (1985) strongly emphasizes in his reply to Jessop et al (1984), who criticized the use of ‘authoritarian populism’ for the analysis of ‘Thatcherism’, the concept simply implied the hegemonic construction of far-right ideology. Jessop et al. (1984, p. 36) correctly construes what populism denoted in the Hall’s works, that was, the Thatcherism was a populist for Hall (1979) because “it addresses a set of popular issues, stresses nationalist over sectional interests, redefines the nature of the British people, or simply appeals to the people.” Hall (1985, p. 118) admits in ‘Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to Jessop et al’, in which he defends himself about the criticisms of the concept of ‘authoritarian populism’, that the concept was the combination of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and Laclau’s discourse theory of populism. He indicates that the part and parcel of the

93 concept stood for ‘popular’. It is intriguing why Hall (1979) changed Poulantzas’ ‘authoritarian statism’ to ‘authoritarian populism’. Yet, this is not important for the sake of the present discussion. The important detail here is that the discourse theory of populism misguided Stuart Hall, if not the scholar wanted to take advantage of the concept’s incoherency. Whatever was the case, Jessop et al. (1984, p.33) was completely correct when he expostulated on Hall and predicted; “the precise meaning of authoritarian populism is unclear and that this can lead to incoherent or inconsistent explanations.” As will be soon obvious, Jessop et al. was completely right in his prediction of the consequences of ‘authoritarian populism’.

5.5) FROM BIG ‘P’ POPULISM TO SMALL ‘p’ POPULISM (1980-2007)

When the 1980s began, there were three popular theories of populism; ideology, strategy and discourse. For those who saw populism as an ideology, it was perceived as a fatal disease to the democracy as much as fascism or nazism. Those who theorized populism as strategy, it was a plot or manipulation of a political leader rather than an act of genuine concern. Finally, for the advocates of the discourse theory of populism, it was a political expression of mobilizing the masses through the battle cry of ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’. Nevertheless, it would be unjust not to mention Margaret Canovan’s valuable book ‘Populism’ (1981). Canovan (1981) gently reproved the the fuzzy uses of the concept. More importantly, she suggested evidence in order to convince others that populism was the manifestation of the two historical movements in the U.S and Russia. Canovan (1981) however lacked the proper tools to make a cognitive analysis. And for this reason, her project could not see a happy ending. Even so, Canovan came closer to the truth compared to all the other scholars when she demonstrated; “populism does not mean a threat to democracy, then but is ‘the true, radical idea of democracy itself.” (Canovan, 1981; 173)

Despite all the merits in Canovan’s book, its influence remained highly limited. The reason for this was partly because Canovan could not dig down deep enough and reach the ideologies of the populist movements and partly because it coincided with

94 the advent of postmodernism. In fact, the period after the late 1980s is described by several scholars as postmodern (Habermas; 1990; Jameson; 1991; Best and Kellner; 1991; Deleuze and Guattari; 2004). There is little need to enter in a detailed discussion about postmodernism here. On the other hand, one aspect of postmodernism is important for the general discussion here and therefore it must be mentioned. As its name explicitly indicates, the main theme in postmodernism is the total rejection of its predecessor, that’s to say, “contemporary history should be considered as a distinct period of time.” (Best and Kellner, 1991; 9) Precusely, the period following the late-1980s has been a witness to the extinguishment of modern history, that is, the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. What has prevailed is a new culture that is described by Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 37) as “a motley painting of everything that has ever been believed.” Jameson (1991) writes down in a more serious tone; “it is safest to grasp the concept of the postmodern as an attempt to think the present historically in an age that has forgotten how to think historically in the first place.” From all that has been said, it is safe to conclude that postmodernism is a radical assault on the historical knowledge. Indeed, this particular characteristic of postmodernism is what has been haunting the concept of populism from the 1980s onwards. Returning to Canovan’s book, it is also safe to claim that the book had little impact precisely because postmodernism aims to keep the old ideologies in their graves.

What has been said above can be easily observed in the books and essays published in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Not only were the first messages of the populists exploited, but also they were themselves forgotten. Many examples of this will be given below, however, it is good to begin with the best example in order to fully understand the phenomenon. After receiving more than half of the vote, Russia’s first president Boris Yeltsin was labeled as ‘populist’ both inside and outside of the academia. What’s really strange here is that “Yeltsin’s opponents do not use the Russian term narodnichestvo, but make use of a new Russian word populizm. The new term populizm has a different meaning than narodnichestvo” (Houwen; 2011; 29). The use of the term populism or populizm instead of the term narodnichestvo reveals what has been said about the postmodern era. The former concepts were used

95 polemically and they denoted nationalism, while the latter implied the historical narodnik movement. (Houwen; 2011; 29)

Another good example is how the concept came to be used to describe the dictatorial leaders of the Third World countries. To set an example here, Barry Rubin’s book title tells its own story; ‘Modern Dictators: Third World Coup Makers, Strongmen and Populist Tyrants’ (1987) What’s here is no less than rotating the meaning of populism by one hundred-eighty degree. Indeed, the first original meanings of the term populism were, according to the conventional wisdom, either democracy or people. Somehow, Rubin (1987) transforms the meaning of the term too radically that populism here comes to mean tyranism and it is used to describe all the totalitarian regimes. Indeed, the populists of Rubin are, for example, Khomeini’s Islamic fundamentalist Iran (p. 18), Louis Napoleon in France (p. 24), Wafd Party (p. 37) or Gamal Abdel Nasser (p. 40) in Egypt, Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Hafez al-Assad in Syria. (Rubin, 1987; 118)

How the concept came into the European literature has already been mentioned above. After its controversial use by Stuart Hall (1979) against Margaret Thatcher (Houwen, 2011; 27), several other politicians in Europe received incorrect diagnosis of populism. Jörg Haider who took over the Freedom Party of Austria in 1986 and Jean Le Pen who emerged in the electoral politics in France in the mid-1980s were the first populists of the old-continent. They were populist partly because they were right-wing radicals, right-wing extremists and neo-fascists, or partly because their political rhetoric appealed to the people. (Houwen; 2011; 27) Throughout the early 1990s, for the same reasons, other far-right politicians were included in the same list; Umberto Bossi of the Lega Nord in Italy, Carl Hagen of the Progress Party in Norway, Christoph Blocher of the Swiss People’s Party, Pia Kjaersgaard of the Danish People’s Party, and Filip Dewinter of the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, to name a few.

Another important shift in the meaning of populism coincided with the same period. In the early 1990s, Silvio Berlusconi won the elections with his newly-founded Forza Italia (Go Italy!). He was one of the leading media magnate in Italy and used his

96 television channels to speak directly to the people. Berlusconi articulated anti-party discourse and presented himself as the self-made man, who rose from the ordinary Italian middle-class family and became the wealthy man, but someone who “has not cut his ties with his social hinterland, and who, despite his enormous wealthy, tries to seem like the man in the street” (Tarchi, 2002; 133). After he won the election, as Tarchi (2002, p. 131) points out it, “Berlusconi was given a hostile press by opponents and labelled a populist with the deliberate intention of disqualifying him.” At this point, the concept of populism started to be used in the media to describe the charismatic politicians who used the new communication technologies to make direct contact with the people. Such a phenomenon was called ‘telepopulism’ (Houwen, 2011; 30). Meanwhile, the politicians who demonized and challenged the cartel party system were also described as populist (Meny and Surel, 2002; 19). At the same time, the concept was also used interchangeably with ‘demagogue’ (Mudde, 2002; 228).

To show further in detail how populism became pejorative concept in the political lexicon in the 1990s, it is noteworthy to mention the two books, since they were exceptional examples of how the discourse theory of populism was taken as a starting point for the pejoration of the concept. The first book of two is ‘Greece: 1981-89: The Populist Decade’ (1993), a collection of essays written by ten different Greek scholars and edited by Richard Clogg. As the name of the book already speaks of it, the book examines the period in which Andreas Papandreou, the leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), came to power in Greece as a champion of the anti-right wing forces culturally and of the middle and lower stratas of the society economically. After ruling the country in the 1980s, Papandreou finally came to the opposition at the national elections in 1989. The Greek leader opposed to the privileged elite, represented himself as the outsider of the traditional politics, in fact, ‘change’ was the popular PASOK slogan during the 1981 election campaign (Lyrintzis, 1993; 29). It is needless to enter in a detail discussion about whether the promise for change was kept or not. This is precisely because the exaggeration in the book is too evident to deny. Apart from hyperbolic exaggerations to persuade the readers of their ideas, there are also examples of manipulation by simplification, fuzzy use of concept, and implicit and explicit statements. In all the cases, however,

97 populism is the concept that is used to discredit Papandreou. In fact, the title ‘Greece: 1981-89: The Populist Decade’ does not imply a compliment for Papandreou (Houwen, 2011; 28).

