Nigeria 2015: analysis of election issues and future prospects RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 19 January 2015
This paper looks at the multiple challenges facing Nigeria as it prepares for presidential and legislative elections on 14 February 2015.
These elections will take place amidst an atmosphere of even greater crisis and uncertainty than usual. Boko Haram’s insurgency in the north of the country continues unabated. Over the last year, President Goodluck Jonathan and the ruling People’s Democratic Party have been accused of a complacent and incompetent response to the insurgency.
These developments, combined with deep divisions within the country’s elite, have resurrected old fears that the country might break up if the election aftermath is poorly handled.
However, some observers remain remarkably hopeful about Nigeria’s future, predicting that its enormous economic potential is on the verge of being realised at last.
The paper surveys the coming elections and then explores these hopes and fears about Nigeria’s future. It goes on to describe Nigeria’s relationships with the US, UK, EU, China and India before ending with a detailed country profile of Nigeria.
“I sorry sorry o, I sorry for Nigeria” – song lyric by Femi Kuti
“We know our time will come” – Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala
Jon Lunn and Daniel Harari
Recent Research Papers
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15/01 Economic Indicators, January 2015 06.01.15
Research Paper 15/02 Contributing Authors: Rob Page, sections 3.1-3.3 and 4.4 Louisa Brooke-Holland, section 4.7 Ben Smith, section 4.11 Matthew Ward, sections 2.2, 3.1-3.3 and 4.5
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ISSN 1368-8456
Contents Summary 2
1 Nigerian elections 2015: an update 5 1.1 Outcome of the 2011 elections 5 Map of the presidential election result 5
1.2 Build up to 2015 elections 6 2013: Jonathan on the back foot 7 2014: the PDP and APC trade blows 7 December 2014: the PDP and APC Conventions 8 Aspects of the 2015 election campaign 8
1.3 Will President Jonathan win again? 10 Jonathan’s record in office 10 An incumbency factor? 12 A second-round? 12 Will the APC be allowed to win? 12
2 Future prospects 13 2.1 Can Nigeria hold together? 13 2015: the nightmare scenario 13 Understanding Nigeria’s current political settlement 14 The 2014 National Conference: an opportunity for reform? 17 Prospects for a better political settlement 19 Conclusion 22
2.2 Is Nigeria an emerging economic giant? 23 Member of the MINT club 23 Current economic situation uncertain 24 The need to become less dependent on the oil sector 24 Young population expanding rapidly presents opportunity for growth 26 High poverty levels and poor education skills present barriers 26 Poor business environment and infrastructure hinders growth prospects 27 Conclusion 30
3 Nigeria’s foreign relations 30 3.1 US-Nigeria relations 30 Overview 30
Security 30 Trade 32 Aid 33
3.2 UK-Nigeria relations 33 Overview 33 Security 34 Trade 35 Aid 36
3.3 EU-Nigeria relations 37 Overview 37 Security 38 Trade 38 Aid 39
3.4 China-Nigeria relations 39 Overview 39 Strategic Partnership 40 Trade 40 Facets of the relationship 41
3.5 India-Nigeria relations 41 Overview 41 Trade 42 Facets of the relationship 42
4 Nigeria: country profile 44 4.1 History 44 4.2 The people of Nigeria 45 Population, ethnicity and language 45 Violence and insecurity 45 Public and private realms 45 Religion 46 Rising fundamentalisms 46
4.3 Human rights 47 Brutality and corruption 47 Impunity the norm 47
Positive developments since 1999 48 Ethnic and religious violence since 1999 48 Insurgency and terrorism in the Niger Delta and north-east 48 Police abuses 50 Homophobia 50 Election violence 50
4.4 Human development 51 Progress against MDG indicators: positives 51 Performance against MDG indicators: negatives 51 Spatial disparities 53
4.5 Economic profile 53 Background 53 Largest economy in Africa is more diverse than previously thought 54 Non-oil sectors behind growth in 2013 and 2014 55 Trade crucially dependent on oil exports 55 Fall in oil price dampens near-term economic outlook 57
4.6 Political profile 59 Constitution 59 Government 59 Parliament 60 Judiciary and legal systems 60 Main political parties 61 Political leaders 62
4.7 The Nigerian military 65 Overview 65 Equipment 65 Combating Boko Haram 66 Rise of vigilante groups 66 International support 67 Niger Delta and piracy 67
4.8 Armed militant groups 68 Boko Haram 68 Ansaru 71
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 71
4.9 The Nigerian diaspora 72 Size, location and character 72 Remittances 73 Nigerian government policies 73 A new unity? 74 The Nigerian diaspora in the UK and US 75
4.10 Membership of international and regional organisations 75 The United Nations (UN) 75 The African Union (AU) 76 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 76 The Commonwealth 77 The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) 77 Other organisations 77
4.11 Selected treaty ratifications 78
5 Select bibliography and web sources 81 5.1 Books 81 5.2 Journals, articles and reports 81 5.3 Web sources 83 Official sources 83 Statistics and economic indicators 84 Other sources 84
i Nkonni Birn GoureGouré Zinder Bosso CHAD NIGERIA Illela Maradi Wurno NIGER Diffa Bol Dosso Sokoto Baga Lake Chad Daura Magaria Damasak gu to Nguru Komadu o k SOKOTO Katsina a So an Gumel G Kaura u g Namoda KATSINA Hadejia u N jia ad ig Birnin ade Kom e H BORNO N'Djamena r Kebbi Zamfa ra S Gusau o JIGAWA YOBE Gummi k o Kano ZAMFARA t Maiduguri Dikwa Kamba o Wudil m Damaturu a Gaya Gulbin Dutse r Ka Azare e ds Funtua KANO Potiskum Ye BamaBama KEBBI Dan BackiBacki Gulbi Kari Kandi Damboa Kandi Koko Limani
la Mora YelwaYelwaYelwa Sabon Benin o Chibok Zaria g Bajoga Gwari n Mokolo o Biu Kainj KADUNA G Kontagora BAUCHI Maroua Reservoir Kaduna GOMBE BENIN K Bauchi a d Mubi u Gombe Gombi Guider Wawa NIGER na Jos Ndali Biliri Kajama ADAMAWA Minna Kanfanchan Léré Parakou Pala Pankshin Numan Garoua Amper Lau é CHAD Ni Bida PLATEAU Bénou ger Badeggi Abuja Yola Kisi KWARA Kwolla Jalingo FEDERAL Baro CAPITAL Q Shaki NASARAWA Ganye NIGERIA u TERRITORY é
m OYO Ilorin Lafia é Ogbomosho B TARABA Tungo enue Ibi Oyo Lokoja Bali Kontcha Iseyin EKITI Wukari Iwo Osogbo Makurdi Ibadan Ife Ado-Ekiti KOGI Gboko Bohicon Akure BENUE Ngaoundéré OSUN r Ankpa Owo e Auchi Takum Abong Abeokuta g Oturkpo Katsina Ala Ondo ONDO i National capital N
Ilaro OGUN A Gembu Banyo State capital Nkambe Ore N ENUGU Ikeja EDO Ogoja Town, village A Enugu Cotonou L LAGOS a Abakaliki M m Major airport Porto- g ba os Benin City Asaba B Awka EBONYI M International boundary Novo R Ikom Lake a A Bamenda Bamendjing h State boundary C.A.R. Bight of Benin Sapele Onits CROSS IMO ABIA RIVER Foumban Highway Warri DELTA Owerri Umuahia Bafoussam Yoko Main road CAMEROON Railroad Aba Nikongsamba a RIVERS Calabar nag N Uyo Sa0 50 100 150 200 km Gulf of Guinea i Yenagoa g Port AKWA Kumba e Oron The boundaries and names shown and the designations r BAYELSA Harcourt IBOM 0 50 100 mi D used on this map do not imply official endorsement or e acceptance by the United Nations. l t a Bight of Biafra Buea Douala
Map No. 4228 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support August 2014 Cartographic Section RESEARCH PAPER 15/02
Summary Nigeria – Africa’s most populous country by far, with a population of 177 million people and now its biggest economy – provokes wildly divergent assessments of its prospects. This paper explores that stark disjuncture as the country gears up for crucial presidential, legislative and state-level elections in February 2015.
In these elections, incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan, representing the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), will again face the man he defeated in 2011, Muhammadu Buhari, representing the All Progressives Congress (APC).
2011 presidential election: north-south alternation breaks down
Until the 2011 elections, the PDP, which has won all the presidential and National Assembly elections held since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, operated an informal ‘zoning’ arrangement, under which the presidency would alternate every two terms between southern and northern representatives of the party.
Jonathan, a Christian southerner, unexpectedly became president in 2010, following the death in office of Umaru Yar’Adua, a Muslim northerner, before he had completed his first term. Jonathan’s decision to stand in 2011 alienated many northerners in the PDP who felt that it should be the north’s turn again.
The breakdown of the PDP’s informal zoning arrangement in 2011 did not in the end greatly damage Jonathan’s prospects. He won a convincing victory. But there are those who argue that by overturning the zoning arrangement, he seriously destabilised the country’s ruling elite and inadvertently created space for Boko Haram’s insurgency in the north to flourish.
2015 elections: the stakes are high
Jonathan’s decision to stand for a second term in 2015 has provoked further controversy but the PDP has rallied around him, turning the nomination process into a coronation.
The APC, which is a coming together of four opposition parties, represents the biggest threat that the PDP has faced to its dominance. The APC has strong constituencies of support in both the north and the south-west. However, the PDP remains a formidable electoral machine and enjoys the advantages of incumbency.
There is grave concern that meaningful elections will not be possible in the three north- eastern states (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa) where a state of emergency is currently in force due to Boko Haram’s insurgency. This could damage the APC’s chances.
Some observers forecast that the presidential election will go to a second round for the first time since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999.
Both parties have been careful to select ‘balanced tickets’, in which a Muslim candidate is complemented by a Christian candidate, but many fear that, whoever wins eventually, there could be unprecedented levels of violence in the election aftermath.
Could Nigeria fall apart?
There has been no shortage of predictions since independence in 1960 that the country is ‘going to hell in a handcart’. Only once have the direst predictions proven accurate – the Biafran civil war between 1967 and 1970.
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The crucial question is whether the underlying political settlement that has helped to hold the country together since then is sufficiently robust to ensure that the centre holds in 2015 and beyond.
Nigerian national identity has no automatic privilege over ethnic, religious or regional identities. The country has been held together primarily by the ability and willingness of different parts of Nigeria’s elite to agree deals on the distribution of power and resources. All parties to these deals have sought to avoid a ‘winner-takes-all’ politics, in which the defeated are left with next to nothing.
This elite deal-making has been sustained by a political economy of patronage which became deeply entrenched following the start of oil production in the 1970s.
Many northerners currently feel politically and economically marginalised. Other Nigerians, most notably those from the oil-rich Niger Delta, retain strong memories of the north’s previous dominance, particularly during successive periods of military rule. With the boot now on the other foot, it is unclear how far the north’s grievances will be accommodated.
A National Conference was held in 2014 to discuss Nigeria’s future direction. President Jonathan has promised to implement its recommendations, which include formalising the north-south zoning arrangement that has fallen into disuse since 2011. Only time will tell if this promise is honoured.
Nigeria: an emerging economic giant?
Stabilising the existing political settlement in Nigeria, in which patronage has been the animating force, might be considered an undesirable objective if – as most analysts believe – it has held back economic development.
There has been plenty of debate amongst academics and policy-makers about whether Nigeria is capable of making a transition towards forms of government which promote greater (and more inclusive) economic development. Inevitably, verdicts vary. While pessimists are probably in the majority, there are a significant number of optimists too.
Optimists about Nigeria’s longer-term economic prospects tend to focus on potential for growth inherent in a rising population and the emergence of fast-growing industries such as telecommunications.
Jim O’Neill, the Goldman Sachs economist who coined the term ‘BRICS’ at the beginning of the 2000s to describe a group of emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) that were set to grow rapidly, has gone so far as to include Nigeria in the next generation of emerging economies – the ‘MINT’s’ (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey).
O’Neill believes that Nigeria could be one of the top 15 largest economies in the world by 2050. Nigeria was the world’s 23rd largest economy in 2013, so on the face of it this looks achievable.
However, deep structural challenges remain, such as the Nigerian economy’s dependence on oil, high poverty levels and the nation’s poor infrastructure. Optimists about Nigeria’s economic future acknowledge that successfully tackling these structural impediments is essential if the country’s undoubted potential is to be fulfilled.
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Boko Haram: symptom or cause of crisis?
Boko Haram’s vicious brand of Islamist terrorism is more a powerful symptom of Nigeria’s current crisis than one of its root causes. But it is playing a role in deepening that crisis today – to the point where it could become life-threatening for the country.
Over the last year, President Goodluck Jonathan and the ruling People’s Democratic Party have been accused of a complacent and incompetent response to the insurgency.
However, most analysts agree that, if Boko Haram is defeated militarily – an outcome far from guaranteed, given the parlous state of the country’s security forces and their own poor human rights record – without being accompanied by appropriate structural political and economic reforms, Nigeria’s underlying problems will almost certainly re-emerge before too long, whether in a similar or new guise.
What influence do Western countries have?
Western powers such as the US, UK and EU have relatively limited leverage over Nigeria. The country’s large size and economic weight reduce their influence. Nigeria is not dependent on foreign aid in the way many of its African neighbours are. The US, UK and EU are cautious about becoming closely involved in supporting Nigeria’s counter-insurgency efforts given the poor human rights record of its security forces.
Despite increasing engagement, the same relative lack of influence over Nigeria affects rising powers such as China and India too.
However, all of these powers are acutely aware of the strategic importance of Nigeria in Africa and beyond: Nigeria’s fate matters enormously to the wider world.
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1 Nigerian elections 2015: an update 1.1 Outcome of the 2011 elections Presidential and legislative elections were held in April 2011.
Goodluck Jonathan, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) candidate, won a decisive victory in the 2011 presidential election. He won 59.6% of the vote in the first round, meaning that no run-off was needed. He also won majorities of the vote in 23 out of the country’s 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory.1
The Congress for Progressive Change’s (CPC) candidate Muhammadu Buhari won 32.3% of the vote, gaining majorities in 12 states. The candidate of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Nuhu Ribadu, won 5.5% of the vote and gained a majority in one state.
Map of the presidential election result The map below provides a geographical illustration of the 2011 presidential election result:
Source: US Congressional Research Service
In the elections for the federal National Assembly, the PDP also prevailed, winning a majority of 205 out of 360 seats in the lower house, the House of Representatives. In the upper house, the Senate, the party won 73 out of 109 seats.
1 Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the Federal Capital Territory is not defined as one of Nigeria’s states, but the provisions of the Constitution are deemed to apply to it “as if were one of the states of the Federation” (see Chapter VIII, Part 1, Clause 299).
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Goodluck Jonathan’s victory was decisive – but it was also highly controversial.
Until the 2011 elections, the PDP, which has won all the presidential and National Assembly elections held since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, operated an informal ‘zoning’ arrangement, under which the presidency would alternate every two terms between southern and northern representatives of the party.
Jonathan is a southerner. He had been vice-president under President Umaru Yar’Adua, a northerner who had won the presidency for the PDP in 2007. Yar’Adua had succeeded another southerner, President Olusegun Obasanjo, who served two terms in office between 1999 and 2007. When Yar’Adua died in office during his first term in 2010, Jonathan took over as president, as provided for under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.
However, many northerners in the PDP viewed him strictly as a temporary figure and asserted that it should be the north’s turn to hold the presidency again in 2011. Goodluck Jonathan’s decision to stand in the 2011 presidential election – having originally said that he would not – aroused much consternation.
The breakdown of the PDP’s informal zoning arrangement in 2011 did not in the end greatly damage Jonathan’s personal prospects. The northern political elite was divided amongst itself, enabling Jonathan to build alliances with some of its members. He also deployed the power and resources that come with being an incumbent to great effect. Jonathan’s success in doing so was illustrated by the fact that he won the popular vote in the presidential election in a number of states where the PDP failed to win the vote for state governor.
Nonetheless, the map above shows that the country emerged from the election extremely polarised between north and south. Despite the fact that the 2011 elections were a significant improvement upon the 2007 elections in terms of administrative credibility and fairness, there was a major outbreak of violence in several northern states immediately after the result of the presidential election was announced. It was the worst post-election violence for decades.
Supporters of Muhammadu Buhari and the CPC alleged that the PDP had rigged the vote. Buhari called for an end to the violence but it went on for three days, during which at least 800 people were killed and up to 65,000 people displaced. Some of the violence had religious and ethnic elements to it.2
The CPC launched a legal challenge against the election result but it was unsuccessful. As the dust settled, the political scene looked superficially unchanged. But many underlying political tensions had been exacerbated by the 2011 elections. US Ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell subsequently expressed fears for Nigeria’s future security and stability if its “fractured” elite consensus could not be repaired ahead of the 2015 elections.3
1.2 Build up to 2015 elections After Jonathan’s 2011 victory, speculation began to mount that he would stand for a second term in 2015.4 Northerners in the PDP talked about putting forward a candidate from the north for the party’s internal election process. Opponents argued that a second term would mean Jonathan would in practice serve more than two terms, in violation of the Constitution, given that he first took up the reins on an acting basis in 2010. But the Supreme Court ruled
2 L. Ploch, “Nigeria: Current issues and US policy”, Congressional Research Service, 24 April 2013, pp5-6 3 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pxv 4 J. Paden, “Midterm challenges in Nigeria: Elections, parties and regional conflict”, United States Institute for Peace, special report 334, May 2013, p3
6 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 that the circumstances in which he became president could not be counted towards a term in office and that Jonathan was therefore eligible to stand in 2015.5
2013: Jonathan on the back foot During 2013, the odds against a Jonathan second term appeared to lengthen. He was starting to look like a liability in the eyes of growing numbers within his party. Boko Haram’s armed insurgency in the north was intensifying by the month.6 His administration appeared to lack dynamism and commitment in response. Even more worrying for him, the PDP was facing an unprecedented challenge from opposition parties. Four parties with support-bases ranging across both north and south, including the CPC and the CAN, combined forces to establish the All Progressives Congress (APC).
Then, towards the end of the year, six PDP state governors defected to the APC, along with about one-third of the PDP’s members of both houses of the National Assembly, leaving the PDP without a majority in the lower house for the first time since 1999. To make matters worse, a letter from former President Obasanjo to Jonathan was leaked, in which Obasanjo warned that the country was in danger of breaking up if Jonathan stood again.7 By the end of the year, some commentators were openly speculating that Jonathan might be close to throwing in the towel.
2014: the PDP and APC trade blows However, during the first half of 2014 President Jonathan and his supporters had some success in stemming the adverse political tide. The PDP was able to prevent any more high- level defections and even managed to contrive some defections in the other direction. In August 2014 it pulled off a major political coup by persuading the prominent politician and anti-corruption campaigner Nuhu Ribadu to abandon the APC, which was by now experiencing growing internal divisions of its own, for the PDP.8
Another indicator that the PDP still had plenty of life in it came in June 2014, when it mounted a successful electoral challenge to a prominent APC governor in Ekiti state in the south-west of the country, Kayode Fayemi. The PDP threw vast sums of money at the campaign, delivering victory to its candidate.9 The PDP also sponsored several attempts to impeach sitting APC governors. Jonathan’s close advisors urged him not to withdraw from the race.10 Some of Jonathan’s more militant youthful supporters in the Niger Delta threatened to take up arms if he was not anointed the PDP candidate.
However, in August 2014 the APC was able to steady the ship in another of its strongholds in the south-west, Osun state, where it saw off the PDP in elections for state governor. In late October it was boosted further by the defection to its ranks from the PDP of the speaker of the House of Representatives, Aminu Tambuwal.11 The PDP subsequently sought unsuccessfully to remove him as speaker and a subsequent attempt to enter the National Assembly led to scuffles within the building, with the police firing tear-gas into its main lobby.12
5 This ruling is being appealed. Some claim that when Jonathan changed his mind and decided to stand for the presidency in 2011, he also promised to only serve for one term. Such an undertaking at the time may have helped to stay the hand of some northerners in the PDP who were opposed to his candidacy. However, he has never publicly confirmed that he made such a promise. 6 See sections 4.3, 4.7 and 4.8 of this paper. 7 “Obasanjo’s letter to Jonathan: Before it is too late”, This Day Live, 23 December 2013 8 “Oil, the political lubricant”, Africa Confidential, 29 August 2014 9 “Ekiti, the shape of things to come”, Africa Confidential, 27 June 2014 10 “Jonathan faces the north”, Africa Confidential, 13 June 2014 11 “Speaker defects to the opposition”, The Herald, 29 October 2014 12 “Nigerian opposition warns against speaker’s arrest”, Agence France Presse, 22 November 2014
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While the positions of Jonathan and the PDP had certainly strengthened, it was not certain that he would win the party’s presidential primary if there was a contest at the National Convention scheduled for December 2014.13 However, in September, the need to do so was dramatically circumvented when the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) adopted Jonathan as its sole candidate. The NEC also endorsed all other current PDP post-holders being allowed to stand again uncontested. With Boko Haram’s vicious armed insurgency now at unprecedented levels, the APC criticised the PDP’s approach as deeply undemocratic and complacent. Jonathan formally declared his candidacy in November 2014.14
December 2014: the PDP and APC Conventions The 11 December 2014 PDP National Convention was a coronation. Jonathan was duly elected its presidential candidate, with his current vice-president, Namadi Sambo, once again his running mate. The PDP had opted for the same Christian-Muslim ‘balanced ticket’ that had brought it victory in 2011.
Few expected that the APC’s presidential primaries would be a similar coronation and so it proved. In late September 2014, Atiku Abubakar, the former military leader who had overseen the transition to civilian rule in 1999, announced that he was putting himself forward to be the APC’s presidential candidate.15
This early announcement was viewed as an attempt to destabilise Buhari’s own campaign. As a Muslim, Abubakar’s prospects of securing the vice-presidential berth under Buhari were limited. Some speculated that Abubakar, who has major oil business interests, may have put himself forward to represent those who feared Buhari’s hostility to official corruption. In October, Buhari confirmed he would stand, calling on the party to rally around him as its “consensus candidate” in the same way the PDP had around Jonathan.16 But this was always an unlikely prospect.
The APC’s National Convention also took place on 11 December 2014. There were five candidates for the presidential nomination. In the end Buhari won easily, with Abubakar coming a distant second.17 Attention quickly turned to Buhari’s selection of a running mate. After a week or so of internal horse-trading, Buhari selected lawyer and academic Yemi Osinbajo. A relative newcomer to frontline politics, Osinbajo had two principal virtues as Buhari’s choice. He is a Christian from the south-west, so ensuring that the APC also has a ‘balanced ticket’ in the forthcoming presidential election; and he is very close to Bola Tinubu, who is widely reported to have only reluctantly accepted that, for a range of reasons – including the fact that he is a Muslim – he could not take the role himself.18
Aspects of the 2015 election campaign19 The 2015 election campaign has been characterised more by low politics than by high- minded pledges on policy. PDP leaders have persistently suggested that the APC is a pro- Shari’a law ‘Muslim party’ which is in not-so-secret sympathy with Boko Haram. This
13 “Jonathan faces the north”, Africa Confidential, 13 June 2014 14 “After the bombing, Jonathan declares”, Africa Confidential, 21 November 2014 15 “Atiku declares for president on APC platform”, Nigerian Guardian, 24 September 2014 16 “Buhari seeks consensus candidate for APC”, Daily Independent, 5 October 2014 17 “Muhammadu Buhari to contest Nigeria election for APC”, BBC News Online, 11 December 2014 18 Osinbajo’s relatively low profile may explain why several different spellings of his name are in circulation. B. Awoyemi, “Making a case for Pastor (Prof) Yemi Oshibajo to be chosen as the APC VP candidate”, saharareporters.com, 15 December 2014 19 Continuing Boko Haram attacks during this period are covered in sections 4.3 and 4.8 of this paper.
8 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 potentially combustible allegation was vociferously denied by the APC, which countered with accusations of PDP incompetence and complacency in dealing with Boko Haram.20
Muhammadu Buhari has been clear in his condemnation of Boko Haram, which carried out a suicide attack against his convoy in July 2014. Buhari survived. In November 2014, an email emerged, purportedly from Muhammed Abubakar Shekau, claiming that President Jonathan was in cahoots with Boko Haram. It was swiftly dismissed as a fake.21
Another PDP line of attack on Buhari has been to question his democratic credentials. The party has contrasted his past as a former military leader with President Jonathan’s experience as a “tested and trusted democrat”, who emerged in the aftermath of the country’s return to civilian rule in 1999.22
The large-scale sale of Western oil company assets to Nigerian counterparts in the summer of 2014 was viewed by some as indicating that the electoral campaign was about to begin in earnest – the divide between state and party expenditure, blurred at the best of times, becomes extremely fuzzy when elections approach. The APC has its own oil company links. Both the PDP and the APC have thrown enormous amounts of money at the campaign.23 A significant proportion has been raised from their own candidates, who have been charged “eye-watering fees” to obtain nomination forms.24 Standing for office is far beyond the means of ordinary Nigerians.25
The security forces, which some claim are often closely linked with the ruling party in many parts of the country, are already struggling to maintain order. Rival politicians have – as in previous elections – again been recruiting private armed youth militias from the vast pool of Nigeria’s unemployed.
From October 2014 onwards, armed attacks, including abductions, by members of such groups began to rise.26 In early January 2015, the APC accused gunmen with links to the PDP of shooting at supporters travelling to an election rally in Bori, Rivers state.27 A few days later, the PDP alleged that APC supporters had set fire to one of President Jonathan’s campaign vehicles in the city of Jos.28 There are reports that this time around politicians are also using young “internet warriors” to attack rivals online, often deliberately peddling misinformation and using inflammatory language.29
There have been increasing examples of leading politicians making highly inflammatory speeches in the run-up to the elections. For example, the PDP governor of Katsina state, Ibrahim Shema, called his opponents “cockroaches of politics” in a speech.30 The veteran
20 Amnesty International alleged in May 2014 that the army had had four hours’ notice of a Boko Haram attack but took no steps to counter it. “Nigerian authorities failed to act warnings about Boko Haram raid on school”, Amnesty International, 9 May 2014 21 A. Noakes, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram ceasefire deal: too good to be true?”, African Arguments, 22 October 2014 22 “Buhari’ll bring back dictatorship – Mu’azu”, The Sun (Nigeria), 21 December 2014 23 “Oil, the political lubricant”, Africa Confidential, 29 August 2014 24 “Nigerian elections swayed by deep pockets”, The Star (South Africa), 10 November 2014 25 J. MacEbong, “Campaign finance reform needed to make political office affordable for all”, African Arguments, 7 January 2015 26 “Armed attacks likely to escalate in 2015, heightening death and kidnap risks to expatriates in southern Nigeria”, Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, 29 October 2014; “Deadly return of political thugs”, Daily Trust, 25 October 2014 27 “Shooting of APC supporters in Rivers”, APC press release, 7 January 2015 28 “Presidency condemns burning of Jonathan’s campaign bus”, This Day, 12 January 2015 29 “Letter from Africa: Nigeria’s internet warriors”, BBC News Online, 23 September 2014 30 “EU, US urge Nigerians to ensure peaceful elections”, Leadership, 22 November 2014
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Ijaw politician, Edwin Clark, a leading supporter of President Jonathan, suggested that the APC would be willing to kill the president in order to gain power in 2015.31
In late November 2014, the Nigerian State Security Service raided the APC’s Lagos office, reportedly destroying computers and documents in the process, as part of an investigation into claims that the APC was illegally cloning voter’s cards. The APC likened the raid to the 1974 US Watergate burglary.32
On 14 January 2015, at a ceremony in Abuja attended by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and former Commonwealth Secretary-General Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Jonathan and Buhari were joined by 12 other less-fancied presidential candidates in signing a pledge to ensure that the coming elections are violence-free. 33
The APC has warned that it will not recognise the outcome of the elections if they are rigged but will instead form a parallel government.34
Trying to hold the ring between the main protagonists is the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Every election cycle in Nigeria since 1999 has been characterised by a level of fraud and violence, but in 2011 the INEC was widely praised under its chairman Attahiru Jega, for doing a good job in difficult circumstances.
2015 is proving, if anything, even more challenging for INEC. The International Crisis Group warned in November 2014 that election preparations this time around were suffering from a deficient legal framework and a growing lack of confidence in INEC. It pointed to the failure of the National Assembly to pass amendments to the 2010 Electoral Act – including one which would create an Election Offences Tribunal to punish those who commit or sponsor violence in the run-up to the elections – and INEC’s slowness in producing a credible voter register.35 The Commission has reportedly been trying to do its job with inadequate funding.36 With less than a month to go until the elections, millions of voting cards have not yet been distributed.37 INEC announced in mid-January 2015 that 68.8 million people had registered to vote and 38 million biometric permanent voter cards had been distributed.
Last but not least, INEC will have a role to play in deciding whether security conditions in the north-east are good enough to allow the elections to take place there next month; it has said that, while it has no plans to postpone them, it will take guidance on this from the security agencies.38
1.3 Will President Jonathan win again? To win, President Jonathan needs to obtain over 50% of the vote and at least 25% of the vote in two-thirds (24) of Nigeria’s states and the Federal Capital Territory.
Jonathan’s record in office When President Jonathan took office in 2011, he promised a ‘Transformation Agenda’ for Nigeria. What is his record in office?
31 “Edwin Clark, mind your utterances”, Sunday Trust, 7 December 2014 32 “Nigeria’s opposition APC implicates ruling party in office raid”, Voice of America News, 24 November 2014 33 “Jonathan, Buhari, 12 others sign undertaking on violence free elections”, Vanguard, 14 January 2015 34 “We will not recognise outcome of any rigged elections – APC”, Leadership, 21 November 2014 35 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Nigeria’s dangerous 2015 elections: limiting the violence”, 21 November 2014, pp i-iv 36 “Political storm warning”, Africa Confidential, 19 December 2014 37 “Nigeria on edge”, Washington Post, 7 January 2015 38 “We won’t postpone Feb polls – INEC”, Vanguard, 7 January 2015
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On the positive side:
Nigeria has consistently averaged over 7% real annual GDP growth under his watch. This has led some to view the country as an emerging economic giant (see section 2.2).
The restive Niger Delta has been relatively peaceful. He has continued to support the Niger Delta Development Commission, created in 2000, but also announced in April 2014 a ‘Presidential Initiative for the North East’, which is intended to promote development in that conflict-affected area.
He has not engaged in any frontal attacks on the formal institutions of democracy and in some cases – such as INEC and the National Human Rights Commission – backed strengthening them.
He has signed Freedom of Information and National Health Bills into law and created a Sovereign Wealth Fund.39 He also has significant infrastructural achievements to his name.
In 2014 he commissioned a ‘National Conference’ to come up with proposals to transform Nigeria for the better in future (see section 2.1).
Nigeria’s Ebola outbreak was handled effectively.
On the negative side:
Nigeria’s domestic security situation has dramatically deteriorated, with the state until recently appearing relatively unconcerned about it.
The Government’s response to the kidnapping by Boko Haram in April 2014 of 270 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno state, was widely criticised for its complacency – similar accusations have been made since then.40
The security forces continue to commit serious human rights abuses. Corruption remains pervasive.
The Sovereign Wealth Fund mentioned above is yet to start operating effectively.
Promised reforms – for example, opening up the petroleum and power sectors to private ownership and investment – have proceeded slowly, if at all.
Progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals has been patchy.
Nigeria remains a major importer of refined fuel and the country still suffers from chronic fuel and power shortages. A 2012 attempt to end the subsidy on fuel was partially reversed following large-scale street protests.
39 Y. Soneye, “Nigeria needs to check into oil rehab now”, African Arguments, 4 November 2014; “Passing the National Health Bill – a giant leap forward”, This Day, 23 December 2014. The National Health Bill guarantees free basic health care provision for all children under five, pregnant women, the elderly and people living with disabilities. This is intended to reinforce a National Health Insurance Scheme that to date has not really been effective. 40 There is considerable doubt in some minds as to whether the remaining girls who were unable to escape shortly after the abduction will ever be freed. Boko Haram claims that all of them have converted to Islam and most have been compelled to marry. J. Zenn, “Boko Haram: recruitment, financing, and arms trafficking in the Lake Chad region”, CTC Sentinel, 31 October 2014
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In recent months, the country’s foreign reserves have been depleted by an only partially successful attempt to prop up the Nigerian Naira as global oil prices have slumped.
President Jonathan and other senior officials have failed publicly to declare their assets, as required under Nigerian law, thereby preventing the country from becoming a member of the 2011 Open Government Partnership, which was established “to provide an international platform for domestic reformers committed to making their governments more open, accountable, and responsive to citizens.”41
While outsiders might expect President Jonathan’s track-record to be electorally vulnerable, most observers assess that he is the favourite to win, provided that he can sustain broad enough elite backing through the effective deployment of the patronage and resources at his disposal. This is far from guaranteed.
An incumbency factor? President Jonathan enjoys the advantages of incumbency. Moreover the PDP has managed, more or less, to maintain its unity and discipline in the run-up to the presidential election. He can expect strong backing from voters in the south-south and south-east but needs to neutralise the APC’s apparent initial advantage in most of the north and in the south-west. As in 2011, Jonathan has already had a measure of success in dividing elite opinion in the north, with several leading figures there coming out in support of his re-election.42
Writing in October 2014, two scholars sought to assess the effect that party incumbency at state level might have on the presidential vote. On this basis, assuming that the election is broadly comparable in terms of fairness to 2011, they said that the most likely scenario is that Jonathan will win a majority of the vote in the first round but will not manage to obtain 25% of the vote in two-thirds of Nigeria’s states, so taking the country into a second-round run-off for the first time since the return to civilian rule in 1999.43
A second-round? A run-off is a real possibility. It would be new and hazardous territory for Nigeria. Might an elite deal to be struck to ensure that the country is not seriously destabilised by it?
Some claim that there was a ‘secret pact’ in 2011 between Bola Tinubu, then of the ACN, and the PDP, whereby the latter would let the ACN have a “free run in the state governorship polls in the south-west” in return for ACN supporters backing Jonathan in the presidential election.44 There is no way of knowing if this happened or not.
In any event, at present both the PDP and APC appear to be in a ‘winner takes all’ frame of mind.
Will the APC be allowed to win? While some of the sheen may have come off the APC’s brand during 2014, it remains a formidable opponent. Its National Convention in December 2014 went better than many expected and it must be hopeful that Nigeria’s economic problems in recent months might damage the chances of President Jonathan and the PDP. In early January 2015, Jim O’Neill, the former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management and a well-known ‘Nigeria
41 Open Government Partnership. “Jonathan’s secret assets deny Nigeria membership of global anti-corruption body”, Premium Times, 5 October 2013. 42 “How strong is northern opposition to Jonathan?”, Daily Independent, 28 October 2014 43 Z. Usman and O Owen, “Incumbency and opportunity: forecasting Nigeria’s 2015 elections”, African Arguments, 29 October 2014 44 “Oil, the political lubricant”, Africa Confidential, 29 August 2014
12 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 watcher’, even suggested that world financial markets “might react positively” to an APC victory.45
Victory in both the presidential and legislative elections demands that the party wins well in the north-east, north-west and south-west.46 In more normal times, it might feel pretty confident of achieving this. However, the poor security situation in the north-eastern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states could, if it suppresses the turn-out – as it currently seems likely to – undermine the prospects of the APC.47 There are 1.5 million Internally Displaced People in the north-east and it is unclear how many will be able to vote.48
The APC claims that the PDP is intent on sabotaging the polls in those states and alleges that, for this reason, the PDP has an interest in ensuring that the security situation remains poor.49 The PDP repudiates such allegations and argues that the APC may resort to its own dirty tricks if the result goes against it.
Boko Haram has declared that it will seek to sabotage the elections. There is no sign of its armed attacks abating as the presidential and National Assembly elections on 14 February draw closer.50 Indeed, they are intensifying. For example, in recent weeks, Boko Haram has attacked and seized control of the border town of Baga in Borno state, where a new ‘multinational task force’ involving troops from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger has established its official headquarters. Their forces did not put up a fight and hundreds of civilians in the town and surrounding areas were killed by the group.51
2 Future prospects 2.1 Can Nigeria hold together? 2015: the nightmare scenario In the short-term, there is a real risk that Nigeria will be further destabilised by the forthcoming elections.
The worst-case scenario is that President Jonathan’s re-election leads to violence in the north on a scale significantly greater than that witnessed in 2011, which was itself the worst for decades. John Campbell argues that Jonathan’s decision to stand in 2011 has “provided the space for Boko Haram to flourish”.52
If powerful sections of the northern elite decide to throw their support behind post-election violence, large parts of the region could become completely ungovernable (arguably, Borno state already is). Given that Boko Haram’s position is much stronger in the north than it was in 2011, the region could then be engulfed by a fatal combination of political, religious and ethnic violence. With the Christian population in the north now a substantial minority, it could be a prime target.
45 “O’Neill says Jonathan election loss may be Nigeria positive”, Bloomberg, 9 January 2015 46 “After the bombing, Jonathan declares”, Africa Confidential, 21 November 2014 47 At December 2014, there were an estimated 740,000 Internally Displaced Persons across these states. “INEC expresses concern over 740,000 IDPs”, Leadership, 2 December 2014 48 “Political storm warning”, Africa Confidential, 19 December 2014 49 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Nigeria’s dangerous 2015 elections: limiting the violence”, 21 November 2014, p14 50 “Nigeria must brace for surge in Boko Haram attacks, analysts say”, dpa-AFX International ProFeed, 19 December 2014 51 “Boko Haram seizes army base in Nigeria town of Baga”, BBC News Online, 4 January 2015; “Boko Haram crisis: Nigeria’s Baga town hit by new assault”, BBC News Online, 8 January 2015 52 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pxxiv
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A deepening political and social breakdown of this kind in the north might well prompt militant groups in the south to mobilise in response, above all in the Niger Delta, where security deteriorated again during the second half of 2014. This ‘southern mobilisation’ could also be triggered by a Jonathan defeat – which could in turn prompt a counter-mobilisation in the north. In truth, there are no safe options.
As its efforts to combat Boko Haram have illustrated, the army has lost much of its effectiveness since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999; it could struggle to contain the situation. Indeed, it could, as it has often done in the past, add fuel to the flames through heavy-handed interventions on the ground.
To compound matters, oil prices have been falling significantly since mid-2014, forcing a currency devaluation and downward revisions of the country’s economic growth rate. A continued depletion of oil revenues, along with heavy expenditure of state funds arising from an expensive election contest, could trigger a parallel economic crisis.53
Avoiding the worst What resources and capabilities do Nigerians possess that can help them avoid this nightmare scenario? In truth, more than enough. One immediate ground for hope is that both of the main parties have selected balanced – north/south, Christian/Muslim – tickets for the presidential contest. The defeated party might, as in the past, decide to pursue its grievances about the conduct or outcome of the elections through the courts.
There have been no shortage of predictions since independence that Nigeria is about to go to hell in a handcart. Only once have the direst predictions proven accurate – the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970, which was fundamentally a revolt against northern dominance led by political leaders from the Igbo ethnic group in the east of the country, for which an independent Biafra was the only solution. A cohesive Nigerian army waged a brutal but successful military campaign to defeat the Biafran army.
Many have often argued that this near-death experience for Nigeria inoculated the country against relapsing into civil war. There may be something in this. As John Campbell has put it: “Nigerians have mastered the art of dancing on the precipice without falling over.”54 However, it is now over forty years ago since the defeat of Biafra and memories can fade.
Understanding Nigeria’s current political settlement Let us assume that Nigeria comes through the forthcoming elections in one piece. What are the country’s medium- to long-term prospects of holding together? According to some analysts, a crucial factor to consider is whether the current “political settlement”, which has (just about) held the country together since 1970, will continue to do so.55
Colonial inheritances Many historians have told the story of how under British colonial rule, the main component parts of what formally became Nigeria in 1914 in fact were never more than loosely stitched
53 Y. Soneye, “Nigeria needs to check into oil rehab now”, African Arguments, 4 November 2014. See also sections 2.2 and 4.5 of this paper. 54 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013) , pxv 55 The concept of ‘Political settlement’ used in this section of the paper has been defined by its author, the academic Mushtaq Khan, as the “combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability”. Khan, “Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions”, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, July 2010. The value of the concept has been questioned by other scholars. For example, see Mick Moore, “What on earth is a ‘Political Settlement’?”, IDS Governance and Development Blog, University of Sussex, 19 September 2012. For a cautiously positive assessment, see Bjorn Dressel and Sinclair Dinnen, “”Political settlements: old wine in new bottles?”, Development Policy Centre, Policy Brief No. 9, February 2014
14 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 together. Almost up until the last colonial moment, southern, northern and eastern Nigeria were administered largely separately. British colonial power tended to favour the northern elite over those of other regions. Nigeria’s anti-colonial movement was weak and divided compared with many of its counterparts elsewhere on the continent.
All this means that today, most Nigerians’ sense of ‘Nigerian-ness’ can be somewhat flickering and intermittent. There are many genuine instances of widespread patriotic pride – for example, whenever the national football team, the ‘Super Eagles’, takes the field – but Nigerian national identity has no automatic privilege over ethnic, religious or regional identities.
John Campbell claims that federal institutions that in the past have been a source of national pride, including the army and the civil service, are now “in decline”56 He also points out that ordinary Nigerians “distance themselves from government as much as they can”.57
The political settlement that emerged post-independence – and which was more-or-less restored after the traumatic interruption of 1966-70 – largely reflected these realities.
Elite deal-making Although Nigeria’s political settlement has evolved over time in all sorts of ways, it has also had some fairly stable features up to now.
Perhaps the most important feature has been the ability and willingness of different parts of Nigeria’s elite to make deals about the distribution of power and resources.
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria’s elite has mainly coalesced politically around political binaries such as Muslim/Christian, north/south, Hausa-Fulani/Yoruba-Igbo, not to mention military/civilian, with other social groups either attaching themselves to the coalitions which form or remaining aloof.58
Alex de Waal has suggested that political life in countries such as Nigeria is “a patrimonial marketplace, which operates according to socio-culturally determined rules.”59 There has been a shared – if sometimes grudging – acceptance across the groupings that made up Nigeria’s elite that a ‘winner-takes-all’ politics, in which defeated parties are left with next to nothing while the victorious enjoy a virtual monopoly over state power and resources, would be disastrous for the country.
The elite deals reached have often lasted one or more electoral cycles while simultaneously being subject to almost permanent (re)negotiation and adaptation.60 Different parts of the elite have at points been ascendant (although, overall, the northern groups enjoyed the better of things during the first 40 years of independence) and therefore able to secure advantageous deals, but other groups with significant leverage have usually not been left empty-handed (although claiming that they have is a common negotiating ploy).
56 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pxvii 57 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p41 58 This typology, while justified in the context of an overview of this kind, is inevitably a simplification of much more complex social and political realities. 59 A. de Waal, “Mission without end? Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace”, International Affairs, 85: 1 (2009), p99 60 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pxiv
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The political economy of patronage Elite deal-making in Nigeria has been sustained by broader patronage systems which have durable constituencies of support amongst ordinary Nigerians, who are also sometimes its beneficiaries, or clients.61
While highly asymmetrical in terms of the power relations involved, patronage can and does involve reciprocity and is often viewed as legitimate by many Nigerians.62 For the poor, patronage networks can be a vital means of survival.63
Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare have written: “While Nigerians are general socially supportive of anti-corruption efforts, many are politically or economically connected to the corruption complex, directly or indirectly.”64
But the biggest beneficiaries are the ‘Big Men’ – or Ogas, as they are known in Nigeria – at the top.65 There is an uneasy and fluid hierarchy within the ranks of the Ogas, who can be found across the military, political and business spheres.66 The country’s president may be at the top of the hierarchy, but not necessarily.
Campbell describes some of the ground rules that have regulated relationships amongst the Ogas:
there should be no ‘presidents for life’;
money accumulated in office cannot be reclaimed;
Ogas should never kill each other, “although their clients are fair game”.67
state and local levels of government may be more attractive spheres in which to operate because levels of accountability and transparency there are even weaker than at the federal level.68
Political and economic marginalisation Many northerners currently feel politically and economically marginalised.
The political settlement in Nigeria has been gravely tested by events since the death in 2010 of President Umaru Yar’Adua and the violation, in the eyes of many northerners, of the informal ‘zoning arrangement’, whereby a two-term southern PDP president should be succeeded by a two-term PDP president from the north.
Zone-by-zone data analysis of projects approved by the Federal Government in 2014 produces the following striking figures:
south-south: Naira 639.3 billion
61 The patronage system expanded and became more entrenched following the start of oil production in the 1970s. 62 P. Chabal, Africa. The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London and Durban, 2009), pp92-3 63 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p27 64 W. Adebanwi and E. Obadare, “”When corruption fights back: democracy and elite interest in Nigeria’s anti- corruption war”, Journal of Modern African Studies, June 2011, p195 65 Oga is Yoruba for ‘Master’. 66 Campbell claims that, under President Obasanjo (1999-2007), the political system was dominated by “only a few hundred bigmen.” John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p25 67 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p31 68 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p28
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south-west: N256 billion
Federal Capital Territory: N193 billion
south-east: N111.3 billion
north-central:N101 billion
north-west: N62.2 billion
north-east: N23.8 billion69
Kate Meagher has provided further analysis of the economic dimensions of this marginalisation:
The pressures of restructuring and globalization that have made Nigeria so attractive to global investors have exacerbated rather than eased long-standing patterns of regional inequality […] In the post-independence period, economic opportunity in the educationally disadvantaged northern states was dominated by agriculture and formal sector employment, both of which have declined dramatically over the past few decades. Pressures of high population growth, recurrent drought and a lack of investment in small-scale farming have undermined the agricultural economy, haemorrhaging youth into the urban centres. At the same time, the North’s urban economy has been gutted by deindustrialization and reduction in public employment […] Unemployment in the northern states is three times the levels in the south-west of the country. Poverty levels in the north are 40% higher than those in the southwest.70
Today, Nigeria is an extremely politically polarised country. At the top echelons of power, a group of advisors – many of them, like President Jonathan, members of the Ijaw ethnic group and with roots in the Niger Delta – is currently entrenched in Aso Rock, the presidential residence in Abuja.71
This group of advisors has powerful memories of the time when northerners held sway at the federal level, particularly during successive periods of military rule, benefiting (as these advisors see it) disproportionately from oil revenues generated in the Niger Delta. Many other leading figures from other ethnic groups – most notably, Igbos who recall the Nigerian civil war and its aftermath – share this view. With the boot apparently now on the other foot, it is unclear how far those around President Jonathan are willing to address northern marginalisation today.
The 2014 National Conference: an opportunity for reform? President Jonathan has supported the establishment of a nationwide conference of delegates from all over the country, known as the ‘National Conference’, to discuss all aspects of the country’s future direction.72 It began work in March 2014 and submitted its final report to the president in August.73
69 President Jonathan comes from the south-south. “N1.6 Trillion Govt Contracts for 2014 - Niger Delta Gets Lion's Share”, Daily Trust, 31 December 2014 70 K. Meagher, “MINTs and mayhem: in Nigeria the risks are the only things that trickle down”, africanarguments.org, 22 May 2014 71 The Ijaw are the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria, comprising an estimated 10% of the population. The three biggest are the Hausa-Fulani (29%), Yoruba (21%) and Igbo (18%). See also section 4.2 of this paper. 72 For a full list of the 492 delegates, see: “Govt names 492 delegates to proposed National Conference – full list”, Premium Times, 6 March 2014 73 “Key National Conference recommendations you need to know”, Premium Times, 21 August 2014
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Inevitably, some have viewed Jonathan’s support for the National Conference through the prism of his own political ambitions, suspecting that he was using it to pave the way for a second term in office.
Recommendations Among its recommendations were:
The creation of 19 new states, which would bring the total number to 55 (plus the Federal Capital Territory);
There has been a steady expansion in the number of states in Nigeria since independence. Each phase has tended to create new minorities and grievances. Some wonder whether a process designed to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of government across the Federation ultimately leads to ‘balkanisation’ – the break-up of the country.74 But with the genie out of the bottle, it may now be an unstoppable process which the National Conference felt unable to resist.
There should be further consideration of the percentage of revenue generated by oil and mining that should be returned from the Federation Account to the state where the economic activity is based;
Known as the ‘derivation principle’, this originated primarily in attempts to address grievances in the Niger Delta about the fact that its people benefited little from the oil being produced in the area. A percentage of 13% was agreed in 1994-95 and it was proposed in 2005 that it be increased to 17%. This increase was never implemented. Northern representatives have tended to oppose an increase in the percentage on the grounds that the region will lose out. The National Conference passed the buck on this issue, asking the Government to set up a technical committee to consider the issue further.
Presidential power should rotate between the north and south and among the six geo-political zones and governorships should rotate between the three Senatorial districts within each state;
The National Conference has proposed that the informal ‘zoning’ arrangement on the presidency, which appears to many to have collapsed, should be restored and formalised. It did not specify what implications, if any, this should have for President Jonathan’s candidacy in 2015.
Other proposals included requiring the President in future to pick a Vice-President from the National Assembly, making Representatives and Senators serve on a part-time basis, the elimination of immunity from prosecution of public office-holders where a criminal charge has been laid, and the introduction of special courts to speed up the prosecution of corruption cases. An attempt by northern delegates to scrap the Nigeria Delta Development Commission and the Niger Delta Affairs Ministry was unsuccessful.75
The ghosts of conferences past President Jonathan has promised that the recommendations of the National Conference will be implemented, setting up a ministerial committee to look at what the next steps should be.
74 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pxvii 75 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Nigeria’s dangerous 2015 elections: limiting the violence”, 21 November 2014, p4
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But his attention is currently elsewhere, so little is likely to happen in response to the recommendations until the 2015 elections are over.
Sceptics note that Nigeria has seen several such initiatives in the past (2004 and 1994-95) whose recommendations were honoured more in the breach than the observance. A minority has long argued that Nigeria needs a ‘sovereign national conference’ directly elected by the people, rather than top-down affairs of the kind preferred over the years by Nigeria’s elite.
How far this latest National Conference ultimately plays a part in reforming or stabilising Nigeria’s rickety political settlement remains to be seen. There are many who would contend that too great a focus on piece-meal reform is ultimately undesirable. According to them, if Nigeria is to achieve long-term stability and prosperity for the majority of its citizens, the fundamental ‘rules of the game’ must change.
Prospects for a better political settlement Nigeria: a ‘neo-patrimonial state’? The academic Atul Kohli would probably take this view. He contrasts “neo-patrimonial states” – which have a record of poor economic performance in many developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – with ‘developmental states’ in other parts of the world, whose economic records have been much better.
Kohli identifies Nigeria as a classic neo-patrimonial state. Here is his definition of the term:
These states are labelled here as neo-patrimonial because, despite the façade of a modern state, public office holders tend to treat public resources as their personal patrimony. These are therefore not really modern rational-legal states. Whether organised as a nominal democracy or as a dictatorship, state-led development under the auspices of neo-patrimonial states has often resulted in disaster, mainly because both public goods and capacities to pursue specific tasks in these states have repeatedly been undermined by personal and narrow group interests. Of the cases analysed in this study, Nigeria best exemplifies this ideal-typical tendency.76
Kohli locates the origins of Nigeria’s ‘neo-patrimonialism’ in the pre-colonial and colonial periods before turning to the post-independence era. Kohli asserts that it was not so much that efforts after 1960 to promote economic development failed, “but that they were never really made”.77 When it came in the 1970’s, the oil boom “created an illusion of economic dynamism”.
What would Nigeria be like if it was a ‘developmental state’? There are many competing definitions of the term. Thandika Mkandawire says that it is “one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development.”78
A ‘developmental-patrimonial’ regime in Nigeria? Can Nigeria move beyond neo-patrimonialism?
