The Last Four Mon ths

The E n d of the ‘ War i n the West

B Y - RAL IR F MAUR CE MAJOR GEN E S . I K M G C B . C . . . .

li qfih 7100 fidans

CA ELL AN D SS COMPANY , LT D

o o N ew Y or L nd n , k , Toronto and Melbourne 1919

PREFACE

W Ho wo n the war ' is a question that has been

o n of oft en asked . In the c u tries all the great Allied Powers there have been found those who answered

1 t o ow on as o t their n satisfacti patri ts , because it is easy t o demonstrate that the war would n ot have

’ en won and w i wo n an of be , as hen t was , had y i f d those countr es ailed t o o what it actually achieved .

o of o o M st us , h wever , are agreed that vict ry was the

m n result of co bin ation , and I am convi ced that that opinion will grow stronger the better the story is

n n n know . Duri g the struggle the ews we received of the doings of the armies of our Allies was n atur ally even more limited than was that of the doings of our own men an d n ot o o to , it was easy t all t each its place in the gene ral scheme . I n this book I have sought to give a picture of ’ Foch s great campaign and to sketch in due prop or

o the n to o ti n parts which we t make up the wh le . The

n o of the n o f o u r sple d ur achieveme ts army is , I

n n n n o believe , e ha ced whe they are give their pr per

m on place i n the fra e . I have reduced my descripti s of o m o the battles t the si plest terms , because my bject is to in o of and of expla the br ad causes success failure , and there is danger in entering into details of o pera Preface tions o n so vast a scale o f losing sight of the wood for A n o f the trees . s o st ry o a campaign can be

o s n o nd c mplete unless it de cribes the i tenti ns , aims a

of as the o feelings the enemy , at le t at m st critical

o s e o o peri d , I hav c llected the best inf rmation avail able o n these points from captured do cuments or from

o r . o publicati ns in Ge many F rtunately , there has in that country been co nsiderable public discussio n

w n n L o f and r bet ee Hinde burg , udend r f their c itics as to the c onduct of the former during the period

o and with which I am here chiefly c ncerned , material ’ n o n n n o f n n has t bee lacki g . Lude d r f s Remi isce ces

have appeared while this book was in the press . I

o o o on have thr ugh ut referred t the German editi , as at the time I write the English translation has not

o w n t o n been published . I e grateful tha ks Captai

n o for n n oo and C . T . Atki s n ki dly readi g the pr fs

o n for many valuable suggesti s .

F . MAURICE .

LONDON ,

A u ust 19 19 . g , CON T E NT S

CHAPTE R I PAGE WHAT WENT B EFORE — Unity of Comman d Th e Brit i sh R everses i n th e Spring

CHAPTE R I I FO CH V ERS US LUD E NDORFF — Foc h on —t h e D efensiv e Break ing th e B arri er i n th e W est Th e R ival Met h o d s

CHAPTE R I I I THE PREPARATION FOR ARMAG EDDON — ’ — Th e S ec on d B att l e of th e Marn e Haig s Offensive Th e e Americans at St . Mihi l

C H A P T E R I V ARMAGEDDON — Th e H n enb ur L ne Th e Amer c an att le of th e Meu se i d —g i i B— Argonne Gou rau d i n Ch ampagne Haig Break s th e — ’ H n enb ur L ne Ki n Alb ert s vanc e nt o e um —i d g i g Ad i B lgi Th e R esult ozf Armagedd on

CHAPTE R V LUD ENDORFF TRIES TO RALLY — Th e D el ays t o t h e Allied Advanc e Th e Diffi cult ies of — ’ — th e Ameri cans Lu d end orff s Pl an of R et reat H ow i t was D efeat ed

CHAPTE R V I THE LAST PUSH Th e Ameri can Adv an ce t o S ed an- Gourau d R each es — Mez i eres Th e Brit ish ent er Maub eu ge an d Mon s — V Th e Con dit ion of th e German Army X as th e ‘ Armi st ice Premature 2 V ii MAPS

I TH E W E S TE RN FR NT . O

I I HE G M N D N Y M . T ER A EFE SIVE S ST E THE LAST FOUR MONTHS

CHAPTER I

WHAT WENT BEFORE — U nity of Commands The Bri tish Re v erses in th e Spring

IN E urope 19 17 was a year of disapp ointment for

f i on in ou r the arms o the All es ; ly Asia , where

did o n on . earlier ventures had failed , f rtu e smile us

' At the beginn ing of that year Ludendorfi and Hindenburg brought off their first coup on the

o w Western fr nt , when they ithdrew the German forces from the awkward p osition i n which they were

of of o placed as the result the first battle the S mme , and n n n in n retired behi d the Hi de burg l e , which the

o o first became fam us . By this man euvre they checked the plan s o f the Allies and brought about ’ the failure of General Nivelle s great offen sive upon

i o Th of which such h gh h pes had been set . e re sult this failure had been t o throw a great strain upon the British army , which had to obtain for the

n i o o I n Fre ch the t me t rec ver . the battle of Arras we had won the greatest succes s yet gain ed by i British arms in France , but Ha g had been forced B r The Last Four M on ths

to o t t o n n c ntinue that bat le the stage whe , the e emy

o e o o o having rec ver d fr m his first sh ck , pr gress was

o I n n u sl w and lo sses were heavy . Ju e Pl mer had brilliantly cleared the Messin es Ridge and obliterated

r n for n the Yp es salie t , which early three years had been a sore spot on o ur fro nt ; but the Fren ch still

n and e n d of the on o eeded relief , at the July l g , sl w struggle which ended on the Passchendaele Ridge

n n m h n n had begu . The , just at the ti e w e the Germa forces had been so weaken ed by that battle that there was goo d prospect of reaping at Cambrai the fruits ’ of m n o the year s ca paig , there had c me the surprise

of o o o s of on Cap rett , the c llap e the Italian army

on o o to the Is z , its retreat with very heavy l sses

and of o om the Piave , the dispatch large f rces fr

n Fran ce t o the help of our Ally . I this year the German s committed o ne of their cardin al blun ders i n

o n n ~ o pr claimi g u limited U b at warfare , which added decisively t o the number of their foes ; but the con sequen ces t o themselves of that blunder were not

d i on ou r o n imme iate , wh le we at ce saw sea c mmu i cation s e ndangered an d our p eople threatened with

o ion n ot on I n o o very seri us privat if starvati . Mes p tamia Maude o vercame the Turkish army at Kut an d o t n oo o dr ve their bea e tr ps thr ugh Baghdad , ’ while Allenby e nded the year s campaigns with a triumph at Gaza and Beersheba and with the capture of Jerusalem . But history will certainly co unt the entrv of the United States of America into the war What Went Be fore

and the Russian Revolution as the two outstan din g

n of 19 1 two n i i eve ts 7 , the eve ts wh ch exerc sed the most far- reaching influen ce up on the course of the

war . Early in the year it had become apparent to the military authorities of the Allies that the results o f the Russian Revolution would be felt before the military p ower of the United States could become i i on n f on . I n o t effect ve the Wester r t sh rt , was clear that the German s were going to get a start in ot i n 19 14 and the race , just as they g a start , that con sequently the Allies would be faced with a period of danger in which they would have t o stand on the

n i defe s ve . At a meeting of the Allied Commanders-in -Chief

and f of f i n i n n 19 1 to chie s sta f held Paris Ju e , 7 , consider the military p olicy of the Allies i n these

n i o n e o circumsta ces , t was rec mme d d that s me machinery should be established to e n sure unity ” of i w n o m n i comman d . Th s as by ea s the first t me

i n n o I n that th s questio had bee m oted . quite early days in the war various tentative prop osals had been put forward with the object of en suring better control and greater unity of action amongst the

o of i o had f rces the All es , but the p litical difficulties

n always proved i superable .

o on Mr o S afte r . Lloyd Ge rge became Prime

M n of n o s i ister Great Britai , a seri u attempt was made to reach a practical solution at a conferen ce between The Last Four Mon th s

the French and British Governments at Calais in ’ e r 19 1 and for the oflensi F b uary , 7 , great ve campaign planned for the spring of that year on the Western

o o n - in fr nt the French C mma der Chief , General

n o o o . o n Nivelle , was give c mplete c ntr l Unf rtu ately , ’ the failure of Gen eral Nivelle s campaign gave a set ” to n of o and o back u ity c mmand , enc uraged those who were opposed to it in the belief that it was not desirable to place the army of one n ation directly

n n f n under the comma d o f the ge eral o a other . It was no t then rec ognised that there was a very important differen ce between entrusting the supreme

o t o o e -i n - of n r c mmand the C mmand r Chief o e a my , whose min d and thoughts must necessarily be chiefly

o r own and own on and c nce ned with his men his fr t , placing it in the han ds of one man who could stand

oo o o o back and l k up n the fr nt as a wh le , free from the burden of the special charge of any one part of

o on of n n one it . Als there was the questi fi di g the

of on man . Nivelle had failed , J fre was the shelf , and Foch was still unde r the shadow of his failure

9 of t o take the Vimy Ridge in 1 15 . Thus , in spite

d l o h n the recommendations of the Allie genera s , n t i g was don e until the disaster to the Italian army at

o od Cap retto pr uced a crisis .

o o his Mr . Ll yd Ge rge , with usual energy in

e n n o o o an merge cy , the pr p sed that a c nference

e and should be held between the British , Fr nch Italian Governments for the purpose of establish What Wen t Before ing an Allied organisatio n for the better control

h T on was in o b of t e war . hat c ference held N vem er ,

o - o and it 19 17 at Rapall , ou the Italian fr ntier ,

as n o n o o w the that the Supreme War C u cil , c mm nly

o n was e . kno wn as the Versailles C u cil , establish d One of the objects of that step was to put the conferences of the Allied state smen o n a surer and more businesslike basis than had up till then

o e l o n n t existed . Bef r the Versai les C u cil was i s ituted the Allied Governments used t o confer at irregular intervals when they had imp ortant questions to no o n on discuss , but there was rga isati avail able to prepare beforehan d the business for such meetings or t o supervise the execution of the

ion i For on decis s wh ch were reached . these reas s the Versailles Coun cil supplied an obvious n eed and was a step in the right direction but it did n ot an d could not provide the mean s of e xercising effective military

omm n I n o n no c a d . the first place the C u cil had

o on I n executive auth rity ; it could ly advise . the second place the military representatives who formed the main part of the permane nt organisatio n o f the Coun cil were e ach of them resp onsible to their own

o n n and o all m o n G ver me ts , had t refer back i p rta t

on for n on of o o m questi s the i structi s th se G vern ents . Therefore decisions could o nly be reached slowly and

f on it a ter discussi , whereas in war is essential that military decisions should be taken quickly and in

o one o acc rdance with clear p licy . The military side 5 The Last F our Mon ths

of the Versailles o rganisation was of value in collect ing and bringing together informatio n from each of

T e to n n the Allied armies . his enabl d it te der ge eral advice as to the p olicy t o be followed several months

n of n ahead , but it was quite i capable deali g with day- to-day emergen cies or o f issuing orders to the

o n -in - Allied C mma ders Chief . After the Versailles C oun cil was established at

o o o Rapall Mr . Ll yd Ge rge came home through

o n i Paris , where he made the fam us speech i wh ch he commented scathingly on the conduct of the war by

of the Allies . He asserted that each the weaker membe rs of the Allian ce had been sacrificed i n

n w n and n n o n tur , hile Fra ce Great Britai were k cki g their heads again st what he termed the impe netrable

o barrier in the West . This speech ar used a great deal

n of w o . of criticism . That criticism was mai ly t kinds There were those who realised that the Versailles C oun cil did n ot provide fo r the danger which was

n n ot i n o f faci g us , that it did , fact , pr duce e fective ” n of o n n ot u ity c mma d . These critics were ” o o o n of o n o os pp sed t u ity c mma d , but were pp ed

n to what they regarded as an i adequate measure . The second group of critics was opp osed to the Versaill es C oun cil because they were suspicious of any weaken ing of the con trol of Parliament over the

an d n m to Army , they regarded a atte pt place the military forces of the Allies un der an intern ation al organisation as a blow at the sovereign rights of the 6 What Went B efore

i o ma people . Th s gr up y be regarded as compo sed of out and out opp on ents of un ity of command

n f m oo of c onf o n in a y o r . A g d deal usi was caused by lumping these two bodies of critics together and “ by classing the many soldiers who desired unity of o m n f t o o ni e c m a d , but re used rec g se the V rsailles

o n i a i i a o n on C u c l as practical m l t ry rga isati , with “ tho se who were o pposed t o unity of command m in n a ly fo r p olitical reaso s . IV hile these discussi on s were going on the m n in and om inn n of Ger a s were act g , fr the beg i g No vember onward they were moving troops from the Russian t o the Fren ch front as fast as their

in o m tra s c uld carry the . It was calculated that the German s would be able to in crease their stre ngth on the Western front betwee n the beginning of

o m an d end of i n ot n a N ve ber the Apr l by less tha t mi ion an d f of men and e o ll a hal , that th y w uld be able to bring over a very large number of aeroplanes and heavy gun s which they would no longer require

‘ on I ir um the Eastern front . n these c c stan ces the military authorities of the Allies began pressing their Governments for mo re effective measures to meet the

o in o an d mon o m c m g bl w , a gst th se easures there was a deman d for something better calculated to ensure “ \ n i o u ity of comman d than the Versa lles C un cil .

n o in U n of Kee bservers the ited States America , standing at a greater distan ce from the war and able to take a calmer and more gen eral View of the whole The Last F our Mon ths

o o n n vast c nflict , had l g been insisti g on the need fo r

f n e on o really e fective u ifi d c tr l , and at the time of the Rapallo conferen ce the United States Go vern men t had prop osed that the Versailles C ouncil should be d o veste with executive auth rity . The Fren ch Government was frankly in favour of the appoint m of o ent a generalissim , but as this office would naturally fall t o a French general there was some

t o r to o on reluctance appea f rce it up an Ally , and

Mr . o eo o r to o Ll yd G rge was n t eady g so far .

o This , then , was the directi n in which matters

r o n n of 19 18 con we e m vi g at the begin ing , when a ference was held at Versaill es to consider the Allied

o plan of campaign for that year . At that c nference i was to or o n t decided f m an Executive Military C u cil ,

o of c mposed a French , a British , an American and

o an Italian general , with General F ch as chairman , and that this body should be given authority to cc -o rdin ate the strategy of the Allied Commanders

- o r s r to n in Chief , t create a general e e ve be u der its

n o nd o o i n o co tr l , a t empl y that reserve acc rdance

with the needs of the situation . The institution of this body produced another

' o of Cl l Sl S , f r the British Chief the Imperial General

o o o e no com Staff , Sir William R berts n , bject d that

an and mittee could exercise effective comm d , he asked

t o be permitted to resign rather than to work with it . The British Government offered him the altern ative E xe of becoming the British representative on the cu 8 What Went Before

tive Council o r of remaining as Chief of the Staff i and working with the Executive C oun cil . S r

as not b William Robertson replied that , he did elieve that the Executive C ouncil could be an efficient

n o o \ o i n military organisatio , he c uld n t w rk with it

r n on co n either capacity , and his esig ati was ac rdi gly

accepted . These various events all produced the impression that British soldiers were in general opposed to ” f n of o . o o u ity c mmand In fact , h wever , many them had long been working hard t o find some solution of the difficulties which stood in the way of the realisation of what they regarded as a necessary T . he o of o measure maj rity them were , h wever , certainly opposed to what they considered t o be an

n o of ar i effective compromise . The hist ry w teaches that committees have never been able to co mmand ,

a n to co o that they le d i variably delay and mpr mise ,

and n in Th n these thi gs are fatal war . e Austria Aulic Council and the Dutch Field Deputies of the War of the Spanish Succession have been deservedl y

o ul o o o held up t ridic e by all hist ry , and m st s ldiers were whole -heartedly opposed to prop osals which appeared to savour of the repetition of such ill- advised

o n of measures . H wever , the le gth the war , its

no o o in if f e rm us c st l e and treasure , the many ailures of n and the Allied ge erals , the fact that the hope s which they had expressed had been very rarely

t o on fulfilled , all tended c firm the statesmen in 9 The Last Four Mon ths

their view that what was n eeded was more effective “

o on o - - p litical c tr l . A single C ommander i n Chief

‘ would n aturally p ossess a p osition of far greater

authority even in his own country than would a o i c mmittee , while the nfluen ce of a foreign Govern ment up on the Co mmander- in - C-bief who comman ded

o o o mi n their tr ps w uld be very li ted i deed . When to those who held these views was added the influen ce of those who loc ked with suspicion up on unity o f c ommand as c on stitution ally an un soun d measure there were very strong forces arrayed on behalf of

o o . S o o the c mpr mise , as the crisis appr ached , the supreme direction of the military forces of the Allied and Asso ciated P owers i n the Western theatres o f

i n n of o o omm war was the ha ds a p lygl t c ittee , each member o f which was resp on sible t o a separate

o n n an d m om o G ver me t , im ediately this c mittee set t

n work its clumsy machi ery began t o creak .

o m On M 2 1 Then suddenly the bl w ca e . arch forty German division s were flung against the four

n on o f m was tee divisi s the British Fifth Ar y , which

M 2 5 e o driven back . By arch there appear d t be great danger that the German s would succeed in capturing Amien s an d in separating the British from

n mo o the Fre ch army . By that time al st the wh le o f n n n o the British reserves had bee draw i t the fight , an d Sir Do uglas Haig did n ot feel that he was strong enough t o en sure the safety both of Amiens an d

f n n o i n e n w s o the Cha el p rts , wh le Ge eral P tai a 1 0

The Last Four Mon ths

D oullens in which the conferen ce was held had con vin ced him that the bato n was coming to Foch .

o n of n n The Executive C u cil ge erals had , as had bee

o to too o and o to anticipated , pr ved be sl w cumbr us deal with a real emergency , and already at this early st age it was in a state of suspen ded animation and had to be replaced promptly by something more

. o so o adequate In fact , the situati n was seri us that

o no immediate acti n had t o be taken . There was time t o refer back t o the Allied G overnments fo r

o and o and i n of auth rity appr val , that day stress

o common sense prevailed . P litical difficulties

n an d n o n o t o va ished , Ge eral F ch was give auth rity cc -o rdin ate the action of the All ied armies on the

Western front . Even the n our Government was a little frighten ed

and t o e n of calling a spade a spade , was at pains xplai that Foch had not be en app ointed Generalissimo ; but b oth the soldiers and the public hailed the

D oullens decision with such enthusiasm and with such

complete disregard of the niceties of official termin

o o and o ology , that after s me further discussi n s me

skilful and tactful handlin g of the p osition by M .

o on 14 was no n Clemenceau , F ch , April , mi ated

- - in n C ommander i n Chief of the Allied armies Fra ce

and Belgium . It has often been asked who was mainly

resp on sible for the app ointment of Gen eral Fo ch .

o o There is no question but that Mr . Ll yd Ge rge

1 2 What Went B e fore

” The f ul worked for unity of command . di fic ty with him was that he did not understan d fully the

comm n an d essential condition s of mil itary a d , that for the sake of p olitical con siderations he was pre pared to be content with something which fell short

o n of military n ecessity . It is als certai ly the case that the Government of the United States desired

o n and to achieve unity of c mma d , that their influence was a most potent factor in bringing about

Th con the result which was eventually achieved . e ference at Doullens had been assembled in such haste that there was no time to obtain the prese nce

n in who o n i n o of Ge eral Persh g , was d w the s uth at

n n n of Chaumo t . Immediately Ge eral Pershi g heard the decisi on of the conferen ce he wrote to General Foch his well-known letter of March 2 8 offering the

n n i i m ew Ge eral ss mo every an he had available . There n ever was any doubt but that the decision would be cordiall y welcomed and approved both by

n and n of n the statesme the ge erals the U ited States ,

o o n of neither ere n th ugh in p i t fact . .w represe ted

n n T whe the decisio was reached . his decision was probably mainl y due to the influence at the c on

e of 2 6 of . n wh fer nce March M Cleme ceau , o had been quietly preparing the way for the app ointment

“ of n o o o a Ge eralissim , L rd Milner and Sir D uglas

Haig . There were rumours flying about at the time that Sir D ouglas Haig and the British general s looked I 3 The Last Fou r Mon th s

n o n n of n aska ce at the app i tme t Ge eral Fo ch , but these were absolutely devo id of any foun dation in ’ fact . General Foch s app ointment was welcomed

immediately by b oth Sir D ouglas Haig and his Army

o and C mmanders , there has b ee n no better example of lo yal c c - operation i n war t han that between Sir

o and o D uglas Haig Marshal F ch .

n an d on But , whe all is said d e , the man who 5 ‘ brought about unity of comman d was Luden

o f d r f . It was the emergen cy created by his great drive up on either side of the S omme which produced

n n an d o o clear thi ki g pr mpt decisi n s . B oswell once

e o o n remark d t Dr . J h son that few people allow

t o n o themselves thi k clearly ab ut death , but that when a man is threatened with dea th he usually

o on An d o behaves with res luti . s it was at D oullen s

o f on March 2 6 . Ludend r f had dealt a deadly blow

and un n of to the Allies , der the me ace that blow

‘ the ge ntlemen assembled i n the little to wn of

o o n D ullens c nce trated their minds , behaved with

o o and oo h o o res luti n , t k w at was pr bably the m st momentous decision made during the c ourse of the

r o who n i n o n great wa , while th se had bee hes tati g the bank found when they had taken the plunge

that the waters were not so cold as they looked . I have sp oken of Ludendorff as the controlling

I n of min d at German Headquarters . the middle

n n o n for the campaign of 19 16 Falke hay , wh se pla s

no n o the capture of Verdun had failed ig mi i usly , was 1 4 What Wen t Before

remo ved from hi s p osition as Chief of the Great

f and in e n i Lu den dorfi Gen eral Sta f , H d burg , w th as

i n o o f om i n his first ass sta t , was br ught ver r the Russ a

The fron t t o succeed him at Great Headquarters . pair had n ot beenthere very l ong before it became clear that Hin denburg was little mo re than a figure head and Luden dorff was de facto chief of the

n i i n n n Ge rman war o rga satio n . H de burg had gai ed the deep gratitude of the B erlin ers by his great

i o of T n n n won im n v ct ry a e burg , at a t e whe they were tremblin g in their shoes at the Russian invasi on

of i o on East Prussia . We built h gh h pes up the

i n m o and in mo n Russ a stea r ller , dur g the first ths of the war the German public regarded it as bein g

fo m did T n as r idable as we . hey were n ever easy i

i in n i R i n i n nd the r m ds u t l the uss a s were dr ve back , a when this result was achieved they contrasted Hin ’ — denburg s perfo rman ces with armies comp osed at

- — first largely of second rate troops and the manner m which he restored the military efficien cy of their f i n i eeble Austr a Ally , w th the failure of their

n i n who o ge erals the West , , th ugh they had the

i o f m n m i i o p ck the Ger a ar y at the r d sp sal , had n ot i i ach eved v ctory . ’ in n his H de burg s square head , burly figure , his

on his o n of of str g character , c tempt the arts peace , of i m n o in i l ion wh ch a y st ries were c rcu at , made him an i m o im n of i n i i i adm rable e b d e t Pruss a m l tar sm , a i i ‘ l v ng exp on ent of the gospel of might is right which I 5 The Last Four Months

a eo o the Germ n p ple had ad pted with enthusiasm . He provided the Kaiser with just the person ality needed at Great Headquarters t o keep the war fever

n o n o n . n in the Fatherla d at b ili g p i t Lude dorff , who did his wo rk at the office desk and was first and

o o n o n f rem st a military thi ker , c uld ever make the same appeal t o the popular imagination as did his

. The or n m chief pair , theref e , made an excelle t co

on w n oo binati . The Germans have al ays bee g d at

o o o o n on l such c mbinati ns , at pr viding the str g pers a ity

r o the royal pe rsonage with just the right brain . The classic example is that of Blii cher and Gneisenau

' o n of o o w Bl h r in the cl si g years the Nap le nic ars . ii c e

was o then the pers nality , Gneisenau the brain . Both of them came to England for the fetes which

o o of 18 15 and o of Blii cher f ll wed the peace , it is t ld that he then made a bet in a Lo ndon drawing-roo m that he was the only man in the room who coul d kiss

won n o his own head . He his wager by walki g up t Gneisenau and giving him a smackin g kiss on both

o e so n cheeks . I d ubt if Hindenburg were ver fra k

Blii cher r on w as , but the elati s bet een him and Lude n do rff were very much those of their prede cessors of one hundred years before . By placing the supreme control of the Allied

of o one of armies in the West in the hands F ch , the essential preparations to meet the German menace was completed just in time to prevent disaster , but it was already t oo late to take those others which 1 6 What Went Before might have saved us from such shocks as caused us f 9 to tremble for our safety . At the end o 1 17 the

f n i n o of man p ower o Fra ce , the f urth year the fierce

in of 19 16 struggle which she had , until the summer ,

of fh n o in borne the brunt e fighti g , was appr ach g

on and n o n n no exhausti , the Fre ch G ver me t was longer able to keep up its forces on the West ern

The i front at full strength . British army was wear ed

i n n o by the campaign Fla ders , and was griev usly disappointed that the brilliant promise of the tank attack at Cambrai in November had ended in one

o B o our n m re check . th we and Fre ch Allies had had to weaken materially our forces on the Western front i n order to bring help to our friends in the

o n o of S uther theatre f war . The collapse Russia was

n om and n i on defi ite and c plete , Germa d visi s were

f o o n o streaming r m the Eastern t the Wester fr nt . It had become a certainty that early i n 19 18 we should be confronted in France and Flanders by

o f i o of n alm st the ull mil tary p wer Germa y . The one bright sp ot in the picture was the arrival of the

n o n i n n as first America divisi s Fra ce , but there w little prospect that America would be able to solve the vast problem of creating armies and transp orting them three thousand miles across the Atlantic i n time to make her strength felt in Fran ce before the late summer . Pruden ce therefore demanded that we British should do everything that was p ossible to

1ncrease our o f rces there . (3 x7 The Last Four Mon ths

’ * Allenby s victory at Gaza and B eersheba and his brilliant pursuit ending in the capture of Jerusalem had disorganised the Turkish army pre paring near Alepp o under German leadership for the

o f our o o recapture Baghdad , and had made p siti n in Two n Asia secure . British divisions had bee

o e o o o m v d fr m Sal nika , and a third , c mposed largely of o o o o Territ rial battali ns br ught fr m India , had

n in to o for bee created Egypt , reinf rce Allenby the campaign in which he broke through the Tu rkish

o n o o of lines the s uthern fr ntie r Palestine . His

r and f o a tillery aircra t had als b een increased , and later a veteran Indian division had been moved from

o o to Mes p tamia Egypt , while the Indian cavalry regiments which had been serving in France were also ’ n Allenb s o o con se t there . y f rce was , theref re , very siderably stro nger than that which had for a long time protected Egypt by covering the routes across the

o o f hi of Sin ai desert . N rth Jerusalem , in the lls

ett e n Judma , it was much b er placed than it had b e

one n i n opposite Gaza . On fla k lay the Med terranea , of on the other the Dead Sea , while east the Dead Sea

of w our n spre ad the desert , hich Arab frie ds were I n n o . daily gaining more effective co tr l March ,

n o of 19 18 , Allenby had u der his c mmand an army

on one o a three mounted divisi s , m unted brig de , and eight infantry division s o f an approximate strength

m n f o o of e , o wh m ab ut were white troops and native troops . In India Sir 1 8

The Last F our Months result that the losses were comparatively small ; this

' then was the time to bring the army up to strength in preparation for the camp aign which might be

n was expected i n the spri g . It necessary that the preparation s for filling the gaps in the ran ks should

on for oo o o to be made a l g time ahead , it t k fr m f ur five months to train a recruit to take his place in

n in o of the ra ks France , and the pr cess calling him up often took as long as from two to three months

n o . o from the time he received his first tice Theref re , arrangements for fillin g up the ranks during the early months o f the year should have been well in hand

o by the previ us summer .

19 16 r of In December , , the anks the fighting troops had been heavily depleted by the long and

of Sonnne the bitter struggles the and Ancre , but by

r 19 1 o n of th of Ap il , 7 , the eve e battle Arras , the

e fu i had / b een o ranks wer again ll , and Ha g pr vided with con siderable additional reinforcements ; in fact at that time the fighting strength of our army was

o o alm st at the highest p int it ever reached . We then still had division s at home which could be

out to o r in n sent reinf rce the a my Fra ce , and were

o n oo o able t bri g back tr ps fr m Egypt , because by advancing into the Sinai desert and gaining

o o of w h o e o c ntr l the ells , w ich pr vid d the nly water

for o n n o available a f rce adva ci g t attack Egypt , we could defend that country much more economically

n e n f a tha if w held the lo g line o the Suez C nal .

2 0 What Wen t Be fore

In 19 18 we had in E ngland no division s which could

o i o the o be sent t Ha g , and it was theref re m re

of n n necessary , in view the da ger which threate ed us and of the fact that five divisions had been sent

u r n to to n from o r a my in Fra ce Italy , bri g back to France every man who could be spared from

of war and to m our the more distant theatres , ake

n on of ranks up to their full strength . Yet e these

19 18 o measures was taken . In March , , Sir D uglas ’ H aig s fighting strength was we aker by over

n on n r 1 19 1 men than it had bee Ja ua y , 7 there had been some increase i n artillery and a considerable in

in t n and n - an d crease aircraf , ta ks machi e guns , a very

o o on o large increase in lab ur f rmati s , b th British and coloured ; but unarmed labourers and Chi nese coolies were not the kind of reinforcements S ir D ouglas

e t o r n o Haig need d fight Ge ma s , th ugh they were invaluable t o him for other purposes u His deficiency of f — n f r off n in antry the esse tial arm , whether o e ce — or defence was greater by more than

n n of men than it had been at the begin i g 19 17 .

co o of s s o n of A mparis n the trength , the eve the

of 19 18 o in battle March , , with th se January ,

19 17 i s o n for co o , , h wever , misleadi g , it is a mparis n of a period when the ranks ought to have been full with a perio d when they were n aturally empty ; the only fair comparison is between the p osition in 19 18 i n M 19 March , , and arch , 17 . On the latter date the rifle and sabre strength of the army in France 2 1 The Last Four Mon ths

— t n of tha is , the umber men available for duty in — the tren ches was greater by men than it

was at the former . Duri ng the early months of 19 18 the drafts sent ’ out from home fell so far short of Sir D ouglas H aig s requirements that it was impossible for him to main tain his army any longer at the strength at which

n e o it had bee during the pr vi us autumn . Accord

i n l n the of n g y , betwee middle Ja uary and the middle

of on ou f February , three battali s t o the thirteen in

of o w o nd each the British divisi ns ere br ken up , a the men in them were used to take the place of drafts from home to fill up the ranks of the remaining bat

on . as on n tali s This measure , which w the c seque ce of the failure of the Government to provide the

c n e o n drafts , caused a drasti cha g in the rganisatio and tactics of our infantry at a critical perio d when there was no time to accustom commanders and

roo to new o o . o t ps the c nditi ns W rse still , it adver

ised our to the t weakness army , and was the reverse of encouragin g t o men who were preparing to meet

Nor . n a great attack . was this all Owi g to the declin e o f the strength of the Fren ch army the Fren ch Government became more and more in sistent that we should take over a lo nger stretch of the

n o front . Petai at this time th ught it extremely probable that the German attack woul d be directed

n nd not m to e agai st him , a he did feel hi self able m et

o of oo such an attack unless we relieved s me his tr ps . 2 2 What Went Before

When the length of front held by us and by the French was compared it appeared at first sight that France was bearing a very undue share of the burden ; but the burden born e by troops i n trench warfare cannot be e stimat ed merely by the length of the

in o . The n for m l e they h ld Fre ch , exa ple , held a

r on l and o n ve y l g line in A sace L rrai e , where for months on end a serious bombardment was almo st

n n n an d n o r i u k ow , the tre ches c uld be ve y l ghtly

er n on i on n o i n held , because the G ma s th s fr t were t

and o n o o on t o On strength sh wed disp siti attack .

o n the ther hand , the e emy had always kept a large proportio n of his troops in the West opp osite the

on and s oi o f n British fr t , while the climate l Fla ders

for o i n on e of made this , many m nths the year , the

mo st exacting parts of the whole lin e . A still more important con sideration was that o nly o n a compara tively small part of the French front would loss of

o n o on n gr und bri g with it very seri us c seque ces , while the British front north of the S omme cove red s o narrow a strip of c ountry in fro nt of the Channel

ports that almost every yard o f it was pre cio us .

o o on n o i io n e n H wever , after pr l ged eg t at s b twee the

two Go n n and f o n n ver me ts , a ter the questi had bee referred t o the new Versailles organ isation for

n on n m n i an d exami ati , the Fre ch argu e ts preva led ,

i in of i i Ha g , order to meet the wishes the Br t sh

Go n n e n t o o e an ver me t , agreed with P tai take v r additional twenty-eight miles o f front and to extend 2 3 The Last Four M onths his front south of the S omme as far as the Oise . This exten sio n made the length of our line 18 0

of on miles , the greatest length fr t we had ever held , while the number of rifles available t o hold it was 19 16 approximately equal to that in March , , when the length of our front was eighty miles and the

German s still had great armies on the Russian front . The new front taken over from the French fell

o was in t o our Fifth Army , which , th ugh it urgently

in r e need of rest , had the few weeks p ec ding the German attack to familiarise itself with fresh ground and to wo rk incessantly at the erection of defences .

l our o for t the Actual y , then , preparati ns mee ing threat which the Germans held over us were that we had agreed with our Allies to invest the supre me com

of o we mand in the hands an executive c mmittee , ’ o t w of H ai o had ab lished o g s cavalry divisi ns , had reduced the number of infantry battalio ns at his dis

o o on 2 5 . m o p sal by cl se per cent , had made an i p rtant

o alterati n in the organisation of our infantry , and had at the same time increased our liabilities by

n o — of new on i taki g ver twenty eight miles fr t , th s new front being n ot less important than our p ositions in

n for o o t o n Fla ders , it c vered the r ads Amie s and

Paris . It will naturally be asked how it came about that we did n ot do m ore to prepare for the great German

on o oo . attack , which was expected l g bef re it t k place

r o M . Ll yd George was confirmed by the result of 2 4 What We nt Be fore

the third battle of Ypres in his opinion that the

position o n the We stern front was o n e of stalemate . We and the Fren ch had made attempt after attempt to break through the German trenches when our numerical superiority over the enemy had been greater than his was expected to be when he had

o oo o ro . br ught his tr ps acr ss , f m Russia In April , ’ 19 1 on of of e 7 , the eve General Nivelle s f nsive , it had been calculated that the Allies had o n the Western front a superi ority of rifles and

n 9 guns . In the spri g of 1 18 it was estimated that the German s might have a superio rity of rifles and that their prep onderance in

o no on Mr artillery w uld t be c siderable . . Lloyd George believed that the whole experience of the war on the Western front had sho wn that the German s would require a far greater numerical superiority than they appeared likely t o possess in o to n our o o rder enda ger p siti n . He doubted if the

n o Germa s w uld make the attempt , but was quite certain that the Allied forces in France and Belgium

o o t o o if were str ng en ugh st p them they did . He believed that victo ry could only be won by taking the

’ o n no n o n n way r u d , by k cki g d w Germa y s props . He

o of 19 had held this view fr m the early days 15 , when the trench barrier was first e stablished between the

o o N rth Sea and the Swiss fr ntier . He had first advocated reinforcing Serbia with the object of attack in g Austria and bringing in the o ther Balkan States 2 5 The Last F our Mon ths

on our . n o side The , when he failed t carry his argu

o of e o os ments in fav ur that nterprise , he had pr p ed

to a o o attack Austria through It ly . B th these pera tions were no w out of the quest ion ; the Allied armies in these theatres could only be reinforced to the

f o necessary extent at the expense o the Western fr nt , and if he did not think it necessary to strengthen that front he was not rash enough to weaken it ; but by

n ll n oo in n and leavi g A e by the tr ps he had Palesti e ,

n o n o e by rei f rci g him fr m India , he believ d that it

o o o T u who w uld be p ssible t defeat rkey , was very

o o o o e shaky . Vict ries in Asia Min r w uld , he h p d ,

n o o o n n 19 18 e c urage the Allied peoples t o h ld duri g , while America was preparing her armies and shipping

t o n o o to them Fra ce , and it w uld be time en ugh con sider in 19 19 whethe r it was worth while t o defeat

had to o the German armies i n the West . He pr vide

o for n on o for the o lab ur the mu iti fact ries , c al mines ,

n an d for the shipyards t o meet the submari e menace . He could o nly obtain the soldiers n eeded to keep ou r troops in Fran ce up to strength by raising the age

for e o ff limit the draft , and he dr aded the p litical e ect of o n n d i g this if he left Irela d exempt , while the problem of forcing conscription on Ireland was o ne

on which he did n ot care to face . He c sidered that by in stituting the Versailles C ouncil and its later develop

n Co t of me t , the Executive Military mmit ee the

o o n n C uncil , he had c unterbala ced the adva tage which the Germans had in the West m a single homogeneous 2 6

The Last F our Months

r of . r 9 th eat attack Further , in Ma ch , 1 18 , Luden dorfi had large reserves of trained men still in the

o East , ready t co me across . Actually between March

of and the end May , when his strength was at its

or w r e highest , his f ces e e incr ased by sixt een divisions

o of r and a large am unt heavy a tillery . Therefore Ludendo rff had an impo rtant reinfo rcement at hand

r in Ma ch , and the Allies had no corresp onding reserve which could be ready until long after the German

o r on o c mmande had his the sp t . The extreme advocates o f the policy of seeking victory by the way round failed from the first to re cognise that the German forces on the Russian front

o r for i n were a p tential rese ve their armies France , and that at any time from the b eginning of 19 1 5 o nwards the German leaders might have reversed the pro cess which they carried through after their defeat

of oo on defen in the first battle Ypres , have st d the sive in the East and sent all troops not nece ssary for

o he U- o defence there to the West . Even bef re t b ats , Gothas and Zeppelin s became as dangerous as they

was r h the er subsequently were , it clea t at , if G mans

n oul reached Calais and Boulog e , Great Britain w d be

f n o in danger of s tarvatio n and o i vasi n , and that her army in France would have a very precarious line

of communications with the Motherland . The importance of prote cting Paris needed no

19 14 off discussion . In September , , J re , backed by

n d o the French Governme t , had ma e all p ssible pre

2 8 What Wen t Before parations fo r continuing the war even if the capital o ff i fell to the enemy , but the m ral e ect wh ch the success of a second German attack on Paris might

and f of o have had is incalculable , the sa ety Paris ught not in an y circumstan ces to have been risked . It is an old and well- established maxim of strategy that before laun ching out up on an offensive enterprise a general must lo ok to the safety of the vitals both of

n The nn o his army and of his cou try . Cha el p rts and Paris were the vitals of Great Britain and of

n Fra ce . The moment these were seriously threatened the Government perforce took in haste the measures

n o which might have bee carried thr ugh at leisure . The application of the Military Service Acts was

n out o o exte ded , drafts were rushed fr m h me , and

o who o be o every British s ldier , c uld spared fr m the

n t East was brought t o Fra ce . Jus as the Germans

o of om o so f rced unity c mand up n us , they compelled us to discard the errors in our strategy . But it is now time for a word as to the events which brought these things to pass .

19 8 o By the middle of February , 1 , it had bec me apparent that the German s were pushing forward their preparation s for a great offen sive with all p ossible

n nd n on e ergy , a there were already i dicati s that they

n e our i t nded to attack the British right , held by Fifth

and i n o f o Th rd Armies . Lude d r f was , h wever , much too skilful to confine his preparations to one part of 2 9 The Last Four Months

o o n the fr nt , and these p i ted to the possibility that the att ack on our right might be a preliminary to a

e e o our o gr at r bl w against line farther n rth , or against

e o ~ the Fr nch t the south . The northern p ortion of ou r front was but fifty miles distant fro m Calais and

o o o o sixty miles fr m B ul gne ; theref re , in the north

of o of to n every yard gr und was value us , a d if the Germans had broken through even t o a depth of

-five o e i n twenty miles we sh uld have be n dire straits , for they would the n have gained possession of the hill of Cassel which do minate s the Flanders flats no rth w t o o on s of n ards the c ast either ide Du kerque , wo o n to oul uld have f rced the Belgia s fall back , c d

o o and have shelled and b mb ed the harb urs , have hemmed the All ied left flank into a po sition fro m

n which issue would have been well igh impossible .

n o ow oo for our on I the south we had m re elb r m , fr t

o between St . Quentin and the Oise was ver ninety

i o o an d o l of m les fr m the c ast , c u d , in case emergency , be more quickly reinforced by the French than c ould

u r o lin e in Flanders .

o o o n to Sir D uglas Haig , theref re , felt b u d keep the greater part of such reserves as he had at his dis ’

o o o . o p sal , n rth of the S mme G ugh s Fifth Army held the lin e from our point o f junction with the Fre nch on the Oise not far from La Fere to Gouz eau

o o - f of o c urt , s uth west o Cambrai , a distance ab ut

or -tw o of ro o f ty o miles . On the wh le this f nt G ugh

o r o r o had f u teen divisi ns and th ee cavalry divisi ns , 3° What We nt Before eleven of his divisions being 1n the line , and the

o f i on i n in remainder in reserve , each his d visi s the l e ’ on B n s holding on an average yards o f fr t . y g ’ Third Army on Gough s left held a front of abo ut

- n i on i of twe nty seven miles with fiftee d visi s , e ght

n d n in them bein g i n the lin e a seve reserve , the average length of front held by each division being ’ o i i o about yards . G ugh s l abil ties , theref re , ’ n B n s were very considerably greater tha y g , and the reserves of the Fifth Army were much weaker than

f T n out o those o the hird , while , as it tur ed , G ugh had t o bear by far the greater weight of the German attack . Throughout the winter Ludendorff had been plan

od and of n G m n ning , with the meth care a trai ed er a

how o his o and o mind , t achieve bject to s lve the

o of o the en pr blem breaking thr ugh tr ch barrier , a

o to ne o n the on pr blem which all the ge rals West ,

i o o n n o . both s des , had hithert f und a swer All were by this time agreed that the metho d of attack by m n of and o o m n fol ea s a great pr tracted b mbard e t , lowed by an infantry assault pressed through up on

one of o . part the fr nt , was a failure The immense and lengthy preparation which this form of battle

o o i oo inv lved made any surprise imp ss ble , as s ner o r ’ r e and h later the defender s rese v s came up , t e battle ended in a slogging match in which the as sailant

in d i n fo o ga e l ttle retur r very heavy l sse s . Ludendorff probably realised that it would be out of the question 3 1 The Last Fou r Months to o for keep all his preparati ns attack se cret . No camouflage could altogether c onceal from our air ob r so oo so in se vers that mething was af t , and me formatio n woul d certainly have been elicited from the prisoners taken in the daily skirmishes of trench war

o wo to fare . But he c nceived that it uld be po ssible deceive us as to the weight of the blow which he

t o and to o of sur meant deliver , achieve s me measure prise by keeping the great part of his artillery and the bulk of his attacking division s at a distan ce from the

o o battlefield until the last p ssible m ment . This method had the double advantage o f keeping us in un certain ty both as to the strength of the attack and as to whether it would be made in more than on f r w n e place , o , in the eeks precedi g the battle , he placed his reserves so that they could be moved as

ur o or e readily against o northern fr nt , ven against

ro our . the French f nt , as against right flank

t o no on He decided , then , have l g preliminary

n o bombardme t , which w uld have given us a definite

n on of n o to our i dicati his pla s , and , as we had f und

o wo so o of ou and c st , uld destr y the surface the gr nd

o and w to break up the r ads the rail ays , as make it a matter of great diffi culty to get the reserves forward

o to when they were needed . He als decided bring up his attacking division s at the last moment by train

n o of and by rapid marches u der c ver darkness . This was the essence of his plan and the feature in which it difi ered most from other attacks which had been tried 3 2 What Went Before

I n of on in the West . the details its executi there

o ff and was also much that was n ew. Ludend r his staff had studied very carefully all the previous attacks which had been carried through both by us and by the

n o n o o n e oft n French , a d he f u d that pp rtu iti s had e been miss ed because parts of the attacking line had been checked at strong points held resolutely by the

w for e defenders , and the remainder had aited thes to be reduced ; he also maintained that the progress of the Allied infantry had been delayed by too f d frequent reliefs . He there ore determine that as a prin ciple he would follo w up success wherever it was

won i n o n o , driving at such weak p i ts as he disc vered , and that he would n ot delay his advan ce i n order to overcome centres of resistance against which his pro

gress was checked . I n o rder to develop this method of attack t o the utmost he devoted the winter t o selecting from his army the best and bravest of his soldiers and putting them through a special form of

n n . T m n trai i g hese e , whom he c alled storm

oo to tr ps , were lead his attacks , with o rders t o press

o far o i f rward as and as fast as p ss ble , while they were given the assurance that where they were successful

o o they w uld be immediately supp rted by the reserve . He impressed up on his infantry division s that they

must go fo rward to the utmo st po wers of their

o n endurance with ut expecti g relief , and practised

n o n them in maki g l ng adva ces , carrying food for s everal days . D 3 3 The Last Four Mon ths

’ By March 19 H aig s Intelligence Department had discovered that the German preparations for attack

on r the Third and Fifth A mies were nearly complete ,

and -it was anticipated that the battle would begin

on or March 2 0 2 1 . The attack actually opened

o o 5 A. M on 2 l s o sh rtly bef re . the t with a b mbardment of the greatest inten sity again st the whole front held

o w i n o o o by th se armies , hile rder t keep us in d ubt

o o to n on till the last p ssible m ment as their inte ti s , the German s simultan eously b ombarded parts of our northern line and the French fron ts o n either side of

or o o of Reims . F ab ut five h urs a perfect hurricane ’ ’ shell was hurled again st Gough s and Byng s

and n off defences , it has bee stated by German icers that the rate of fire was so rapid that many of their

ho n o o A M . n a t . 0 . gu s be c me red The , sh rtly bef re 1 ,

n n fi e- o om the German i fantry adva ced . This v h ur b bardment may be compared to our artillery prepara

o of o tion f r the first battle the S mme , which lasted

n ot n on in o seven days . The battle had bee l g pr gress before it became clear that Ludendorff was throwing

n our and o his whole weight agai st right , , theref re , though Haig had guessed accurately bo th the time

o an d the place at which the attack w uld be made , Ludendorff had won the first move by getting all his

t o reserves in motion first . This much was due his

so o e o n . skill , but he was al greatly fav ur d by f rtu e

o of 9 1 8 n n o The early m nths 1 had bee phe menally dry , but March 19 had been a day of driz zle suffi cient to 3 4

The Last F ou r M onths f guns and in antry were blinded . The only answer to the fog was to strengthen the infantry holding the

fo r w trenches , but this there ere not men available

ro unless they were taken f m the already weak reserve . Nor was the fog the only stroke of fortune which ’ o o fav ured the Germans . Gough s fr nt ran roughly

ort o r n h and s uth till it eached the River Oise , and then bent back south-e astwards along the northern

of r or o of bank the iver. In this p ti n its course the

o an d o Oise runs thr ugh a wide n rmally marshy valley , such as no great attacking force could cross in an

o r . o not rdinary sp ing It had , theref re , been expected

o n or that the German attack w uld i clude this sect , f w a . I n one o hich w s lightly held fact , the arguments which the French had put forward in o rder to induce us to extend our front so far south was that n o large number of troops would b e requi red t o defend the

our o so o Oise , where line w uld be str ng naturally as n w to be impervious to attack . The Oise li e had al ays

n o of been regarded as a quiet sector . Bei g very sh rt

t o o troo ps , Gough had decided h ld this , apparently

of o of the least vulnerable part his fr nt , with a series

no o o n o of . p osts , and t t have a c nti u us line defence

n to The dry weather , however , e abled the Germans

difi cult fo cross the marshes without y, while the g w the o o allowed them to penetrate bet een p sts , ften

ul of unobserved . The res t this was that the enemy were able to get behind our defences further north and cut off the defenders . 36 What Went Before t e It is not my purpose t o describe the s ruggl in

to detail . My object is make clear the causes which nd to ow led t o the defeat of the Fifth Army a sh that

- o s of the battle Ludendo rff flung sixty four divisi n against the Third and Fifth Armies . Of these sixty four at least forty attacked the fourteen divisions and ’ three cavalry division s o f Gough s Fifth Army , while ’ the remaining twerity-four fell up on Byng s fifteen

on o n o wa divisi s . It is , theref re , in y surprising that the Fifth Army was overwhelmed . The news that it had be en overwhelmed came as in a rude shock to the public at home . It seemed conceivable that the Germahs should have been able to break so completely through such elaborate

nn i o o defences , ma ed by Brit sh tr ps , when we had , despite lavish supplies of gun s and munition s and the

n o o of our o n b i c mparable val ur men , ly been able y continuous effort and at an appalling cost to achieve

o much smaller results . Wild stories were flying ab ut

of ‘ the breakdown o f the Fifth Army, and it was whispered in the drawing- rooms of L ondon that the

n ot fo men had ught as they ought t o have fought . In the co nfusion and uncertainty of retreat the true f o not i o and n acts c uld be d sc vered made k own , with the result that for long imputatio ns rested upo n the

f o o Fi th Army which were wh lly c ntrary to the truth .

r to find o i r Eage s me s lve lining to the cloud , the 3 7 The Last Four M onths publi c fastened upon the glo rious defence of the Third

’ Army and contrasted it with Gough s apparent

o c llapse . I have n o desire to minimise in any way the splen ’ o of of B n s d ur the achievement y g men , but I trust ’ I have made it clear that the burden which Gough s

oo to n o I n tr ps had bear was i c mparably the greater . the first stage of the battle very nearly twice as many

’

n on a o on n . Germa divisi s ttacked G ugh as fell .up By g

’ Each of Gough s division s had o n the average to hold

50 n . o ro nearly per ce t m re f nt than had Byng , while the Third Army reserves were nearly twice as strong ’ o of of as th se the Fifth , yet at the end the first day s ’ o ft 9th o battle G ugh s le , where the gallant Divisi n heat off o n o all attacks , had given less gr u d than s me ’ of Byng s divisions further north had been compelled to yield . By the evening of March 2 1 our battle positions t had not been pen etrated except on the ex reme right , where the German s had crossed the dried-up b ed of

and n o n the Oise , but during the night the ext m r ing

fo o the enemy , helped by the g, had disc vered three ’ n ou r o to o f weak points i fr nt , and , true Ludend r f s

o n prin ciple , had pressed his advantage at these p i ts w of till the lin e crumbled . These ere days gallant

o n od an d desperate fighting against verwhelmi g ds , passing all precon ceived stan dards of enduran ce and

- o o f of our o of self sacrifi ce . The garris ns many w rks

o o held out long after the enemy , p uring thr ugh gaps 38 What Went Before

o and o in our line , had swept bey nd them c mpletely

in of of cut them off . As the days the crisis the first

n n odd battle of Ypres , cooks , sig allers , serva ts and f job men of all kin ds rallied round the headquarters o battalions and fought on long after ho pe of supp ort

Th n n o had gone . e Germa s , surgi g past these dev ted

i ood out an d on on bands , wh ch st here there al g the fr t

n o in like rocks surrounded by the i c m g tide , pressed ’ and n n of back Gough s right , , as by the eve i g the

2 2 nd o n in an d , he had thr w all his available reserves , only on e Fren ch division had as yet arrived t o help

f n o n to him , he elt that there was alter ative but fall ‘ m back to the So me . A bridgehead p ositio n had be en prepared aroun d

e onn on n of i P r e the east ba k the r ver , but there had be en n o time to complete the defences along

f n oo in the river itsel . Whe the tr ps arrived

new o on to t n their p siti s , which hey withdrew duri g

n n m o n the ight , hard pressed by the e e y , they f u d only some rudiments of tren ches with little or no

in f on of n n nd wire r t them . Ma y stra ge a baseless

o o o n fo i f rep rts were circulated t acc u t r th s act . It

o in n was said that G ugh , be g a cavalry ge eral , had

f to o his in of f n to i re used all w rear l es de e ce be w red , and had even ordered wire to be pulled up i n order i T h f that the cavalry m ght have free scope . e act is ’ that the southern p ortio n of Gough s front had only been taken over from the Fren ch about seven weeks

fo n n be re the Germa attack bega . During the early 3 9 The Last Four M onths part of the winter the French had been able t o hold

o o of o so this p rti n the fr nt very lightly , that the troops they had there were n ot sufficiently numerous t o main

n n n oo o on and tain eve the existi g defe ces in g d c nditi , they had made no attempt t o construct the new works necessary to withstand a great German attack . The d f 9 6 country had been evastated by the battles o 1 1 ,

o o o no the r ads were in bad c nditi n , there was light

ro railway system , the b ad gauge system was defective ,

e n no and , as all the villages had b e gutted , there was

n o of o shelter fo r the troops . An imme se am unt w rk

o to o t had , theref re , be d ne by the Fif h Army , the men lab ouring incessantly at fhe con struction of defences i n the battle zone and at improving the

o o defective communications . The s le reas n why the line of the S omme was not fortified was that there had f been neither time n or labour available or the purpo se . Gough had early realised that it was very probable that he would not have the time he n eeded t o com

l n p et e his rear lines of defe ce , and in February had asked our Intelligence Departmen t to use every device at their disposal to cause the German s t o delay their attack . Owing to the diffi culty of carrying out a uniform retreat t o the S omme of the wh ole line in the dark a gap occurred i n our front in the n eighbourhood of

nd n ed in n o Ham , a Germa s succe ed getti g acr ss the

o o river at that place . Alth ugh very elab rate prepara tio ns had been made for blowing up the S omme 40 What Wen t B efore

and o i for o bridges , and the men expl s ves this w rk ’ o n o n i o o n were the sp t , yet the e emy s art llery , f ll wi g

h u our t o n m of o p re reat cl sely , in a u ber cases expl ded

in o the charges prematurely , and thers cut the leads and so prevented the complete destruction of the

Th i n con s . e o e bridges S mme , like the Oise , was ,

uence of no l ow and q the ab rmally dry winter , very , the enemy was able to cross at many places where i n o in o n m rd ary times the river w uld have bee i passable . The result of this combin ation of untowar d events was that by the night of March 2 3 the li n e of the S omme was already in the han ds of the German s on ’ n Gough s right , a d the defen ce of the river fti rther

no o m rth was seri usly co promised . ’ n n o Meanwhile , the enemy had bee pressi g G ugh s

f n o of o le t , while it was falli g back n rth the S mme in conformity with the retreat of the centre of

i n and o the F fth Army behi d the river , the situati n at the jun ction o f the Third and Fifth Armies

became critical . The Third Army , which , during

2 3 rd the , had repulsed repeated attacks by the enemy in mass formation and had given very little

o n on n om e to in gr u d , was c seque tly c pell d sw g back its

n right across the S omme battlefields . Duri g the 2 2 nd the German s extended their gains west of the

’ o n o and on S mme agai st G ugh s right , his left had seized the heights no rth of the river and west o f

e onn n f nd P r e . Both fla ks of the de e ers of the river

i and o o f onn n n l ne at s uth Per e were thus e da gered , 4 1 The Last Four Months

and there was no help for it but t o fall back

again . The loss of the lin e of the S omme was a very

for n ow o serious matter , the Germans entered up n

our o o and the zone in which were placed dep ts , st res

t o n o or evacu hospitals . These had all be aba d ned

nd on n nt of war ated hastily , a c seque tly great qua ities ’ material of all kinds fell into the e nemy s hands much

of suffering was caused t o the sick an d wounded , whom numbers had to be left unten ded and without shelter alongside the railway lin es in the rear until the hospital train s could pick them up the telegraph

nd o n o n o n e an d a telephon e c mmu icati s were dis rga is d , the difficulties of organising defen ce in creased as the

as o of danger grew. It w clear that the main bject the German s was t o reach Amien s and that the weight

f n on o . o their attack was falli g up the Fifth Army S , in order t o allow Gough to devote his whole attention to n n n o of the e emy adva ci g s uth the river , Sir D ouglas Haig placed that p ortion of the Fifth A rmy

n o of o n n which was rth the S mme u der By g , and it

n r of the became a pa t the Third Army . This new right of the Third Army was pressed back north of

o e and o of the S mm , the Fifth Army s uth the river ,

n n n o t o on n fi di g its fla k exp sed , had c ti ue its retreat .

now of It was the sixth day the battle , March 2 6 . The danger of the German s reaching Amien s and driving in a wedge between the British and French armies was very nigh . Haig had ordered his last 42

The Last Four Months

This was the state of affairs while Ludendo rff was trying to get up fresh troops to the front and Foch was hurrying up the French reserves from

o to our the s uth aid , and it was then that an ’ improvisation of Gough s gave just the time needed

for our o o di Allies t c me up . He rected General

e o s ma Grant , his Chief Engin er , t as emble every n

oul co t hi s oo en he c d llec from training sch ls , his gineers an d the odds and ends of troops employed

s o o o in pecial j bs behind the army , and f rm them int

n o n o n a rei f rci g f rce . Later , as the Chief E gineer

for ro o of was required his p per duties , the c mmand

o b o was t o n this miscellane us dy given Ge eral Carey ,

ho to be an d ow o w happened free , it became kn n t ’ a o o fame s Carey s F rce . It was j ined by Canadian

n o u o e h and America railway c nstr cti n engine rs , w o were engaged in laying railway lines in the n eighbour

of oo . o h d Amiens These men , th ugh but few of

an o n them had had y real military training , v lu teered to i fight , as had the American railway eng neers who ’ had fought with Byng s men when the German s made

o r- o 9 their c unte attack at Cambrai in N vember, 1 17 , and were the first American soldiers to take part in

on s t o battle the We ern fr nt . With this exception ’ this little band o f Carey s consisted almost wholly of

n re of r men i cluded in the fighting st ngth the A my ,

ei n o o but , b g hastily br ught t gether , they lacked the

f o n o o e . equipme t an rganis d f rce Nevertheless , this r fo o o ein rcement , together with the skill and dev ti n 44 What Wen t Before

who on our r e of our cavalry , , ight , rep ated in even more trying circumst ances their achievements during

o w of o the retreat from M ns , and ith the aid divisi ns ’ brought up to Amiens from Gough s extreme right

the as they were relieved by French , just enabled the battered remnant of the Fifth Army to bar the direct road to Amiens until the arrival of the Australians from the north and of the French troops from the south once more established a firm barrier against

on n the tide of the German invasi . By the eveni g 2 8 o of o o of March the w rst the crisis was ver , th ugh

no the great battle was by means ended . On that day the Germans made a desperate effort to in r m an f o i o o drive at A s , e f rt des gned t f rce us out of o ne of n o of ur the Vimy Ridge , the mai piv ts o defence . This attack , which involved the right of ’ o n r H r e s First A my . as well as the left and centre ’ of B n s y g Third Army , was delivered by the enemy in

n f o great stre gth , but it ailed disastr usly . When it

n n o o o n e ded , the Germans had gai ed a p rti n ly of our o o t o on and our utp s p siti s , battle p ositions had every where resisted their assaults . This time there was no ’ fo to i g help the enemy , and H a g s system of defence

o e was c mplet ly successful . It is not t oo much to ’ say that this costly repulse doomed Ludendorff s

o campaign t failure . We have the evidence of captured documents and ’ of Ludendorff s statements in his Reminiscences that the chief object of this campaign was to separate 45 The Last F our M onths

o of the British fr m the French army , the capture

n o o Amien s bei g nly a means t wards that end . The danger of the German s realising this plan would have been much greater than it actually was had

n o f o they ma aged , as Ludend r f intended , t make a

o of o for o wide breach n rth the S mme , they w uld then have used that river between Peronne and Abbe ville t o hold off the Fren ch reinfo rcements comin g

o o m to up fr m the s uth , while they atte pted drive

n o and of o the British army i t the sea , , c urse , the farther n orth the breach the longer it would take the

n oo t o n o n one Fre ch tr ps reach the da ger p i t . When recalls how very n ear the German s were to creating a real breach south of the S omme and how the French re serves came up only just in time to prevent such a

mi ffi u l n i n h cala ty , there is little di c lty magini g ow much greater the peril would have been had the Thi rd

r wa w o A my given y , and in appreciating the isd m of ’ Sir D ouglas H aig s decision t o keep the greater part

o f o of his very limited reserve n rth o the S mme . I believe it was the stout resistance of the Third Army upon March 2 3 and the retirement of the Fifth Army behin d the S omme upo n that d ay which induced Luden dorff t o follow what he believed to be the line of to t for le ast resistance , and s rike Amiens by the

n southern bank of the Somme . Then whe he found that he could not overcome the resi stance of the Fift h

o n and Army bef re the Fre ch came up , realised that he would have to call a halt on the southern part of 46 What We n t Be fore

t o r and i m n the battlefield est rel eve his exhausted e , he made the desperate attempt of March 2 8 t o return to his first idea of creating such a breach n orth of the S omme as would en able him t o roll up ou r lin e

on o and force us back the p rts . From this second ’ T dan ger Byng s hird Army saved us . Checked on

no n - on n o f on i 4 the rther battle fr t , Lude d r f , Apr l , made on e mo re attempt t o reach Amiens by the southern route in a battle which lasted till the even ’ i ng of the 5th ; but Fo ch s vigorous methods had

o fi n n oo and already br ught up suf cie t Fre ch tr ps ,

in ou r o ed o aga cavalry c ver themselves with gl ry , while four Australian brigades had strengt hen ed our f on o of o s o n r t s uth the S mme , that the great Germa effort t o drive a wedge between the Allied armies wo re itself out .

one i i o no Hardly had cr s s passed bef re a ther arose . On April 9 the German s attacked and overwhelmed the Portuguese holding a po rtion of the Flanders f on of n i i r t t o the south Arme t eres . Ha g had greatly weaken ed his forces in the north in o rder t o fi nd troops to m n and i i ion n o o m save A ie s , the d v s s se t t the S m e had to some extent be en replaced in Flanders by ex hau sted division s withdrawn from that battlefield and hastily recon stituted with reinforcements sen t out

o n T our men om on e fr m E gland . hus passed fr fiery

i T i n n con tr al to another . h s Fla ders battle had bee sidered and rej ected by Ludendorff when he formed his o i n n n oo on r gi al pla , but , findi g that his tr ps the 47 The Last Four Month s

Amiens front were checked and that his Seventeenth

or Army , which had attacked Byng and H ne , had

to for been so severely handled as be incapable , a

of f o b e r t o r r to time , further e f rt , dete mined eve t it

r o and to drive fo the Channel p rts . By the evening of April 9 the Germans had forced

wa o w dw w their y acr ss the River La e , mi ay bet een

r and had A mentieres Bethune , and made such

' progress as t o endanger our hold upon both towns . Bethune was s aved by the splendid defence of the 55th West Lancashire Division of its front about Festubert

o o one and Givenchy . Sir D uglas Haig menti ns as of the many gallan t deeds performed by this division

sto of - w wa on the ry a machine gun hich s kept in acti , although the German s had entered the rear compart

- ment of the pill box from which it was firing , the gun team holdin g up the e nemy by revolver fire from

o ot n o the inner c mpartment . N ma y m nths before

m o n this sa e divisi n , u der the same commander , Sir

eudwin H . J e , had given way before the German

- w in counter attack at Cambrai , when eary , weak

n o n umbers , and h ldi g a very extended front . It had then been subje cted to a great deal of ill-founded

a n o criticism , but in this b ttle it se t a pr ud answer to its critics and told them that the simple process

of n o o judgi g by results , which has s ften been com

mended , is rarely applicable in war , and that the popular cry for victims when things are n ot going

w on n s u ell is wr g in ni e ca es o t of ten . 48 What Wen t Before

At the other end o f the break the enemy made

nd o t n o f more progress , a despite the st ut resis a ce the ” i o wa 9th Divisi on on the Messines R dge , w rked his y m n e to the north and south of Ar e ti res , at the same time deluging the town with gas shell t o an extent

i as ' o which made life i n it impo ss ble . It w theref re i n abando ned on the l oth, wh le the ext day Merville

ll The n now n n o o fe . Germa s bega a da ger us m ve

o n i n ment towards Hazebr uck , the ce tral ra lway ju c

and on 12 tion of Flanders , the th it was as near capture as Amien s had bee n duri ng the crisi s of the

o io o i on March battle . S ser us was the p s ti that ‘ extensive preparation s were made for flooding the approaches to Dunkerque and Calais and for sendi ng back to Englan d from those p orts all perso nn el n ot

m n for i o i in o i mediately eeded the r w rk ng while , rder to shorten his fronts and to get reserves t o meet this

‘ n for new Germa rush Calais , Haig , with a sad heart , o i o n e rdered a w thdrawal fr m the Fla d rs ridges , which

n won o in o n had bee at such c st the previ us autum , to n o in on i a li e just c ver g Ypres . But ce aga n British

oo n so i n i f n i tr ps , ever br llia t as n a de e s ve battle

in o io n n aga st great dds , surpassed all expectat . O the

13 mn n of 2 9th nd 3 1s ion th the re a ts the a t Divis s ,

n out on i on on oo stru g a very w de fr t , c tested every f t of o n nd on and heat off gr u d with bullet a bay et , a succession of fierce attacks from early morning until

noon so nin i for l st i late after , gai g t me the Austral an

i i ion i e f o o to D v s , ra l d up r m the S mme , detrain at E 49 The Last F our Mon th s

o o o Hazebr uck , c me f rward and help to save that

o n t w .

The most pressi ng danger was then averted ; but the e n o o G rma s , th ugh f iled in their attempt t o open a

t o o l o n o direct way Calais and B u g e , still f ught fiercely t o n n exte d their gai s. On the 15th the arrival of

n o n en l e to c rei f rceme ts ab d them apture Bailleul , and the strain upon the British army had become all but

o Two- of insupp rtable . thirds the divisi ons engaged in the Flanders battle had been through the fiery m trial of the S o me . As fast as they were withdrawn from the first battle their ranks were refilled with

o o o o a n the drafts fr m h me , which were c mp sed m i ly of o o f n n and n and n b ys ni etee u der , they were se t f o . n o n o o n rth It was these sple did y uths , ma y wh m went into the maelstrom of battle within a few days of n n in an o o of la di g Fr ce , with little pp rtunity gettin g t o know their leaders or of accustoming

t o s n on on who themselves tra ge and terrible c diti s ,

n n o i co no n saved the Cha el p rts . But Ha g uld t go o in definitely recon stituting his shattered divisio n s and

sen ding them back into battle , and he was very n ear f o f his so . o the end re urces By the middle April ,

o n oo o to our h wever , Fre ch tr ps had c me aid , and with their help repeated attacks by the German s in the ne ighbo urhood o f Kemmel on the l 6th an d 17 th were

e an d t for in repuls d , thereaf er a time the battle

Flan ders died d own . The interest then shifted t o the southern battle 50

The Last Fou r Mon ths

Hill , which was at the time held by the French , and f in cutting o f the garrison . This was a very serious

ow for n bl , in Kemmel Hill the enemy obtai ed a

o r o o t o of l grand bse vat ry , fr m the p which he cou d overlook all our lines as far north as Ypres and could watch all the roads and railways leading thither from

t o o as far wes as P peringhe . Theref re a further with

r d awal of our front i n the salient became necessary .

I n ow of o the result , h ever , the gain Kemmel pr ved ’ o o for o t be the enemy s und ing , it enc uraged him

to e o n 2 9 make a gr at attack April , which extended

o n l o o of fr m ear Bail eul t the n rth Ypres . The German infantry came on in massed formatio n with

-onet s and o ou bay fixed , were c mpletely repulsed by r

troops and by the French and Belgians on our flanks .

our o t On fr nt , be ween Kemmel and Ypres , the ’ en emy s repeated and heavy assaults were all beaten

2 1st 49th 2 5th v o back by the , and Di isi ns , which ,

one o to o of except at p int the s uth Ypres , yielded

o l n ot a yard of gr und . This fai ure was hardly less important in its effect o n the campaign than that

n f on 2 8 which the Germa s had su fered March , and ,

i n hese two r of our e as will be see , t t iumphs defenc ’ over the enemy s attack went far in preparation for h the victories w ich came later in the year . On April 3 0 the battle came to a clo se with the recapture

of o on - r of the village L cre , the Bailleul Yp es road ,

o our r . t the west of Kemmel , by F ench Allies In rather less than six weeks the Germans had 52 What We n t B efo re flung no fewer than one hundred and forty-one division s against the combined British and Fren ch

if -five f n di i on and forces . F ty in a try v si s three cavalry ’ division s of H aig s army had stayed the attacks of n one hundred and nine German di visio s . The third German campaign of con quest i n the West had been defeated by the grit and en duran ce of the British

i nd i oin n of o t o sold er , a by the t mely app tme t F ch

m o n o t . the supre e c mma d , but at a terrible c s Our

o n casualties amounted t o m re tha killed ,

— n o wounded and missing that i s, very early d uble our losses i n the eight and a half months of the

n n and o o n Darda elles campaig , ver m re tha our losses in the three and a half months of the third I battle of Ypres . n that battle we had captured

on and 64 n and pris ers gu s , we had gained

o on of n i en d of p ssessi the Fla ders r dges . At the the battles of March and April we stood with our backs ” to we o o the wall , had l st pris ners ,

n n - 00 n o 2 00 gu s , machi e guns , 7 tre ch m rtars , * d mm n n i f o Th n an an o . e ta ks , i e se qua t ty st res worst result of the strain which had been thrown

on our i of ou r i i on up army was that e ght d v si s had , in con sequence of ou r heavy losses and of our lack of m n o m om t o to ea s t replace the pr ptly , be reduced

on fo on i od n skelet s , and were r a c s derable peri u able

Th e fi gures of losses of mat erial are th ose given by th e Mini st ry of

n t ons and re resent th e re acement s n ecessar a t er th e att es . Mu i i , p pl y f b l The ac tual captures by th e Germans were somewhat smaller. S3 The Last F our M onths

to n n in fight eve defe sively the line , while the Portu

uese o n g c ntingent had disappeared as a fighti g force . Such was the price which we had to pay for our failure to prepare adequately for a menace which had

o e o l ng b en f reseen . Had the Government taken in

n time the measures which it had bee urged t o take , the reductio n of two cavalry division s and of more than one hundred infantry battalions might have been

o e and o o and av id d , b th G ugh Byng might have had sufficient men to have e n abled them to hold their ’ o on n H ai s battle p siti s agai st all attacks , while g reserve might have been in cre ased by at least two

m n o on . n own o divisi s Our e had sh co l ess , c urage , determin ation and enduran ce i n adversity which pass

n n nd n all understa di g a are beyo d all praise , but they should n ever and n e ed never have been called upo n for such sacrifices as they made without stint and

o o n with ut c mplai t .

54 CHAPTER II

FOCH V ERS US LU DENDORFF — Foc h on the Defensive Breaking the Barrier i a the — West The Rival Methods

FOCH made his name before the war as a military

i o o and n as i f of thinker . F rst as a pr fess r the ch e

n o i o the Fre ch War C llege , he acqu red a Eur pean

ion an d to n n n reputat , have bee a stude t u der him was regarded as a special distin cti on by the officers of the

in i French staff dur g the war . Wh le at the War College he published two books which were regarded by the military world as the most in spiring an d thoughtful studies of war which had appeared sin ce

o hi Clausewitz pr duced s great work . It was these

oo o o to om b ks which caused L rd R berts predict , s e

ten fo n o n n years be re Germa y threw d w the gau tlet ,

n o n for that whe the great Eur pea struggle , which

n n to he was urgi g Great Britai prepare , came , the

o oul of o who n n n o w rld w d hear F ch , was the u k wn

o T on -of utside profess1o nal circles . his reputati ’ Fo h n c s had been built up by writing a d by study .

io n of e o i an d i It was the reputat a th r st , s nce war is

i n n of o a very pract cal busi ess , eve the greatest the rists i s regarded m ore or less with suspicion until he has

o d f n T pr ve himsel i practice . here were many in the 55 The Last F our Mon ths

French army before the war who lo oked upon Foch

oo the as a b kman . It was way in which he covered

of n o o n the withdrawal the Fre ch army fr m L rrai e , ’ of of n and when J fre s first fe sive failed , ab ove all his

n o w on 9 9 4 brillia t bl delivered September , 1 1 , near

of ond of the marshes St . G , in the first battle the

o Marne , which sho wed the world that F ch was as

oo o g d at practice as at the ry .

w n o Great as ere these early achieveme ts , I d ubt ’ if anything sh ows Fo ch s mastery of his craft more clearly than his handling of the situation in the days which followed his appointment t o the supreme com

f o n . o w mand The fate the rld hu g in the balance ,

no fo on or and there was time r hesitati delay . The new Gen eralissimo had t o form a headquarters

and to o of rapidly , rganise in the midst a great battle the machin ery n ecessary for the command of five million men extended over a front of four hundred

n d i n a fifty miles , tasks which , the circumstances ,

f an o n woul d have taxed the capacity o y rdi ary man .

on d o not n Not ly did he this , but he had bee in the

n saddle many hours before he made his perso ality felt . ’ The success of Ludendorff s attempt t o separate the British from the French army and to capture the great railway jun ction of Amien s depended almost entirely up on the progress he made before the Fren ch reserves from the south reached the battlefield . The Fren ch staff had worked out the m ovements of troops towards Amiens with their usual care and precision u 56 F o ch vers us Lu de n dorff

A systematic flow of division s t o the point of dangel

n n for o n f ood not had bee arra ged , but F ch wa ted a l ,

flow a . It has often been objected that the tenden cy of

o o n n war scho ls is t wards peda try , that their stude ts are inclined to be too much tied t o the methods which they have learn ed during their course of study ; and it i n o who r r m ght have bee expected that F ch , ep e sented the essence of the teaching of the modern war

o o n i o in o of c lleges , w uld have bee pred sp sed fav ur

o n f i as o n staff r uti e , but he a rly t u ded the experts by i f his o . i n o meth ds It s ' the s g the master that he

m m his n n akes syste serva t , that he has the tech ique

hi of on n his n o n o of s pr essi u der co tr l , that he k ws

i and n o fo o when to put rules as de whe t ll w them . In that first week which followed the fateful meeting “ o n of M 2 6 n i n at D ulle s arch , whe he was g ve supreme

on o F o o f im - and n c tr l , ch t re up all sta f t e tables by a y

and n o o o and no o o every , , e _ mea s rth d x u rth d x rush d oo o oin of n T tr ps t the p t da ger . hey were brought up

’ n i n o o - o n by trai , by marches , m t r l r es , m buses ; with

or i o n o i or w th ut tra sp rt , w th without their proper

om m n of an d mm n c ple e t supplies a u ition . The p oint was to get t o the bat tlefield men who could fight ; details o f organisation could be straightened out after

wards . S o by inspiri n g th ose un der him with his own

n o in ten of fierce e ergy , F ch the first days his tenure of comman d brought t o the battle n early twice as many troops as had been est imated for by the French f 57 The Last Fo ur M on th s s f and so o r w ta f , by d ing built up a barrie against hich the waves of German troops beat in vain .

o n n of I saw F ch at the begi ni g April , when he

n on o o o had bee in c tr l ab ut a week , at his temp rary

i n o n of an d headquarters the t w hall Beauvais , thus early he was satisfied that he had the situation i n

and o s hand . Despite the immense burden resp n i

ilit on o d o n and b y his sh ul ers , he was perfectly c nfide t

n a o cheerful . He lea ed back in his ch ir sm king his in evitable cigar an d looking at the great map o n the ’ wall opp osite o n which each day s progress of the German offensive was marked in colour ; he pointed ou t how o s n n how that pr gres was steadily dimi ishi g ,

on o o the marks the map grew cl ser t gether , just as do the circles made by a stone thrown into a p ond h befo re the last ripple disappears . I am still fig t ” i to o ing , he sa d , and I have first stabilise the fr nt

of . n o f w o n battle Lude d r f ill pr bably try agai , but he ’ o won t get through . In a few days m re I shall have ” o his pr gres s permanently blo cked . The day after I l e on 4 o f s no eft B auvais , April , Ludend r f , ure e ugh ,

o o nd did make an ther great eff rt , but it e ed in disaster f or o . the Germans , and the fr nt was stabilised

o fo n I saw F ch again just a rt ight later , on

1 6 of on of April , at the height the sec d crisis the

of 19 18 n t h n o spring , whe e Germa s were n the out

of o to skirts Hazebr uck , and appeared be well on

o to o o o the r ad Calais and B ul gne . F ch had then moved his headquarters t o a small chateau behind

The Last Four M onths

Flanders ended in a complete repulse of the second

r or o Ge man eff t to break thr ugh . Fo ch used t o impress upo n hi s students the supreme imp ortance in war of the will and spirit of

h o r-in- om n he t e C mmande Chief . The c ma der , said ,

o of who is the sw rd his army . The general refuses to admit the possibility of defeat can compel victory ; a general who thinks he may be b eaten is halfway o o I n o of n the road t defeat . th se dark days the spring of 19 18 Foch did not fail to put these prin ciples

o o o of his int practice , and it was his c urage and res lu

o o of o was tion which laid the f undati n vict ry . He

o s o o o n bly upp rted by Sir D uglas Haig , wh se calm , unru fHed temperament e n abled him to stand the appalling strain which began when his right crumbled o n 2 1 and o n March c nti ued until June , when the arrival of British reinforcements from t he East and the steady growth of the American army allowed him

o for t o breathe m re fre ely . But Foch an even more

w o severe trial as c ming . He believed that the mo st

o o o f o danger us c urse which Ludend r f c uld take , and

o o o one t o o theref re the m st pr bable , was c ntinue the attempt to separate the British from the French

o n oo to army , and he acc rdi gly t k measures meet such an attack by the Germans . ’ There was at this time much talk of Foch s

of n t army ma oeuvre , but it never exis ed , save in the imagin ation of those critics who had got hold ’ of the term from a study of Napoleon s ” superficial 60 Fo ch vers us Lu de n dorff

o all o do t o o o strategy . F ch had he c uld st p the h les which Ludendorff was making in the Allied front by sending division s to reinforce the armies which were

I n o to f on being pressed back . rder have resh divisi s ready for this purpo se he had to place in the line other divisions which had been sorely battered in battle and filled up with recruits whose training had

oon been cut short . As s as the battle in Flanders was ended Fo ch arranged with Haig to send down

o n on n f on t the Chemi des Dames , the Ais e r t ,

i ion of o o five Brit sh divis s , which f ur had f ught the Ge rmans bo th in the March battle on the So mme and in i in n and n the Apr l battle Fla ders , the fifth had bee

i n i n fo heav ly e gaged the rmer battle . The Chemin des Dames ridge was looked upon as a position of

e s n t and o n ot n gr at tre g h , F ch did thi k it likely that the Germans would attack it . He therefore withdrew f o it n of n o r m a umber fresh Fre ch divisi ns , which he placed in reserve ready to meet the attack which he

n o ff to n o expected Lude d r re ew up n Amiens , and

and i replaced them with tired French Brit sh divisions . Whi le the Bavarian Crown Prin ce Rupprecht had been endeavouring t o force his way to the Channel

o ‘ p rts , the German Crown Prince had been resting his

o o o tr ps which had taken part in the S mme battle , and he had a great number of divisions in reserve

o of d wn the valley the Oise . These divisions were so placed that , while they threatened an attack upon

co Amiens , they uld be moved just as quickly against 6 1 The Last Four Mon ths

o f the Chemin des Dames . Ludend r f was , in fact ,

n had playi g again the game he played in March , and o n May 2 7 he surprised the French and British troops on the Chemin des Dames by much the same methods as he had us ed again st the British Third and Fifth

. o of o Armies Again the b ys , wh m the British

v o o o d o di isi ns were in great part c mp se , c vered them

o on f on and selves with gl ry the right o the battle fr t , saved Reims by their tenacity in ten days of battle which took the place of the rest they had been

o n wa o e pr mised ; but the Allied ce tre s verwhelm d , and the German Crown P rince drove straight

o t o n w o thr ugh the Mar e , here his further pr gress was just checked in time by the arrival at Chateau

. o Thierry of American tro ps . This German drive

o of brought the enemy within f rty miles Paris , and was a heavy blow both to Foch and to the French ’ eo o n people . Simultan usly with the Cr w Prince s

o attack , Big Bertha began b mbarding Paris , and a number of air raids were made up on the French

o o t o capital , fr m which an ex dus began very similar that which had taken place in 19 14 before the first

f e battle o the Marn . Fo ch was now i n the most trying position i n

-i n - can in which a Commander Chief be placed war . The e nemy had deceived him and the capital of his

n o no coun try was i n da ger . S ldiers k w that the ge ne ral who make s no mist akes in war achieves

o hi a n how f u f n t ng, nd they u derstand di fic lt it is or 62 Foch vers us Lu den dorff a commande r who has been forced to stand on the defensive to divine what the enemy may do n ext but the statesmen and gen eral public of demo cratic countries very rarely appreciate the difficulties and

i on of f n and who l mitati s de e ce , the general has failed to foresee and provide for an emergency is usually

n o i n an looked at aska ce by them . Theref re , y

— - circumstances the position of a C omman der in Chief whose troops have been worsted i n battle is not en o and n i i viable , but his tr ubles resp o sib l ties are increased tenfold when he is i n command not only of oo of ow o of i of tr ps his n nati n , but the arm es ’ One o f o h Allies . the greatest tributes t Foc s strength of will and character is that i n this time of trial he kept the confidence of the Allied armies and of the i Go n e n and All ed ver m ts , bo th M . Clemen ceau and o Mr . Ll yd George deserve their ful l share of credit for the trust which they repo sed i n him despite the inauspl ci ous o verture to unity of com n T ma d . he days were now fast approaching when

o this trust was t have its reward .