The definition of populism in the book already involves in simplification. It is not specific set of ideas, but it is discourse in the Laclauian sense mobilized against the elite, and it presents social reality in oversimplified mode (Lyrintzis, 1993; 30, 34, 40). Furthermore, populism is a tool for discriminating others (Mavrogordatos, 1993; 50). However, in contrast with his own definition of populism as a mere rhetoric, Mavrogordatos (1993, p. 54) contradicts himself by mentioning populist perspectives, for example, the author argues about populist equality and egalitarianism. However, the author is not alone in giving up the claim that populism is only discourse, and this makes difficult to understand whether populism is strategy, discourse or ideology. That’s to say, its meaning is completely covert. While it is already a problem, it is curious that populism does not imply anything neutral. The PASOK is populist because of its ambiguity and oversimplified nature (Lyrintzis, 1993; 31). In another example, Papandreou is blamed for his populist strategy. According to Lyrintzis, Papandreou had promised almost everything before the elections. While keeping his promises, Papandreou’s populist strategy concluded with “a total failure”, and then the same author adds; “that the party's only contribution to politics was nothing but patronage, scandals, profiteering and the bankruptcy of the economy” (Lyrintzis, 1993; 36). Furthermore, there is the totalitarian connotation, as if Papandreou did not govern the country following after the military junta, however, Lyrintzis (1993, p. 31) writes it down without hesitation, “populist logic does not allow the autonomous expression of different views.”

The second book is Betz’s ‘Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe’ (1994), and this book requires a special attention, not only because the pejorative uses of the concept are clear, but also because it is one of the main reference of Mudde (2000, 2011, 2013, 2016, 2017) who is the inventor of the today’s most famous definition of ‘populism’ as ‘thin-centered ideology’. Indeed, Mudde (2000, p. 15) points out the classification of Betz, who claims that there are two different kinds of far-right

98 populism, the first of which is ‘neo-liberal’ or ‘libertarian’ populism, and the second type is ‘authoritarian’ or ‘national’ populism. Then, Mudde curiously writes that “Betz’ classification has both theoretical and empirical relevance” (Mudde, 2000; 16). What’s worse is that Betz (1994) does not even attempt to theorize populism, but rather he brings about a conceptual innovation through producing a superficial discourse on ‘far-right’ and ‘extremist’ populism. The readers come across the term ‘populism’ in almost all the pages of Betz’s book, but if one gives chase to a definition in dream of making sense of the meaning of ‘populism’, it just does not exist in the book. There are many examples of populism, from a conservative to a xenophobic and from a neoliberal to a fascist, but not a single, precise definition of populism. For only one time, Betz explains the concepts of ‘far-right’ and ‘populism’, but needless to say, they cannot lead anyone to sobering conclusions about what they mean. This is simply because the definitions of the concepts are distorted and deceptive. Betz categorizes parties as ‘far-right’ because of their rejections of individual and social equality, social integration of marginalized groups, and their appeal to xenophobia, racism or anti-semitism. Then, Betz (1994, p.4) writes the reason why he defines parties ‘populist’; “they are populist in their unscrupulous use and instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiment of anxiety and disenchantment and their appeal to the common man.”

It is now time to call attention to Mudde’s well-circulated definition. Mudde (2017, p. 6) defines populism as follows; “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” This definition of populism first appeared in his essay ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’ (2004). After that, it was used by oceans of scholars without any critical reflection. The purpose here is not to offer a detailed treatment of Mudde’s definition of populism. However, its contribution to the pejoration of populism is as much as Laclau’s discourse theory of populism, and therefore a few important details have to be underlined. Initially, Mudde (2004) observes the fuzziness and emptiness of the concept in the literature and attempts to fill it (p. 542). While doing so, Mudde does not seem interested in the history of

99 populism. In another saying, Mudde (2004) makes no historical research into the concept. This is an undeniable fact since one cannot find satisfactory references to either the American populist movement or the Russian populist movement. This is not only the case for ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’ (2004), but for all his essays, including his recent book written together with Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Populism: A Very Short Introduction’ (2017). For example, Hofstadter’s ‘The Age of Reform’ and Goodwyn’s ‘Democratic Promise’ are in the reference list. However, there is no reference to Goodwyn’s work, and as has already been mentioned on several occasions, Hofstadter’s book is famous for its revisionist historical writing of the American populist movement. On the other hand, like all other essays of Mudde, the book is very silent to the Russian populist movement.

Then it is curious that why exactly Mudde suggests that populism is an ideology. This is not to say that the author is wrong in his claim. Still, if not historical populist movements, the question needs to be answered that what Mudde investigates and concludes that populism is an ideology. This question is important because neither Houwen’s work that offers the conceptual history of populism nor the present research have found self-described populist politicians or movements after the historical events. On the other hand, Mudde detects too many populists, as many as the stars on the sky, and so indeed, Mudde (2004, p. 548) points out, the populist ideology occured in almost every decade, beginning from the late-1940s to today. Even the Greens of the 1970s were populists because they challenged the political establishment and ‘the elite’, “represented the people as a whole, often championing the common sense and decent values of ‘the people’ (Mudde, 2004; 548) However, the contemporary populism is mainly associated with the radical right (Mudde, 2004; 549). It is worth asserting that Cas Mudde is one of the leading scholars on right-wing parties in Europe (Abromeit, 2017; 180). George-Hans Betz is one of Mudde’s main references, indeed, Mudde continues to use the concept of ‘far-right populism’ that he borrows from Betz (1994). From this aspect, it is more clear how Mudde contributed to the pejoration of populism. In his essays, populism is always connoted with fascism, xenophobia, exclusionism, anti-semitism, etc.

100 Mudde criticizes the scholars who contributed to the process in which populism became a fuzzy concept and gives a precise meaning to the concept. However, he distorts the meanings with the half-truths and misleads the literature through pretending his definition based on scientific facts. Indeed, there is too much doubt about the validity of his definition of populism. Mudde (2004) defines populism according to three essential concepts; ‘the people’, ‘the elite’ and ‘the general will’. For him, it is an an ideology that separates the society two competing camps and demands general will of the people against the establishment. As is no doubt obvious, nothing is different than Laclau’s theory that perceives populism as a discourse, except that Mudde (2004) suggests that populism is an ideology, but then he changes this to a thin-centered ideology (Mudde and Kaltwasser; 2011). The change from ideology to thin-centered ideology is needless to discuss here, but by suggesting it as ideology, Mudde leaves almost everything fuzzy since he does not provide any other certain world-views of populist ideology except the antagonistic world-view against elitism and desire of general will of the people. These two certain worldviews are even vague because it is impossible to understand the competition between people and elite without any clear idea about the socio-cultural and economic context.

Since populism is defined in relation to only ‘people’, ‘elite’ and ‘general will of people’, then it becomes a set of ideals that can be used in different ways by different actors. From this point of view, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, p. 6) come up with the idea that populism is a thin-centred. However, the scientific validity of this propositions have to be considered seriously. First of all, Mudde never defines ‘ideology’ in his papers, although it is one of the concept in social science that has been vehemently debated by the intellectuals. His definition of ideology, as understood in his papers, is only ‘a set of ideas’. There is neither a theoretical discussion about ideology nor a systematic investigation of self-described populists. As mentioned earlier, Mudde later claims that populism is a thin-centred ideology, and the main reason for this claim, populism is usually combined with other ideologies. Needless to say, this argument is self-contained. Mudde firstly suggests an extremely minimal definition, and according to this definition, he detects too many populist leaders and movements. However, what Mudde really investigates are not

101 populists but they are associated closely with fascist, liberal, socialist or conservative ideologies. He finds the populist discourses in these ideologies. Therefore, Mudde claims that populism is a thin-centred ideology, but it is worth reminding that one cannot find any theoretical discussion.

The theory of ‘thin-centered ideology’ is first developed by Michael Freeden in his monumental work ‘Ideologies and Political Theory’ (1996). In this book, the author gives the example of the green ideology as a thin-centered ideology (p. 526). What’s crucially important here is that even it is thin-centered, according to Freeden (1996), the green ideology or who belongs to the green community can be easily identifiable. This is because green ideology has core concepts such as ‘relationship with human beings and nature’, ‘valued preservation’, ‘holism’ , ‘implementation of qualitative human lifestyle’ (p. 527), and has several adjacent concepts such as ‘biodiversity’ , ‘community’, ‘equality’, ‘self-sufficiency’, to name a few (Freeden, 1996; 529). Needless to say, all these concepts are explicitly explained by Freeden (1996). In his papers, Mudde is too silent to such an analysis. It is also worth reminding that Mudde (2004, 548) also combined populism and green ideology. In this scenario, populist ideology is then not only a thin-centered, but since it combined to another thin-centered ideology, it has to be extremely ‘thin-centered’ in Mudde’s sense. The historical researches, however, demonstrates that populism as an ideology led one of the largest third-party event in the United States and forced Lenin to write almost a fat book to criticize populist doctrines.

