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Again, it is not easy to tell whether the Italian Government understands the abovementioned phenomena as self-standing bases for triggering the competence of the SC under Chapter VII of the Charter. An answer in the affirmative might stem both from the explicit qualification of many of such phenomena as threats to international peace and security and from the Government’s insistence on the role the SC has in tackling them. A negative answer, on the other hand, is per- haps suggested by the references – which, however, are infrequent – to the fact that this role must be taken on by the SC within its mandate. Moreover, the idea, expressed by the Italian representatives, that all these threats (forced migration, climate change, conflicts, food insecurity, terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking) are intertwined166 leads to a situation where it is almost impossible to disentangle them. Again, the ambiguity persists. As this would prevent the identification of a clear factual basis for the action of the SC, one could presume that the Italian Government, with its statements on the interconnection of current security risks, is not actually taking a legal stance on the scope of the mandate of the SC. Alternatively, one could take the Italian commitment to a “comprehen- sive and integrated approach”, a “cross-dimensional approach”167 to international security seriously, and think that the Government’s holistic understanding of both the scope and means of action of the SC is meant to bring the extensive interpre- tation of that body’s powers even further. Paolo Tu rrini
XVIII. USE OF FORCE AND PEACE-KEEPING
Th e Airstri k es a g ainst Sy ria in Response to t h e Alle g ed Use o f Ch emical Weapons
On 17 April 2018, Mr Paolo Gentiloni Silveri, Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (President of the Council of Ministers), reported before the Senato della Repubblica (Senate of the Republic) on the developments of the situation in Syria (5th Meeting, XVII Legislature). In doing so, he also summarized the Government’s position on the airstrikes against Syria conducted by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom on 14 April 2018, presented as a re- sponse to the chemical weapons allegedly used in Douma by the Syrian army a few days before. Mr Gentiloni firstly commented upon the credibility of these allegations:
Eventually, the Joint Investigative Mechanism (which is a part- nership between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations) determined that in the last years, at least three times, the Syrian army resorted to using chlorine gas.
166 See the statements made by Amb. Inigo Lambertini on 16 October 2017, by Amb. Sebastian Cardi on 19 July 2017, and by Amb. Mariangela Zappia on 6 November 2018. 167 Statement by Amb. Inigo Lambertini of 22 February 2017.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��19 | doi:10.1163/��116133_0�801039 554 italian practice relating to international law
Moreover, it confirmed the use of nerve gas in the attack in Khan Shaykhun that occurred exactly one year ago. You will recall that on that occasion there was a response by the United States. But the same body – the Joint Investigative Mechanism – determined that Daesh as well, on a couple of occasions, resorted to using chemical weapons in the Syrian context.
With respect to the decision to conduct airstrikes, Mr Gentiloni mainly reiter- ated the position that had already been taken by Italy in the case of the response by the United States to the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack.168 He said:
This is the background against which the Government, a few hours after the events of the 14 April, assessed the response that had been decided by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom – the two European States most militarily involved in Syria. The Government considered it as a motivated response. Since in these circumstances even words matter, I want to underline that this ad- jective is the same one that the Government used exactly one year ago to describe the response to the use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun.
Mr Gentiloni, however, further qualified the military action:
A motivated and, I would add, targeted and circumscribed response. The response is targeted and circumscribed because, at least for now, there are no indications that there were civilian casualties or significant collateral damage during this military operation, which, as you know, was targeted and circumscribed to three chemical weapons facilities. The fact that no incidents occurred with the Russian or the Iranian army demonstrates for sure that there was a coordination between the forces which conducted the airstrikes and
168 See the statement delivered by Amb. Sebastiano Cardi, Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations, on 7 April 2017 at the 7919th Meeting of the UN Security Council, which reads as follows: “Italy understands the reasons for the United States’ military action, which was proportionate in time and manner and a response to a prolonged sense of impunity that is completely unacceptable. It is also a deterrent to the risk of any further use of chemical weapons in Syria, in addition to the cases already ascertained by the United Nations, for which there already should have been a prompt and meaningful response, including in terms of ac- countability, which the Council must continue to seek”. The statement is available at: