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The Parties Manifesto Promises on Brexit and Devolved Government

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The Parties Manifesto Promises on Brexit and Devolved Government The parties manifesto promises on Brexit and devolved government Colour indicates policy alignments Brexit Party Not ‘seeking election as a government’. Propose a ‘Contract with the People’. A ‘Clean-Break Brexit’: • ‘no extended ‘transition period’, • ‘no further entanglement with the EU’s controlling political institutions’. Conservative ‘Get Brexit Done’. ‘Keep the UK out of’: • the Single Market • any form of Customs Union • end the role of the ECJ No extension of the implementation period beyond December 2020. A trade agreement with the EU by December 2020. DUP ‘Want to see a sensible Brexit’ ‘No borders in the Irish Sea’. Do not consider the current deal in NI’s longer-term interests. Requirements for a revised deal are: • unfettered access from NI to GB market, • ‘one-nation approach’ to the customs and consent arrangements, and • ‘the principles of power-sharing ‘must be enshrined in any deal’. Would work to secure a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU. If no FTA, ‘the UK tariff schedule should ensure reciprocal tariffs are placed on all agri food products which are imported from the EU’. Would not support trade agreements that would allow goods that do not meet equivalent standards as required of NI farmers. Would also ‘place a much more sustainable Tariff Rate Quota and Tariff Rate on all imports from the rest of the world’. Green Party People’s Vote; ‘an immediate final say on the terms of any Brexit deal’. Remain as an option on the ballot paper. Would campaign for remain. Labour Rules out a no-deal Brexit. A ‘final say referendum’ on Labour’s new Brexit deal. Remain as an option on the ballot paper. Welsh Labour government would campaign to remain. A new Brexit deal 6 months post-election, to: • protect jobs, rights and the environment, • avoid a hard border in NI, • avoid a regulatory border down the Irish Sea, • protect the Good Friday Agreement, and • ensure no change in the status or sovereignty of Gibraltar. Labour’s new Brexit deal would also include: • a permanent and comprehensive UK-wide customs union, • close alignment with the Single Market, • dynamic alignment on workers’ rights, consumer rights and environmental protections, • continued participation in EU agencies and funding programmes, • clear commitments on future security arrangements, • a revised Withdrawal Agreement that provides legal protection for citizens’ rights, and • an appropriate transition period. Oppose a 2nd Scottish independence referendum. Liberal Democrats ‘Stop Brexit’ Revoke Article 50 and stay in the EU. A UK written, federal constitution. Home rule for each of the nations of a federal UK. Oppose a 2nd Scottish independence referendum. A permanent Scottish Parliament. National Assembly for Wales ‘to mature into a Welsh Parliament’. Plaid Cymru A ‘Final Say Referendum’ The ‘minimum’ needed to protect Wales’ economic interests, are membership of the: • EU Single Market, and • Customs Union. SNP Do not support the PM’s ‘Brexit deal’. Would support a 2nd referendum. Remain as an option on the ballot paper. Would support the revocation of Article 50, if it is the only alternative to a ‘no deal’ Brexit. Would always vote to protect Scotland’s place in the Single Market and Customs Union. Calls for an independence referendum; date to be set by the Scottish Parliament but wants it in 2020. Would campaign for the UK to remain aligned with EU environmental regulations. Is ‘willing to take part in a progressive alliance to lock the Tories out of office’. A ‘clean-break exit from the EU ‘complete and total withdrawal’. UKIP Do not support the current Brexit deal. Want to ‘take back full and immediate control of sovereignty, laws, money, borders, trade and fishing waters on 31st January 2020’. Do not support a ‘regulatory or customs border down the Irish Sea’. Supports a FTA with the EU with on terms: • tariff-free trade in goods and services, and • regulatory independence. If no FTA, support trade with the EU on WTO terms. womblebonddickinson.com © Copyright 2019 Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP. All rights reserved. Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP is authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority..
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