RADICALISATION AND DIALOGUE IN PAPUA Asia Report N°188 – 11 March 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 1 II. RADICALISATION OF THE PAPUAN STUDENT MOVEMENT ..................... 2 A. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER SOEHARTO’S FALL..................................................................................2 B. FOCUS ON FREEPORT ...................................................................................................................4 C. FORMATION OF THE KNPB..........................................................................................................5 III. ACTIONS OF THE KNPB ......................................................................................... 8 A. ACTIONS IN NABIRE.....................................................................................................................8 B. THE 9 APRIL ATTACK ON THE ABEPURA POLICE STATION ...........................................................9 C. BURNING OF THE RECTOR’S OFFICE AT CENDERAWASIH UNIVERSITY .......................................10 D. THE RAID ON VICTOR YEIMO’S HOME.......................................................................................10 E. BREAKING WITH THE PAST.........................................................................................................11 IV. PUNCAK JAYA......................................................................................................... 12 A. TABUNI, ENEMBE AND THE SECURITY FORCES...........................................................................12 B. THE VIOLENCE ..........................................................................................................................13 V. THE TAKEOVER OF KAPESO AIRSTRIP ......................................................... 16 VI. TIMIKA AND THE FREEPORT SHOOTINGS ................................................... 18 A. SHOOTING ALONG THE FREEPORT ROAD ....................................................................................18 B. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SHOOTINGS? .............................................................................20 1. Kelly Kwalik’s forces ................................................................................................................20 2. Another OPM group ..................................................................................................................22 3. Military protection rackets? .......................................................................................................22 C. THE SHOOTING OF KELLY KWALIK............................................................................................24 VII. PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE 24 A. THE LIPI-TEBAY INITIATIVE .....................................................................................................24 B. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AND POTENTIAL SPOLIERS..........................................................25 C. NEED FOR HIGH-LEVEL BACKING ..............................................................................................26 D. THE KNBP IN THE FUTURE........................................................................................................26 VIII. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 27 APPENDICES A. MAP OF INDONESIA..........................................................................................................................28 B. MAP OF PAPUA/WEST PAPUA PROVINCES .......................................................................................29 C. MAP OF SHOOTINGS ALONG FREEPORT MINE ROAD ........................................................................30 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................31 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2007.........................................................32 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................34 Asia Report N°188 11 March 2010 RADICALISATION AND DIALOGUE IN PAPUA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Indonesia’s easternmost province of Papua saw an up- communication and coordination with the local TPN/OPM surge in political violence in 2009, continuing into 2010. commander, Goliat Tabuni. One factor was the increased activity of militant activists from the central highlands, many of them members of In other areas where violence took place, the KNPB either the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional claimed responsibility when it apparently had no direct Papua Barat, KNPB). They decided there was no longer role, as in the occupation of an airstrip in the village of any hope of achieving their main objective – a referendum Kapeso in Mamberamo Raya. The most dramatic violence on independence – through peaceful means, and led some in Papua over the last eight months has been the series to advocate violence and in some cases directly partici- of shootings along Freeport’s main mining road linking pate in violent acts. Their tactics are decried by many the towns of Timika and Tembagapura, aimed at either Papuans, but their message resonates widely, and the Freeport vehicles or those of the paramilitary police, frustrations they articulate are real. A dialogue between Brimob. Many inside and outside Papua believe the se- Papuan leaders and central government officials, if care- curity forces themselves are responsible as a way of in- fully prepared, offers the possibility of addressing some creasing their numbers and therefore their rent-seeking longstanding grievances, without calling Indonesian opportunities in Timika. Crisis Group believes there is sovereignty into question. a stronger case to be made for the involvement of one or more TPN/OPM commands, because of statements The KNPB had its origins in the growth of pro-independence claiming responsibility for some but not all of the attacks student activism in Papua following the fall of Soeharto and various witness testimonies. But the possibility re- in 1998. As various coalitions formed and fissured, KNPB mains that multiple parties were involved, in what the emerged as a group of mostly university-educated stu- Papuans refer to as “one plate, two spoons”. dents and ex-students who adopted a militant left-wing ideology and saw themselves as revolutionaries, fighting The violence, combined with the activities of the KNPB, the Indonesian state and the giant Freeport copper and has succeeded in raising the profile of Papua both at gold mine near Timika. There were two main conse- home and abroad, and has increased interest in the pos- quences to their increased militancy. They moved closer sibility of dialogue between Papuan leaders and Jakarta to their highland counterparts in the guerrilla army of the on a range of issues aimed at resolving the conflict. The Free Papua Movement (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional/ path toward dialogue is full of pitfalls, and there are po- Organisasi Papua Merdeka, TPN/OPM) and they in- tential spoilers and much distrust on both sides. Many in creasingly saw that the only hope of achieving their cause the central government believe that any discussion of lay in showing the world that Papua was in crisis – and non-economic issues such as greater autonomy or his- that meant more visible manifestations of conflict. torical grievances will only fuel the push for independ- ence and obscure the positive changes taking place. Not Violence rose in 2009 in part because it was an election only has there been “Papuanisation” of local government year, and the polls provided a focus for action. It was also and a commitment to accelerated development, they argue, because activities abroad – particularly the establishment but the police have gradually replaced the military as the in October 2008 of a then tiny group called International front line of response to separatist activity. Parliamentarians for West Papua (IPWP) – encouraged the militant activists to believe that more international Some Papuan activists believe that dialogue should only support could change the political dynamics at home. Sev- take place with international mediation and with the po- eral violent incidents in the provincial capital Jayapura litical endgame left open, rather than accepting autonomy and the university suburb of Abepura in April, around and not independence as final. Even some of those who the time of legislative elections, are directly attributable accept Indonesian sovereignty as a given believe that to the KNPB. Its members may also have helped spur Jakarta has a history of promising but not delivering, and violence in the highland district of Puncak Jaya, through that if it does agree to dialogue, it will be as a public rela- Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua Crisis Group Asia Report N°188, 11 March 2010 Page ii tions effort without any intention of changing the status quo. But the radicalisation of the KNPB is proof of the dangers of leaving political grievances to fester. More- over, though many of the Papuan elite disagree with its tactics, the KNPB’s message resonates more widely than its small numbers would suggest. A joint initiative of Papuan intellectuals and researchers at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga