Legal Monitoring in Ukraine III Preliminary
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CEC: Pylypyshyn Ahead of Levchenko in Constituency No. 223 Nov. 8
CEC: Pylypyshyn ahead of Levchenko in constituency No. 223 Nov. 8, 2012, 12:21 p.m. | Interfax-Ukraine http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/cec-pylypyshyn-ahead-of-levchenko- in-constituency-no-223-315765.html On 5 November, the CEC adopted a resolution on ecognizing the impossibility of announcing election results in five constituencies – Nos. 94, 132, 194, 197 and 223.© Kostyantyn Chernichkin With 94.05% of the ballots counted in constituency No. 223 (Shevchenkivsky district, Kyiv), self-nominee Viktor Pylypyshyn, who is the former head of Shevchenkivsky district council and district administration in Kyiv, is leading by 265 votes the candidate of the Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union, Yuriy Levchenko. According to the Central Election Commission, Pylypyshyn took 27.49% of the vote (25,808 votes), while Levchenko took 27.21% (25,543). The CEC obliged district election commission No. 223 to count all the ballots and sign the relevant protocol by 1500 on November 9. At the same time, the Central Election Commission adopted a resolution on November 5 recognizing the impossibility of announcing parliament election results in five single-seat constituencies – Nos. 94, 132, 194, 197 and 223. CEC receives vote-count protocols from Kaniv constituency No. 197 Nov. 8, 2012, 10:13 a.m. | Interfax-Ukraine http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/cec-receives-vote-count-protocols- from-kaniv-constituency-no-197-315758.html In problematic district No.197, there is still a mismatch between the protocols and the public vote count.© AFP The Central Election Commission (CEC) has received the vote-count protocols from district election commission No. -
Abuse of Power – Corruption in the Office of the President Is His Most Recent Book
Contents 1. Preface 2. 1 “Evil has to be stopped” 3. 2 Marchuk, the arch-conspirator 4. 3 Kuchma fixes his re-election 5. 4 East & West celebrate Kuchma’s victory 6. 5 Kuchma and Putin share secrets 7. 6 Corruption 8. 7 Haunted by Lazarenko 9. 8 Bakai “the conman” 10. 9 “Yuliya must be destroyed” 11. 10 Prime minister’s wife “from the CIA”? 12. 11 Kidnapping Podolsky & killing Gongadze 13. 12 Covering up murder 14. 13 Marchuk’s “secret coordinating center” 15. 14 Kolchuga fails to oust Kuchma 16. 15 The Melnychenko-Kuchma pact 17. 16 “We can put anyone against the wall” 18. 17 Fixed election sparks Orange Revolution 19. 18 Yanukovych’s revenge 20. Bibliography 21. Acknowledgements 22. A note on the author 23. Books by JV Koshiw Artemia Press Ltd Published by Artemia Press Ltd, 2013 www.artemiabooks.com ISBN 978-0-9543764-3-7 Copyright © JV Koshiw, 2013 All rights reserved. Database right Artemia Press Ltd (maker) The photograph on the front cover It shows President Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko clasping hands, while his rival Viktor Yanukovych looks on. Yushchenko’s pot marked face bears witness to the Dioxin poisoning inflicted on him a few weeks earlier during the 2004 presidential election campaign. Photo taken by Valeri Soloviov on Nov. 26, 2004, during the negotiations to end the Orange Revolution (Photo UNIAN). System of transliterations The study uses the Library of Congress system of transliteration for Ukrainian, with exceptions in order to make Ukrainian words easier to read in English. The letter є will be transcribed as ye and not ie. -
The Donbas As an Intentional Community
THIS IS A DRAFT PAPER From Exit to Take-Over: The Evolution of the Donbas as an Intentional Community VLAD MYKHNENKO* International Policy Fellow The Central European University & Open Society Institute E-mail: [email protected] Paper for Workshop No 20. The Politics of Utopia: Intentional Communities as Social Science Microcosms The European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops 13-18 April 2004 Uppsala, Sweden ABSTRACT: The Donbas – a large old industrial region in the Ukrainian-Russian Cossack borderland – constitutes a particular intentional community. According to earlier positive accounts, it was a space, the open steppe, a frontier land, a fugitive’s paradise, where the notions of and desires for freedom and dignifying labour had been realised. According to its current negative