DOCSLIB.ORG

Incremental Peace in Afghanistan Accord ISSUE 27 an International Review of Peace Initiatives

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Incremental Peace in Afghanistan Accord ISSUE 27 an International Review of Peace Initiatives Logo using multiply on 27 layers Accord ISSUE Editors an international review of peace initiatives Logo drawn as seperate elements with overlaps Anna Larson and coloured seperately Alexander Ramsbotham 2018 Incremental peace in Afghanistan 27 Accord ISSUE an international review of peace initiatives Incremental peace in Afghanistan June 2018 // Editors Anna Larson and Alexander Ramsbotham Accord // ISSUE 27 // www.c-r.org Published by Conciliation Resources, to inform and strengthen peace processes worldwide by documenting and analysing the lessons of peacebuilding Published by Acknowledgements Conciliation Resources We would like to give special thanks to Professor Burghley Yard, 106 Burghley Road Michael Semple for his extensive expert advice London, NW5 1AL and substantive editorial input and support for www.c-r.org this Accord publication. Professor Semple's experience, insights and ideas have been Telephone +44 (0)207 359 7728 integral to conceptual development and practical Fax +44 (0)207 359 4081 implementation throughout this Accord project. Email [email protected] We would also like to thank the following: Charity registered in England and Wales Ali Wardak, Heela Najibullah, Christine Bell, (1055436). Company limited by guarantee Charlotte Morris, Scott Worden, Sippi Azerbaijani registered in England and Wales (03196482). Moghaddam, Jonathan Cohen, Ed Hadley, Chris Sell, Jawed Nader, Noah Coburn, Erika Tarzi, Editors Kate Clark, Emma Leslie, Veronika Tesarova, Anna Larson and Alexander Ramsbotham Beatrice Liese, Timor Sharan, Sayed Abdullah Ahmadi, Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Mohammed Executive Director Munir Salamzai, Ali Hassan Fahimi, Shaharzad Jonathan Cohen Akbar, Ahmad Shuja, Malais Daud, Rahmatullah Director of Accord Hashemi, Sayed Ali Faisal, Lotfullah Najafizada, Alexander Ramsbotham Amir Hussain Hussaini, Tahir Qadiri, Mohammed Hussain Hasrat, Wali Naeemi, Hamish Nixon, Director of Policy and Learning Francesc Vendrell, Tom Rodwell, Behrouz Teresa Dumasy Afagh, Hameed Hakimi, Jenny Norton, Daud Senior Advisor, Peace and Transition Processes Qarisadah, Marika Theros, Elizabeth Winter, Zahbia Yousuf Christopher Langton, Kathryn Tomlinson and Andrew Nethercott. Senior Advisor, Gender and Peacebuilding Sophia Close Special thank you to Veronika Tesarova for her invaluable role throughout the project Policy, Accord and Learning Officer and publication. Felix Colchester Opinions expressed by all contributors are Accord, Policy and Practice Assistant their own. Veronika Tesarova This report is an output of the Political Copyedited by Aaron Griffiths Settlements Research Programme, funded by Designed and typeset by Soapbox UK aid from the Department for International www.soapbox.co.uk Development for the benefit of developing countries. The views expressed and information © Conciliation Resources 2018 contained in it are not necessarily those of Permission is granted for reproduction and or endorsed by DFID, which can accept no use of the materials for educational purposes. responsibility for such views or information Please acknowledge your source when using the or for any reliance placed on them. materials and notify Conciliation Resources. www.politicalsettlements.org Cover photo: No matter how high the mountain, Twitter.com/PolSettlements there will always be a way up. (Dari proverb) View of a village in Nuristan province, Afghanistan // © MohibNoor/iStock ISSN 2397-5598 ISBN 978-1-905805-26-6 Contents Acronyms 4 Foreword 5 Introduction 7 Section 1: Looking back – lessons from Afghanistan’s past 13 Afghanistan’s political history 15 Lessons from Bonn 20 Transformative politics in 20th century Afghanistan 25 President Najibullah and the National Reconciliation Policy 30 Taliban history of war and peace in Afghanistan 35 Peace in Afghanistan: a northern, non-Pashtun perspective 41 Section 2: Looking forward – peace initiatives 46 Elusive settlement in Afghanistan 48 Perspectives of leaders of five Taliban caucuses – interviews 56 Women’s participation in Afghan peace talks 63 Integrating a military and peace strategy – interview with Amb. Douglas Lute 68 Statement by the Taliban Political Office in Qatar 72 Brokering local settlements in Helmand 74 Local peacebuilding in Afghanistan 80 International support for a political process 85 Section 3: Looking forward – institutional change 91 Inclusive politics as a path to peace 93 Local perspectives on peace and elections – Herat Province 102 On elections and peace: Dr Habiba Sarabi – interview 104 Local perspectives on peace and elections – Nangarhar Province 106 On peace and political reform: Younus Qanooni – interview 109 Local perspectives on peace and elections – Balkh Province 113 Theses on peacemaking in Afghanistan 115 Local perspectives on peace and elections – Ghazni Province 119 Human rights, security and Afghanistan’s peace process 122 On war, peace and transition: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – interview 128 Institutionalising inclusive and sustainable justice in Afghanistan 132 Conclusion 138 Chronology 143 Glossary 147 Profiles 148 Key texts 152 References 154 Accord series 156 Incremental peace in Afghanistan // 3 Acronyms ACJC – Anti-Corruption Justice Centre ISK – Islamic State of Khorasan ADR – Alternative dispute resolution KHAD – State Intelligence Agency – Khadamat-e Aetla’at-e Dawlati AIBA – Afghanistan Independent Bar Association MoJ – Ministry of Justice AIHRC – Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission MoWA – Ministry of Women’s Affairs ANA – Afghan National Army NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ANP – Afghan National Police NDS – National Directorate of Security ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces NRP – National Reconciliation Policy BAAG – British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group NUG – National Unity Government BRI – Belt and Road Initiative OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom CDC – Community Development Council PDPA – People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan DDA – District Development Assembly PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration SERC – Special Electoral Reform Commission HIG – Hezb-i Islami-ye Gulbuddin SNTV – Single Non-Transferable Vote HRSU – Human Rights Support Unit SSR – Security Sector Reform HRU – Human Rights Unit UN5PPP – UN five-Point Peace Plan IEC – Independent Electoral Commission UNDP – United Nations Development Programme INLTC – Independent National Legal Training Centre USIP – United States Institute of Peace ISAF – International Security Assistance Force USV – Upper Sangin Valley ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence 64° 66° 68° 70° 72° 74° CHINA AFGHANISTAN UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN JAWZJAN KUNDUZ TURKMENISTAN BALKH TAKHAR BADAKHSHAN 36° 36° SAMANGAN FARYAB BAGHLAN AFGHANISTAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SARIPUL Jammu BADGHIS PANJSIER NURISTAN BAMYAN N and PARWAN KAPISA A KUNAR M H G Kashmir A WARDAK Kabul L 34° NANGARHAR 34° HERAT GHOR DAY LOGAR KUNDI Islamabad PAKTYA GHAZNI KHOST PAKISTAN URUZGAN FARAH PAKTIKA 32° ZABUL 32° National capital NIMROZ KANDAHAR International boundary Provincial boundary HELMAND INDIA 0 50 100 150 200 250 km 30° 30° Map: United Nations 0 50 100 150 mi 62° 64° 66° 68° 70° 72° 74° 4 // Accord // ISSUE 27 Foreword Mohammad Kareem Khalili His Excellency Mohammad Kareem Khalili is Chair of the High Peace Council of Afghanistan, having previously served as Vice-President of Afghanistan from 2002–14 during both the Interim Administration and then under elected Mohammad Kareem Khalili. President Hamid Karzai. The country known as ‘Afghanistan’ has been burning in Of course, questions remain as to the conditions under the fire of war and violence for nearly forty years now. which peace can be achieved. But despite these questions, These destructive wars have inflicted all kinds of injury Afghanistan’s political class is confident that peace on every aspect of the country. From the widespread and offers the best way to escape the current crisis without largescale slaughter of our people, to the destruction of precipitating a new one. housing and economic infrastructure, to the degrading of the natural environment, to the traumatised psychology Undoubtedly, peace in Afghanistan is intimately linked to of the war-affected. From the violation of the rights and international peace. The problem of conflict in Afghanistan freedoms of women and children, to the crumbling of the is a manifestation of contemporary global conflict. rule of law. And from the emergence of all kinds of negative Therefore, progress towards peace in Afghanistan will not phenomena in the domain of social relations, to the damage just save the residents of this country from the evils of war, to the nation’s cultural life. These are all consequences it will also contribute to the solution of a global problem. which the continuous wars have inflicted on the people Accordingly, while the peace process in Afghanistan is of Afghanistan. Therefore, to extricate the country from Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, it requires the clear and this horrendous, bitter state requires a transformational committed support from the countries of the region and approach. This approach is peace and understanding! at the international level. Only peace offers a sustainable and fundamental solution to the Afghan crisis. In 2001, the international community achieved a rare unity of action with regard to Afghanistan. It was thus able to The necessity of achieving peace is one issue on which there transform positively the lives of millions of our people and is no difference of opinion. Over the past ten months the
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Justice & Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar
    Justice & Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar M AY 2014 Above: Behsud Bridge, Nangarhar Province (Photo by TLO) A TLO M A P P I N G R EPORT Justice and Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar May 2014 In Cooperation with: © 2014, The Liaison Office. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, The Liaison Office. Permission can be obtained by emailing [email protected] ii Acknowledgements This report was commissioned from The Liaison Office (TLO) by Cordaid’s Security and Justice Business Unit. Research was conducted via cooperation between the Afghan Women’s Resource Centre (AWRC) and TLO, under the supervision and lead of the latter. Cordaid was involved in the development of the research tools and also conducted capacity building by providing trainings to the researchers on the research methodology. While TLO makes all efforts to review and verify field data prior to publication, some factual inaccuracies may still remain. TLO and AWRC are solely responsible for possible inaccuracies in the information presented. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Cordaid. The Liaison Office (TL0) The Liaison Office (TLO) is an independent Afghan non-governmental organization established in 2003 seeking to improve local governance, stability and security through systematic and institutionalized engagement with customary structures, local communities, and civil society groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy
    Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy July 18, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45818 SUMMARY R45818 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy July 18, 2019 Afghanistan has been a significant U.S. foreign policy concern since 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military Clayton Thomas campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored and supported it. Analyst in Middle Eastern In the intervening 18 years, the United States has suffered approximately 2,400 military Affairs fatalities in Afghanistan, with the cost of military operations reaching nearly $750 billion. Congress has appropriated approximately $133 billion for reconstruction. In that time, an elected Afghan government has replaced the Taliban, and most measures of human development have improved, although Afghanistan’s future prospects remain mixed in light of the country’s ongoing violent conflict and political contention. Topics covered in this report include: Security dynamics. U.S. and Afghan forces, along with international partners, combat a Taliban insurgency that is, by many measures, in a stronger military position now than at any point since 2001. Many observers assess that a full-scale U.S. withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the Afghan government and perhaps even the reestablishment of Taliban control over most of the country. Taliban insurgents operate alongside, and in periodic competition with, an array of other armed groups, including regional affiliates of Al Qaeda (a longtime Taliban ally) and the Islamic State (a Taliban foe and increasing focus of U.S. policy). U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, and FUTURE by Andrew Watkins
    PEACEWORKS Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, AND FUTURE By Andrew Watkins NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 Making Peace Possible NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 ABOUT THE REPORT This report examines the phenomenon of insurgent fragmentation within Afghanistan’s Tali- ban and implications for the Afghan peace process. This study, which the author undertook PEACE PROCESSES as an independent researcher supported by the Asia Center at the US Institute of Peace, is based on a survey of the academic literature on insurgency, civil war, and negotiated peace, as well as on interviews the author conducted in Afghanistan in 2019 and 2020. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Andrew Watkins has worked in more than ten provinces of Afghanistan, most recently as a political affairs officer with the United Nations. He has also worked as an indepen- dent researcher, a conflict analyst and adviser to the humanitarian community, and a liaison based with Afghan security forces. Cover photo: A soldier walks among a group of alleged Taliban fighters at a National Directorate of Security facility in Faizabad in September 2019. The status of prisoners will be a critical issue in future negotiations with the Taliban. (Photo by Jim Huylebroek/New York Times) The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject. © 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No.
    [Show full text]
  • Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Current Rain Spell (31­08­2020 to 04­09­2020 at 11:00 Pm)
    PDMA PROVINCIAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY Provincial Emergency Operation Center Civil Secretariat, Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Phone: (091) 9212059, 9213845, Fax: (091) 9214025 www.pdma.gov.pk No. PDMA/PEOC/SR/2020/Sep­M­1­25 Date: 04/09/2020 KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA CURRENT RAIN SPELL (31­08­2020 TO 04­09­2020 AT 11:00 PM) INFRA/ HUMAN INCIDENTS NATURE OF CAUSE OF CATTLE DISTRICT HUMAN LOSSES/ INJURIES INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGES INCIDENT INCIDENT PERISHED DEATH INJURED HOUSES SCHOOLS OTHERS Male Female Child Total Male Female Child Total Fully Partially Total Fully Partially Total Fully Partially Total House Collapse/Room Mardan Heavy Rain 0 0 0 0 4 4 1 9 0 0 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 Collapse Boundry Wall Collapse/Cattle Swabi Heavy Rain Shed/House 0 1 4 5 4 1 3 8 1 1 9 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 Collapse/Room Burnt/Room Collapse House Collapse/Room Charsadda Heavy Rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Collapse Nowshera Heavy Rain House Collapse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 Boundry Wall Collapse/Cattle Shed/House Buner Heavy Rain 0 2 3 5 0 1 2 3 5 6 121 127 0 0 0 0 0 0 Collapse/Roof Collapse/Room Collapse House Collapse/Room Upper­Chitral Heavy Rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 5 Collapse Malakand Heavy Rain House Collapse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lower Dir Heavy Rain House Collapse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 Boundry Wall Collapse/House Shangla Heavy Rain Collapse/Roof 1 0 3 4 0 4 2 6 12 2 40 42 0 0 0 0 2 2 Collapse/Room Collapse Boundry Wall Collapse/Flash Heavy Rain/Land Flood/Heavy Swat 7 2 2 11 5 0 4 9 0 3 27 30 0 0
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorist Organizations Leadership Takeover Mechanisms Within : Ωϭοϭϣϟ΍Ϥ΍ϭϧϋ Terrorist Organizations 02/11/2016 : Έηϧϟ΍Φϳέύη
    Leadership Takeover Mechanisms within : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ϡγ΍ Terrorist Organizations Leadership Takeover Mechanisms within : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ϥ΍ϭϧϋ Terrorist Organizations 02/11/2016 : έηϧϟ΍ΦϳέΎΗ ΔϣΩϘΗϣϟ΍ΕΎγ΍έΩϟ΍ϭΙΎΣΑϸϟϝΑϘΗγϣϟ΍ίϛέϣ : ΏΗΎϛϟ΍ϡγ΍ : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ Recently, many terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Almoravids in the Western Sahara, and Boko Haram in Nigeria, have witnessed radical changes in leadership, which have had an influence on these organizations as a whole. These changes had an evident impact on the activities of these organizations and how they faced the pressures imposed upon them by the states or other terrorist organizations. These changes are reflected in the various types of relations between these organizations, which vary from alliance to competition, and from conflict to balance. Remarkably, in this context, there is no one mechanism for dealing with the leadership shift inside these organizations. These shifts are attributed to several factors, relations with the other terrorist organizations, the external pressures facing them, and their ability to devote their efforts to internal cohesion and harmony among different wings of operation. Fundamental Characteristics: After the death of Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in May 2016 by a U.S. drone which targeted his parade, the movement¶s Shura council issued a decree that Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada would be the leader of the movement, following his position as vice leader tothe former leader. Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani network, and Mullah Yaqoub, son of the former leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, were appointed as vice leaders for Akhundzada. Following the death of Zahran Alloush, Commander of Jaysh Al Islam organization in Syria, in December 2015 due to a Russian raidEssam Al Buwaydhani, nicknamed Abo Hammam, was appointed as his successor.