76 A. Kohli, State-Directed Development. Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery (Cambridge, 2006), p9 77 A. Kohli, State-Directed Development. Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery (Cambridge, 2006), p329 78 T. Mkandawire, “Thinking about developmental states in Africa”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 25, 2001, p291. This definition is more modest than many of the other definitions, which Mkandawire unrealistically portray the developmental state as some kind of “omnipotent and omniscient leviathan that always gets what it wants”.
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There is no state on the planet that has eradicated patronage and corruption. Given this, the real question is whether the Nigerian state has the potential and capacity to become much more ‘developmental’ in its orientation.
While Nigeria currently faces many formidable challenges, there is no reason to believe that this is impossible in future. Mkandawire has argued:
[…] neither Africa’s post-colonial history nor the actual practice engaged in by successful ‘developmental states’ rule out the possibility of African ‘developmental states’ capable of playing a more dynamic role than hitherto.79
A group of researchers based at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) has recently identified several hybrid “developmental-patrimonial” regimes in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa – most notably, Rwanda and Ethiopia.
One of the ODI researchers, David Booth has described some of the most important factors that have helped to create these regimes. However, he also issues a warning that democratic forms of governance can hinder rather than help.
In both cases, long-term vision is accompanied by strong leadership and at least some degree of institutionalised political competition. Whatever one’s view on these kinds of exceptions, the big question today is whether democratic politics can deliver a sufficient level of elite consensus on the fundamentals for economic transformation to occur. The risk is that African democracies will get locked into political short-termism to such an extent that the transition from economic growth to economic transformation is delayed indefinitely. There is no more important challenge on the horizon than this.80
Booth and his colleagues have looked at the conditions under which such a transformation has been possible in East and (to a lesser extent) Southeast Asia since 1945. Without expecting sub-Saharan Africa to imitate parts of the world with different histories and cultures, they ask themselves whether there are elements of this experience that could be transposed. They do not believe that there are insuperable obstacles. Booth goes on to say:
The key requirement for establishing a ‘national vision and shared sense of purpose’ is that ruling elites are relieved of pressures to respond to short-term political exigencies and acquire an incentive to look to the long-term. This happened in a number of countries, first in Northeast Asia, and later in Southeast Asia, as a result of national crises or threats, often including large amounts of violence.81
So, could a hybrid ‘developmental-patrimonial regime’ emerge in Nigeria? For all its problems, the country’s annual economic growth rates are good and there are large pockets of political and economic dynamism, albeit mainly concentrated in the south-west. The recently-retired governor of Lagos state, Babatunde Fashola, is widely credited for doing much to promote economic growth there (continuing the work of his predecessor, Bola Tinubu). There are undoubtedly a significant number of genuine reformers within the federal
79 T. Mkandawire, “Thinking about developmental states in Africa”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 25, 2001, p289 80 D. Booth, “No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa”, in Commonwealth Good Governance 2011/12 (London, 2011), pp34-5 (hard copy available from the House of Commons Library). A longer summary of the conclusions of the ODI’s Africa Power and Politics Programme can be found in D. Booth and D.Cammack, Governance for Development in Africa: Solving Collective Action Problems (London, 2013) 81 D. Booth, “No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa”, Commonwealth Good Governance 2011/12, p34
20 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 and state governments – and within the civil service, despite its many weaknesses.82 And Nigeria is surely experiencing a ‘national crisis’ at the moment which could act as a catalyst for change.
However, Booth laments that what he hopes for “has rarely happened in sub-Saharan Africa”.83 Writing in 2011, he did not rate Nigeria’s chances highly. Viewing Nigeria as a “winner-takes-all democracy”, he argues that:
Under current arrangements, all of the contenders and their supporters face a significant risk of being completely excluded from the spoils of office under the next government. As a consequence, none of them can afford to suspend or moderate their pursuit of short-term gains.
[…] The question that really needs to be posed is what, if any, variant of power-sharing or compacted democracy would be capable of liberating all contenders from the compulsion to sacrifice long-term national interests for short-term partial interests.84
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that this is their view, Booth and company are also highly sceptical of the value of most aid programmes, which they believe “miss the main point”.85
Whether Nigeria today is a winner-take-all-democracy is open to question. Earlier, we suggested that its political culture has not, as a rule, been ‘zero-sum’ in the past. But it is true that Nigeria’s political culture strongly encourages short-termism and corruption.
The ‘developmental-patrimonial’ concept deployed by Booth and his colleagues will not convince everybody. Some may wonder whether it adds much to our understanding. However, the explicitly hybrid character of the concept does have the virtue of challenging the either/or terms – that is, specific African states are either inherently neo-patrimonial or inherently developmental – in which the debate has often been conducted.
One commentator has also criticised Booth’s “rather lazy dismissal of both democracy and citizen action”.86 In addition, many activists and donors are unlikely to view with much enthusiasm his argument that some types of corruption can, in the right context, promote economic growth.87
Few would argue that Nigeria has experienced too much of the ‘wrong type’ of corruption. Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare have argued that the return to civilian rule since 1999 has coincided with unprecedented corruption: “Indeed, instead of being eroded, existing networks of patronage and clientilism have consolidated, even expanded.”88 They
82 “Nigerian service: Dan Rogger on public vices, hidden virtues and silent voices in the civil service”, Gateway for Africa Blog, 11 June 2014 83 D. Booth, “No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa”, p34 84 D. Booth, “No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa”, p35 85 D. Booth, “No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa”, p35. However, since then Booth has written on a more hopeful note about an effective UK-funded programme operating across ten of Nigeria’s states called the State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI), which he describes as an example of “politically smart, locally led development”. See his article of the same title in African Arguments on 23 October 2014 86 D. Green, “Africa Power and Politics – a great new research programme, with lots to argue with”, From Poverty to Power blog, 15 April 2011 87 It is widely accepted that the countries which led the ‘East Asian economic miracle’ during the 1970s and 1980s (Taiwan, South Korea) were anything but corruption-free during this period of rapid development. For further discussion of corruption in developing countries, including when it is ‘productive’, see the work of Mushtaq Khan – such as this article co-authored with Hazel Grey, “Good governance and growth in Africa: what can we learn from Tanzania?”, in V. Padayachee ed., The Political Economy of Africa (London, 2010) 88 W. Adebanwi and E. Obadare, “”When corruption fights back: democracy and elite interest in Nigeria’s anti- corruption war”, Journal of Modern African Studies, June 2011, p187
21 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 have also asserted that corruption has killed off three previous attempts to democratise Nigeria.89
Are we asking the right questions? Some observers go so far as to wonder whether the value of all such existing policy prescriptions is fatally undermined by the fact that they have a shared origin in teleological “theories of development”. Patrick Chabal, claims that:
Theories of development, whatever their guise, made two clear assumptions: the first was that there is a path to (economic and political) development, which all countries follow, if in different ways; the second was that Africa is merely behind on that path but that it will eventually catch up.90
De Waal broadly endorses this perspective, asserting that “[…] states can function in a different way indefinitely, albeit with less desirable outcomes for most of their citizens.”91
While acknowledging just how hard it can be to avoid “the Western gaze”, Chabal advocates instead trying “to write about the Africa that stands before our eyes” and to do so “without recourse to a given political theory.”92
To follow Chabal on Nigeria would require us to view it through an entirely different set of political lenses entirely to those that have featured in this discussion. In a recent book, Chabal preferred to take as his point of departure the politics of being, belonging, believing, partaking, striving, surviving and suffering.93
While Chabal has issued an intriguing injunction that could lead to policy prescriptions that chime better with the lived experience and everyday struggles of ordinary Nigerians, it does require busy policy-makers to make substantial changes to their habitual frameworks of reference. Critics might respond that he is asking the impossible – not least, because it is beyond the capability of human beings born in specific societies at a particular time and place to operate “without recourse to a given political theory”.94
Conclusion So, to end where most commentators begin on Nigeria – with Boko Haram. Its brand of Islamist terrorism is an extremely potent symptom of Nigeria’s current crisis, rather than one of its causes. It is playing a major role in deepening that crisis today to the point where it could become life-threatening for Nigeria; but most analysts agree that, if Boko Haram is defeated militarily – an outcome far from guaranteed – without being accompanied by appropriate structural reforms, the country’s underlying pathologies will almost certainly re- emerge before too long, whether in a similar or different guise.
What might replace Nigeria should it break up? Inevitably, the picture is hazy. The creation of new countries might take place around the three main regions that currently comprise Nigeria – the south, north and east. An optimist might even hope for a loose Nigerian confederation
89 W. Adebanwi and E. Obadare, “”When corruption fights back: democracy and elite interest in Nigeria’s anti- corruption war”, Journal of Modern African Studies, June 2011, p187. However, Mushtaq Khan and others go so far as to ask whether Nigeria’s main problem is premature democratisation, rather than rampant corruption. They argue that, historically, democratisation has followed economic transformation and it is unrealistic to expect the process to work the other way around. 90 P. Chabal, Africa. The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London and Durban, 2009), p4 91 A. de Waal, “Mission without end? Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace”, International Affairs, 85: 1 (2009), p101 92 P. Chabal, Africa. The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London and Durban, 2009), pp17, 173 93 These are the chapter headings used in Chabal’s 2009 book. 94 P. Chabal, Africa. The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London and Durban, 2009), pp17, 173
22 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 or ‘Commonwealth’, but is far from clear that it could work, given that the south would be much wealthier and better-resourced than the north and east.
The creation of three new states out of what was once Nigeria would not guarantee stability: past experience of state formation in sub-Saharan Africa suggests each of the new governments would likely soon be faced with internal challenges to their authority and legitimacy.
For now, committed separatists are a small minority within Nigeria. They tend to focus on the independence of their group or region without thinking much about how the fractured pieces might relate to each other in future. But while those who want Nigeria to stay together may take heart from these facts, once again experience from other parts of the world shows how quickly this can change.
The US National Intelligence Council stated in a March 2005 report: “Nigeria’s leaders are locked in a bad marriage they all dislike but dare not leave.”95 Writing eight years later, John Campbell argued that the break-up of Nigeria remained unlikely. However, he added that it was on a distinctly downward trajectory:
A more realistic alternative is that federal authority will continue to decline, while power will gravitate to the state governments. The danger is not the emergence of an independent Biafra or a Nigerian version of South Sudan with defined boundaries. Rather it is of national fragmentation in the context of hollowed-out or irrelevant federal institutions with the prospect of localised ethnic and religious conflict dominated by warlords.96
Of course, the situation has deteriorated markedly since 2013. Nigeria certainly can hold together, but in current circumstances it is flirting with disaster. The danger of the country breaking up is certainly greater than it has been since 1970.
But perhaps this conclusion is an unwarranted counsel of despair – there are some commentators today who are remarkably upbeat about Nigeria’s future. They are not so sure that the kinds of political impediments discussed here are necessarily inimical to rapid growth, placing less emphasis on the need for structural reforms and more on the massive potential of Nigeria’s ‘factor endowments’ – potential which is beginning at last to be realised.97 Next we review the credentials of such arguments.
2.2 Is Nigeria an emerging economic giant? Optimists about Nigeria’s longer-term economic prospects tend to focus on its favourable demographics and the emergence of fast-growing industries such as telecommunications and media. However, deep structural challenges remain, such as the economy’s dependence on oil, high poverty levels and the nation’s poor infrastructure. The extent to which Nigeria’s economic potential is fulfilled depends significantly on how successfully Nigeria is able to tackle these structural impediments.
Member of the MINT club Ever since the success of the acronym ‘BRICS’ – created at the beginning of the 2000s to describe the large fast-growing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – economists and investment managers have been attempting to come up with another collection of emerging economies containing large populations with bright prospects that can
95 “Talking it over”, Africa Confidential, 8 July 2005 96 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pxvii 97 Defined by Businessdictionary.com as “the amount of labor, land, money and entrepreneurship that could be exploited for manufacturing within a country.”
23 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 be combined to form a catchy acronym or phrase. The most recent of these to gain significant traction is the ‘MINT’ countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey).98 Jim O’Neill, the Goldman Sachs economist who coined the term BRICs, has been prominent in drawing attention to the MINT’s.99
Mr O’Neill believes that Nigeria “could be one of the top 15” largest economies in the world by 2050.100 Others also see massive potential in the Nigerian economy in forthcoming decades. In its 2011 report The World in 2050, PwC, the consultancy, projected Nigeria to become the 13th largest economy by 2050.101 More recently, McKinsey, another consultancy, in its July 2014 report Nigeria’s renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy estimated that Nigeria could potentially achieve growth of 7% per year up to 2030, which would make it a top-20 economy, bigger than the Netherlands.102 Nigeria was the world’s 23rd largest economy in 2013.103
Current economic situation uncertain Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy and has experienced fast growth over the past 15 years. A large proportion of the population has not seen the benefits of this growth, with high rates of poverty, particularly in rural areas. Recently revised data show the economy to be larger and more diversified than previously thought, with fast-growing industries such as manufacturing and telecommunications driving growth. Nevertheless, the oil and gas sector remains crucially important, accounting for almost 95% of exports and up to 75% of government revenue. The steep fall in the oil price since mid-2014 has therefore hurt the economy, with the local currency depreciating meaning that imports are more expensive, the government has to cut its expenditure and growth forecasts have been lowered.104
Annual GDP growth (%) Oil price (Brent crude) IMF data and forecasts (Oct '14) US$ per barrel, daily data 12 IMF forecasts 120 10 (Oct'14) 100 8 80 6 60 4 40 2 20 0 0 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 '19 Jan '14 Apr '14 Jul '14 Oct '14 Jan '15 Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database Oct'14 Source: FT
The need to become less dependent on the oil sector Recent developments only serve to highlight the need for the Nigerian economy to become less beholden to oil. Indeed the government’s 2015 budget plan makes clear the need to
98 The MINT acronym originated in a strategic plan from the Japanese company Panasonic in 2010. They used the term “MINTS + B” to denote Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Balkans, parts of the world where growth in sales could be achieved. In May 2011, Fidelity, the large investment company, highlighted the MINT economies in an effort to find markets with strong long-term potential gains for investors. 99 In 2014 Jim O’Neill made a BBC radio series looking at each of the countries, including Nigeria, that form the MINTs. 100 Jim O’Neill, “Nigeria may be one of the top 15 economies by 2050”, Business Report, 9 April 2014 101 PWC, “The World in 2050”, 2011 102 McKinsey Global Institute, “Nigeria’s renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy”, July 2014, p.2 103 Using market exchange rate. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2014 database 104 For more on recent developments in the economy, see section 4.5 of this paper.
24 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 become a non-oil economy, a goal reiterated by President Jonathan recently.105 This will require better management of the public finances, a broadening of the tax base and more inclusive growth.
Fast-growing sectors such as telecommunications and media will be part of this diversification and the population’s embrace of entrepreneurialism, together with the projected rapid growth in the working-age population, create opportunities for strong growth.
In its report, McKinsey argues that there is potential for rapid growth in the non-oil sector over the next 15 years.106 It believes potential growth in manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade, and infrastructure sectors will outpace that of agriculture and oil, creating a more diverse economy. This is based on assumptions that Nigeria takes advantage of its potential by increasing the productivity of the workforce, and that government is effective in addressing some of the economy’s key structural barriers to growth such as weak infrastructure, high levels of corruption, poor education levels and an unproductive agricultural sector.
The government’s long-term strategy for structural reforms is reflected in its 2020 Vision and Transformation Agenda plans. These are aimed at boosting the country’s productivity and competitiveness and making growth more inclusive by diversifying the economy away from oil.107
Oil and gas sector While the need to become less dependent on oil is clear, the oil and gas sector will remain an important part of the economy. Oil reserves are the second largest in Africa at an estimated 37 billion barrels and revenues from production will continue to provide much- needed revenue to government.108
As such, improving the performance of a sector that has been struggling in recent years is an important component of delivering a stronger economy.
Reducing disruptions to supply form a key part of this agenda. Between 100,000-500,000 barrels of oil per day (up to 20-25% of potential production) are lost due to ageing infrastructure, poor maintenance and theft from pipelines. An estimated $11 billion in revenues was lost due to oil theft from 2009 to 2011.109
For these reasons, oil production in recent years has fallen short of what was expected, leading to budget shortfalls. The need for investment in the sector, which generally comes from international oil companies is therefore clear.
However, security risks in the form of pipeline vandalism, as well as activities of militants in the Niger Delta region, have dampened the appetite to invest. Uncertainty with regard to the regulatory climate is another factor behind the absence of investment and exploration activities.
The Petroleum Industry Bill was initially proposed in 2008 in order to improve transparency in the state-run oil company and introduce new fiscal terms to govern the sector. The bill has
105 “Nigeria’s Jonathan Sees Stable Economy, Strong Naira in 2015 ”, Bloomberg, 1 January 2015 106 McKinsey Global Institute, “Nigeria’s renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy”, July 2014, pp.37-8 107 IMF, Nigeria: 2013 article IV consultation - staff report, April 2014, p.18 108 US Energy Information Agency, Nigeria country report, December 2013 109 US Energy Information Agency, Nigeria country report, December 2013
25 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 still not been passed and this uncertainty has deterred international oil companies from investment projects.
With the right reforms, McKinsey estimates that production could increase from 2.4 million barrels per day to more than 3 million in 2030, helping to provide an additional $35 billion a year to GDP by 2030.110
Young population expanding rapidly presents opportunity for growth With a population of around 177 million, Nigeria is already Africa’s most populous country. Rapid growth is expecting to continue with the UN projecting the population to climb to 440 million in 2050 (this would be 10% above the projected US population of 400 million).111 Demographics are also favourable with the working-age population (those aged 15-64) projected to rise from 85 million in 2010 to 260 million in 2050.
Nigerian and US population projections to 2050 Every five years to 2050 500
400 US
300 Nigeria 200
100
0 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Source: UN, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision
This could help boost growth in a number of ways.112 A rising population boosts demand for goods and services in the economy creating more businesses, expanding existing ones and creating the potential for economies of scale to develop (thereby lowering production costs). The rise in the working-age population also provides a larger potential pool of workers for businesses. The sheer size of the country and the large number of potential new customers also makes it attractive to foreign investors. Population growth is also likely to lead to greater urbanisation, which is closely associated with economic development and improved standards of living.113 Large urban areas have been shown to boost innovation and allow firms to service larger numbers of people more cheaply.
High poverty levels and poor education skills present barriers Poverty Strong population and economic growth over the past 15 years has not translated into lower poverty levels, which have remained high and stagnant since the 1980s. The World Bank estimates that 62% of the population in 2010 lived on less than $1.25 a day, the same as in 2004 and 1992.114 Poverty rates are higher in rural areas than urban areas and much higher in remote areas of the north than in the relatively prosperous coastal cities such as Lagos.
110 This GDP estimate includes natural gas production. Source: McKinsey Global Institute, “Nigeria’s renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy”, July 2014, p.53 111 UN, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision 112 McKinsey Global Institute, “Nigeria’s renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy” July 2014, p.32 113 World Bank blog Africa Can End Poverty, “Can rapid population growth be good for economic development?”, 15 April 2010 114 World Bank, World Development Indicators [accessed 9 January 2015]
26 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02
Common factors behind poverty across the nation include the lack of an overall social protection safety net and poor infrastructure (discuused in more detail below).115
The higher levels of rural poverty are often associated with low productivity in the agriculture sector, which as the dominant employer, has suffered from underinvestment and failed to move beyond a subsistence level. Nigerian farms yield less than comparable countries and small farmholders generally lack knowledge of farming best practice, meaning productivity in the sector is poor. In addition, a growing population has also reduced plot sizes and a poor infrastructure limits the ability to sell crops to market.
The government launched its Agricultural Transformation Action Plan in 2011, a series of market-oriented reforms designed to: boost the efficiency of the sector; make it more profitable; and move it up the value chain of agricultural products.116
Urbanisation has not raised income levels as quickly as it has in other fast-growing developing nations. A huge number of Nigerians work informally, mostly in very small enterprises. Such informal small companies are unlikely to have access to capital, innovate and expand. Profits are also less likely to remain in the business, reducing the chances for expansion. A lack of formal employees on contracts in large businesses also reduces productivity, as workers are less likely to be given training and acquire new skills. A survey of businesses found that 63% of new jobs created in the first three quarters of 2014 were in the informal sector.117 Urban areas also suffer from a relatively high cost of living resulting from a limited housing stock (especially in Lagos), high transport costs and high food prices (due to poor productivity in the agricultural sector).
Education levels Skill levels of the workforce in Nigeria are generally seen as poor, with plenty of room for improvement. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index ranks Nigeria as 124 out of 144 countries in terms of higher education and training.118 More fundamentally, 35 million adults cannot read or write and UNESCO found that 10 million children aged between 6 and 17 are not in school.119 Boko Haram’s targeting of schools in the north of the country presents substantial additional barriers to expanding educational attainment there. These shortfalls in human capital restrict economic productivity and therefore wages.
With a rising young population, the labour market will need to be able to absorb millions of new entrants in the decades to come. Therefore in order to maximize both the country’s growth potential and reduce poverty rates it is crucial that education levels of the current and future workforce are raised.
Poor business environment and infrastructure hinders growth prospects Potential for stronger private sector Nigeria is a strongly entrepreneurial society, with the 2013 Global Entrepreneurial Monitor reporting that 40% of those of working age were involved in setting up their own business in the past three-and-a-half years, the highest proportion of the 70 countries surveyed. In addition, 81% of those aged 18-64 agree that most people in Nigeria consider starting a business a desirable career choice – ninth highest of the 65 countries in the survey (the UK
115 Much of information in this section is from McKinsey Global Institute, “Nigeria’s renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy”, July 2014, pp.16-25 116 Looney, Robert E.. Economy (Nigeria), in Europa World online. London, Routledge. House of Commons. Retrieved 08 January 2015 from http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ng.ec 117 National Bureau of Statistics, Selected Tables from Job Creation and Employment Survey 3rd Quarters 2014, November 2014 118 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Index 2014–2015 119 African Development Bank, Nigeria Economic Outlook 2014, p.12 and McKinsey report, p36
27 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 figure was 54%).120 This suggests the country is well placed to build a strong and successful private sector that can take advantage of new technologies and to exploit expanding markets both at home and abroad.
The vast commercial area centred around Lagos in the south-west already contributes an important share of the country’s economic activity, but has the potential to become more productive and take advantage of its location on the coast that is favourable for trade, tourism and industry.121
Poor business environment To be able to fully capitalise on these positive foundations, the country’s current poor business environment needs to improve.
At present, weaknesses in business regulations are holding back the private sector. These include poor regulations in tax administration, the enforcement of contracts and difficulties in starting a business. Measures of international competitiveness reveal the extent of the problem. The World Bank’s Doing Business rankings put Nigeria 170th out of 189 countries for “ease of doing business” in 2014, just above Zimbabwe (171st) but below Cameroon (158th), Ghana (70th) and South Africa (43rd).122 Nigeria does especially poorly in terms of businesses getting electricity (ranking 187th out of 189 countries), registering property (185th) and paying taxes (179th). Businesses, particularly smaller ones, have difficulty getting access to finance and those that can agree loans face very high rates of interest.123
Nigerian rankings in World Bank Doing Business report Out of 189 countries 2015 Change Topics rank from 2014* Overall 170 up 5 Starting a Business 129 up 9 Dealing with Construction Permits 171 down 3 Getting Electricity 187 down 1 Registering Property 185 0 Getting Credit 52 up 73 Protecting Minority Investors 62 down 1 Paying Taxes 179 down 2 Trading Across Borders 159 0 Enforcing Contracts 140 down 1 Resolving Insolvency 131 down 2
Note: *up means Nigeria improved its rank Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2015
120 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2013, January 2014 and McKinsey Global Institute, “Nigeria’s renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy”, July 2014, p.32 121 McKinsey Global Institute, “Nigeria’s renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy”, July 2014, p.31 122 World Bank, Ease of Doing Business (2014) in Nigeria 123 IMF, Nigeria: 2013 article IV consultation - staff report, April 2014
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The World Economic Forum in its Global Competitiveness Report, ranked Nigeria 127th out of 144 countries in 2014/15, below Cameroon (116th), Ghana (111th), and South Africa (56th).124 Nigeria does particularly poorly on the quality of public institutions (132nd) and infrastructure (134th).
Corruption, as well as the perception of corruption, hinders growth in Nigeria by creating additional costs (in the form of bribes) for firms, distorts the market, leads to the misuse of public funds and deters foreign investment. Transparency International ranks Nigeria as equal 136th out of 175 countries in its Corruptions Perceptions Index of public institutions in 2014, below Ghana (61st), South Africa (67th) and the Ivory Coast (115th).125
Political and security instability presents an additional problem for businesses, particularly for businesses operating in conflict areas of the country. The threat of violence and terrorism may lead to companies investing in security, creating an additional cost to doing business. These concerns make the country less attractive to foreign investors. Political instability also creates uncertainty, with some fears over the potential impact of the Presidential election
Weak infrastructure Nigeria’s poor infrastructure is a major obstacle to growth and will continue to be so unless significant investment is made. The World Economic Forum in its Global Competitiveness Report ranked Nigeria 134th out of 144 countries for its overall infrastructure in 2014/15.126 The quality of the transport network is weak, with severe congestion in city centres like Lagos, unpaved roads in many areas and high rates of road accidents. The rail network is patchy with limited coverage. There is no deep-water port (though two are being built) and Lagos’s ports are beset with congestion.127 This makes it difficult for businesses to maintain reliable supply chains and raises their transportation costs.128
Electricity supply is poor and extremely unreliable. Demand far exceeds supply, meaning there are frequent power cuts. Lack of maintenance leads to loss of power in transit of up to 30%, and power stations only generate about 4GW of electricity, one tenth that of the capacity in South Africa.129 Most businesses buy their own generators, adding to production costs. The World Bank’s Doing Business report ranks Nigeria as the third worst in the world in providing business with electricity, only above Bangladesh and Madagascar.130 The government in 2013 privatised the generation and distribution of power (it retained transmission) in the hope of improving efficiency in the sector.131
The government also introduced a 30-year National Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan (NIIMP) in 2013 to try and address the weakness in the nation’s infrastructure. It aims to accelerate and coordinate projects and raise the stock of Nigeria’s infrastructure from 20- 25% of GDP to 70% by 2043.132 Funding will be provided, almost equally in the first five years, by the public and private sectors. The plan estimates that Nigeria requires over $3 trillion to deliver the quality of infrastructure desired in the plan.133 Given the cutbacks in the
124 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Index 2014–2015 125 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 126 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Index 2014–2015 – Nigeria 127 Looney, Robert E., “Economy (Nigeria)”, in Europa World online. London, Routledge. House of Commons. Retrieved 08 January 2015 from http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ng.ec 128 “Africa's testing ground; Business in Nigeria”, The Economist, 23 August 2014 129 Ibid., and McKinsey Global Institute, “Nigeria’s renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy”, July 2014, p.45 130 World Bank, Ease of Doing Business (2014) rankings 131 African Development Bank, Nigeria Economic Outlook 2014, p.9 132 African Development Bank, Nigeria Economic Outlook 2014, p.9 and National Planning Commission, “NIIMP: Planning Commission Engages States to Establish Infrastructure Delivery Units” 133 National Planning Commission, “Bridging Nigeria’s infrastructural gaps through NIIMP”, September 2014
29 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 government’s budget as a result of falling oil revenues, it remains to be seen how much funding the plan will actually receive.
Conclusion In order for the optimistic scenarios of Nigeria’s economy to be achieved, a large number of significant barriers to growth need to be overcome. These include a poor business environment, high poverty, corruption, poor infrastructure (especially electricity supply), low skill levels of workers, security concerns and over-dependence on the oil sector for government revenues and exports.
As numerous and significant as these challenges are, rapid population growth, good demographics, an entrepreneurial culture, ample natural resources, favourable geographic location and fast-growing non-oil sectors present a real opportunity for Nigeria to improve the living standards of its vast population and, as some anticipate, become one of the world’s largest 15 economies by 2050.
3 Nigeria’s foreign relations 3.1 US-Nigeria relations Overview The US views Nigeria as a key power in Africa and a valued strategic partner. This perspective first took hold in the 1970s, when Nigeria emerged as an oil power.
While relations were often strained during periods of military rule in Nigeria, they have generally been much more positive since the country’s return to civilian rule in 1999 – but this does not mean that they have become straightforward.
Levels of oil imports to the US from Nigeria have begun to decline – a trend which looks set to continue.134 In July 2014, Nigeria exported no crude oil to the US for the first time since 1973.135
The main framework for bilateral dialogue and co-operation today is provided by the US- Nigeria Binational Commission, which was established in 2010. Five working groups meet regularly, covering: good governance, transparency and integrity; energy and investment; regional security; Niger Delta; and agriculture and food security.136
John Campbell writes: “Unfortunately, the United States and other outsiders have little leverage over the Jonathan government”. He notes that Nigeria is not reliant on US aid and that American capacity to influence its policies or actions is further limited by the country’s large size and economic weight.137
In early January 2015, the US Ambassador to Nigeria, James Entwistle, said: “I am not worried in the least that Nigeria is going to disintegrate in 2015”.138
Security The two countries co-operate on counter-terrorism. Nigeria is eligible for assistance under the US Government’s Global Security Contingency Fund. The US has designated a number
134 T. Ogunlesi, “The ebb and flow of US-Nigeria relations”, blog, 14 August 2014 135 “Nigeria stops oil exports to US as shale effect cuts demand”, Financial Times, 3 October 2014 136 US-Nigeria Binational Commission 137 J. Campbell, “US policy to counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram”, Council on Foreign Relations, November 2014, p4 138 “No signs of Nigeria likely to fall apart in 2015 – US”, Daily Independent, 8 January 2015
30 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 of individuals linked to Boko Haram as global terrorists, including its leader, Muhammed Abubakar Shekau, and has designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation.
Nigeria is a participant in the US-sponsored Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. However, Nigerian officials and sections of public opinion are sometimes sensitive about ‘outside interference’ in the country’s internal affairs and across the region, particularly with regard to corruption, human rights and security issues.139
While not overtly hostile to it, Nigeria has viewed the establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) with a certain mistrust, opposing proposals to establish a headquarters within Africa.140
On the US side, concerns about human rights abuses committed by the Nigerian security forces and rampant official corruption has prevented fuller co-operation.141 The ‘Leahy Law’, first passed by Congress in 1997, prohibits assistance to any foreign security forces which are implicated in gross violations of human rights.
More broadly, US Department of Defense officials have called Nigeria “an extremely challenging partner to work with” and “slow to adapt with new strategies, new doctrines, and new tactics”.142
The international furore surrounding the kidnapping by Boko Haram of an estimated 270 schoolgirls from the town of Chibok in Borno state in April 2014 has led to heightened counterterrorism co-operation.
AFRICOM personnel were part of a Department of State-led interagency coordination and assessment cell set up in response to this kidnapping to identify any assistance and resources required by the Nigerian government to locate and recover the missing girls.
Joint efforts to promote a “civilian-centred approach to security” were also stepped up, as was work to create a counter-Improvised Explosive Device capability and strengthen the intelligence capability of the Nigerian security forces.
The US is providing commercial satellite data and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support to Nigeria’s military.
The US is also assisting regional efforts to enhance border security along Nigeria's borders with Chad, Niger and Cameroon.143
In May 2014, the US deployed about 80 military personnel to Chad, where they support the operation of drones based in the capital, N’djamena, over northern Nigeria and neighbouring countries.
Co-operation continues to have its limits. In late April 2014, US experts began working with Nigeria's newly created counterterrorism-focused ranger battalion. However, in December 2014, the US confirmed that this effort had been terminated early by the Nigerian Government.
139 L. Ploch, “Nigeria: Current issues and US policy”, Congressional Research Service, 24 April 2013 140 W. O. Alli, “The role of Nigeria in regional security policy”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Abuja, 2012, p80 141 L. Ploch Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently asked questions”, Congressional Research Service, 10 June 2014 142 Testimony of Alice Friend, Department of Defense Principal Director for African Affairs, to the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, 15 May 2014 143 “DOD Sends UAV, 80 Airmen to Help Nigerian Search”, American Forces Press Service, 22 May 2014
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Although no public reason for the termination was given, some claimed that it came in response to a US refusal to sell lethal military equipment to Nigeria.144 The US has refuted recent claims that it has introduced an arms embargo against Nigeria.145
Trade Nigeria has run a goods trade surplus with the US every year between 1995 and 2013. 146
The US has been Nigeria’s single largest goods export market every year since 1995. Levels of Nigerian goods exports to the United States peaked at $125 billion in 2011, though this has fallen sharply in subsequent years, reaching $103 billion in 2013. This fall is due to a reduction in oil exports, owing to increases in American shale oil production.
Nigerian Goods Trade with USA, 1995 - 2013 40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000 Exports
10,000 Valueof trade ($ millions) Imports 5,000
-
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Between 2011 and 2013 the value of Nigerian oil exports to the US fell from $34.5 billion to $13.7 billion. In July 2014, Nigeria did not export any oil to the US for the first time since records began in 1973.147 In spite of this, oil and natural gas still comprise the vast majority of Nigerian goods exports to the US, making up 98% of total goods exports in 2013.
In 2013, the US was Nigeria’s second largest source of goods imports, after China. Nigeria’s largest goods imports from the US were manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment.
In 2000, the US and Nigeria signed the United States-Nigeria Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). This agreement sought to provide “regular, high-level dialogue on enhancing U.S.-Nigeria economic ties and improving co-ordination on multilateral and bilateral trade and investment issues.”148 In March 2014, the TIFA Council
144 “Nigeria ends US mission to counter Boko Haram”, Defense News, 1 December 2014 145 “No arms embargo on Nigeria: US”, The Nation, 9 January 2015 146 Trade data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database 147 Javier Blas, Victim of shale revolution, Nigeria stops exporting oil to US, Financial Times, 2 October 2014 148 Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. and Nigeria Conclude Meeting under Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, 3 December 2012
32 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 held its 8th meeting, led by U.S. Trade Representative Michael B. G. Froman and Nigerian Minister of Industry, Trade and Investment, Dr. Olusegun O. Aganga.149
Aid Although – unlike many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa – Nigeria is not heavily reliant on foreign aid, the US is Nigeria’s largest single bilateral aid donor. In total, the US allocated $419.1m in net Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to Nigeria in 2012 (the most recent year for which full data is available). Of that total, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) spent $238.2m on the following sectors:
Health - $173m (of which nearly two-thirds went on HIV/AIDs relief) Democracy and Governance - $23.6m Economic Development - $11.7m, of which over three-quarters went on agriculture) Education and Social Services - $9.3m Environment - $1.3m Programme Management - $19.3m150
In the Niger Delta, USAID is working with Chevron on a $50m programme to improve agricultural development and governance capacity. In the north, most of USAID’s work is focused on Bauchi and Sokoto states.151
The most striking characteristic of USAID’s work in Nigeria in 2012 was its overwhelming focus on the health sector: 79% of its total bilateral aid was spent on health. USAID spent relatively little by comparison with the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID – see below) on areas such as governance, economic development or education.
3.2 UK-Nigeria relations Overview Like the US, the UK views Nigeria as a key strategic partner in Africa but has longstanding concerns about the country’s governance and security. For its part, while Nigeria acknowledges the importance of the bilateral relationship today, official attitudes do sometimes echo a certain level of underlying public mistrust of the former colonial power and its motives.152
The UK has identified seven priorities for its strategic partnership with Nigeria. They are:
collaborating with Nigeria on science and innovation supporting development in Nigeria supporting British nationals in Nigeria strengthening UK relations with Nigeria to support mutual prosperity strengthening democracy, independent institutions and more effective governance in Nigeria working with Nigeria to beat national and international security threats working on bilateral foreign policy goals with Nigeria153
An issue which has sometimes complicated UK-Nigeria relations has been criticism of the Anglo-Dutch oil company Shell by international and local campaigners. Criticisms have
149 Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States and Nigeria Hold 8th Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Meeting, March 2014 150 USAID: Nigeria 151 L. Ploch, “Nigeria: Current issues and US policy”, Congressional Research Service, 24 April 2013 152 F. Aribisala, “Is Britain Nigeria’s evil stepmother?”, Nigeria Development and Finance Forum, 13 January 2014 153 “UK and Nigeria”, UK Government website
33 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 ranged from Shell’s alleged implication in human rights abuses committed by the Nigerian security forces to its failure to prevent or adequately compensate local communities for oil spills in the Niger Delta. In January 2015, Shell agreed a £55 million settlement with residents of the Bodo community in the Niger Delta for two oil spills in 2008 and 2009. This is said to be the first deal of its kind in Nigeria.154
Security Nigeria-UK co-operation to combat security threats has had by far the highest public and media profile recently. Such cooperation has often not gone entirely smoothly.
The British Government has had reservations about aspects of Nigeria’s policy on counterterrorism based mainly on the poor human rights record of its security forces. It has been correspondingly cautious about the assistance it has offered. To the reported frustration of the Nigerian Government, in the past this has limited the scope of UK involvement in military training programmes for forces deployed on counterinsurgency operations.155
However, as with the US, the kidnapping of about 270 schoolgirls by Boko Haram in April 2014 led to assistance being stepped up. In the immediate aftermath, the UK Government sent three teams of advisors in Nigeria, including experts in counter-terrorism, hostage negotiation and victim support, assisted by an RAF Sentinel reconnaissance aircraft from 5 (Army Cooperation) Squadron that was based in Ghana. The Sentinel aircraft appears to have been withdrawn since then.156
At a regional security conference in London in June 2014, measures to increase British involvement in training Nigerian security forces deployed on counterinsurgency operations were announced. The then Foreign Secretary William Hague said:
We will increase our work with the Nigerian Government to strengthen its capacity to deal with Boko Haram. This will mean significantly expanding the training and tactical assistance that the UK provides to the Nigerian Armed Forces. This will include helping to train units deployed on counter insurgency operations against Boko Haram in North East Nigeria. We will also provide further assistance to regional security and intelligence cooperation.
We also want to make sure that Boko Haram does not succeed in its twisted mission to deny education to girls, so together with the US, we will boost our education programmes to draw a million more boys and girls into education in Northern Nigeria. We will be increasing our support for girl’s education to help better protect those who are most vulnerable.
And through our Department for International Development, we will do even more to help Nigeria and the region deliver development and prosperity, ensuring that basic services and infrastructure are provided to those communities most at risk.157
In August 2014 three Tornado GR4 from 2 (Army Cooperation) Squadron were sent to the region. They were based at the French airbase at N'Djamena, Chad. The Tornados provided
154 “Shell agrees $84m deal over Niger Delta oil spill”, BBC News Online, 7 January 2015 155 Foreign Affairs Committee, “The UK’s response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa”, HC 86, 7th Report, Session 2013-14, 21 March 2014, Vol. 1, paras 58-63 156 HC Deb 12 January 2015 c606 157 “Foreign Secretary announces UK support following ministerial on Boko Haram”, FCO press release, 12 June 2014
34 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities. They appear to have been withdrawn since then.158
The Daily Telegraph reported in November 2014 that the UK was considering sending additional trainers to Nigeria following a request from the Nigerian Government.159 However, there have been no official statements announcing any additional training provision, which makes it unlikely that it has been provided.
The UK Government has recently expressed concern that military equipment given by Western countries to the Nigerian army has gone missing and that money donated to purchase such equipment has been misappropriated.160 It has made it clear that no British troops will be deployed on the ground in Nigeria in anything other than a training capacity.161
The UK has long had a small, permanent British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) based in Nigeria, which provides military training and advice. Members of the Nigerian armed forces attend UK training establishments.
The UK helped to establish the Joint Maritime Security Training Centre in Lagos in 2010 as part of the UK’s efforts to assist Nigeria in combating maritime piracy. HMS Portland, a Type 23 frigate, visited Lagos in March 2014. Sailors and Royal Marines conducted training with Nigerian sailors
Trade Nigeria ran a goods trade deficit with the UK between 1995 and 2010 and has run a surplus since then. 162
Nigerian Goods Exports with the UK, 1995 - 2013 7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000 Imports Valueof trade ($ millions) 1,000
-
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
158 HC Deb 12 January 2015 c606 159 “Britain plans more military trainers to help Nigeria fight Boko Haram”, Daily Telegraph, 28 November 2014. It is unclear whether this request was prompted by the fact that Nigeria had asked the US to terminate training its new counter-terrorism focused ranger battalion (see section 3.1 of this paper). 160 HC Deb 12 January 2015 c607 161 HC Deb 12 January 2015 c607 162 Trade data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database
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Nigerian goods exports to the UK doubled between 2007 and 2008 from $0.6 billion to $1.4 billion, before increasing further between 2010 and 2011 from $1.2 billion to $4 billion. Goods export values have remained above $4 billion ever since, peaking in 2012. These increases have been due to increased levels of oil exports. In 2013, the UK was Nigeria’s 8th largest export market. Oil and natural gas made up 85% of Nigerian exports to the UK.
The UK was Nigeria’s single largest source of imported goods between 1999 and 2001, before being overtaken by the US and subsequently China. Nigerian goods imports from the UK peaked at $2.8 billion in 2008 and have fluctuated in subsequent years. In 2013, Nigeria imported $2.2 billion worth of British goods, 4% of total imports. Nigeria’s largest goods imports from the UK were manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment.163
Aid DFID’s programmes are strongly focused on northern states in Nigeria. DFID’s top priorities in Nigeria are:
providing more people with better services, including education, healthcare and access to safe water and sanitation
helping Nigeria use its oil revenues to improve the lives of its citizens
help establish an enabling governance environment for tackling corruption and enhancing transparency and accountability164
The UK is Nigeria’s second biggest bilateral aid donor. DFID expenditure during 2013/14 was £266.2m.165 During the present financial year (2014/15), DFID plans to spend £275m in Nigeria in the following sectors:
Health - £94.4m Wealth creation - £65.1m Governance and security - £53.6m Education - £44.3m Poverty, hunger & vulnerability - £16.2m Climate change - £1.5m166
During 2014, the DFID-funded State Accountability and Voice (SAVI programme), which operates across ten of Nigeria’s states, received positive reviews as an exemplar of “politically smart, locally led development”.167
DFID does not currently allow UK funds to go through Nigerian government structures. DFID’s 2011-15 Operational Plan says:
DFID will continue to avoid putting any UK funds through government systems because of concerns about fiduciary risk, and avoiding the substitution of Nigerian resources with UK aid.168
In 2013, DFID published an Anti-Corruption Strategy for Nigeria.169
163 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database 164 DFID, Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, p71 165 DFID, Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, p71 166 DFID Nigeria, Operational Plan 2011-2015: updated June 2013. Expenditure on Nigeria is set to increase further in 2015/16 and 2016/17. See also the Nigeria entry on DFID’s Development Tracker website. 167 D. Booth, “Towards politically smart, locally led development in Africa”, African Arguments, 23 October 2014 168 DFID Nigeria, Operational Plan 2011-2015: updated June 2013
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3.3 EU-Nigeria relations Overview EU relations with Nigeria are framed by the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, a treaty signed by EU Member States and the members of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States, which includes Nigeria.170 Relations are also shaped by the ‘EU-Africa Strategic Partnership’ which was agreed in 2007.171 An EU-West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement which will govern trade relations with Nigeria was signed in July 2014 but is not yet in force.172
In 2009, an enhanced framework for political dialogue and cooperation, called the ‘Nigeria- EU Joint Way Forward’, was agreed. It says:
The purpose of the Joint Way Forward is to take the Nigeria-EU political dialogue and cooperation to a new level.
The Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward will be guided by the fundamental principles of ownership and joint responsibility, respect for human rights, good governance, democratic principles and the rule of law. Both parties are committed to advancing these values globally.
Nigeria and the EU consider each other as natural and strong partners. Nigeria and the EU share common values and ideals, both believing in peace and security, equality, democracy and tolerance as ways of developing prosperous and generous societies.
It is important to strengthen economic cooperation between the parties and stimulate the development of bonds between private industrial, commercial and financial actors. A strong private sector economy acting in partnership with a sound public administration is essential to achieve sustainable development.
The Parties during this process will take into due account their common concern for the environment and in particular, climate change as phenomena with an overall impact on security and development issues. Energy security is linked to these concerns. The impact of climate change in Europe and Africa and the role of technology innovation to reduce the adverse effects are of highest importance to Nigeria and the EU.
The Parties, in line with their common values, recognise the importance of promoting democracy and rule of law and of developing a human rights dimension in their dialogue touching upon a number of issues of mutual concern.
A key element of the Joint Way Forward is the common commitment to regional cooperation and integration. The EU fully supports Nigeria’s commitment to working with ECOWAS and the AU. Both Parties agree that the Joint Way Forward shall be supportive of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy by including several of the strategic priority areas and developing over time the remaining areas after common agreement.173
Since 2009, there have been five Nigeria-EU Ministerial Dialogues. The most recent took place in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, in November 2014.174
There will be an EU Observer Mission in Nigeria monitoring the February 2015 elections.
169 DFID, Anti-Corruption Strategy for Nigeria, January 2013 170 Europa – Cotonou Agreement 171 Africa—EU Partnership 172 European Commission, Trade—West Africa 173 The Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward, 9 June 2009 174 “Nigeria: EU partners Nigeria on elections, security”, Daily Independent, 28 November 2014
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Security The EU has provided funds over recent years to Nigeria for counterinsurgency initiatives, although it has shared wider concerns about the human rights record of Nigeria’s security forces. EU priorities on security have moved from the Niger Delta to the north of the country.
The EU has expressed grave concern about the deteriorating security situation in the north of Nigeria and has condemned Boko Haram’s attacks, including the kidnapping of the schoolgirls in Chibok.
In May 2014 it listed Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation.175 In July it added Ansaru to the list, as well as Boko Haram’s leader, Muhammed Abubakar Shekau.
In May 2014 the EU announced a new €9.9m counterterrorism package through its Instrument for Stability.176 The UK Government has called for Nigeria to be eligible for funds under the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, to which it has given financial support, but it appears so far without success.177
Trade Nigeria has run a goods trade surplus with the EU in all but four years between 1995 and 2013. 178
Nigerian Goods Trade with the EU, 1995 - 2013 45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000 Imports
Valueof trade ($ millions) 10,000
5,000
-
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Nigerian goods exports to the EU have increased dramatically in recent years, jumping from $19 billion in 2010 to $40 billion in 2012, before falling slightly to $35 billion in 2013. This is due to increased levels of oil exports, which jumped from $13.7 billion in 2010 to $33.9 billion in 2012. In 2013, Nigeria’s largest export markets within the EU were Spain, the Netherlands,
175 “The EU designates Boko Haram a terrorist organisation”, EU press release, 2 June 2014 176 J. Barna, “Insecurity in context: The rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, European Parliament Policy Department Note 2014/113, July 2014, pp21-2 177 Supplementary written evidence by FCO Minister of State Mark Simmonds to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s inquiry “The UK’s response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa”, December 2013 178 Trade data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database
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Germany, France, the UK and Italy, with oil and natural gas making up 92% of total Nigerian goods exports to the EU.
Nigerian goods imports from the EU peaked at $17.5 billion in 2008, before falling slightly in subsequent years, reaching $14 billion in 2013. Nigeria’s largest goods imports from the EU were manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment. In 2013, Nigeria’s largest sources of imports within the EU were France, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium.
The basis for Nigerian trade with the EU is the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, also known as the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. This covers Nigeria and 78 other developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. It was last revised in 2010.
In 2009 Nigeria and the EU signed the “Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward”, which sets out detailed plans for intensified dialogue and cooperation, including assistance with trade and promoting the diversification of the Nigerian economy.179
Nigeria is also one of 16 countries negotiating the West African Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU, described by former EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht as “a privileged economic partnership with West Africa that will be a foundation of long-term growth and future prosperity in a region that is so close to Europe.”180 The European Commission have described the terms of the deal as “providing West African firms with conditions that are more advantageous than those that apply to European exports to Africa.”181
Aid Whilst the European Commission’s overall programme is smaller than those of the UK or the US, it is still a major aid donor. Most of the European Union’s aid to Nigeria is delivered through the European Development Fund (EDF), which operates in multi-year cycles. Under the 10th EDF (2008 to 2013), €580m was allocated for Nigeria, targeting three priority areas: governance and human rights; peace and security; and trade and regional integration.182
The Country Strategy Paper for the 11th EDF (2014 to 2020) was finalised in June 2014.183 Programmable resources for the period have been set at €512m. Most of the funds are scheduled to go to three sectors: health, nutrition and resilience (€240m); sustainable energy and access to electricity (€150m); and rule of law, governance and democracy (€90m).184 The decision to focus on these sectors marks a significant shift in priorities.
The EU's humanitarian office – ECHO – is supporting food security and nutritional programmes in northern Nigeria, as well as assisting victims of violence.
3.4 China-Nigeria relations Overview China-Nigeria relations got off to a slow start after independence. Although China never officially recognised Biafra during the Nigerian civil war (1967-70), its stance was supportive. Nigeria only recognised the People’s Republic of China in 1971.
179 European Commission, Nigeria-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, 9 June 2009 180 European Commission, West African leaders back Economic Partnership Agreement with EU 11 July 2014 181 European Commission, West African leaders back Economic Partnership Agreement with EU 11 July 2014 182 EU-Nigeria Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2008-2013 183 EU External Action, Nigeria 184 EU-Nigeria National Indicative Programme 2014-2020
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While relations improved a great deal in the decades that followed, Taiwan remained a bigger trading partner for Nigeria than the mainland well into the 1980s. However, things began to change thereafter and economic ties have “grown phenomenally in the 21st Century” as China has actively trawled sub-Saharan Africa for much-needed natural resources.185
By 2011, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria since the beginning of the millennium was estimated at $7 billion.186 Military cooperation has also grown. However, Nigeria is not a large oil exporter to China.187 In terms of development aid to Nigeria, China remains a minor player.188
Strategic Partnership Relations between the two countries were close during the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007). In 2005, China and Nigeria upgraded the relationship to a ‘Strategic Partnership’. This emerged in the context of a broader ‘China-Africa New Strategic Partnership’. The institutional framework for this broader partnership is the Forum on China- Africa Cooperation, a ministerial-level summit that was established in 2000.189
Trade Nigeria has run a goods trade deficit with China every year between 1995 and 2013. 190
Nigerian Goods Trade with China, 1995 - 2013 16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000 Value of of Value trademillions) ($
2,000
-
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Nigerian goods exports to China have been increasing steadily in recent years, from $0.2 billion in 2006 to $1.6 billion in 2013, though they peaked at $1.7 billion in 2011. The vast majority of Nigerian exports to China are oil and natural gas, which made up 72% of exports in 2013.
185 D. Shinn and J. Eisenman, China and Africa. A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, 2012), pp301-2 186 D. Shinn and J. Eisenman, China and Africa. A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, 2012), pp303 187 “China” US Energy Information Administration [last updated February 2014] 188 D. Shinn and J. Eisenman, China and Africa. A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, 2012), pp304; J. Campbell, “Who’s in charge, China or Nigeria?”, globalpost.com, 7 June 2010 189 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 190 Trade data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database
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China has been Nigeria’s largest source of imported goods every year since 2006, overtaking the US. Import values peaked in 2013 when Nigeria imported $14 billion of Chinese goods, a quarter of total imports. The vast majority of imported Chinese goods were manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment. In 2006, during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Nigeria, China secured four oil drilling licenses in exchange for a $4 billion investment in oil and infrastructure projects in Nigeria.191
Facets of the relationship For its part, China’s relative agnosticism about governance and human rights is attractive to Nigeria. However, predictions that Nigeria and other African countries might seriously downgrade relations with Western countries and institutions in favour of China have so far proven wrong.
The contemporary China-Nigeria relationship is not without its tensions. As cheap Chinese imports flood Nigeria, critics have accused China of just being another ‘neo-colonial’ power. Major economic projects involving Chinese state companies have often been announced only to fall through, including in the oil sector.
President Obasanjo introduced an ‘oil for infrastructure’ approach to relations with China, under which Nigeria awarded Chinese energy companies oil blocs in return for Chinese- financed and built infrastructure projects, but his successor, President Umaru Yar’Adua abandoned this approach, instead encouraging Chinese companies to access Nigeria’s oil resources by buying stakes in existing companies.192
The number of Chinese living in Nigeria was recently estimated at 70,000. The arrival of Chinese traders and low-cost Chinese goods has led to allegations that domestic manufacturing and trade are being undermined. For example, Nigeria’s textile industry is now under severe pressure; Chinese businesses have illegally copied Nigerian designs and then sold them under fake labels back in Nigeria, as well as in other parts of the world.193 There are an estimated 12,000 Nigerians resident in China.194
3.5 India-Nigeria relations Overview India and Nigeria have long had cordial relations. They have shared history and values around decolonisation and were subsequently both members of the Non-Aligned Movement.
Today both countries are primarily motivated by the concrete benefits of economic cooperation. Nigeria is India’s most important trade partner in Africa and India is Nigeria’s second largest trading partner.195
However, there is also an element of competition with China underpinning India’s growing interest in building ties with important African countries such as Nigeria. This element of rivalry potentially gives Nigeria greater room for manoeuvre in conducting its relations with these two rising economic powers.196
191 “China and Nigeria agree oil deal”, BBC News Online, 26 April 2006 192 G. Mthembu-Salter, “Elephants, ants and superpowers: Nigeria’s relations with China”, South African Institute of International Affairs, September 2009, pp7-9 193 D. Shinn and J. Eisenman, China and Africa. A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, 2012), pp304-5 194 “Nigerians in China rely on Chinese ladies for survival – envoy”, Newswatch Times, 18 May 2014 195 “India-Nigeria relations”, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, January 2014 196 S. Naidu, “India stepping up the ante in African relations”, Pambazuka News, 25 March 2010
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India has provided assistance in the fields of defence and education since independence. Indian IT companies have set up franchises in Nigeria and these have provided training opportunities for local students.197
Trade Nigeria has run a goods trade surplus with India every year between 1995 and 2013.198
Nigerian Goods Exports Trade with India, 1995 - 2013 16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
Value of of Value trademillions) ($ 4,000 Imports 2,000
-
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Nigerian goods exports to India have increased dramatically over the last decade, from $1 billion in 2005 to $12 billion in 2013, though they peaked at $14 billion in 2011.
The vast majority of Nigerian exports to India are oil and natural gas, which made up 98% of exports in 2013. India has become the largest importer of Nigerian crude oil. In 2013, Nigeria made up about 8% of India’s oil imports.199
Indian goods imports to Nigeria have increased over the last decade, from $0.7 billion in 2005 to $3.1 billion in 2013, though they peaked at $3.5 billion in 2012.
Both India and Nigeria are signatories to the ‘Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries’ (GSTP), signed in 1988 and operation since 1989.200 This agreement aims to foster trade between developing countries within the framework of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Facets of the relationship As with China, initiatives between India’s oil companies and their Nigerian counterparts have not always gone smoothly, sometimes falling victim to the vagaries of Nigerian politics.
197 P. Vasudevan, “The changing nature of Nigeria-India relations”, Chatham House Programme Paper AFP 2010/02, December 2010, pp4-6 198 Trade data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database 199 “India” US Energy Information Administration [last updated June 2014] 200 Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries
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In 2007 the two countries signed the ‘Abuja Declaration on Strategic Partnership’, which committed both countries to expand ties in trade, investment and consular relations.201
More broadly, Nigeria participates in the India-Africa Forum Summits (IAFS).202 The IAFS draw their agenda from the first summit, which produced the 2008 Delhi Declaration and the second, which agreed the ‘Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation’.203 The third such summit was due to take place in December 2014 but it was postponed until 2015 following the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.
In 2012 the India-Africa Business Council was also established, with the Nigerian businessman Aliko Dangote one of its co-chairs.204
The Indian community in Nigeria has been estimated at 35,000, with 25,000 of them Indian Nationals but other reports suggest that the real number may be significantly higher than that. The community is well-established and relatively affluent.205
About 50,000 Nigerians live in India. There were protests by Nigerian expatriates in Goa in late 2013, following the murder of one of their number, leading to dozens of arrests; the police there had been investigating suspected Nigerian links to drug gangs. The incident aroused strong feelings back in Nigeria.206
201 “Nigeria-India: A key partnership”, lecture by HE Nonye Rajis-Okpara, Nigerian High Commissioner to Singapore at the National University of Singapore, 21 March 2013 202 See the website for the India-Africa Forum Summit 2011 203 New Delhi Declaration, 9 April 2008; Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, 25 May 2011. See also the website for the Africa-India Forum Summit 2011 204 J. Lal, “India Africa Forum Summits: Engagements and outcomes”, Indian Council of World Affairs, 20 November 2013 205 “India-Nigeria relations”, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, January 2014 206 “Murder sparks India-Nigeria diplomatic storm”, Al Jazeera, 10 November 2013
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4 Nigeria: country profile 4.1 History
5000 BC Archaeological evidence suggests that there was human habitation in the region at this time.
Circa 800 BC The Jos Plateau is settled by the Nok – a Neolithic and iron age organised society. Circa 800 AD Kanem-Bornu and the Songhai Empires emerge. The age of city-states, kingdoms and empires in the region begins. Late 11thCent. The ruling elite of the Kanem-Bornu Empire converts to Islam. 1200-1300 The Kingdom of Benin and Oyo, a Yoruba state, emerge. 1472 First European contact. 1591 The Songhai Empire is conquered by Sultan of Morocco.
Early HistoryEarly 1700s Britain and other European states become heavily involved in trans-Atlantic slave trade. 1809 The Sokoto Caliphate is formed in the north of what is today Nigeria. 1861 Lagos is annexed by Britain, marking a first step towards formal colonisation. 1885-6 The Royal Niger Company is given responsibility for the British sphere of influence. 1893 The Ibadan Empire is defeated by Britain; The Yoruba agree to a British Protectorate. The British Niger Coast Protectorate is established. 1900-3 The Igbo people are conquered and the Sokoto Caliphate falls. The Royal Niger Company has its charter revoked. The British establish a Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and a Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Frederick Lugard is appointed High Commissioner in the Northern Protectorate, where he establishes a system of ‘indirect rule’ through traditional leaders. 1914 Abeokuta, the last independent polity, is conquered by Britain. The Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria are unified. 1922 Part of the German colony of Kamerun is added to Nigeria under a League of Nations mandate. 1947 A Federal Constitution based on extensive autonomy for the three regions – north, south and east – Colonial Period comes into force. It represents an attempt to accommodate ethnic and religious tensions between the regions. 1954 The Federation becomes self-governing. 1959-60 Elections to a bicameral federal parliament are held. On 1 October 1960, Nigeria gains its independence under northern Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa. 1963 Nigeria becomes a Republic. 1966 Major-General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo, leads a military coup in January. Prime Minister Balewa is assassinated. The federal system is abolished. In August, a counter-coup is successfully carried out by Lieutenant-General Yakubu Gowon. Ironsi is assassinated. A federal system is reintroduced. 1967 Three states in the east of the country secede as the Republic of Biafra, provoking civil war. 1970 Biafra surrenders and is reintegrated into Nigeria. 1975-6 Gowon is overthrown and replaced by Brigadier Murtala Mohammed. Following his assassination in 1976, Mohammed is in turn replaced by Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo. 1979 Obasanjo returns Nigeria to civilian rule under a presidential system. Shehu Shagari is elected. 1983 Shagari is re-elected amidst claims of fraud. In December, Major-General Muhammed Buhari seizes power in another military coup. 1985 General Ibrahim Babangida seizes power from Buhari.
1993 A return to civilian rule is aborted when General Sani Abacha seizes power following the annulment of preliminary results indicating that Moshood Abiola had won the presidential election. 1995 Execution of Ogoni campaigner and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa. EU imposes sanctions against Nigeria and the Commonwealth suspends the country’s membership. 1998 Abacha dies and is succeeded by Major-General Abdulsalami Abubakar. Abiola dies in custody. 1999 Olusegun Obasanjo, a southerner and the candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), is elected civilian president. Membership of the Commonwealth is restored and international sanctions lifted. 2000 Several northern states adopt Sharia law amidst rising ethnic and religious violence in different parts of
independence
- the country. 2003 Obasanjo is re-elected. His second term is also marked by ethnic and religious violence as well as low- level insurgency in the Niger Delta, the heartland of Nigeria’s oil industry.
Post 2007 PDP candidate and northerner Umaru Musa Yar’Adua is elected president in deeply flawed elections. 2009 Radical Islamist movement Boko Haram launches a campaign of violence in northeast Nigeria. The security forces respond with their own operations. Boko Haram’s leader Mohamed Yusuf dies in police custody. An amnesty programme helps to calm the situation in the Niger Delta. 2009-10 President Yar-Adua falls ill and is incapacitated, provoking a constitutional crisis. Southerner Vice- President Goodluck Jonathan takes over, first in an acting role, and then as his permanent replacement. 2011 Having initially said that he would not stand in the presidential election, Goodluck Jonathan does so and is elected. 2011-14 Boko Haram escalates its campaign of violence. President Jonathan declares a state of emergency in three northern states: Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Ethnic and religious violence continues in the ‘middle belt’ of the country. Jim O’Neill declares that Nigeria could become an emerging economic giant.
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4.2 The people of Nigeria Population, ethnicity and language Recent estimates put Nigeria’s population at around 177 million.207 The 2006 census produced a figure of 140 million.208 It is Africa’s most populous country and the eighth most populous country in the world.
It is a youthful country; about 62.5% of the population is 24 or under.209 It is a country that is rapidly urbanising; about 50% of the population now lives in towns or cities. The south of Nigeria is much more heavily populated than the north. Lagos, the country’s economic capital, has a population of over 11 million and has been described as one of the world’s ‘mega-cities’.210
Nigeria is also Africa’s most ethnically diverse country. There are at least 250 ethnic groups. Most are small in number. The largest groups are: Hausa-Fulani at an estimated 29% of the population, Yoruba at 21%, Igbo (also described as Ibo) at 18%, Ijaw at 10%, Kanuri at 4%, Ibibio at 3.5%, and Tiv at 2.5%. There are over 500 indigenous languages. English is the official language.211
Violence and insecurity Daily life for many ordinary Nigerians over the last 50 years has been characterised by violence and insecurity. Hundreds of thousands of civilians died in the 1967-1970 civil war, when Igbo political leaders declared the creation of the independent state of Biafra in the east of the country. The Nigerian army ultimately defeated the Biafran army, forcibly reuniting the country.
In significant parts of the country since then, there has been increasingly intense competition between groups for scarce resources such as water and land. Tensions have also tended to be particularly high where levels of inward migration are significant. In the multi-ethnic, religiously diverse states at the intersection of the ‘Middle Belt’ and the north of the country, conflict between ‘settlers’ and ‘indigenes’ has triggered violence.212
Many Nigerians have, at particular points in the past, felt themselves to be politically and economically marginalised. Today, it is the people of the north who make this claim. Previously, the Igbo and the people of the Niger Delta have done so.
Public and private realms The people of Nigeria live in a country where the distinction between “the public and the private realms” is often neither clear nor well-established. Public power and resources have tended to be viewed as the “patrimony” of “personal and narrow group interests”.213
Public/private is just one of several distinctions which might seem natural to Westerners but which many ordinary Nigerians would view as highly blurred.
207 See the Nigeria entry of the CIA World Factbook [all links in this paper last accessed 14 January 2015] 208 National Population Commission of Nigeria 209 Nigeria entry of the CIA World Factbook 210 Nigeria entry of the CIA World Factbook 211 Nigeria entry of the CIA World Factbook 212 M. Basedau, J. Vullers and P. Korner, “What drives inter-religious violence? Lessons from Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 36:10, 2013, p866 213 Atul Kohli, State-directed Development. Political Power and Industrialisation in the Global Periphery (Cambridge, 2006), p9
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Other blurred distinctions are those between formal/informal and visible/invisible. Indeed, many ordinary Nigerians are likely to believe that greater power and influence is to be found in the informal and invisible realms.
With regard to formal/informal, many ordinary Nigerians distinguish between official institutions such as the government, where power is ostensibly exercised, and elite networks – often operating ‘behind the scenes’ – where power is in practice mainly to be found.
With regard to visible/invisible, many ordinary Nigerians distinguish between the observable physical world, in which people live and function on a day-to-day basis, and the spiritual world, which is widely viewed as underpinning and shaping it.214
Religion The vast majority of the people of Nigeria are highly religious. The two main religions are Islam and Christianity. Muslims constitute about 50% of the population and Christians about 40%.215 Christianity is believed to be growing more quickly than Islam.
Marshall says that “Nigeria has been the site of Pentecostalism’s greatest explosion on the African continent”, with adherents now numbering “tens of millions”. She describes Pentecostalism as the “single most important sociocultural force in southern Nigeria today”.216
An estimated 10% of Nigerians are animists – that is, they adhere to indigenous belief systems. But a lot of Muslims and Christians also accommodate animist beliefs in their lives. Many Muslims and some Christians (despite the official disapproval of church leaders) practice polygamy.217
The north of the country is usually characterised as predominantly Muslim and the south as predominantly Christian. This is an over-simplification. It is estimated that 40% of northerners are now Christian.218 Many Muslims live in the south of the country. Nonetheless, large numbers of Nigerians do seem to view religious and regional (not to mention ethnic) identities as overlapping significantly.
Rising fundamentalisms The impact and role of religion in Nigerian society has been going through significant changes in recent decades. According to Ruth Marshall, in recent decades both Islam and Christianity have seen the rise of fundamentalist “political spiritualities”.219
Marshall argues that these reflect new responses to the everyday struggles for survival and dignity of ordinary Nigerians in a context of mounting social and political crisis; however, because they are “mutually exclusive”, they deepen socio-political cleavages and act as a spur to rising levels of violence.220
214 For a fuller discussion, see: Patrick Chabal, Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London, 2009); Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Oakland, 2001) 215 The main umbrella groups are the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and the Christian Association of Nigeria. 216 Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities. The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago, 2009), p2 217 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p45 218 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p53 219 Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities. The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago, 2009) 220 Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities. The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago, 2009), p215
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At the same time, there are many examples of peaceful co-existence (including inter-faith marriages). In the south-west of the country, peaceful coexistence has been described as the norm.221.
The impact of Islamic terrorist groups – most notably, Boko Haram – in northern Nigeria has been extensively charted in the Western media, although the longer-term historical origins of radical Islam more widely tend to be overlooked.222
Originating in northern universities in the 1980s and influenced by Salafist beliefs originating in the Arabian Gulf, militant Islamists have challenged the majority Sufi tradition promoted by traditional elites in northern Nigeria, who they believe have failed to defend Islam or the political power of the north.223
In 2000, 12 states within Nigeria fully or partially adopted Shari’a law for criminal offences, although implementation in practice has varied significantly.224 Yet, Campbell claims that Sufism is still the majority tradition in the north.225
4.3 Human rights226 Nigeria’s record on the protection of human rights since independence in 1960 has been poor. Numerous commentators and academics have argued that the authoritarian legacy of British colonialism is crucial in understanding why this has been so.227
Brutality and corruption The police and army have characteristically displayed high levels of brutality and corruption.
A series of military coups were accompanied by the suspension of those parts of the Constitution which guaranteed basic rights. During these periods, many hundreds of political critics, journalists and civil society activists were harassed and detained; some paid with their lives.
The treatment of detainees and prisoners by the authorities has often been harsh, with many instances of torture or ill-treatment documented. The scale and extent of abuses has tended to reduce under civilian governments but by much less than many might have hoped.
Elections have almost invariably been flawed and accompanied by significant levels of violence.
Impunity the norm For the politically powerful and for state operatives, impunity has been the norm, whether in connection with abuse of power or allegations of large-scale corruption.228
Since the 1970s, elites have become heavily involved in what Nigerians call ‘bunkering’ – in essence, the theft of Nigeria’s oil production.229 While the judicial system has never been
221 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p47 222 Boko Haram is discussed in more depth in sections 2.1 and 4.8 of this paper. 223 Salafism is a fundamentalist Sunni religious movement which originated in the 18th Century. 224 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p55 225 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p63 226 Economic and social rights are also covered in section 4.4 of this paper. 227 See, for example: M. Mamdani, Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism (Princeton, 1996); A. Jauhari, “Colonial and post-colonial human rights violations in Nigeria”, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, May 2011 228 See, for example: “Welcome to hell fire”. Torture and other ill-treatment in Nigeria”, Amnesty International, 18 September 2014
47 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 entirely captured by the executive branch and has at times exhibited some independence, it has often failed to uphold the rule of law, whether due to political pressure or its own inadequacies.230
On the positive side, Nigeria’s print (and, more recently, some broadcast) media has always been remarkably vibrant, if often also partisan, and there has been an abundance of courageous civil society activists trying to hold the authorities to account in hazardous circumstances.
Positive developments since 1999 The human rights situation has improved in some respects since the country returned to civilian rule in 1999 under President Olusegun Obasanjo. For example, the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary has increased, although there are concerns about corruption within its ranks, as overall has that of statutory oversight bodies such as the National Human Rights Commission, the Independent Electoral Commission and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission.231
The influence of the army over politics has also reduced, although ‘retired’ military figures retain considerable power and influence.
Ethnic and religious violence since 1999 In other respects the human rights situation has arguably stagnated or deteriorated since 1999. There are an estimated 3.3 million internally displaced people in Nigeria.232 In the states of the ‘Middle Belt’, many hundreds of thousands have died in regular outbreaks of ethnic and religious violence over the last decade or so, often at the hands of private militias and armed groups.233 For example, Nassarawa state has been severely affected by such violence in recent years.234 It is often claimed that these entities are backed by rival politicians.
Insurgency and terrorism in the Niger Delta and north-east The Niger Delta and north-east Nigeria have both been heavily affected by armed insurgencies and terrorism over the last decade or so, with the situation in the latter part of the country reaching crisis proportions since 2010 as a result of attacks by the Islamic terrorist group Boko Haram. An amnesty programme has calmed the situation in the Niger Delta in recent years but the region remains volatile.
Figures on the scale of civilian fatalities at the hands of Boko Haram are difficult to verify.
Below is a chart produced by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project which shows a strongly upward trend in the number of civilian deaths at the hands of Boko Haram since late 2010.235
229 “Oil bunkering in Nigeria: 7% of Nigerian crude oil stolen daily”, World Oil News Centre, 28 February 2012 230 A Olowofoyeku, “The Beleaguered Fortress: Reflections of the Independence of Nigeria's Judiciary”, Journal of African Law, Spring 1989 231 J. Nwokeoma, “The judiciary’s redemptive role in Nigeria’s democracy”, Peace and Collaborative Development Network, 7 November 2007; National Human Rights Commission; Independent National Electoral Commission; Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 232 “Electoral body to release voting plan on IDPs”, Pan African News Agency, 5 January 2015 233 This violence is sometimes described as ‘communal violence’. 234 I. Hassan, “Why are the stakes so high for the 2015 elections?”, African Arguments, 16 December 2014 235 The chart was taken from the BBC News Online website on 15 January 2015. See: “Boko Haram crisis: why it is hard to know the truth in Nigeria”, 13 January 2015
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The figure most commonly cited for the number of people who have died in Nigeria during 2014 as a result of attacks by Boko Haram has been over 2,000 people.236 However, according to the Nigeria Security Tracker website, that figure is likely to have been much higher.
Nigeria Security Tracker estimates that in 2014 over 10,000 people died from violence linked to Boko Haram’s activities across the three north-eastern states where a state of emergency currently operates (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states), with about 80% of that total occurring in Borno state. Although a significant proportion of those who died during 2014 did so at the hands of state actors and allied vigilante groups (see below), Boko Haram is identified by the website as by some distance the largest single identifiable perpetrator.237
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project says that 3,428 civilians were killed by Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria during 2014.238 The UK Government says that over 4,000 people were killed by the group in the course of the year.239
About 1.5 million people in the north-east have also been displaced by the violence.240 In November 2014, there were over 50,000 Internally Displaced People in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, alone.241
Boko Haram has attacked schools, forcing many in the three states worst-affected to close The Nigerian authorities have been heavily criticised for their ineffective response to the kidnapping of schoolchildren by Boko Haram; an estimated 219 of the 270 schoolgirls kidnapped by the group in April 2014 in the small town of Chibok, Borno state, remain in captivity.
236 Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Boko Haram kills 2,053 civilians in six months”, 15 July 2014 237 Nigeria Security Tracker [figures at 2 January 2015] 238 Armed Conflict Location and Data Event Project, “Trend 3: violence against civilians in 2014” 239 HC Deb 12 January 2015 c601 240 HC Deb 12 January 2015 c601 241 “Thousands of people displaced by conflict in north-eastern Nigeria have taken refuge in Maiduguri”, ICRC update, 6 November 2014
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Boko Haram has attacked churches and mosques. In November 2014, over 100 people died following explosions at the Central Mosque in Kano.
Meanwhile, the army has killed many hundreds of people in retaliatory operations, with Amnesty International asserting that it is implicated in war crimes and Human Rights Watch describing it as “almost as evil” as Boko Haram itself.242
In November 2014 there were media reports that 18 men accused of being members of Boko Haram and taken into custody in the town of Potiskum by soldiers had been found dead several hours later.243 A few days later, a suicide bomber killed at least 47 school children attending an assembly in the same town.244
The most notorious part of the security forces has been the Joint Task Force, which brings together the military, the police and the security services. Although it was disbanded in 2013, many of its commanders and units remained in place.
Civilian vigilante groups, set up in part due to the failure of the security forces to provide much protection to ordinary Nigerians from Boko Haram attacks, have also been responsible for serious abuses.245
Police abuses The police have been accused of killing “thousands each year.”246 Amnesty International recently claimed that “torture and other ill-treatment are routine practices in criminal investigations across Nigeria”, including for the purpose of extracting ‘confessions’.247 The human rights group alleges that many police stations have “torture chambers” and some have an officer unofficially known as “O/C Torture”.
Levels of torture and ill-treatment by the police have reportedly increased dramatically in the north in recent years.248
Homophobia Homophobia is dominant across all levels of Nigerian society.249 Homosexual acts are illegal in Nigeria. In January 2014, President Jonathan signed a law which further increased the criminal penalties for homosexuality.250
Election violence The 2007 presidential and legislative elections were described by one writer as an “election- like event”, reflecting widespread concerns about fraud and low-level violence. The 2011 elections were then followed by “the worst outbreak of post-electoral violence since the civil war”.251 As the 2015 elections draw closer, levels of election-related violence are again on the increase.
242 Amnesty International, “Q&A: Nigeria’s military implicated in war crimes”, 5 August 2014”; Human Rights Watch, “How do you beat Boko Haram with an army that is almost as evil?”, 14 May 2014 243 “Boko Haram suspects found dead after arrest by Nigerian army”, BBC News Online, 6 November 2014 244 “Nigeria school assembly in Potiskum hit by blast”, BBC News Online, 10 November 2014 245 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014, p415 246 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), ppxviii 247 “Welcome to hell fire”. Torture and other ill-treatment in Nigeria”, Amnesty International, 18 September 2014, The Nigerian police has contested Amnesty International’s claims. See: “Nigeria Police Force refutes Amnesty International report, says torture is prohibited”, Vanguard, 18 September 2014 248 “Welcome to hell fire”. Torture and other ill-treatment in Nigeria”, Amnesty International, 18 September 2014 249 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p45 250 “Nigeria's president signs law imposing up to 14 years' jail for gay relationships”, Guardian, 13 January 2014 251 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), ppxv and 99
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4.4 Human development In public discourse around human development in Nigeria, optimism is often in short supply. Whenever the question of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) comes up, discussion tends to focus on the many challenges which Nigeria faces, and the perceived lack of progress made.
Nigeria was ranked 152nd out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index in 2013, an improvement of one place on its 2008 ranking.252
Progress against MDG indicators: positives However, there has been considerable progress against a number of the MDG indicators.253
Those showing the most marked progress are indicators 1.9 (level of undernourishment), 4.1 and 4.2 (under-five mortality rate and infant mortality rate respectively), and 5.1 (maternal mortality ratio). The proportion of the population suffering from undernourishment has fallen from 21.3% in 1991 to 6.4% in 2013 (though progress has levelled off somewhat since 2005).
Over the same period, the under-five mortality rate fell from 212.8 to 117.4 per 1,000 live births, whilst the infant mortality rate fell from 126.1 to 74.3 per 1,000 live births. The maternal mortality ratio has seen particularly dramatic progress, falling from to 1200 to 560 per 100,000 live births between 1990 and 2013.
A number of other indicators have also shown significant, if more limited, progress. The proportion of the population using an improved drinking water source increased from 46% in 1990 to 64% in 2012, whilst the gender parity index in primary level enrolment has increased from 0.79 in 1990 to 0.92 in 2010.
The proportion of 15-49 year olds living with HIV, meanwhile, peaked at 3.7% between 2003 and 2006 and has now begun to decline.
Performance against MDG indicators: negatives However, the progress made will in many cases not be sufficient for Nigeria to meet the MDGs. The chart below, which appears in DFID’s Annual Report for 2013-14, assesses progress against key MDG indicators (one indicator for each of the first seven MDGs). Nigeria is ‘off-track’ for all of them. In four cases out of seven the rating is the worst – ‘red’ – while three get an ‘amber’ rating.254
252 UNDP, "Table 2: Human Development Index trends, 1980-2013". The Human Development Index takes account of Gross National Income (GNI), life expectancy and levels of education 253 It should be emphasised at the outset that there are significant data integrity issues. For some targets, data is available up to and including 2013; for many others, data from recent years is not yet available. For other targets, the number of data points in the series is very few. For example, we know that the literacy rate of 15- 24 year olds fell from 71.2% in 1991 to 66.4% in 2008, but we know very little about what precisely happened in between those dates: the only intermediate data point is for 2003, when the rate stood at 69.0%. For some of the MDG indicators, such as the proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total employment, there is no data at all, whilst for other targets the data’s incoherencies are such that it is of little use. As another example, there are three sets of data for the tuberculosis prevalence rate (the “lower bound”, “mid-point” and “upper bound”), none of which bear much resemblance to each other. In 2012, the lower bound, mid-point and upper bound respectively were 25, 161 and 420 per 100,000 population. Given such wide divergences it is difficult to have any confidence in the data. 254 Department for International Development, Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, 15 July 2014, HC 11, Session 2014-15, p71. A red rating does not necessarily mean there has been no progress (it may simply mean that progress has been “very slow”), whilst an amber rating means that progress is insufficiently quick to meet the MDG target by 2015.
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In some cases, Nigeria’s performance against MDG indicators has regressed in recent years.
The total net enrolment ratio in primary education fell back from 71.3% to 65.7% between 2007 and 2010.255 The proportion of the population living on less than $1.25 (PPP) per day has increased, from 61.9% in 1992 to 68% in 2010. Levels of poverty have been rising across the whole country.256
The literacy rate amongst 15-24 year olds has decreased, from 71.2% in 1991 to 66.4% in 2008, whilst the percentage of the population using an improved sanitation facility fell from 37% in 1990 to 28% in 2012.257
In a recent report, the international NGO ONE criticised the Government of Nigeria for its insufficient spending on the health sector. If the Government were to meet its commitment under the 2001 Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious Diseases258 – which is to commit 15% of total government expenditure to health -- ONE argued that much greater progress towards meeting health-related goals would be made:
With Nigeria ‘partially on track’ for health-related goals such as child mortality and maternal mortality, fulfilling its health spending commitment through effective and accountable programming is now more strategically important than ever – enabling it to build on gradual progress thus far, accelerate its implementation and sprint towards the MDG finish line in 2015. If current spending levels (budget allocations as a share of total budget) were carried forward, Nigeria is projected to have a cumulative Abuja commitment deficit of $22.5 billion between 2013 and 2015. In other words, if Nigeria met its Abuja commitment to spend 15% of its total budget on health in 2013, 2014 and 2015, there would be an additional $22.5 billion available for key investments in health.259
However, Nigeria’s health system was praised for its effective handling of the Ebola outbreak during the second half of 2014.260
255 Admittedly this came after an increase from 62.8% to 71.3% between 1999 and 2007. 256 P. Rogers, “Nigeria: the generic context of the Boko Haram violence”, Oxford Research Group, 1 April 2012 257 Thus whilst the percentage of the population using an improved water source has increased, the same cannot be said for the percentage of the population using an improved sanitation facility. 258 Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious Diseases 259 ONE, "The 2013 data report", 22 July 2013, pp. 30 & 35 260 “How Nigeria defeated Ebola”, Guardian, 31 October 2014
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Spatial disparities It is also important to note that progress has been far from uniform across the country.
While the proportion of the population using an improved drinking water source has grown considerably, closer inspection reveals great disparity between urban and rural areas.
In 1990, the respective proportions were 78% in urban areas and 28% in rural areas, whereas in 2012 the respective percentages were 79% in urban areas and 49% in rural areas. Almost all of the progress achieved since 1990 has been in rural areas (albeit starting from a very low base). The situation in urban areas is essentially unchanged since 1990.
Moreover, there are great disparities in progress between the north and south of the country.
In terms of average under-five mortality rates across Nigeria’s six geographical zones, the worst performing are the north-east and north-west, where the average under-five mortality rates are 160 and 185 per 1,000 live births respectively. The best performing are the south- west and south-south, with 90 and 91 per 1,000 live births respectively.261
But it is not simply a north-south divide: the south-east zone performs much worse (131 per 1,000 live births) than the north-central zone (100 per 1,000 live births), which includes the capital, Abuja.262
4.5 Economic profile Strong growth in recent years has been driven by the non-oil sector, with particularly strong expansions seen in the manufacturing and telecommunications sectors.
The oil and gas sector, however, remains crucially important as it accounts for 95% of the country’s exports and up to 75% of the government’s revenue.
The sharp drop in the price of oil (down by more than half from mid-2014 to the beginning of 2015) has led to growth forecasts for 2015 being lowered, budget cuts implemented and a weakening currency.
Background Oil was first produced in the 1950s (prior to independence) and became the economy’s dominant industry during the 1970s.
Public spending was closely tied to the oil price and thus rose sharply in the mid- to late- 1970s. Fiscal mismanagement and corruption during the boom years led to a fiscal crisis in the 1980s when the price of oil fell.263 As a result, Nigeria’s development was halted. Debt began to pile up, the currency was devalued and inflation soared.264 GDP per capita, one measure of the standard of living, fell and didn’t recover for a generation – until the 2000s.
261 National Population Commission, ICF International; Nigeria: Demographic and Health Survey 2013, June 2014, p120 262 National Population Commission, ICF International; Nigeria: Demographic and Health Survey 2013, June 2014, p120 263 Looney, Robert E.. Economy (Nigeria), in Europa World online. London, Routledge. House of Commons. Retrieved 08 January 2015 from http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ng.ec 264 IMF Finance & Development magazine vol 45, no. 4, “Point of View: Nigeria's Shot at Redemption”, Dec 2008
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Oil price in real terms (2013 prices) Real GDP per capita US$ per barrel, annual data Index where 1960 level = 100 140 200 120 100 150 80 100 60 40 50 20 0 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 Source: World Bank
Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria’s economy has performed better overall, aided by oil and gas exports, improved fiscal stability (for example the creation of the Excess Crude Account, a fund that provides a cushion during oil price volatility) and a debt-relief agreement with the Paris Club group of rich Western creditor nations in 2005.
Annual GDP growth since 1999 has averaged around 9%, compared with an average of 6% for Sub-Saharan Africa.265 Despite the improved economic performance overall, growth has not been inclusive. Poverty levels remain high and have barely changed since the 1980s. The World Bank estimates that 82% of the population in 2010 lived on less than $2 a day, only slightly lower than in 2004 (83%) and higher than in 1986 (77%).266
Annual GDP growth (%), 1980-2014 IMF data (2014 is an IMF estimate) 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 1980 '84 '88 '92 '96 '00 '04 '08 '12
Largest economy in Africa is more diverse than previously thought In 2014, the National Bureau of Statistics released new GDP data which revised up estimates of GDP in 2013 by 89% (from $290 billion to $509 billion), making Nigeria Africa’s largest economy (overtaking South Africa). The old data was based on how the economy looked in 1990 and did not take account of its changing structure since then. The new figures are based on the shape of the economy in 2010 and give greater weight to fast-growing sectors such as telecommunications, banks and the Nollywood film industry.267
The new figures present a changed picture of the importance of different industries to the economy. The share of GDP accounted for by the agriculture and oil and gas sectors is now lower than previously estimated, while the manufacturing and services sectors contribute a higher share (see table below). Under the old data, agriculture and oil and gas accounted for 70% of GDP; the new data puts this at 38%. Meanwhile, manufacturing is now estimated to account for over 7% of GDP compared to 2% before and telecommunications is up from less than 1% to over 8% of GDP.
265 IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2014 database 266 World Bank, World Development Indicators [accessed 9 January 2015] 267 National Bureau of Statistics and “Step change; Nigeria’s GDP”, The Economist, 12 April 2014
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Importance of sectors under old and new GDP data, 2012 % of total GDP Old data New data Change Agriculture 33.1 22.1 -11.0 Oil and gas 37.0 15.8 -21.2 Manufacturing 1.9 7.4 +5.5 Telecommunications 0.8 8.3 +7.5 Finance & insurance 1.6 2.8 +1.2 Real estate 4.5 7.7 +3.2 Films, music, TV - 2.0 +2.0
Source: World Bank, Nigeria economic report, July 2014
Non-oil sectors behind growth in 2013 and 2014 Growth in recent years has been more diverse than was thought under the old estimates.268 In 2013, growth was 22% in the manufacturing sector, 9% in the services sector but only 3% in agriculture.269 Overall non-oil GDP growth in 2013 was 8.4% but a 13% fall in oil and gas output (due to supply disruptions) reined in GDP growth to 5.5%, though this was still higher than the 4.2% recorded in 2012 and 5.3% in 2011.
In 2014, non-oil GDP continued to drive growth (even before the fall in the oil price).270 Growth in the first three quarters of the year averaged 6.3% compared with the previous year. The non-oil sector averaged growth of 7.5% over this period. In Q3 2014 growth was underpinned by strength in crop production, the textile, apparel and footwear, telecommunications, and real estate sectors.
Trade crucially dependent on oil exports In 2013, Nigeria exported $103 billion worth of goods and imported $56 billion, resulting in a positive trade balance of $47 billion.271 Levels of Nigerian goods exports reached an all-time high in 2011 at $125 billion, though export levels fell in 2012 and 2013. Nigerian goods imports also reached an all-time high of $56 billion in 2011, before falling in 2012 and subsequently returning to a similar level in 2013.
In 2013 Nigeria’s five largest export markets were the US, India, Brazil, Spain and the Netherlands; the UK was Nigeria’s eighth largest export market.
The US has been Nigeria’s single largest export market every year since 1995. While the US was Nigeria’s single largest export market in 2013, buying $14 billion worth of Nigeria goods, this has fallen dramatically from a high of $35 billion in 2011. This fall is due a sharp reduction in oil exports, owing to increases in American shale oil production.
94% of Nigeria’s exports were made up of oil and natural gas. Nigeria also exported small amounts of cocoa, rubber and leather.
268 World Bank, Nigeria Economic Report, July 2014 269 Central Bank of Nigeria, Statistics database – real sector statistics, GDP statistics 270 National Bureau of Statistics, GDP Report Q3 - 2014, November 2014 271 All trade data in this section come from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database
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Nigerian goods exports by destination, 2013 ($ millions) Value of exports % of total United States 14,272 14% India 12,504 12% Brazil 9,440 9% Spain 7,274 7% Netherlands 6,672 6% Germany 4,856 5% France 4,824 5% United Kingdom 4,773 5% South Africa 4,108 4% Japan 3,157 3% Source: UNCTAD
Nigerian exports by product group 2013 Value ($ millions) Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 96,283 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 1,922 Food and live animals 1,615 Manufactured goods 1,238 Machinery and transport equipment 928 Total 102,959 Source: UNCTAD
In 2013, Nigeria’s five largest sources of imports were China, the US, India, France and the UK. Over a quarter of Nigeria’s imports came from China; these were chiefly machinery, transport equipment and manufactured goods. China has been Nigeria’s largest source of imported goods every year since 2006, when it overtook the US.
Nigeria’s largest group of product imports was machinery and transport equipment, including motor vehicles, telecommunications equipment and electric power machinery. Other significant imports included wheat, fish and rice.
Nigerian goods imports by destination, 2013 ($ millions) Value of exports % of total China 14,292 26% United States 7,585 14% India 3,101 6% France 2,339 4% United Kingdom 2,283 4% Netherlands 2,270 4% Germany 2,013 4% Republic of Korea 1,864 3% Belgium 1,670 3% South Africa 1,472 3% Source: UNCTAD
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Nigerian imports by product group, 2013 Product Value ($ millions) Machinery and transport equipment 20,926 Manufactured goods 9,293 Food and live animals 7,941 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 6,567 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 6,009 Total 55,993 Source: UNCTAD
Fall in oil price dampens near-term economic outlook Despite the new data showing the oil and gas sector accounting for a lower proportion of GDP, it still remains crucially important to the economy. Nigeria produces over 2 million barrels of oil per day, making it the largest producer in Africa and 12th biggest in the world.272 The oil and gas sector make up almost 95% of the country’s exports; it is the source of 90% of foreign exchange earnings and in recent years has contributed up to 75% of the government’s revenue (though this has been on a downward trend). The steep fall of over 50% in oil prices since mid-2014 therefore has large and important ramifications for the country’s economic stability.
Oil price (Brent crude) US$ per barrel, daily data
120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Jan '14 Apr '14 Jul '14 Oct '14 Jan '15
Source: FT
As a result of reduced revenues from oil, the government’s 2015 budget plans include an 8% reduction in expenditure.273 Most of the cuts are planned to come from a sharp reduction in capital expenditure, while “recurrent expenditure” such as personnel costs rises.274 The budget also includes a cut to the GDP growth forecast for 2015 from 6.4% to 5.5%.275 These plans are based on a reference price for oil of $65 – still well above the price as of 9 January 2015 of around $50.
Despite the existence of the Excess Crude Account (ECA), a fund designed to provide a buffer to state finances in times of volatile oil price movements, and the creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in 2012, fiscal buffers are limited. Even while oil prices remained above $100 per barrel the combined balance of the ECA and SWF fell from $11 billion at the end of 2012 to just $3 billion at the end of 2013 due to lower than expected oil
272 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 273 PwC, Nigeria’s 2015 budget: fiscal and macro analyses, December 2014 274 Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Minister of Finance, “An overview of the 2015 budget proposal: A transition budget”, 17 December 2014 and Budget Office, “An analysis of the 2015 FGN Budget”, 17 December 2014 275 “Nigeria forced to revise budget as oil prices remain low”, BBC News, 17 December 2014
57 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 revenue resulting from oil theft and production loses.276 Reserves rose in the first half of 2014 but remain insufficient to cover any substantial or persistent shortfall in the public finances.
The fall in the oil price has also led to pressure on the country’s currency. The central bank devalued the naira’s target rate by 8% against the dollar from N155 to N168 in late November 2014 after losing billions of dollars in foreign exchange reserves defending the currency.277 The market rate is even lower at N184 as of 12 January 2015 and there are serious concerns that further decline may be on the cards unless oil prices recover.
The central bank also raised interest rates in November 2014 for the first time in three years from 12% to 13% in order to defend the currency (by making it more attractive to invest in Nigeria).278 The decline in the value of the naira makes importing goods from abroad more expensive. As Nigeria imports 80% of what it consumes, this is likely to push inflation up from its current rate of around 8%.279
It is clear therefore that the short-term outlook for the Nigerian economy is precarious, with the lower oil price translating into budgetary pressures, rising import costs, and investor uncertainty. In many ways, Nigeria’s longer-term economic prospects look positive – but many challenges, such as poor infrastructure and a weak business environment remain.280
Below is a table setting out key economic statistics and forecasts for Nigeria over the period 2011 to 2019.
Economic statistics and forecasts
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 IMF forecasts (Oct. 2014) GDP growth % 4.9 4.3 5.4 7.0 7.3 7.2 7.1 6.9 6.9 GDP per capita $ (market exch. rates) 2,612 2,835 3,082 3,416 3,677 3,824 3,970 4,080 4,167 Inflation % (annual average) 10.8 12.2 8.5 8.3 8.7 8.2 7.5 7.0 7.0 Current account balance % GDP 3.0 4.4 4.0 3.7 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.1 Government revenue % GDP 17.7 14.3 11.0 10.6 10.4 10.3 9.5 9.1 8.8 Public sector budget balance % GDP 0.5 0.4 -2.3 -1.7 -2.2 -1.9 -2.6 -2.8 -3.2 Population millions 160.3 164.8 169.3 173.9 178.7 183.6 188.7 193.9 199.2
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database, October 2014
276 IMF, Nigeria: 2013 article IV consultation - staff report, April 2014, p.5 277 “Nigeria's naira touches record low after official devaluation”, Reuters, 26 November 2014 278 “Well below par; The Nigerian economy”, The Economist, 29 November 2014 279 “Nigeria’s economic pain may not decide election”, Reuters, 14 December 2014 280 These issues are explored in depth in section 2.2 of this paper. The country also faces major political challenges, which are discussed in section 2.1.
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4.6 Political profile Constitution Nigeria’s Constitution was promulgated in May 1999 in the context of the country’s return to civilian rule and democracy after 16 years of authoritarian military rule.281
It is Nigeria’s fourth constitution since independence from Britain in 1960. The previous Constitutions were agreed in 1960, 1966 and 1979. Large parts of all three were regularly suspended due to a series of military coups.
In the 1979 Constitution, Nigeria moved from a British-style political system based on cabinet government and headed by a prime minister to a system that more closely resembled the US political system, with a president at the head of government. The 1999 Constitution embodied the same choice.
All four post-independence constitutions have endorsed the principle of federalism.
While the 1999 Constitution has strong supporters, some analysts argue that further revision is needed.282 During 2014, a government-sponsored ‘National Conference’ was held – the fourth of its kind since independence. It submitted a report to President Goodluck Jonathan in August, which included a range of proposals for constitutional reform, including some changes to Nigeria’s presidential form of government. These proposals are still being considered.283
Government According to Europa World Plus:
The executive powers of the Federation are vested in the President, who is the Head of State, the Chief Executive of the Federation and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation. The President is elected for a term of four years and must receive not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in at least two- thirds of the States in the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory.
The President nominates a candidate as his associate from the same political party to occupy the office of Vice-President. The Ministers of the Government of the Federation are nominated by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate. Federal executive bodies include the Council of State, which advises the President in the exercise of his powers. 284
In many minds, since 1999 there has been an informal arrangement in place within the ruling PDP that provides for the rotation of the federal presidency between southerners and northerners, known for short as ‘zoning’. But this is not explicitly provided for in either the current Constitution or the law.
Nigerians today divide the country into six geographic zones: north-west, north-east, north- central, south-west, south-east and south-south.
281 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 282 I. Ayua and D.C.J. Dakas, “The Federal Republic of Nigeria”, International Association of Centers of Federal Studies, n.d 283 “Key National Conference recommendations you need to know”, Premium Times, 21 August 2014. See also section 2.1 of this paper. 284 Europa World online, London, Routledge. House of Commons. Retrieved 01 July 2014 from http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ng
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Apart from the Federal Capital Territory, there are currently 36 states within the Federation. Europa World Plus says:
The executive powers of a State are vested in the Governor of that State, who is elected for a four-year term and must receive not less than one-quarter of votes cast in at least two-thirds of all local government areas in the state.285
Both the federal president and state governors can hold office for a maximum of two terms.
Under the 1999 Constitution, the Federal Capital Territory does not have its own elected governor. The Federal President performs the role.
There are also 774 directly elected local government councils across the 36 states.286
Parliament The National Assembly is comprised of a lower house, the 360-member House of Representatives, and an upper house, the 109-member Senate. Members of both houses are elected for a four-year term.
Legislation can originate in either house but must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the house where it originates before it can be sent to the other house for approval. The bill is subsequently presented for presidential assent. If that is refused, the bill returns to both houses and can become law without presidential assent if it gains a two-thirds majority in both houses.
A substantial number of the bills introduced in the National Assembly have failed to become law or have become stuck within the legislative process and taken a long time to pass.
Each of the 36 states has its own House of Assembly. They have between 24 and 40 members, depending on how many seats a state has been allocated in the federal House of Representatives.
Under the 1999 Constitution, the Federal Capital Territory does not have its own elected House of Assembly. The National Assembly performs the role.287
Judiciary and legal systems Under the 1999 Constitution, the following courts are provided for:
At the federal level – Supreme Court; Court of Appeal; High Court; Sharia Court of Appeal; Customary Court of Appeal.
At the state level – High Court; Sharia Court of Appeal; Customary Court of Appeal.288
Chief Judges are nominated on the recommendation of a National Judicial Council.289
As the names of the courts described above suggest, across Nigeria, three legal systems operate, often in parallel: the common law, which is derived from English law, as introduced
285 Europa World online, London, Routledge. House of Commons. Retrieved 01 July 2014 from http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ng 286 Europa World online, London, Routledge. House of Commons. Retrieved 01 July 2014 from http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ng 287 Europa World online, London, Routledge. House of Commons. Retrieved 01 July 2014 from http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ng 288 The Federal Capital Territory has its own High Court, Sharia Court of Appeal and Customary Court of Appeal. 289 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999
60 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 during the colonial period; customary law, which is derived from the principles and practices implemented by Nigeria’s myriad ethnic groups; and Sharia law, which applies to Nigeria’s Muslims.
Since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999, 12 state governments in northern Nigeria have fully or partially introduced Sharia law for criminal offences.290 While Sharia Courts in these states have continued as before mainly to address property, matrimonial and inheritance disputes, in the period since 1999 they have also dealt with cases relating to criminal acts and public morality. Their procedures and punishments have been forcefully criticised by local and international human rights groups.291
Main political parties There are two main political parties contesting for office at present:
The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) The PDP emerged at the time of Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule following the death of the military dictator General Sani Abacha in 1998. It became the vehicle for a diverse range of politicians and retired military figures who had been opposed to Abacha.
The PDP rallied around the candidacy of Olusegun Obasanjo and he and the party won decisive victories in the 1999 presidential and National Assembly elections. Since then the party has won a clean sweep of elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011. Since 1999, it is the only party that has come anywhere near to representing all parts of the country, although it is still relatively weak in the north and has never come close to monopolising power at all levels of government.292
The PDP has always been more oriented towards patronage politics than constructing an ideological programme for government.293 It has accommodated reformers but they have often ultimately found themselves out of favour. At various times – including in recent years – it has seemed possible that factional rivalries might destroy the party. However, bolstered by the benefits of political incumbency, to date it has hung together and remains a formidable electoral machine. The party could yet deliver a second presidential election victory in February 2015 for its candidate, President Goodluck Jonathan.
The All Progressives Congress (APC) The APC is the latest combination of forces opposed to the PDP and hoping to end its grip on power. Established in 2013, its factions mainly consist of the ‘legacy parties’ that have come together in search of victory in the 2015 elections.
The Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) is the party of ex-military leader Muhammadu Buhari, who has unsuccessfully contested the last three presidential elections. It is overwhelmingly a party of the north.
Buhari formerly led the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), another northern party, but he left it after the party accepted the 2007 election result. The party has since re-joined the opposition ranks but has it lost support since Buhari’s departure.
290 Zamfara, Kaduna, Sokoto, Kano, Bauchi, Katsina, Kebbi, Jigawa, Borno, Yobe, Niger and Gombe states. 291 For example, see: “Political Sharia? Human rights and Islamic law in northern Nigeria”, Human Rights Watch, September 2014 292 Jibrin. Ibrahim, “The Dynamics of Competitive Party Politics,” in Jibrin Ibrahim, Musa Abutudu, and Kelechi C. Iwuamadi, eds., Elections and the Management of Diversity in Nigeria (African Governance Report III, 2011) 293 J. Liebowitz and J. Ibrahim, “A capacity assessment of Nigerian political parties”, UNDP, January 2013
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The Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) is a predominantly southwestern party. Its leading figures have been Bola Tinubu, former governor of Lagos state, and until August 2014 (see below), Nuhu Ribadu, who contested the 2011 presidential election for the party.
A faction of another party, the All Progressives Grand Alliance, has also joined the APC.294
All of these parties have formed governments at state-level. The main planks of the APC are anti-corruption, job creation and the restoration of internal peace and security.295 However, sceptics allege that not much distinguishes it ideologically from the PDP.296 Muhammadu Buhari will be its candidate in the February 2015 presidential contest.
Political leaders Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan – President Born in 1957 in the oil-rich Niger Delta in the south of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan is a Christian from the Ijaw ethnic group. He is close to Ayodele Oritsejafor, a Pentecostal priest who is president of the Christian Association of Nigeria.297 Jonathan went into politics as a member of the PDP in the late 1990s and became governor of Bayelsa state in 2005.
A supporter of former president Olusegun Obasanjo, in 2007 he was picked as the party’s vice-presidential candidate. The death in office of northerner President Umaru Yar-Adua in 2010, led to him becoming President. Having originally said that he would not do so, he stood successfully as the PDP’s presidential candidate in the 2011 elections and is standing again in 2015.
Many northerners believe that by standing in 2011, he tore up the informal ‘zoning’ arrangement established since 1999, in which northerners and southerners alternate holding the presidency.298 He may not have a particularly dynamic reputation as a leader and has been viewed by many as an “accidental president”, but powerful interests are aligned behind him.299
Namadi Sambo – Vice President Born in 1952, Namadi Sambo was elected as the PDP governor of Kaduna state in 2007. In 2011 he was selected by Jonathan as his running mate. Because he came from the north and was a Muslim, he was viewed as helping to create a balanced ticket.
A supporter of former military president Ibrahim Babangida, he is not viewed as having a strong personal power base and there was speculation that he might not be Jonathan’s running mate in 2015.300 However, in the end, he was retained. In 2012 his family home was attacked by Boko Haram.
David Mark Born in 1948 in the mid-eastern Benue state, David Mark is yet another ex-military man in politics. He is a member of the PDP and has been the President of the Senate since 2007, which makes him the third most senior member of the current government.
294 J. Liebowitz and J. Ibrahim, “A capacity assessment of Nigerian political parties”, UNDP, January 2013 295 “Nigeria’s opposition: a united front”, Economist, 2 August 2013 296 “Policies, what policies?”, Africa Confidential, 21 November 2014 297 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Nigeria’s dangerous 2015 elections: limiting the violence”, 21 November 2014, p5 298 “Profile: Nigeria’s Goodluck Jonathan”, BBC News Online, 11 September 2013. The President has a presence on Facebook and Twitter. 299 “Jury still out on record of accidental president”, Financial Times, 22 November 2011 300 “Profile: Namadi Sambo, Nigeria’s new vice-president”, BBC News Online, 18 May 2010
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A loyal backer of both Ibrahim Babangida and Olusegun Obasanjo when they were president, there has been speculation that he might run for president himself at some point in the future, but currently he appears satisfied with his current role, which he hopes to return to after the elections.301
Nuhu Ribadu Born in 1960 in the eastern Adamawa state, Nuhu Ribadu came to prominence after he was appointed chair of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2003 by former president Olusegun Obasanjo. He held the post until 2007 when he was suspended. He was subsequently replaced.
During his tenure as chair of the EFCC he launched a series of high-profile anti-corruption legal cases against powerful political figures, although critics accused him of failing to target close allies of President Obasanjo. He briefly went into exile but returned to stand as the ACN’s presidential candidate in the 2011 elections.
He subsequently became a senior figure in the APC but in August 2014 defected back to the PDP, his original political home.302 He is the PDP’s candidate for the governorship of Adamawa state in the February 2015 elections.
Muhammadu Buhari Born in 1942, Muhammadu Buhari is a northerner from Katsina state who forged a career in the army. He became president after a military coup in December 1993. In 1995 he was forced from office by a rival army faction led by Ibrahim Babangida. His time in power is remembered for human rights abuses but also for a strong stance against corruption.
Buhari has unsuccessfully stood for the presidency as a civilian three times and will do so again in 2015 as the candidate of the APC. He has never accepted the legitimacy of his defeat in the 2007 elections.