Many things can be written about the claim that populism is a thin-centered ideology, but it has to be the project of another essay, as its crucial of importance. The important thing that has to be emphasized is that Mudde’s definition, like Laclau’s theory, is extremely minimal, and even the both theories have some correct claims, it is noteworthy to mention that the manipulations might be done through ‘half-truths’. Finally, it should bear in mind that the very coiner of the concept of ‘thin-centered ideology’ has never mentioned populism as a thin-centered. In addition to this, in his recent essay on populism, Freeden (2017) gently lectures the contemporary scholars and future students of ‘populism’; “we should entertain considerable doubts about

102 the applicability of thin-centrism to populism.” At the very end, Freeden (2017) writes explicitly that ‘populism’ is dissimilar to thin-centered ideologies.

5.6) POPULISM FROM FINANCIAL CRISIS TO PRESENT

In the first years of the 2000s, as the previous section outlined, it was an impossible task, even for the prudent readers or listeners, to determine what populism precisely meant in the popular discourse. Raadt, Hollanders and Krouwel (2004, p.2) describes the phenomenon with a use of irony; “So we are left with the unsatisfactory situation that political observers seem to know exactly who to call populist but not what precisely constitutes populism.” The fuzzy use of the concept was one of the most common manipulation, however, some scholars defined it for their political ends, and some others employed the concept to demonize the political opponents. Still, there were also some others who used the term populism without any reason, if not because its implication of catastrophe made the academic paper or newspaper article easy-selling. After the economic crisis of 2007, however, the pejorative use of populism went in hand in hand with the rapid upsurge of the anti-establishment parties and movements.

Following after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the picture was one of the crises in the global politics. The demonstrations against the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999 were the opening salvo of the carnival of public demonstrations in the early 2000s. (Bucker; 2004) The financial crisis, however, marked a new era of political resistance to the project of globalization. While all these happening, it is worth reminding that the number of scholars had already been busy of seeking answers to the question of why the voter turnout had been dwindling. (Franklin; 2004, Merkel; 2014) In the light of the political and economic crisis, the scene has been increasingly engulfed by the %99 vs %1 narratives. Nearly everywhere in the world the number of anti-establishment politicians and movements has increased in the waiting rooms of power. They established clear presences in national parliaments and gained elected offices or, to put it differently, they entered the corridors of the states. The voting support of the traditional far-right parties tripled from the mid-1980s to the late-1990s

103 (Kaufmann, 2010; 195), and after the financial crisis, their supports have skyrocketed to the highest level until today.

On the other hand, there is also a new wave of the anti-establishment parties, ranging from the left side of the political spectrum such as the Podemos or the Syriza, to the right side such as the Law and Justice Party in Poland, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Golden Dawn in Greece and the Alternative for Germany. Furthermore, there are others that are not easy to be placed in the traditional right-left spectrum such as the Five Star Movement in Italy. The recent years have also witnessed several other political challenges such as the Sanders’ self-described socialist campaign for the Democratic Party nomination, Trump’s election as the new President of the United States, the British vote for the exit from the EU, Le Pen’s last minute miss of the French presidency, and the Occupy Movements from New York to Madrid. The reason for all these information about the socio-political context is the fact that “shifts in the meaning of the concept of ‘populism’ do, therefore, not only stem from the semantic variability of the concept, but also from political struggles to define the word.” (Houwen, 2011; 41) The best proof of this is the fact that all these ‘no government, no cry’ parties or movements have been painted with a single brush, which is the label of ‘populist’.

In this final part of the present dissertation, there is little need to rehearse all the details that have been already mentioned. The main project in a few paragraphs below is to present examples of how populism is used to label all the political leaders and movements and how the meanings of populism is filled according to ideological positions of the user of the concept. For example, all the names of the politicians and movements that have been mentioned above are represented to the readers as populists by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017). As if all these names are not enough to confuse the reader, the Danish People’s Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, the Tea Party movement, Richard Nixon, Hugo Chavez, Juan Peron, Carlos Menem, Evo Morales and Sarah Palin, the ex-governor of Alaska, Joseph Estrada in the Philippine and Roh Moo-hyun in South Korea, and many others, are suggested as populist leaders. After all, as a doubt about the value of populism as conceptual analytical tool,

104 even the definition of the scholars is accepted. Still, the question remains what distinguishes all these leaders and movements from others and what unites them to put in the same family.

