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2444Ch13 3/12/02 2:05 pm Page 315 13 Ben J.S. Hoetjes The Netherlands: a former founding father in search of control Introduction: a mature member’s second thoughts The involvement of the Dutch in European integration dates back to the 1950s, and so do the Dutch attitudes towards it. Over the years, they have changed, but there is also a long-standing support for the overall process of European integration. A clear distinction, however, should be drawn between the elite and the general public. For the general public, European integration in the 1950s was a good cause, to be left to the experts and to the elite. Until the mid-1960s, when the system of pillarisation1 was still in force, the general public was quite willing to leave politics to its pillarised elites (Catholic, Protestant, Socialist or Liberal-Conservative). Within the political elite, there was hardly any disagreement about European integration, and the general public played its role as a ‘captive audience’. In the mid-1960s, relations between the voters and the elite, and within the elite, became less predictable. New parties emerged, and ‘floating voters’ became more important in the elections.2 In the 1970s, public opinion and political discussion were radicalised. Remarkably, however, this change did not affect the Union. European integration remained a highly technical, specialised and politically uninteresting field. Notions about integration were rather vague. There was, at least, an implicit assumption that Dutch identity and Dutch political institutions would remain in place, and that the integration process would deliver considerable benefits, especially in economic terms.3 With the decline of ideology and political participation in the 1980s, European integration became a matter of ‘positive indifference’. After the end of the Cold War, ideological controversies subsided, or virtually disappeared. The public at large lost interest in politics altogether. Only very down-to-earth and close-to- home issues such as safety in the streets, the stock exchange, career openings, private business, etc. could draw the public’s attention. Against this ‘post-modern’ background, the mid-1990s showed more Ben J.S. Hoetjes - 9781526137364 Downloaded from manchesterhive.com at 10/02/2021 02:42:32PM via free access 2444Ch13 3/12/02 2:05 pm Page 316 316 Member States and the European Union and more signs of Euroscepticism and Eurocynicism. Gradually, European integration came to be criticised as ‘too costly’, ‘wasteful’, ‘un-democratic’, etc. Business people remained quite positive about the Union, but in other circles, positive indifference was replaced by controversy, or by negative indifference. The Dutch state and the integration process: the constitution and national politics The ratification of the EU treaties (Maastricht and Amsterdam) created no constitutional problems. Although international treaties require the assent of parliament, the Dutch Constitution permits the granting of legislative and/or executive powers to international bodies created to carry out international treaties (Article 92). Therefore, neither Maastricht nor Amsterdam required a constitutional amendment. Both treaty ratifica- tions as such, did not generate a serious discussion in parliament. Because of this smooth and silent approval, it took some time before Dutch politics and administration became aware of the consequences of the Maastricht Treaty. Specifics will be presented later, but in general there was a rather hurried and haphazard reaction to the Union as the new supranational level of government. Meanwhile, some important political changes took place in the 1990s. One was the decline in ideological identity, especially among the left. Another, related to the first, was the emergence of new coalitions. The 1994 parliamentary elections brought losses for the social democrats and the Christian Democrats, and gains for the liberal conservatives and the leftist liberals. The new ‘purple’ coalition government led by the social democrat Kok left the Christian Democrats in opposition – an event unprecedented since the First World War. After the 1998 elections, a second ‘purple’ government was formed. The policy programme of the new government did not represent a radical break with the previous government (Christian Democrat/social democrat coalition), but there were some interesting changes from an EU perspective. For one thing, the Christian Democrats no longer represented the Netherlands in Brussels. Personalities such as Lubbers disappeared, and the long-standing Christian Democratic commitment to Europe was replaced by social democratic and liberal commitments. Personalised animosities, e.g. Lubbers’ failure to become President of the Commission, could be put