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The Basmachi: Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of an Islamic Insurgency in Central Asia

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The Basmachi: Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of an Islamic Insurgency in Central Asia SMALL WARS JOURNAL smallwarsjournal.com The Basmachi: Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of an Islamic Insurgency in Central Asia by Boris Kogan Abstract. This paper delivers a short overview of the Basmachi insurgency in Soviet Central Asia, a conflict which spanned a quarter of a century (1918-approximately 1943) and the territory of a half-dozen of today’s countries, foreshadowing many future Islamic insurgencies including those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Western China, Iraq and Chechnya. The “Basmachestvo” involved prolonged full-spectrum warfare fought by a fragmented insurgency with multiple centers of gravity against a multiethnic empire, whose ideology the insurgents perceived as a threat to their identity and way of life. The subject has been largely opaque to Western historians due to several reasons, including the remote and inaccessible theater of warfare (Soviet Central Asia having been denied to Western journalists and diplomats in the timeframe discussed,) the suppression of accounts failing to adhere to the official narrative by the Soviet Union and purges of those who participated on both sides of the insurgency and remained in the Soviet Union after the conflict’s conclusion. Thus, a conflict with a high degree of relevance to the present-day international situation has been forgotten or ignored. This paper attempts to begin to remedy this situation. Figure One. Soviet Central Asia. Imagery retrieved from GoogleMaps. From 1918 until the mid-1940’s the consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia was opposed by a widespread insurgency. Known in Soviet media as the “Basmachestvo” or © 2011, Small Wars Foundation March 5, 2011 “Basmachi” (“oppressors” in Uzbek) and to itself by many terms including “Qorboshilar” (“leaders”-Uz.), this insurgency was many-faceted in nature. Insofar as it had a unified cause, this was opposition to the administration of Central Asia (formerly Russian Turkestan) by the militantly atheist Soviet Union and its representatives among the Russian and Russified city populations. Of the failed counter-revolutionary movements that flared up throughout the Soviet Union after its establishment, the Basmachi lasted the longest, encompassed the widest swath of territory and perhaps had the highest chance of success. Had they succeeded, it is possible that independent countries would have arisen in modern-day Central Asia, much as they did in the Baltic and Poland. In this paper, I propose to give a general overview of the Basmachi movement’s rise, fall and aftermath, and examine the reasons behind its ultimate failure to achieve independence. The insurgency initially had two major sub-components: the Jadidists or Jadids, a reformist Islamic movement, and the Qadimists, who were the traditional Islamist movement representing the ulema (Islamic clergy) and the Emir of Bukhara (Paksoy). The former referred to themselves initially as Shuro-i-Islam, the latter as Ulema Jamiati (Olcott). Zeki Velidi Togan, a Bashkort leader who threw his lot in with the Jadids after having fought for the Communists in Russia, refers to the two parties as “socialist” and “radical-nationalist,” respectively, but notes a further distinction between socialist and non-socialist Jadidists (Paksoy). Later, a third party would emerge: the Pan-Turkist/Pan-Islamist Turkish pashas Cemal and Enver. The roots of armed insurrection ran deep in Turkestan. There had been a proto-Qadimist revolt in the Ferghana Valley against the Russians in 1898 due to the circumscription of the powers of the waqf (Islamic endowments) and ulema. More recently, there had been a Turkestan-wide rebellion (also started in Ferghana) in 1916 caused by the Russian administration’s announcement that the Turkestani indigenous population would be subject to conscription into labor units (Olcott). These insurgencies failed for two reasons: the united front presented by the Russian military administration and settlers and the lack of support from the indigenous leadership such as the Emir of Bukhara, who stayed loyal to his Russian patrons. Both were suppressed, the latter quite severely, but they had provided a precedent for the coming insurgency. When the Russian empire collapsed in 1917, the initial reaction in Turkestan was the emergence of a widespread revolutionary movement. This included the Jadidists, who demanded equality and modernization within a Russian federation of states, and the Qadimists, who desired a sharia state and the primacy of the ulema as well as traditional power structures. The Jadidists at first allied themselves with the Russian Bolsheviks of the main cities, who were centered around the Tashkent Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. Almost immediately, conflict broke out. The first active insurgency emerged in Kokand as a reaction to Communist nationalization, and was led by a Qadimist named Irgash. As it became obvious that the Communists did not mean to keep the initial promises of self-determination that they