’ Ludendorff s March offensive had led t o an appeal from the British Government t o the Un ited States of America to expedite the dispatch of troops to n Fra ce . This appeal met with a prompt and warm

on and resp se , resulted i n one of the most remarkable

i n o f o ach eveme ts the wh le war . Just as in the March i i cr s s Fo ch had haste ned the arrival of the Fren ch

so o reserves , by ne means o r an other the transpo rt 63 The Last Four Mo nth s of men across the Atlantic was increased until from the m onth of June onwards American

o we ro t o r on s ldiers re b ugh ve each m th , a feat of transportation which is without parallel in the hist ory of war ’ . This feat , which upset all Ludendo rff s calculations as to the rate at which American troops

o r c uld each France , was made possible by the spirit

e of n o and nthusiasm the America pe ple , by the

of the and - supremacy British Navy , by the self denial of o ho o o the British pe ple , w , in rder t save tonn age to

oo t o n n bring American tr ps Fra ce , willi gly accepted restriction s up on imp orts into Great Britain which

o o imp sed up n them very real privations . By the beginn ing of Jun e these measures had

o f and of begun t take e fect , the number American

in n o n divisions Fra ce m u ted very rapidly . At the

e of on oo same time a steady str am seas ed British tr ps ,

o of o r n withdrawn from ther theatres war , was p u i g

o o to n int France , and , wing the respite which Lude dorff all o wed the British army while he was fo rcing his

was for o way toward the Marne , there time Sir D uglas Haig to assimilate and train the drafts sent out from

o of o i n England . This w rk rec nstruct g the British army was much helped by the arrival o n the British

o s of o front of several American divisi n , which s me went into the line and thus e n abled British divisions to be withdrawn for re st and training . S o it came about that though by the middl e of June the German s were within fo rty miles o f Paris 64 Fo ch vers us Lu den do rff

nfo m of i and o o n and and withi rty iles Cala s B ul g e ,

n o i on hi s i o Lude d rff had st ll str g reserves at d sp sal , yet the danger of a crushi ng German victory was

n s T i o n daily growi g maller . h s was sh w by the result ’ o fo off n i i oo of Ludend rff s urth e s ve , wh ch t k place

‘ on of n and n n t o in the sec d week Ju e , was i te ded improve the positio n created by the German Crown ’ i in The Prince s surpr se at the Chem des Dames . drive t o the Marn e had left the German s in po ssession of a triangular salient so me twenty-six miles deep and about thirty-three miles wide at the base along

i n of i n b in a the A s e , the apex the tr a gle e g at Ch teau

T i Th i n om o n f h erry . e tr a gle was s ewhat c nfi ed or the

m of fo in it and n o f asse bly large rces with , Lude d r f

n o o oo T f wa ted m re elb w r m . here o re on e o f the ’ o n in n von i m o Cr w Pr ce s ge erals , Hut er , atte pted t widen the base of the tri angle to the west of S oi sso n s by an attack delivered between the Amien s and the

M n n Th ar e salie ts . e immediate objective of this

t Com l e ne and on at ack was p g , had v Hutier succeeded in taking that to wn he would have linked up the two salients and have given Ludendo rff a much mo re

on n n f f i o on or an o n . c ve ie t r t attack up Par s F ch ,

o e and fo on e h wev r , was ready , iled v Huti r by a counter-attack which was an earnest of what was t o

o Th n did n o e o e n c me later . e Ge rma s t r ach C mpi g e , their position fo r an attack upo n Paris was no t

e im o e and ot i n for appr ciably pr v d , they g l ttle retur

very heavy losses . F 65 The Last Four Months

’ After von H utier s attack was brought to a sto p

o f o n f f o Ludend r f set ab ut prepari g or his great e f rt . As t o the result of this effort the Germans were more i blatantly confiden t and boastful than they had been

n t o of 19 14 . any time si ce heir first vict ries August , They said that the British army had been e xhausted

n and we no by its defeats in the spri g , that had men with which to make good our losses . They said that it was utterly imp ossible that America should

t he to i n have in time created armies fit fight battle , that the Allies were bluffi ng when they spoke about the large number of American troops in Fran ce . They said that the Allies had n ot at their disposal the shippin g to make such movement of troops

- * U bo to . possible . The ats had seen that Luden dorff informed his Government on the eve of the

o was n not n on battle that vict ry certai , a fact me ti ed ” n o f o by Lude d r f in his Reminiscences , but discl sed

on n who for o n by v Hi tze , was then Secretary F reig

to of n oo Affairs . As the quality the America tr ps , the German authorities issued this remarkable state ment ' Demonstrations against the war are the o rder

o n s of the day in New Y rk . Of the e thusia m

*“ i s e mb ilit c e ore R ss a co a ed . ere t en ar ose t h os w u ll p Th h p y hi h , b f th e a t mn of 19 17 n o one h ad cont em at e of see n t o r n a o t u u , pl d ki g b i g b u a d ec s on of th e war d r n 1 9 1 8 an att ac on and w ch wo d b e i i u i g , by k l , hi ul cert ain to su cceed if by t h at t ime th e U -b oat campaign h ad red uced t onn age t o an ext ent whi ch mad e th e rapid transport of Ameri can troops ’ m oss e or our s mar nes were ab e t o hit some of th e en em s i p ibl , if ub i l y r e re b e t ransport s . Acco ding t o th p ort s mad e by the Navy t his was t o ” — ex e t ed . Lud end rfi . 3 3 2 . p c o , p 66

The Last F our Months is the correctness or otherwise of the impressi on which it creates in the minds of the generals and

‘ who an d statesmen use it , at every great crisis in this war the German intelligence system created a

n wro g impression .

I n 19 14 July , , the Germans believed that Belgium would be terrorised into submissio n and that Great

n n and o Britai , bei g fully occupied with Irish lab ur

o n o . on o tr ubles , would t fight A m th later , bef re

o f n the first battle the Mar e , they held that the British army had bee n annihilated and that the moral of n o n the Fre ch tro ps was broke . The Kaiser had

n the of n o arra ged details his entry i t Paris , and had o n o 6 rdered a gala lu che n at the H tel Majestic , near

n of 9 1 the Arc de Triomphe . In the spri g 1 7 they believed that Great Britain was on the verge of

o and on of n starvati n , that six m ths u restricted * U - o w o n to our b at arfare w uld bri g us knees . They were so completely out in their un derstanding of the psychology of the American p eople that they did n ot understand that an order to the United States n ot to sen d across the Atlantic more than on e vessel

to n in a week , which was be pai ted a particular way and to follow a particular route to a particular British

o o o and n all p rt , w uld infallibly ar use u ite classes in

an n f w irresistible e thusiasm or the ar . In September ,

19 1 orf f o 7 , Ludend f , in a review o the positi n which

t Ludendorff th o t t s wou d t a e a ear b ut e eved it wou b e ugh hi l k y , b li ld c m i s e e r — 9 a co fore Ame ca co d n e ene e e . 4 . pl h d b i ul i t rv eff ctiv ly p . 2 68 Fo ch vers us Luden do rff

m o o n i he sub itted t his G vernme t , impl ed that Great

and on of Britain , France Italy were the verge

o and i nt n on on as exhaust i n , that the r i er al c diti w

o n of n o more precari us tha that Germa y , wh se

n No o n military position was far the stro ger . acc u t ’ was taken in this document of the effect of America s In n o h n n . economic and fina cial aid t t eE te te July ,

9 18 o on of n 1 , bef re the sec d battle the Mar e , the

n ou i n o n and Ge rma s were equally t their c u t , they christened beforehand the battle which they were t o

ie n o fight the Fr de sturm , the attack which w uld

— f o n Th bring peace o c urse a Germa peace . e Kaiser had a grand stan d built for himself on a wooded height

o loo in M n and to mounted on ver k g the ar e , this he , the morning of July 15 to see his troops advance to

o vict ry . While the German s were busy with their prepara

on for inn n o ne o ti s w i g the war by great final bl w , ’ o n F ch was also at work . He had di vi ed Ludendorff s

n and n t pla , he was quite certai hat the Ge rman s — meant t o attack upon both side s o f Reims that is

to n n o n say , that the Germa Crown Pri ce w uld re ew hi s to to . n o attempts get Paris It happe ed , h wever ,

o o n nc that the ther Cr w Pri e , the Bavarian Rup

on s i n n and o precht , had str g re erves Fla ders , a sh rt

n o oin out adva ce there w uld , as I have already p ted , place the German gun s within range of the Channel

o . o o i n Ma and i p rts F ch had been wr ng y , he m ght

be w o r ng again this time . He was himself confident

69 The Last Four Months

was n l that he right , but he had t o co vince the Al ied s a for not t tesmen that he was right , he did feel himself strong enough to deal with the German Crown

r w o o for oo P ince ith ut drawing up n Haig tr ps , and thus weakening the armies covering the Channel co ast . He first sent southwards the eight French

o e i n n divisi ns which had be n aiding us Fla ders , and asked Haig to move four British is o to the . div i ns neighbourhoo d of Amien s to relieve four more Fren ch ’ on o o of H ai s divisi s . This was a very seri us reducti n g

o was not e d strength ; but F ch satisfi d , and he aske that these four British divisio ns sh ould be handed over to him for the counter-offensive which he was plan

o o o ning , and that yet ther f ur British divisi ns should

n take their place about Amie s . Haig being re sponsible to his Government for the safety of his

r o o a my and the p rts , felt that he must btain their

o r o c ncu rence in this last step , th ugh he was quite ready to take the respon sibility upon himself of

t o on . o o o t o o advising them c cur It d es h n ur F ch ,

o eo and t o o to Mr . Ll yd G rge , Sir D uglas Haig

o that in this critical time they all agreed . B th the British Government and the British Commander-in

o t o Chief supported F ch , decided back his judgment , and to accept the danger o f weakening the British

and n ed to forces in the n orth , he was thus e abl mature n his plan s fo r the defeat of Lude dorff . ’ Many a general s plan s in war have been upset because he was compelled by a nervous G overnment 70 Fo ch vers us Lu den dorff to strengthen the defen ce of some p oint which they

The n n held to be vital to the n ation al safety . i sta ce s are few in which a Government has shown itself ready

' n o eo to shoulder such resp o sibility as Mr . Ll yd G rge

n Ye t o of undertook on this occasio . with the mem ry what happened in April and May he had every excuse

i o n o and e n for hes tation . F rtu ately c urage a r adi ess to take risks for a great end are characteristics of the Prime Mini ster . ’ Fo ch s plan s were based o n a prolonged study o f Th the conditi on s of tren ch warfare . e war on the Western front has be en repeatedly compared to a

T om on i s on o great siege . hat c paris accurate ly up t

in oin The on i ion of n a certa p t . c d t s tre ch warfare

o for n were , after due all wance is made the cha ges due to o n ro n in m o m der imp veme ts ar s , very like th se which prevailed in some of the great sieges of the past . There was the same deadly monotony of life in the trenches ; there was a return t o the weapon s used in the past in the attack and defen ce of fortresses

— n n o an d ha d gre ades , m rtars heavy artillery ; there

t o n to t e were the same hardships be e dured , due h

on if in o i n o n o stati ary l e h les dug the gr u d , wet , c ld and i n in and i n mud w ter , heat , dust flies summer ; there were sallies by defenders and raids by the

for o o attackers , there were struggles the utw rks , and when the defen ders tried to break out or the attackers to break in they both began by blasting a great breach in the defences with a con centrated bombardment of 7 1 The Last F our Mo nth s

heavy artillery and followed this with an assault by

n n . o I n n o n . the i fa try There , h wever , the a al gy e ds

old on l n the days , ce the assai a ts had broken through

f n o o n o the de e ces int the t w which they pr tected , their

o o on n and w rk was , with s me rare excepti s , fi ished , the

in o place was at their mercy , but the great war the w rst

of h n n . n w o the struggle the bega The defe der , was

n ot oo i n o n n c ped up a t w , but had ample space behi d his lin es an d plenty of roads and railways at his dis

o hi re er far t o s . s ves p sal , was able keep back , where ’ o n e n they c uld rest u disturb d by the e emy s artillery , and to bring them up fresh to the battlefield at a time

n n n n o n whe the attacki g i fa try was be c mi g wearied , when it had been thrown more or less into confusion

of ff of n in by the stress battle , when the di iculty se d g forward reinforcements and supplies of food and

n The ammu ition was for the assailan t at its greatest . essential differen ce between the siege warfare of old and the warfare as we have seen it during the great struggle in Fran ce and Belgium is that i n the former a successful assault normally finished the business and

o i n brought vict ry ; the latter , the assault was but a

’ prelude t o a battle with the enemy s reserves .

o o 19 14 n n Fr m N vember , , whe tre ch lines were first established between the North Sea and the Swiss

o n i n o n the n on fr t er , all the ge erals Wester fr t ,

n an d n o n o British , Fre ch Germa , were at w rk tryi g t

h o o solve the problem of ow t break thr ugh . At first it was believed that this was mainly a q uestion of 72 Foch vers us Lu den do rff having sufficient gun s and sufficient ammun ition of

i in of tin bi no o i n the r ght k d , blas g a g e ugh h le the

I n 9 15 o is on hi f f n . 1 s de e ces F ch , with Brit h help le t

n i e to im i and o fla k , tr ed twic capture the V y R dge , b th

o I n times he failed with very heavy l sses . the same

off in year J re tried , by a great assault delivered

m n to o n n and Cha pag e , burst thr ugh the Germa li es ,

f 9 n t oo i . I n o 1 16 he , , fa led the first half the Germa s , using much the same method of an artillery bombard

n fo o an nf n t o me t , ll wed by i a try assault , tried reach

I n mm and Verdun and were defeated . the su er autumn of that year Haig fought the first battle of

omm i n an d fo the S e , which rel eved Verdu rced the

m n to n o i n n n Ger a s retreat i t the H de burg li e , but

n o in d o of e ded there , like the ther battles , the dea l ck

9 n i l trench warfare . In 1 17 Ge eral N ve le succeeded General Joffre in the supreme command of the

en mi and o in o f Fr ch ar es , th ugh Haig , the battle

i out i n to him Arras , carr ed the part ass g ed by

i and n o N velle , the British army bit deep i t the

’ m n in in im i Ger a l es , captur g the V y Ridge , N velle s

on n f on n in f i great attack the Ais e r t e ded a a lure ,

oo o n n of n which sh k the c fide ce the Fre ch army . Up to this time it had been argued that the success won had been sufficien t to warrant the hope

i o and i n m o m that w th m re heav er gu s , i pr ved ethods of nn and e i of e gu ery larg r suppl es sh ll , the breach would be wider and deeper and that the assault

e o m i o i must succ ed , S the il tary p licy n the We stern 73 Th e Last F our M onth s

theatre of war during 19 15 and 19 16 continued

to be t o in crease the p ower and duration of the

o n and n b mbardme t , whe a battle did not give

e was o the results expect d it always p ssible , as the munition factories of the Allies grew in size and num

to oo o o bers , l k f rward t a still greater bombardment n 9 ext time . But in 1 17 the Allies suffered from n o

of e and lack quipment , it was quite evident that lack of s e n o o to o f ucc ss was l nger due lack shell . The colossal bombardments which heralded these attacks

f o n u n literally tore off the surface o the gr u d . The g s

o n e was had d e their part , the br ach made , but the

o o o st ry was always the same . The first b und f rward of o n f and the attackers was alm st i variably success ul , they easily o vercame such of the en emy as remain ed

h o e o alive in t e b mbard d area , with c mparatively little ’ o o n n l ss t themselves . The up came the e emy s

o on reserves , and a sl w hammer and t gs struggle

o o n devel ped , in which the attackers sl wly gai ed ground at a very high price until gradually the attack

o t nd o n l s its momentum a died away fr m exhaustio . Clearly the great bombardment was not the key t o the

o t o oo for o o pr blem , and it was nece ssary l k s me ther

o soluti n . During the autumn of 19 16 and the summer of 19 17 the Fren ch and British had fought a number of what in these days would be called small battles with

o s o n c mplete uccess , the French ar und Verdu and on

on o n the Aisne fr t , the British the Messin es Ridge in 74

The Last Four Months

phenomenally wet and Ludendorff had devised a very

e w t o o of succ ssful ans er this f rm attack . The mud of o e o Flanders pr v d a terrible bstacle . It made the bringing fo rward of the gun s and the masses of ammunition needed t o feed them a work almo st o o bey nd human p wer , and the infantry had t o endure

n n i describable hardship , with o cover from the ’ enemy s fire save such as could be found in water logged shell-holes and trenches poun ded by our

e o o artill ry int a sticky mess . At every step f rward

to n e or o they sank their k es ver into the gluey slime , which the soil of Flanders be comes when torn by

e e o shells and saturat d with rain . Add d t all this , the

n h f of o n Germa s neutralised t e e fect the b mbardme t , upon which the plan of attack depended so largely for

n few o its success , by withdrawi g all but a men fr m

o o o the gr und which w uld be m st heavily shelled by us , and by meeting our weary infantry as they dragged themselves fo rward through the mud with counter

S o attacks by fresh troops . the fight up the ridges

o t o n on o os fr m Ypres Passche daele was a l g , sl w , c tly

n to an end o o busi ess , and it came bef re the pr blem ’ o of beating the enemy s reserves had been s lved .

n a ha Then a new experime t w s tried . Tanks d bee n first used by the British army in the battle of the

r Somme i n small numbers . There are a g eat many

and h people who believed , still believe , that t is was a great mistake ; they hold that we should have waited until we had tanks in large numbers and then sprung 76 Fo ch vers us Lu den dorff im a great surprise on the Germans . But it is an possibility t o simulate in practice the conditions of

or o how an new n war , t be certain y device will tur out until it has been tried in the field against the

f of an to enemy . Further , the ef icacy y device be

e o n ot n on or n us d in war d es depe d ly , eve chiefly , up on its own perfection s or imperfecti on s ; it depends mainly upon ho w it fits into the military machine .

of m n n All the parts an ar y , artillery , i fa try , cavalry ,

n n - n and o ta ks , machi e gu s aircraft have to learn t

o o t o no w rk t gether , k w what each can d o and what

’ n e of and i can on are the e ds each , th s ly be learned by

on Th l g practice together . e first experience of the

n in n of 19 16 and n of ‘ 19 1 ta ks , the autum spri g 7 , was i o n n T d sapp i ti g . hey were found to be t oo slow to

e n i nf n keep pace ve with the a try , they broke down

n and freque tly , there Were many kinds of groun d

o not o which they c uld get ver . I n the battle of Messines the infantry found that the artillery had

o all and o n as n e d ne m re tha all that w e ded , and for the o not for n m st part they did wait the ta ks . I n the t third ba tle of Ypres the mud proved altogether too

fo r new on much the weap . S o fo r a time many of ou r generals and most of the infantry distrusted the n f ta ks and regarded them as a ailure . This did not

m of damp the enthusias the experts , who worked i n

o n n cessantly at impr vi g the ta ks , at devising n ew o o f o n m meth ds empl yi g the , and at showing the h ow to o and o infantry w rk with them , m N vember , 77 The Last F our M onths

9 k o 1 1 t r a . 7 , the tan s g their first eal ch nce Haig decided to make a surprise attack on the very strong

r of r o est pa t the Ge man fr nt , the Hindenburg line w of est Cambrai .

o o r Hithert , the time and lab ur equired to collect a gre at mass of guns and the huge st ores of shell for them had made it almo st impo ssible to surprise the

fo r o o of r enemy , this inv lved the extensi n ailway

n of o o of li es , the laying tramways , the c nstructi n

e o roads , and a great incr ase in the n rmal traffic

o behind the lines . The German aer planes and spies

u o wa ro always found o t that s mething s up . Haig p posed to bring up a large number of tanks secretly at the last po ssible moment and t o u se them in stead of

for hi n n guns to make the breach s i fa try . The Germans had sent most of their re serve s up to

to our e Flanders meet attacks at Passchenda le , and ,

o n s of relying the trength the Hindenburg line , had m weake ned the Cambrai front . The surprise was co

l l o p ete y successful , and the tanks m re than justified themselve s by breaking clean through the mo st fo rmidable defences which the Germans had been able to devise and by preparing the way for the

f h r . advance o t e infant y Unfortunately , as I have

o h to r already menti ned , t e disaster the Italian a my o o o to s five ccurred at Cap rett , and Haig had end

o o of our e divisi ns s uthward to the help Allies , despit his urgent request to be allo wed t o keep at least two to s o five upport his attack at Cambrai . None of ur 78 Fo ch vers us Lu den dorff divisions fired a shot before the enemy were checked

and we f ni on the Piave , were ur shed with a classical f example of the advantages to a skilful enemy o n T o i n interi or lin es of communicatio . his reducti n his strength so weakened Haig that he was un able to

and n n follow up his success , whe the Germa reserves arrived they won back a good part of the ground we had gain ed .

n o on inn n of This , the , was the p siti at the beg i g

n n o f n n oo o 19 18 , whe Lude d r f was bri gi g his tr ps acr ss

fro m Russia and preparl n g for his great o ffensive .

The attempt t o break through by mean s of a great

bombardmen t followed by an infantry assault had

so to e o s failed , had the attempt br ak thr ugh by mean o f a series of bombardments and assaults up on one

f n o i part of the ro t ; the attack with limited bject ve ,

o n i n n o the sh rt , sharp pu ch which the infa try m ved forward and o ccupied the ground won in a single

o m n o b mbard e t had pr ved a success , but the results gained by this method of attack had made little impression up on the whole long front ; the use of

in n i n n of o on tanks umbers , replaceme t the pr l ged

o n for out o . b mbardme t , held pr mise the future Ludendorff was deeply impressed by ou r surprise

i and o attack at Cambra , believed he c uld break

o if o thr ugh he br ught off a surprise . He had very few tanks and n o prospects of getting a large

m for n o nu ber , the German mu iti n factories co ul d not at this period of the war find the n ecessary 7 9 The Last F ou r M on ths

o material ; they had , in fact , m re than they could do to o o n keep the armies supplied with m t r tra sport . In 19 18 the Ge rman s had barely a score o f tanks of o wn n and their ma ufacture , these were of a type

o to our o f 9 little , if at all , superi r tanks 1 16 . They had added to these by repairing some of the tanks

o which they had captured fr m us , but at no time

o an n not did they p ssess y large umber . It doe s appear that Ludendorff was particularly impressed with the value of tanks be fore the events of the

of 1 9 1 8 w o i n summer taught him isd m this respect .

n n of 19 1 He had , duri g the autum 7 , prepared an able

o n on our o a mem ra dum meth ds in ttack , in which he adve rted o n the dependen ce of ou r i nfantry upon

t to e z o o r what he termed ma erial , its failures s i e pp tu niti s s n e e e when they pre e ted th mselv s , and the delay caused by c ontinually relieving infantry in the front line . Much that he said was very

our o true , particularly as regards reliance up n

f n n o b ombardment as a mean s o gai i g gr und , but when he in cluded tan ks in his con demn ation of

” material he forgot that he was writing of a

o ' new weapon capable of improvement . The devel p ment of aircraft during the course of the war

o was not should have taught him cauti n . It the tanks of Cambrai which made him think , but the

o n effect pro duced by surprise . We l st a great umber

s not e of tanks in tha t battle , becau e we had yet learn d

not r d how to u se them , and did appreciate thei depen 8 0 Foch vers us Luden dorff

n o of and o f ence upo the supp rt artillery , Ludend r f , thinking of the success of the German counter- attack at Cambrai and o f the derelict tanks lying within his ” of lines , classed that battle as a battle material . So he did n ot pre ss his War Office to find means t o

n and o in hi s provide him with ta ks , he set ab ut gett g

m o e e surprise by other eth ds . I have alr ady describ d tho se methods and the measure of success which they

n i n f achieved . He certai ly , his attacks in the first hal

of 9 18 n o o n oo o o 1 , gai ed m re gr u d , t k m re pris ners an d gun s and infl icted heavier losses than any other

n o n o general had succeeded i d i g n the Western front . He was very nearly successful in his first drive for

n in . i d o Amie s March He fa le , as all ther generals

e o had failed , b cause his pr gress was stopped by the ’ n defender s reserves . Just at the time whe the Ger

oo m man tr ps were wearied , when it was becoming i possible t o sustain the momentum of the attack by sending forward fresh troops and supplies fro m the

e o o r ar , F ch br ught the French troo p s from the south

on n up the sce e .

Then Ludendo rff made the mistake of trying for

o just a little m re . His first effort had worn itself out M 2 9 i by arch , with the fa lure of the great attack

o o o up n the Arras fr nt , but six days later , n April 4 , after an interval not long en ough for the systematic

o of n preparati n a fresh battle , but lo g enough for the Allies t o strengthen their forces and improve their f n de e ces , he made another attempt to break through G 8 1 “ The Last Four Mon ths which was shattered and o nly served to deplete his strength . H e repeated this mistake in Flanders at

f w n o o the end o April , he he th ught he had f und

o as on another soft sp t . At this time it w a questi whether he would be able to keep fo rces enough in hand for a last smashing blow before the arrival of American troops finally turned the scale i n favour of

n o o the Allies , and he fell i t the same err r as every o n o n o o ther German ge eral the Western fr nt , the err r of underrating his e nemy an d believing that the n ext

o bl w must be the smashing blow. When his first attack in Flanders had been checked he tried again on

2 9 f ff of April and su fered a severe defeat . The e ect

of 2 8 5 ri 2 9 . his failures March , April , and Ap l was

be to oo o that required time make g d his l sses , rest

oo and n of his tr ps , train them reple ish his stores ’ n on o n mu iti s . When the Cr wn Prince s attacks i May and June were stopped by the action of the ’ American troops at Chateau- Thierry and by Fo ch s

o - o f e o o c unter attacks , Ludend r f need d a full m nth t

for f or and on prepare his last e f t , during that m th

r o the Allied rese ves , far fr m being used up , were

growing daily stronger . The German had failed t o

o oo m solve the pr blem . The reserves st d between hi

and victory . A short time befo re the Germans started their last o ffensive battle of the war a meeting of the

o n oo l Supreme War C u cil t k place at Versai les . The Allied statesmen were naturally very anxious about 8 2

The Last Four Months

u trained to take its place in the line . Early in J ly

w w -five n on there ere t enty America divisi s in France , and twelve of them had completed their training and were ready to take part in battle ; such had been the effect of the speeding up of the transport of American troops across the Atlantic . ’ While the forces under Foch s control had been ’ n o t o w . The growing , Lude d rff s had begun d indle German s had reached their gre atest strength early in

w two n d o May , hen they had hu dre and seven divisi ns

n o not o on the Wester fr nt , but they had f und it possible to replace at once all the losses incurred in the battles of May and June . Altogether the position was much more favourable than it had been six weeks

o the s n of bef re , yet fighting tre gth the Germans was f still greater than that o the All ies . On the eve of the second battle of the Marne they had a superiority of over a quarter of a million rifles ; i n guns they were ab out equal t o the Allied

was o l in - artillery ; it n y machine guns , tanks

nd o a aircraft that they were inferi r . With the

flow of roo to u re American t ps France ass d , Foch

as r of r r w ce tain having an ample ese ve in due time , and Ludendorff had no means of increasing his ; but at the moment the number of American troops trained to take part in battle was not sufficient to give

l r o the Al ies a definite nume ical superi rity at the front .

S o w n o the statesmen ere still a xi us , feeling that they

o not f o o r r h c uld a f rd a f u th surp ise by t e Germans . 8 4 Foch vers us Lu den dorff

Fo ch was always and rightly reticent as t o his

o not do o n con plans . He w uld m re tha express his

s n i f n fidence in general terms . The e se t al di fere ce between his mind and the minds o f the German

an n ot generals was that he regarded war as art , as ” T o n o in a science . here is n thi g abs lute war , is

e i t o one of his favourite axioms . He b l eved it be beyond the p ower of the human min d t o foresee all the factors that would influen ce the actio ns of the

n n n and n on opposi g ge eral , all the cha ges cha ces the front which would influence the action s of opposi ng troops and often decide the issue of battles . There

i o n h fore he acted o n certa n br ad pri ciples w ich , he

s o n on of was per uaded , g ver ed the applicati his art , just as there are prin ciples which govern the arts of

n in and o no pai t g , music architecture ; but he c uld more tell beforehand what form each of his strokes would take than a painter can tell you beforehand with what stroke of his brush he will get his effects . ’ The artist s strokes depend up on the inspiration and

i n of mo n n ot the c rcumsta ces the me t , but they are

T i o haphazard strokes . hey are all made n acc rdan ce

i n of and on n n w th the pri ciples art a ge eral pla . The

n on o n i o in Germa s , the ther ha d , bel eved m re the

n in i n T od pla than the spiration . hey were very go ’ nn V o pla ers . n Moltke s first plan for the invasion of

n n so i n i Fra ce was excelle t ; , its deta ls , was Luden ’ dorff s n for his of n in 9 pla fe sive March , 1 18 . Both failed in the execution of their plans because they 8 5 The Last F our Months

' allowed scientific planning to take precedence of the

of So o principles the art . F ch did not tell the Allied d statesmen assemble at Versailles , in these trying days when the Germans were engaged in tuning up their

for t o of war machines their las great bl w, very much

of his plans . One them asked him p oint blank

n do But , General , if the Germa s make their great

w o ' o attack , hat is y ur plan and F ch answered by s n out r ow w triki g three apid bl s , ith his right , with

and w hi o o n his left again ith s right , f ll wi g these by

ou o o wa launching t a vig r us kick . There s the principle of the art dramatically described . Foch had been thinkin g deeply over the prob lems of the war which I have described i n the first

—ho o ro how to part of this chapter w t break th ugh , ’ n how to old defeat the e emy s reserves , apply the principles of war to the new con ditions of trench war

w war of o o fare , hich made a m vement and man euvre

o as it had been c nceived in the past impo ssible . He

n o had had his bitter experie ces like ther generals .

on and His attacks the Vimy Ridge had failed , he had acquired a reputation in certain quarters of being

m n of the of e . reckless , regardless lives his States

o men , anxi usly watching the appalling casualty lists an d n n man - ow of o the dwi dli g p er the nati n , were

o of o suspici us a general with such a reputati n . It is n ot generally known that for a time F och was un der

n o o n a cloud . After a asty m t r accide t which befell

of 19 16 was n f him in the summer , he give the duty o 8 6 Foch vers us Luden d orff studying the p ossibility of a German invasion through

ob for Switzerland , a j which , a time , practically put

and n him on the shelf , after he had fi ished that he

fo r few was literally placed on the shelf a weeks , early

n on a . o in 19 17 , whe he was actually put half p y Fr m

e e o this he was recall d , larg ly , I believe , thr ugh the

n who n ot t n b e influen ce of M . Cleme ceau , had he

f n t o of come Prime Minister o Fra ce , be Chief Staff

i n i for n n . in Paris . While Paris he had t me thi ki g The main facts before him were the failure of the

n of f on great assault upon o e part the r t , the terrible cost in life of the slow hammer and tongs struggle in

i n and of wh ch it always e ded , the success the limited

T n n . o n pu ches heref re , as a pri ciple , he determi ed

not to n n o o e n ot t o be draw i t a pr tracted struggl , ’ attempt the great break through until the en emy s

and o o t o h reserves were exhausted , he pr p sed ex aust

of im n n these reserves by a series l ited pu ches . He ce

o o o o . the three sh rt , sharp bl ws , f ll wed by the big kick

Not in 19 18 o ou n that he had July , , w rked t i detail

n o the great pla by which the war was won . He c uld not have told the statesmen in Versailles whether he would be ready for the big kick in the autumn o f 19 18 or whether he would ' have t o wait for it until the

fo o in ll w g year . He has said himself that all that he had i n his min d when he delivered his first pun ch on July 18 in the secon d battle of the Marne was t o relieve Paris and that the purp ose of the secon d

n d o n 8 pu ch , ma e by Haig August , was to relieve 8 7 The Last F our Month s

a on w e o of vi c Amiens . It w s ly hen the succ ssi n tories won by the British army between August 8 and September 9 began t o produce the effect at which

e o of r Foch was aiming , the xhausti n the Ge man ’ f e n or reserves , an e fect made certain by P rshi g s vict y

f 2 . e on o September 1 at St Mihiel , that he decid d the great battle which began on Septembe r 2 6 and

decided the result of the war . All o ther generals o n the Western front had tried the big kick too soon ; m ost of them had begun with it and had not thought it necessary or p ossible t o prepare for the maximum effort of which they were

n I n n o o capable by prelimi ary fighting . dista t Mes p

of 19 16 tamia Maude at the end had , by a carefully

n of m e wo ow plan ed series li it d attacks , rn d n the resistance of the Turks and had then forced his way across the Tigris and routed their army ; but those

o o w o n n perati ns ere , as c mpared with the vast fro t i

on s France , a small cale , and the enemy was very

o and to inferi r in skill equipment the Germans , so the ’ application of Maude s methods to the problems of the

e on not t o West rn fr t did leap the eye . I n 19 17 Haig

as a w , as I have s id , near reaching the solution at

o o e Cambrai , but the Cap rett disast r supervened , and Cambrai became a seco ndary enterprise instead of the

of climax a great campaign . In the spring of 19 18

n o ff o n ou Lude d r had , as I have p i ted t , made a great n i n adva ce battle tactics , but he committed the mis

of n o - take aimi g fr m the first at a break through , 8 8 Fo ch vers us Lu den dorff

and he allowed himself in each battle to be drawn

so was too and too far by his early success , that he late m F edenstur . too weak when he was ready for the ri

Fo ch had always taught before the war that the

dec1s1ve act of the battle i n the war of manoeuvre must be prepared systematically by a number of pre

nd o n n for o limin ary combats , a that the pe i g the kn ck

was out blow had t o be created . That a military d dis doctrine whi ch was universally accepte . He covered how t o apply to the n ew condition s of tren ch

n i of and n warfare these old pri c ples war , therei lies his title t o greatn ess “ Fo rtun e favours the brave and

and o o n i n the thoughtful , F ch was f rtu ate that the fierce struggles which had preced ed the turn in the

n f r om The tide of war had bee very a fr fruitless . great offensive campaigns of the Allies an d their resolute courage in defen ce had sapp ed the military

n of and in 19 18 stre gth Germany , July , , the cream

o h of her army had perished . F ch had t o put the finis in o t o o n n g t uches a pr cess which had bee lo g at work . The advent of the American armies gave him the men o of , the vast utput the Allied munition factories

e in the mat rial , particular the great improvements which had been made in the tanks sin ce their first appearan ce in battle and the quantities of them avail able gave him just the means he n eeded for carrying

o thr ugh his scheme . Cambrai had proved that tanks could replace the long bombardment and obviate all

ow o n i n the sl preparati wh ch it i volved . 89 The Last Four Mon ths

n not o e Eve Cambrai had , h wever , establish d that co nfiden ce between the infantry and the tanks which

as t o n or - o b e w essential success , had the cc operati n n n twee ta ks and artillery been completely worked out . Cambrai had shown th at tanks are particularly vul n erabl e to an d n no n artillery fire , the Germa s were k w to have placed a number of gun s in forward p osition s along their front for the special purpo se of dealin g

our on o n with tanks . At Cambrai e res lute Germa

l of o n o o arti lery ficer , w rki g his gun t the last fr m

n no ou of our behi d a park wall , had k cked t a number

n o n ta ks as they came in view , much as a sp rtsma

bo wls o ver rabbits bolting from ferrets i n a warren . Early in July a comparatively small operation carried ’ out by Rawlin son s Fourth Army settled all these

n n o problems . Haig was even then pla ni g a battle t

n n of - l - e on free Amie s , but the cleari g the Vil ers Br tt neux plateau and the capture of Hamel was a meces

n on sary preliminary to the larger adve ture . Rawlins

n t n o who e trusted this task to the Aus ralia C rps , were

given sixty of the n ewest type of tanks t o help them .

o for n an The ch ice was happy , the Australia s had had unfo rtun ate experienc e with tan ks at Bullecourt i n

o of 19 17 and were distrustful of them . The w rk infantry and tanks in combin ation was carefully prac

n d o n 4 oo tised beforehand , a July , when the attack t k ”

o o n t o n . place , it was carried thr ugh acc rdi g pla

ow fu r The tanks , working behind a p er l a tillery bar ’ o o n rage , which pr tected them fr m the enemy s gu s , 9°

The Last Four Months ceeded o n in d i g . It was as essential to restore that confiden ce before we could hope t o attack successfully on a great scale as it was to establish confidence be tw ‘ k een tan s n . w on of and i fantry Ra lins , in a series

o o o n of min r perati s , which Hamel was the latest and ’ o u oo the m st successf l , sh k the enemy s confi dence

of own n and built up that his men , and the brillia t wo of n o rk the ta ks added the last t uch , so that when

o the crisis came b th men and material were ready .

n o of Ta ks made surprise , that greatest weap n general

n ed ship , much easier tha it had been , they sav life and

o o ed oo and re o s ec n mis tr ps , , the f re , that quick ucces sion of pun ches for which Fo ch was seeking his opportun ity became possible . The artist had his

on o t o w how materials to hand . H ur him that he kne to use them .

9 2 CHAPTER III

THE PREPARATION FOR ARMAGEDDON

— ’ — The Second Battle of the Marne Haig s Offensive The t Mi i el Americ an s at S . h

’ LUDENDORFF S F ri edensturm was to be developed

from the salient with its head at Chateau-Thierry on

n o n n the Marne , which the Germa Cr w Pri ce had

The n made in his May attack . Germa s had spent the time since that attack was stopp ed in training

m n for s no o o e their e ju t such a ther assault , and pr p s d again to pour in a mass of troops wherever they could

n make a hole i n the Allied defe ces . But railways are necessary to keep a mass of troops supplied with

and o their needs in battle , it happened that the nly railways which could be used t o supply the German troops i n the Chateau-Thi erry salient passed through

o n of o o o - the t w S iss ns , which lay in the n rth west corner of the salient not far from the German fro nt

line . For his advance upon Paris Ludendorff wanted

on of n railways the eastern side the salie t as well .

o of n n o Theref re , the first part his pla i v lved the cap

e of e so tur R ims , that he might repair and use the

n n n n to railways ru ni g through that city . He i te ded capture Reims by a big attack delivered on the

n on to e of ow o n Champag e fr t the ast the t n , c mbi ed 93 The Last Four Months

w o t o o - f ith an ther attack the s uth west o Reims . These attacks were design ed to unite on the river Marne near Epernay and thus cut off Reims and all

oo . neo the tr ps defending it Simulta usly , a third attack was to be made southwards across the Marne

w a - r bet een Ch teau Thie ry and D ormans . When these attacks had all developed satisfactorily the Ger man troops on the we ste rn face of the salient between So issons and Chateau-Thierry were to come in and

cc - o o r fo perate in the advance up n Pa is , and r this

o oo of purp se their tr ps were , at the beginning July , reo rganised under a gen eral and staff recently brought

o h across fr m t e Russian front . This was a big

e was e t o scheme , but ther is evidence that it intend d

or ro o d be still bigger and that Ludend ff p p se , when his m ovement again st Paris astride the Marne was in

w to o o r o full s ing , devel p yet an the attack up n Paris from the north by issuing from the Amiens salient

r o which he had created in March , and that fa ther n rth s‘till Rupprecht was preparing for an advance i n

Flanders . Probably owing to the carelessness engendered by over- confiden ce the Germans took fewer pains t o con ceal their intentions before this battle than they had

on an d o r for d e earlier in the year , F ch was eady ’ o f o o on Ludend r f s first m ves , which pened July _ The great attack to the east of Reims fell up on

* Ludendorfi s ays th at before th e b attle th e coming attack near R e ms a t — 5 w a e an . 5 s of r o erm 3 . i lk d th ough ut G y p. 94

The Last Four Mon ths

’ of o ff n for on f r Ludend r s pla , e arm o the pince s with which he had intended to nip out Reims had failed to

act w n -five , and t e ty picked German divisions specially rested and trained for the enterprise had

o been shattered . Thr ughout the three and a half years of tren ch warfare on the Western front n o attack made on such a scale had met with so little

o ad co o success in its pening phase . It h me t be regarded as inevitable that the defender should lose

o n o n o r o gr u d , pris ners and gu s . G u aud l st very little more ground than that which he had deliberately

n o to e o n . aba d ned the nemy , few pris ners and no gu s While these events were taking place to the east of n o Reims the Germans , in their remaini g tw attacks south- west of the city an d across the Marne

a - and o n between Ch teau Thierry D rma s , did make

o o e o o d s me pr gress , and b f re F ch struck back he wishe

o t see that front steadied . It was steadied mainly by the firm courage of the American troops who fo rmed ’ of n D out s of part Ge eral eg te army , and particularly

3 rd and 2 8 th n on the America Divisi s , which held the

of a - r o sector east Ch teau Thier y , and by the st ut ’ resistance of Berthelot s army on the heights south

1 oo e t o o for of Reims . On the 7th it l k d be p ssible a time that the Germans would force their way up

o w the Marne valley t Epernay , but the gap hich

o they had made was not wide en ugh , and they were in the p ositio n of a man who has got his head through a fence but finds the hole too small for his body . 96 The Preparati on for Armageddon

o o f e Then , on the f urth day the battl , July

‘ n for 18 , Foch spra g the first surprise , which he

n on e n . had been quietly prepari g , up the G rma s While the en emy were still t rying t o make pro gress from the southern and eastern face s of

n n n the the Marn e salie t , Ge eral Mangi attacked

- western face between S oissons and Chateau Thierry . It required great courage and determination t o make

r n that attack as it was made . The Ge ma s had still a superiority of more than infan try on the

n o o . o Weste r fr nt , and F ch , as well as Mr Ll yd

nd ir o to . George a S D uglas Haig , had take risks When the first plan s for that counter-st roke were made by the French gen erals on the sp ot they con sidered that the most which they could do was to

o attack on a front of some twelve miles . F ch came down an d insisted that the front of att ack should be ’ o m re than doubled . We haven t the men ' said

n n ow e o the Fre ch ge erals . I kn that , repli d F ch ; still you ~ must attack the whole of the German n fla k . The spirit which turned the first battle of the Marne into a decisive victory for the Allies was to win in the second battle of the Marne another i tr umph .

’ The popular faith in Foch s army of manoeuvre led t o the belief that the Gen eralissimo had brought up large reinforcements o f fresh troo ps at the i r ght moment and had overwhelmed the German s

i o w th superi r numbers . This was very far from H 97 The Last Four Mon th s

o being the case , and F ch had , in fact , at his disposal few troops who could by any stretch of n o b e imagi ati n called fresh . The French di vision s were tired by the l ong defen sive struggle which ’ o o on ow n f ll wed the Cr n Pri ce s May attack . The l st American Division was on its way t o a well -deserved rest after a long spell in the line on on f on 2 md on the M tdidier r t , the American Divisi had only been relieved i n the first week of July after

in oo its bitter struggle Belleu W d . Of all the Allied troops on the western side of the German salient o nly

2 6th o the American Divisi n , which had taken the

of 2 nd or of as place the n th the Marne , w unwearied by

n its previ ous effo rts . But Pershi g was as convinced as was Fo ch himself of the importance of a counter attack again st the German flank and in sisted that his

nd 2 nd o o o 1st a Divisi ns c uld and w uld fight , and they ’ Man in were brought up to strengthen g s battle . The 1st American Division on ly reached its

o o o n n n of 17 of p siti ns the eve i g the th , while part the infantry of the 2 nd Division did n ot c ome up

o until the attack was actually in pr gress . The late arrival of this reinforcement helped to keep

o oo the Germans in the dark as t what was af t ,

and Mangin was able t o use the great forests of ,

- n o t o n Villers Cotterets , which lay behi d his p st , scree

o o his preparations . His meth d was adapted fr m those empl oyed by Haig at Cambrai i n the previous

o or but e November . He pened with a very sh t intens 98

The Last F our Mon ths

ru n the river , st ggli g hard to maintain what they had won w o f u , ere at nce in di fic lties , and there was

o t o n thing left but withdraw them . That withdrawal

as not for o- n - w easy , a Franc America counter attack had given the Allies possession of heights on the south bank of the river from which many of the bridges

row Ge o d w th n by the rmans c uld be shelle , hile the ’ en emy s infantry was continually harassed by attacks

o fr m the air .

Now n n o , as I have explai ed , the pri ciple up n which Foch had determined to act was to deliver a

of n w n series pu ches , each ith a defi ite but limited

o n o object . His idea was t press the e emy so l ng as

o t o o ow he gave way bef re the punch , but av id a sl , protracted struggle when the German resistan ce

n o . So n bega t harden Mangin , havi g achieved his

o of o o purp se taking the railways thr ugh S issons ,

o e t r e oo to st pp d , res ed and eliev d his tr ps , and it fell — D egoutte to attack next in a north easterly direction from the Chateau-Thierry front against the Germans

o of yielding on the Marne . The fresh vig ur the

n — 2 8 h 3 rd 2 6th o w America s t , and Divisi ns , ith the — 4th and 3 2 nd in suppo rt swept the enemy back from whi the Mai ne to the Ourcq , behind ch river they attempted to stand between Oulchy-l e- Chateau and

— — o o wo of o Fere en Tarden is . Simultane usly , t the f ur

o ow ro the or British divisi ns sent d n f m n th by Haig, 5 1st 62 md o the and , reinf rced the French and Italian

o on r e of o f rces the easte n sid the salient , and there , to , 100 The Preparati on for Armageddon

o r w o to but more sl wly , the Ge mans ere c mpelled give

two n n ground . Meantime , the remai i g British * 5th and 3 4th o n M n divisions , the 1 the , j i ed angi ,

who on 2 3 for o o . , July , was ready an ther bl w This

and o on and was delivered between the Ourcq S iss s , threatened the flan k of the German s opposed t o ’ D e ou s n D egoutt e on the Ourcq . g tte army had bee reinforced by the transfer t o it of the 4 2 nd Ameri

can io o o 2 6th Divis n fr m G uraud , which relieved the , and by the appearance in the front li ne of the 3 2 md

on rd nd American Divisi , which relieved the 3 , a un der this combined p ressure from the west and the south the German defence between the Ourcq and

n o the Ais e gradually br ke down .

On July 2 6 the 15th Scottish Division captured

z n of - - Bu a cy , east the main S oissons Chateau Thierry

o D e ou t - r ad , and g t e was able t o enter Fere en

T o arden is . Then followed two days of fierce German counter- attacks delivered by reinforcements sent o s uthwards by Rupprecht . These attacks were a last attempt by the Germans t o hold the north side of the Ourcq valley , and they were broken by the 3 2 md and 4 2 nd American Divisions . On July 3 1

the last crisis of the battle was over and the whole

of b wn won D ou valley the Ourcq had by eg tte .

' Ludendorff now found that he was l eft with n o

The 51s t was the and Terr t or a di v s on Highl i i l i i , th e 62 nd th e West Yo s r re Terr1tori al s th e 15 h “ k hi , t a S cot tish d ivi sion of th e second n r h d ed t o sand th e 3 4t u h u , h h ad been reformed of b att alions from Pa est n l i e . The Last Four Months

to or of leisure rest e his lines supply , that the salient

ow o o was daily getting narr er , and that c ngesti n and confusion within it left him no alternative but to come

f o out o . or it alt gether Acc dingly , he retreated behind

e on the V sle and Aisne , pressed all sides by the Allied

o w th f rces , hich had been strengthened by the 7 7

on ot o American Divisi . The Germans g acr ss the

of d rivers in the first days August . Paris was relieve of n o the menace which had hu g over her f r six weeks , and a secon d time the Marne had proved fatal to

n o on e of r o Germa h pes . It is the emarkable c in cidences of war o n of o the that twice , c nfide t vict ry ,

G r o o e r the e mans sh uld have cr ss d the Ma ne , neglect i n to o n ow g pr tect their right fla k , and that twice a bl against that neglected flank should have brought their of n li r fensives to rui . It is ttle less emarkable that in the first battle of the Marne the first five divisions of

o h r1 er a the British army , cr ssing t e v near Ch teau

of Thierry , in their first fensive campaign after the

o o o d or retreat fr m M ns , sh ul have advanced n th eas twards through Oulchy-l e- Chateau and Fere - en

' Tardenois t o the Vesle and the Aisne , and that the first American divisions t o take part in an offensive

o battle should have traversed ex actly the same gr und . The Germans behind the Vesle and the Aisne were posted in strong positions ; by withdrawing from the salient they had extricated themselves fro m the ’ difficulties i n which Mangin s blow at S oisson s had placed them and were ready to put up a strong resist

1 0 2

The Last F our M on ths of of ro - r rest and relief f m shell fi e . Time and again attacks planned by us and by our French Allies were p ostponed because the weather conditions made it

f or o for r t o o di ficult , even imp ssible , the artille y as er tain by prelimin ary trial the exact adjustment of their guns needed for the b ombardment of the targets

o of o of allotted to them . This pr cess registrati n targets had been regarded as an indispensable pre

of of liminary battle , and when a great mass guns was t o be employed it was a slow and elaborate

n n n of busi ess . Time and agai it had given us warni g ’ the enemy s intent ion to attack and had warned the enemy that we were preparing t o attack him ; it was one of the factors which had made it all but impossible t o 9 18 o of achieve surprise . But by 1 the devel pment scientific gunnery had made it p ossible t o ascertain for the gunners beforehand the exact adjustment required to enable them to reach any given target

r o o o f unde any reas nable c nditi ns o weather . So the

ow o of o n sl pr cess registrati n became un ecessary . It was po ssible t o open a great bombardment without

o n e of previ usly alarmi g the en my , and , best all , the attackers became far more independent of the weather

Fo than they had ever been . g became an aid instead of to e er rote an impediment attack , becaus , und its p c

on and o ti , guns , tanks infantry c uld be massed unseen . S o for this battle o f August 8 t wo thousan d ’ w o n n o n on of guns ere c llected o Rawli s s fr t attack , many of them bein g brought into action at the last 1 0 4 The Preparation for Armageddo n

nd an had o n d f o moment , a hardly y pe e fire r m their

new position s before they all crashed out together . A friendly mist covered the final assembly of the

n and assaulting troops an d of the t a ks , these burst ’ through the enemy s lines almost simultaneously with . the opening of the bombardment which rolled o n I n ahead of them in the form of a crushing barrage . n o battle of the war was the power of the tan k better

Th of u of 19 18 in displayed . e tank the s mmer was ,

i i to o o o and n speed , ab l ty verc me bstacles tur quickly

i i on o hi e o in any d rect , a vastly impr ved mac n fr m that

m f 9 o wo n e of the S om e battle o 1 16 . Ab ut t hu dr d

of m o e in n n these were e pl y d the first li e , with as ma y

mo in o and not on n re supp rt , they ly duri g the battle drove avenues for the advan ce of the in

fantr o o y thr ugh the German defences , vercame their nests of machine- gun s and spread demoralisation in

the m n n i Ger a ra ks , but , by thus relieving the art llery of many of the complicated tasks which had formerly

n to in n nf fo falle them helpi g the i antry rward , they also helped the process o f simplifying and speeding

on for up the preparati s battle . ’ H aig s first o rders to Rawlinson to prepare for

n out on 3 o battle we t July 1 , a little ver three weeks

fo i imin f r be re the attack , wh le the prel aries o the great i i f attacks , wh ch n ormer years had begun with days

of n n in shelli g , had take months . It had these cir cumstances been imp ossible to keep secret from the

n T f army what was i tended . alk o the next push 1 0 5 The Last Four Months w on s o ent in every me s , and as sick , w unded and men on leave came home items of information were pieced

o o o o o n r t gether . S L nd n usually had bef reha d a ve y

of was oo and fair idea what af t , we may be reas onably certain that what was kn own i n England was also ’ no n ~ k wn at the e emy s headquarters . But the speed with which the battle of Amiens was prepared made

to e r an d it much easier pr serve sec ecy , the army had very little notion of what Haig and Rawlinson were

n n of n o h pla ni g . The men the Ca adian C rps w o were brought down from Arras at the last moment had n o

o idea where they were going . Their h spitals had

n o n o n o been sent rth i t Fla ders , and the m st circum stanti al rep orts were in circulation that the Can adian s were going to j oin Plumer for a great attack on the

o r o Ypres front . Canadian battali ns we e put int the

n o w n line o the Kemmel fr nt , where they ere ide tified

n n by the enemy . Eve Ki g Albert was deceived , and inquired indign antly why he had not been told of this offensive which was ab out to take place on his right . ’ There were no rumours t o attract the en emy s at ten tion to wards Amiens and many t o draw it elsewhere . The result was that Rawlinson sprang an even more c omplete surprise up on the enemy than had

The n n o Byn g at Cambrai . ta ks , lumberi g f rward

o n n through the mist , were thr ugh the Germa defe ces an d amongst the troops in the fields and billets behin d before they were aware that any attack had

of i o taken place . The headquarters div si ns , and

1 06

The Last Four M onth s

North of the S omme the 3 rd Corps had had a

s r for harder t uggle , the enemy there was on the

not o alert , the surprise was c mplete and the nature of the ground made it impossible t o use tanks ; but non e the less the greater part of the ridge dividing the Ancre south of Albert from the S omme

n o w was gained . Twenty Germa divisi ns ere de

d n on e feate by thirteen British i fantry divisi s , thre

on an n n British cavalry divisi s , and America i fantry r n and n -two o n on egime t , nearly twe ty th usa d pris ers

n n imm di and four hu dred gu s were captured . The e ate effect of the advan ce of the Australian s and Canadians south of the S omme was very similar to ’ f n in o o o n that o Ma g s bl w at S iss ns . The Germa s were deprived of the use of the railways passing

o ' n oo thr ugh Chaul es , which had supplied their tr ps b o and etween the S mme the Oise , and had t o carry

o o w w . n who thr ugh an ther ithdra al Debe ey , was n ot

t o t aided by tanks the same ex ent as we were , at first made slower progress than did the Canadians on f of n his left , but as the di ficulties the Germa s

o to of n increased , wing the threat the Ca adian

t o on n ot on as attack o their c mmunicati s , ly w

to s o w ow o Debeney able pres f r ard t ards R ye ,

u on o d o b t Humbert , his right , j ine in and dr ve

n o n the e emy back fr m the Lassig y plateau , which

won von n so had been by Hutier in Ju e , that by the middle of August the German s between the Somme and the Oise were almost everywhere back in; 1 08 The Preparatio n for Armageddo n

n in f the li es which they had held the summer o 19 16 .

T in o w o o hen , acc rdance ith the the ry f limited

n . The n pu ches , the attack was stayed Amie s salient

n and had disappeared , as had the Mar e salient , the m in in of o n h a l es railway thr ugh Amie s , which t e enéTny had dominated sin ce the end of March and which were the main chann els of commun ication d B n an . between the Fre ch ritish armies , were cleared No soon er was Humbert established on the

n and f on on n Lassig y plateau , the battle r t the Amie s

n for m in n M n salie t the ti e be g at a sta dstill , than angi , ’ n ' o n an o Humbert s right , pe ed attack between the

n o Oise and the Aisn e at S oissons . Ma gin began n the 18 th with a lo cal operation which sent the German s

in o o i on no n back t their battle p s ti s , but did t alarm vo

B oehn f n to t o n su ficie tly cause him se d up reserves ,

no oo n V on B o h of which he had ne t ma y . e n had just assumed command of the armies which had hitherto ’ on n o i n c stituted the Germa Cr wn Prince s right , order that that young gentleman might be better able to devote his attention to the reorganisation of his centre after the buffeting it had received i n the ’ V on B oehn s on second battle of the Marne . fr t

n as extended from S oisso s to Albert , and he w

n ot o anxiously watching Haig . He did , theref re ,

t o wish to send off troops prematurely his left , and

n On 19th n Mangin caught him n appi g . the Mangi 2 oth extended his front of attack , and by the had gained possession of the whole of the heights between 109 The Last F our Months

n the Oise and the Aisne , havi g captured

o 2 n pris ners and 00 gu s . ’ Foch s system of manoeuvre was now in

on o acti , and it is w rth while again pausing f or a momen t t o compare his quick rapier thrusts i ’ w th Luden dorff s heavier and slower sword play . ’ It will be remembered that Ludendorff s attacks on

on on 2 n n the British fr t , begun March 1 , had e ded o April 2 9 with the repul se between Bailleul and

n e of n - n Ypres . Then e su d a pause twe ty seve days , for the third battle of the Aisne did n ot begin until

2 n on 2 o o May 7 . This e ded June , and was f ll wed ’ ’ after a week s interval by von H utier s attempt to

e as o on n o 3 . reach C mpi gne , which w st pped Ju e 1

o n 15 t - two It was n t u til July , hirty days later , that the Crown Prin ce was ready t o begin the second

of of battle the Marne , and each these respites which Ludendorff had all owed the Allies made his next

o No h diffi . w ow o who task the m re cult see F ch , had not the superiority in numbers which Luden dorff

had had in the spring , gave his adversary no

‘ o o - time t o rec ver . He makes his c unter attack

o of on July 18 , and the sec nd battle the Marne ends with the Germans behind the Aisne and the

8 o Vesle on August 6 . On August Haig pens the

of on 12 th d battle Amiens , and the it en s with the

r n o n . Ge ma s in their lines ab ut Chaul es Meanwhile , on 9 th the , Humbert has already begun the battle of

i w o to an on Lass gny , hich c mes end the 16th , and 1 10

The Last Fou r Mon th s

’ promises of victorywhich on Ludendorff s authority

out t o r had been held Ge many , filled the German

w a statesmen ith dismay . It w s held that to undeceive the people so bluntly and brutally was p olitically

o and the n o n imp ssible , eg tiatio s which resulted in Prince Max of Baden bec oming Chancellor were set

on oo f t . While the Emperor and his advisers were thus seeking for a way out of their difficulties Ludendorff

o o changed his military policy . His purp se was n w

to n on t o o o oo sta d the defensive , av id exp sing his tr ps

to an o r n y m re such defeats as he had ece tly suffered , and t o present a barrier t o the Allies which they

would hesitate to attack . He had had again t o draw ’ heavily up on Rupprecht s reserves to stop the hole caused by the collapse of his defence in the Amiens

o salient , and it had bec me imperative that he

o o ow should e conomise tr ops s meh . He there fore decided on a gen eral shortening of his

t o w out of front . He began dra the salient

an i n and e he had made in Fl ders April , attempt d t o follow this by a repetition of the manoeuvre which

u of 9 had been so successf l at the beginning 1 17 . Then he had upset General Nivelle ’ s plan by a with

n n now ro drawal into the Hinde burg li e , and he p p osed t o retire slowly over the same ground t o the

of s as of i n w shelter the ame v t system defences , hich he hoped t o stan d until a peace not unfavourable t o

r e o e . 19 Ge many had b en c nclud d As in 17 , he wished

1 1 2 The Preparatio n for Armageddon this retirement t o be deliberate an d to cause us the

ni n o maximum of delay an d in conve e ce . It w uld have suited him admirably t o h ave completed the move ment ab out the time when the weather broke i n the

m o n n i o late autu n . We w uld the have bee left w th ut

of old o shelter in the desert the S mme battlefields , while his troops were established i n the elaborate — dug outs of the Hindenburg syst em o r billeted i n the intact towns an d villages t o the east of it .

n in i . i Fortu ately , Haig div ed th s scheme At th s time the Hin denburg lin e ran much n earer to our front between Albert and Arras than it did in the

o and i o o t o n S mme valley , Ha g pr p sed upset Lude

’ dorff s n of to fo him ou t of o m pla retreat , rce the S m e uplands and turn the lin e of the river from Peronne

o n f o - on s uthwards , by striki g r m the Albert Arras fr t through Bapaume t owards the n earest p ortio n of ’ d n o o Lu e d rff s g al .

On eve of of the the battle Bapaume , which , as

s i n on 2 1 n I have a d , bega August , Haig issued a o to hi s oo in n rder tr ps which , while h ti g at the prob

i i of m n i n o ab l ty a Ger a w thdrawal , called their atte ti n to the great change which had been wrought by the

i o i of the M n and of n and for v ct r es ar e Amie s , asked their greatest efforts i n pressin g back the en emy

Th n f i wherever he gave way . e bru t o th s n ew battle ’ f on B n s T i ell up y g h rd Army , which had the task of in in n o of n o press g rth the A cre t wards Bapaume ,

’ while Rawlin son s Fourth Army co-o perated on its I 1 1 3 The Last Four Months

o on e o right by advancing astride the S mme P r nne . ’ By the evening of the 2 l st the success of H aig s plan

as who w practically assured by Byng , gained the line

— o as of the Albert Arras railway . The c nsequence w

on 2 3 rd on the that , when the a general attack

o o of o e o o wh le fr nt the Third and F urth Armi s f ll wed ,

o of o the German defence n rth the S mme gave way ,

i o e o r Mar and the Th epval Ridge , P zi res , C u celette , tinpuich and Miraumon t fell i n rapid succession to ’ B n ff c of o n our y g s men . The e e t this up men was

9 6 of of electric . In 1 1 the capture each these places

o o ow oo had c st us a l ng , sl , bl dy struggle , and the prime manhoo d of our n ew armies lay buried thick

o around them . They are names as sacred t the

o r of s Nati nal A my Great Britain a Minden , Sala

oo t o old manca , Waterl and the Alma are the

Regular Army . They had been yielded in March in

n n sorrow and pai after a noble defence agai st odds .

No w o o o , in a few h urs and at c mparatively small c st , the same regiments which had perforce retreated from them with heavy hearts had on ce more thrown

n f o No one who the e emy back rom this sacred s il . has not tasted the bitterness of retreat can appreciate the full thrill of an advance over ground made familiar

nd n n by victory a defeat . Times had i deed cha ged

o of of fr m the days the first battle the S omme . The army was from long experience suspicious of ann oun cements from Headquarters which foretold

Too the collapse of the enemy . often these had come 1 1 4

The Last F our Mon ths

While Byng had been closing in on Bapaume the Australian C orps had been steadily pushing the

o o e o nn Germans back up the S mme t wards P r e , and in the early hours of August 3 1 the 5th Australian

o Brigade , having cr ssed the river on improvised

o r wa ow on bridges and w rked thei y t ards M t St .

n of Quenti , surprised the German defenders that

o n e onn and hill , which d mi ates P r e , carried it by

of assault . As the result this achievement the Australian s were able to enter Peronn e the following

e o o day , and the G rman defences al ng the S mme as far south as Ham were turned . In the battle of Bapaume thirty-five German division s had been driven in ten days acro ss the scen e of the struggle which in 19 16 had lasted from July 1

and o until November 17 , they had l st ’ n n o ff prison ers and 2 7 0 gu s . Lude d r s retreat , far

o oo from enabling him to eco n mise tr ps , was exhaust i ng his dwindlin g resources as rapidly as a battle accepted voluntarily . While the battle of Bapaume was i n progress Haig had been quietly transferring the Can adian to C orps from the Amiens battlefield back Arras ,

and on 2 6 2 nd whence it had come , August the

on 5 l st an d 3 rd Canadian Divisi s , with the British w o n o o Division , hich had been m ved rth fr m the of and d Marne , attacked east Arras capture the ’ ‘ o n important hill of M onchy l e Preux . H r e s First o o ow to w s v o , Army, hich the e di isi ns bel nged f ll ed up 1 1 6 The Preparatio n fo r Armageddon this success by driving the enemy back into the

n en n no n northern exten sion of the Hi d burg li e , k w

- o o in as the Drocourt Queant switch . This Dr c urt l e had been completed by the e n emy after the battle

i n 19 1 and for n on of Arras , April , 7 , eightee m ths he had been hard at work improving it until it had become almost as formidable as the main Hindenburg

n onn uéan t . li e , with which it c ected at Q It was assaulted i n the morning of September 2 by the 1st

n d 4 h n i n i i on and 4th 5 2 nd 5 th a t Ca ad a D v si s the , , 7 an d 63 rd i i i on e o o Br t sh Div si s , assist d by s me f rty

n T i on not on o ta ks . hese six d visi s ly br ke clear through the n etwork of German defences and gained p ossession of the whole system i n less than seven

o in o n so o n n h urs , but d i g they r uted i e German

i ion who nt of n d vis s , had all the adva age defe sive works which they knew thoroughly and believed to

n . T i f i h d be impreg able h s great eat had , as Ha g a

o o - n h ped it w uld , far reachi g results . With their

i n n n o n r ght fla k threate ed , the Germa s s uth of Quea t had to hurry back t o the shelter of the Hin denburg

in and l e , by September 9 they were back in the ou t

o o ion in f on of i in f i p st p sit s r t the r ma de ens ve system .

On m 6 n o n Septe ber the Fre ch ccupied Ham , o the

o and n on i and S mme , Chau y , the O se , a few days ’ i in i of a later were w th s ght La Fere . H ig s manoeuvre had the simultan eous effect of hastening

G n i in n the erma w thdrawal Fla ders , and by Septem ber 6 we had reoccupied Bailleul and Merville and 1 1 7 The Last F our Months

e 2 h were back in N uve Chapelle , while the 7t

American Division had passed beyon d Kemmel Hill . Thus in on e month all the groun d won by Luden

of two of and d r f in his first attacks March April had ,

on of o o on on with the excepti a p rti n the Ypres fr t ,

r e and been egain d , the British army had amply

n of ave ged the reverses the spring . The two German attempts to derange the plans of the Allies by a retreat in to the Hindenburg line

ff n I n 9 had had very di ere t results . 1 17 we did not discover what they were at until their pre

arations o p had been c mpleted . Their retreat

o on then lasted alm st exactly three m ths , and during those three months we fought the battle

of i n n n or Arras , which the Ca adia s st med the

was o o o Vimy Ridge . That the m st c nspicu us success

o o n on we had gain ed up t that time the Western fr t ,

n n our o and , i cludi g captures in that vict ry , we , in

o e o o on th se thre m nths , secured ab ut pris ers and 2 2 an n of we 0 guns , achieveme t which were at

o 9 18 the time rightly very pr ud . In 1 , when Luden d orff again tried to escape from his embarrassments

we o n o by a similar retreat , dr ve the Germa s back ver almost exactly the same distan ce between August 2 1

9 — in n — in and September that is , twe ty days and that time we captured prison ers and 47 0 guns .

n Luden dorff could no lon ger retreat according to pla . While Haig was hunting the German s back into the Hindenburg line Pershing was engaged in collect

I 1 8

The Last Four Month s

was and t held by nine German Aus rian divisions ,

of o s o - oo wh m six were ec nd class tr ps . Ludendorff

had decided to withdraw to the base of the salien t

in o t o ono oo rder ec mise tr ps , and some of the

German heavy artillery had been removed before

the Americans attacked . Probably the enemy relied

up on the stren gth of his p osition and upon the

ease with which he could observe all preparation s for attack to e n able him to make a leisurely

n o o n retireme t at the pr per m me t . If this is so , he was surprised by the method and swiftness of the

n n on America advance , which bega September 1 2 . The main attack was made by the l st Co rps of four division s and the 4th C orps of three division s

n o n of s and agai st the s uther face the alient , was directed northwards so as to cut i n east of the

n o heights of the Meuse . Simulta e usly the 5th American C orps attacked w ith two divisions on the north-western front of the salient and drove i n east

n wards towards the s outhern attack . O e French

o on of 5th o and divisi n attacked the left the C rps , two m ore connected the 5th C orps round the nose of the salient at St . Mihiel with the main attack . ’ o n o o o The battle pe ed with a f ur h urs b mbardment ,

nd in o n n a then , at five the m r i g , the American

n infantry advan ced behi d their barrage . Either because the moral of the German troops was not good or because they knew that it had been plann ed to

o ou of n h c me t the salie t , the resistance was on t e 1 2 0 The Preparati o n fo r Armagedd o n

o f and in i o t wo m i wh le eeble , th rty h urs the A er can attacking forces had j oin ed hands an d the salien t had

i i o The been wiped out with aston shingly l ttle l ss . whole operati on was carried through accordin g t o

n ot n to o an of programme . It was ecessary empl y y

i i ion of si x in the American reserve d v s s , which were

n and n on readi ess , , as will be see , they were at ce available t o begin preparation s for an other and more

The in formidable t ask . battle resulted the capture by the First American Army of prison ers an d

4 43 n gu s . . Mi i i n on o n The St . h el sal e t had l g br ke up the

of f on n Mo and n so stretch r t betwee the selle Verdu , that any con siderable offen sive movement by the

n in o o in n im o i Th Fre ch t L rra e had bee p ss ble . e front was equally unpromisin g from the German

o n of for n n p i t view a attack directed agai st Nan cy . The result of this was that this p ortion of the long ’ in f f il o f off in 19 15 l e had , a ter the a ure J re s attempts to i n om o m n and n reduce the sal e t , bec e d r a t had bee

i o i n ow very l ghtly held by b th s des . But that the salient was gon e and the front had been straighten ed out m n fo n f , the Ger a s u d their great ortress of Metz

n e and o n n me ac d with attack , als the Fre ch iro fields of to n or of M i Briey , the th etz , wh ch they had cap f in of an d ured the early days the war , were of

n o m o n to m n fo eve m re i p rta ce the tha the rtress . American Headquarters allowed it t o be whispered ’ in confidence that Pershin g s real objective was these 1 2 1 The Last Four M onths

o an d o o of o n ir n fields , d ubtless s me these whispers f u d

I n an n their way into the German lin es . y eve t

n o ff o t o en d ow Lude d r , alm st the very , sh ed his nervousness as t o an American attack o n the east

n of and a for ba k the Meuse , , h rd up as he was

oo to w for reserves , he kept tr ps atch an attack which did n ot begin t o develop until the German pl eni potentiaries were on their way t o sign the Armistice . ’ This victory of Pershing s completed the series of

n and o n ow for prelimi ary punches , F ch was ready

n - o n the k ock out blow. His immediate bject had bee to free Paris and Amiens and t o clear the strategic railways which he n eeded for the free movemen t of his tro ops ; his ultimate object had been to prepare for a decisive victory by exhausting the German reserves . We have seen how he achieved the first ;

n ow how oo to on let us see he st d as the sec d .

end o f o o n n At the May , just bef re the Cr w Pri ce ’ on William s attack the Chemin des Dames , the German forces in the West had reached their

greatest strength . They then had 2 07 division s on

n on and of o 66 on the Wester fr t , these ab ut divisi s

in i n I n fit to take part battle were reserve . the ’ of n o third week September , after Pershi g s vict ry at

n of n on f St . Mihiel , the umber Germa divisi s had allen

t o 18 5 for o to oo o , in rder make g d his heavy l sses

n o n o i n man o o Lude do rff , wh se i c me p wer fr m Ger

n in suffi ci ent to n ma y was quite meet expe diture ,

o o o t o had been c mpelled t draw up n his capital , and

1 2 2

The Last Four Months the period when he was inflicting more loss than he

and in on o suffered , he failed the sec d because he w uld not or could n ot continue them t o the p oint where

o n and i n n decisive success was btai able , acti g as he

n ] o did he sapped his stre gth . Still m re was the ’ exhaustion of Germany s man p ower the fruit of the

o n Allied eff rts duri g the previous years . It is easy in the light of after knowledge to criticise the Allied gen erals an d to say that their methods were wasteful

f n no n in 19 15 o life . Certai ly if they had k w what they kn ew in 19 18 their procedure would have been different an d the war would have been over soon er ; but that criticism is best an swered by the fact that the man who is to - day universally recognised as the outstanding figure of the war was himself engaged in o n o o d i g that t which the critics bject . It is commonly asserted that the Allies should

n on d n in i n 9 have remai ed the efe sive the West 1 15 . That argument overlooks the fact that it was always ’ presen t in Joffre s min d that the German s might at any time elect to do the very thing which they came

so n n 19 18 . t o ear achievi g in March , I believe it have been one of the greatest of the many German blunders that they did not attack in force in the West in 19 15 o ou r n ew i and ou r , bef re arm es were ready

o munition factories had bec me really productive . I n 19 16 Verdun was saved because we were able to exten d ou r front to the S omme and free a great number of French troops ; an attack made before we 1 2 4 The Pre paratio n fo r Armage ddo n were in a p osition to bring such help to ou r Allies

Th o n e m n might have had very differen t results . e ea s of averting that danger was to take every opp ortun ity of makin g the We stern front more secure by pushing back the German lines and of exhausting

an i the military power of Germ y . Here l es the root of the long barren c ontroversy which raged between the Easterners and Western ers throughout the greater part of the war . It was necess ary to be safe in the East in o rder to be stron g

t n o o o in the West , but i was at time p ssible bef re the summer of 19 18 to make the West safe by

in not success the East , because the Allies had the force n ecessary to protect their vitals in the West again st possible danger and at the same time carry

o n in mo n thr ugh a decisive campaig re dista t fields . Therefore the p olicy of seizing every favourable ’ opportunity of exhausting Germany s military p ower by attack in the West was the right p olicy if the m o o o n ot eth ds f ll wed were always the best . It was

o i i m de 6t in n that p l cy wh ch e ptied the p s Germa y , and though it came near to emptying both our own and d e dts 9 8 the French p , it had its reward in 1 1 , for ’ without it n either coul d Foch s skill in two sho rt ’ months have materiall y reduced the enemy s strength nor could American aid have enabled us t o win when we did win .

While the German strength had been going o n steadily d w , the Allied strength had been going 1 2 5 The Last Four M on th s

n f n steadily up . Betwee the middle o July a d the beginning of August n ine American division s took

on of e part in the sec d battle the Marne , and ther w n o on ere the three m re the British front , which

o n n f had practically c mpleted their trai i g or battle .

n of o Pershi g at the battle St . Mihiel had f urteen

o o or in divisi ns in acti n reserve , while at that time there were two on the British front an d nin e more

— - almost ready twenty five American division s i n all

on o o o on o up which F ch c uld reck n at ce , and m re

o o of o n o t c me , each these divisi ns bei g ab ut twice

n of r n or n on the stre gth a B itish , Fre ch Germa divisi .

o o n n The British army , which in July c uld ly bri g

n o fift - o i t the field y three divisi ns , in September had , thanks to the arrival of reinforcements from other

of o t o fift - n o o theatres war , gr wn y ni e divisi ns , t w of

o t i n o of r or an which were , h wever , s ill pr cess e g i sa T on . n of ti hus , while the fighti g strength the Germans an d Austrians in the West had fallen by sixteen divisions sin ce Fo ch had delivered his first

n o f e uival pu ch , that the Allies had increased by the q

of o -two o n n one n ent ab ut thirty , c u ti g America

on division as equal t o two German divisi s . Sin ce July 18 the Allies had captured more than

n and t o of German gu s large s cks shell , while

o e on o n so the bl ckad , which we had f u ded many

o nn n to premature h pes , was at last begi i g have

on o results directly bearin g the military situati n , and made it in creasingly difficult for the German s t o

1 2 6

The Last Four Mo n ths in the war a real sense of corp orate unity pervaded th n Th n e . n of ra ks e British army , havi g made o e

o o o in i o of the m st marvell us rec veries the h st ry war ,

of o n a an d o was sure its superi rity , i dividu l c llective ,

o n . n o n ver the e emy The grim , determi ed , st lid e dur ance of the spring had been changed by the series of victories which began with the battle of Amiens into Th n . e on of eager , irresistible e thusiasm sec d battle the Marn e had taught the Allied leaders that the un tried American troops could fight and win with far less training than they had calculated t o be n o of o n ecessary ; the vict ry St . Mihiel had sh w that

n o n an America army c uld take the field as an e tity . Every on e of the data up on which Luden dorff had based the plan fo r the F ri edens turm had

of n been proved t o be false . The spirit Fra ce was as high as ever ; the British army , far

a e and o from being e xh ust d , had struck hard ften an d with conspicuous success ; the American s were not only present in numbers , but had taught the

o Germans to fear their dash , skill and val ur .

1 2 8 C H A P T E R I V

ARMAG EDDON — The Hindenbu rg Line The Americ an Battle of the Meuse-Argonn e G ouraud in Champagne H aig — ’ Breaks the Hindenbu rg Line King Alb ert s Advanc e — into e i m Th e esu t of rma e on B lg u R l A g dd .

C n fo r his i FO H , havi g prepared the way dec sive thrust

i of n n o by his ser es prelimi ary pu ches , was about t launch the Allied armies against the most formidable “ of m f n n all the Ger an de e ces . The ame Hinden

in o in i i o who burg L e rig ated with the Br t sh s ldiers , so entitled the great system of German works which had been discovered to wards the end of 19 16 behind

o the S mme battlefield .

of A 19 16 n At the end ugust , , when Hinde burg

' and o f Ludend r f first arrived at Great Headquarters , the German military situation was by n o mean s

o was i fo mi a n r sy . Russia st ll r d ble , the Austria

i of o o n army requ red a great deal supp rt , R uma ia

o o e n n of n was ab ut t ter the field , the Verdu fe sive

o o i o f i had pr ved t be a d sastr us a lure , the British

m o n to o m n ion and ar y had gr w f rmidable di e s s , the Fran co-British attacks o n the S omme were pressing the Germans hard and eating up their

i to ni off reserves . Ludendorff w shed first fi sh Russia I 1 2 9 The Last Four Month s

i n o to do to and Roumania , and rder this he had make the situation i n the West safe and to be able

o t o economise troops there . The nly way in which he could d o this effectively was by shortening his

o l n ot an o front . He c u d give up y gr und in Belgium without endangering his hold up on Ost end and

Z o eebrugge , which were invaluable as bases fr m which submarin es and destroyers could attack the

o on o nn British c mmunicati s acr ss the Cha el , while the country about Bruges and Ghent gave him an excellent jumping-off place for aeroplane raids upon

on o - f n not L d n and the south east o E gland . He did

t o o wish aband n Lille , because great pains had been

o o o taken t f rtify the place , which had bec me the

o o o n rthern piv t f the German defensive system , while the great manufacturing district surrounding

o or the t wn was of the utmost value . N did he wish t o o o for o c me away fr m the Vimy Ridge , it c vered

of o a great part the Lens c al fields , and in the hands

‘ of the Allies would be a strong barrier against a German offensive when he was ready to attack in

of o . o n the West . West La n the St G bai massif

o o for o f rmed a piv t his centre , which it was imp rtant t o o w h ld . Between Reims and Verdun a ithdrawal

o on wo n w uld n ot shorten his fr t , and uld bri g his en emy dangerously near the railway which connected

w nd e r of Metz ith Sedan a Mezi res , pa t his main

n I n oul lateral li e of communicati ons . the east he c d not give ground without exposing Metz t o bombard 1 3 0

The Last Four Months

r rd o o eargua s in hi s front line . He then pr ceeded t lay waste systematically the country he intended to

of abandon . Every article value was removed from

ow - the French t ns and villages , all the able bodied

t were de orted o of os who inhabitan s o p , and m st th e

t oo o t oo old or oo to of rv were y ung , t feeble be se ice were collected in two or three centres to be rescued

by the Allies when they advanced . The trees were

ow no o cut d n , t even the rchards being spared , the

on o n villages were set fire , the t w s were gutted , explosives being used for the more solid buildin gs

o n ot f which fire c uld damage su ficiently , the wells

w o r o as ere f uled , eve y r ad and railway bridge w

o e n o n i n destr yed , the railway mba kments were bl w ,

h w o and n o t e rails ere t rn up , mi es were expl ded

o - o n effec under every cr ss r ads , maki g craters which i l f n t ve y barred wheeled tra fic . As a last refi ement a

of oo series devilishly cunning b by traps was devised ,

o of w r o n o n c nsisting i es c n ected t Germa helmets ,

a o oo - of - o or pi n s , d r handles , the steps dug uts of

o o o h uses , which when t uched expl ded charges and

f f our cost us the lives o many o men . The systematic and skilful savagery of the modern German created a devastation which shamed the best efforts of his

o o of untut red f rbears . This was all part Luden ’ dorff s scheme of defence . He knew that the time

o to t o t e o n o and lab ur required res re h c mmu icati ns , to and o an d repair the bridges , pr vide water shelter for their troops would derange the plan s of the 1 3 2 Armageddon m Allied generals , and as a purely ilitary measure the

i ell scheme was an unqualified success . N v e had intended that one of his attacks should be made against the southern part of the front from which

n and no m the Germa s had retired , he had ti e

r no o to prepare properly fo a ther t take its place , with

n was the result that his attempt on St . Quenti

n o f o n on repulsed , while Lude d r f , by sh rteni g his fr t , obtained the reserves n ecessary to meet and check the main French attack on the Aisn e . Only the ’ British - part o f Nivelle s campaign met with any

n of of co siderable measure success , and in the battle Arras a part of the Arras arm of the Hindenburg

in o l e was r lled up . Before the battle of Arras started the German s had begun to prepare for the p ossibility of the capture of the Vimy Ridge by digging a northern

n ion of n n n o exte s the Hi de burg li e , which ran fr m

e n t en of Qu a t , miles west Cambrai , and then north wards through Drocourt and east of Len s to the

o n ef n of T n o s uther d e ces Lille . his was the li e kn wn

' to the British army as the Drocourt- Queant

nd o a n on 2 9 8 . switch , br ke by them September , 1 1 It was the beginning of a vast extension of the

n n s out o o 9 Hi de burg sy tem carried thr ugh ut 1 17 , during the whole of which year the Germans were on f n the de e sive . Lille and Metz became the main

‘ ‘ “ o of e e piv ts this ext nd d system . The term line

to it no fo as applied is a mis mer , r nowhere did it I 3 3 The a t our ont s L s , F M h

f a o consist o a single line of trenches . It w s c mposed of a whole series of tren ch lin es enclosing a heavily

in o fi . r f rti ed area many miles depth The Ge mans , t o of o mark their sense its imp rtance , named its various sections after the heroes of German * o o o myth l gy . The Dr court switch they called the Wotan p osition the section covering Cambrai

. n e o o and St Que tin , the Siegfri d p siti n that f s o o . and w of o uth St Quentin est La n , the Alberich p osition behind the Champagne front came the B runehi ld p osition and the southern

o o o w of th o m st p siti ns , hich ran east e Arg nne to the

to Kri em Meuse and thence Metz , were called the ” and hilde Michel positions . Thus a great barrier

o o o o r o was built up from n rth t s uth c ve ing D uai ,

o Cambrai and St . Quentin and pr tecting the rail way connecting Metz with Sedan and Mezieres .

o o of the Of the vari us secti ns this barrier , f Siegfried system in front o Cambrai and St .

was o Quentin , which begun first , was the m st elaborate ; the Kriemhilde s ection had not the same

r ro on depth , pa tly because the g und the Meuse

r r s and Argonne front was natu ally ve y defen ible , the ‘ approaches to the Kriemhi lde line were more difli cult

r s on r than those leadi ng to othe ecti s , and pa tly because the original German trenches between the Meuse and the Argonn e were neve r penetrated by Allied troops from the first days of trench warfare

on 11 Th ese p ositions are shown Map . I 3 4

The Last F our Mo nths

n o o heavy gu s , which fire fr m a l ng distance behind ' the front lines . Even the best observatio n from aero planes will n ot replace in a great artillery attack the eyes of an observer on the ground

o n c nnected by telepho e with the guns . The Ger mans therefo re designed the Hindenburg lines so that observation of them from the groun d should

r o be as diffi cult as p ossible . Wheneve it c uld be do o o o ne , they were c nstructed al ng the back sl pes of n o on to or o n o o ridges , t al g the p the fr nt sl pes ,

o o o where they w uld be easily seen . In rder t keep

o n to the bservers and the gu s at a distance , and

o e a n on o o dis rganis the ttacking infa try , str g utp st positions were built often as much as three o r four

o h o n miles in fr nt of t e main p ositions . The tr ops i these outpost position s were intended t o fall back

o a n bef re a heavy attack , after del yi g it as much as

o - p ssible by machine gun and rifle fire , and with this method of defence it would not be n ecessary to keep

r of oo on n la ge numbers tr ps in the very fr t li es , which

o o to o s of o w uld be exp sed the w r t the b mbardment .

was on This , in fact , an early versi of the system of defence which Gouraud applied so brilliantly when

e r of he defeat d the great Ge man attack July 15 ,

This was t he syst em of defence wh en st rong lines were i n exist ence as att e os t ons . W en th e att e os t ons were erced i t as u b l p i i h b l p i i pi , w su ally necessary t o d isput e every y ard of ground . Th e outp ost system was aband oned b y th e German s i n th e l at er st ages of th e t hi rd b attl e of Y res an d i n e t em er 19 18 and us on t h e ron p S p b , , by f t of t h e Fift h Army aft er t he German att ack of March 3 1 . 1 3 6 Armageddo n

In the Siegfried s ection the system was given

so great depth , that if the attackers succeeded in storming the first lin es it woul d be n ecessary for them to pause until the guns had been brought fo r ward and the stocks of shell brought up for a renewed

n n bombardment of the rear li es . Betwee Cambrai

nd n in o out a St . Que t the Siegfried system , fr m the po st positions near Epehy to the rearmost line near

‘

o . The Beaurev ir , was as much as ten miles deep most elaborate wire entanglements were provided in

n of in of n e n fro t each l e tre ch s . They were ofte

n in o i so n arra ged ge metr cal patterns , that the a gles

o n - and c uld be swept by machi e gun fire , there were ,

in e n e o r n n b of plac s , as ma y as ight i e elts barbed

i i n f on of n . i n f w re r t the tre ches Stand g , a ter the great battle had been wo n and the Siegfried system

n e on r d e of had bee pierc d , the i g s east the St .

n n n in of s one oo Que ti Ca al , the heart the sy tem , l ked over miles of de nse entanglements running in every

o and e n i directi n , was fill d with amazeme t that t should have been possible for flesh and blood to storm

a way through such obstacles . Heavily co ncreted shelters for the infantry and machine -gunners were

o in pr vided the fire trenches , while farther back great underground barracks were constructed at a depth to make them proof again st the heaviest

om n b bardme t . When we first broke into the Hindenburg ’ in i B n n o f o 9 1 l e w th y g s ta k attack N vember , 1 7 . I 3 7 The Last Four Months

we found that the Germans had hollowed out

o n n r of the gr u d u de many the villages , piling the chalk into the buildings so that it would not attract attention and would add to the immunity of the dug

ou o o - t fr m b mbardment . These dug outs were fitted up on a lavish scale so as to provide for the

o o of o n c mf rts the ccupa ts . They were often boarded

i n e w and fitted with el ctric light , hile water and

o e sleeping bunks were pr vid d , and they were fur

nished w e o so ith num r us stairways , that the men in them could co me out quickly when the bombardment

was over. Through the middle of the Siegfried system ran

du o two canals , the Canal N rd and the St . Quentin

w e o Canal , hich near Cambrai b c mes the navigable

o of w run Scheldt . B th these canals , hich in places

n n ho through deep cutti gs , were used by the e emy , w

o o o dug deep into the banks t pr vide shelter f r his men .

Between Bellicourt and Vendhuile the St . Quentin

n n o for of Ca al ran u dergr und a distance yards ,

o o e and this tunnel , when bl cked up , pr vid d the

r - e o Germans with a eady made und rgr und barrack ,

was out for o o o which fitted ccupati n , and c nnected

o o by numer us shafts with the trenches ab ve . Along

to of o s o the p _, the canal , which c n tituted a very seri us

o n o f o - natural bstacle , umbers c ncreted machine gun

a so h empl cements were built , t at the whole l ength of the canal where it ran above groun d coul d be swept by cro ss fire . 1 3 8

The Last Four Months of war in great numbers , and the fact that the Hague Co nvention forbade the employment of prison ers of war upon military work counted as nothing with

o them . They were als able t o employ forced labour from the p opulation s of Belgium and the occupied dis tric ts of o an d wo N rthern France , with these t sources of supply they could carry out the mo st ex tensive works without calling up on the army for more men than were n ece ssary for planning and supe r

o co s on of visi n . The n tructi these great defensive systems therefore did not involve the withdrawal of

o o no in any s ldiers from the fighting fr nt , and did t terfere with the rest and training of the troops in

on o n o onl war . The Allies; the ther ha d , c uld y provide labo ur for the construction of rear lines of

n of e e or of defence at the expe se th ir armi s , the fac to ries in the homeland which provided fo r the great

- nd and ever growing demands of the armies a fleets , and had t o meet the urgent call for more and more ships . It is quite true that in the first years of the war the Ge rman infantryman dug better and worked harder at his trenches than did the British infa ntry m n o n t o a o r his French c mrade , but this i dus ry w uld not have sufli ced for the co nstruction of the R inden

on and burg system , and as time went the quality and discipline of the German troo ps declined the new n on o n won Germa trenches , gr u d in attack , which had necessarily to be constructed by the 1 40 Armageddo n

n n r r and fo . n , i soldie s , g ew, less less rmidable Ma gi his attack o f July 1 8 in the second battle of the ’ o d e o n n Marne , f un little behind the nemy s fr t li e ,

and Rawlinson had the same e xperience in the battle

Ti and bo of Amiens of August 8 . me la ur made the

Hindenburg systems po ssible .

as e Those systems had , I have said , be n designed

‘ d n o to meet a great bombar me t , but by the time F ch was ready to assault them the conditions had altered n c e to fundamentally . B ombardme t had eas d be the only or even the chief mean s at the se rvice of the

Allies for opening the road for the infantry attack . The perfected tank was able t o break through any

f i o ens o belts o barbed w re , h wever d e , and f rce its

n son f o way acros s a y trenches , given rea ably av urable

f o do not n n n conditions o gr und . I mai tai that ta ks alone would have e n abled us to break through the

i f for the t wo n fo S eg ried system , ca als rmed an

o s an co no os and h b tacle which the t ks uld t cr s , t e gaps in and between the can als were no t sufficiently wide to allo w of a really efi ective breach being made

e o I n o f n wher they ccurred . the battle Amie s the

e on of n d o n l ss s Hamel had bee applie a great scale ,

and o f with c mplete success . The triumph o the tanks in that battle had been greatly due t o the su d denness and to the p ower of the bombardment which

f o n n ell up the Germa artillery . Both methods o f

to be o nd o attack had c mbined , a were c mbined with r s i ’ are k ll . But it is certain that neither Foch s 1 4 1 The Last Four M onths

l r o for the re ski ful p eparati n g at battle , nor the

o of n oul val ur the i fantry , w d have b rought us vic tory if we had had to rely upo n bombardment

o o t o ow r a al ne in rder batter d n the Ge m n defences . The acres of wire entanglement which surrounded the trenches of the Siegfried system would not have been cut without that prolonged artillery preparation which had failed in the past to solve the problem of

n attack in tre ch warfare . With the warning which this preparation woul d have given them the Germans would have been able t o shelter their machine-guns an d infantry in the vast dug-outs which they had pre

an d o out pared , have br ught them after the barrage

n n had gon e forward . Even whe we had ta ks they

o o n s metimes succeeded in d i g this , as the Americans

n n 2 9 o t o fighti g with us o September f und their cost . The tanks were needed not onl y to clear a way for the ’ infan try through the wire but t o crush the enemy s machin e -gun nests and keep his men in their under

o n n of gr u d shelters . Faili g this the exhaustion the ’ en emy s reserves would not have sufficed to give us

o for oo vict ry in the great battle , the German tr ps holding the lin e would have been able t o break up

n our attacks without supp ort from behi d . The tanks had proved their efficacy in the preparation for Ar mageddon ; now they were t o take their part in the

n o o culmi ation towards which F ch had been w rking , and few things helped us more in the decisive struggle than the moral ascendancy which the success of the 1 42

The Last Four Months leaders had delayed too long to study the p ossibilities of tanks and the mo st effective means of meeting

- them . The counter measures presented in this o rder might have availed against tanks alone ; they

n n were useless agai st tanks , artillery a d infantry

o n o n o . o w rki g in c mbi ati n They were , in fact , w rse

for than useless , they were harmful , they served to

o to o who dem nstrate the German s ldier , was already in mortal fear of tanks and prepared to make their

an or appearance excuse f surrender , that his chiefs

n of as and were as frighte ed them he was , that they

o had n effective reply ready . There are few things mo re depressing to the men

or o at o con in the ranks , m re calcul ed t shake their

fid nc no t e e in their leaders , than the k wledge hat the enemy po ssesses a p owerful weapon with which they

of are no t provided . We had bitter experience this

of 19 14 - 19 15 to o in the winter , when we had h ld the

of c o t o line witho ut the aid tren h m r ars , with a t tally

n n and in adequate supply o f ha d gre ades , with little

i all of supp ort from heavy art llery , with which the

o no o e German s were well pr vided . They had m r expected or desired the deadl o f t rench warfare

had for s of than we had , but they prepared the iege

nd for s a fortresses , a had the appliances iege w rfare m n n bo no t . e ready , and we had Our the re the strain of me eting superior equipment with super

and in 19 18 oo human endurance , the German tr ps

T own t n s w few failed to stand a like test . heir a k ere 1 44 Armageddo n

n and of n o n and r in umber i feri r desig , thei know ledge of our superio rity in that weapon had shaken their confiden ce in the defences befo re they were

oon or in an n o i s attacked . S er later war a tid te

o n o f a or of c and f u d t every device o ttack defen e , the combination o f gun and t ank proved to b e the anti

o o n he a w d te t the Hindenburg li e , while t Germ ns ere not allowed the time to find an antidot e to the tank .

- un e e The anti tank g , on which they had r li d after their first experience of the effect of artillery fire upon

n n f o our ta ks , had bee success ully c untered by bar

- . n n n n rage They then i ve ted a anti tank rifle , firi g

- ' o n not a heavy arm ur pierci g bullet , but it had much

o nd o success , and t wards the e they were pr ducing an

n i - n c in - un n o a t ta k ma h e g , which might have bee m re

as in o successful , but w the field too late t receive a f i o o a r trial . It w uld be idle to suppose that n reply to the tank woul d have been fo rthcoming had the

o on on i war g ne l ger . All that is certa n is that British ingenuity found the answer to the problem pre sented by German field fortifications before German

n i i o i genu ty d sc vered ho w t o overcome the tank . The general plan for the great battle which was to decide t he issue of the war was determin ed by Foch i n consultation with the Allied Commanders-in

i fo o of Ch ef be re Pershing won the vict ry St . Mihiel . T hat victory served to confi rm the Generalissimo i n his n o o f i tenti ns . As a result the second of M f f battle the arne , and o the retreat o the K I 4S The Last Four Months

Germans into the Hindenburg line before the

i o Brit sh bl ws , the German front ran roughly from north to south fro m the North Sea coast

e o e o f near Ni up rt , just ast Ypres , by Armen

e o f o a a t ti res , west D u i , C mbrai and S . Quentin to r t the Rive Oise near La Fere . S arting fro m the Ois e

e w w rou nd h it made a big bulg est ards t e S t . Gobain . o o e to F rest al ng the Oise and the V sle Reims , where it again s traightened o ut and ran eastwards through the Champagne heathlands across the Argo nne

- o e 'to e or o f n F r st the M use , n th east Verdun . Behi d this front at a distance o f about forty-five mile s from

o of the British lines ppo site Cambrai , and about

o M s - o o n ran twenty miles fr m the eu e Arg nne fr t ,

m i of a w c o n n the ain l ne r il ay nnecti g Metz , Seda ,

M n o se . Mezieres , Maubeuge , s , and Brus ls This railway line formed the spinal cord of the German ’ s e as orf s n of defensive sy t m , w Ludend f main mea s mo ving his reserves and military stores rapidly from

as his a oo o f flank to flank , and w l st g d line lateral communication west of the Ardennes . Fo ch proposed t o strike at this spinal cord from ’ * either side of the great bulge in the enemy s line . The First American Army was to advance between the

o o d w o Meuse and the Arg nne up n Se an , hile G uraud drove in between the Argo nne and Reims towards

o s i d the i of the Mezieres . This c n t tute right w ng

o was Allied b attle front . The intenti n that

s I The direction of th ese variou att acks is shown on Map . 1 46

The Last Four Mon th s would clear the Belgian coast and threaten the ’ enemy s communication with Germany no rth of the

oc w a Ardennes . F h believed t hat the t o m in attacks on eithe r side of the bulge would force the German s to o ar o n withdraw fr m it , and the French mies ar u d

r the bulge were , while the three attacks were in p o

to n in the o d and gress , keep the e emy bulge ccupie ,

n r s preve t them from retiring at thei lei ure . The

n on t Fifth British Army , which had bee rec s ituted

o of n oo was to under the c mmand Ge eral Birdw d , carry out a similar r61e on the Lille front between the main British attack on Cambrai and the Flanders

attack . h b o . Now Such was t eplan , vast , simple and ld

o an d n n that all is ver , the pla has been brillia tly

o the o and t and c mpletely successful , c urage de er min ation of the men who formed it and carried it

to o oo o through is apt be verl ked , m re especially as

n o c s on of t o the co nti u us and rapid suc es i vic ries , which began with the famous counter stroke of

1 8 o in n an a a July , pr duced the public mi d ex gger ted impression of weakness and e ven o f collapse in the

as o o e n emy . It s eemed if F ch had br ught back the

o and e trumpets of J shua , that German def nces fell

. before him wherever and when ever he chose to

of b advan ce . Yet in the third week Septem er the th German resistance was far from broke n . If e

’ en emy s infantry had lost much o f the dash and

u 19 1 6 and initiative which disting ished it in , the sub 1 48 Armageddo n

ordinate leaders had n ot the skill of their predecessors

f n in r o n who had alle battle , his a tillery , th ugh weake

in o and e e and his g, was still p werful w ll dir cted , machin e - guns were manned by picked men of high

o and o on e n o c urage , had , fr m l g xperie ce , bec me m f on s o f the ore o rmidable than ever . The str ge t

n ne in on of e German tre ch li s still lay fr t the Alli s ,

lines which the enemy believed t o be impregn able . Many of the American divisions which were t o take part i n the battle had had little or no war

‘ n and of i n n experie ce , the last stages the r trai i g

Th n com had been hurried through . e America manders and staffs had had n o oppo rtunity of handling such masses of troops as were to be em

o M o . o to pl yed , and th ugh St ihiel had pr ved be a

o had os in very c mplete success , it discl ed defects the

o n on f o American rga isati and sta f . It was th ught ,

i i n n part cularly the British War Cabi et , that it would be wiser to defer forcing a decision until the American troops had learned mo re and the American

m n s i n t o ar y had i crea ed size , that the attempt break through should be po stpo ned until the spring

of 19 19 .

Those who held this view were not without hope that the anticipation s which they had long cherished

o i and a an w uld be real sed , th t Germ y would collapse

n o no n whe her pr ps were k cked away . O e of these

o i on o n of n nd pr ps , Bulgar a , was the p i t surre de r , a the news both from Austria and from Turkey was 1 49 The Last Four Months

r a encouraging . It might neve be necessary to ssault

a h the impe netr ble barrier in t e West .

oc r o o his Though F h was in sup eme c ntr l , special funct io n was to cc -ordinate the strategy of the Allied

o r -in- of o armies , and the C mmande s Chief th se armies remained resp onsible t o their Go vernments for the

I wa a e o lives and wellbeing of their men . t s q u sti n of fighting a battle on a s cale whi ch had never yet

e t o of o bee n attempt d , a ba tle in which milli ns s ldiers

of t o sa of would take part , and hundreds h u nds lives

Had and rshi a a a . e we re t st ke Haig P ng hesit ted ,

he o of o and t arguments in fav ur hesitati n were many ,

o no o ma the great plan c uld t have been c nsum ted .

was ow r o n ms and his Haig , h eve , c nfide t in hi elf in

o t or men . Believing abs lutely in heir superi ity over

r and no e c o o the Ge mans , that d fen es c uld h ld t hem

was to on oul h back , he ready take his sh ders t e heavy

o ns li o f o on a on resp ibi ty deciding t push t ce .

o w ll o o The British G vernment , while un i ing t vet

' n so o ul of the pla , felt d ubtf its success that they were

no t d to o . . o o i n prepare supp rt it Mr Ll yd Ge rge , daily contact with our diffi cul ties i n rai si ng men fo r

os o of war the pr ecuti n the in all its varied aspects , dreaded the casualty lists of another S omme or

a Passchend ele , and his sympathies with the theory of victory by the way round were this time more powerful than his courage and his readiness to take risks . Even Foch felt that he could not t ake the responsibility of ordering the army of another 1 50

The Last Four Mon th s

These different condition s were present to my

. ro ul of o or mind The p bable res ts a c stly failure , ,

of n o of e s in indeed , a ything sh rt a decid d uccess , any attempt up on the m ain defences of the Hin denburg lin e were obvious ; but I was convin ced that the British attack was the essential part of the general

o n o scheme , and that the m me t was fav urable . Accordingly I decided t o proceed with the

and or n attack , all preparat y measures , i cluding the

n r o e on o prelimi a y p rati s already rec unted , were carried out as rapidly and as thoroughly as In making this deci sion Haig staked his future ; n ot that such a consideration weighed with him fo r

o t o a m ment ; but he mus have kn wn that failure ,

do o e co with a ubting G v rnment behind him , uld have

ul i for him but one res t . At the t me the fact that the War Cabin et sent no congratul ations t o the army

of of s o of on the victories Bapaume , the ec nd battle

of or of r o the Scarpe , Epehy , Camb ai , vict ries which

o com gave us nearly pris ners , caused much

n on of n me t . The reas this eglect was that the War Cabinet t o the last doubted of victory and did n ot wish to appear t o exult until all danger of a setback

o n ot o . o was over . S until F ch assured Mr Ll yd ’ George on October 7 that H aig s hammer blows had

n done their work was any message se t .

o o Pershing was equally sure that the pr ved val ur , the vi gour and enterprise of the Ameri can soldier

ement t o the London Gaz ette 7 Januar 1 919 ara . 3 2 t 14 . Suppl , y , , p , p 1 52 Armageddo n would more than compensate for any lack of experi

w r o for ence and training . These e e fateful decisi ns , if we had not attacked the war could not have been

f 9 9 m and ended before the spring o 1 1 . The fir ness 9 8 courage of these two men gave us victory in 1 1 .

o of and n of The vict ry Bapaume , the pierci g

o n of the Dr court li e in the battle the Scarpe , had forced the enemy on the front covering Cambrai t o

f du Nord o take re uge behind the Canal , but s uth

of of . n n west Cambrai , and west St Que ti as far as

s on n o on o the Oi e , he still held str g adva ced p siti s s me m f n n three iles i n front o the main Hi de burg system . These p ositions in cluded the outp ost defen ces of that system and some of the British wo rks which had

n o bee prepared t meet the March attack . It was

o o n n necessary , theref re , bef re the Hi de burg lin e co e o ou of uld be attack d , t clear the Germans t these

o and i i n m 2 d w rks , th s Ha g did betwee Septe ber 1 an

18 n n , while Pershi g was busy at St . Mihiel . Duri g this period fifteen divisions of the British Third and

o o of F urth Armies f ught the battle Epehy , and drove twenty German divisions back into the main Hinden

n n on and burg li e , capturi g pris ers 100 guns . ’ Simultaneously D eb eney s First French Army per fo m o n i r ed the same functi n between St . Que t n and L a e F re .

While these events were taking place on the —St Cambrai . Quentin front Pershing was quietly

n f n oo f om M tra s erri g tr ps r the St . ihiel salien t t o I S3 The Last Four Months

d o Ver un . This m vement had begun as soon as it was seen that the American divisions in the front line wo of o s uld succeed in the task bliterating the alient ,

r o wou not and that the rese ve divisi ns ld be needed .

was e ro w o It carri d th ugh ith the utm st secrecy , the American troops on the new front created by

of oi n the battle St . Mihiel d g everything that was po ssible to produce the impressio n that the advance

oul o o B w d be c ntinued t wards Metz and Briey . e tween the Meuse and the western edge of the

o for or Arg nne , which had been inactive m e than a

oo o o o year , French tr ps c ntinued t h ld the trenches while the First American A rmy assembled behind

' w n ot e n n o f them , and they ere reliev d u til the ight

2 5 - 2 o September 6 . There is little d ubt that the Germans were surprised when the great battle opened with an American attack between the Meuse and the

for not fo o Argonne , they had rein rced their fr nt ,

as o 1on who which w held by f ur divis s , were overwhelmed by the nine American divisions which

n of 2 th advanced against them . By the eveni g the 7 the Americans had taken the first lin e defen ces on

on of had the whole fr t their attack , and in the centre

t o of o to pressed forward a depth s me seven miles , the southern slopes of Montfaucon . This hill domin

n o for ates the surroundi g c untry , and that reason the Crown Pri n ce William had had built for himself on it a palatial dug- out from which he directed the opera

-i n i o tions h s unsuccessful attempt t capture Verdun . 1 54

The Last Four Months

' o o o had f re , c nfr nted Ludendorff with a crisis which

to an o be dealt with at y c st . While the battle had opened thus auspiciously on

the e ron o n V rdun f t , G uraud had attacked simulta e ou sly in Champagn e on a fro nt of eighteen miles from

the west of the Argonne to wards Reims . The Cham ’ pagne hills had be en the scene of Joffre s first efforts

o n o t wear down the e emy by the nibbling pr cess , and o f his attempt t o force a way through the tren ch

in on e 19 15 . barrier e great rush in Septemb r , The ’ left of Gouraud s battle front included part of the ground on which he had defeated the German attack

of 5 w o and o -bom July 1 , hen b mbardment c unter b ardment had torn the surface of the heathlands and

of o o t r o left an area des lati n and des ucti n , which , if

of o o less deep than that the S mme battlefields , c uld only be compared in its intensity with that on the

on Ypres fr t . Forward movement across country so pitted w n and o o o ith mi e craters shell h les was very lab ri us , and the Germans held all the heights c omman d ’ in of u aud g the lines the French advance . Go r s progress on the first day was therefore slower than

’ ’ n and evenin of 2 h n Pershi g s , by the g the 7t his i fantr on ot o o y had ly g f rward s me three miles . It took him three days of hard fighting to force his way

of old clear the battlefields , but by September 3 0

won h o and he had t r ugh , thencefo rward his ditfi culties diminished just when those of Pershing began I 56 Armageddon

t o 1 e n o to increase . On Oc ber he was the utskirts

o in f om his n of Challerange , s me n e miles r starti g

in on and o po int , hav g captured pris ers m re

n and n n o ff than 3 00 gu s , havi g made Lude d r realise that he constituted a danger not less immin ent than that of the American advan ce There for the ’ present I must leave the right wing of Foch s battle

to turn to the British front . The British attacks were timed to begin in the

2 and on n n early morning of September 7 , the eve i g before a great bombardment opened on a thirty-mile

- f o o n o two o of . front , r m a p i t ab ut miles n rth west St

n n the é n o - of Que ti , as far as Sens e River rth west

T n in of n Cambrai . he the grey light early daw the

4th 6th 1 and n n o o , , 7 th Ca adia C rps , thirteen divisi ns ’ ’ i of B n T and o n r n all , y g s hird Army H r e s Fi st

n on on o Army adva ced the Cambrai fr t , st rmed the

m n on du o on i me sely str g Canal N rd , swept bey d

o on oo and o - o r x B url W d F ntaine N t e Dame , the e treme limits of our advance in the first battle of Cam

of o 19 1 o brai N vember , 7 , and captured Sailly , m re

n mi f o n o n a n o tha six les r m their starti g p i t , t ki g ver

on and 2 0 o m pris ers 0 guns . By this bl w Ca brai

as n o no w threate ed fr m the rth , whereas in the pre vious battle we had attempted to approach the town

f om o - t n r the s uth eas , where the St . Que tin Can al was

fo i o to our oo and in o a rm dable bstacle tr ps , we had ne

o n ot uffi n t o b u d g s ciently ear the railway lines , which converged on Cambrai and made it one of the most IS7 The Last Four Months

m o o n of r i p rtant juncti ns in the ha ds the Ge mans , to

to to be able deny their use the enemy .

o d orff I have already menti ne that Ludend had ,

11] to o w his anxiety pr tect Cambrai , been ithdrawing

oo o n o ur tr ps fr m Fla ders . D ubtless he remembered o

e of experi nces in the third battle Ypres , and recalled the fact that the Flanders mud had there done mo re to check our progress than had the German

oo o e tr ps . The seas n was already far advanc d and f there had be en a good deal of rain . The state o his reserves was such that in order to meet the American

w of advance est the Meuse , and the British advance on o of o a Cambrai , b th them bl ws aimed at his vit ls , ' t o o and e he had take chances s mewhere , he decid d

on o t o take them the Flanders fr nt . He left less

on t o o n n of o than five divisi s h ld the seve tee miles fr nt ,

o V ormez e le o f fr m near e , f ur and a half mile s south o

to on 2 8 Ypres , Dixmude , and September this thin lin e was attacked and overwhelmed by the Belgian

o a b o n o an d army , supp rted y s me Fre ch divisi ns , by ’ o of Plumer s on o six divisi ns Sec d Army , the wh le

o of under the c mmand King Albert . The success

on n who w by the gallant Belgian ki g , had seen his army cooped in for four years behin d the floods of the

on n w Yser , and had ly left it at rare intervals , livi g ith his Queen in a litt le villa within range of the German gun s and in a district i n cessantly attacked by the ’ o n o n com enemy s b mbi g aer planes , was startli gly pl ete and exceeded the wilde st expe ctations . The 1 58

The Last Four Months amounted t o as compared with tons of shell fired by the British artillery alon e on the n on so n o Wester fr t , and yet , treme d us had the effect of the German guns appeared to be in tho se

o o o days , that Nap le n III . t ld his enemies after his surrender at Sedan that he felt himself beaten by their

ll n and arti ery . Scie ce industry have in less than fifty ’ years develop ed man s power of destruction to an extent which makes comparison with the past futile . With this artillery attack we reverted t o former

o e o for o n so was meth ds , and the r as n d i g , that imme diately behind that part of the German fro nt to be

o ran attacked by the F urth Army , the St . Quentin w Canal , hich merges near Cambrai in the navigable

of n and Scheldt , is capable taki g the largest barges

o o is unf rdable . With such an bstacle in their path tanks could not be used to prepare the way fo r

n s o on of the i fantry , except again t such p rti s the

f and n he German line as lay west o the canal , agai st t

an o one two stretches where the canal r under gr und , of about four and a half miles between Bellicourt and

n o of o s on Ve dhuile , the ther ab ut yard l g just

ow o o north of , S t . Quentin kn n as the Le Tr nqu y

r was no o r o Tunn el . Further , the e l nge any questi n

r we w of obtaining surprise , the Ge mans re ell aware

ore one of that we intended t o attack , and theref the great objections to a prolonged bombardment disap

u o r own . peared . So the g ns again came int thei It was long since the Germans had been subjected to 1 60 Armagedd o n

in and m n of i oo such a dose of shell g , a y the r tr ps hav m the n ro or in f f ing come fro Easter f nt , be g resh dra ts n n n i n from Germa y , had ever experie ced a really n o ff tense and prolonged bombardme t. The m ral e ect

o of this cann onade was therefore very great . It dr ve

-o and and the e nemy into his deep dug uts tunnels , prevented his carrying parties from bringing up foo d and ammunition . ’ 2 9 n on M . on At A. September Rawli s s Fourth Army attacked the heart of the Hindenburg

n on f on of mi 9 th li e , a r t . twelve les , with the British C orps and the 2 md American Corps with the ’ n D eb en e s Australian C orps in supp ort behi d it . y First Fren ch Army exten ded the battle fron t t o the

o i two o of T i s uth , wh le c rps the h rd British Army prolonged it to the n orth as far as the loo p i n the

n in n M o n T St . Que t Ca al at arc i g . his was the decisive day of the great battle and was marked by m n o io f o f m Th 9 th a y gl r us eats ar s . e C orps attacked

. n in n an d no of n the St Que t Ca al at rth Belle glise ,

46th i on o n o the Div si , N rth Midla d Territ rials ,

in men n n if lead g , the adva ci g equipped with l e

i ion f om nn o belts , requ sit ed r the Cha el steamb ats , and in and and carry g mats rafts . Here there they

n to o fo o i i n m ma aged cr ss by t br dges , wh ch the e e y

e n n to o o had b e u able destr y , but the maj rity dropped

o n e i o f t e n m o d w the sh er s des h ca al , swa acr ss , clam bered out an d stormed the German tren ches o n the t o of s n n p the ea ter ba k . Then swinging southward

L 1 6 1 The Last Four Months they surprised the enemy befo re he had realised the ne r o of on n w di ecti n the attack , and this o e day the division captured over prisoners and 7 0 guns . The 2 nd Amen can Co rps attacked the Bellicourt

n ro t ow Tu nel f n , which the Germans , kn ing that it

o ed to had o w was exp s tank attack , f rtified ith especial

Th th o o care . e 3 o American Divisi n stormed thr ugh the intricate web of barbed wire and the network of

o trenches which surrounded Bellic urt , and breaking clean through this section of the main Hindenburg

n r o t o li e , ca ried the village , nly be attacked in the re ar by the German machine -gunners who had come out of their subterranean shelters in the tunnel The Australians comin g up i n support had t o tackle these

o of or n fo pests with ut the aid artillery ta ks , r both the barrage and the tanks had gone forward with the

r o r o Ame icans , but they ve came them , and an ther ’ n d breach in the Hi denburg line was efi ecte . The 2 7th American Division attacking on the left of 3 o h ffi for the t , had an especially di cult task , the

westerly bend in the canal at Vendhuile made it im‘ p ossible for the British troops farther north to keep

d of 2 th pace with the a vance the 7 , and its left flank — was exposed to cross fire of artil lery and machine guns fro m the ridge north-east of Vendhuile on the

Two e astern bank of the can al . regiments of the

o 06 h l o th r o to divisi n , the 1 t and 7 , had the ef re fight

o of o desperately hard t safeguard the left the divisi n , 1 62

The Last Four Months

o r 3 T pris ne s and 8 0 guns . hirty British and two American divisions with a British cavalry division

- n n on o n had defeated thirty ni e Germa divisi s , h ldi g the strongest defences ever devised by the wit of man . At last after four years of do gged effort the great

n n for tre ch barriers had bee pierced , between the

an d o British army its bjective , Maubeuge , there lay

n n b eli evm but on e German li e , which the e emy , g the

n n t o oo n l t Hi de burg system be pr f agai st all assau s ,

o o n o had not troubled t c mplete . This li e lay s me

and d n con fourteen miles back , its artificial efe ces sisted o f n othing more formidable than a thin fen ce o f of to barbed wire , with the sites the trenches be

n ou o o dug behi d it marked t up n the gr und . The

o of oo out o o n oo vict rs Cambrai l ked ver r lli g , w ded , and well - watered country with something of the j oy and won der which filled the soldiers of Zen ophon when at the end of their great march they first saw

s the sea . The leafy trees , the harve ted fields , the green meadow lands and the valleys were t o an army which had lived and fought for four years surrounded

on in of o o by hideous devastati , with the st k the bl d

- o o n o o soaked , battle t rn gr u d ever in their n strils , m re c onvin cing eviden ce of achievement than ten s of thou

n san ds o f prisoners an d hundreds of gu s . The effect o f the three great blows on the Meuse

- m n on on . n n on Cha pag e fr t , the St Que ti Cambrai fr t ,

and in n o o o Fla ders was , as F ch had h ped it w uld be , to cause the German s to yield i n the intervals between 1 64 Armageddo n

e nd of n those attacks . By the September the e emy had begun t o withdraw between Len s and Armen tieres before the left of our First Army and our Fifth

and i n of m n o Army , there were s g s retire e t fr m the

o in . on St . G ba bulge He was at ce pressed by the

n i i o o n o on and Fren ch a d Br t sh f rces th se fr ts , the battle thereup on enveloped the whole 2 50 miles from ’ Fo ch s o n ion Dixmude t o the Meuse . great c cept had been realised ; he had delivered his big kick an d the

m n n Fo r whole German fro nt was cru bli g u der it . a

im on i fron l n moral t e , the Brit sh t at east , the Germa

o o n i on o m n br ke d w , pr s ers were taken fr m the Ger a infantry in great numbers and without much resi st

n and i n of onf ion and i o a ce , there were s g s c us d s rder in n m n o m n re the e e y ra ks , th ugh the Ger a artillery tained much o f its efficien cy and the machine -gunn ers

n n o old o ion co ti ued t fight with their dev t and skill . More imp ortan t st ill the resolution of the German

Hi h Command n T . n o g . was badly shake here were men in Germany to replace the tremen dous losses i n ’ and n of n o ff i the field , ma y Lude d r s d vision s were

d to i in reduce mere skeletons . He had p led up beh d his f on for his of n i n o o o of r t , great fe s ve , e rm us st cks

and of mi i o and n i shell , l tary st res , had had e ther the

im n or n o o Th t e the tra sp rt t o rem ve them . e Allies

o n of n The o f had captured th usa ds gu s . utput o the German munition s factories was quite in capable of

in oo o and m mak g g d these l sses , he had a ple eviden ce that the Allied factories had n ot yet reached the 1 65 The Last Four Mon ths

of c zenith their produ tion . In September Haig had

or o - ore n on m e guns , m re machine guns , m ammu iti

” and ore o o m aer planes than he had ever p ssessed , while the growth of the American army was daily bringing more and more guns into line .

o e n o f saw With dwindling res urc s , Lude d r f him self faced by three great dangers ; in the east the

o o and efli cient n Americans , m re numer us tha he had

oul o n n hi s believed they c d p ssibly be , were threate i g communication s between Metz and Mezieres ; in the centre the British army had beaten the best of his

oo on n c an no tr ps in their str gest defe es , d he had more Hindenburg lines t o stay its progress ; in

o ss d Flanders the Belgians , wh m he had cla e as

o of n won a o capable nly defe ce , had their w y int . the

open and were fighting with unexpected dash .

o n was i n Lastly , Bulgaria had c llapsed , Mackense dire straits and was clamouring for reinforcements

o n o o n t e able him t escape fr m the Balka s . Under the pressure of these calamities Ludendorff threw up the

o on n of 2 8 sp nge the eve ing September . The n ext day he and Hinden burg met the Kaiser and the

o n who o o F reig Secretary , had c me t headquarters ,

and insist ed on an immediate request for an armistice .

oo w o o In the aftern n the Kaiser , ith ut c nsulting his ’ o o f u military advise rs and much t Ludend r f s disg st , issued his pronouncement on the introduction of Parliamentary Govern ment and von H ertling ceased

to n o orff one of be Cha cell r . Ludend then sent his 1 66

The Last Four Months

e to no this startling messag , which Ludendorff makes

t o n for reference in his Reminiscences , was haste the

o o f o n n o on of mati n the new G ver me t , but the f rmati a Government could n ot by any stretch of imagin atio n be supposed t o influen ce the military situation on the

on and n o on o fr t , there was reas , if that situati n had not b een held at German Army Headquarters t o be

n o n ot de sperate , why Pri ce Max sh uld have been given as much time as he needed to form his Adminis

’ n n H ai s o of 8 tratio . Ever si ce g vict ry August Luden do rff had bee n pressing his Government to o n o o n o pen eg tiati s , because he was then c nvinced ’ that Germany s military p osition must go from bad

to o . o n o w rse It seems m re tha pr bable that , when

n n n o n n an the Hi de burg li e was br ke , he wa ted

e n immediate armistice , because he fear d that a ge eral

o n c llapse was immi ent and that he might , if he

o n ot o n on o f o c uld btai a cessati h stilitie s , b e forced

or on to an n o on bef e l g accept u c nditi al surrender .