associations, the Donbas is an allegedly realised utopia of an ‘anti-modern’ community, dominated by a ‘criminal-political nexus’ of terrorising mafia gangs and political clans. The purpose of this paper is to compare the Donbas community, the evolution of intentions of its founders and of the images produced in the process of its construction, in three very different points in time – under the Russian Empire, under the Bolshevik Rule and Stalin’s Great Terror, and during the post-communist transformation. * I would like to express my gratitude here to the International Policy Fellowships, affiliated with the Central European University and Open Society Institute – Budapest, for their generous help, which has allowed me, among many other things, to work on this paper. 2 In both a geographical and symbolic sense, the Donbas constitutes a particular community, just as a nation, city, or village does. -
Ukraine's Security Forces: Bloated, Incompetent and Still Neo-Soviet Taras Kuzio
Eurasia Daily Monitor -- Volume 10, Issue 22 Ukraine’s Security Forces: Bloated, Incompetent and Still Neo-Soviet Taras Kuzio More than 20 years after independence, Ukraine’s security forces are over-manned, incompetent and largely remain neo-Soviet in their operating culture. On January 18, the prosecutor’s office accused former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko of being in league with Pavlo Lazarenko (prime minister in 1996–1997) for the murder of Donetsk oligarch Yevhen Shcherban. Allegedly, she paid $2.329 million from her accounts, while Lazarenko paid another half a million dollars in cash for the murder (http://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=115177&fp=40). When asked why the prosecutor’s office had not initiated these criminal charges when he was in power, former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma replied, “The Prosecutor-General [Mykhaylo] Potebenko, in his reports, said at the time there were no grounds for legal action [against Tymoshenko]. And that is it.” “And against Lazarenko, at that time, there were [grounds for opening a case],” Kuchma added (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/01/24/6982168/). Interviewed on Russian television, Kuchma remains adamant that Tymoshenko had nothing to do with the murder of Shcherban (http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/02/3/6982753/). Under Presidents Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine’s moribund security forces and prosecutor’s office were unable to find evidence linking Tymoshenko to the Shcherban murder. The new “information” against Tymoshenko is part of a concerted campaign to remove her forever from Ukrainian politics and “prove” to the West her case is allegedly not political. -
Tymoshenko Suspected of Ordering Lawmaker's
Part 3 of THE YEAR IN REVIEW pages 5-13 THEPublished U by theKRAINIAN Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal W non-profit associationEEKLY Vol. LXXXI No. 4 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, JANUARY 27, 2013 $1/$2 in Ukraine “Freedom in the World 2013”: Democratic breakthroughs in the balance Freedom House WASHINGTON – The emergence of popular movements for reform were the driving force behind major gains in the Middle East last year, according to “Freedom in the World 2013,” Freedom House’s annual report on the state of global freedom. However, a number of regions experienced setbacks due to a hardened and increasingly shrewd authoritarian response to these move- ments. While the number of countries ranked as free in 2012 was 90, a gain of three over the previous year, 27 countries showed significant declines, compared with 16 that showed notable gains. This is the seventh consecutive year that Freedom in the World has shown more declines than gains worldwide. Furthermore, the report data reflected a stepped-up campaign of persecution by dictators that specifically targeted civil society organizations and independent Freedom House’s “Map of Freedom 2013” shows Ukraine among partly free states. media. Among the most striking gains for free- Noteworthy declines were recorded tive presidential election and direct mili- leaders elsewhere in the Middle East, dom was that of Libya, which advanced for Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, tary rule came to an end, yet the elected with resulting setbacks for freedom in from not free to partly free and registered Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Parliament was dissolved and President Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, one of the most substantial one-year The Middle East showed ambiguous Morsi pushed through a new Syria and the United Arab Emirates. -