    [Show full text]
  • 269 Abdul Aziz Angkat 17 Abdul Qadir Baloch, Lieutenant General 102–3
    Index Abdul Aziz Angkat 17 Turkmenistan and 88 Abdul Qadir Baloch, Lieutenant US and 83, 99, 143–4, 195, General 102–3 252, 253, 256 Abeywardana, Lakshman Yapa 172 Uyghurs and 194, 196 Abu Ghraib 119 Zaranj–Delarum link highway 95 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 251, 260 Africa 5, 244 Abuza, Z. 43, 44 Ahmad Humam 24 Aceh 15–16, 17, 31–2 Aimols 123 armed resistance and 27 Akbar Khan Bugti, Nawab 103, 104 independence sentiment and 28 Akhtar Mengal, Sardar 103, 104 as Military Operation Zone Akkaripattu- Oluvil area 165 (DOM) 20, 21 Aksu disturbances 193 peace process and Thailand 54 Albania 194 secessionism 18–25 Algeria Aceh Legislative Council 24 colonial brutality and 245 Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) 24 radicalization in 264 Aceh Referendum Information Centre Ali Jan Orakzai, Lieutenant General 103 (SIRA) 22, 24 Al Jazeera 44 Acheh- Sumatra National Liberation All Manipur Social Reformation, women Front (ASNLF) 19 protesters of 126–7 Aceh Transition Committee (Komite All Party Committee on Development Peralihan Aceh) (KPA) 24 and Reconciliation ‘act of free choice’, 1969 Papuan (Sri Lanka) 174, 176 ‘plebiscite’ 27 All Party Representative Committee Adivasi Cobra Force 131 (APRC), Sri Lanka 170–1 adivasis (original inhabitants) 131, All- Assam Students’ Union (AASU) 132 132–3 All- Bodo Students’ Union–Bodo Afghanistan 1–2, 74, 199 Peoples’ Action Committee Balochistan and 83, 100 (ABSU–BPAC) 128–9, 130 Central Asian republics and 85 Bansbari conference 129 China and 183–4, 189, 198 Langhin Tinali conference 130 India and 143 al- Qaeda 99, 143,
    [Show full text]
  • AFGHANISTAN - Base Map KYRGYZSTAN
    AFGHANISTAN - Base map KYRGYZSTAN CHINA ± UZBEKISTAN Darwaz !( !( Darwaz-e-balla Shaki !( Kof Ab !( Khwahan TAJIKISTAN !( Yangi Shighnan Khamyab Yawan!( !( !( Shor Khwaja Qala !( TURKMENISTAN Qarqin !( Chah Ab !( Kohestan !( Tepa Bahwddin!( !( !( Emam !( Shahr-e-buzorg Hayratan Darqad Yaftal-e-sufla!( !( !( !( Saheb Mingajik Mardyan Dawlat !( Dasht-e-archi!( Faiz Abad Andkhoy Kaldar !( !( Argo !( Qaram (1) (1) Abad Qala-e-zal Khwaja Ghar !( Rostaq !( Khash Aryan!( (1) (2)!( !( !( Fayz !( (1) !( !( !( Wakhan !( Khan-e-char Char !( Baharak (1) !( LEGEND Qol!( !( !( Jorm !( Bagh Khanaqa !( Abad Bulak Char Baharak Kishim!( !( Teer Qorghan !( Aqcha!( !( Taloqan !( Khwaja Balkh!( !( Mazar-e-sharif Darah !( BADAKHSHAN Garan Eshkashem )"" !( Kunduz!( !( Capital Do Koh Deh !(Dadi !( !( Baba Yadgar Khulm !( !( Kalafgan !( Shiberghan KUNDUZ Ali Khan Bangi Chal!( Zebak Marmol !( !( Farkhar Yamgan !( Admin 1 capital BALKH Hazrat-e-!( Abad (2) !( Abad (2) !( !( Shirin !( !( Dowlatabad !( Sholgareh!( Char Sultan !( !( TAKHAR Mir Kan Admin 2 capital Tagab !( Sar-e-pul Kent Samangan (aybak) Burka Khwaja!( Dahi Warsaj Tawakuli Keshendeh (1) Baghlan-e-jadid !( !( !( Koran Wa International boundary Sabzposh !( Sozma !( Yahya Mussa !( Sayad !( !( Nahrin !( Monjan !( !( Awlad Darah Khuram Wa Sarbagh !( !( Jammu Kashmir Almar Maymana Qala Zari !( Pul-e- Khumri !( Murad Shahr !( !( (darz !( Sang(san)charak!( !( !( Suf-e- (2) !( Dahana-e-ghory Khowst Wa Fereng !( !( Ab) Gosfandi Way Payin Deh Line of control Ghormach Bil Kohestanat BAGHLAN Bala !( Qaysar !( Balaq
    [Show full text]
  • Genetic Analysis of the Major Tribes of Buner and Swabi Areas Through Dental Morphology and Dna Analysis