aside. Something else was also obvious: new, and more crit- ical attitudes towards the Union would soon present themselves. In terms of personnel, the trio of Lubbers–van den Broek–Dankert (Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, State Secretary for European Affairs) was replaced by Kok–van Mierlo–Patijn. Patijn (liberal conservative) took a low profile, and concentrated on the organisational and diplomatic side of EU work. Van Mierlo (left liberal) took a higher public profile, preferring broad ‘philosophical’ views on world affairs, and – Ben J.S. Hoetjes - 9781526137364 Downloaded from manchesterhive.com at 10/02/2021 02:42:32PM via free access 2444Ch13 3/12/02 2:05 pm Page 317 The Netherlands 317 interestingly – stressing closer relations between the Netherlands and France. Kok, however, took the actual lead in Dutch EU affairs. Being on close personal terms with Helmut Kohl – in spite of party differences – he managed to improve Dutch–German relations, both bilaterally and within the Union. In the background, the Queen and especially her husband Prince Claus von Amsberg, contributed further to the Dutch commitment to the Union and to close relations with Germany. The second ‘purple’ coalition in 1998 involved the same parties, but some new personalities. The Kok–van Mierlo–Patijn group was succeeded by the trio of Kok–van Aartsen–Benschop. Kok and Benschop belonged to the social democratic party while van Aartsen was a liberal conservative. Although this implied a stronger social democratic weight in EU affairs, it should be taken into account that Benschop did not have any EU experience – he was the election campaign manager for the social democrats. Van Aartsen, on the other hand, was Agriculture Minister in the former ‘purple’ coalition. As such, he acquired considerable EU experience. He has a reputation for down-to-earth political skill and as a ‘general manager’ more than a ‘career diplomat’. Furthermore, he has close links with the (liberal conservative) Minister of Finance, Zalm, who strongly asserted himself in EU affairs after 1994 – he was also the Finance Minister in the previous government. Next to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (assisted by the State Secretary for European Affairs), the Ministry of Finance plays a strategic role, both in domestic politics (co-ordinating all public finance) and in EU affairs. Dutch policy priorities in the Union: a rethinking of governments and political parties For the Dutch government, the Maastricht Treaty and the new European Commission in 1994 were two ‘dramatic moments ‘ of rude awakening to the political realities of Europe in the 1990s. In the negotiations for Maastricht, the Dutch presidency took a strongly pro-federal position which proved untenable and had to be discarded in a rather embarrassing way. The TEU’s three-pillar structure was a Luxembourg–French design,4 forced upon an unwilling and disgraced Dutch presidency. For the Dutch, Maastricht is remembered vividly as ‘Black Monday’5 – a major diplomatic failure, and a trauma, especially for the Foreign Ministry. The Dutch, therefore, have tended to overlook the enormous progress of European integration brought about by the TEU. In the negotiations for the new Commission in 1993–94, Prime Minister Lubbers campaigned rather openly for the Commission Presidency. When this failed – the post went, rather humiliatingly, to the Luxembourg Santer – he campaigned for the position of NATO Secretary- General, and also failed. These two experiences, on the one hand, created ill-feelings especially among the Christian Democrats – the bitterness of ‘a Ben J.S. Hoetjes - 9781526137364 Downloaded from manchesterhive.com at 10/02/2021 02:42:32PM via free access 2444Ch13 3/12/02 2:05 pm Page 318 318 Member States and the European Union founding-father of the EU, who is no longer listened to’. This may well have contributed to the electoral discredit of the Christian Democrats in 1994 and 1998. On the other hand, they also forced the Netherlands to re-think its approach and priorities in the Union. This re-thinking process has not yet come to an end, but since 1994 some overall changes have emerged. First, there is now an explicit commitment to the national interest. Before 1994, the Netherlands always declared their full and explicit commitment to the cause of European integration – implicitly assuming that this was the best way to serve the national interest. After 1994, the government publicly stated its desire to promote its national interest in Europe, including Dutch business interests. Secondly, a higher priority is given to financial issues in the Union. The presidency of the ECB was won by the Dutch social democratic banker Duisenberg, after a sustained and extensive

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