How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy Chapter
ch04_16071_Peterson_Ukraine:ch04_16071_Peterson_Ukraine 8/28/09 5:50 PM Page 93 4 Kuchma’s Stagnation, 1996–99 By the summer of 1996 Leonid Kuchma’s strategic outlook was clouded. He had introduced elementary market economic reform and the national currency, the hryvnia. Although he desired to pursue more privatization, his reformist endeavors had to a large extent been accomplished. After long and hard work, a Ukrainian constitution was finally adopted in June 1996. National integrity seemed safer. But Ukraine’s foreign policy was not set- tled, and no great deed, such as membership of the European Union, was within reach. Kuchma started devoting a lot of time to foreign policy. Polit- ically, he was at his peak, but he had no real vision or major goals to accom- plish. His strategy seemed to have evaporated, and tactics took its place. As so often happens with politicians who have enjoyed early success, Kuchma focused on his own political survival, which took five expres- sions, best summarized as standard divide and rule with limited policy ambitions. First, he checked the power and ambitions of his prime minis- ter. Second, he devoted great efforts to both parliamentary and presiden- tial elections. Third, he played different business and regional groupings against one another. Fourth, he also played different branches of law en- forcement against each other. Fifth, the presidential administration in- creasingly disciplined and controlled media. These were tactics without strategy. This period was not pretty. In 1996– 97 Pavlo Lazarenko was prime minister but acted like a businessman. Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk undertook a brave but hopeless attempt at renewed economic reform for the sake of economic growth. -
Bridging Divides in Eastern Europe
Bridging Divides in Eastern Europe Policy Perspectives June 2012 IERES • THE INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN, RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN STUDIES PONARS Eurasia is an international network of academics that advances new policy approaches to research and security in Russia and Eurasia. PONARS Eurasia is based at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. The program is generously supported by the International Program of Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. Edited by Alexander Schmemann and Cory Welt. PONARS Eurasia Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) Elliott School of International Affairs George Washington University 1957 E Street, NW, Suite 412 Washington, DC 20052 Tel: (202) 994-6340 www.ponarseurasia.org © PONARS Eurasia 2012. All rights reserved. Images: The Bronze Soldier, a statue commemorating Soviet soldiers killed during World War II at its new location, the Defense Forces Cemetery, Tallinn, Estonia. In 2007, it was removed from a downtown square in Estonia's capital provoking riots by ethnic Russians. The sign reads in Estonian and Russian: “To the Unknown Sodier.” Some ethnic Estonians consider the memorial a bitter reminder of the Soviet occupation of their Baltic republic, while some ethnic Russians view its removal as a slap at Soviet contributions and an example of discrimination against Russians. (AP Photo/NIPA, Timur Nisametdinov) The members of the Council of the Baltic Sea States pose in front of a giant tank at the Ozeaneum Sea Museum in Stralsund, Germany, May 31, 2012. -
Murder and Selective Use of Justice in Ukraine (Part One) Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 35 February 25, 2013 02:54 PM Age: 11 Days