    GENETIC ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR TRIBES OF BUNER AND SWABI AREAS THROUGH DENTAL MORPHOLOGY AND DNA ANALYSIS MUHAMMAD TARIQ DEPARTMENT OF GENETICS HAZARA UNIVERSITY MANSEHRA 2017 I HAZARA UNIVERSITY MANSEHRA Department of Genetics GENETIC ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR TRIBES OF BUNER AND SWABI AREAS THROUGH DENTAL MORPHOLOGY AND DNA ANALYSIS By Muhammad Tariq This research study has been conducted and reported as partial fulfillment of the requirements of PhD degree in Genetics awarded by Hazara University Mansehra, Pakistan Mansehra The Friday 17, February 2017 I ABSTRACT This dissertation is part of the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HEC) funded project, “Enthnogenetic elaboration of KP through Dental Morphology and DNA analysis”. This study focused on five major ethnic groups (Gujars, Jadoons, Syeds, Tanolis, and Yousafzais) of Buner and Swabi Districts, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan, through investigations of variations in morphological traits of the permanent tooth crown, and by molecular anthropology based on mitochondrial and Y-chromosome DNA analyses. The frequencies of seven dental traits, of the Arizona State University Dental Anthropology System (ASUDAS) were scored as 17 tooth- trait combinations for each sample, encompassing a total sample size of 688 individuals. These data were compared to data collected in an identical fashion among samples of prehistoric inhabitants of the Indus Valley, southern Central Asia, and west-central peninsular India, as well as to samples of living members of ethnic groups from Abbottabad, Chitral, Haripur, and Mansehra Districts, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and to samples of living members of ethnic groups residing in Gilgit-Baltistan. Similarities in dental trait frequencies were assessed with C.A.B.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan Assessment
    AFGHANISTAN ASSESSMENT April 2001 Country Information and Policy Unit 1 CONTENTS I SCOPE OF DOCUMENT 1.1 - 1.5 II GEOGRAPHY General 2.1 Languages 2.2 – 2.5 Economy 2.6 – 2.8 III HISTORY 1973 Coup d' État 3.1 – 3.2 1978-1992 3.3 – 3.11 1992-1994: Mujahidin Government 3.12 – 3.17 Emergence of the Taliban 3.18 – 3.21 February 1995-June 1996 3.22 – 3.23 September 1996-June 1997 3.24 – 3.31 August 1997-August 1998 3.32 – 3.40 September 1998-December 1999 3.41 – 3.47 January 2000-September 2000 3.48 – 3.52 October 2000-April 2001 3.53 – 3.59 IV INSTRUMENTS OF THE STATE 4.1 POLITICAL SYSTEM Constitution 4.1.1 Government 4.1.2 – 4.1.5 4.2 JUDICIAL SYSTEM Introduction 4.2.1 – 4.2.4 Taliban Territory 4.2.5 – 4.2.7 Northern Alliance Territory 4.2.8 – 4.2.9 4.3 SECURITY General 4.3.1 Taliban Territory 4.3.2 – 4.3.6 Northern Alliance Territory 4.3.7 – 4.3.8 V HUMAN RIGHTS 5.1 INTRODUCTION 5.1.1 – 5.1.4 5.2 GENERAL ASSESSMENT Torture 5.2.1 Detainees 5.2.2 – 5.2.7 Mazar-i-Sharif Massacres 5.2.8 – 5.2.9 Recruitment of Soldiers 5.2.10 – 5.2.11 2 Religious Police 5.2.12 – 5.2.14 5.3 SPECIFIC GROUPS General 5.3.1 – 5.3.2 Religious Minorities - Introduction 5.3.3 – 5.3.6 - Demography 5.3.7 - Shia Muslims 5.3.8 – 5.3.9 - Ismailis 5.3.10 - Sikhs and Hindus 5.3.11 – 5.3.13 Ethnic Groups - Introduction 5.3.14– 5.3.16 - Pashtuns 5.3.17 – 5.3.20 - Tajiks 5.3.21 – 5.3.23 - Hazaras 5.3.24 – 5.3.29 - Uzbeks and Turkomans 5.3.30 – 5.3.31 - Baluchis 5.3.32 - Nuristanis 5.3.33 - Panjsheris 5.3.34 Former Members of the PDPA Regime 5.3.35 – 5.3.42 Women 5.3.43 – 5.3.54
    [Show full text]
  • The Kgb in Afghanistan
    THE KGB IN AFGHANISTAN RALPH PICKARD Figure 1: A display case of a KGB officer’s grouping showing his known Soviet and Afghanistan medals and award booklets earned during his service in the KGB. There has been much written over the years about the intent of stabilizing the Afghan government from the history of the Soviet forces occupation of Afghanistan deterioration that was occurring throughout the region and during the Cold War. However, less has been written especially the souring relationship with the government from the collecting community perspective about the prior to December 1979. The Soviet forces’ intent was Afghanistan medals and award booklets that were earned to seize all important Afghan government facilities and by Soviet personnel during that same time period. The other important areas.1 Within days after the Soviet forces intent of this article is to shed a little light on a few of invasion into Afghanistan and occupation of the capital the Afghanistan medals that were awarded during the of Kabul, the Afghanistan President was assassinated Cold War through a unique group that belonged to a and replaced with the more pro-Soviet government of KGB officer (Figure 1). This grouping provides strong President, Babrak Karmal, who had promised his loyalty indications that this officer served multiple tours and earlier to the Soviet government. 