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How Estonian Public Broadcasting Creates an Alternative to Russian Propaganda -Euromaidan Press | 11/15/2017 How Estonian Public Broadcasting creates an alternative to Russian propaganda -Euromaidan Press | EuroMaidan Russia Putin Crimea HOME NEWS ANALYSIS & OPINION UKRAINE CRIMEA ABOUT US ⤭ ☍ + SEARCH How Estonian Public Broadcasting creates an alternative to Russian propaganda On air of the newscast at ETV+. Photo: Euromaidan Press About the Source OLENA MAKARENKO Olena Makarenko is a journalist at Euromaidan Press. In 2014, Olena started working as a volunteer on http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/09/25/how-estonian-public-broadcasting-creates-an-alternative-to-russian-propaganda/ 1/11 11/15/2017 How Estonian Public Broadcasting creates an alternative to Russian propaganda -Euromaidan Press | public initiatives focusing on building civil society and promoting dialog between people from different regions of Ukraine. » Analysis & Opinion, Information security » How Estonian Public Broadcasting creates an... Previous post: Wounded veterans train for Invictus Games, beginning 2017/09/25 - 23:46 • ANALYSIS & OPINION, INFORMATION SECURITY September 23rd Like 73 Share The occupation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in Donbas made the Next Post: Baltic countries reconsider their policy towards Russia. The situation in Latvia, Russia’s TV news: threatening Lithuania, and Estonia is similar but has its own nuances in every country. In Ukraine with nukes, claiming Estonia, it is complicated by the fact that about 25% of its population are USSR only real democracy, Russians. defensive Zapad 2017 The population of Estonia is 1.36 mn people. Of them, about 340,000 are Russians. Related Posts The problem of their integration in Estonian society was underestimated for many years. Now, the state tries to pay more attention to the question. BBC: How What Euromaidan Press visited the “DNR” Ukraine can ERR, Estonian Public special learn from Broadcasting and in services & Estonia’s particular ETV+, a Russian- troll... healthcare language Estonian channel created as an alternative to Russian propaganda media which are quite popular Ainar Ruussaar. Photo: Euromaidan Press among Russian Estonians. “Russia How big is Now Russia’s Estonian Public Broadcasting is one of three largest media companies in Leading inuence in Estonia. It has 5 radio stations and 3 TV-channels. It belongs to the people of Source of Estonia? Estonia and is regulated by the Parliament which appoints a supervisory ISIS authority for the broadcaster. Russian-language channel ETV+ was launched in autumn 2015. http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/09/25/how-estonian-public-broadcasting-creates-an-alternative-to-russian-propaganda/ 2/11 11/15/2017 How Estonian Public Broadcasting creates an alternative to Russian propaganda -Euromaidan Press | We talked to Ainar Ruussaar, an experienced journalist, ex-member of the board of Estonian Public Broadcasting, and one of the initiators of creating a Russian- language channel in Estonia. SUBSCRIBE TO THE WEEKLY NEWSLETTER As Ruussaar told, about 70% of the Russian population watches Russian channels – Perviy Baltiyskiy Kanal (First Baltic Channel) which is a daughter of Email address: Your email add the Russian First Channel, NTV, and Rossiya 1. News and analysis highlights LetMyPeopleGo Friends of Ukraine Network Four warnings Sign up EUROMAIDAN PRESS SURVEY Help us get better! Take the Euromaidan Press survey FEATURED The studio of the evening newscast. Photo: Euromaidan Press The Estonian free Russian-language channel was created from the fourth attempt. Ruussaar names all the attempts: 1. In 1992 after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, then the initiative didn’t lift off due to the lack of funds in the chaotic post-socialist period. 2. In the spring of 2007. Then, the Estonian government decided to move the Soviet monument to the fallen Soviet soldier from the city center of Tallinn to the military cemetery. This led to 3 days of protests in the capital. The majority of the protesters were young Russians. Ruussaar attended crisis meetings of the government that time. There he was asked whether it is possible to open a Russian-language channel. He answered yes, but claried Decentralization: that creating a channel needs time. But when the unrest ended, the idea the mortal threat was forgotten. to Ukraine’s entrenched elites 3. In 2008 after the Russian-Georgian war. The active phase of the war lasted for 100 hours and was quickly forgotten by Europe and NATO. The idea of an In April 2014, Ukraine Estonian Russian-language channel was forgotten as well. launched its decentralization reform. So http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/09/25/how-estonian-public-broadcasting-creates-an-alternative-to-russian-propaganda/ 3/11 11/15/2017 How Estonian Public Broadcasting creates an alternative to Russian propaganda -Euromaidan Press | 4. The channel was created from the fourth try, with the occupation of far it is