Known as a devout Muslim and for his personal probity, he has considerable grassroots support in the north but has powerful enemies within Nigeria’s elite, where political victories are still won or lost.303
Yemi Osinbajo Born in Lagos in 1957 and a relative newcomer to frontline politics, Yemi Osinbajo has been selected by Muhammadu Buhari as his vice-presidential running mate for the 2015 elections.304 A pastor of the Redeemed Christian Church of God in Lagos, his selection by Buhari seems in large part designed to ensure that the APC has a ‘balanced ticket’ in the forthcoming elections.
Both a lawyer and academic by profession, he served as Attorney-General of Lagos state during the governorship of Bola Tinubu.
Bola Tinubu Born in Lagos in 1952, Bola Tinubu was elected governor of Lagos state in 1999 on behalf of the Alliance for Democracy, which became the dominant force within the ACN when it was
301 “Who’s who: Colonel David Mark – President of the Senate”, Africa Confidential, n.d.; “Jonathan faces the north”, Africa Confidential, 13 June 2014 302 “Nigeria’s Nuhu Ribadu in profile”, BBC News Online, 25 March 2014 303 “Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari in profile”, BBC News Online, 18 April 2011 304 His low profile may explain why several different spellings of his name are in circulation. B. Awoyemi, “Making a case for Pastor (Prof) Yemi Oshibajo to be chosen as the APC VP candidate”, saharareporters.com, 15 December 2014
63 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 formed in 2006, serving two terms in office until 2007. He is viewed as having been a dynamic governor who got things done during his eight-year tenure.
Tinubu was a powerful ‘godfather’ to the ACN, and has continued this role with the APC. He is widely believed to retain presidential or vice-presidential ambitions but has so far had to content himself with the role of kingmaker. He has a wide-range of business interests.305
Lamido Sanusi Born in 1961, Lamido Sanusi is a member of the Fulani royal family, whose court is based in Kano. A banker and Islamic scholar, he came to prominence in 2009 when President Umaru Yar’Adua appointed him as governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. He rapidly acquired a reputation as a reformer and critic of official corruption, including in the petroleum industry. In late 2013, he alleged that US$50 billion worth of oil revenue (later reduced to $20 billion) had disappeared between January 2012 and July 2013.306 President Goodluck Jonathan suspended Sanusi from his post in February 2014 amid counter-allegations of graft against him.
The dispute has been largely overtaken by Sanusi’s unexpected crowning as the 14th Emir of Kano in June 2014, which involved by-passing the son of his predecessor. He has taken the title Muhammad Sanusi II.307 Sanusi has joined the ranks of those traditional rulers in Nigeria who are able to use their position to exert a degree of public influence.308 Since then, relations with President Jonathan appear to have improved.
Edwin Clark Born in 1932 in Nigeria’s south-south, Edwin Clark is a close advisor to President Goodluck Jonathan. Briefly Minister of Information when Yakubu ‘Jack’ Gowon was military ruler (1966- 75) and a former member of the Senate, today he is chairman of the Delta State Elders Forum. He is viewed as a strong (and sometimes controversial) defender of Ijaw – the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria – interests.309
Others Ex-presidents Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93) and Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) continue to exercise much influence behind the scenes. They remain (not always loyal) ‘godfathers’ of the PDP’s extended family. Theophilius Danjuma is another important actor in PDP politics.
An influential political figure who defected from the PDP is Atiku Abubakar. Formerly vice- president under Obasanjo, he fell out with him during their second term in office and ended up unsuccessfully contesting the presidential election in 2007 as the candidate of the ACN. He is now a senior figure within the APC, losing out on the party’s 2015 presidential election nomination to Muhammadu Buhari.
Also prominent within the APC are the governors of Kano state, Lagos state and Rivers state, Rabiu Kwankwaso, Babatunde Fashola and Rotimi Amaechi. A recent recruit from the PDP is Aminu Tambuwal, the speaker of the House of Representatives.
305 “Who’s who: Mr Bola Ahmed Tinubu”, Africa Confidential, n.d. 306 Western oil companies have also been accused of complicity in corrupt oil deals in Nigeria. “Nigeria/Italy: follow the money”, Africa Confidential, 24 October 2014 307 “Letter from Africa: Will Emir Lamido Sanusi ruffle feathers?”, BBC News Online, 25 June 2014 308 Another powerful traditional ruler is the Sultan of Sokoto. 309 “Who’s who: Edwin Clark”, Africa Confidential
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Finally, there is Aliko Dangote, Africa’s richest man. Born in 1957 in Kano state to an affluent family, he has made his billions through cement, sugar and flour and is now moving into the oil business.310
While he avoids overtly partisan politics and places much emphasis on philanthropic interventions through his private foundation, Dangote has made contributions to political projects, including the presidential campaigns of former President Obasanjo – and, after his retirement, Obasanjo’s presidential library – for which the Dangote Group reportedly received valuable government concessions in return.311
4.7 The Nigerian military Overview Nigeria has, on paper, the best-funded and best-equipped forces in West Africa.312 It has the largest armed forces in West Africa, numbering 80,000, of whom 62,000 are in the Army and 10,000 in the Air Force.313 It is one of Africa’s leading peacekeeping nations. In the last twenty years Nigeria has deployed troops to Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Mali and Somalia.314
Nigeria’s prime security concerns are internal: combating Boko Haram in the north; piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and instability in the Niger Delta. However, defence experts point to a lack of effective counter-insurgency and intelligence-gathering capabilities and a lack of equipment suited for counter-insurgency.
Equipment While the Nigerian military has a wide array of equipment, including tanks, fighter jets and naval vessels, it is unclear how much is operational. Questions abound about the serviceability of equipment.
The Military Balance 2014 notes that “on paper, it maintains the broadest spectrum of capabilities in the region, but in reality much of its equipment is unfit to be deployed for prolonged periods of time.”315 This reflects the view of the Foreign Affairs select committee, which in a recent report on West Africa was told that much of the Air Force fleet is not currently operational.316 Many of the Navy’s vessels are deemed to be in poor condition.317
What equipment Nigeria has tends to be better suited to state-on-state warfare than counter- insurgency, according to The Military Balance, although defence experts note recent efforts to improve this situation with programmes to refit and repair current equipment, and to purchase equipment more suited to counter-insurgency – for example, new attack helicopters.
Piracy and oil theft in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea has also prompted the procurement of new inshore and offshore patrol vessels, including a former US Coast Guard cutter and
310 In April 2014, Forbes estimated Dangote’s net worth at US $24.4 billion. 311 “Who’s who: Mr Aliko Dangote”, Africa Confidential; S. Allison, “Cementing Africa’s future”, Good Governance Africa, 1 June 2014; for the work of his foundation, see the Dangote Group’s “touching lives” webpage. 312 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014, p451 313 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014, p451 314 Nigeria was among the top 10 contributors of troops to multilateral peace operations in terms of numbers of troops (excluding ISAF in Afghanistan) in 2013, according to SIPRI Yearbook 2014, figure 3.3 315 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014, p451 316 Foreign Affairs Committee, The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa, 21 March 2014, HC 86-I 2013-14, para 57 317 “Nigerian Armed Forces”, Defence Web, 7 October 2013
65 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 two new offshore patrol vessels from China. The government has approved the acquisition of new fighter aircraft.
Combating Boko Haram President Jonathan overhauled his military high command in early 2014. He sacked his Chief of Defence Staff and the chiefs of Army staff and Navy staff. He promoted the chief of Air Force Staff, Air Marshal Alex Sabundu Badeh, to Chief of Defence Staff. Reports at the time suggested that in-fighting between the chiefs in the conduct of operations against Boko Haram prompted the sweeping changes.318 By the end of 2014, the army was claiming a number of successes against Boko Haram, particularly in Adamawa state.319 However, it continued to experience serious reverses too – most notably, losing the border town of Baga in Borno state in early January 2015 (see below).
The Government set up an Army-led Joint Task Force under Operation Restore Order in the north-east in 2011. It brought together the military, state security services and the police. The Joint Task Force was replaced in mid-2013 with a newly formed Army division, based in Maiduguri in Borno state. The 7th Division numbers around 8,000 troops and draws on elements of 1st Mechanised Brigade, 21st Armoured Brigade and 23rd Armoured Brigade. It reports to the chief of Army staff.320 However, it was claimed that many of the commanders and units operating under the 7th Division appeared to be the same people as under the Joint Task Force.321
Islamist militants have directly targeted members of the armed forces. Militants attacked the air force base in Maiduguri in December 2013, destroying two attack helicopters. A daylight assault on Giwa barracks in the same city in March 2014 resulted in hundreds of detained individuals being released.
Human rights organisations have documented serious human rights violations by soldiers in the immediate aftermath of the attack.322 Nigerian troops are reported to suffer low morale, and American officials have suggested that some of them have been afraid to engage.323 Amid concerns about desertion, the Nigerian defence spokesman cautioned troops against mutiny in August 2014.324 A number of soldiers are currently being court-martialled for mutiny; at least 60 death sentences were handed out in December 2014 for serious offences by military personnel.325
Rise of vigilante groups Local vigilante groups to combat Boko Haram emerged in the middle of 2013 in the north- eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. They have become known as the Civilian Joint Task Force.
318 “Nigeria; why Jonathan sacked Ibrahim, Ihejirika, Ezeoba”, all Africa, 17 January 2014 319 “Why Nigeria holds back in Boko Haram fight”, Premium Times, 320 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014, p415, 451 321 Many media sources continue to use the term ‘Joint Task Force’. US State Department, “Nigeria Human Rights Report 2013”, p3 322 For further details, see sections 4.3 and 4.7 of this paper. 323 Testimony of Department of Defence Principal Director for African Affairs Alice Friend, Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, #BringBackOurGirls: Addressing the Threat of Boko Haram, May 15, 2014. US policy towards Boko Haram is explored further in a Congressional Research Service report, Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions, 10 June 2014, R435558 324 “Nigerian security forces deployed in north-eastern states likely to desert, raising risk of further Boko Haram expansion”, IHS Global Insight, 18 August 2014 325 “Why army holds back in Boko Haram fight”, Premium Times, 31 December 2014; “Nigeria sentences another four soldiers to death”, Anadolu Agency, 25 December 2014
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Although unconnected to the military, local and state authorities are training and using the Civilian Joint Task Force to provide security: maintaining checkpoints and providing intelligence to the security services.
Borno state government is using members of the Civilian Joint Task Force to provide security at public schools, while the Adamawa state government announced plans in mid-November 2014 to train 10,000 people to join the Civilian Joint Task Force and assist security forces in the fight against Boko Haram.326
International support The UK hosted a conference on tackling Boko Haram in June 2014, attended by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin and the US, France, Canada, the UN, the EU and African Union. The UK, US and France agreed to provide tactical training and advice to Nigerian forces engaged in the fight against Boko Haram.
At the conference, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger agreed to deploy a 2,800 strong (each contributing 700 troops) multinational task force, centred on the Lake Chad area, to combat Boko Haram. However, what this amounted to in practice has never been clear. In January 2015, Boko Haram attacked and seized control of the border town of Baga, the town where the multinational task force had its notional headquarters.327 Government forces did not put up a fight and hundreds of civilians in the town and surrounding areas were killed by the group. The future of the force is now in question, although this major set-back could also provoke more concerted action.328 Chad and Cameroon have been cooperating more closely in recent days, with a significant Chadian force being despatched to Cameroon. There is also talk of the African Union becoming directly involved, as it has been in Somalia.329
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin also agreed in June 2014 to set up a Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit to enable them to share intelligence on Boko Haram. The UK, US and France undertook to ensure that it is operationalised quickly and to provide technical expertise to support the unit.330
Niger Delta and piracy Another Joint Task Force, set up in 2006, is responsible for combating piracy and oil theft in the Niger Delta. Operation Pulo Shield consists of members of the army, navy and police.
The Joint Task Force’s mandate is to stop illegal oil bunkering (oil theft), protect oil and gas facilities and installations and secure the environment. In 2013 the naval component killed 82 pirates and conducted 1,025 anti-oil bunkering patrols, while the army component destroyed 1,951 illegal oil refineries, over 69,000 pieces of oil bunkering equipment, over 1,800 surface tanks and 82 tanker trucks. The Joint Task Force arrested 1,857 people suspected of stealing crude oil.331
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea continues to pose a problem for seafarers. The International Maritime Bureau reports that pirates are often well armed and violent. Vessels along the
326 “Nigeria’s vigilantes take on Boko Haram”, BBC News, 24 July 2013; “Nigerian vigilantes aim to rout Boko Haram”, Al Jazeera, 31 May 2014; Further examples of local and state use of the Civilian Joint Task Force can be found on Information Nigeria 327 “Boko Haram seizes army base in Nigeria town of Baga”, BBC News Online, 4 January 2015 328 “Boko Haram seizes army base in Nigeria town of Baga”, BBC News Online, 4 January 2015; “Boko Haram crisis: Nigeria’s Baga town hit by new assault”, BBC News Online, 8 January 2015 329 “Boko Haram crisis: African Union to discuss multinational force”, BBC News Online, 16 January 2015 330 “Foreign Secretary announces UK support following Ministerial on Boko Haram”, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 12 June 2014 331 “Nigeria destroys 1,951 illegal oil refineries, arrests 1,857 in 2013”, Defence Web, 17 January 2014
67 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 coast, rivers, ports and anchorages have been targeted. However the Bureau also says that the number of reported incidents dropped noticeably to 13 in the first nine months of 2014 compared with 29 in the same period in 2013.332
4.8 Armed militant groups Boko Haram Overview Since 2010, the Islamic terrorist group called Boko Haram has become by far the biggest threat to Nigeria’s internal security. Meaning ‘Western Education is forbidden’, Boko Haram’s formal name is Jama’at ahl al-sunna li-‘l dawa wa’l-jihad, which translates as People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.
Estimates of the membership of the group range widely, with some arguing it may be as high as 50,000.333. But there is uncertainty over how far it is really a single organisation, rather than a loose coalition of affiliated groups.334 A senior Nigerian official has described it as a “franchise”.335
Its base has always been north-east Nigeria – in particular, Borno state. However, while most of its armed attacks have taken place in the north-east of the country, it has undertaken operations elsewhere too – including Kano, Jos and the capital, Abuja.
Some observers claim that Boko Haram has links to other jihadi armed groups inspired by al- Qaida in the wider West African region and beyond. While this may be so, the majority view is that its agendas are predominantly driven by local grievances rather than by global jihad.336
It appears that a substantial number of Boko Haram’s leaders and members come from the Kanuri ethnic group and that there may be a ‘civil war’ dimension to the phenomenon. Kanuri “commoners” have reportedly gravitated towards the group in significant numbers, disaffected by a Kanuri “oligarchy” which has lost much of its legitimacy in the course of the economic crisis that has affected the north-east.337
Origins and growth since 2010 Boko Haram first emerged in the late 1990s as a small Salafist sect under the leadership of a preacher called Mohammed Yusuf.338 Initially it was known as the Yusufiyya. It drew on the resonance of older jihadi movements going back as far as the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate by Usman dan Fodio in the early 1800s.339
Until 2009 its activities were peaceful. However, after members were prevented by the police from attending a funeral in Borno state, leading to violent confrontation, Boko Haram launched an uprising. The security forces responded equally violently, killing hundreds of
332 “EU Naval Force, IMO warn of continued, although diminished, piracy threat”, Defence Web, 28 November 2014 333 J. Zenn, “Boko Haram: recruitment, financing, and arms trafficking in the Lake Chad region”, CTC Sentinel, 31 October 2014 334 E. Donnelly, “Nigeria’s child catchers”, The World Today, June/July 2014 335 R. Pantucci, “The ‘franchising’ of Boko Haram”, RUSI Newsbrief, 19 May 2014 336 M. Smith, “”Boko Haram is no ‘global terror’ group”, Guardian, 14 May 2014 337 M. Baca, “The tragedy of Borno state: local dimensions of Boko Haram’s insurgency”, African Arguments, 19 December 2014 338 Salafists believe that Muslim societies must be purified of modern values and systems and returned to those that reputedly applied during early Islam. 339 R. Pantucci and M. Cadoux-Hudson, “Nigeria’s opaque Jihad: Insurgency in Africa’s richest nation”, RUSI Analysis, 16 May 2014
68 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 suspected members of the group. Mohammed Yusuf was captured and died in police custody.
For a brief interlude it appeared as if Boko Haram had collapsed. This turned out to be incorrect. In 2010 it re-emerged under a new leader, Muhammed Abubakar Shekau. Shekau had broken away from Yusuf for a period and been one of the leaders of the ‘Nigerian Taliban’, but later the two reconciled.340
Under Shekau’s leadership, large-scale violent attacks have become its preferred tactic – more often than not against civilians, although politicians and the military have also been targeted.341 Thousands have died as a result of Boko Haram’s attacks and three states in the north – Borno, Yobe and Adamawa – have been placed in a state of emergency.342 According to one politician, by early 2015 at least 70% of the north of Borno state had fallen to Boko Haram.343
Tactics evolve Kidnappings have become increasingly common. The main goal is usually to trade them in exchange for money or the release of wives and children of group members taken into custody by the Nigerian authorities. The most notorious case in point was the kidnapping of 270 school girls in Chibok, Borno state, in April 2014. Another major kidnapping took place in Gumsuri, a village 20 kilometres away from Chibok, in December 2014. This time 185 people, including women and children, were kidnapped.344
In recent months, Boko Haram has started to engage the security forces much more directly and seek to expand its control over territory. It has held a number of towns for considerable periods. For a period in late 2014, there were fears that the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri, might fall to Boko Haram, but this risk subsequently receded.345
The group has also begun to carry out suicide bombings, some of them involving children of both sexes.346 A ten-year old was reportedly involved in a series of attacks involving three female suicide bombers in January 2015.347
There have been reports of rank-and-file soldiers deserting to Boko Haram or leaking information to the group.348
Over the last year, Boko Haram has also clashed on numerous occasions with soldiers on the Cameroon side of the border, seeking to control border towns in order to facilitate weapon supply lines and secure its rear-bases, signalling that it is now a threat to the wider Lake Chad region.349 Boko Haram has also carried out kidnappings in Cameroon. Cameroon has undertaken ground operations against the group and conducted some air strikes against it. But there are concerns that excesses committed by the Cameroon Army in the context of
340 “Boko Haram”, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism (posted 21 July 2014) 341 E. Donnelly, “Nigeria’s child catchers”, The World Today, June/July 2014 342 See also section 4.3 of this paper. 343 “Boko Haram: army repels attack in Borno state”, BBC News Online, 14 January 2015 344 “Nigeria must brace for surge in Boko Haram attacks, analysts say”, dpa-AFX International ProFeed, 19 December 2014 345 “Special report: North-east Nigeria on the brink”, Nigeria Security Network, 2 September 2014; “Military arrests soldiers for being ‘moles’ for Boko Haram”, Vanguard, 14 October 2014 346 R. Pantucci and M. Cadoux-Hudson, “Nigeria’s opaque Jihad: Insurgency in Africa’s richest nation”, RUSI Analysis, 16 May 2014 347 “Boko Haram crisis: Nigerian archbishop accuses West”, BBC News Online, 12 January 2015 348 “What now after Nigeria’s Boko Haram ceasefire fiasco?”, BBC News Online, 3 November 2014 349 J. Zenn, “Boko Haram: recruitment, financing, and arms trafficking in the Lake Chad region”, CTC Sentinel, 31 October 2014
69 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 its counter-insurgency operations could strengthen Boko Haram’s position amongst the local population on that side of the border.350
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger have established a multinational military task force to combat Boko Haram in the region. However, in January 2015, Boko Haram attacked and seized control of the border town of Baga, the town where the multinational task force had its official headquarters.351 The force did not put up a fight and hundreds of civilians in the town and surrounding areas were killed by the group.352 At the time of writing, Baga reportedly remains in the hands of Boko Haram.
Ideology and motivations Boko Haram has announced the creation of an “Islamic Caliphate”.353 Some believe that it may be looking to recreate the Kanem—Borno Caliphate, whose heyday was a thousand years or so ago.354
This strongly suggests that the group is now taking inspiration from the self-declared ‘Islamic State’ in Syria and Iraq. But there is little hard evidence as yet of direct links with the Islamic State. In November 2014, a suicide bomber killed at least 23 people in a procession of Shi’a Muslims in Yobe state, suggesting to some that Boko Haram and its affiliates may be becoming more sectarian in approach.355
While Boko Haram’s tactics have changed dramatically over the last five years or so, there are important ideological continuities between the group as it operated under Mohammed Yusuf and under his successor.
For Yusuf, the main impulse behind Boko Haram was to cleanse the north of un-Islamic ideas and practices that for him originated in British colonialism and which the post-colonial Nigerian state had perpetuated. ‘Western education’ was viewed as symbolising this impurity. It called for the establishment of an Islamic state under Shari’a Law in Nigeria. The traditional Muslim leadership in Nigeria, which had retained considerable influence under a colonial system of ‘indirect rule’, is viewed by the group as corrupt and illegitimate. Muhammed Abubakar Shekau’s agenda is broadly similar to that of his predecessor, although exponentially more violent.
However, it is not clear how far its members are motivated mainly by ideology. Boko Haram’s most immediate demand today is the release of all its detained members by the Nigerian authorities. As with so many armed insurgencies, the reasons for becoming involved can be many and varied: for example, involvement may be primarily a way of seeking revenge for real or perceived injustices by the security forces; or it may simply be a means of survival in a region that is suffering a deep-rooted economic crisis and chronic insecurity.
350 “Boko Haram’s large-scale attacks in Cameroon indicate protracted campaign of violence and severe kidnap and death risks”, IHS Global Insight, 29 December 2014 351 “Boko Haram seizes army base in Nigeria town of Baga”, BBC News Online, 4 January 2015 352 “Boko Haram seizes army base in Nigeria town of Baga”, BBC News Online, 4 January 2015; “Boko Haram crisis: Nigeria’s Baga town hit by new assault”, BBC News Online, 8 January 2015 353 “Nigerian town seized by Boko Haram ‘part of Caliphate’: leader”, news.yahoo.com, 24 August 2014 354 J. Zenn, “Boko Haram: recruitment, financing, and arms trafficking in the Lake Chad region”, CTC Sentinel, 31 October 2014 355 “Suicide bomber kills 20 Shia Muslims in Nigeria”, telegraph.co.uk, 3 November 2014
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There are rumours and allegations that behind the scenes the group has powerful political sponsors and links to criminal networks, but these have proven difficult to corroborate.356
Negotiations In recent years there have been periods when the Nigerian authorities have sought to hold negotiations with representatives of Boko Haram. However, it is often unclear who Boko Haram representatives really represent.
In 2013 there were talks with Momammed Marwan, who claimed to be second-in-command to Shekau. Some observers questioned the extent to which this was true and the negotiations eventually foundered. 357 In October 2014, the authorities announced that a ceasefire, brokered by Chad, had been agreed with Boko Haram and that the 219 schoolgirls kidnapped in Chibok in April and still in its custody would soon be released. However, it all proved “too good to be true” and Boko Haram attacks continued unabated.358 Indeed, Boko Haram forces briefly took Chibok before being forced back.
There have also been claims that there is more than one Muhammed Abubakar Shekau – his death has been announced on more than one occasion.359 These episodes highlight the difficulty in finding the ‘right people’ to negotiate with in the event of future peace initiatives.
Ansaru In January 2012, a group called Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa – known for short as Ansaru) announced that it had split from Boko Haram. Its leader is reported to be Khalid al-Barnawi.360
Information about this group is relatively limited and not always reliable. Some believe that Ansaru has separated from Boko Haram over ideology, with the former much more interested in global jihad – in practice meaning co-operation with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the main jihadi group in the West African Sahel.
However, others believe that its differences with Boko Haram are mainly derived from feelings that the latter is overly-dominated by the Kanuri ethnic group. Ansaru, by this interpretation, has been viewed as a vehicle for the rival Fulani ethnic group. Today, there is considerable uncertainty about whether Ansaru is still a separate group, or whether it has again become a ‘franchise’ of Boko Haram.361
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has been the most active and best known of the armed groups operating in the oil-rich region in southeast Nigeria.
Described as a “loose coalition of militant groups, factions, and cults”, it first emerged in 2005.362 Its leaders included Jomo Gbomo, General Tompolo and Henry Okah. Today, its
356 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pp132, 136. A Nigerian Senator, a former Borno state governor and an ex-Chief of Army Staff have been accused by various sources of being sponsors of Boko Haram. See: “How terror twists the vote”, Africa Confidential, 12 September 2014; “Australian negotiator insists Modo Sheriff Ihejirika sponsor Boko Haram, exonerates Buhari, el-Rufai”, Sahara Reporters, 31 August 2014; “In search of Dr Stephen Davis”, Daily Trust, 11 September 2014 357 R. Pantucci, “The ‘franchising’ of Boko Haram”, RUSI Newsbrief, 19 May 2014 358 A. Noakes, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram ceasefire deal: too good to be true?”, African Arguments, 22 October 2014 359 “The many deaths of Abubakar Shekau”, Africa in the News, Royal African Society, 3 October 2014 360 “Boko Haram”, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism (posted 21 July 2014) 361 R. Pantucci, “The ‘franchising’ of Boko Haram”, RUSI Newsbrief, 19 May 2014; “Boko Haram”, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism (posted 21 July 2014) 362 “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)”, Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (posted 16 July 2014)
71 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 main leader appears to be Jomo Gbomo. Its core programme has centred on securing compensation for communities affected by environmental degradation in the Niger Delta and a higher share of oil revenues for the region, as well as the release of detained leaders. Campbell asserts that the vast majority of the estimated 33 million residents of the Delta have benefited little from the oil production in the region.363
At times it has also called for the withdrawal of Nigerian security personnel and oil companies from the region. According to Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre:
MEND waged a damaging guerrilla campaign against the Nigerian security services and foreign companies - primarily multi-national energy companies - operating in the Niger Delta, in pursuit of a greater share of oil and gas revenues. Although MEND's populist credentials were eroded as members become associated with corrupt politicians and kidnapping for profit, the organisation established itself as a severe security threat in the Niger Delta and the greatest militant expression of popular disaffection with the government and international corporations.364
In 2009 most of MEND’s leaders agreed to participate in a government-sponsored amnesty programme and declared a ceasefire. Although some MEND commanders returned to armed attacks in 2010 and there were further operations in its name during 2013 and 2014, levels of violence in the Niger Delta reduced significantly following the amnesty.
As Boko Haram’s attacks have escalated, there have also been threats by MEND to undertake actions ‘in defence of Christianity’, although none have so far occurred. While levels of violence are still relatively low in the region, observers say that they have risen during 2014 and there remains a significant risk that they could escalate still further if differences between ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ parts of Nigeria’s political elite spiral out of control in the course of the 2015 presidential and legislative elections. In early January 2015, MEND publicly endorsed the presidential bid of the APC’s Muhammadu Buhari.365
4.9 The Nigerian diaspora Size, location and character Although there is general agreement that the Nigerian diaspora is large and spread far and wide, there is no single authoritative source on its size or location. Estimates of its total size vary from just over 1 million to 20 million people.366
It is often claimed that the largest concentrations of people of Nigerian heritage are to be found in the North America and Europe, although this has also been challenged, with one commentator estimating that 75% of the diaspora is based in other African countries, Asia and the Middle East. However, he argues that these emigrants are less educated and more likely to lose contact with their homeland.367
363 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p65-6 364 “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)”, Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (posted 16 July 2014) 365 “MEND endorses Buhari’s presidential bid”, This Day, 7 January 2015 366 B. Mberu and R. Pongou, “Nigeria: multiple forms of mobility in Africa’s demographic giant”, migrationpolicy.org, 30 June 2010 367 Chukwuma Soludo, “Is Nigeria losing her 17 million diaspora?”, This Day Live, 4 February 2013
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While there is certainly a significant element of ‘brain drain’ to North America and Europe (in 2007 the estimated migration rate of Nigerians with tertiary education was 36%), migration from Nigeria has been primarily driven by poverty and, to a lesser extent, conflict.368
Nigerians are well represented amongst the African migrants involved in clandestine, risky movements towards Europe, including by sea. For example, the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported in 2008 that there were at least 59,000 Nigerians without valid travelling documents in North Africa, trying to get to Western Europe. Nigeria is also an important centre for human trafficking of women and children to other countries.369
A focus on patterns of migration since independence should also not obscure the fact that there was large-scale forced migration between 1400 and 1900 as a result of the slave trade. One estimate puts the number of people enslaved and transported from what is now Nigeria at around two million.370
Remittances Figures for the scale of remittances to Nigeria from today’s diaspora are also uncertain, although it is clear that the country is the largest recipient of remittances in sub-Saharan Africa.371 The World Bank has reportedly estimated that Nigeria received about US $21 billion in remittances in 2012 – about 10% of its Gross National Product. The majority of this sum was remitted from the US and the UK.372
It is reasonable to assume that remittances currently play the same important role in helping to sustain many households as they do in other African countries, although concerns have been expressed that the level of support may tail off as family connections weaken over successive generations.373 The south-east and south-west of Nigeria are reported to benefit particularly strongly from remittance inflows from North America and Europe.374 Smaller sums make their way to northern Nigeria from the Gulf States.375
Nigerian government policies The Nigerian authorities have established a range of policies and institutions in order to maintain and strengthen ties with the diaspora.
In 2001 the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization was established. It now has branches across North America and Europe. In 2003 the Nigerian National Volunteer Service was also created in order to promote diaspora involvement in the country’s development efforts and, as far as possible, reverse the ‘brain drain’.
In 2002, the law was also changed to allow Nigerians abroad to hold dual citizenship. More recently, President Goodluck Jonathan has proposed establishing a Diaspora Commission
368 B. Mberu and R. Pongou, “Nigeria: multiple forms of mobility in Africa’s demographic giant”, migrationpolicy.org, 30 June 2010 369 B. Mberu and R. Pongou, “Nigeria: multiple forms of mobility in Africa’s demographic giant”, migrationpolicy.org, 30 June 2010 370 B. Mberu and R. Pongou, “Nigeria: multiple forms of mobility in Africa’s demographic giant”, migrationpolicy.org, 30 June 2010 371 S. Akinrinade and O. Ogen, “Historicising the Nigerian diaspora: Nigerian migrants and homeland relations”, Turkish Journal of Politics, Winter 2011 372 Chukwuma Soludo, “Is Nigeria losing her 17 million diaspora?”, This Day Live, 4 February 2013 373 Chukwuma Soludo, “Is Nigeria losing her 17 million diaspora?”, This Day Live, 4 February 2013 374 B. Mberu and R. Pongou, “Nigeria: multiple forms of mobility in Africa’s demographic giant”, migrationpolicy.org, 30 June 2010 375 S. Akinrinade and O. Ogen, “Historicising the Nigerian diaspora: Nigerian migrants and homeland relations”, Turkish Journal of Politics, Winter 2011
73 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; a bill to this is end was tabled in the National Assembly in 2010 but it is yet to become law.376
The Federal Government approved a ‘Diaspora Bond’ worth US$100-300 million, to be issued by the end of 2014, with a view to encouraging members of the diaspora to invest in the country.377 However, the Bond does not appear to have been issued at the time of writing.
The House of Representatives, the lower house of the National Assembly, has set up a Committee on Diaspora Affairs.378
Since 2007, 25 July has been marked as ‘National Diaspora Day’. However, these initiatives have been criticised as “at best ad hoc and pedestrian”.379
It has also been claimed that diaspora engagement in the economic and political life of the country has been held back by the way in which public authorities across Nigeria have traditionally taken steps to privilege the rights of ‘indigenes’ – that is, those whose ancestors came from a particular area – over those of ‘settlers’ or ‘strangers’.380 There have been calls to amend the Constitution to outlaw discrimination against ‘non-indigenes’.381
In addition, there are calls for Nigerians abroad to be given the vote in elections. However, although President Goodluck Jonathan has indicated his support for the idea in principle, the Independent National Election Commission has ruled it out for the 2015 elections.382
A new unity? The differing socio-economic origins and motivations of Nigerians migrating abroad since 1960 – as highlighted earlier – are, of course, further overlaid by ethnic, religious and regional differences.
All of these factors provide valuable social networks for migrants but they render it problematic to talk about a homogenous diaspora and inevitably they have an impact on official efforts to mobilise it for development purposes.383
However, there are signs that advances in new technology have the potential to create new, broader-based links around a national identity. On example is Nigerian Web Radio, a 24- hour online radio station. Satellite and cable television stations aimed at the diaspora have also been springing up.384
376 “A Diaspora Commission?”, Nigerian Tribune, 15 July 2014 377 “Nigeria: diaspora bond in the offing”, Business Report (South Africa), 1 July 2014 378 House of Representatives’ Committee on Diaspora Affairs 379 Chukwuma Soludo, “Is Nigeria losing her 17 million diaspora?”, This Day Live, 4 February 2013 380 This is widely known as the ‘state of origin’ policy. See: R. Chikwem, “Lifting the veil of ignorance: The issue of discrimination, ethnicity and national integration in Nigeria”, n.d.; Chukwuma Soludo, “Is Nigeria losing her 17 million diaspora?”, This Day Live, 4 February 2013 381 “State of residence should replace state of origin – Atedo Peterside”, Premium Times, 16 May 2014 382 “Diaspora voting: still a long wait for Nigerians abroad”, New Telegraph. 6 April 2014 383 S. Akinrinade and O. Ogen, “Historicising the Nigerian diaspora: Nigerian migrants and homeland relations”, Turkish Journal of Politics, Winter 2011 384 S. Akinrinade and O. Ogen, “Historicising the Nigerian diaspora: Nigerian migrants and homeland relations”, Turkish Journal of Politics, Winter 2011
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The Nigerian diaspora in the UK and US The size of the Nigerian diaspora in the UK was estimated at around 150,000 in 2009, with approximately two-thirds living in London.385 This made Nigeria the ninth-largest source country for migration into the UK.
In 2013, the Office of National Statistics (ONS) estimated that there were 181,000 people living in the UK who were born in Nigeria, and 106,000 Nigerian nationals in the country.386 Workers of Nigerian origin are strongly represented in the public sector, with health and social care a particularly significant sphere of employment.387
If the UK connection is based on obvious historical and personal ties, the primary attraction of the US has been its reputation as a place of opportunity. The diaspora in the US has been estimated at 150 – 250,000.388 Houston, Texas, is the most popular city of residence for Nigerians in the US.389 John Campbell writes:
It has been a successful immigrant community characterized by entrepreneurship, strong family ties and an emphasis on education. Socially, it is generally conservative and evangelical or even Pentecostal in outlook.390
4.10 Membership of international and regional organisations The United Nations (UN) Nigeria became a member of the UN following independence in 1960. It has been an active participant in UN peacekeeping and peace support operations, beginning with the deployment of military personnel to Congo between 1960 and 1964. Other countries in which it has participated in peace operations include Lebanon, Chad, Angola, Namibia, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sudan (Darfur).
As at July 2014, Nigeria was providing 2,977 military and police personnel to UN operations – the seventh largest contribution.391 Nigeria was also active at the UN in promoting decolonisation. Nigeria chaired the UN’s Anti-Apartheid Committee between 1970 and 1994.
Since 1992 Nigeria has campaigned for a permanent seat on the Security Council.392 Nigeria was elected to the Security Council as a non-permanent member for 2014-15.
Nigeria accepted the 2002 decision of the International Court of Justice in favour of Cameroon over the sovereignty of the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula.393
Since May 2014, the UN has designated Boko Haram and Ansaru (see above) as terrorist organisations, and Boko Haram’s leader Muhammed Abubakar Shekau as a terrorist individual.394
385 B. Mberu and R. Pongou, “Nigeria: multiple forms of mobility in Africa’s demographic giant”, migrationpolicy.org, 30 June 2010 386 ONS, Population by Country of Birth & Nationality, 2013 387 B. Mberu and R. Pongou, “Nigeria: multiple forms of mobility in Africa’s demographic giant”, migrationpolicy.org, 30 June 2010 388 B. Mberu and R. Pongou, “Nigeria: multiple forms of mobility in Africa’s demographic giant”, www.migrationpolicy.org 30 June 2010 389 www.nigeriadiaspora.com 390 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), ppxx 391 “Ranking of military and police contributions to UN operations”, UN website, 31 July 2014 392 South Africa and Egypt have lodged rival claims for a permanent African seat on the Council. 393 “Focus on Nigeria’s response to ICJ ruling on the Bakassi Peninsula”, IRIN News, 15 October 2002 394 The Al-Qaida sanctions list [accessed 9 September 2014]
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The African Union (AU) Nigeria was a founder member of the Organisation of African Union when it was established in 1963, and of its successor, the AU, which was created in 2002. It is one of five African member states that currently makes a significant contribution to AU funding. It has been represented for much of the subsequent period on the AU’s Peace and Security Commission and has played a major role in the construction of what is called the ‘African Peace and Security Architecture, which is due to include an African Standby Force by the end of 2015.
Nigerian political leaders and diplomats have often been involved in AU-led mediation efforts. Nigeria has also been prominent in efforts to promote regional economic development and integration, including through the New Partnership for Economic Development (NEPAD).395
However, Nigeria has at times found itself at loggerheads with other countries seeking a leading role in the AU – most notably South Africa.
Nigeria unsuccessfully opposed the election of South African cabinet minister Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, as the new Chair of the African Union Commission in 2012.396 More recently, Nigeria has also found itself in disagreement with South Africa over proposals to establish a smaller, rapid reaction force (known as the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises [ACIRC]) in addition to the agreed African Standby Force. South Africa favours the proposal and a decision to go ahead was taken by the AU in January 2014.397
Deep tensions remain between the two countries as they continue to jostle for primacy within the AU.398
In mid-January 2015, there was talk of the AU becoming involved in coordinating efforts to combat Boko Haram, as it has been in Somalia.399
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Nigeria was a founder member of ECOWAS on its establishment in 1975. Its headquarters are in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria.
Nigeria’s relative demographic and economic power has meant that it has always been a powerful player within the organisation. Only Cote d’Ivoire has come close in terms of influence. However, at times there has also been considerable mistrust of Nigeria on the part of some of the other member states.400
Over time, the mandate of ECOWAS has expanded well beyond sub-regional economic matters to include the maintenance of peace and security in the neighbourhood. Nigeria has led the way in this regard. It was central to the ECOWAS response to the outbreak of civil war in Liberia in 1990. The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that was established to bring the internal conflict there to an end was in practice a Nigerian force. It also operated in neighbouring Sierra Leone during that country’s internal conflict. This experience overturned the previously dominant principle within the organisation of non- intervention in the internal affairs of member states.
No doubt motivated by its own history, over the last decade or so Nigeria has also been a strong exponent of the ECOWAS policy of ‘zero tolerance’ of military coups.
395 Ambassadors O. Oshiru and O. George, “Nigeria and the OAU/AU: A fifty years journey”, May 2013 396 “African Union: Dlamini-Zuma takes charge”, Africa Confidential, 20 July 2012 397 “African Union: South Africa’s volunteer force”, Africa Confidential, 7 February 2014 398 “Clash of the titans”, Africa Confidential, 24 October 2014 399 “Boko Haram crisis: African Union to discuss multinational force”, BBC News Online, 16 January 2015 400 W. O. Alli, “The role of Nigeria in regional security policy”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Abuja, 2012, pp13-15, 77
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Overall, Nigeria is less predominant within the organisation than it was during the 1990s. Its leadership in driving economic integration forward across the sub-region has been weaker than on peace and security issues. For example, efforts to create monetary union across the sub-region are decades behind schedule.401
However, Nigeria’s reputation on peace and security issues has also begun to suffer as a result of its apparent failure to address its own growing internal threats. But the decline in its influence within ECOWAS should not be exaggerated. Nigeria continues to be the corner- stone of ECOWAS military capabilities, providing its standby force.402
In mid-January 2015, there was talk of ECOWAS becoming more involved in coordinating efforts to combat Boko Haram.403
The Commonwealth Nigeria joined the Commonwealth immediately following independence in 1960. It was actively involved in decolonisation issues within the organisation and campaigned forthrightly for a strong stance against the Apartheid system in South Africa until 1994.
However, between 1995 and 1999 its own membership of the organisation was suspended during the military rule of General Sani Abacha.
Between 1990 and 2000 a Nigerian, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, was the Commonwealth Secretary-General.
The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) The ACP Group was established in 1975. It comprises 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific states, including Nigeria, all of whom are (with the sole exception of Cuba) signatories to the Cotonou Agreement with the European Community (now the European Union).
According to the ACP Group’s website, its main goals include the “sustainable development of its member states and their gradual integration into the global economy” and the “establishment and consolidation of peace and stability in a free and democratic society.”404
Other organisations Nigeria is also a member of the following international organisations:
World Trade Organisation (joined at its establishment in 1995)
Non-Aligned Movement (joined in 1964)
Organisation of Petroleum-producing Countries (joined in 1971)405
Group of 77 (joined in 1964)
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (joined in 1986)
401 “Monetary integration: Regional leaders set the benchmarks for a single currency”, Oxford Research Group, 2011 402 W. O. Alli, “The role of Nigeria in regional security policy”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Abuja, 2012, p31 403 “Boko Haram crisis: African Union to discuss multinational force”, BBC News Online, 16 January 2015 404 ACP Group website 405 Nigeria’s Minister of Petroleum, Mrs Diezani Alison-Madueke, was elected president of OPEC in November 2014.
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4.11 Selected treaty ratifications
Signed/ Ratified/Acceded/ Treaty Declared Succeeded
Geneva Conventions
Convention (1) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. 12 August 1949 .. Acceded 20/06/1961 Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. 12 August 1949 .. Acceded 20/06/1961 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 12 August 1949 .. Acceded 20/06/1961 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 12 August 1949 .. Acceded 20/06/1961 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). 8 June 1977 .. Acceded 10/10/1988 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). 8 June 1977 .. Acceded 10/10/1988 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III). 8 June 1977 ......
UN Charter and the International Court of Justice
Declarations of Acceptance of the Obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations 07/10/1961 .. .. Declaration recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 30/04/1998 .. ..
Human Rights
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 9 December 1948 .. Acceded 27/07/2009 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 7 March 1966 .. Acceded 29/10/1993 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 16 December 1966 .. Acceded 29/07/1993 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 16 December 1966 ...... International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 16 December 1966 .. Acceded 29/07/1993 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 18 December 1979 23/04/1984 Ratified 13/06/1985 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 10 December 1984 28/07/1988 Ratified 28/06/2001 Convention on the Rights of the Child. 20 November 1989 26/01/1990 Ratified 19/04/1991 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty. 15 December 1989 ......
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Signed/ Ratified/Acceded/ Declared Succeeded Optional Protocol the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 6 October 1999 08/09/2000 Ratified 22/11/2004 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. 25 May 2000 08/09/2000 Ratified 27/09/2010 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. 25 May 2000 08/09/2000 Ratified 25/09/2012 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 18 December 2002 .. Acceded 27/07/2009 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 13 December 2006 30/03/2007 Ratified 24/09/2010 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 13 December 2006 30/12/2007 Ratified 24/09/2010 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. 20 December 2006 .. Acceded 27/07/2009 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 10 December 2008 ...... Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure. 19 December 2011 ......
Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 1 July 1968 01/07/1968 Ratified 14/10/1968 African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. 11 April 1996 11/04/1996 Ratified 20/04/2000 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Ani-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. 18 September 1997 .. Acceded 27/09/2001 Convention on Cluster Munitions. 30 May 2008 12/06/2009 .. .. Arms Trade Treaty. 2 April 2013 .. Acceded 12/08/2013
Refugees
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 28 July 1951 .. Acceded 23/10/1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 31 January 1967 .. Acceded 02/05/1968
International Trade and Development
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 30 October 1947 18/11/1960 .. ..
Environment
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. New York. 9 May 1992 13/06/1992 Ratified 29/08/1994 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa. 17 June 1994 31/10/1994 Ratified 08/07/1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. 11 December 1997 .. Acceded 10/12/2004 79 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02
Signed/ Ratified/Acceded/ Penal Matters Declared Succeeded Slavery Convention, signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926 and amended by the Protocol. 7 December 1953 .. Succd. 26/06/1961 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. 17 December 1979 .. Acceded 24/09/2013 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. 15 December 1997 .. Acceded 24/09/2013 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 17 July 1998 01/06/2000 Ratified 27/09/2001 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 9 December 1999 01/06/2000 Ratified 16/06/2003 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 15 November 2000 13/12/2000 Ratified 28/06/2001 United Nations Convention against Corruption. 31 October 2003 09/12/2003 Ratified 14/12/2004
Regional
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. 10 September 1969 10/09/1969 Ratified 23/05/1986 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 1 July 1990 13/07/1999 Ratified 23/07/2001 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. 3 June 1991 03/06/1991 Ratified 31/12/1991 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 1 July 1991 31/08/1982 Ratified 22/06/1983 OAU Convention on the Preventing and Combating of Terrorism, 1 July 1999 26/04/2002 Ratified 28/04/2002 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 7 November 2000 08/09/2000 Ratified 29/03/2001 OAU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 1 July 2003 16/12/2003 Ratified 26/09/2006 African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance. 30 January 2007 02/07/2007 Ratified 01/12/2011 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 1 July 2008 22/12/2008 .. .. African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. 23 October 2009 23/10/2009 Ratified 17/04/2012 Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 1975; revised 24 July 1993 24/07/1993 Ratified 01/07/1994 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression. 22 April 1978 22/04/1978 Ratified 17/05/1979 ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence. 29 May 1981 29/05/1981 Ratified 18/04/1988 ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. 20 December 1999 20/12/1999 .. .. ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. 21 December 2001 21/12/2001 .. .. The Agreement of the West African Monetary Zone. 15 December 2000 [not yet launched] 15/12/2000 Ratified 23/08/2002
Main sources: The UN Treaty Collection: https://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=18&subid=A&lang=en The African Union Treaties webpage: http://www.au.int/en/treaties The Economic Community of West African States Protocols webpage: http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/?id=protocole&lang=en ECOWAS Annual Report 2012: http://events.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/2012-Annual- Report_Annexes_English_final.pdf 80 RESEARCH PAPER 15/02
5 Select bibliography and web sources 5.1 Books D. Booth and D. Cammack, Governance for Development in Africa: Solving Collective Action Problems (London, 2013)
J. Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013)
P. Chabal, Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London, 2009)
A. Kohli, State-directed Development. Political Power and Industrialisation in the Global Periphery (Cambridge, 2006)
M. Mamdani, Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism (Princeton, 1996)
R. Marshall, Political Spiritualities. The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago, 2009)
A. Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Oakland, 2001)
V. Padayachee ed., The Political Economy of Africa (London, 2010)
D. Shinn and J. Eisenman, China and Africa. A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, 2012)
5.2 Journals, articles and reports African Development Bank, Nigeria Economic Outlook 2014
S. Akinrinade and O. Ogen, “Historicising the Nigerian diaspora: Nigerian migrants and homeland relations”, Turkish Journal of Politics, Winter 2011
W. O. Alli, “The role of Nigeria in regional security policy”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Abuja, 2012
Amnesty International, “Welcome to hell fire”. Torture and other ill-treatment in Nigeria”, 18 September 2014
M. Baca, “The tragedy of Borno state: local dimensions of Boko Haram’s insurgency”, African Arguments, 19 December 2014
J. Barna, “Insecurity in context: The rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, European Parliament Policy Department Note 2014/113, July 2014
L. Ploch Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently asked questions”, Congressional Research Service, 10 June 2014
D. Booth, “No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa”, in Commonwealth Good Governance 2011/12 (London, 2011)
D. Booth, “Towards politically smart, locally led development in Africa”, African Arguments, 23 October 2014
J. Campbell, “US policy to counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram”, Council on Foreign Relations, November 2014
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R. Chikwem, “Lifting the veil of ignorance: The issue of discrimination, ethnicity and national integration in Nigeria”, n.d.
C. Cummings, “Nigeria: what to do when wealth doesn’t mean development”, whydev.org, 9 December 2014
B. Dressel and S. Dinnen, “”Political settlements: old wine in new bottles?”, Development Policy Centre, Policy Brief No. 9, February 2014
Foreign Affairs Committee, “The UK’s response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa”, HC 86, 7th Report, Session 2013-14, 21 March 2014, 2 Vols
Human Rights Watch, Political Sharia? Human rights and Islamic law in northern Nigeria”, September 2014
Human Rights Watch, “‘Those Terrible Weeks in Their Camp’: Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria,” October 2014
International Crisis Group, “Nigeria’s dangerous 2015 elections: limiting the violence”, November 2014
A. Jauhari, “Colonial and post-colonial human rights violations in Nigeria”, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, May 2011
M. Khan, “Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions”, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, July 2010
J. Lal, “India Africa Forum Summits: Engagements and outcomes”, Indian Council of World Affairs, 20 November 2013
J. Liebowitz and J. Ibrahim, “A capacity assessment of Nigerian political parties”, UNDP, January 2013
B. Mberu and R. Pongou, “Nigeria: multiple forms of mobility in Africa’s demographic giant”, migrationpolicy.org, 30 June 2010
McKinsey Global Institute, “Nigeria’s renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy”, July 2014
K. Meagher, “MINTs and mayhem: in Nigeria the risks are the only things that trickle down”, africanarguments.org, 22 May 2014
S. Naidu, “India stepping up the ante in African relations”, Pambazuka News, 25 March 2010
J. Nwokeoma, “The judiciary’s redemptive role in Nigeria’s democracy”, Peace and Collaborative Development Network, 7 November 2007
A Olowofoyeku, “The Beleaguered Fortress: Reflections of the Independence of Nigeria's Judiciary”, Journal of African Law, Spring 1989
Ambassadors O. Oshiru and O. George, “Nigeria and the OAU/AU: A fifty years journey”, May 2013
J. Paden, “Midterm challenges in Nigeria: Elections, parties and regional conflict”, United States Institute for Peace, special report 334, May 2013
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L. Ploch, “Nigeria: Current issues and US policy”, Congressional Research Service, 24 April 2013
R. Pantucci, “The ‘franchising’ of Boko Haram”, RUSI Newsbrief, 19 May 2014
R. Pantucci and M. Cadoux-Hudson, “Nigeria’s opaque Jihad: Insurgency in Africa’s richest nation”, RUSI Analysis, 16 May 2014
N. Rajis-Okpara, “Nigeria-India: A key partnership”, lecture by the Nigerian High Commissioner to Singapore at the National University of Singapore, 21 March 2013
Z. Usman and O Owen, “Incumbency and opportunity: forecasting Nigeria’s 2015 elections”, African Arguments, 29 October 2014
P. Vasudevan, “The changing nature of Nigeria-India relations”, Chatham House Programme Paper AFP 2010/02, December 2010
World Bank, Nigeria Economic Report, July 2014
World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Index 2014–2015 – Nigeria
5.3 Web sources Official sources National Human Rights Commission
Independent National Electoral Commission
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999
House of Representatives Committee on Diaspora Affairs
IMF: Article IV Country Assessments
World Bank
ECOWAS
ACP Group
US-Nigeria Binational Commission
USAID: Nigeria
“China”, US Energy Information Administration
“UK and Nigeria”, UK Government website
“Foreign Secretary announces UK support following ministerial on Boko Haram”, FCO press release, 12 June 2014
DFID’s Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14
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DFID Nigeria, Operational Plan 2011-2015
DFID Development Tracker website.
DFID, Anti-Corruption Strategy for Nigeria, 2013
Cotonou Agreement
Africa—EU Partnership
European Commission, Trade—West Africa
The Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward, 2009
EU-Nigeria Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2008-2013
EU External Action, Nigeria
EU-Nigeria National Indicative Programme 2014-2020
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
India-Africa Forum Summit 2011
New Delhi Declaration, 2008
Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, 2011
Statistics and economic indicators IMF World Economic Outlook database
World Bank: World Development Indicators
UNCTADstat (foreign direct investment and trade)
UN COMTRADE (trade)
Other sources Europa World Plus (available through the Parliamentary Intranet)
CIA World Factbook
Amnesty International
Human Rights Watch
International Crisis Group
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