Science Made Up: Constructivist Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

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Science Made Up: Constructivist Sociology of Scientific Knowledge Science Made Up: Constructivist Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. In P. Galison and D. Stump (eds.) The Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Contexts, and Power. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, pp. 231-54. REFERENCES Barnes, B. 1977. Interests and the growth of knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Barnes, B. and D. Bloor 1982. Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of knowledge. In M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds.) Rationality and relativism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1982, pp 21-47. Bloor, D. 1976 (second edition, 1991). Knowledge and social imagery. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Bloor, D. 1981. The strengths of the strong programme. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11:199-213. Fine, A. 1986. Unnatural attitudes: Realist and instrumentalist attachments to science. Mind XCV: 149-179. Fine, A. 1988. The shaky game: Einstein, realism and the quantum theory, revised paperback edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Fine, A. 1991. Piecemeal Realism. Philosophical Studies 61: 79-96. Galison, P. 1987. How experiments end. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Garfinkel, H. 1967. Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Hacking, I. 1983. Representing and intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hollis, M. and S.Lukes (eds.) 1982. Rationality and relativism. Oxford: Blackwell. Husserl, E. 1970. The crisis of the European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Translated by David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Knorr-Cetina, K.D. 1981. The manufacture of knowledge: An essay on the constructivist and contextual nature of science. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Latour, B and S.Woolgar. 1979. Laboratory life: The social construction of scientific facts. London: Sage Publications. Second edition as Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Latour, B. 1987. Science in action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Laudan, L. 1981. The pseudo-science of science? Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11: 173-98. Lawson, H. and L. Appignanesi (eds.) l988. Dismantling truth: science in postmodern times. London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson. McCarthy,T. 1988. Scientific rationality and the "strong program" in the sociology of knowledge. In E.McMullin (ed.) Construction and constraint. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, pp.73-96. Merton, R.K. 1973. The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Miller, R.W. 1987. Fact and method. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pickering, A. 1984. Constructing quarks: A sociological history of particle physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Putnam, H. 1981. Reason, truth and history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, H. 1987. The many faces of realism. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court. Rorty, R. 1979. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rorty, R. 1982. Consequences of pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Sargent, R. 1988. Explaining the success of science. In A.Fine and J.Leplin (eds.), PSA 1988, Volume 1. E. Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association, pp.55- 63. Shapin, S. 1982. The Sociology of Science. History of Science 20: 157-211. Shapin, S. 1988. Review of Andrew E. Benjamin et al, The figural and the literal. Isis 79: 127-28. Sharrock,W. and R.J. Anderson. 1986. The ethnomethodologists. London: Tavistock Publications. Traynham, J.C.(ed.) 1987. Essays on the history of organic chemistry. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Woolgar, S.(ed.) 1988a. Knowledge and reflexivity. London: Sage Publications. Woolgar, S. 1988b. Science, the very idea. London: Tavistock Publications. Wylie, A. 1988. Explaining confirmation practice. Philosophy of Science 55: 292-303. .
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