had made to the various Muslim nationalities of the former Russian empire, the Jadidists turned on them as well. The Russian population, too, was split; there was a White Russian anti-Communist underground in Tashkent, which had allied itself with the Jadidists and counted on British support from across the Caspian (modern-day Azerbaijan). All parties in Turkestan were alienated by the Bolsheviks’ economic policies, which led to widespread privation (Nazaroff); the indigenous population of Turkestan was outraged by the social reforms forced upon them 2 smallwarsjournal.com (Olcott). In Fergana, the Jadidists, led by Madamin Bek, were joined by General Monstrov’s Russian Peasant Army, and captured all of the major cities of the valley, including Osh, Jalalabad and Andijon. By 1919, the entire country, with the exception of Tashkent, was controlled by either Jadidist or Qadimist insurgents, who had formed a loose alliance (Olcott). This was the high point of the insurgency in Turkestan. Even here the signs of the future disaster could be discerned. The aims of the various parties were incompatible: the centerpiece of the Qadimists, the Emir of Bukhara, “regarded the Soviets as the Russians…and attempted to remain loyal,” and regarded the Jadidists as a greater threat than the Bolsheviks, at least according to Togan. The Jadidists desired the elimination of the Emir of Bukhara, and the establishment of a Turkestani republic; the socialists among them desired the nationalization of most of the economy (Paksoy). The White Underground desired a return to a Russian-dominated empire or federation (Nazaroff). Though the primary insurgent commanders (Irgash and Madamin Bek) attempted to form a unified command structure, it was never stable (Olcott); furthermore, it is unclear to what degree they controlled their sub-commanders’ actions. The insurgency was able to maintain control of Turkestan during this timeframe because the Bolsheviks’ main forces were isolated from Turkestan by the White Armies fighting them in Siberia (Olcott). The Basmachi failed to take advantage of this temporary respite to secure material support from any major nation besides Afghanistan (Nazaroff). With the defeat of the abovementioned White Armies in 1919-1920, the Bolsheviks were able to concentrate on Central Asia. Their forces inexorably wrested the cities from the insurgents; the latter could not stand against the Red Army in a conventional battle. By the end of 1921, the major cities and lines of communication were all controlled by the Bolsheviks (Olcott). The Emir of Bukhara had been dislodged from his seat of power and forced to flee to Afghanistan. This defeat ended the first phase of the insurgency. Figure Two. Madamin Bek and his insurgents defected from the Basmachi and joined the Red Army in 1920. Here, he conducts a joint inspection of his troops with the commander of the Red Army’s Eastern Front, Mikhail Frunze. (Unknown) During the second phase, the nature of the insurgency changed. First, it was forced to abandon its attempts to seize and hold territory and fight the Bolsheviks on conventional terms. 3 smallwarsjournal.com From this point on, it primarily fought by raids launched from sanctuaries in the mountains and deserts, and later from across the Afghan border. Second, the Turkish Pashas entered the scene with their own organizations including armed forces as well as propagandists, and brought their agenda into play. Third, the Jadidists were marginalized and ceased to play a major part in the insurgency. Fourth, the Bolsheviks implemented a new counterinsurgency strategy. As a result, the insurgency became centered on Qadimist groups built around the Emir of Bukhara, and dependent entirely on Afghan support. Figure Three. The Emir of Bukhara, Said Mohammed Alim Khan. This picture was presumably taken between 1920, when the Emir was dispossessed from Bukhara, and 1923, when he was forced from the territory of modern-day Tajikistan and fled to Afghanistan. (Unknown) The abovementioned Pashas had been exiled from Turkey by its new leader, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. They moved East into the former Russian Empire to implement their plan for the establishment of a pan-Islamic empire stretching from British India to Turkey. Naturally, the entrance of the Pashas on the scene diminished the already small possibility of British support for the insurgency. Cemal Pasha moved to Kabul and pursued a policy aimed at establishing the center of an Islamic state in the Punjab; Enver Pasha moved to Eastern Bukhara, threw in his lot with the deposed Emir, and attempted to rally the insurgency around himself. According to Togan, Enver Pasha thus frustrated the master plans of the Jadidists, who had been preparing to 4 smallwarsjournal.com launch a Turkestan-wide offensive aimed at re-establishing territorial control. Due to his lack of understanding of the realities on the ground, he alienated the Jadidists and their supporters in the urban underground, and caused the premature and uncoordinated launch of several components of the planned offensive in 1921-1922; these were all crushed by the Bolsheviks. This all precipitated the Jadidists’ fading from the scene, culminating in the flight of Togan to Iran and Turkey in the beginning of 1923 (Paksoy).
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