2,3,4 continued to operate in Afghanistan even after February 1989. However, prior to illustrating more about the group Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets the in this article, a brief overview of the Soviet invasion and two governments had an ongoing relationship dating back available history of the KGB in Afghanistan during the to the early 1920s with Soviet advisors and technicians Cold War will be presented.
    [Show full text]
  • Separatism in Indonesia Ñ the Cases of Aceh and Papua Ñ
    SUMMARY Separatism in Indonesia Ñ The Cases of Aceh and Papua Ñ Osamu INOUE If in the future disintegration does happen in the Republic of Indonesia, the states most likely to separate from Indonesia are Aceh (the most western province) and Papua (the most eastern province). Such development has come under the calculation of the central government since the downfall of the Soeharto regime. The government for some time has been making preparations to formulate autonomy plans for the two states in an effort to prevent the disintegration from happening. But despite the governmentÕs endeavoer, the Aceh and Papua communities seem still discontented. This can be seen from the fact that they still keep on demanding a referendum. As a democratic country, the government cannot turn down such demands, and one day will have to accept the demand for a referendum to let the people of the two provinces vote for their futures. Certainly the way to referendums is not going to be smooth, as there are a number of politicians and security personnel who are worried that such a move will become a precedent for other provinces that might seek to ask for separation. The central government does not want to see Indonesia break up into many small countries. Nevertheless, according to my view, the possibility of such a national split is not high, as Aceh and Papua have a different historical background from that of the other provinces. Concerning Aceh, first, if we look back on history, the Aceh community never surrendered authority to the Dutch government. Therefore, it can be regarded that Aceh joined the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 when Indonesia proclaimed independence from the Dutch government.
    [Show full text]
  • Discord in Pakistan's Northern Areas
    DISCORD IN PAKISTAN’S NORTHERN AREAS Asia Report N°131 – 2 April 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................... 1 II. THE HISTORY............................................................................................................... 2 A. THE KASHMIR CONNECTION..................................................................................................2 B. ACCEDING TO PAKISTAN .......................................................................................................3 III. SIX DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONAL NEGLECT ................................................... 5 A. RETAINING THE KASHMIR CONNECTION ................................................................................5 1. Justification ................................................................................................................5 2. Enforcement ...............................................................................................................6 B. THE NORTHERN AREAS AND AJK: DIVERGENT PATHS...........................................................7 1. Constitutional and administrative development .............................................................7 2. Azad Jammu and Kashmir..........................................................................................8 3. The Northern Areas....................................................................................................8
    [Show full text]