Minneapolis Unit of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies

Home , America First Committee, Harold Knutson, Melvin Maas, Walter Judd (politician)

Minneapolis Unit of the COMMITTEE TO DEFEND AMERICA

BY AIDING THE ALLIES

GEORGE W. GARLID

IN THE SPRING of 1940, Minnesotans and this cataclysmic event did not immediately most other Americans were stunned by the dispel the tenacious hold isolationist senti downfall of the Allies in Europe. With ment had upon Minnesotans. surprising ease, German Panzer divisions For more than two decades the rhetoric overran Denmark, Norway, the Low Coun of isolationism, in all its variant forms, had tries, and France and forced the almost been proclaimed throughout the state. Min miraculous evacuation of British and some nesota's political leaders rarely challenged French forces from Dunkirk. Only the the assumptions buttressing the isolationist British and the Atlantic Ocean stood be faith. Rather, they accepted those assump tween Adolf Hitler's military might and tions and encouraged an isolationist foreign the United States. poficy. During the late 1930s, the task of This shocking display of Nazi power cer contesting the isolationist position was left tainly added new voices to those aheady largely to the metropolitan press and a calling for changes in America's cautious handful of academicians, practically none foreign policy. Yet, it would be a mistake of whom were active participants in the to exaggerate the effect that the blitzkrieg political process. Even those few politicians had upon opinion in Minnesota. Although who questioned the wisdom of a pohcy of the collapse of Western Europe eventually isolation were unable, because of their own helped blunt the dynamic of isolation, even preconceptions, to abandon all of the sup positions which lent substance to the iso lationist view. Mr. Garlid is associate professor of history at It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that Wisconsin State University — River Falls. This not a single influential political leader in article is an expansion of a paper presented at Minnesota was wdling to attack the isola the Missouri Valley History Conference held in tionists directly during the campaign of March at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. 1940. The tradition was too strong, the

Summer 1969 267 sentiment ran too deep, and finally the senatorial nominee with broad public sup startling events abroad broke too rapidly port. In 1940 the state's most successful to make such an attack politically appeal politician was wilHng to accept the Re ing. Clearly, Minnesota's thirty-three-year- publican nomination. Waiting until the last old governor, Harold E. Stassen, knew day to file, Farmer-Labor Senator Henrik this and his actions in 1940 bear out this Shipstead switched his allegiance to the judgment. Republican party. For years Shipstead had Stassen disagreed with Minnesotans who cultivated the image of political inde feared that aid to Great Rritain meant war. pendence. This and his isolationist convic Two days after the French surrender of tions were articles of faith for Shipstead. June 22, 1940, Stassen stated in his key He never disowned them. During the cam note address at the Republican National paign for the nomination, Stassen remained Convention in Philadelphia that the United silent. While there is little evidence to States was "too woefully weak to give the support the position that he favored Ship Alhes" the aid it wanted to. The death of stead's nomination, there is even less to Minnesota's isolationist Senator Ernest Lun indicate he disapproved. (Stassen's op deen in an airplane crash August 31, 1940, ponent for the Repubhcan gubernatorial unexpectedly gave Stassen a further oppor nomination in 1940, Ernest F. Jacobson, tunity to demonstrate his disapproval of charged that Stassen was supporting Ship the isolationist view. Ignoring the political stead in exchange for the latter's pledge to claims of several prominent Republicans, support Stassen in 1942 in a projected most of whom were isolationists, Stassen senatorial campaign against Ernest Lun conferred the interim appointment upon deen.) In any event, Shipstead's actions Joseph H. Ball, then a political reporter for during the campaign must have pleased the St. Paul Pioneer Press. Ball's views on the governor. Initially tepid in responding foreign policy were not widely knowm, but to Willkie's candidacy, Shipstead threw his Stassen had carefully ascertained them be full support behind the Republican nomi fore making the appointment. Ball was an nee before the campaign was over. Con internationalist. Naming him senator was sidering Stassen's objective, he no doubt welcomed Shipstead's nomination despite a significant initial step in altering the iso the latter's isolationist convictions.2 lationist complexion of the state's con gressional contingent, but at the time it in Stassen correctly gauged the temper of curred more surprise than opposition. This Minnesota's electorate, for throughout the presumably was the reaction Stassen antici pated. His major objective in 1940 doubtless was to unify rather than weaken the party ' New York Times, June 25, 1940, p. 17; Minne apolis Tribune, June 25, 1940, p. 4 (both have fiie in Minnesota, as he hoped the Republicans Stassen quote); Ivan Hinderaker, "Harold Stassen might carry the state for Wendell L. Willkie and Developments in the Repubfican Party in in his campaign to defeat President Frank Minnesota, 1937-1943," unpubfished doctoral dis sertation. University of Minnesota, 1949, p. 610. lin D. Roosevelt, who was running for an Stassen wrote in 1965 that "views on foreign poficy unprecedented third term. Certainly, too, did have a very important bearing upon my ap Stassen knew that party unity could not be pointment of Joseph Bafi as United States Sena tor. ... I knew of his views and we had discussed achieved by a direct attack upon Minne them before he was appointed." Stassen to author, sota's isolationists.^ Febmary 3, 1965, letter in possession of author. To achieve his end, Stassen chose to co ^St. Paul Pioneer Press, August 27, p. 6, Au gust 31, p. 1, 5, 1940. The week preceding the operate with the man most prominently primary, Repubfican leaders accused Shipstead's identified with the isolationist cause in Min supporters of using unfair tactics by trying to con nesota. The Repubfican ticket could be vey the impression that the state central committee was backing his candidacy. See the Minneapolis strengthened significantly if it included a Tribune, September 1, 1940, p. 2.