believed to be the Crimea and the de-facto war in eastern Ukraine acting as the catalysts. most successful reform in the country – local The decision on the creation of ETV+ was made in 2014. In autumn 2015 the communities nally received the power and channel started to work. The broadcasting starts at 7 in the morning and ends at nances to deal with local 1:0 a.m. It has 20 hours of original programs per week. The rest is purchased issues themselves. lms and TV-series. According to Ainar Ruussaar, it is the only one independent However,... Russian-language channel in the region (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, Sweden): READ ARTICLE “It is important because there are very few independent Russian journalists in the world.” ADVERTISEMENT The expert also names some concomitant advantage: they at ETV+ can show Russian content which is forbidden in Russia. “For example, the Russian TV-series Trap. Guess why it is forbidden in Russia? It tells about Russian maa. But there is no maa in Russia,” sneers Ruussaar. The mission in terms of freedom of speech On air of the evening talk show at ETV+. Photo: Euromaidan Press ETV+ isn’t created as an anti-propaganda channel. It provides an alternative to the Russian media’s narrative, so the audience can see different points of views. http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/09/25/how-estonian-public-broadcasting-creates-an-alternative-to-russian-propaganda/ 4/11 11/15/2017 How Estonian Public Broadcasting creates an alternative to Russian propaganda -Euromaidan Press | The Russian-language channel follows the concept of the Estonian-language channels of the public broadcaster. “Our budgets can’t compete with Perviy Baltiyskiy Kanal or NTV. The only way we can compete is by talking about local stories and local people,” says Ruussaar. He goes on saying that local Russians can come to the channel and speak freely: “If they think that Crimea is a Russian territory they can say it absolutely freely. However, we will also put up another opinion. And there will be a debate.” According to the channel’s statistics, the biggest share of their audience watches ETV+ at 8 PM, the time of the newscast. “The audience behaves strangely. Russian-speaking people will watch our news until the end and then go to Perviy Baltiyskiy Kanal. So over one hour, they will watch two newscasts – the Kremlin one and an independent one. But I have no idea what do they think afterward,” says Ruussaar. The journalist is condent that Russians within Estonia do not trust anyone at all: “They trust neither Putin’s government nor the government of Estonia. They have a job here, an apartment. Life seems pretty normal. It is strange for them that there are American forces here. However, they do not see Americans in everyday life, so it’s OK. Young people are integrated – they know Estonian and Russian and have dierent sources. But I am afraid that older ones do not trust anyone.” The Estonian government recognized the value of strategical communication with the Russian population in Estonia was after the events in Georgia and Ukraine. In the mid-90s, a policy to reduce the use of Russian language in Estonia was established, putting the focus on Estonia, the Estonian government, and the Estonian language. After Estonia joined EU and NATO, the concept of globalization became closer to the country: “When the crisis arose in Georgia and Ukraine, we started to realize that strategical communication is sometimes more important than anti-tank weapons. We started to realize that there are many people here who live in Estonia physically, but in Russia mentally. They watch Russian TV, they do http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/09/25/how-estonian-public-broadcasting-creates-an-alternative-to-russian-propaganda/ 5/11 11/15/2017 How Estonian Public Broadcasting creates an alternative to Russian propaganda -Euromaidan Press | not know Estonian, they did not know that they can participate in local elections. They did not know it because Russian channels did not show it,” explains Ruussaar. After it became clear, Estonian society realized the need to talk to Russians and to explain in their language what Estonia is, who is its president, why NATO forces are located there etc. Wherein highly valuing freedom of speech, the country decided not to block propaganda coming from the Russian Federation: “We trust in our people. We believe that they are educated enough to understand what propaganda is, what Kremlin channels are, what Russia Today is, and can choose other sources. However, if I want to watch the TV- channel Al-Qaeda, Rossiya-1, or Ukrainian 5 Kanal it is my free choice in a democratic country,” says Ruussaar. Evaluating the Russian threat A souvenir shop in with matrioshkas of Putin in Tallin Photo: Euromaidan Press From the Ukrainian point of view, such an approach seems reckless, as it was Russian propaganda which made the war and occupation in Ukraine possible. However, Ruussaar says that in Estonia, the Ukrainian scenario can be repeated only in theory.
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