In another example, Jakobson (2012) in her populist investigation in the Baltic countries writes that the Labour Party, the Order and Justice Party and the Liberal Movement are labelled as the populists (p. 22), and after making an analysis of “online populism in the Baltic states’ (p. 77), she adds many more political parties such as the Lithuanian Centre Party, the Young Lithuania, the Civic Democratic Party, the Political Party ‘Front’ noting that populist discourse could also be found in others according to the same author. (p. 41) What this precisely means is that almost all the political parties in Lithuania are classified as populists.

To reveal the use of the term populism as denunciatory tool, there are some good examples. In her essay ‘The Rise of Populist Parties in Central Europe: Big Government, Corruption, and the Threat to Liberalism’, Tupy (2006) writes about populism in the Central Europe. Although the author herself admits that Robert Fico is a self-described socialist (p. 5), it does not prevent the use of the concept of populism to position him as a danger to liberalism. Tupy (2006) might be right or wrong in his criticisms, but what concerns us here is the use of populism. The author does not even intend to explain what he means by saying populism. The main aim of the author to use the term populism is obviously appealing the emotions, since the concept is positioned as an asymmetric counter-concept of liberalism.

Another interesting example of appealing the emotions through the use of the term populism is ‘Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duerte’s Rise to Power’. The title is already speaking of the content but still a few things can be underlined. Curato’s references to the concept of populism are Shills, Lipset, Laclau and Mudde, from whom the scholar comes to conclusion that populism means appealing to ‘the people’ against ‘the elites’, and it is ‘irrational protest ideology’, ranging from fascism to racism and nationalism. (p. 94) According to Curato (2016), Duterte Harry is ‘the Trump of the East’ (p. 92), that’s to say, he is a populist. What’s

105 interesting is that Curato (2006) offers that promoting short-term solutions to complex problems at the expenses of human rights is one of the criteria of populism. Even worse, as the section title already indicates, ‘Who Laughs at a Rape Joke? The Populist Appeal’, laughing at a rape joke is also a criterion. (Curota, 2016; 93) Among the uses of the concept for emotional appeals, it is impossible not to mention two more papers, as their titles shine as manipulations by themselves; ‘Ict for Dictators: How Global Populists Leverage Internet for Political Gain’ (2016) and ‘Help! The Populists Are Coming: Appeal Is to the People in Contemporary Swedish Politics’ (2013)

The anti-populist discourse is strikingly similar in the media. Bale et al. (2011) was among the first who investigated the use of the term populism in detail, particularly in the printed media of the UK, and not surprisingly, Bale et al. (2011) found out that “populism is used for a wide range of seemingly unrelated actors across the world, that it is hard to find any logic in the set of policies that are associated with the term, and that populism is, more or less explicitly, regularly used in a pejorative way.” A similar study to Bale et al. (2011) was conducted by Herkman (2016) for the Nordic Press. The finding supports the conclusion that there is a hostile environment against ‘populism’; “when the term populism was used, its meanings were mainly constructed within negative framings.” (Herkman, 2016; 117) Finally, Schrauwen (2017) uses a linguistic lens to analyse the use of the term populism in the Dutch media, and the conclusion of this research is very consistent and complementary with the previous studies; “the last conclusion by Bale, van Kessel and Taggart is that populism is often used pejoratively. The conclusion is applicable to the Dutch case, but I found that the pejorative use if even more frequent here. This is most likely related to the switch from both left-and right-wing politics to mainly right-wing populism.” (Schrauwen, 2017; 24)

Indeed, in the media of the postmodern world, the term populism is only a linguistic weapon in the arsenals of the manipulators. Before ending this research paper, it would not be fair unless a few examples are offered here. The headline of the Financial Times reveals the general attitude toward populism; ‘Fascism revisited? A

106 warning about the rise of populism’. (Mazower, 2018) There are three photos in the article that support the emotional appeal, since it is not possible to understand the reason why the term populism is used in this paper, while fascism would be just enough. The first photo is from Athens in which the anger of the supporters of Golden Dawn is framed. In the second photo, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini meet in Florence. Finally, Juan Peron, the Argentinian dictator, gives a speech in Buenos Aires. In another article published by The Conversation, namely ‘Why is populism popular? A psychologist explain’ (Lewandowsky, 2016), the author has more of words that appeals to emotions rather than a genuine explanation, for example, populism is described as a ‘natural disaster’. Furthermore, according to the author, “populism and hatred do not erupt, they are stoked.” Lastly, the Peruvian Novel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa writes in his column in the El Pais that ‘communism’ is not the principal enemy of the ‘liberal democracy’ anymore but ‘populism’. (Llosa, 2017)