268 MINNESOTA History campaign politicians invoked the spirit of Montana stridently denounced Roosevelt's isolation. Congressman Harold Knutson foreign policy. Rail estimated that Minne asked that President Roosevelt be im sotans were overwhelmingly opposed to peached for the deal swapping fifty over war and strongly adverse to the president's age destroyers for British bases in the recent moves.^ Western Hemisphere. Representative Oscar Youngdahl informed his constituents that IT WAS in this atmosphere that the Min the administration was surveying the pro neapolis unit of the Committee to Defend ductive capacity of the nation's casket in America by Aiding the Allies was or dustry. "No doubt a million or two under ganized. It in effect became the state unit. arms," he wrote, "means eventual casual Announcement of the formation of the na ties if we intend to use these men for war." tional group bearing that lengthy name was Congressman August H. Andresen told a made May 20, 1940, when the Nazis were Rochester audience that Roosevelt had done having their way in Europe and increasing everything possible to provoke the Euro numbers of United States citizens felt that pean nations and to incur their wrath. their country should not only shore up its Assuredly, most of the congressional candi defenses but, short of war, also aid the dates believed a policy of isolation served Allies with supplies and money. Chairman the national interest. Assuredly, too, they of the nonpartisan national committee was agreed with Rail's assessment of opinion Wilham Allen White, noted liberal Re within the state. After attending a dinner publican editor of the Gazette of Emporia, at which Senator Rurton K. Wheeler of Kansas, and a good friend of President Roosevelt. The national committee's execu tive director was Clark M. Eichelberger, 'St. Paul Pioneer Press, June 21, p. 8, Septem ber 4, p. 1, 1940; "Observations from Washington," who worked from headquarters in New October 10, 1940 (quote), mimeographed letter York. Using the press and other media to from Youngdahl to constituents (copies available at arouse public opinion, the committee by Minnesota Historical Society); Rochester Post- Bulletin, June 27, 1940, p. 4. July 1, 1940, could count some three hun-

Governor Harold Stassen and newly appointed Senator Joseph Ball during a broadcast in October, 1940

Summer 1969 269 Committee on Cultural Relations with Latin America.^ Acutely sensitive to the isolationist temper of the electorate, the local unit at first was not prepared to lend effective support to those few congressional candi dates who represented something of a break with isolationist policies. The unit's officers admitted as much. They refused to circulate a foreign policy questionnaire, prepared by the national organization, giving as their reason both the isolationist record of con gressional incumbents and the lack of inter nationalist sentiment among their oppo nents.^ This discouraging situation did not di minish the organization's enthusiasm. While it never succeeded in recruiting the 10,000 members it hoped to attain, the Minneapofis unit enjoyed rapid growth at the outset. Clark M. Eichelberger Starting with 150 members in August, 1940, the unit grew to 1,500 by mid-October. A year later the committee had more than dred self-financed, self-controlled local doubled its size, enrolling nearly 4,000 units, including one in St. Paul.^ members.'^ The Minneapolis unit was activated in Although the committee tried to enlist July but, beset with organizational diffi persons from all walks of fife, it drew most culties, did not announce its formation of its active support from business, pro publicly until September 13, 1940. It soon fessional, or academic communities. Of 159 established headquarters in the Foshay members who had joined by early Septem- Tower at 813 Marquette Avenue. Edgar M. Jaeger, an investment trust executive for the Northwestern National Rank and Trust * For details on the formation and growth of the Company and a naval officer in World national committee, see Walter Johnson, William War I, agreed to be the unit's permanent Allen White's America, 524-554 (New York, 1947). chairman. He remained chairman until he ^ Minneapolis Tribune, September 14, 1940, p. 1; Minneapolis Star Journal, September 14, 1940, p. 9; resigned in January, 1942, to serve in the typescript copy of a manuscript history of the unit navy again in World War II. Other original prepared by Robert Hefty in March, 1941, Com officers of the Minneapolis unit of the Com mittee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, Min neapolis Unit Papers (hereafter cited as CD A: mittee to Defend America by Aiding the Minneapolis Unit Papers), in Minnesota Historical Allies were: secretary, Mrs. Folwell W. Society. Coan, wife of the vice-president of the ' M. W. Goldsworthy of the local unit to Mrs. Harrison Thomas of the national committee, Octo Central Lumber Company; treasurer, ber 24, 1940, GDA: Minneapofis Unit Papers. Charles F. Keyes, an attorney and presi "^ "An Outline of Inception, Growth and Activities dent of the Minneapolis Taxpayers Associa of THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND AMERICA, MINNEAPOLIS UNIT," dated September 30, tion; and, executive secretary, Harriet 1941. An undated letter, probably prepared in Webb Libby, daughter of a vice-president March, 1941, for circulation to prospective mem of the First National Bank and Trust Com bers, gives membership figures as nearly 4,000 for pany of Minneapolis and former assistant the Minneapolis unit, over 500 for the St. Paul unit, and several hundred outstate. Both of these items director of the New York office of the are in CD A: Minneapolis Unit Papers.