” t o o It is absurd supp se that he , with his great

n o n military experie ce , c uld have imagi ed that the Allied and Associated Po wers would agree t o any

e of wo t rms armistice , after they had just n the

e o in o o of great st vict ry the wh le c urse the war , unless those terms made it imp ossible fo r Germany

in an o t o resume the struggle y f rm . An o ffer to con clude peace made immediately after the stro ngest German defen ces had been pierced is obviously very different fro m such an offer put fo rward when 1 68 Armageddon

n n o in the Hindenburg li e was still i tact , and c uld the circumst an ces be nothing less than an open

n ' fo on acknowledgme t of defeat . It is , there re , ly reasonable t o supp ose that Hinde nburg and Luden dorff believed that their armies had been decisively beaten and that there was no better altern ative to

an n n The n such ack owledgme t . defe ce that they were influenced by the p olitical rather than by the military situation has been put forward i n Germany i n support of the fiction that the German

m n n an d o n ar y was u beate , that it was the p liticia s and the German public who lost their heads and sur rendered when it was still p ossible for the German

to n f o o army wri g av urable terms fr m us . This defen ce i s shown t o be untenable by a state

n on o 2 on me t , made Oct ber , the military situation t o the party leaders of the Reichstag by Maj o r Freiherr

von B ussche who n o ff der , , as Lude d r admits , had been carefully coached by him and presented his Th views c orrectly . e statement ran

In a few a s t he situ at i on has fun ment all c n d y da y ha ged . The c ollapse of the Bulgari an front has entirely upset ou r is ositi on of t oo s ur c o uni i d p r p . O mm c at ons wit h Const anti no l e we e t eat ene as we as t he s i in p r hr d , ll h pp g rout e i i nd spen sable for t he transport of ou r suppli es on t he Danu e. We were c om e e if we were b p ll d , n ot t o leave

t he nt ent e a free n in t he ans t o s e E ha d Balk , nd German and t - - Au s ro Hungarian divi sion s ear marked for t he

est e n f ont t o t ose e ions a n onin t e W r r h r g , ba d g h Black Sea I 69 The Last Fou r Mon ths and ou ni e R ma a . W were obliged t o make an immediate ecision e d . Th entrainment of our tr0 0ps had already e un e b g . W have every j ustific ation for h0ping t hat the sit ation i n t he a an s ma b e re-e t i s e at u B lk y s abl h d , all nt uffi cient t o u ou r own int e e t s Unfort u eve s s ly g ard r s . n at el as I s a in t i nnot b e one wit out eat y, h ll expla , h s ca d h gr

et iment t o the sit u ti on as a o e ost simult a d r a wh l . Alm neou sl wit t he offensiv in M ce oni i o ent enem y h e a d a , v l y

tt c s a e n m e in the e t T e a n ot foun a a k h v bee ad W s . h y h ve d u s un l s i e t en prepared . Al po s ble m asures have b een ak t o o t e u ivisi ons f om t he s e on t he h ld h m p. D r Ea t w re t i i i way o rel eve t he s orely tr ed div si on s in t he West . Unfort un at ely a portion of these tr0 0ps had t o b e divert ed t o t he ns The st m n c of e in ms Balka . la e apable b ar g ar

e n wit wn f om t he t e c m wait e had b e hdra r Eas . W al ly a d t he ecisi e t e The nt ent e new how t o c onc eal d v ba tl . E k f u ou t e c e Fro t he s ea rom s where t he attacks w ld ak pla . m t o S it e n e tions for t he tt c e e in o ess w z rla d pr para a a k w r pr gr . The ost t ensiv was a ain st o r in and t he Sun d au m ex e g L r a e g , and we were forced t o distribut e our reserves and t o keep t e f ont in t t e of e ine for the tt c Con h whole r a s a r ad ss a a k .

i era l e fo c es t o b e t tione es eci in o in s d b r had s a d , p ally L rra e an in t he Sund au for the fenc of G m n t er it o d g , de e er a r ry .

ft e c r in out t he nec e sa mo ement s we we e A r ar y g s ry v , r absolut ely c onvin ced t hat we should emerge vict ori ou s

t c omin att es and t t we s ou b e e t o from he g b l , ha h ld abl break t he oppositi on of our enemi es by t he en ormous

t e ou u e losses whi c h we anticipat ed h y w ld s ff r . Gonse

ent uttin in e es at t he ri t time we qu ly, by p g res rv gh , have b een able t o hold up t he enemy at all t hose plac es w e e m n of t n r i tt c s or su e i o it h r , by ea s a ks , by su pr se a a k p r r y

i n nu m e s he has enet t e our in s . The tin of b r , p ra d l e figh g ast six s ma b e t e m successfu for us in s it e t he l day y r ed l , p t i of t he loss of pri soners and ma er al . 1 70

The Last Four Months

t he ecisiv f ct o he nt t e f it d e a r . T army e ered h ray w h e et e num e d pl d b rs .

I n s it of us in e e ossi e evi c t he st en t p e g v ry p bl d e, r g h of our tt ions s n f om out 00 in i t o 540 ba al a k r ab 8 Apr l, by t he end of S e t em e And t e e num e w e on p b r. h s b rs er ly s ec ured by t he disb an ding of 2 2 i nfantry divi sions (66 i nf nt e iment s The u i n efe t as e t en u a ry r g ) . B lgar a d a h a p

7 more i i si ons T e e i s no os ect at of a sin d v . h r pr p wh ever r i g t he s t en t . The cu ent ese es c onsi stin of men r g h rr r rv , g who are c on escent c om e out men et c wi n ot e en val , b d , . , ll v c ove t he o ses of uiet wint e c m i n he inc usi on r l s a q r a pa g . T l of t he 1 900 class will only i ncrease t he strengt h of t he t t ali ons 100 and t t i s t he l st of ou r ese es ba by , ha a r rv . The osses o f t he tt e w i c i s n ow in o ress are as I l ba l h h pr g , a e st t e un e ect e e es eci a as e s h v a d , xp dly larg , p lly r gard of ce s T t i s a eci si e f ct o If t he t oo s are t o fi r . ha d v a r. r p st em the onslaught or t o att ack t hey require more t han e e the e m e of t ei of e s he tt e u st and c . T m v r xa pl h r fi r la r ,

e i ce e n e e e i nt a s c t mse es u ese . Th m hav , a r fi d h lv r rv dly r g e l c omman ders and leaders fought in t he front lines t oget her it t ei men i i e n e on n two w . v o e m I h h r I w ll g xa ple ly . a s of t in on e ivi si on ost it s ofli cers ea or d y figh g d l all , d d woun e and t ee e iment c om n e e ill e m r e . d d , hr r g al a d s w r k d

The m num e of e ofii cers as u t o not n s all b r res rve h s nk hi g.

The s me i t o t he The nem owin t o a appl es e y, g the e he has cei e f om m i c i s in a osition t o h lp re v d r A er a, p

e oo his o e T e Am e i c n t oo s as are m . h uc ak g d l ss s r a r p , s h, r i an u i not of eci u o n e o t o our men . sp al val e, y way s p r r I n t o e c es i n ic owin t o num e one t e h s as wh h, g b rs al , h y in e an initi succe s t e we n e at b a ga d al s , h y re fi ally h ld y ur t oo T e e e owe e e t o t e o e e o s . by r p h y w r , h v r, abl ak v r larg o t i ons of t he f ont t e e e mittin the n i and p r r , h r by p r g E gl sh French t o liberat e s ome of t heir experi en ced divisi ons and in

f a t in u ti s es t hi s way orm n almos exha s ble supply of re erv . 1 7 2 Armageddon

Up till now our reserves have been adequ at e t o fill the a ri e The est tt ac s g ps and drafts have duly ar v d . hard a k we e r ul se The tin was escri e t o b e of r ep d . figh g d b d

un a a e se e it T en ou r ese es e n t o fai . p r llel d v r y . h r rv b ga l

If t he enem c onti nu es t he tt ac t he situati on ma de y a k, y man d a wit hdrawal from ext ensive s ect ors of the front We c an c onti nu e t hi s kind of warfare for a measurable s ace of t ime we c an c au se t he enem ea osses p , y h vy l , e st atin t he c ount in our et re t but we c nn ot d va g ry r a , a i w n t he war. Thi s deci si on and these event s c au sed t he idea t o ripen in t he minds of t he Fi eld -Marshal and Lu dendorff t o ' o ose t o t he Kai ser t he rea in -off of osti ities so pr p b k g h l , as t o spare t he German people an d t heir Alli es further s cri e u st as our reat o ensive of Ju 1 5 was a fic . J g ff ly

an one w en t he sacri c e ent i e n o on e warrant e ab d d , h fi a l d l g r d

it s c ontinu ti on s o the eci si on now t o b e t a en t t a , d had k ha

it as o e ess t o rocee wit t e ar T e e i s sti w h p l p d h h w . h r ll

ti e The Germ n arm i s sti st ron enou t o o m . a y ll g gh h ld the enem for mont s t o ac i e e oc succ esses and t o y h , h v l al

ose t he ene t o f es s i es B ut e e d a exp my r h acr fic . v ry y rin s t he en em n earer hi s oa and wil m e him ess b g y g l , l ak l inclined t o c onclu de a peace wit h u s whi c h will b e s ati s

fa u i ct ory on o r s de .

T e efore no time ust b e ost er a the situ ati on h r m l . Ev y d y

ma ec ome worse and i e t he en em t he ort unit y b , g v y Opp y of rec o ni sin ou r moment ar wea ness w ic mi t a e g g y k , h h gh h v t he m ost evil c onsequences for peace prospect s as well as

for the mi it ar situ ati on Neit er t he rm n or t he ome l y . h a y H lan d should d o anyt hing whi c h would make our weakness

a arent on t he ot e n t he rm and t he ome an pp h r ha d , A y H l d

mu st st an t o et e f imu d g h r more closely t han b e ore . S l “ t aneously wit h the peace offer a unit ed front mu st b e s own at ome so t at the ene i ur unben in h h , h my recogn se o d g I 73 The Last Four uMo nths wi t o ontin the if t he n m i n ll c ue war, e e y w ll ot make peace

wi t us or onl umi i tin one. If t i s s ou b e h , y a h l a g h h ld , then t he enduranc e of the army will depend on a fi rm

ttitu e at om and on t he owe of t he o e a a d h e, p r H m l nd t o ins i t he m p re Ar y .

o This is a very human statement . It c ntains the excuses and explanations of men who find themselve s beaten and are e ndeavouring t o shuffle out of their

o t o o n f resp nsibility . Much is laid the acc u t o Bul

who co n n garia , by llapsing u warra tably has upset the

of best laid plans the German Great Headquarters . ’ Ludendorff s advocate says truly that the last man capable of bearing arms had been withdrawn from

For o o nd of the East . s me time bef re the e September the German division s on the Russian front had been combed out and the fittest men had been sent westwards t o help make good the losse s in

' n o o n n i n Fra ce . It is bvi us that the Germa battalio s the Western front would not have been permitted t o

o t o o n fall alm st half their pr per stre gth , and that twenty-two divisions would not have been disban ded had there been men in the East avail able for service

in the West . The situation on the Bulgarian fron t began to be

9 n o o o critical on September 1 , and by p ssibility c uld troops starting west wards after that date have been i n

o time t o save the Hindenburg line . Theref re the statement that the collapse of the Bulgarian front has entirely upset our disposition of troops is a gross I 74

The Last Four Mo nths

G oo erman tr ps have been fighting splendidly , an d

the General Staff had made every p ossible preparation

to e ou r meet the expect d attack , but superiority in tanks and the exhaustion of the German reserves

the o i o o have made p s ti n h peless . I had written all that I have said in the earlier part of this chapter on the effect of ou r tanks befo re

o o nd this d cument came int my hands , a it is interest ing t o see how co mpletely it confi rms all the informa tion on this point which we had obtained before the

o armistice . N t less interesting is the tribute paid to ’ Foch s a f strategy . Great He dquarters were in fear o attack alo ng the whole front from the sea to Switzer

land , and the remarkable statement is made that the most exten sive preparations for attack were again st

o Su nd au o L rraine and the g , that is the fr ntier district

of of o of Alsace , east Belf rt . This is evidence the ’ f of n o of of e fect Pershi g s vict ry St . Mihiel and the activities of the Second Army i n simulating an offen

o and M sive t wards Briey etz . It is difficult t o make this anxiety square with the disparaging remarks

o n oo for n n ab ut the America tr ps , the Germa Ge eral Staff must have known that the maj ority of the troops

o o on the Lorrain e fr nt were American . This is pr b ably another attempt t o save the face of the Gen eral

tafl who o n S , had declared r undly that the America s would not be able to train troops to fight in any

9 8 we ow o for numbers during 1 1 . As kn , preparati ns an offensive into Lorrain e were not completed until 1 76 Armage ddo n

im no some time later , and at this t e there were pre

T fo paratio ns at all for an invasion o f Alsace . here re this statement is an admission that Foch had very

o f o n completely hoodwin ked Ludend r f . M st i terest ’ i ng of all is the eviden ce of the efii cacy o f Fo ch s method of exhausting the German reserves before

a n of fighting his great battle . The picture dr w the

o i and state f the German army is impress ve , tallies exactly with information received from other sources . Truly the question of reserves was the decisive

n x e and factor . The Germa reserves were e haust d therefo re there was n othing t o be done but to make

o peace as quickly as possible . As the staff fficer n i i on to n it a vely remarks , the dec si had be take that was hopeless to proceed with the war for the same reasons as l ed to the abandonment of the great offen

of 1 Th of n of sive July 5 . e fe sive July 15 was aban doned because the German s were soundly beaten i n

on of M n n o 2 the sec d battle the ar e . O Oct ber the Great Headquarters were compelled to advise that the struggle should be abandoned because the Ger

man a n n rmies had bee beate .

in on mo of o 3 H denburg , the rning Oct ber , confirmed the statement made the previous day by hi s representative in the following memorandum

To T H M E I CE . I OCT . 3 I PER AL CHAN LLOR BERL N , . The High Command i nsi st s on t he immediat e i ssue of a peace offer t o our en emi es in accordance wit h t he deci si on of Mon a S e t em er 2 9 19 1 8 In conse u en of t he d y, p b , . q ce M I 77 Th e Last Four Months

c o of t he Ma oni n f ont and the in it e llapse ced a r , ev abl esu t nt w enin of our es s in t he st and a so r l a eak g r erve We , l the impossibility of making good t he heavy losses whi c h v occu u in t he tt e of t he ast few s t e e ha e rred d r g ba l s l day , h r i s no os ct um nl s in of fo cin ou r enemi es pr pe , h a y peak g, r g

t o sue for e c . The n m on t he ot n is ontin p a e e e y, her ha d, c u in t o t ow f e e s nt o t he tt g hr resh r s rve i ba le . The German army still st ands firm and is defending , it e f in t all tt ac The itu tion o i s a eace mm s l aga s a ks . s a , h wever, p o in mo itic i and ma fo ce t he gr w g re cr al da ly, y r i omm n t o moment ous eci ions In t es H gh C a d d s . h e circumst ances it i s imperative t o st op the fighting in order t o spare the German people and t heir allies unnec es s s c i c da of e ost s t ou an s of ary a r fi es . Every y d lay c h s d s i s —SI G E D V ON HI DE RG o t i i U . brave ld ers he r l ve . ( N ) N NB

o t o firm w The appeal to the H meland stand , ith which the gloomy review of the situation made to the

of o r r o o leaders p litical pa ties ends , is cu i us as c ming from men who were pressing with all their en ergy for an immediate opening of negotiation s to men who were anxious t o delay so fatal a step until they

V on were better assured that it was unavoidable .

Paye r in particular seems to have taken a f much h calmer Viewof the situation than did t esoldiers , and before acceding to coun sels of despair he wanted t o

ow o o e 3 r or s Hinden kn m re . On Oct b r he the ef e ent burg the following memorandum

E LI OCT E 3 1 91 8 . B R N, OB R , efo c omin t o an ecisi on as t o eac mo e ou B re g y d a p e v , I w ld req uest your Excellency t o answer the following qu estions' 1 78

The Last Fo ur Mo nth s

oi s l . The duration Of such withdrawals c ann ot b e det er mine efo e n ut t i t o t e a d b r ha d . B i s o b e h ped t ha t h y m y ot ect Ge m n oi unti e t i pr r a s l l n x spr ng.

2 nswe t o uest ion 1 ies t o t is u e ti on d o not ( ) A r q appl h q s . I

e ie e t t t e i e an ene c se As on as b l v ha h re w ll b y g ral ollap . l g v alu able reserv es are at han d t he yi elding of t he front c onse u t - t q en on enemy break throughs n eed n ot have su ch a resul . (3 ) This qu esti on is an swered by my c ommuni c ati on of ct o t o t e ri n o O b er 3 h Impe al Cha cell r .

4 Un ess t in s s ou c n e t he ief m Com ( ) l h g h ld ha g , Ch Ar y man d will t ake int o c onsiderati on t he surren der of small

Fre - i i s sa - i For it t e e nc h speak ng port on of Al ce Lorra ne . h r i s n o u esti on of t he c essi on of Ge n t er it or in t he ast q rma r y E .

5 ft n ot e was ise b ut not enc ose . ( ) Dra adv d , l d

These answers and the memoran dum to which

ar o no oo for they refer e very cauti us , but leave r m

o doubt as to the opinion at Headquarters . The h ld ing of the front is possible ; the army may be able t o resist until the spring ; the wholesale surrender of Alsace - Lorrain e n eed not be considered unless things chan e o t o n an of g , but it is imp ssible guara tee y these

The on an things . situati is highly critical and at y m oment it may be n ecessary t o take momentous

n to o the decisio s , that is say , disaster may vertake

T o h German armies . heref re it is imperative t at n egotiation s should be open ed at once . On Octobe r 4 Prin ce Max of Baden became Im

nd s perial Chan cellor , a the next day the fir t request for an armistice was dispatched t o President Wilso n . ’ The greatest battle in the world s history had been

1 8 0 Armage ddon

o t o n fought and w n . There was be bitter fighti g

fo r n orf an m before the end came , Lude d f made atte pt

of and to rally which met with some me asure success ,

m n mi i n the discipline of the Ger a ar es , which the

o in n first days of October appeared t be crack g , agai

n n on for a time asserted its i flue ce . N e the less , it was the great battle begun on September 2 6 which

f T i so decided the issue o the war . h s battle was vast * that no si ngle name has ever been suggested for it . During its course we fought the secon d battle OBritish of i of n in and oo Cambra , the battle St . Que t , t k

in of n m i n o a part the battle Fla ders , the A er ca s f ught

of M - onn n the battle the euse Arg e , the Fre ch the

of n i i n i n battle Champag e , wh le the Belg a s w th Fre ch

o of n T help f ught the bat tle Fla ders . hese great

o o on e and struggles , h wever , made up a wh le , c ceiv d ’ i o n m n Fo ch on - o -ou t n d rected by e a . s l g th ught pla s and on i careful preparati s had the r reward . He was

o i in e in and in ably supp rted by Ha g , Persh g , P ta K g

and of i mi on n Albert , each the All ed ar es the Wester f on its o o i n on r t had played gl ri us part Armagedd . Foch had worked patiently an d skilfully up to a great

i and n i cl max , whe the cl max was reached the whole of the huge machin ery under hi s control had been set in motion and every o ne of its parts had answered

to his o n o in c tr ll g hand .

W l e t s oo h h b was i n th e Press . Lo s ad e n in the st i i k M ui M li , Augu “ num er of t he R ev e d e De x on es h as ca e b u u M d , ll d th e great struggle “ ” the attl e of Fra nce . Th s name st a s t o b e a os e b i j u f il pp it , for an m ort ant art of th e att e was fo t i B e i p p b l ugh n lgium. 1 8 1 CHAPTER V

LU DENDORFF T RIES TO RALLY L The ela s to th e llie van ce- The iffic ulties D y —A d Ad D of the Americans Lud e ndorff 5 Plan of Retreat How it was Defeated

ON none of the three fronts of attack which made up ’ Fo ch s great battle was it easy to gather the fruits of o n ' vict ry . In Flanders Ki g Albert and Plumer ,

n o n o havi g cr ssed the ridges , had behi d them gr und over which the tide of war had ebbed and flowed for

o o and now had n m re than f ur years , that it bee fin ally turned back it had left a morass of stin king mud which had obliterated every road and track . Behind the main British battle lay the deepest zone of on n o devastati o the whole long front . Fr m Vimy

to o of n Ridge the eastern utskirts Amie s , and thence

o n o to thr ugh St . Que tin n rthwards by Cambrai

o of o on e o n D uai , in an area ver th usa d square miles ,

o o o no l there was hardly a h use t be f und intact , vil age which had not been gutted ; the surface of the ground

o was torn and blasted by shell fire , the vegetati n

o o o s o e withered by p is n gas , the r ad had been destr y d ,

o o e the railways t rn up , and all the bridges v r the

o r many rivers and canals blown down . Behind G u aud in Champagne lay a somewhat narrower but equally 1 8 2

The Last F o ur Mo nths been sufficiently deep to force the German s out of

onn o n the Arg e . N w that forest ru s roughly from north- east to s outh - west along a series of rough ridges which separate the valleys of the upper Aisne and of o - the Aire . These f rest clad ridges gave the German s splen did vantage groun d from which t o harass with artillery an d machin e - gun fire the All ied

oo on of onn and tr ps either side the Arg e , if these troops were t o get on there was nothing for it but

n to clear the forest . By September 2 8 the America left had pen etrated some three miles into the

o n Arg nne , but o that date the centre was nearly

m o n o of o and five iles ahead the utskirts Exerm nt , was being worried by the German gun s firing from

n nd To the Argonn e heights into their fla ks a rear .

n to n clear these heights and e able the centre adva ce , the American left had to force its way forward through nin e miles of the most diffi cult country on

n d o -fire the whole Western fro t . Un er m dern shell woods become an almost impenetrable tangle of

o for fallen timber , which aff rds ideal nests the ’ - l en emy s machin e guns . This tangle was made stil more difficult by cunn ingly-placed wire entangle

o ments and stretches of rabbit n etting . The f rest is

o o cut up by deep ravin es with alm st precipit us sides , which made it very hard for the infantry t o keep

n o of no to and touch , while ta ks c uld be help them , even the most experien ced artillery would have been

as on put to it to give them supp ort . It w a questi 1 8 4 Lude n do rff Tries to Rally

n nf n and n of hard sloggi g i antry fighti g , the America

n did o and n of infa tryman sl g hard , after eleve days

o o ffo o 10 continu us , grim , d gged e rt , by Oct ber he had won his way through .

n n i n o n Simulta eously with the adva ce the Arg n e ,

o of l s m n o which fell t the left the t A erica C rps , the right of that corps and the 5th and 3 rd Corps worked

' their way forward t o the latitude of the northern

of o of n edge the f rest , while east the Meuse sufficie t

o l n on n on n pr gress was made , c ju cti with Fre ch

oo t o f d n of 00 of tr ps , sa eguar the fla k the tr ps west

h I n n t e river . all this fighti g the casualties of the American First Army were very heavy an d the hard

m o on ships i p sed the troo ps severe . It is difficult to see how this c ould have been avoided in the

n i n o circumsta ces which the battle was f ught . There was undoubtedly lack of co-operation between the infantry and the artillery an d between the aircraft

nd o a b th . It is equally true that the eage rness of the American infantry t o get forward landed them in

n in e f awkward salie ts , which th y su fered very

and o u n - un es severely , that attempts t r sh machi e g n ts

by direct attack had t o be paid for at a heavy price .

I n n of n fact , the experie ces, the America army in this their first great continuous offen sive battle were i n some respects similar to our own experien ces in the

s o f 0 on i n fir t battle the S omme . N e w ll mai tain that

i of n i i the qual ty the i fantry of the Br t sh army , which in the summer of 19 18 drove the German s across the 1 8 5 The Last Four Months

S omme battlefields into and through the Hindenburg

can line , be compared with the quality of the infantry

ho two o w n o w , years bef re , o their way up the S mme heights . Then the pick of the manhood o f the British

o 9 8 con Empire f ught and fell , while in 1 1 the ranks t ained a high prop ortio n of middle -aged men and

Yet 19 6 boys . in 1 we gained comparatively little at a

19 18 won great price , and in we much with far less

o on of sacrifice of life . The deteri rati in the quality the German troops in those two years does not wholly

n n i n account for the cha ge . The esse tial difference the two battles is that the first was won by sheer

o o o o n inexperienced val ur , the sec nd by val ur c mbi ed with skill . We have learned in this war that it is po ssible t o train thei ndividual soldier and get him to meet the terrible conditions of the modern battlefield in far less time than had been supposed to be

o o —o necessary . The clerk fr m the c unting h use , the

o n o ploughman fr m the fields , and the ha d fr m the ’ factory have all shown that with a few months

r o con inst ucti n they can acquit themselves , under ditions such as man has n ever been called upon

o c of o before t fa e , better than the best the s ldiers

o d o d are to of l , pr vide they sent take their places in an o rgani sation which has been perfected and of which all the parts are working smoothly

o war Contrary t o general expectati n , the great has shown that civilisation and e ducation by develop 1 8 6

‘ The Last F our Mo n ths

n n Th of trai i g at its disposal . e first battle the

o f n w h S mme merged in the battle o the A cre , hic n e nded in the Ge rm an retreat t o the Hindenburg li e .

of Then came i n succession the battle Arras , the

of e n and t of battle M ssi es Ridge , the third bat le

n of 19 1 - 18 to o Ypres , while the wi ter 7 had be dev ted t o o w n fo r e preparati n , ith depleted ra ks , the expect d

n of n r Germa fe sive . The respite which the Ge mans allowed us between the end of April and the begin

o f 19 18 f o on o ning August , , a f rded us the l gest peri d of good weather for training and in struction which

n o n of o and we had e j yed si ce the battle the S mme ,

o of o of it pr ved invaluable . The result that peri d ’ o o o f H ai s in rec nstructi n , when the full benefits g

on n n o structi al arra geme ts were felt , sh wed them selves i n the battle of Amien s and in the victories

o which foll wed it . Sir D ouglas Haig has often been accused of having maintain ed an extravagant organisation behind his front at the cost of the fighting ranks . He was looking forward confiden tly t o the day when

wo on o and n he uld get his enemy the m ve , whe that

o of day came he was ready . It was the perfecti n the organisation o f the services behin d the British

n on o o of on li es , a perfecti which was the utc me l g

and on w experience , the scale which these services ere i f fi ht equipped , as much as the ncreased skill o the g i n n n o g ra ks , which e abled the British army t fight continuously and Victoriously for three months and 1 8 8 Luden dorff Tries to Rally

keep up that succession of hammer blows to which

Foch has paid a generous tribute . The American army had had little of the war

training which had taught the British army its lesson . Many of the division s which fought i n the Meuse Argonn e battle went into action then for the first

n so n time . That bei g , it was i evitable that there should be defects i n co-operation and that a high

price should be paid for victo ry . I have already described the difficulties of the ground over which

m oo o The f l the A erican tr ps f ught . dif icu ties which c onfronted the services of supply were not less for

mid l On of n n ab e . the stretch eightee miles betwee — the Meuse an d western edge of the Argonn e a front of battle occupied by nin e American divisions i n the

n i n to n or n first li e , equ vale t eightee British Fre ch — division s there were only two main roads running

in the i o of n one of on d recti n the adva ce , them the

m a on of extre e right fl nk , al g the valley the Meuse , exp osed to artillery fire from the heights in the hands

of m n on n of the Ger a s the east ba k the river , the other on the left flank along the eastern edge of the

onn o t o f o o . Arg e , exp sed artillery fire r m the f rest

T on e o o ran o on here was m re r ad , which thr ugh M t

f on to m n n of n auc , parallel the A erica li e adva ce , but

oo o n and o o oon out it was a very p r e , the b tt m s fell of it under the combin ati on of wet weather and a

never ending stream of traffic. Between these ‘ on the front of the main American advan ce there were 1 8 9 The Last Four Mo n ths o row o -ro o nly nar cr ss ads c nnecting the villages , and

o i these r ads had been shelled to pieces . The h lly and wooded nature of the country made the task of con structin new o of o g r ads , repairing the existing nes ,

of w o n and laying rail ays very labori us , and co se quently in the early stages of the battle the transport had to be crowded on to the very few roads which

f r were fit o traffic . On September 2 8 the main American advance east of the Argonne had penetrated through the

' o of n German lines t a depth seven miles . Eleve days

was wo r o later it barely t miles fa ther f rward . This slow progress was by n o means only due to the

of o n for necessity clearing the Arg n e , the centre and right of the First American Army was not troubled

o t f of by flanking fire from the f res . The dif iculties , getting forward food and ammunition and of sending up timely reinfo rcements and of relieving tired troops

our caused even mo re delay . Just as happened in

so the early battles , in this , first great American

o e o o effort in the war , s m divisi ns had t give ground

no because they could t be supported in time . The

too few too oo t o roads behind the army , and p r take the immense amount of transport which was seeking

a o w r o o t o find its w y f r a d , became h pelessly c ngested , and in some cases masses of vehicles were so jammed that they could not be moved either forward or back

o of as ward for long periods . The c nsequence this w that it was not p ossible t o get a -regular supply of 1 90

The Last Four Mo nths

- n loss o f an d machine gu s with less life , the s ervices of o o o oo h supply w uld have w rked m re sm t ly . Had

t o the American army waited gain that experience , the war would certainly have been prolonged by at

on and o in least six m ths , the c st life would certainly

n have been far greater tha it was . Pershing must have taken all these factors into consideration when he threw in his vote for fighting

on 2 the great battle which began September 6 . He decided that the vigour and valour of his troops would mo re than counter-balan ce their lack of battle experi ence , and he was justified in the result . From September 2 6 until the Kriemhilde system was

n o n use o f fi ally br ke , by making the fullest his man

o for oo p wer , American tr ps were engaged

o n o n in this battle , he c nti u usly me aced the Metz

e e w and o orf to o M zi res rail ay , f rced Ludend f empl y more than forty divisions i n an i n effectual effort to

o stem his advance . The American attack , theref re , ’ r of Fo ch s n fo rmed an essential pa t pla , and had it not been successful it is almost certain that the German s would have been able t o withdraw in fairly

e an d e o not good order to the M use , that w sh uld have forced them to sign an armistice on Novem ber 1 1 but befo re it was successful there were many

o w of mb 2 6 delays . The first rush f r ard Septe er changed to slow progre ss and a long struggle as much again st the difficulties o f Nature as again st the

resistance of the e n emy . 1 92 Lu de ndorff Tri es to Rally

o n During the first week in Oct ber , the , the Allies

f r on n were , o the reas which I have explai ed , delayed on all the main fronts of attack t o a greater or less

T i n to degree . h s gave the Germa s time pull them

o o e n and n o ff selves together t s me xte t , Lude d r began t o see a p ossibility of re-forming his armies

n n T was oo of exa era on a ew li e . here a g d deal gg tion at various periods of the war on our side as to

of n the pro wess the Germa s as diggers , and they were rep orted t o have defen sive lines con structed

n e o n in right back to the Rhi e . These xisted ly the excited imaginations of those who at one time were disp osed t o believe that in matters military the

n o n Germa s were demig ds , but it was true that whe the Siegfried p osition was broken through Luden

o f i n t o to d r f st ll had defe ces which withdraw . His military p olicy at this time is indicated in Hinden ’ no of to 3 to - n burg s te Oc ber the Vice Cha cello r .

The was t o f o army all back as deliberately as p ssible ,

n n to whe retreat was ecessary , successive p ositions , and he hoped to be able to keep the Allied armies out of n T Germany at least u til the spring . his

o en e o n t o pr gramme tail d a sl w retireme t the Meuse , and a prolonged stand on that river when it was

. Hi s n o o i n reached left fla k , pp site the Amer ca s ,

n of in to and was the earest part his l es the Meuse , hi i s in m f o . r ght , Belgiu , farthest r m that river

T fo or re here re , the two first steps n ecessary f a adjustment of his front were t o delay the American s N I 93 The Last Four Month s an d to n n o n begi withdrawi g his right fr m Fla ders . It was equally imp ortant that the British advance through Cambrai towards Maubeuge should be

for on n checked , the British were c siderably earer to the IMeuse at Namur than were the German troops

o n and o ab ut Oste d R ulers . Lastly , it was n eces sary t o withdraw from the bulge in the German n w of on for li e est La , the position there became daily more precarious on ce the Siegfried line was

o n br ke . * I n l ooking o ver his map Luden dorff saw that by beginning t o retire at on ce in Flanders he might hope t o establish his troo ps behind the Ghent Can al

n nn and the River Scheldt as far south as Vale cie es . With his n orthern flank on the Dutch frontier east

f Z n d o o o eebrugge , a a f rmidable water bstacle in front of his position s to protect them again st the

n of n n dreaded tank , there was a cha ce gai i g the time necessary to organise an o rderly and gradual with dr wal o o and n a fr m Belgium , pr vided Haig Debe ey c ould be checked sufficiently long between Valen

T in ciennes and the Oise . his was the weakest l k

n nn n of n in his new chai . The begi i gs a defe sive p osition had been prepared connecting the Scheldt w south of Valenciennes ith the Oise west of Guise .

o n n This line , t which the Germa s had give the name

n o on e o com of the Herma n p siti , was v ry far fr m

l et a n o p e, because it had lways bee supp sed that it

1 Th e positions d escrib ed in th e following pages are shown on Map 1 . 1 94

The L ast Four M o nths

o w c e o o o positi ns , hi h , lik the Hermann p siti n , had nly b een sketched out .

o n n On the existen ce o f these vari us defe sive li es , ’ en o f n for n natural or artificial , Lud d r f s pla s rallyi g his forces and keeping the Allies out of Germany

o o until the spring of 19 19 were based . He pr p sed to carry through an immediate and exten sive retreat in n n an d o t o o Belgium , Fre ch Fla ders Art is , aband n

n o o and o the Belgia c ast , Bruges , C urtrai , Lille D uai , an d to establish his front behind the Scheldt through ’ n nd n n n on o f H ai s Ghe t a Vale cien es . O the fr t g mal n attack he set about retiring t o the Hermann

o on on and o e to o n p siti al g the Selle , h p d c mpe sate for its weakn ess by massing along it the troops he had economised by shortening his front in the north .

n He began a withdrawal of his ce tre from the St . Gobain massif an d from Laon into the Hu ndung

n for o li e , and prepared a similar withdrawal in fr nt of o n o n G uraud i t the Brunhilde li es . East of the Argonne his programme was t o make the most of the n atural difficulties of the country t o delay the progress of the Americans towards the Kriemhilde

o o on p siti n as l g as possible . If the last phases of the war i n the West are t o

o o o n to be f ll wed , it is imp rta t understand this scheme ’ of o f and t o o and , Ludend r f s appreciate b th where when he meant to stan d and fight and where and n n whe he mea t to retreat . After the Hin denburg line was broken the front was in a continual state 1 96 Lu den dorff Tries to Rally

of flux ; news arrived almost daily of fresh progress

ie o and if t o discrimin by the All d f rces , it was d ficult ate between victori es won by hard fighting and the

n of o conseque ces th se victories . There was hard fighting before the en emy was ’ o for n o f n as c mpletely smashed , Lude d r f s pla w

n i in of atte ded w th a certa measure success . By

o 14 n n to t Oct ber , whe Ki g Albert was ready at ack

n in n n n for n agai Fla ders , the arra geme ts the Germa

n and on o retreat were well adva ced , it was the wh le ’ on o n well c ducted , th ugh the e emy s rearguards had to o n m and in of s struggle t gai ti e , spite their resi t an ce he had to abandon numbers of gun s and great

f in o to quantities of sto res o all k ds . R ulers fell

n oo on 15th o o o Fre ch tr ps the , Th ur ut was ccupied

n on 16 and n by the Belgia s the th , the ext day they m n n . n n e tered Oste d Plu er , mea while , had e tered

M n in and o an d o n e C urtrai cr ssed the Lys . O

O o 18 ct ber the Fifth British Army , farther south ,

fo n i d n and o had u d L lle evacuate by the e emy , f ur days later the whole of the Belgian c oast was in our

n an d m n in of ha ds , the Ger a s had reached the l e the

o n nn n T Scheldt fr m Vale cie es t o Ghe t . here have been many curious examples duri ng the war of the difference between the men tality of the Ge rman s

and of o o n o o if ther Eur p ea pe ples , but I d ubt there has been anything stranger than their conduct during

o n an d i their retreat thr ugh Fla ders Belg um . At the last moment before they retired they brought into I 97 The Last Four Months many of the prin cipal town s wagon -loads of the flags of n one the Allies , which i cluded peculiarly German — invention a comp osite bann er made up of the

of n and colours their chief e emies , hawked these round for sale t o the inhabitants i n order that they might deco rate their houses fitly for the welcome to

ou of on the in co min g troops . It is t the questi that this traffic i n their shame can have taken place with out si t n o f G n o who the as s a ce the erma auth rities , were n ot t oo proud to allow money t o b e made out of or w their defeat , but pretended sh tly after ards that they were too proud to acknowledge themselves

n beate . The retreat of the German centre from the

o on n St . G bain massif , La , the Chemi des Dames and the neighb ourhood o f Re ims was carried

o i n oo o o o thr ugh fairly g d rder , th ugh ab ut Reims it was hasten ed by the tran sfer t o that neighbour hood of the 2 nd and 3 rd American Division s in

o n On o 3 n n successi . Oct ber 1 the Fre ch e tered

on and two o n con La , days later f u d themselves

on en o on fr ted by the emy in his new p siti s . Opp osite

o n on G uraud the Germans withdrew , whe October 8

i n o nto the French attacked f rce , i their Brunhilde

o o on o of p siti n al g the Aisne , fr m the west Rethel ,

o t n t o o er w of thr ugh At ig y , V uzi s , just est the

h o northern edge of t e Arg nne . The German retreat from the main British front

and . was ow between Cambrai St Quentin , h ever , 1 98

The Last F our M on th s

’ ro and en emy s inten ded orderly fetreat became a ut , the roads behind his front converging on the bridges over the River Selle were blocked with troops and

o so t o n transp rt , that the time which was have bee employed in the systematic occupation of the Her mann p osition had t o be devoted t o restoring order amongst weary an d dispirited troops an d clearing away such of the impedimenta as could be saved

o n o 9 n n n fr m capture . O Oct ber the Ca adia s e tered Cambrai from the north and the 57th Divisio n from

o an d o n out of the s uth , dr ve the last Germa s the

o n o t w , while the F urth and Third Armies , led by

o oo su of n cavalry patr ls , t k up the pur it the e emy

n o and o o retiri g t wards the Selle , dr ve him acr ss the

of of field the first battle Le Cateau , where Smith D orrien‘ had fought von Kluck durin g the retreat

o on o 12 was o n fr m M s . By Oct ber the enemy f u d t o t in o o be es ablished the Hermann p siti n , but his retreat t o it had cost him prisoners and 2 50 guns . On the American fro nt there was no question of

n an d i n o a Germa retreat , except the n rthern part of the Argon ne Fo rest the Ameri can s had to fight

for of o hard every yard gr und they gained . The slo w struggle through the southern en d o f the forest had brought the American s on October 1 to approxi

‘ n for w little or o mately its ce tre , and a eek no pr gress

. o n o t o was made Then , f rtu ately , it became p ssible

- n o n d apply the plan , which had bee rigi ally attempte Lu den dorff Tri es to Rally

f i of fo in G n to and had a led , rc g the erma s evacuate

” d o i On the forest by advan cing o n both si es f t . October 6 an d 7 troops of the American 2 8 th an d

8 d on e t 2 n Divisi s , after a desperat ly hard s ruggle , to ok the village and chateau of Chatel and the hills around it which domin ate the eastern edge of n On o 8 — I S the Argo ne . Oct ber that , the same day on which the Third an d Fourth British Armies made their dawn attack in the secon d battle of Le

— o e n Cateau G uraud had , it will be r membered , begu hi n to ° n and 9 th oo s adva ce the Ais e , by the his tr ps were i n p osition alo ng the greater part o f the western

of o . of e n off edge the f rest Fearful b i g cut , the

n on on and n Germa s thereup evacuated the Arg ne , o October 10 the 7 7 th American Division was clear of the forest and in touch with the German s o n the

i of n s of onn outsk rts Gra dpre. Ea t the Arg e there

n o o and was such rapid pr gress , the Americans fought their way slowly on t o the forward p osition s of the Kriemhilde sy stem , with which they were

in o o 4 i everywhere t uch by Oct ber 1 . F ve days befo re this Pershin g had han ded over command of

to n i for the First American Army Ge eral L ggett , the co ntinued arrival of American troops had made i t necessary to form a Secon d American Army of

o o o n W oeuvre f o n of the tr ps ccupyi g the r t , east the M . i i i n nd M St h el sal e t a oppo site etz . Ludendorff appears to have bee n fairly well satisfied with the progress o f his retreat by October 3 0 1 The Last Four Mo nths

w r 16 . His left and centre e e by then back in their

o on w on o new p siti s , which ere str g , and his l sses

not o during the retreat , if heavy , had been ver

had o whelming . His right not yet c mpleted the

had retreat from Flanders behind the Scheldt , but he good reason to believe that it would be able t o do

o on o 1 o o so . Acc rdingly Oct ber 7 he sp ke much m re boldly to the German cabinet than he had done on

n of o o n to October 1 . Pri ce Max Baden was pr p si g pave the way for peace negotiation s by offering to abandon unrestricted U -boat warfare and to guaran tee that the German troops would not destroy

n n French and Belgia to wns duri g their retreat . The

f o o ow n o rumblings o rev luti n were gr i g l uder , and it was vitally necessary t o make concession s t o the

o l w o t onfi p pu ar party , hich had l s all c dence in the

f o or Great General Sta f , and were bec ming m e and

n o o more determi ed t enf rce peace . It had become abundantly evident that the German p eople had only been induced to endure the rigours of the blockade and to hold on by the lavish

of o promises vict ry which had been given to them .

r o o It was the ef re imp ssible , while the military situation on all fro nts was going rapidly from bad to

or o t o o w se and decisi ns had be taken quickly , t educate them to an attitude of endurance with the o of f of bject minimising the e fects defeat . The preten ce that Germany had been fighting a defensive

i o war , which had per dically been put forward by the 2 0 2

The Last Four Mo nths

arouse d for a war of endurance in defen ce of the n Fatherla d . Yet this was what Ludendorff pro

o p sed . He wished the negotiations to be continued

w n on to t o ith Preside t Wils , but refused agree the acceptance of any terms which would make Germany

d e n o n militarily ef celess . He pr tested e ergetically against the renun ciation of the U -boat campaign, and claimed that the German army should be allowed to take any and every me asure which would delay the ’ n e emies advance . But while he was actually press

n i g his views up on the German cabin et . another blow

n on an d n ew o e n had falle up him , his fr nt had b e

o br ken . ’ os o on The enemy s p iti n al g the River Selle , which was the conn ecting link between the Scheldt and his

n o of s a li es s uth the Oi e , was , as I have s id , naturally ’ n o o D e n e formidable . His left fla k pp site be y s army rested on a series of very defen sible wooded heights

which divided the valleys of the Selle and the Oise . On the front o f the Fourth British A rmy the Ger

n n n of and o ma s held the easter ba k the Selle , had cen pied the line of the railway which co nn ects L e Cateau

n n o and S olesmes . This railway li e ru s thr ugh a series

n o of embankments and cutti gs , which pr vided the German infantry with excellent cover and their machin e gunn ers with position s from which they

o i n be co uld sweep the valley , while the r ll g heights hind gave their artillery splendid opp ortunities for

I n on of dominating the appro aches to the river . fr t 2 04 Luden dorff Tries to Rally

l n n o en the railway i e a si gle , and as c mpared with the tanglements of the Hindenburg lin e n ot very formid

of n able , belt barbed wire had bee erected , but the

o in an n n n s n Selle , rd arily i sig ifica t tream, had bee . en and i n oo and i n dammed by the emy was fl d ,

on io o t o n n itself /c stituted a ser us bstacle i fa try , which would have to fo rce its way acro ss i n face of

m in - un h r ach e g fire . T e sites fo a strong trench sys tem had been marked out by digging down t o a depth

of ou on e oo n nf ab t f t , but the Germa i antry and en

ineers and ‘ i i g , weary d sp rited by their defeats , had not the energy to complete these tren ches in the time

o . on on at their disp sal N e the less , the attack such

o i ion io n in a p s t was a ser us u dertak g , particularly as

n no n the e emy , k wi g that it covered the direct road

t o M b o au euge , had ccupied it in great strength and had numerous machine -guns and a powerful r a tillery .