Murder and Selective Use of Justice in Ukraine (Part One) Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 35 February 25, 2013 02:54 PM Age: 11 days By: Taras Kuzio Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (Source: Kyiv Post) On February 25, President Viktor Yanukovych arrived to a frosty reception in Brussels for a European Union–Ukraine summit (Kyiv Post, February 25), less than two weeks after Kyiv’s Pechersky District Court launched investigatory proceedings into the 1996 murder of then Ukraine’s wealthiest oligarch, Yevhen Shcherban. The prosecutor’s office alleges the CEO of United Energy Systems of Ukraine (YESU) Yulia Tymoshenko and Shcherban had “a conflict of business interests” related to the supply of natural gas and its price. Tymoshenko and Pavlo Lazarenko then allegedly put into effect a “joint criminal intention” to eliminate Shcherban, whereby Lazarenko was to find the murderers, while Tymoshenko was to pay for the assassination. Tymoshenko purportedly paid $2.329 million from her accounts, while Lazarenko allegedly paid another half a million dollars in cash. The Shcherban murder opens up a Pandora’s Box from the 1990s that many in Ukraine’s political elite would prefer to remain closed. If the opposition returns to power, it will arguably be able to use this precedent to open up murder investigations of other high- profile Ukrainians from the 1990s. According to Ukrainian journalist Sergei Vysotsky, “Following Tymoshenko’s conviction, the entire Ukrainian oligarchy and political class will lose their legitimacy. They will be taken back in time twenty years” (http://liga.net/opinion/98778_delo-shcherbanya-syadut-vse.htm#). -
Oligarchs, the Partial Reform Equilibrium, and the Euromaidan Revolution
10 Oligarchs, the Partial Reform Equilibrium, and the Euromaidan Revolution Taras Kuzio What are oligarchs and who are the oligarchs in Ukraine? The term “oligarch” has been used since the 1990s when referring to big business tycoons and nat- ural gas moguls in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, frequently without citing an established definition. The key feature of oligarchs in the Ukrainian context is their penchant to become monopolists in every field where they op- erate: media, economy, and politics. They therefore have an intrinsically neg- ative influence on Ukraine’s quadruple transitions of democratization, mar- ketization, state-institution building, and national integration (Kuzio 2001). Oligarchs have benefited from maintaining the country in a “partial reform equilibrium” (Hellman 1998) at the crossroads of Eurasia and Europe. Ukraine’s oligarchs are in many ways nationalists, seeing closer ties with both Russia and the EU as leading to a decline in Ukraine’s sovereignty and therefore threats to their interests. Oligarchs prevent the emergence of a level playing field in politics by block- ing the entrance of genuine political parties into the political arena. Instead, for each election cycle, they like to support disposable election vehicles, which are dubbed political “projects” by Ukrainian observers. They co-opt opposi- tion political parties and political leaders through political corruption and finance fake candidates and parties with the sole purpose of confusing vot- ers. Oligarchs’ control over Ukraine’s major television networks distorts the information available to voters during elections while preventing governments from explaining their reforms and policies to the public. Oligarchs typically care more about making money than ideology, and the most successful oli- 181 taras kuzio garchic groups are able to work with every incumbent. -
The Ukrainian Week №4
THE WINDOW TO EUROPE: ANOTHER POLITICAL REFUGEE: AN EXCLUSIVE WILL UKRAINE IS YANUKOVYCH CLOSING INTERVIEW WITH EX-DEFENCE MINISTER SURRENDER ITS GAS IT FOR UKRAINE? VALERIY IVASHCHENKO TRANSIT SYSTEM TO RUSSIA? № 4 (46) FEBRUARY 2013 PRESUMPTION OF GUILT The new trial againstT ymoshenko shows that if necessary, those in power will prove anyone guilty of anything WWW.UKRAINIANWEEK.COM Featuring selected content from The Economist FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION |CONTENTS BRIEFING FOCUS Game of Endurance: Phantoms From the Ex-Defence Minister Valeriy Ivashchenko The opposition may soon 90s: Details of the talks about renewed pressure from the unblock parliament, but new trial against Ukrainian prosecution and what pushed resistance is likely to escalate Tymoshenko and tricks him to seek political asylum in Denmark in the near future to prove her guilt in an exclusive interview for The Ukrainian Week 4 6 11 POLITICS NEIGHBOURS The Battle for the Capital: As the Andrew Wilson: European Taking a Break as a mayoral and city council elections politicians feel that Ukrainian Strategy: Yanukovych draw closer, the government is authorities are mucking them is trying to provoke the