6) CONCLUSION

This dissertation outlines a conceptual history of populism, in particular the changes in the meaning of populism in the scholarly discourse, with the main purpose being discovering how populism became a pejorative concept. The intellectual desire of this present paper, however, is not limited to revealing the roles of intellectuals in the pejoration of populism. The academic studies which attempt to pinpoint the problem concerning the definition of populism are never useful precisely because they do not suggest a satisfactory and precise definition of populism. It is a conventional wisdom that there is still a lack of consensus on what populism means and how to define it. So that, another objective of this present paper is to overcome this maddening problem by seriously engaging with the field of history, which provides all the necessary means for analyzing the ideological mappings of the first populist movements.

The conceptual history of populism illustrates that the concept was originally invented by the self-described Populist movement in the United States in the late 19th century, which is considered by many scholars as one of the most powerful and authentic

107 third-party movement in the history of the country. The American populists became more organized as the People’s (Populist) Party in 1892, but failed to preveal against the nation’s two established political parties in its quest for government and vanished in a short span of time. At about the same time a similar political movement emerged onto the stage of Russian revolution history and the adherents of this movement called themselves ‘narodniki’, which is Russian equivalent of the term ‘populist’, while ‘narodnichestvo’ translates as ‘populism’. The story of the Russian Narodniks is similar to the story of the American Populists; the movement proved short-lived by reason of the growing influence of Marxism both in practical and intellectual realms and faded away soon afterwards.

Despite coming out in different social, cultural, economic and political contexts, some shared ideological components are evident in the American and Russian populist movements. Such consistency between the ideologies of two movements is easily attainable through Freeden’s conceptual approach model for the study of ideologies. Since the main objective of this present dissertation is to investigate how populism became a pejorative concept, a comprehensive content for populist ideology is not provided. Instead, only some of the common ideological characteristics of the populist movements are presented through political concepts. With this, the readers can grasp various aspects of populism as an ideology and a political movement, which owe its existence to the socio-economic and intellectual developments of the late 19th century Russia and the United States respectively. Not only that, the readers would further have a good grasp of how populism became a pejorative concept since each of the concepts presented in the historical populism was gradually wiped away after the mid-1950s. This phenomenon was to the extent that what remains from populism after Laclau (1978) is only the ‘anti-elite’ discourse in both the popular and academic discourses. Today’s most famous definition of ‘populism’ as ‘thin-centered ideology’, which was invented by Mudde (2004), is the best demonstration of this phenomenon.

The conceptual history of populism reveals no conceptual continuity among the meanings of the concept of populism and identifies several major time periods in which the shifts in the meaning of populism occured. The semantic innovations within

108 the concept of populism are not organic but chronically produced by intellectuals, that are, academicians and journalists. The first semantic change recorded in the concept of populism happens in the mid-1950s. During the interwar period, the term populism was like a sleeping beauty of the famous princess in the story, absent from the popular discourse, only be found in the writings of some historians. While waiting for a magic touch to awaken, the concept was brought from its sleeping bed back to the literature by the historian Richard Hofstadter in the mid-1950s, however, different from the original story, not to praise it but to bury it. The revisionist interpretation of Populism in Hofstadter’s books, which portrayed populism as a ‘paranoid style in American politics’, established the first negative tone for the understanding of populism.

In the 1960s, Edward Shils, Martin Seymour Lipset and Daniel Bell, who are well-known for the ‘end of ideology’ thesis, become a party to Richard Hofstadter. With their writings they contributed further to the demonization of the concept, connoting it with anti-intellectualism, nativism, anti-Semitism, and several other unrelated concepts. Despite painting an extremely depressing picture of populism, these scholars perceived and treated populism as an ideology, not as a discourse or as a strategy. This is worth calling an attention for an important reason. In the conference held at the London School of Economics and in the follow-up book published from the conference notes, ‘Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics’ (1969), which is found by this dissertation as the most confusing book ever published on populism, it is impossible to grasp whether populism is an ideology, a discourse, a strategy or a movement. Two unique new understandings of populism as a strategy and as a discourse arose from the scholars from the Latin America. The Latin American scholarship on populism embodied a novel paradox within itself, for example, they defined populism in a number of ways, but yet their definitions was employed by a great number of scholars from other continents without any critical reflection. The arrival of populism to the European scientific/academic discourse in the late 1970s is the best example. Borrowing the theory of populism as a discourse from Laclau’s framework, Stuart Hall invented the concept of ‘authoritarian populism’, which opened all the avenues for the pejoration of populism in the European scholarship. In the 1980s, many

109 scholars incorrectly labelled some of the European politicians as ‘populist’ on the ground that their discourses pitted ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ in ‘us versus them’ dichotomy. More interestingly, some scholars even rotated the meaning of populism by one hundred-eighty degree through using populism as a synonym of dictatorship. Among them Barry Rubin’s book title by itself tells this curious story; ‘Modern Dictators: Third World Coup Makers, Strongmen and Populist Tyrants’ (1987).