270 MINNESOTA History ber, 1940, forty-five were executives or base of its financial support, the committee wives of executives, thirty-four were edu got most of its receipts from contributions cators or their wives, thirty-eight were other of $25 or more, although there were numer professional men or their wives, six were ous gifts of from 50 cents to $5. Nearly clergymen, and seven were public officials. half of the funds came from a select group Only twenty-nine were employees or wives of contributors who gave $100 or more.^ of employees. Before the Lend-Lease Act Once estabhshed, the Minneapolis unit became law March 11, 1941, more than vigorously pursued its goals. Its most am 130 faculty members at the University of bitious effort was to sponsor a public mass Minnesota belonged to the committee.^ meeting on January 29, 1941, at the Minne The committee, moreover, was heavily apofis Auditorium to demonstrate support dependent financially upon a small group for the Lend-Lease Bill (H.R. 1776) then of men and women who were prominent in being debated in Congress. With such mass Minneapolis business and social circles. meetings the national committee and its The largest contributions — more than $600 local units not only sought to back Lend- in each case — were made by Mrs. John Lease as the logical means of aiding Rritain Cowles, wife of the president of the Minne in its stand against Nazi Germany but also apolis Star Journal, and Mrs. George Chase to counter the influence of a rival pressure Christian, member of a prominent Minne organization, the America First Committee. apolis milling family. Mrs. Christian was It and other isolationist groups opposed the noted for her philanthropies, and the bulk bill because they feared it might make of her contribution technically was given President Roosevelt a dictator and would through the Citizens Aid Society, an organi force the United States to go to war. zation she headed and to which she gave The local arrangements committee, of extensive financial support. In all, the Min which attorney Thomas Vennum was gen neapolis unit raised slightly more than eral chairman, worked hard to line up a $10,000. Despite efforts to broaden the speaking program that would draw a large crowd and thus show area congressmen that the administration's foreign policy en ® Manuscript history by Hefty; undated letter to joyed considerable support in Minnesota. University of Minnesota faculty soliciting additional The crowd of about 4,000 that showed up, members, both in CDA: Minneapolis IJnit Papers. The original executive committee of the unit in however, was rather disappointing, as at cluded: Eleanor Leerskov, Eve Read, Muriel Stew least 8,000 were expected. The meeting ard, Mary Warner, Thomas Vennum, Mrs. Stuart was judged a financial success, though, Wefis, Jr., Mrs. Chades Fuller, Mrs. C. A. Taney, Jr., Karl R. Andresen, Russefi H. Bennett, John Bos- with its total take of $1,574.68. It also coe, F. Stuart Chapin, Mrs. George Chase Christian, netted substantial newspaper coverage, in Mrs. John Cowles, Everett M. Fraser, Martin W. cluding unexpected publicity from objec Goldsworthy, Almon C. Greenman, George B. Leon tions raised by Wever Dobson, head of the ard, David Winton, Folwell W. Coan, Addison Lewis, Edwin Dodge, Harold Tearse, and Gordon A. Minneapolis chapter of the America First More. After Jaeger resigned, Coan and then Lewis Committee. The lack of a Hollywood head- eventually served as chairmen of the unit. liner was given as a principal reason for "Financial Statistics, CDA: Minneapofis Unit Papers. Although it is difficult to determine the the failure to attract a larger crowd. exact amounts given by all donors, the fofiowing "Whether we like it or not," wrote Jaeger were among those who contributed $100 or more: to a member of the national committee's Helen H. Bennett, George B. Leonard, Robert Pack, Cargifi, Inc., Merntt L. Carpenter, Leonard Car staff, which had promised a film celebrity, penter, Alice W. Whitney, O. C. Coan, Russefi H. "the presence of a movie star does more td Bennett, Mrs. Franklin Crosby, Dorothy B. Atkin fill an auditorium than half a dozen heavy son, Samuel C. Gale, Helen Winton Jones, Alfred Pillsbury, Mrs. John H. Queal, F. B. Wefis, Whee weights." In the same letter Jaeger wrote: lock Whitney, Mrs. Stanley Hawks, Mrs. Charles J. "You must remember that Minneapolis and Winton, and David Winton.

Summer 1969 271 Listening while Ernest W. Gibson addressed the January 29,1941, mass meeting were other speakers: (from left) Edgar A. Mowrer, Clark M. Eichelberger, Edgar M. Jaeger, Dr. Charles J. Turck, and Admiral William H. Standley.

St. Paul are probably the heart of the mittee to Defend America by Aiding the isolationist country; and if we do not make Allies; and Edgar Ansel Mowrer, foreign a success of this meeting . . . the cause correspondent for the Chicago Daily News. here in the Northwest will be irretrievably Dr. Charles J. Turck, president of Macales harmed." The names of Douglas Fairbanks, ter College and chairman of the St. Paul Jr., Constance Rennett, Madeleine Carroll, unit of the committee, presided after being Melvyn Douglas, Miriam Hopkins, Myma introduced by Jaeger. The speakers agreed Loy, and Franchot Tone were mentioned that all-out, immediate aid to Britain was while plans were being made for the meet necessary or the United States eventually ing, but no representative from Hollywood would have to fight the Nazis alone. Then' attended. The crowd had to settle for tele speeches were given generous coverage in grams from Miss Rennett and Fairbanks. Twin Cities newspapers. A resolution was Among others who sent communications adopted at the meeting calling for prompt were Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia of enactment of the Lend-Lease Bill and for increased and rapid production of defense New York, Efizabeth Morrow (mother-in- weapons "so that we may both send these law of "America Firster" Charles A. Lind lavishly to the Alhes and budd up our own bergh, Jr.), and John Cowles, who was in reserves." ^^ London with Wendell Willkie and cabled that both believed England would not surrender short of extermination but that '"Minneapolis Tribune, January 29, p. 1, Janu the Engfish needed "much help" if they ary 30, p. 1, 9 (Cowles quote), 1941; Minneapolis were to be victorious.^" Star Journal, January 30, 1941, p. 17, 27; manu script history by Hefty, p. 59; Jaeger to Jerry Crow "In person" speakers at the rally were ley of the national committee, January 23, 1941 Clark M. Eichelberger, the group's national (quotes), CDA: Minneapofis Unit Papers. director; Admiral William H. Standley, re "^ A copy of the resolution is in CDA: Minneap olis Unit Papers. Before accepting them as speakers, tired former chief of naval operations; committee members were afraid that Standley was Ernest W. Gibson, former senator from too controversial and Gibson too lacking in force. Vermont who succeeded Wdliam Allen See transcript of telephone talk between Jaeger and Helen R. Nicholl of the national committee, Janu White as National chairman of the Com- ary 20, 1941, CDA: Minneapolis Unit Papers.

272 MINNESOTA History Although Jaeger described the meeting to assess the effectiveness of each speaker. as "very encouraging," it suffered in com The papers of the unit include an undated parison with a similar one four months list of available speakers. On the list is later in which Lindbergh headed an Hubert H. Humphrey's name and below it America First Committee program that is the notation: "About 28. Enthusiastic in fided the Minneapolis Auditorium to over- cause of Lend-Lease. Spirited but tactful. flowing.^2 Very good in Q & A." Cognizant of the need for publicity, the committee per PRIOR TO the final passage of Lend-Lease, suaded metropolitan newspapers to give committee members telephoned citizens at substantial coverage to its activities. In random to urge them to contact their con deed, some opponents of the committee's gressmen and plead for the bill's passage. objectives alleged it received preferential A speaker's bureau filled numerous re treatment from the press largely because quests for people to make talks both in the John Cowles and Gideon Seymour, presi Twin Cities and outstate, and it attempted dent and editorial editor respectively of the Star Journal, were indirectly affiliated wdth the committee. ^^ The committee's work was done almost '^Minneapolis Star Journal, January 30, p. 17 (quote). May 11, p. 1, 1941. entirely by volunteer effort. In addition to ^^ Jaeger to Eichelberger telegram, March 7, sponsoring meetings, providing speakers, 1941; undated list of avaflable speakers (quote), and flowing publicity to various media, the both in CDA: Minneapolis Unit Papers; interview with J. D. Holtzermann, January 20, 1965. Holtzer- committee's staff did many routine tasks. mann, a Minneapolis businessman, published a These included sending out many thou weekly newspaper called the Minnesota Beacon for sands of mimeographed letters to members several weeks during the late summer and early fall of 1941. The paper was dedicated to keeping and the general public asking for contri the United States out of war. butions and support of the committee's