searching for political tactics about EU into not signing the to offset its poor ratings in Kyiv Association Agreement 14 16 18 SECURITY James Sherr talks about A Pipe of Discord: While having a chance the personal, political and to end Ukraine’s dependence on Russian clan interests of those in gas, the Yanukovych regime seems ready to power and Ukraine’s energy surrender its gas transit system in exchange security and prospects for a small short-lived discount 20 22 Over ECONOMICS 60% SOCIETY of the domeic market (prior Unfair banking to Aerosvit’s bankruptcy)y) fees and the manipulation of loan intere rates which make Colossi With Feet of Clay: Phony Currency Wars: clients involuntary slaves to credits. -
Етнічна Історія Народів Європи Ethnic History of European Nations
ВИПУСК №18 Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка Інститут політичних і етнонаціональних досліджень НАН України Посольство Фінляндської Республіки в Україні ЕТНІЧНА ІСТОРІЯ НАРОДІВ ЄВРОПИ ETHNIC HISTORY OF EUROPEAN NATIONS Збірник наукових праць ВИПУСК 18 Êè¿â ÓͲÑÅР2005 1 ЕТНІЧНА ІСТОРІЯ НАРОДІВ ЄВРОПИ ЕТНІЧНА ІСТОРІЯ НАРОДІВ ЄВРОПИ: Збірник наукових праць. Випуск 18. – К.: УНІСЕРВ, 2005. – 130 с. Редакційна колегія: А.Г. СЛЮСАРЕНКО, д-р іст. наук (голова); І.Ф. КУРАС, академік НАН України; В.К. БОРИСЕНКО, д-р іст. наук (відповідальний редактор); М.І. ГЛАДКИХ, д-р іст. наук; Л.Л. ЗАЛІЗНЯК, д-р іст. наук; В.І. СЕРГІЙЧУК, д-р іст. наук; В.В. ПИЛИПЕНКО, канд. іст. наук (відповідальний секретар) Адреса редакційної колегії: 01033, Київ, вул. Володимирська, 60, Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка, історичний факультет, кафедра етнології та краєзнавства Рецензенти: член-кор. НАН України, д-р іст. наук Г.А. СКРИПНИК д-р іст. наук В.Н. СТАНКО В збірнику опубліковані статті учасників четвертого українсько-фінського наукового симпозіуму “Національні меншини в сучасному світі” (Берегове, АР Крим, 26 – 30 травня 2005 року) Видання здійснено за підтримки Посольства Фінляндської Республіки в Україні Автори статей несуть повну відповідальність за підбір, точність наведених фактів, цитат, власних імен, географічних назв та інших відомостей. Тексти подаються в авторській редакції. Рекомендовано до друку Вченою Радою історичного факультету Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка Постановою президії Вищої атестаційної комісії України від 9 червня 1999 р. № 1-05/7 збірник наукових праць включено до переліку наукових фахових видань України, в яких можуть публікуватися результати дисертаційних робіт на здобуття наукових ступенів доктора і кандидата наук за спеціальністю “історичні науки”. -
Yulia Volodymyrivna Tymoshenko: Her Political
Наукові праці. Політологія УДК 323.281(477) Donaj Ł. YULIA VOLODYMYRIVNA TYMOSHENKO: HER POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE SENTENCE ON THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF UKRAINE FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF POLISH RESEARCHERS AND PUBLICISTS The problem of the role and place of women in society and in the sphere of politics or the economy is addressed in research more and more often. Because of the changing role of women in the political arena and consequently, in society, an analysis and evaluation of the role of Y. W. Tymoshenko in contemporary Ukrainian politics from the perspective of Polish researchers and publicists are worthy of academic note. This article aims on one hand to cover the profile of the former prime minister of Ukraine and on the other to show how her actions and the so-called «Tymoshenko case» have been received in Poland and Europe. Key words: Y. W. Tymoshenko, woman in politics, «Tymoshenko case.» Проблема ролі і місця жінки в суспільстві та в сфері політики чи бізнесу стає все більш популярною в наукових дослідженнях. З точки зору ролі жінки на політичній арені, а тим самим і в суспільстві, гідним уваги в науці є аналіз та оцінка впливу Ю. В. Тимошенко на сучасну українську політику в роботах польських дослідників та публіцистів. Метою статті є, з одного боку, дослідження місця фігури колишньої Прем’єра України в політичних процесах, а з іншого – показати, як спосіб її дій і так звана справа Тимошенко були сприйняті в Польщі та Європі. Ключові слова: Ю. В. Тимошенко, жінка в політиці, «справа Тимошенко». Проблема роли и места женщины в обществе и в сфере политики или бизнеса стано- вится все более популярной в научных исследованиях.