The battle of the Selle began in the early hours f ’ o Octobe r 17 with an attack by D ebeney s First 9 th 2 French Army and the , md Amerl can an d 13 th

Corps of the Fourth British Army against the Ger

f o man left , r m Le Cateau southwards . The enemy fo the 2 th ught well , 7 and 3 oth American Divisions having a particularly hard task i n their attack up on

n o of the railway li e s uth Le Cateau , where it ran o o n n bi l al ng a c mma di g l . It was only after two of days strenuous effo rt that the German s south of Le Cateau were forced back behind the Sambre and 2 0 5 The Last Four Months

Oise Canal . It was quite evident from this fighting

that the enemy was making a desperate effort t o hold

our up advance . Appeals were issued to the German

oo to o w tr ps remember the devastati n , hich they had

n i n u o see Belgi m and n rthern France , and to save

o o their c untry fr m a like fate . But , though they

o o f ught valiantly , they had lost c nfiden ce both in

themselves and in their leaders , and they had non e of the grit and staying p ower which distinguished

o w in the British s ldier hen he was like straits .

o t H wever , it still remained o tackle the German

n o o o of mai p siti n al ng the Selle west Le Cateau , and this was d one in a n ight attack by seven divi si ons of the Third Army and one of the First

in n o Army . A mist the valley i creased the c ver

f o n and n nf n and a f rded by ight , e abled the i a try engine ers t o lay foot bridges across the Selle under ’ of n the very noses the e emy s machine gunners , and

n tanks to be brought d own u seen into the valley . At

h n n A M . on o 2 0 t e 2 . Oct ber British i fa try advanced

o to the assault , and helped by the ubiquit us tanks , which succeeded somehow i n get ting across the

o on river , they st rmed the heights the east bank

for the o after fierce fighting , Germans again f ught

hard .

o ro as The weather had br ken , the g und w satur

for oo ro ated , there was little shelter the tr ps , the ads churn ed up by shell-fi re and by the stream of traffi c

f and o o and became rivers o mud , b th r ads railways 2 0 6

Th e Last Four Months enabled the Americans to pierce the Kriemhilde line n n n o ear its ce tre . The Germa s f ught desperately to

o n and o o of oo h ld the li e empl yed s me their best tr ps ,

n n the 3 rd on of i cludi g Guard Divisi , the infantry

o n o o n which was alm st a nihilated . The m st imp rta t result of this battle was to exhaust the German ’ defensive power on the Meuse front just as H aig s

on - n n attacks had exhausted it the Cambrai St . Que ti

on on to n fr t , a sec dary result being straighte out

n n so end of the America li e , that by the the month it was well placed for another general forward movement . ’ I have already explained that Ludendo rff s plan of deliberate withdrawal t o the Meuse depended on holding off the British on the Selle and the American s

en o to on the Kriemhilde line . He was deav uring assure his Government that there was no cause for de spair when the news of the Selle battle and of the American attacks on the Kriemhilde n li e reache d them . It convinced them that there was no line up on which the German army could

on to and be relied up stand , it shattered what

little faith they had left in their military adviser .

n o n n o On Octo ber 2 6 Lude d rff te dered his resig ati n ,

i wa and n wh ch s accepted , the ext day he left Great

‘ on of o o Headquarters . The capitulati Turkey , f ll w

i n and of g up on that of Bulgaria , the decisive defeat the Austrian s on the Piave coupled with the never

n e o and endi g tale of disaster on the W stern fr nt ,

2 08 Lude n dorff Tri es to Rally the growing unrest in Germany left n o glimmer of

n f d hi hope in the mi ds o the Kaiser an s ministers . While they were prepari ng to send in pl enipoten

i ries t o o o t o o t a F ch , he , in rder make assurance d ubly

n for n n . sure , was setti g the stage the fi al adva ce

2 09 CHAPTER VI

THE L AST PUSH — Th e merican ance to Sedan Gourau Reac es A — Adv d h Mez ieres The ritis e M n B h enter Maubeug a—nd o s The Condition of th e German A rmy Was the Armistic e Premature '

’ AT the end of October Germany s armies on the Western front had suffered a series of crushing

e n defeats , her navy was s ething with muti y , her working class population were on the verge of

o o w of starvati n , the German pe ple ere at last aware the extent to which they had been deceived by

and of o . their rulers , all her allies had c llapsed The military power of the United States was but

o o of i n o half devel ped , the utput the All ed mu iti n o n on and fact ries had not reached its ze ith . After a l g bitter struggle we had won a definite superiority in

o of a the air , we had aer planes ready type capable of n o and U - o bombi g every t wn in Germany , the b at

n co d no . menace had bee s tche , if t definitely mastered There coul d be only one end t o the war ; the question

o was when that end would c me . The situation of France in 1 8 70 after the battle of

d n oo o nd Se an had bee , except as regards f d st cks a the

n o of o to s s o o determi ati n the pe ple re i t , m re h peless

2 1 0

The Last Four Month s troops deployed on the Western front had cro ssed the line extending from the Dutch frontier north of

t of 1 15 . Liege t o Metz , a dis ance miles As the war

e o o went on and Germany d vel ped her man p wer , her

n o n forces on the Wester fr nt had been strengthe ed , and in the early m onths of 19 18 they received a very great reinforcement consequent on the collapse of

9 4 so fift - o n Russia . In August , 1 1 , me y f ur Germa infantry division s had passed between the Dutch

n and of 9 18 fro tier and Metz , by the middle 1 the front of deployment of 1 15 miles had developed into a battle front extending from the North Sea near Nieup ort to Pont- a- Mousson on the M oselle south of of o Metz , a great arc with a circumference ab ut

3 of n 50 miles . The maximum strength the Germa armies on and behind the circumference of this arc

o Ma 19 18 to o 19 am unted in y , , ab ut 0 divisions .

o o of These divisi ns were smaller than th se August ,

19 14 n , but their appurte ances , guns , mortars ,

n - o machi e guns , aer planes and war material of all

i n o kinds had the f ur years multiplied exceedingly . Even when Ludendorff had completed his retreat

r of 2 — 3 afte the great battle September 6 October , his front from the Dutch frontier t o the n eighbour

oo of not s 2 50 h d Metz was les than miles in length , and the number of divisions which he had on that

o er not fr nt and in res ve was fewer than 160.

r o o to The ef re , in rder make good their retreat the Germans had to get back across the 1 15 miles 2 1 2 The Last Push about three times as many men and many times as much material as Moltke had sent westwards acro ss

I n to n 19 4 . that li e in August , 1 fact , they had get

was their armies through the neck of a bottle . It

n o o n o ak n o n like tryi g t f rce a pla t , which has gr w in

o n o in o of four years fr m a ac rn a b ttle water , back into the bottle without dest royi ng the plant ; a diffi

o if n of o cult pr blem the eck the b ttle were clear , but

n in n o it was ot . Beh d the German ce tre lay the f rests and mountains of the Belgian and Luxembourg

nn o rs few roa w Arde es , a regi n trave ed by ds and fe er

and h e railways , washed by t e M use , which had a

i of Th o l mited number bridges . e main exits lay n rth

nd o of nne in n o o a s uth the Arde s , the rth fr m

e t o i n o o Me e o Li ge Namur , the s uth fr m zi res t

on n L guyo . The course of the Meuse from Mezieres to Namur

n l n o runs ge eral y rthwards , but at Namur , where the

o n n . Sambre j i s it , it makes a sharp be d e astwards The consequence of this was that the German troops on on of n o n i n the Scheldt either side Ghe t w uld , whe

e o of their retreat they reach d the l ngitude Namur ,

i fif o o st ll have ty miles t march t the river , and would o nly fi nd east of Namur four p oints of passage . If the British succeeded in crossing the Meuse between Namur an d Din ant before the Ger man fo in ot o rces Belgium had g ver the river , there was a probability that they would be driven against the Dutch frontier and forced t o surrender ; if the 2 1 3 The Last F our Months

German centre had n ot made good its retreat before Gouraud and the American s captured Mezieres and

a f off. was Sedan it w s in danger o being cut There ,

o n o on an o of the s re theref re , l ger y questi n lei urely treat to the Meuse which Luden dorff had plann ed . It was essential t o withdraw to the river as quickly

o o d o o n u n irremedi as p ssible , but t this with ut i c rri g able disaster it was still as necessary as it had been sin ce the end of September to delay t o the utmo st the British advan ce on Namur and the American progress

ow t ards Sedan . This was the po sitio n of which Fo ch proposed to take advantage by continumg the general plan of his

o and n o great battle . G uraud the America s were t strike for Meziere s an d Sedan and blo ck the s outhern

s fo exit , while the British armies made r Maubeuge and Mons and threatened Namur before the Germans in o w n on western Belgium c uld get a ay . The adva ce Namur would fo rce the Ge rman s to come out of the

of or off greater part Belgium in a hurry be cut , and woul d save that sorely tried land from the destruction which was inevitable if it became the scene of pitched

‘ a on ‘ e nd a battles , while the dvance M zieres a Sed n would have the same efl ect on the German centre .

w o to The French armies in the centre ere , theref re , continue their rfile of harassing and delaying the Ger w man retreat , and the Belgian armies ere to keep the

00 Germans busy o n the Scheldt . The French tr ps ’ on ow r w of two King Albert s right , h eve , ith the help 2 1 4

The Last F our Mo nths despite the continuously wet and cold weather on the bleak hills of the Meuse . On November 2 the l st American C orps on the left of the First Army drove forward six miles , cap

nd of tured Buzan cy , a lined the eastern edge the

o o n o o B urg g e F rest , G uraud at the same time reach n i ng its western edge throughout its le gth . The Ger man s immediately evacuated the forest and began a gen eral retreat before the First American Army an d ’ Gouraud s right . During the night o f Novem

3 of 2 nd on ber the infantry the American Divisi , giving the weary Germans n o time t o reorganise

n d a defe ce , made a remarkable pursuit and a vanced in the darkn ess straight through the Ge rman

for f T lines a distance o five miles . his great progress enabled the Americans to bring forward long- range guns and t o shell the railway station s of

on on and on ed o L guy M tm y , thr ugh which the Crown Prin ce was tryin g to get away as much as

o of p ssible his war material . The clearing of the Bourgogn e Forest had en abled Gouraud to j oin han ds with the Americans on

o 3 t o n o of o an d N vember the rth the f rest , he thus obtained a straight front of some nine miles beyond

h n o t e Aisne east of Attig y . He was n ow able t threaten the retreat of the German troops holding the fo rmidable Brunhilde lin e farther west between

n and n Attig y Rethel , by pushi g forward his right

W n i n con uction i g j with the American advance . On 2 1 6 The Last Push

November 4 he drove the enemy back from the southern portion of the can al which connects the

n Aisne n ear Attigny with the Meuse near Seda . This manoeuvre compelled the Germans to fall back from the Brunhilde lin e in order to avoid being cut off o e e d fr m M zi res , and the French entere Rethel on o N vember 6 .

M n i o 5 n o n ea wh le , by N vember the America fr t

n fo no an d on had spru g rward a ther six miles , the

n n of 6th s n o of eve i g the , de pite the e deav urs the Ger man n - n e t o on machi e gu n rs delay the pursuit , a divisi of the 1st American C orps reached the Meuse opp o

i o n o of an - one s te the s uther utskirts Sed , twenty miles f o its in n f o o o 1 . o r m start g p i t N vember G uraud , with a longer distan ce t o go an d with the resistance of oo who n the German tr ps , had falle back from the

n i n to o o no Bru h lde li e , verc me , did t reach his oh

ective e e n e n n of j , M zi res , u til the ve i g the l oth . W hile the 1st and 5th American C orps were advan cing n orthwards towards S edan the right o f the 3 rd Corps

n to out bega strike eastwards , and it crossed the

o on o 4 Meuse and ccupied Dun N vember . Then ce on o o n 3 rd 2 nd the f ll wi g days , the , C olon ial and 17th French Corps o n the right of the First American Army gradually wore do wn the resistance of the Ger m ns in oo e i a the w d d Meuse h lls , and on the morning of o e 1 1 , the t n o f N vemb r when Armis ice came i t e fect , n - the Fra co American fron t was within six miles of on e M tm dy , where the German Cro wn Prin ce had 2 1 7 The Last Four Months

n the of not lived duri g battle Verdun , when he was

hi - in s dug out on the Mo ntfauco n Hill . Though Montmedy was not entered by the Allies until the German s had withdrawn in accordance with the

o on t Armistice terms , they f und arrival hat defeat

n ot n for the had changed the Germa nature , little ’ town was pillaged by the e nemy s troops befo re they left . These operations on the east ban k o f the Meus e to wards Mo n tmedy were e xten ded southward s by

o n o the Sec nd American Army , which bega the l ng thre aten ed movement to ward the Briey iro n fields .

The reasons 'for this development I must leave for the present to follow events farther north . While the French and Americans on the southern battle front were completing the task set them by

o w n in o on . F ch , the British armies ere agai m ti The

o f o on Germans at the end Oct ber , after their defeat

o n of the Selle , ccupied the li e the Scheldt from Ghent t o a p oin t about two mile s south of V alenci

w o ennes , hence their front ran s uthwards to the River

o Sambre , which it reached a little ab ve Landrecies . The distance between the Scheldt and the Sambre

n on this line was n ot more than eightee miles , and the southern five of these eighteen miles were ’ o H ai s taken up by the Mo rmal Fo rest . Sir D uglas g

o e t o o oo for first care was , theref r , get m re r m his

and and advance between the Sambre the Scheldt , particularly to force the enemy t o fall back from the

an of t gle reclaimed land , cut up by innumerable 2 1 8

The Last Four Mo nth s it and the canal prevented the Fourth Army from

of making free use its tanks . The British army was n ow fighting on the very

o on w s d i n n gr und hich it had first as emble Fra ce , b o e e to o was o t o ef r it advanc d M ns , and ab ut take

o r for o n c mplete evenge its early misf rtu es . A dense

r o o n artillery bar age r lled f rward , and behi d it , with the of n d help ta ks wherever they could be use , the infantry on the whole thi rty miles broke into the

o o nd 3 2 nd German p siti ns . On the right the l st a Divisio ns of the 9 th C orps fought their way across

o o the canal near Catill n , and by nightfall were m re

t o he of o than three miles t east it . Farther n rth the Germans were driven far back into the Mormal

or and oo of the 2 5th o of F est , tr ps Divisi n the

13 th o o on r C rps , cr ssing the Sambre afts , captured

o - o of o Landrecies at the s uth east c rner the f rest . Landrecies was defended by a battalion of the German 1st Guard Reserve Division ; it was i n Lan drecies that British Guards first met the Ger

n w on t 2 5 19 14 ma s , hen , Augus , , they repulsed a

o n o of night attack in the streets of the t w . N rth the Mo rmal Fo rest the 3 7 th Divisio n and the New

Z n n o n ealanders , after repulsi g a heavy Germa c u ter

o e b on V alenci attack , dr ve the nemy back ey d the

n — n r n o e nes Aves es ailway , which ru s thr ugh the

n f o to e and New ce tre o the forest fr m west ast , the

Z n o n old o tow of eala ders , surr undi g the f rtified n

L n o o o o . e Ques y , c mpelled its garris n t surrender By

2 2 0 ‘ The Last P u sh

‘ and the evening the left of the Third Army , the right

w on o s o of the First Army , ere a fr nt five mile bey nd ’ On i Deb en e s Valen ciennes . the Brit sh right y First Fren ch Army had also forced a cro ssing over the Sambre Can al to the north of Guise and kept pace In with the advan ce of our Fourth Army . this battle the resistan ce of the enemy was definitely broken and

The he never rallied again . three British armies

d 4 50 u n and captured prisoners an g s ,

on o of Deben ey gathered in more pris ers . S uth ’ o on n Ghent the two French c rps Ki g Albert s right ,

n n div151on which each now had a America with them ,

n on and drove back the Germa s al g the Scheldt , the

9 l st American Division captured Audenarde . From this time until the end the pursuit was delayed mainly by the very complete destructio n of the roads and railways by the Germans as they fell

and on n of in back , by the c seque t difficulty gett g up ’ n ffi e in supplies to the troops . The e emy s di culti s l o . n o Be retreat were , h wever , much greater Far i t gium the roads were blocked with masses of transport and o n of for the railways with th usa ds trucks , the removal of which the German s had not sufficient n e gines . Our aeroplanes s woo ping down from the sky attacked the German convoys and railway lin es

ne - and o n with machi gun fire with b mbs , causi g great

on and n destructi frequent panics . A si gle battalio n of the 2 5th Division on November 5 took possession of n thirty gu s , which the German artillerymen had

2 2 1 Th e Last Four M o nth s

o o ' aband ned when attacked fr m the air . By Novembe r 5 our troops were well beyond the Mo rmal

o . th F rest On the 7 the Guards entered Bavai , on

8 o n the th the F urth Army occupied Aves es . On the 9 th the Guards and 62 nd Division occupied the

o e of the n o n f rtr ss Maubeuge , French taki g Hirs n o the same day . O n the 8 th the German s began to

ro s fly f m the Scheldt , and the Briti h Fifth and

o n on Sec nd Armies , with the Fre ch and Americans

who e n n to their left , had b e prepari g deliver a great

on on o 1 1 n attack the river line N vember , findi g that

ne s n o o the e my were lippi g away , f ll wed hard after

o . o n him and made rapid pr gress Peruwelz , T ur ai and w o in on Renaix ere ccupied successi , while by a last dramatic stroke of fortune the 3 rd Canadian Division entered Mon s a few hours before the

o Armistice was signed . There were many curi us coincidences be tween our first an d last co ntact with

ffi of our who the Germans in arms . O cers cavalry

fo Mo 19 14 o had ught at ns in August , , f und them

19 18 o n n of selves o u November 1 1 , , the sce e their original encounter with the German troopers ; while most curi ous of all the 2 md Battalion of the Royal

fo i n the 3 rd Irish Regiment , which had ught Division in the loop of the canal n orth- east of Mons on 2 3 9 14 63 rd on August , 1 , was with the Divisi entering that loop when hostilities ceased . The opin ion is widely held that the Armistice of

i s d e November 1 1 was premature . It argue that w 2 2 2

The Last Four M on ths

o n - met Marshal F ch , and vo B rockdorfi Rantzau ad

mitted s n it at Ver ailles , whe he said after the Allied peace terms had been presented t o him ' We are un der n o illusio ns as to the extent of our defeat and

of our n o f the degree wa t power . We know that ” o of o the p wer the German Army is br ken .

n s on no t Eve if the e admissi s had been made , the condition of the German lin es of retreat to the Rhin e

o s e of o n o f is c nclu ive evid nce the c diti n o their armies . Every road was littered with broken -down moto r t - n rucks , guns , machine guns and tre ch mortars . Great stacks of supplies and of military s tores of on all kinds were aband ed . Every railway lin e was blocked with loaded trucks which the

n o o Germans had been u able t rem ve . The sixty miles of railway in the valley of the Meuse between

‘ Din ant and Méz ieres was filled from end to end with a continuous line of German freight train s carrying

n n ion n n e an d o gu s , ammu it , engi eeri g equipm nt , ther

the n n o o paraphern alia . On Belgia ca als al ne ver eight hundred fully charged military barges were

on on o 1 1 foun d . It is bey d dispute that N vember the lines of communication immediately behind the German armies had been thrown into complete dis order by the streams of traffi c which were convergl ng

o n e on the Meuse bridges , dis rder greatly i tensifi d by n the attacks of the Allied airme . The German

n to on n on oul armies , u able resist the fighti g fr t , c d

o in oo o d of no l nger retreat g d r er , partly because 2 2 4 The Last Push

e e t to troops , but pr vent d the sys ematic supply them

o o n to the of food and ammuniti n , partly wi g fact that there were not horses left to draw the transport

oo o o s on of of the fighting tr ps . The f ll wing de cripti the condition of the German Army at the time when it began its march back to the Rhin e i n accordan ce with the terms of the A rmistice has been recently published in Berlin .

Many of t he uni t s hf the army were unable t o move for f ns o r es ven t ose w i c were lack o tra p rt ho s . E h h h able t o march had b ut little of t heir former mobilit y bec au se t ss of s een so e t The ma orit of t he he lo horse had b gr a . j y t r00 s we e un c cu st ome t o on m c es t he o ses were p r a d l g ar h , h r i n er oo con iti on and the ai osses even urin v y p r d , d ly l d g t he retreat t o t he Antwerp-Meuse positi on had been very e t T e e was a e cienc of oot s wint e c ot in gr a . h r d fi y b , r l h g, oof- a s and f ost nai s and int e we t e mi t h p d , r l , w r a h r gh set in at an time. lmost ll the c su alt cle i n st ati ons y A a a y ar g , the ambulances and t he hospit als were overcrowded owi ng t o t he continu ous st e m of woun ed and si c w i c r a d k, h h poured i n m consequence of t he fighting whi c h c ontinued * ri t u t o t he mi sti ce gh p Ar .

Not less remarkable is a report from the head quarters of one of the divisi ons of the 17th German ’ of the o n o Army Cr wn Pri ce Rupprecht s gr up . The

n e of on o on umb r the divisi is bliterated the report , w o 8 19 1 hich is dated N vember , 8 , and was found i n

Di e Rdch uhrun dos eslhee cs f g W r , B erli n, 1919 . 2 2 5 The L ast Four Mo nths

r ho s a Belgian fa m u e . I have therefore been unable

to d o identify the ivisi n , but it appears t o have been

one of o o o our th se which was ppo sed t First Army . The report runs ' The division can only be con

sidered n for n as u fit battle . Owi g t o the extremely

a to n and t o o d heavy c sualties , sick ess numer us eser * o of n ti ns , the average strength regime ts is under

6 o o 00. Still m re imp rtant as regards efficiency in

o of o fi of n o battle is the sh rtage f cers , which regiment of o o and on the divisi n has m re than twelve , e

o l o regiment has nly n ine . A m st all the machine gun s in the division have been lost o r are out of

n of . repair , and half the gu s the artillery are deficient

w n o of o s n o O i g t lack h r es , less than half the tra sp rt of o o d and con the divisi n can be m ve , if the retreat tinn es many gun s and vehicles will have to be

o n to of o of aband ned . Owi g lack petr l , much the

of o o motor transport the divisi n cann t be moved .

on not on for two The divisi has received rati s days , and the con dition of the horses which remain is

n o to o o becomi g very bad , because wing c nstant m ve ment there is no time to collect supplies from the ” for n o n o t . country , and f rage them is arrivi g

s of o o If ever armies were in a tate h peless r ut , the German armies were in the second week of

mor l of o 9 8 . a oo o N vember , 1 1 The the tr ps was g ne , the organis ation of the services on which they

erman re ment cons sted of t ree att a ons and i ts f A G gi i h b li , ull cer strength was ab out men and 64 offi s . 2 2 6

The Last Four Mo n ths

cation grew steadily longer as the Germans were

o our o o driven back , and even bef re vict ri us advance began the state o f the railways and the amount of

o l n o n Fo r o r l i g st ck in Fran ce had caused a xiety . f ur and a half years the railway systems o f north- eastern France had been strained to the limit of their

h ff of r n capacity , and t e e ects that strain we e beginni g

9 o n t o be serious in 1 18 . B th we and the America s had made great efforts to improve and extend the

ur o railway systems in o respective z nes . During 19 18 the British military railway administratio n i n Fran ce built or reconstructed miles of broad

of r ow gauge and miles na r gauge railways , while to suppleme nt the French rolling stock we sent

to France locomotives and cars . The shipment across the Channel of such cumbrous and heavy objects as locomotives and trucks was a slo w

f n s n of and di ficult busi es , and the eeds the armies were always growing faster than were the resources

o o o of f the railways . During the last f ur m nths the war the weekly average load carried by the British military railways in France amounted to o ver half a

million to ns .

o If these were ur difficulties , those of the

r r r r ow to th r Ame ican a my we e greate , ing e apid growth of the army during the latter half of the

r19 18 or of of o yea , the sh tage shipping capable cr ss

in f n rs g the Atlantic , and the nece ssity o givi g fi t place to the transportation of troups and of war 2 2 8 The Last Push

to end r material . Up the the railways unde American control in France suffered from a

n in o n r deficie cy r lli g stock , and had g eat difficulty i n meeting the demands of the large forces engaged in the Meuse-Argonne battle at the end of an ever

n n on lengtheni g line of commu icati s . The French

rmms i n dl of a , which the mid e September had been extended along the outside of the great b ow made

n n n by the German li e s between St . Que ti and Ver dun on s n to n in o o n , had the l ge t dista ces adva ce f ll wi g

m n e and o n up the Ger a r treat , bef re the adva ce began the Fren ch Government had cut down the railway transp ortation in the interi or of the country t o the bare min imum n ecessary for the preservation of n t o of the i dus rial and s cial life France , and even then was un able to meet the full demands of the Fren ch armies and t o supplement the railway material which Great Britain and America had been

The able t o produce . Belgian armies had hardly any resources of their own an d no means whatever of

o n th of n o o devel pi g eir means tra sp rtati n . The result of all this was that the mere lengthening of the Allied

in of o m n on n e l es c m u icati s by the Germa r treat , apart

o f o an o o n alt gether r m y ther acti n by the e emy , threw a very great strain up on the Allied railway adminis

r ion s t at .

The n o nd Germa s were , h wever , very active a skilful i n damagin g the roads and railways befo re

a they retreated , and this damage w s extended by 2 2 9 The Last Four Mo nth s

the destructive p ower of the artillery of b oth sides .

w m was o n Every rail ay bridge , large or s all , bl w up ,

n on the railway embankme ts were cut , l g stretches of o o n n track were destr yed , the stati s were bur ed

o and d wn , the telegraph lines were almost obliterated

n o and the i struments rem ved . The Germans had left behind them mines buried under the railway

in e o l es , and these xpl ded often after the first damage

n and n nni n had bee repaired the trai s were ru g , with the result that there was constant interruption to

n the traffic . O e of our Army Commanders told me

o o o that , wing t the c nstant explosion of mines behind

o n f of his fr nt , duri g the last st ages o the advance his army his railhead was retreating faster than his troops

of hi o n were advancing . The c onsequence t s was that

o 1 1 os n o and o e N vember , despite the m t stre u us dev t d work by all concerned in the repair and working of

o n the railways , the farthest p i ts at which supplies could be delivered by rail were from thirty- five to

on and fifty miles in a direct line behind the fr t , T often double this dist an ce by road . his gap had

o o n o of to be bridged by the m t r tra sp rt , which ,

o o use o . on c urse , had t the r ads But the destructi of the roads by the Germans was as thorough as their

Not on destruction of the railways . ly were the

n bridges destroyed , but mi es were sprung at every

o - o n n n n cr ss road . I remember c u ti g eleve mi e craters on three miles of the main road between Le Quesnoy

o o o o and M ns . This damage c uld nly be very r ughly 2 3 0

The Last Four Month s

o on the r situati n Belgian , F ench , and American fronts .

Nor was the f e of n oo an , e ding the fighti g tr ps by y means the only problem of supply which the Allied

to o The armies had s lve . Germans in their retreat had left behin d them in the liberated pro vin ces of Fran ce and Belgium a large civilian population on

o n the verge of starvation . In the French pr vinces o the British front alone there were nearly

on t o r o of we pers s be fed , and during a pe i d six eks , until the French Government could undertake the

o of s e we r o n distributi n uppli s , dist ibuted m re tha

o o o on rati ns am ngst the civilian p pulati , a task which threw an immense additional burden upon

o o n n the transp rtati services . The French armies o their own front had very much larger numbers to

w o o r deal ith , and , as it taxed all their res urces t epair the main ro ads and railways so that the troop s o n

on and the fr t might be fed , many French villages small towns off the main lines of communication

ed o for o o o remain is lated l ng peri ds , and were nly kept from starvation by having food brought to them

o n . o n by aer pla es Added t all this , the Germa s as they retreated released large numbers of prisoners of war without making any provision for their feed

of e of ing . The people B lgium their necessities made great sacrifices in order t o do what was possible for o w o suf these unf rtunate men , h se ferings were

f n n n not to r o ten i te se , but their mea s were equal thei 2 32 The Last P ush

o and o was to the gener sity , yet an ther burden added

wo rk of supply . This being the situatio n on the fro nt at the time when the Armistice was signed and during the days

o d n o o which f llowe its sig ature , it is bvi us that a great and rapid advance t o and across the Meuse - by the

i n i n and Belg a , Brit sh; Fre ch American armies , such as might have brought ab out the complete destruc tion of the German armies and en ded the war with

o o e n was out of o . a c l ssal S da , the questi n It is true that on November 11 two British cavalry division s had passed through the front and were ready to

n m pursue the e e y . Sir D ouglas Haig has expressed the opinion that this cavalry would have b een able to turn the retreat of the German s on the British

f on nto o o o r t i a c mplete r ut , but it is very impr bable that any action by such a comparatively small force of mounted troops would have been able to affect

o on on o on o and seri usly the situati the wh le l g fr nt ,

n n o o n n their i flue ce , th ugh it w uld certai ly have bee

on i m n n The c s derable , ust ecessarily have bee local .

n i s on or so on o 1 1 plai fact that , very after , N vember

o o i n on in n it w uld , had h stil ties bee c t ued , have bee necessary t o call a halt of the Allied armies between the Dutch frontier and the Meuse until the roads and railways behind them had been repaired and the

i of in to o no serv ces supply were aga able w rk rmally .

T i s to it o n hat say , w uld have bee necessary to gly c

n m n the e e y a breathi g space , which would have 2 33 The Last Fo ur Months allowed him to restore some sort of order in his ranks

oo o and make g d his retreat t the Meuse , where he would have been able t o establish himself on a very much shorter front and in very strong positions . This would have e ntailed fighting at least one more great battle an d have cost us very many lives .

o of o on hi There was , h wever , a part the fr nt w ch the Allied armies had made little progress and behind which their communication s were i n good order ; that

on n o e of was the fr t between the Meuse , rth ast Ver

and o d dun , the Swiss fr ntier . As I have explaine , ’ o of n Pershing s vict ry the St . Mihiel salie t had given

oc o or for n o n F h an pp tunity invadi g L rraine , a d the French Marshal had all his plans ready for the exten sion of his long line o f battle by an advance into

Lor w r o e . aine hen h stilities ceas d In fact , the manoeuvres preliminary t o this advan ce had begun on o r n N vember 7 , when the th ee Fre ch corps imme diately east o f the Meuse attacked in the direction of o e o n o o M ntm dy , a m veme t f ll wed by the advance of o o W oeuvre the sec nd American Army thr ugh the , l n f . n as the cou try east o the St Mihiel salie t is ca led ,

The of towards the famous i ronfields of Briey . left the Secon d American Army had driven the German s back some three miles in the 'W oeuvre by the morn

n n for n ew i g of N ovember 1 1 . The ge eral plan this attack was that the left of the Second American Army should be protected by the advance of the right of the First American Army and of the three 2 3 4

The Last Four Months

r e t o o . as thei d s ructi n as a military f rce It w , there

o on f re , reas ably certain that if the Armistice had been refused the Allied armies would have had to

wo f r o o fight hard and uld have su fered se i us l sses , while there was the risk of exp osing the greater part of of nd Belgium, including the cities Bruss els a w Ant erp , and the great Charleroi industrial district — — which were still in the hands of the Germans to

r o r fo r n dest ucti n . Eve ything was ready a other battle

o o t o t n on the L rraine fr nt , but this , oo , w uld cer ai ly have cost us many lives and have caused much damage

o r - nd in to valuable pr pe ty , which is t o day intact a

n o the hands of the Fre ch . The pr blem which the Allied and Associated Governments and gen erals had to decide was whether they would continue to fight on these terms or would impose such conditions of armistice upon the enemy as would render him

n on militarily impote t . They decided the latter

n f ho o course , and I thi k there are very ew w w uld have taken upon themselves the responsibility of deciding otherwise . The criticism of the decision to stop fighting on November 1 1 has be en due to the feeling that the German p eople do not rec ognise that their armies were beaten in the field , and the fear that this state of mind may sooner or later cause them

o own on o t fight again . My c victi n is that the recep

' tion of the German troops in Germany and the state ments made in the German press and by the German 2 3 6 The Last Push people that the Armistice was n ot the consequence

d an n ot an c n . of defeat were unnatural , be explai ed

19 18 Ger o co In November , , the man pe ple uld only get news of what was happening on the front

o ot thr ugh the newspapers , and the newspapers g

i nf o their ormation thr ugh the military Press Bureau .

The o o f fficials that bureau , either because they were so n o no inured to lyi g that they c uld t tell the truth , or in the hope of st aving off revolution by continuing

o o e o he a to deceive the pe ple , ann unc d , fr m t first d ys when things began togo wrong for them right up to nd e the e , that the German armi s were fighting

n f on r sple didly , that the r t was eve ywhere intact , and

oo n a o and that the tr ps were falli g b ck , sl wly steadily ,

o in to to an d on acc rd g plan better str ger positio ns . No inkling was given of the true state of affairs on

on n o the fr t , and the Germa pe ple ascribed the surren

to o on not ao der either the rev luti , if they were in f v ur of or or it , m e generally t o the desire of the new Government t o get the blockade raised as quickly

o as p ssible . When the German troops came back to o to their h mes and began talk , the truth gradually

o n became kn w , and the German people were able to see for themselves the state of the army which had o b d do n—ce bee their go . I n ot think that there is to day any intelligent German who does not know

r that the Ge man armies were utterly beaten , though there may be many who would not admit as much to o a f reigner . The Last Four Mo nth s

It has begun t o dawn upo n most Germans that it is more disgraceful to admit that they accepted

o o u defeat , ign mini usly s rrendered their navy , gave

of and o up the greater part their artillery aer planes , handed over large quantities of rolling stock an d

or of military st es , and permitted the armies their

to o n o o enemies ccupy the Rhine u pp sed , that they

s ow t o n did all thi when they still had the p er fight o , than to ackno wledge that their armies were defeated

do not in the field . I believe that we shall in the future hear much more of the unbeaten German

e o fe t armi s , except perhaps fr m a w ex remists like

nor do we not to Bernhardi , I believe that if had s pped fighting on November 11 it would have been possible to make Germany any less capable of resistance than

- she is to day . I set out i n this b ook t o describe the general course of the last great campaign on the Western

not o o w o front . I am , theref re , c ncerned ith the st ry

f o n of o the d w fall Bulgaria , Austria and Turkey , except in so far as these have contributed to the

of n defeat of our chief enemy . The trials the spri g of 19 18 had taught us that common sen se whi ch is the essen ce of strategy ; we had learn ed that the . on and we Western front was for us the vital fr t , had con centrated there every man who coul d be spared ’ from other theatres of war - but Sir Charles Monro s expan sion of the Indian army had en abled us to replace the British troops withdrawn from Palestine 2 3 8

The Last Four Months

was not for round . Fortunately , this necessary , it would have greatly prolonged the war .

o o So it happened that , while F ch was c mplet

r on ing hi s preparations fo r A magedd , Franchet

’ n n d E sperey was drivi g back the Bulgars , Alle by

n h and o on was overwhelmi g t e Turks , ab ut a m th

o 2 4 n later , on Oct ber , the Italians bega the third

s battle of the Piave . By the time that Au tria ’ collapsed Lude ndorff s attempt to rally had been

of r in defeated , and the fate the Ge man armies the

a . or o West w s sealed The Italian vict y , theref re ,

t oo to f s n or came late a fect the main is ue , did ’ ll n o of o A e by s campaign , th ugh vital imp rtance in

on of t its influence the future the East , has en by

of an hour the defeat of Germany . The defeat

on o n o Bulgaria , the ther ha d , did , as I have sh wn from the statements made by Hindenburg an d his

e o advisers at the time , unqu sti nably weigh with the p olitical and military leaders of Germany and helped to o of o of o c nvince them the h pelessness their p sition . The controversy between the advocates of an East

f r o w s o ern and o a Weste n p licy , hich o l ng agitated

o of o us , is a sympt m defective rganisation . C onflict between the political demands for dispersal of force and the military demands for concentration are

o n ew ar n thing in w . It has always been a very

f o to and i n di ficult pr blem adjust them , the case of a scattered Empire such as ours the problem is

o peculiarly c mplex . War , as the Germans were 2 40 The Last Push

n i s an of o and never tired of telli g us , act p licy , it is the business of the statesman t o defin e policy in

The o s r n war as in peace . s ldier is as much his e va t

as the civilian administrator i n Whitehall . It is the

’ of the statesman s duty to determin e the objects war ,

to say what interests are vital t o the security of the

n e w n n ation and what may be eglect d ith impu ity, to in crease our power by bringin g in all ies t o our

nd o i n s of n side , a t d mi i h that the enemy by detachi g n from him p otential or actual adhere ts to his cause .

o not o . War , h wever , is an abstract pr blem It is a , struggle against an oppone nt whose intentions and resources can only be surmised from in complete

n Mi i on an d t o evide ce . scalculat s mis akes entail l ss

of if and . o fo l e , maybe , disaster Theref re , be re the statesman decides on his policy it must be translated for him by experts into a definite plan which shows

o n in en and him what his p licy e tails m and in time , gives him the best po ssible estimate of how the e nemy

i n o o o n n w ll e deav ur t c u ter the pla . It is very easy t o take a map and place one millio n men i n the

n or e of Balka s , a quart r a million in the Gallipoli

n ns and Pe i ula , picture the results of their action

e when they have arriv d . It is quite another matter to calculate accurately how long it will take to get

men t o o to the th se places , estimate what will be n t o n eeded mai tain them when they are there , and to fo recast what the en emy may do while they are

o n to i o m vi g the r p sitions .