Participants in the America First mass meeting of May 10, 1941, included: (from left) Hanford MacNider (who introduced Lindbergh), Senator Henrik Shipstead, the Reverend Richard C. Raines, and Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr., chief speaker.

Summer 1969 273 America by Aiding the Alhes. Members from the Minneapolis, St. Paul, Duluth, Waseca, Rochester, and St. Cloud units attended and so did other individuals from around the state. Dr. Donald J. Cowling, president of Carleton College, was elected state chairman. Named other officers of the Minnesota unit were: Folwell W. Coan, Minneapohs, vice-chairman; George W. Morgan, St. Paul, vice-chairman; James G. Nye, Duluth, vice-chairman; and Mrs. Silas Rryan, Minneapolis, executive secretary. The executive committee included Jaeger, Admiral Standley, Edgar M. Jaeger Julian B. Baird, Pierce Butler, W. Hubert Kennedy, Charles J. Turck, and J. RusseU cause. Volunteers also dispensed thousands Wiggins. Following this conference, the of pamphlets, dodgers, broadsides, "V for Minneapolis unit and the Minnesota unit, Victory" stickers, special letter stamps, while they possessed different sets of offi "Stop Hitler" matches, and aid-to-Britain cers, functioned almost as a single organi Christmas cards, among other things. Much zation that utilized the staff facilities of the material was handed out from a committee Minneapolis committee.^^ booth at the 1941 Minnesota State Fair.^^ Though cautious at first, the Minneapolis In addition to its work in Minneapolis, unit became bold enough to assume posi the local unit assumed responsibility for tions in advance of the administration's creating support outstate. Early in 1941 actions. The day after President Roosevelt the committee received a subsidy from the signed the Lend-Lease Act, for instance, a national organization to underwrite the ex prominent member of the Minneapolis unit, penses of Mrs. Arthur J. McGuire of St. Russell H. Bennett, clearly outlined the Paul who was to serve as an organizer in committee's next objective. It was futile the Northwest. The New York office further "for the American public to bend its back expected that the Minneapolis unit would to the heavy load of producing armaments advance the interests of the committee in for Great Britain," he wrote, "unless there North Dakota and South Dakota. Jaeger is assurance that these armaments wifl was asked to consider those states as "your arrive in Great Britain." Observing that bailiwick too for the time being" as the his opinion was ahead of that of the ma national staff didn't "know any other good jority of Americans, he concluded by affirm way to promote interest in our cause in ing the committee's willingness to act North and South Dakota unless you people courageously. Members of the unit agreed. help us by taking the lead." Jaeger re By telegraph on May 24, 1941, some 200 sponded positively. In fact, upon complet ing a tour of northwestern Minnesota in late April, he had already reported: "There " See "Outline of Inception, Growth and Activi ties of THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND AMER is certainly no isolation in the country. ICA, MINNEAPOLIS UNIT," CDA: Minneapolis People are realistic. Many of them are de Unit Papers. manding the repeal of neutrality and the '^Jaeger to Eichelberger, February 8, 1941; Mrs. Harrison Thomas to Jaeger, Aprfi 24, 1941, and use of convoys." ^^ July 1, 1941 (quotes); Jaeger to Mrs. Thomas, In May, the unit acted as host for a state April 24, 1941, afi in CDA: Minneapofis Unit wide conference which gave birth to the Papers. "'Jaeger to Earle A. Barker of Bemidji, June 4, Minnesota unit of the Committee to Defend 1941, CDA: Minneapofis Unit Papers.

274 MINNESOTA History committee members and others attending the organizational conference of the Min nesota unit urged Roosevelt to use the navy for convoy duty in the Atlantic and observed that "strong action, even armed action, entailing greater sacrifices will be required of us." ^^ After the fall of the Japanese cabinet headed by Prince Fumimaro Konoye on October 16, 1941, the executive council again telegraphed Roosevelt advocating a continuance of a firm policy toward Japan. Avowedly speaking not only for its mem bers but for "the large majority of citizens in Minnesota," the council asserted that "a show of weakness in this present crisis will only lead to misfortune in the future. France and England went to Munich, let it not be said that America went to Tokio." IS

INTIMATELY CONNECTED with the "V for Victory" sticker Minneapolis unit's campaign to win sup port for the foreign policy of the adminis tration was its effort to moderate the attempting to do just that. On January 5, isolationism of the state's congressional 1941, forty-seven prominent citizens of the delegation. As it became apparent that most Twin Cities telegraphed Shipstead demand members of the delegation were adamant in ing that he state, in unequivocal language, their opposition to Roosevelt's foreign his views on foreign policy. They were par policy, the committee intensified its efforts. ticularly incensed at Shipstead's trenchant As early as January, 1941, Jaeger informed criticism of Roosevelt's policy. Responding Eichelberger, the national director, that "A caustically and with considerable justifica sharp battle is developing in this state tion, the senator said he had been stating between the Committee and Senator Hen his views for twenty years. He denied that rik Shipstead, who is very decidedly isola England was fighting America's battle or tionist. . . . We are going to need every "that our safety is dependent on her efforts." bit of ammunition we can muster to . . . If that were true, and Shipstead did not alter Shipstead's course, or to discredit believe it was, then America "should, in all him." 19 honesty, declare war on Germany and her Members of the committee were already alhes now, and not resort to subterfuges which deceive no one." 20 Although Minnesota's senior senator "Bennett to Jaeger, March 12, 1941, CDA: Min proved unyielding, the committee continued neapolis Unit Papers. These also include a copy of its efforts. Refore the final vote on Lend- the telegram to Roosevelt. Lease, laeger visited Washington to present "A copy of the telegram is in CDA: Minneapolis the committee's views to the representatives Unit Papers. ^® Jaeger to Eichelberger, January 14, 1941, from Minnesota and to assess their re CDA: Minneapofis Unit Papers. sponse. In Jaeger's opinion, Congressman -" Copies of the telegram and of Shipstead's reply Oscar Youngdahl was "concerned with are in the Shipstead Papers, in the Minnesota His torical Society. building his own fences and nothing else."

Summer 1969 275 He understood that Youngdahl would never its case. He pointed to the fact that young change his position as long as he believed men alone do not make an army and noted his constituents were opposed to war. that equipment to train them was lacking. Jaeger was not as critical of Congressman "I for one," he declared, "detest making a Richard P. Gale, possibly because Gale was political issue out of the lives of our young socially close to several of the committee's men who are now in camp." Gale was more most prominent financial backers and cer specific in spelling out his reasons for being tainly because he appeared to be more opposed. He believed that "unless the dan receptive to the committee's position. None gers which threaten us become more acute theless, Jaeger knew that Gale would not and unless there is a more actual need for back the committee's goals because he feared the use of our army ... it would be wise they meant war. Even before Jaeger's visit, to keep the term of service as it is. . . . The Gale had revealed his hesitancy to support navy and the air force are by all means the full-scale aid to Britain. While agreeing that first line of defense and they are not af the British needed help to survive, the third fected by the draft." As something of an district congressman believed that extensive aside, Gale wrote that the "army comes aid meant convoys. Therefore, it was "a into its own about once a generation and I question, not of all-out aid to Britain but of cannot say that I really blame them for going to war, and I do not think that the their enthusiasm." 2^ people are ready for war nor that we could Gale's position was a severe disappoint carry on a war if the people did not want ment. Jaeger, angry and disheartened, pre it." 21 pared a heated reply; then, thinking better In May, 1941, the committee mailed every of it, he waited over two weeks before Minnesota congressman a copy of the mes responding. In the letter he finally sent to sage the unit sent to Roosevelt requesting Gale, Jaeger freely allowed his pent-up that he use the navy for convoy duty. The frustrations to show: ". . . the stand you rephes from Youngdahl and Joseph P. took on the bill extending the service period O'Hara were noncommittal. August Andre of draftees is now a matter of history. I am sen referred rather tartly to an article in the sure you are aware that this stand was Readers Digest which convincingly demon much regretted by every member of our strated, he believed, that the United States Minneapohs committee as well as the hun "is not prepared to begin a war in any way." dreds of members of our State Committee Gale wrote that he could agree with the located outside of Minneapolis. ... If the committee "as far as helping Britain, but not to the extent of open warfare." Siding ^Minutes of the Minneapofis unit, March 21, with the committee. Ball agreed "that since 1941 (quote); Gale to Mrs. Jaeger, February 8, 1941, the loss of the battleship Hood it is more both in CDA: Minneapolis Unit Papers. Jaeger cor responded more frequently vrith Gale than with any important than ever that the United States other congressman. Although they often differed, move swiftly in this crisis." 22 their letters were usually friendly. Even when the issue was essentially one "" Youngdahl to Mrs. Harriet Webb Libby, May 23, 1941; O'Hara to Mrs. Libby, May 24, 1941; of national defense, the unit made httle Andresen to Mrs. Libby, May 23, 1941; Gale to Mrs. headway in impressing its views upon the Libby, May 23, 1941; Bafi to Mrs. Libby, May 26, delegation. During July, 1941, Youngdahl 1941, afi in CDA: Minneapofis Unit Papers. "^ Youngdahl to Folwefi W. Coan, July 28, 1941; and Gale were asked to support the biff Gale to Jaeger, both in CDA: Minneapolis Unit which extended the service time of draftees Papers. Every Minnesota congressman except Mel inducted under the Selective Service Act of vin Maas had voted against the Selective Service Act in 1940. In 1941, Wifiiam Pittenger was tiie 1940. Youngdahl objected on several only Minnesota congressman to vote for extension grounds. He maintained that the adminis of the act, although Ball was recorded in favor of tration had not been consistent in stating it and Representatives Maas and Richard T. Buckler did not vote on the issue.