The present linguistic analysis encounters wholly new meanings of populism in the 1990s. For example, the analysis identifies yet another shift in the meaning of populism in the early 1990s away from its original meaning. The term populism was invested with an interesting political meaning; any charismatic political leader who bypassed the traditional media forms and used the new communication technologies to enter into direct contact with ‘the people’ were called ‘populist’. During the course of the 1990s, many examples of populism, from conservative to neoliberal, from fascists to socialists, started to be widely discussed in the academia. Nevertheless, it is a matter of fact that none of these academic papers and books provided their readers with a precise meaning of populism. Rather, the concept appeared as linguistic weapon in the arsenals of these scholars to marginalize what was perceived as subversive, dangerous or potential rebel, either it was a political leader, a movement, a set of idea or belief.

Closely related to its treatment in the academic discourse, the journalists started to use the term in the same way to cast away their political opponents outside of the scope of the honourable political practice. In this respect, the term carried a dose of pejorative connotations; populist was denounced as demagogic, authoritarian, undemocratic, xenophobic, racist, etc. This was an end result of the fact that populism was mainly studied as a characteristics of right-wing political parties and used more frequently against right-wing politicians because they put themselves on the side of ‘the people’ and argued that ‘the people’ must have been defended against ‘the elites’. In the end, most of the discussions on populism attempted to find a right answer to the question of whether populism would expand democracy or represents a threat to it, and if the second, how to cure it.

110

With the turn of the millennium, this present analysis finds an entirely confusing new definition of populism suggested by Cas Mudde in a series of articles after his well-circulated article ‘Populist Zeitgeist’ (2004). Populism is, as defined by Mudde, “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” A significant similarity can be observed between Laclau’s view of populism and Mudde’s understanding. Both authors simplifies the concept and reduces it to a single meaning, that is, a form of ‘anti-elite’ discourse that pits the people against the elite. Different from Laclau, however, Mudde defines populism as an ideology, by which he puts himself in the middle of a hornet’s nest on the one hand. Not only that, he intentionally or unintentionally manipulates the readers by ‘half-truth’ on the other hand. The inventor of the theory of ‘thin-centered ideology’ writes great number of pages about the ‘thin-centered ideology’ that he analyses, giving extremely broad definitions, including ideas, beliefs, attitudes, values and myths. They are all absent in Mudde’s writings. This is not surprising at all; Mudde’s writings neither engages with a theoretical discussion about ‘ideology’ nor a systematic investigation of the cognitive elements that compose populist ideology. What is suggested by Mudde is an extremely minimal definition.

Mudde’s definition as a ‘thin-centered ideology’ is the most popular framework employed by scholars today. This explains why anyone who declares to represent ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ cannot escape but gains the label of ‘populist’ nowadays. The logic behind this is simple; since the only criteria to be a ‘populist’ is the claim to represent the true voice of the people, then, in the nature of things, any political leader can be called ‘populist’ except the world’s Islamists leaders who legitimize their rules in the name of ‘Allah’ (God) but not the people. This trend was especially observed during the period following after the turn of the millennium. The term populism turned out to be a pejorative or slur in the hands of intellectuals whose aim is to demonize or marginalize their political opponents. The financial crisis of 2008 reinforced this tendency. For example, all the political parties founded after the

111 financial crisis, ranging from left of the political spectrum to the right side, have been painted with a singly brush by calling them ‘populists’. The meaning of the concept has become so hollow, even banal, and, accordingly, the use of the concept has become so out of place. This has been to the extent that it is not surprising anymore to see titles such as ‘How Tech Populism is Undermining Innovation’ (2015), ‘The technological performance of populism’ (2018), ‘Populism on Steroids’ (2018), ‘Education Can Counter Populism and Lead to A More Stable World’ (2018). If anything, these titles proves that the true populists have been erased from history as if they have never been existed. In some cases, there is not even a single common characteristic that the historical populism and today’s populism have in common.

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