Q 2 4 1 The Last Four Months

’

. o o o o e 19 5 Mr Ll yd Ge rge s pr p sal , mad early in 1 , to transfer the British army t o the Balkan s would H have been admirable had it been practicable . e

n n oo o noe re mai tai ed , with g d reas n , that such a ma uv

of would assure the safety Serbia , bring in Italy ,

o on our n Greece , Bulgaria and R umania side , e able us to complete the encirclement of the Central

ow off o P ers , cut them fr m Turkey and the East ,

o o o n o w w uld pen up c mmu icati n ith Russia , and

ow u to o n o all s attack Austria in verwhelmi g f rce . It opened up a dazzling prospect when compared with ’ Kitchener s prophecy of a war lasting three years and with the slow and costly process of wearing down

r n the Ge mans in the West . The fallacy i the plan was that we had not the military power ready to provide for s ecurity in the West and in the Eas t

s wo a while it wa in preparation . It uld h ve taken us many months to move an army to the Balkans and to was on o o equip it . While it the m ve it w uld

n n o f on r have bee i capable acti , and in the inte val both the Western front and Egypt would have been

o n a o exp sed to attack . Even if Germa y w s unable t get the Turks to organise an effective attack upon

oo Egypt and did n ot again mass tr ps against France , there was no guarantee that she would not anticipate

i n o n o us the Balkans , as fr m her ce tral p sition she

do w of s might readily , and ith the help Au tria , Bulgaria and Turkey destroy our expedition while it was o o o of . c ncentrating . The translati n Mr Ll yd 2 42

The Last Fo ur Mo n ths

' for for was tha th o Egypt , it clear t e Turks w uld no t venture to att ack the Suez Can al while Con stantinople

‘ was . The as menaced plan w faulty because Mr . Churchill had formed an exaggerated estimate of the

o of n e c p wer naval guns against la d def n es , because the machinery for getting the expert naval opinio n before

on o was and the Government this questi n defective , because we were drawn into a military enterprise for

no w o which we had t the means ready , hen it was f und that the Navy had been given an impo ssi ble

i of o s task . Owing to th s s ame absence rgani ed

the o o n d o expert advice , Mes p tamia expe iti n was allowed to drift gradually into co mmitments which

o o ur w r were bey nd its powers . S o energies e e exhausted in controversies which need not have arisen

r les r o of n if the é and esp nsibilities the statesma , the

o and soldier and the sail r had been clearly defined , if the Government had been equipped with the means of r n o ro o o su veyi g the wh le g und fr m the utset , and of learning what various alternative policies entailed in n our men , gu s , ships , material and time . In

- special circums tances side shows were inevitable .

o ro We had t p tect India , and keep the Suez Canal open ; we could not allow the Germans a free hand

in to o n or s . Africa rganise ative f ces , at their lei ure We could not therefore concentrate all our forces in the Western theatre and leave the outlying parts of th i r was e Emp e to look after themselves . The fact ,

ow ver ur w Was h e , that so large a part of o total po er 2 44 The Last P ush required in order to make the Western front safe

n our n on that we were never able , u til e emies were

o h on to on of n the verge f ex austi , c duct fe sive cam paigns elsewhere to a decisive issue . Because that

not our truth was realised in time , we frittered away resources and prolonged the war . In the end circum stances compelled us to renounce our strategical

o o ow . heresies , and vict ry f ll ed Not o nly was the defeat of the German armies

’ t o Fo ch n due s campaig in the West , but that campaign made victory possible in all theatres of war ’ n e who by discouragi g G rmany s allies , , like the

o i n German pe ple , had been kept the war by

o of o and n of pr mises vict ry , by deprivi g them her aid at the moment when they were most in need of

e n of of o n o it . The sudd n cha ge the tide f rtu e fr m

t o o o of o e n the ebb the full fl d vict ry , the vast xte t of o on w of lo the perati s , and the s ift succession b ws st ruck made this campaign a stupendous climax to

n 8 a stupendous war . I 11 days the great German army which set out confidently to capture Paris on 15 19 18 July , , had been utterly and completely

o n br ke . It had b een driven back t o the French

on and of fr tier , made incapable further resistance . During the period of rather less than four months which had elapsed sin ce the beginning of the second battle of the Marne the British army had captured

i on and n pr s ers gu s ; the French army , prisoners and guns ; the American 2 45 The Last Four Mo nths

nd n army , prisoners a gu s ; the Belgian

on 4 n — o army , pris ers and 7 4 gu s a t tal of

son and s o pri ers gun . Many th usands of machin e -gun s and tren ch mortars and thousands of ton s of war material of all kinds must be added ’ t o e of oo o i n this tal b ty , while the enemy s l sses killed and wounded are estimated to have amounted to

hi s on ul n a T w derf result , which eve as l te as the en d of September no o ne would have ventured t o

o to of f retell , was due many causes , which , in the m o ilitary sphere , three are pred minant ' the genius of o n e o n of F ch , the u expect dly rapid devel pme t ’ o e o re America s fighting p w r , and the marvell us covery of the British army fro m its reverses of the ’ To Foch s n spring . ge ius I have already paid my ” I n of t . tribu e his Principles War , which em bodies his teaching at the Fren ch War College before

s to the war , he says Great re ults in war are due

n o o the comma der . Hist ry is theref re right in making

on for c o e in generals resp sible vi t ri s , which case they

o and for in s are gl rified , defeats , which ca e they are

W o o no no disgraced . ith ut a c mmander battle ,

to on victory is p ossible . The will c quer , such ’ on o and o is victory s first c diti n , theref re every ’ o o o n t o s ldier s first duty , but it als am u ts a supreme

o o e res lve , which the c mmander must , if ne d be , ’ ” ’ r o Fo ch s l to o impa t t o the soldier s s ul . wil c nquer wavered neither in the dark days of 19 14 n or through 2 46

The Last Four Mo nths

which constitutes a mod ern battle . The multiplicity of weapon s and the complications of tactics which

o of o an d an f ur years war had pr duced , the fact that e ntirely new element had ent ered into war with

o n f f the devel pme t o aircraft , all made the e fective handling of troops in battle a far more diffi cult

o pr blem than it had ever been . Neither the American generals n or the American staffs had had experience in fitting together the numerous parts of the military machin e o r in han dling large bodies of

For n tro ops . all these reaso s a great attack by American troops against intact German defen ces on the most difficult part of the front was a b old experi

n one to o me t . It was thing bliterate the St . Mihiel

n r o to o salie t in thi ty h urs , st p the German rush at the Marne ; or even to drive the Germans from the Marne to the Vesle i n co- operation with Allied

no troops . It was quite a ther matter t o fight con tinuously on a front of some twenty miles for close o o n n f n n fifty days , thr ugh li e after li e o Germa

n o n trenches , in a battle which e tailed the empl yme t of - f on nearly three quarters o a milli American troops . It was done because America placed the pick of her

n oo i n the oo splendid ma h d field , and that manh d went ahead at the j ob i n front of it without counting

o n ob 11] the cost . By d i g its j it gave us Vi ctory

19 18 .

Of the achievements of the British army in this

d o last campaign , under its great lea er wh se calm 2 48 The Last Pu sh

oolne i n i n judgment , c ss advers ty , u selfish patience ,

n o o and o ion when u supp rted at h me , b ld decis s , when

i o o e o s in our the t me came t be b ld , w re vital fact r dl i o can . triumph , a Brit n . har y wr te temperately The Old Cont emptibles of 19 14 have become

o of e n and h i on o almost her es l ge d , t e r w derful rec very

o e o Mon n to fr m the r treat fr m s , their adva ce the Marn e and the Aisn e are rightly reckon ed as amongst

oo the proudest records of the British army . I t k part in the retreat from M on s and in the subseque nt

n of our and o our adva ce little army , I saw b th what army had to endure in the spri ng of 19 18 and what

it om i e i on of and acc pl sh d n the last m ths the war , I am convin ced that the achievement of the Nation al Army of Great Britain tran scends even that of her

on f old Regular Army . That Nati al Army or six

f o 2 1 n the end of weeks , r m March u til April , with stood the full brunt of the greatest military effort of

, m n n which Ger a y was capable . It was drive back

on e oi n to of o i it o at p t a depth f rty m les , l st 7 prison ers and gun s and suffered casual ties ; 55 of its divisions were attacked by 102 German

vis on and n t o n f on di i s , still prese ted the e emy a r t

o n ot . n n on 8 he c uld break The , starti g August , it fought uninterruptedly and Victoriously for three

on n n 1 2 0 in m ths , drivi g the e emy back miles , tak g more than twice as many prisoners and more than

im n n os and com three t es as ma y gu s as it had l t , pletely routin g the German armies by which it was * 9 2 49 The Last F our Mon ths o o d pp se . This is a re cord with which any army

o n n o on n c mi g fresh i t the field might be c te t . That it was accomplished after four and a half years of bitter struggle is an achievement t o which n o words can do justice .

n n The soldiers of Fra ce were not less sple did . They had to en dure first while Great Britain was

n of m o and en maki g herself a great ilitary p wer , th , ’ when Great Britain s efforts were in sufficien t t o turn

n n the bala ce , while America was placi g her armies in Th n n nd i n the field . e Germa s had agai a aga

' b oasted that n Fra ce was bled white , that she was

of F o 9 6 weary the war and would n ot fight . r m 1 1 onwards the n ext win ter was to see the collapse o f

n . o o n d Fra ce Fr m every trial , with her c u try ravage , and many of her richest provinces in the han ds of

o n o f o o o the m st brutal tyra t wh m hist ry tells , she r se

to f o n o again a new e f rt , u til at last she dr ve her o ppressor back t o her fro n tiers and her poilus marched

- n n triumphantly through Alsace Lorrai e t o the Rhi e .

of who for o The soldiers little Belgium , m re than four years had protected the last little strip of their country west of the Yser after the German tide of

n on n on n i vasi had bee stemmed that river , had , u der

o f n o the leadership Ki g Albert , wh se spirit was as

n o o f o d o n i d mitable as that F ch , issue fr m behi d their

- o o water lines , had f ught with a fire and dash wh lly wonderful i n an army which had lon g been con demned to in action and had non e of the means of 2 50

INDEX

R P N as oo carr ers 2 32 mer ca n t r00 s a remar a e Ger AE O LA ES f d i , A i p , k bl Ai r ra s on ar s 62 ma n st a t ement con cer ning 66 id P i , ,

sne th e t h rd b at t e o f, 110 mer ca n t roop s i n th e est Ai , , i l A i W

bert n of t h e e ans, 106, 12 6 Al , Ki g B lgi 158 18 1 mer ca ns a rri e at Chat ea . A i v u ent ers o ers 18 3 Th er ry 62 8 2 R ul , i , ,

n om t a e s r t of 2 50 a t t a c St . h e s a ent 12 0 i d i bl pi i , k Mi i l li ,

en c a t res J er sa em 2 , 18 miens , ba t t e of 103 110. 141 by p , , All u u l , A l

o erwh e ms th e T rk s 2 40 de eat of erma ns at , 107 v l u , f G

re n orc ement s for 18 , 1 2 6 p rep a rat ons for, 105 i f , 9, i

ict ory at aza 2 , 18 c r t ca d a ys i n 1918 , 11 v G , i i l 4 ied a d a n ce, t h e, de ays to , 18 2 erma n a t t empt s for 7 , 51 All v l G , ed p eace t erms p res ent ed t o t h rea t en ed by en emy 42 Alli ,

erma n p en p oten t a r es , 2 2 4 mm n t on o esa e ex en t re G l i i i A u i i , wh l l p di u mt ment f ies t h e, a y ea r o f di s app o o , 159 All ,

for, 1 n cre th e rst b at t e of, 2 0, 18 8 A , , fi l c r t ca a s for 11 nt -t an ns 145 i i l d y , A i k gu ,

de ences of, cont ra st ed w th t hose remont 119 f i Ap ,

of en emy 139 rgon n e Fo rest , 147 18 4 , A ,

es t on of n it y of comma n d , 3 rma geddon 12 9 et se . qu i u A , q

mer ca see Un t ed t at es) t h e re a rat on for 93 et se . A i ( i S p p i , q

mer can a d ance t h e, di c t es rment eres aba nd on ed 49 A i v , ffi ul i A i , of 18 4 rmi st ce t h e co n d t on of erma n , A i , , i i G

a d a nce to Sed a n, 2 17 a rmy a t t me of 2 2 5 v i , a rmy a nd th e r a w a y d c ty en era s t at o n at 2 35 il iffi ul g l i u i , i n Fra nce 2 2 8 see a l s o Fir st i n o erat on 2 17 , ( p i , mer can rm econ mer wa s i t remat re ' 2 2 2 A i A y , S d A i p u

can rmy rra s , a erman eflort for 45 A ) A G ,

mer can Corp s l st , 12 0 18 5, 2 16 at t e of 1 73 118 18 8 ( ) , b , , , A i l ,

2 17 ; 2 n d) , 161, 162 , 199 , 2 05 rt i ery fi re, s o n d rang n and ( A ll u i g , 3 rd 18 5 2 15 2 17 4th 12 0 3 ( ) , , , ; ( ) , , 1 5

(5th 12 0, 18 5, 2 15. 2 17 d en a rde, c a pt re of , 2 2 1 ) , Au u

mer ca n i s on s oya s pp ort of ic Co nc i , t h e 9 A i Div i , l l u Aul u l , ’ oc e ans 2 47 s t ra an r a e 5t h c a t res F h pl , Au li B ig d ( ) p u mer ca n s ons o erat on s of ont St en t n 116 A i Divi i , p i M Qu i ,

(l st ) , 98 ; (z ud) , 98 , 198 , 2 16 st ra an Corp s , t h e op erat o ns of , Au li , i rd 0 4t 0 1 (3 ) . 96, 1 0, 198 ; ( h ) , 1 0 90, 03 , 161 t 1 (2 6th ) , 98 99 100; (2 7 h ) , 1 8 st ra ia n s on (1st , det ra ns at , , Au l Divi i ) i

162 , 163 2 05 2 8th ) 96 100, 2 01 a zebro ck 49 , ; ( , , H u , 3 oth 162 2 05 32 nd 100 101 st ra a n s on s erat ons of ( ) , , ; ( ) , , Au li Divi i , Op i 4 (33rd ) . 91, 103 ; (4z ud) , 95, 101 ( th ) , 51 ; (st h ) , 51 77th 102 2 01 8 2 nd 2 01 st ra an s a t eco rt 90 ( ) , , ; ( ) , ; Au li Bull u . 9i st 2 2 1 st r an e eat o n th e a e 2 0 ( ) , Au i d f Pi v , 8 2 53 In dex

st r an D s ons arr e on estern 51st 101 116 52 nd 117 Au i ivi i iv W ( ) , , ; ( ) , ron t 12 3 57th 117 62 nd 101 63 rd f , ( ) , ; ( ) , ; ( ) , es nes oc c at on of 2 2 2 11 Av , up i , 7 B rit ish Government u rge exp editious disp at ch of American t r00ps to HD D A G A , enemy ans for reca t re F ra nc e 63 B pl p u , o f 18 r t r ers es i n th e s r n , B i ish ev p i g of e t m 1 a c ap red by ene y , 50 918 3 7 et s e . B ill ul u , q reocc p a ti on of 117 B rock d orii - ant a von a m t s , z , u R u , d i ’ a k a n ent erp r se, oyd eor e s erma n d e eat 2 2 4 B l i Ll G g , G f , 2 41 ga r a a sk s for armmt i ce 175 Bul i , a a me b a tt e of 113 115 c a t at on of 2 08 B p u , l , , pi ul i , enemy e ac a t on of 115 co a se of 12 3 166 , p v u i ll , , erma n osses i n 116 mp endi n s rrend er of 149 G l , i g u ,

a er Co one 107 eco rt , t a nk a r a re a t 90 B u , l l , Bull u w f , a a e n t ere d by th e a rd s 2 2 2 es c e a or re err von d er 167 , h , j F ih B v i Gu Bu M , a ar a n C row n ri nce see a n c c a t re of 101 2 16 ( z y , p B v i P Rup Bu u , , p recht ) y n g b egi ns b at t e of ap a me 111 B l B u , , ea re o r i ne b roken 163 113 B u v i l , ’ ea a s , a n i nt er e th Foch B n s Thi rd rmy , op era t ons of B uv i vi w wi y g A i , a t 58 3 1 4 37 3 8 41 42 4 4 , , 3 , , , , , 4 , 5, 47 , ’ eersh eb a , Al l enb y s ct ory at . 2 18 113 , 115 147 153 157 159 199 B vi , , , , , , ,

e a n rmy, t h e, o era t ions of 2 00, 2 01, 2 06, 2 07 2 19 2 2 1 B lgi A p , , ,

147, 158 e a n coa st i n i ed h a n ds 197 B lgi All ,

e a ns ent er s t en d 197 CALA S , a con erence b etw een French B lgi O , I f

e m, a t rib t e t o h er n and a nd rit i sh o ern ment s at 4 B lgiu u Ki g B G v , a rm 2 50 en em r s for 49 y . y u h ,

e en se St . ent n Ca n a at re a rat ons fo r floo n a B ll gli , Qu i l p p i di g p 4 t ack ed a t 161 roa ch es t o, 9 , p

e e oo tt er st r e i n 98 C ambra ront , th e, r t sh ad ance d , b B ll u W i uggl , i f B i i v n e co rt T nne ront , a tt ack on o . 157 B lli u u l f , - 160 C ambra , er man co nt er att ack at i G u , ’ ert h e ot s rmy 96 19, 44 48 B l A , ,

et ne a a nt e ence of . 48 erma ns dr en rom 18 3 2 00 h d , B u , g ll f G iv f , r oo enera s ccee s o secon d bat t e of 18 1 d d , d gh , Bi w G l , u G u l i n comman of t rm 148 t an a tt ac s a t 17 8 9 90 d Fif h A y, k k , , ,

B l fi ch er a st or of 16 C ana di a n Corp s , op erat i ons of th e , y , ,

B oeh n von , and hi s comman d 109 103 . 157 . 2 19 , ,

o she sm i n erman rmy 12 7 Cana d a n s ions , op erat ons of B l vi G A , i Divi i

ombardment , a p ro on ed 157 (1st ) , 117 ; (z ud , 116 3rd 116, B l g , ) ; ( ) , on a e of 163 2 2 0 4th 117 B y , vill g , ; ( ) ,

o r o ne orest of 2 15 C a n a d a n s e nt er C amb ra , 2 00 B u g g , f , i i o r on oo 157 a na d u or sto rm n of t h e 157 B u l W d . C l N d , i g , r e i ronfiel ds of 12 1 2 18 2 34 Cap oretto di sa st er t o I t a ia n rmy y , , B i , , , l A

r t s rm t h e a t r t e t o t h e at 2 , 4 7 8 8 8 B i i h A y , , ibu , , , ” d Cont em ti bl es 2 49 Ca rey , en era c omma n ds a n im Ol p , G l , a e mi t ra i se 2 6 rov1sed orc e 44 g li d , p f ,

b r a nt b at t e t act c s of 50 C a a ry Corps , t h e, 107 illi l i , v l

ri t sh c as a t es i n F a n ders 53 Ch amp a ne, b at t e of 18 1 B i u l i l , g l , n r t sh Corp s , op era t on s of (3 rd Ch an e ort s, th e , a erma n dr e B i i i ) , l P G iv 3 4 2 103 ; (4t h ) , 157 ; (6th) , 157 ; (9th ) , for , 4, 8 , 49, 6 161 i 7th 157 mp ort a nc e of to reat r ta n ; ( ) , i , G B i i

r t sh c ross S amb re Ca nal 2 19 and France. 2 9 , B i i , r ti s s ons o erat on s of 4th Chatea -Th erry a rr a of mer B i h Divi i , p i ( ) , u i , iv l A i

117 i 5th . 101 3 4t h , 101 c a n t roop s at , 62 8 2 ; ( ) ; ( ) ; , 2 54

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Foch arsha con ti n u ed erma ns a car na n er of 2 , ( ) , d b d M l G i l lu , - p a ns for a co nt er o fens e, 70 a det erm n ed s h by 2 9 l u f iv i pu , repa ra t ions for na a d ance a an on o t ost s stem of de p fi l v , b d u p y 2 14 ence 136 n ot e f , ( )

n d er a c o d, 4 8 6 a m t e eat 2 2 3 , d d u l u i f , - Font a in e Not re am e, 157 a n e am e of ment a t of 197 D x pl li y , ort o f t h e oma n a m t h e 119 o s e st te n enc es i n s o ers F R C p , , B l h vi d i ldi

Fo rth rit sh rmy , peratio n s of , ret rne rom ss a 12 7 u B i A O u d f Ru i , 4 91, 103 et seq . 113 et seq 1 1, b omba r d ari s 62 , P , 4 1 7 , 153 , 159, 161 163 , 199, 2 00, ca pt re th e ne of th e S omme . 41 , u li 2 01 2 04 2 05 2 07 2 19 2 2 1 m n s n art er an d ma n , , , . , di i i hi g ill y

S ee a l so a i ns on o er of 12 2 12 3 . 12 5 ( R wl ) p w , , F ra nce a t rib t e to h er army 2 50 r e ac th e r t s i t rm , u , d iv b k B i i h F f h A y , a t er t h e at t e of e a n 2 10 10 f b l S d , a rri a of rs t mer ca n i s ons e ac ate orest o f o r o n e 2 16 v l fi A i D vi i v u f B u g g ,

i n , 17 ght n st ren t h of 8 4 fi i g g , d e en s e syst em of ea st ern t r of 132 2 18 k , f iv ul u , ron t ier of 119 mo e t roop s rom ss a n ront f , v f Ru i f , - d m n ish n ma n p o er of, 17 7 17 174 i i i g w , , m ort an ce of a n n e o rt s t o re n o rcement s rom th e a st ern i p Ch l p , i f f E 2 9 ront 17 f ,

t h e b at t e of, 18 1 (n ot e) r et re b eh n d ndenb r ne 1 l i i Hi u g li , , 18 6

t e r sc ent c a ns i n a r a re h i i ifi pl w f , 8 5-6

' AZA Al l enb s c tory a t , 2 , 18 t e r s econ e eat at th e a rn e , y h d d G vi i f M ,

eorge oyd a amo s sp eech of , 6 102 G , Ll , f u ’ and th e est ern ront i n t h e erma n Lu dend orfi s ran a c e W f G y , f k dvi s r n of 1918 2 5 to 111 p i g , . ecom es n ste r of n t ons m s n ers t an s s c o o of b Mi i Mu i i , i u d d p y h l gy 13 5 mer c a ns 68 A i , ’ c a ra ct er st cs of 7 1 t h e a ser s p rono ncement on h i i , K i u

h i s a ct on on ed or a n s at on , p a r ament ary o ernment 166 i Alli g i i li g v ,

4 12 enchy . th e 55th est a nca sh re , Giv W L i h i s a t i n oc 63 s on a t 48 f i h F h , Divi i , ro osa t o t r a ns er r t s rm ne sena and uc er 16 p p l f B i i h A y G i u Bl h , t o a ka n s 2 42 o h a b ase ess cha r e a a nst 3 9 B l , G ug , l g g i , G erma n a r ra ngement s for adva nc e a combinat ion of u nto w a rd

on aris 93 e ent s concern ng, 34 et s e . P , v i q

a t t ac k on Th rd and Fi th rm es a s b ack to t h e o mme, 39 i f A i , f ll S 3 4 o rms a re n orc ng orce 44 f i f i f , c am a n i n th e es t e eat of h i s rea r nes of de ence 39 p ig , d , W f li f , ’ 53 o gh s Fi t h rmy op erat i ons of G u f A , , 10 2 9 3 0 3 1 34 3 3 40 C rown ri n ce , th e 61, 62 , 69 110 , , , , , 7 , 8 , , 41, P , ,

ns secon att e o f t h e 45, 165 197 2 2 2 b egi d b l , , i t r t Ma rn e 110 (Cf. F h sh rmy) , f B i i A t t em t t o c a o ra d enera 146-7 2 14 u n s ucces sful a p p G u u , G l , , t re er n 154 att ac ks i n t h e Ch amp agne 156 u V du , , en s t em ' th e s na cor b ri ant d e ence of 95 def sive y s pi l d lli f , 46 c ros ses t h e s ne 2 07 of , 1 Ai , n 43 reach es Mez eres 2 17 r f s 1 , d ead o t a k , i e at e t roo s ran dp re a of 2 07 t on of t e r e , , r ec ep i h i d f d p , G f ll ra nt enera orms a re n or n 2 2 3 G , G l , f i f ci g or e 44 regiments st ren gt h of 2 2 6 (n ot e) c , , f r n er ro n a r rac s a 138 reat t a n , t h e mp ort a n ce of th e u d g u d b k , , G B i i i 18 2 7 Ch an n e o rt s t o 2 9 war st ren t i n 19 , g h , l p In dex

' reat War th e cont ro ers et een orne s Fi r st rmy, op erat ons of y b , G , , v w H A i “ ast erner s a nd est ern 45, 116 et seq . 147 , 157 , 163 165 E W , , , ” 2 06 2 07 2 19 2 2 1 ers , 12 5, 2 40 , , , r ast of 2 10 et se . (Cf . F st r t sh rmy l push , q i B i i A ) ar s s ons o erat ons of 2 07 mbert dr es enemy rom La s d p , Gu Divi i , i , Hu iv f 2 2 0 2 2 2 s igny p ate a 108 , l u , occ p es Noyon 115 u i , t er Genera von attem t s t Hu i , l , p o r G S i s Bos s u s a s r r se attac each Compie ne, 65. 110 A , p k H I , u i g on th e n en r n e 7 8 Hi d bu g li ,

a se ec s o n of 42 , 46 wi d i i , a nd ars a oc 13 14 18 1 M h l F h , , , I ND AN t roop s for a est n e 18 19 2 6 a n d th e rs t att e of th e S omme I P l i , , , fi b l , I t a a n co a ps e on t h e I sonzo 2 7 3 li ll ,

d sa st er at C ap orett o 2 , 4 78 8 8 and th e German at t ack on Fifth i , , , It a y , r t sh r e n orcement s for 2 l B i i i f , , rmy , 10 A 2 1 78 att ac s enem on m ens ront , k y A i f , 103 att en s con erence at o ens 11 d f D ull , e ten s h i s ro nt 2 3 x d f , J R US ALEM, ca pt re of 2 18 E u , , h i s fi t n st ren t i n arc gh i g g h M h, J eu dwi ne Si r H. , comman der of 5sth , 1918 2 1 0 , est a n cas hire s on 48 W L Divi i , o rders withd raw al from Flanders Jofi re ener a a n d es t n o , G l, qu io f r dges 49 i , n it y of comma nd 4 u , p rep arat ions for sma shi n g Hi n a tt a cks St . M h e s a ent 119 12 1 i i l li , , d enb u rg ne, 151 li a i re of h i s rst ofiensi ve 56 f lu fi , s yst em of army t r a n n 18 7 i i g , un success ful assa ult i n Ch a m t r b t e t o 55t h es t an cas h re i u W L i a ne 73 p g . s on 48 Divi i , n a er n co ra e of 60 u w v i g u g , Ham ermans cros s th e r er at 40 , G iv .

occ p ed by t h e French , 117 u i Ksmms t . enemy att a cks rep sed a t ul . ame att e of 90 91 103 H l , b l , , , 50

azebro ck p er o s p os t on of , 49 H u , il u i i Kemme a ned by ermans 51 l Hill g i G , Hertli n von, s p ers ess o n of 166 g, u i , 59 nd enb r rst co p on est ern t n r Hi u g , fi u W che e , or d, ores ht of 2 42 Ki L f ig , , ro nt 1 f , 2 43 h i s ct ory a t Tannenb r 15 , K c von an d rst t t vi u g lu k , , fi ba le of Le nsist s on a p eace offer to es , C at ea 2 00 i Alli u , ’ a nd von ayer s rep y 177 178 ' , P l , t r , erman nst anc es of 132 Kul u G , i , , erso na t of 15 p li y , 2 18 re es t o von ayer 179 p , Kut T li P , rk sh de eat at 2 u i f , s ccee s a en a n 15 u d F lk h y , t e e ram t o von a er 167 l g P y , t en ers h is res nat on 111 d ig i , ” m n en r ne t h e, 1 112 113 Lw nas c s, capt re of 2 2 0 i d b g , , , H u li , , u 117 aon ent ered by th e French 198 L , t a n a t acked an d broken 133 148 161 ssi g y, b att e of , 110 , , , L l

et se . Le at ea rst att e of 2 00 e q C u , fi b l . s cond

ba tt e for ' th e dec s e d a 161 bat t e of, 2 01 l i iv y , l ’ Hai g s s r r se at t ac on 78 Le es no s rre n ers u p i k , Qu y u d to New r o n of n ame , 12 9 Zea an ders 2 2 0 igi l , o rig na s ect on of 13 1 Le Tron oy T nn e 160 i l i , qu u l , st rengt h of d e ences of 164 i n r t s an s 163 , h h d f B i i ,

nt ze, von 66 ens coal fiel ds 130 Hi , L . rson t ak en by th e French 2 2 2 Les E ar es 119 Hi , p g , In dex m L ett enera t akes co man d of a e, h i s ctor at Kut 2 , , M d y igg G l u vi ,

F rst mer can rmy , 2 01 ro ts t h e T rk s 8 8 i A i A u u , e e ac at e e n em 197 Max of a en r n ce and Hi Lill v u d by y , B d , P i . nden ’ e 1 menac ed by th es , 59 b r s s est ed eace ofier Alli u g ugg p , e rec a t re t h e ren c 52 179 Loc r p u d by F h , on u on ra a st at on s e e en ea o rs t o o m a L g y ilw y i h ll d , d v u f r Govern

2 16 ment , 167 orra ne w thdra wa of F rench ec omes ance or 112 179 18 0 , b Ch , L i i l ll , , rmy rom 56 a e t h e wa for eace ne ot i a A f , p v s y p g n o ch e r M. a t o e s con er t ons 2 02 L u u , , D ull f i , en n ence , 11 e nt ered by mer 197 M i Plu , Lu dend orfi a d s es mmed at e o fer er i e a of 49 vi i i f M v ll , f ll ,

of p eac e 111, 166 ret aken by es 117 , Alli ,

a n d h i s s to rm t roop s , 33 eso ot am a x e t on a l t M p i E p di i , f u y a n et conc ern n a m ra 158 a ns of 2 44 xi y i g C b i , pl , app ea s t o st r a for ai d on eso ot a m a o erat ons i n 2 M p i , p l Au i i , est ern ront 12 3 ro t of th e T rks i n 8 8 W f , u u , a s c ont ro n m nd at erma n es s n es at t e of 77 18 8 , b lli g i G M i l , , ead art ers 14 16 Messmes e c ea re m , , dg d by er 2 H qu Ri l Plu ,

ch a nges h i s m t ary p o c y 111, s en di or of 9t h i s o n , p d k n o ili li l w Div i , 112 49

- d r e on t h e S omme, 14 e se r onne att e of 18 1 , b iv M u A g l , f en e 13 1 f e a borat e scheme o de c , d c t es of mer c an rmy i n l f i fi ul i A i A , rst co on est ern ro nt 1 18 9 fi up W f , - o rth ofiens i ve of , 65 e se Champ a ne ront efiect of f u M u g f , hi s con dence of ct ory 66 att ac on 164 fi vi , k ,

h i s p an of r et reat , a nd h ow i t e se e t s e en ce of 119 h gh , d l M u i f , r wa s d e eated , 193 et seq . ez e es r each ed by o ra d 2 17 f M i G u u , d e u r t a ns for t h e Fri e n st m, 93 ary S er ce ct s , ext ens on of pl Mili vi A i ,

res er e s i n M arch , 1918 2 8 2 19 v , ’ res t of a c ost r e s e 45 i ner or and Foch s a o nt ul ly pul , M l , L d , pp i e nd i t s ost 02 6 m nt 3 ret r at of , a c , 1 , 11 , e , 1 118 i n con erence at o ens 11 f D ull ,

st rat e y of, 2 7 2 9, 3 1 Mi na umont a of 114 g , , f ll ,

t en ders h i s res gn at o n , 2 08 on chy l o re x c a pt red 116 i i M P u u ,

t r es t o ra y , 192 et s eq . Mon ro, Si r Cha r es 19 2 3 8 i ll l , ,

L s th e crosse mer, 197 on s e nt ered by C a n a di a ns 2 2 2 , d by y , Plu M ,

ont S t . ent n carr ed by a ssa t M Qu i i ul , 114

Mi cxrs ss s h rri es t roo s t owa r ds Mont a con , c apt re of 155 u p f u u , o a 17 5 ont medy ent ered by th e ies 2 18 S fi , M All , i n i f c t es i n t h e a ans 12 3 res ence of erma n ro n d fi ul i B lk , , id G C w 166 175 r nce 2 15 , P i ,

a e n . o s 18 1 n ot e t h e ra wa y s t at on she ed 2 16 d M , M li , L ui , ( ) il i ll

an n en era at t ac s th e enem orm a Forest , 2 18 2 19, 2 2 0 k y , M gi , G l, , M l 97 d rives Germa ns from Ai s ne

e t s 109 N SLE. eb eney at , 115 h igh , E D o ens a tt ac a t o s son s 109 Ne e a e e r t s reocc at on p k S i . uv Ch p ll , B i i h up i ’ arne th e rs t at t e of Foch s of 118 M , , fi b l , ,

a c e ement s at 56 New Zea an der s 163 , 2 2 0 hi v , l ,

arne t h e s ec on att e of 8 7 92 Ni e e, enera , h i s c a mp a gn and , d b , M , l , , v ll G l i

97 110 17 7 i t s a i re, 1 4 7 3 , , f lu , , mer can s i n 12 6 s c ce ed s Jofi re 7 3 A i , u ,

art np ch a of 114 Nort h d a n d Terr t or a s , 161 M i ui , f ll , Mi l i i l a e e oc c at on of 2 2 2 Noyon o cc p ed by mb ert 115 b p , M u ug , u i , u i Hu 2 58

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oi s S sons, Marigi n atta cks enemy at Un t e St at es of mer ca first , i d A i , divi

108 . 109 n i n ran e 17 see sio s arrive F c . ( Som e. t he rst b at t e of 1 34 18 7 a l so mer can , fi l , , , A i ) t an s i n 76 Un t of comman est on di s~ k , i y d , qu i

So n ra n n an d th e a cc rac c s se 3 et se . u d gi g u y u d, q of art er fi re 135 ill y , S an s S cces s on War t h e 9 p i h u i , Of , py s yst em i n erma ny 67 ENC NNE entere ana ans , VAL S d by C d S G IE i , S up reme Wa r Council (see Vers ailles 2 19 ’ Co nc i er n a en a n s ai re at a nd ) V d , F k h y u l u l f lu , h i s s p erse ss on 14 u i , erman e eat a t 73 G d f ,

TANKS , a r ank erman con ess on ers a es a n ec t e t ar f G f i V ill , Ex u iv Mili y re a r n 17 1 o nc orme at 8 g di g, C u il f d , ’ deserters disclosu res of imp en d meet in g Of Sup reme Wa r Cou ncil i n att ack 99 n ot e a t 8 2 g by , ( ) , n 1 4 erma , 51, 4 V ers a es Co nci th e, est ab shment G ill u l , li m ro ement i n r t sh 105 5 i p v B i i , Of , i n ar are 6 8 - , 7 , 9, 91 99, 105, 106, Vi ers B r ettonneux erman occ p a w f , ll , G u 142 t on of 51 i , ’ Lu d endorfi s c an e e of 143 r ec a t re r t s 51 h g d vi w , p u d by B i i h , ’ Lu d endorfi s cr t c sms of rs t m e ca t re a 73 i i i fi Vi y Ridg p u d by H ig , r t s 8 0 enem re arat ons a a nst c a B i i h , y p p i g i p t h e erman d rea d of 143 t re 13 3 G , u Of , ’ Ta nnenb rg , erma n ict ory at 15 Foc h e a r e at 4 73 8 6 u G v , f ilu , , , T hiep a idge , a of 114 i t s de ens e a e 45 v l R f ll , f iv v lu , T r r t s rm i t s c r t a hi d B i i h A y, i ic l S it at i on 41 u , i t s or o s e en ce 37 WAR com e ro ems of 2 40 gl i u d f , , pl x p bl ,

o era t ons of , 3 1 3 4 3 8 45 47 113 t h e de as t at o n of 18 2 p , i , , , , , v i 115 147 153 157 159 199 2 00 est a nc a sh re i s on 5sth al , , , , , , , W L i D vi i ( ) , g 2 01 2 06 2 07 2 19 2 2 1 a nt d ee ds of 48 , , , , l ,

rece es a ort on of Fi th rmy i ia m H . , m ero r, a rra nges d e iv p i f A , W ll E p 42 ta s of h i s ent ry nt o ar s 68 il i P i ,

Th oma s . bert 13 5 at reat ea dq art ers con er , M Al , G H u f

Tho ro t occ p ed by e an s 197 enc e, 111 u u u i B lgi , To rna occ at on of 2 2 2 ss es p ron o ncement o n t h e i n , p i u i u , i u u Tran s ort at on c t es of 2 2 8 ci t rod u ct i on of p ar a ment ary p i , diffi ul i , li

s e . go ernment 166 q v , t ne s s Trench s yst ems , erman 13 8 139 s es ec ond batt e th e G , , wi l Of

Tren ch ar are con dit ions of 71 arn e , 69 w f , , M oc an d 8 9 s on en era Si r enry atten ds F h , , , Wil G l H o ens con eren e 1 T rkey, cap t at on of 2 08 c , 1 u i ul i , D ull f T r s rm t h e sor an s t on son res dent erma n req est k h y di a , , u i A , , g i i Wil P i G u of 18 for a rmist ce disp at ch ed t o , i , T rk s de eat ed at Kut 2 18 0 u f ,

re ent an ement s, e aborat e 137 Wi gl l ,

U-B AT cam a n t h e 2 66 O p ig , , , ' Lu d end orfi s o n on on 68 n ot e Yras s rst bat t e of Foc h a nd , 59 pi i , ( ) , fi l ,

Un te tat es of mer ca a eat of th r d b at t e of , 53 7 5 77 158 , d i , , i S A , f i l , t ransp ort at on by 63 8 4 188 i , , “ a nd n t of c omman 7 8 13 u se t a nk s i n 77 y d , , u i , , Of

ent ers t h e wa r 2 Yp res sa ent , th e 2 , li ,

R P INTED av CASS ELL C O MPANY I M ITED LA ai t s SAUV AGs , ONDON C , L , B L , E 4 F O 4 . 9 x9