276 MINNESOTA Histovy present situation is not filled with dynamite vacant chairmanship of the national organi and the danger to this country most ap zation. Jaeger, after carefully making in palling, then I and milhons of others who quiries in Minneapolis, replied that Stassen feel as I do are nothing but crack-brained sympathized with the objectives of the com alarmists. What in heaven's name do you mittee but warned that the governor's ap demand in the way of threats or danger in pointment would be a mistake. Voicing order to be wiUing to make whatever sacri resentment over Stassen's failure to ally fices are necessary for the preparation of himself with the committee, Jaeger wrote our defense? that the new chairman "must feel that this "You speak of the damage to the morale cause is more important than any possible by keeping the present crop of draftees in pohtical considerations, and he should be definitely in service. Dick, you voice again the kind who would not only be willing, but that sentiment which it seems to me ex glad to make any sacrifices for the cause. presses your position, namely that you are I don't mean to sound extreme, but what more fearful of what the American people this country and the committee need are a may do than of what Hitler may do. I am few more men fike Nathan Hale." 25 not concerned about the morale of our men, The morale of the committee remained unless it may be that theu* morale is under high in spite of frustrations. Aware that mined by men such as Wheeler, Lindbergh, they were fighting an uphifi batde, com Shipstead, Nye, and the rest — they are mittee members nevertheless befieved that doing more to destroy our morale than events were on their side and that isolation events themselves." 24 ist sentiment in Minnesota was waning. In May, 1941, the committee tried to offset THE INTRANSIGENCE that most Minne sota congressmen displayed in adhering to The committee ran this newspaper ad isolationism certainly discouraged members after a Lindbergh speech in 1941. of the committee. Nearly as discouraging was the reluctance of politicians whose views were simdar to those of the commit RATTLESNAKES IN THE ATLANTIC tee to commit themselves fully to a more ...DUPES AT HOME forceful policy. Early in August, 1941, Eichelberger discreetly asked Jaeger if Stas After five deliberate Nazi attacks on American ships, Charles A. Lindbergh still accuses our govern sen should receive consideration for the ment of "creating incidents." Mr. Lindbergh says he clarifies the issues and uses no subterfuge ... yet after Germany's invasion of fif ^Jaeger to Gale, August 23, 1941, CDA: Min teen countries he still stresses the point that war was neapolis Unit Papers. declared by England against Germany. ^Jaeger to Eichelberger, August 13, 1941, CDA: The American people, like President Roosevelt, Minneapofis Unit Papers. In 1965, Stassen wrote have no illusions about the gravity of the situation, in reference to his relationship to the Committee to but they are 100 per cent with him when he says to Defend America that he "had an established policy the Nazis: You have attacked our safety; you shall of not associating with any special committees or go no further. groups of this kind. Even though they were at a particular moment working on something that was What are the motives of those who, through the in accord with my views, one could never be cer person of Charles A. Lindbergh, are turning the tain when either they or their principal leadership greatest national emergency in our history into a po- would go off on some tangent which I would not lirical attack on our government? approve of and could not accept. Since I was con Which side are you on—Lindbergh's... or Amer stantly before the people as Governor and had to ica's? carry the State along with my firm opposition to isolation, I had to be very precise in stating my own MINNEAPOLIS CHAPTER position, maintaining it clearly before the people, COMMITTEE TO DEFEND AMERICA and not having it confused with other . . . indi 813 Marqu«H« Avt. Phont: MAin 790i viduals." Stassen to author, February 3, 1965.

Summer 1969 277 the effects of the massive America First as it could, that many Norwegians were rally at which Lindbergh spoke. It worked "beginning to get mad, and the madder hard to provide a sympathetic audience for they get, the better it will be for you." In Rail when he addressed a rally in Minne his prompt answer, Rail agreed that con apolis the week following Lindbergh's ap tinued pressure upon the delegation was pearance. Enthusiastic about the outcome, beneficial because he understood that the the executive secretary informed Rail that America First Committee in Minnesota his speech had changed opinions whereas would be active in the 1942 campaign.28 Lindbergh had merely reinforced the con On the eve of the Japanese attack on victions of those who already were isola- Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, discerning tionists.2^ Minnesotans knew that foreign policy An editorial appearing in the New Ulm would be the issue in the 1942 campaign. Daily Journal on July 5, 1941, gave Jaeger For months it had been evident that isola further cause for hope. Edited by Walter tionists welcomed the opportunity to defeat Mickelson, a close friend of Shipstead, the Rail. During the autumn of 1941 it was just New Ulm paper was judged by the com as evident that other Minnesotans, led by mittee to be the only daily in outstate Min those affiliated with the local units of the nesota dedicated to the cause of isolation. Committee to Defend America, were In an item entitled "Shall We Quit Writing equally eager to unseat the most wififul 'War' Editorials?" Mickelson rather de isolationist congressmen. The congressmen fiantly asked his readers to indicate whether whom the committee undoubtedly would or not they believed the paper had the right have liked to have defeated were Oscar to oppose a war until the United States Youngdahl, August Andresen, H. Carl An formally entered it. Jaeger, taking cog dersen, Joseph P. O'Hara, and Harold Knut nizance of the editorial, hopefully wrote son. Senator Shipstead was not a candidate that possibly Mickelson did "feel a little bit for re-election in 1942 or he certainly would shaky about his present position and I sup have been a member of the group, afi of pose we should be thankful for that." ^'^ whom identified themselves consistently While they never forgot that the isola with the isolationist position. No doubt a tionists still were strong in Minnesota, the part of the electorate continued to wait leaders of the Minneapolis unit became in upon the course of events before making a creasing optimistic during the fall of 1941. decision; nevertheless, the intensity of feel Their optimism did not, however, prompt ing was marked for those who had already them to relax their pressure on congress decided. men. Resides indicating their unwilhngness to support a soft policy toward Japanese ""Mrs. Libby to Bafi, May 28, 1941, CDA: Min demands, committee leaders urged Minne neapofis Unit Papers. •^' Undated list of newspapers noting tfiose pre sota's congressmen to act favorably on the sumed to be isolationist (five weekfies were in second Lend-Lease appropriation and on cluded); Jaeger to Gideon Seymour, July 11, 1941, the proposal to repeal the 1939 Neutrality both in CDA: Minneapofis Unit Papers; New Ulm Daily Journal, July 5, 1941, p. 2. Act. Significantly, these efforts were not ^^The executive council of the committee was undertaken in the befief that many of the concerned with the large amount of radio time the congressmen could be converted. Rather, isolationists procured. The councfi also knew that people in small towns outstate were sympathetic to they were viewed as preliminary maneuvers the committee's stand but afraid to say much be in preparation for the 1942 congressional cause of the impact their views might have on their elections. Writing to Rail, Jaeger revealed businesses. See minutes of the Minneapofis unit, August 15, 28, 1941; executive councfi letter to con the optimism which prevailed. He told the gressmen, September 25, 1941; Jaeger to Mrs. Silas senator that the committee intended to put Bryan, November 12, 1941; Jaeger to Bafi, Septem the congressmen on the spot as frequently ber 27, 1941; Bafi to Jaeger, September 29, 1941, afi in CDA: Minneapolis Unit Papers.

278 MINNESOTA History FOR NiERRY CHRISTMAS NEXT YEAR

Local units sold this Christmas card in 1940.

In DejenJ Amtrica hy Aiding Ihc Allies Copyrigtl (910 GIVE AID TO BRITAIN THIS YEAR

Not even the attack on Pearl Harbor and Committee to Defend America nor the the unanimity of feeling which came in its America First Committee found it easy to wake could immediately dispel the animosi maintain the cohesion necessary to guaran ties resulting from the struggle over foreign tee that the 1942 election would be waged policy. Five days after Pearl Harbor, Fol primarily over the issue of foreign policy. well W. Coan, acting chairman of the Indeed, even before Pearl Harbor there was Minneapolis unit, wrote Rail that "bonfires noticeable unwillingness to challenge Rail will spring up under a number of repre among those isolationist leaders who had sentatives whose type of thinking in the frequently been mentioned as the most past has so clearly demonstrated that they likely contenders for his seat. Almost cer will be incapable of straight thinking for tainly this reluctance reflected an awareness that very important postwar period which among the isolationists that opinion in Min will surely come." The next day Shipstead, nesota was shifting. One example of this in replying to a constituent, indicated that change came in November, 1941, when Raff he was interested in any attempt under spoke at Albert Lea and Fairmont during a taken to unseat Rall.2^ swing through the state. When M. W. Hal- loran, political reporter for the Star Journal, WITH THE United States at war and attempted to assess the response to Rail's the elections nearly a year away, neither the position, he found people to be strangely quiet. Many of his respondents reported that, whereas earlier most people in the area were isolationists, it now was impos ^Coan to Ball, December 12, 1941, CDA: Min neapolis Unit Papers; Shipstead to the Reverend sible to tell what they were thinking.'^o Wfifiam B. Rfiey, December 13, 1941, Shipstead Nonetheless, the issue of foreign pohcy Papers. did enter into the forthcoming campaign. '" Minneapolis Star Journal, November 6, p. 17, November 12, p. 12, 1941 (home edition). Con Some pohtical figures, notably Shipstead, gressman Andresen had been frequently mentioned had been committed to isolationist precepts as a contender for the nomination but had done far too long for the situation to be other nothing himself to promote his candidacy. He dis liked being labeled as isolationist unless those in wise. Shipstead certainly was aware of the the opposite camp were cafied interventionists. hostility directed toward him. In fact, dur-

Summer 1969 279 should continue under a new name, Citi zens for Victory. The new organization, it was hoped, would serve both to stimulate support for the war effort and to promote America's participation in a postwar organi zation. Those who did not want to disband felt that an organized effort was needed to eliminate the last vestiges of isolationism from Minnesota. Even among those who believed the committee's work was finished, there existed a healthy respect for the vitality of isolationist attitudes. George W. Morgan, a prominent attorney from St. Paul and an active member of both the St. Paul and Minnesota units, wrote Eichel berger explaining at length why he dishked continuing the organization under a dif ferent name. Significantly, he stressed that isolationist attitudes would persist as a fac tor in the response of Minnesotans to foreign policy.^2 "There is also in my mind," wrote Mor gan, "the question whether a separate or ganization, perhaps loosely affiliated with, and cooperating with, a national organiza Congressman Richard P. Gale tion of this sort, organized for the Midwest or perhaps for Minnesota alone, might not ing the week following Pearl Harbor the be more effective than a mere Chapter of a executive council of the Minneapohs unit national organization with headquarters in of the Committee to Defend America seri New York, in view of the rather specialized ously considered approving the use of its local problems we have here in Minne name in connection with the publication of sota . . . with respect to isolationist senti a letter which savagely denounced all that ment and its foundations. As an example he represented. The letter demanded that (but by no means the only one that could Shipstead resign and told him "that a part be cited) is the attitude of the very large in the future conduct of the affairs of this nation cannot be entrusted to one who has displayed such abysmal ignorance and com plete lack of vision and statesmanship." '^The final draft of the letter is in CDA: Min neapofis Unit Papers. See also the minutes of After considerable deliberation, the council the Minneapofis unit, December 10, 30, 1941, CDA: failed to give its full support to the letter. Minneapofis Unit Papers, and the Minneapolis It therefore was published in the Sunday Sunday Tribune and Star Journal, December 14, 1941, p. 19. paper under the writer's name — Willem "^The St. Paul xmit, although organized some Luyten, University of Minnesota professor what earlier than its Minneapolis counterpart, ap who was a member of the committee.^^ parently was never as active. Dr. Charles Turck served as its chairman, Mrs. John W. Thompson as This incident dramatizes the dilemma secretary, and John A. Lagerman as treasurer. See facing the committee. With the nation at Theodore Smith of the national committee to Jaeger, war the committee's work was finished. A July 26, 1940; Jaeger to Thorold F. Fields of Dulufii, August 24, 1940; and minutes of the Minneapofis few members, however, agreed with na unit, December 6, 1940, all in CDA: Minneapofis tional oflBcials and believed the committee Unit Papers.

280 MINNESOTA History agricultural population in this territory to did. Most of the business and professional ward economic problems and foreign trade men who had provided much of the financial and their traditional scepticism as to any support for the committee did, however, political or economic program which in reject the idea of sustaining the organiza volves relatively free exchange of goods, tion during the war years. As a conse particularly of agricultural products of any quence, by February, 1942, both the St. kind." Morgan plainly recognized that an Paul and the Minnesota units had dis intimate connection existed between tradi banded. The Minneapolis unit continued tional agrarian suspicions of Wall Street until after the campaign of 1942, but only as and isolationist attitudes. Moreover, he as a skeleton organization.^* sumed that this connection would persist.^"^ It was the representatives of the latter on It is impossible to determine how many the one hand, and Shipstead and Mickelson committee members felt the way Morgan on the other, who carried the struggle into the 1942 campaign. Early in June, 1942, four men from the Minneapolis unit met ^Morgan to Eichelberger, January 19, 1942, CDA: Minneapolis Unit Papers. with Dr. Walter H. Judd and encouraged '* Mrs. Silas M. Bryan to Marguerite Wells of the him to run against Oscar Youngdahl in the national committee, February 9, 1942; Mrs. Bryan Republican primary. They were Addison to Mrs. Harrison Thomas, February 7, February 26, 1942; minutes of the Minneapolis unit, Febru Lewis, last chairman of the committee, Pro ary 28, 1942, afi in CDA: Minneapofis Unit Papers. fessors Christopher S. Norberg and Willem

The national committee distributed this cartoon by Rollin Kirby of New York Post.

Summer 1969 281 alleged refusal to be guided by sentiment within the state prior to Pearl Harbor, Mickelson employed the rhetoric of the agrarian isolationists by indicting Rail for representing the Laments, the house of Mor gan, Wendeff Willkie, and John Cowles.-'^*' The primary election of September 8,1942, was heralded as a triumph over isolation as both Rail and Judd captured the nomi nations with ease. Judd received 34,835 votes to Youngdahl's 25,699; Rail defeated Mickelson 198,733 votes to 111,834. The Minneapolis Star Journal was exultant that Minnesotans had supported "the kind of leadership — typified by Rail and Judd — which accepts, for our own greater well- being, the responsibihty of the United States in the world." In the larger sense the Star Journal was right. The war ended the isolationism of the 1930s. Slowly the con gressmen who had supported isolationist pohcies died, retired, or were defeated. Of those who lost their seats in an election, the isolation issue was not a major factor in •^v.:-. c^-.. their defeat — except in the case of Ship stead. He lost the Republican nomination Senator Henrik Shipstead to Governor Edward Thye in 1946.^^ Luyten, and Dr. Charles E. Proshek. Young Shipstead's view of America's relationship dahl's support of a policy of isolation had to the world never changed. Of the two been a constant irritant to the committee votes against the United Nations charter in and those now active in the skeleton organi 1945, one was cast by Shipstead and the zation were determined to defeat him. Judd other by Senator Wilfiam Langer of North received assurances that the committee Dakota. While he attributed his defeat would assist him in obtaining financial sup largely to his vote against the charter, Ship port. As the race took place in the metro stead never regretted it. Whether he could pohtan fifth district, the committee was able to support Judd's candidacy because con tacts could easily be re-established with ^^ Lewis to Russefi Bennett, June 3, 1942, CDA: those once active. Rut that was all that it Minneapolis Unit Papers. '"^ A typescript copy of Mickelson's speech given could effectively do. The threatened revolt over KSTP August 17, 1942, is in the Shipstead against the isolationist congressmen who Papers. represented outstate constituencies never '" Minneapolis Star Journal, September 9, 1942, p. 18. Congressmen Melvin Maas and Richard Gale, materialized.^^ neither of whom were identified with the more adamant isolationists, were defeated in 1944 par FOR THEIR PART, those who had sup tially as a result of unification of the Democratic and Farmer-Labor parties. Interestingly, Repre ported a policy of isolation were not sentative Wfiliam A. Pittenger, whose eighth dis silenced by the war. Mickelson chose to trict became the DFL stronghold in the state, challenge Rail for the Republican nomina managed to survive until 1946 because his DFL opponent in 1944 — William McKinnon — had tion. He received warm support from Ship been obdurately opposed to Roosevelt's foreign stead. Rasing his campaign upon Rail's policy.

282 MINNESOTA Histoty have survived Thye's successful challenge you were obstrukionists [sic] befor [sic] had he been less intransigent regarding the Pearl harbor." ^^ United Nations is questionable. In any Shipstead's defeat in 1946 was only added event, Shipstead relied upon an old theme confirmation that the isolationism of the in attempting to secure renomination. He 1930s was dead in Minnesota. Yet, the told the electorate that he believed a small, failure to mount a state-wide challenge to secret group of men intended to defeat him. Minnesota's isolationist congressmen in The group was led by Stassen, the New 1940 and after illustrates one of the major York bosses, and "the big Eastern Inter- problems confronting a democracy in for nationahsts." ^^ mulating its foreign policy. It was possible to interpret Shipstead's Normally responsive only to issues and defeat without invoking a conspiracy theory events which are persistently and immedi of politics. A onetime admirer from Luverne ately before it, the public never acquires in Rock County, for example, wrote the the habit of giving consistent attention to senator that he had been ousted because his foreign policy questions in congressional friends had grown increasingly suspicious campaigns. Indeed, its opportunity to do so after he had identified himself with the is severely limited because Americans have "reactionary" Republican party. His cor been, for long periods of time, in substan respondent said, moreover, that Shipstead tial agreement as to what constitutes a had failed to heed the warning of Mickel viable foreign policy for the United States. son's defeat in 1942, had depended over Not infrequently, as in the 1930s, this much on the pro-German element, and consensus hardens and becomes intensely consequently had lost his old Norwegian resistant to change. Such was the case in friends. Hardly sophisticated in his presen the nation and particularly in Minnesota in tation, the correspondent probably came the years immediately preceding Pearl Har closer to a correct analysis of the senator's bor. Then, it required the momentum of defeat than Shipstead himself: ". . . at least rapidly breaking events and the efforts of in this county [your friends] deserted you determined organizations to break the con at a rate of about 3 out of every 5, for they sensus and to assist in establishing a new knew that if all or a majority of the Senate one. The Minneapolis unit of the Commit had voted like you did Hitler would have tee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies written the terms of pease [sic], and where played such a role in the years 1940 through would that have left Norway or for that 1942. It helped elect Walter Judd and re matter the rest of the alfied Nations. So elect Joseph Rail. The world view it sup there you are together with Wheeler, Nye, ported assisted in establishing attitudes Clark and others. You have found that iso- which were in part responsible for the latinoism [sic] like crime, does not pay, all of defeat of Shipstead. Its presence as an organization even served in a minor way to advance the political career of Hubert '^ Shipstead to Harry F. Kfinefelter of Baltimore, Humphrey. March 28, 1953; printed copy of Shipstead speech, March 18, 1946, Shipstead Papers. More important than these accomplish " Jacob Ohisen to Shipstead, July 19, 1946, Ship ments, however, was the Minneapolis unit's stead Papers. work in helping estabhsh a new consensus — THE PHOTOGRAPHS on pages 269, 270, 272, a consensus which not only emphasized that 273, 274, and 280 are reproduced through courtesy the United States had widespread responsi of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune; that on 280 is from the society's picture collection. The filustra- bilities in the world but which, following tions on pages 267, 275, 279, and 281 are from the World War II, hardened and became re CDA: Minneapolis Unit Papers; the ad on page 277 sistant to change just as its predecessor had appeared in the Minneapolis Tribune, Septem in the 1930s. ber 13, 1941, p. 14.

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