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The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict: Settler Colonialism and Resistance in the Midst of Geopolitical Upheavals Nicola Pratt
Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas – Syria, Iraq and at Home; How They Are Related, and Where They Might Lead %LOO3DUN
Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas 2IUD%HQJLR
Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma: An Episodic Analysis of Partial/Non-Cooperation Discourses in Turkey’s Iraq Policy 0HKPHW$NLI.XPUDO
Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya ,ð½N*UOH\HQ
Internationalizing Islamophobia: Anti-Islamophobic Practices from the Runnymede Trust to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation ïHULI2QXU%DKoHFLN
The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe and the Diyanet: The Case of Austria =DQDdLWDN
Book Review / King Abdullah II of Jordan, Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril =H\QHS6WDODQ
Book Review / Ali M. Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran $JDK+D]½U
ISSN: 1309-1557 {:`ck$,#JXpÓ$(#K\ddlq)'(*} ORSAM 257$'2ï8(7¶7/(5ñ MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 6L\DVHWYH8OXVODUDUDV½¼OLòNLOHU'HUJLVL Journal of Politics and International Relations
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Zana Çitak in her article looks at the 0XVOLPFRPPXQLWLHVLQ$XVWULD$QDO\VLQJWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOL- ]DWLRQRI,VODPLQWKH$XVWULDQFRQWH[WdLWDNTXHVWLRQVWKH UROHRIWKH'L\DQHWLQWKLVLQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNDQGWKHRS- SRUWXQLWLHVDQGOLPLWDWLRQVWKH$XVWULDQFDVHSURYLGHV $VLQWKHSUHYLRXVLVVXHVWKLVLVVXHDOVRFRQFOXGHVZLWKERRN UHYLHZV,QWKLVVHFWLRQ=H\QHS6WDODQUHYLHZVWKHERRNE\ .LQJ$EGDOODK,,RI-RUGDQWLWOHG´2XU/DVW%HVW&KDQFH 7KH 3XUVXLWRI3HDFHDWD7LPHRI3HULOµ$JDK+D]×UUHYLHZVWKH ERRNE\$OL$QVDULWLWOHG´7KH3ROLWLFVRI1DWLRQDOLVPLQ0RG- HUQ,UDQµ%RWKERRNVDGGUHVVZLGHO\GLVFXVVHGLVVXHVLQUH- JLRQDOSROLWLFVDQGZLOOKRSHIXOO\EHRILQWHUHVWIRURXUUHDGHUV Özlem Tür 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 6 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the ,VraeO3aOeVtine &RnÁiFt SettOer &RORniaOiVP and 5eViVtanFe in the 0idVt RI *eRpROitiFaO 8pheaYaOV* Nicola PRATT** Abstract ThiV artiFOe e[aPineV the iPpOiFatiRnV RI the “Arab Spring” IRr the ,VraeO3aOeVtine FRnÁiFt ,t draZV Rn a grRZing ÀeOd RI FritiFaO ap- prRaFheV tR FRnVider thiV TXeVtiRn in Oight RI a ORnger hiVtRriFaO tra- MeFtRr\ RI the =iRniVt VettOer FRORniaO prRMeFt 3aOeVtinian reViVtanFe tR thiV prRMeFt and eIIRrtV tR paFiI\ thiV reViVtanFe PRVt reFentO\ Xnder the banner RI the “2VOR 3eaFe 3rRFeVV” ThereIRre the artiFOe reMeFtV PainVtreaP interpretatiRnV RI the iPpOiFatiRnV RI the “Arab Spring” IRr the ,VraeO-3aOeVtine FRnÁiFt in terPV RI either inFreaVing Rr deFreaVing the prRVpeFtV IRr a negRtiated biOateraO VettOePent baVed Rn the 2VOR paradigP 5ather the artiFOe argXeV that the “Arab Spring” FRnVtitXteV bRth FRntinXitieV and diVFRntinXitieV in the ,VraeO-3aOeVtine FRnÁiFt Rn the Rne hand ,VraeO FRntinXeV and haV eYen intenViÀed itV prRMeFt RI VettOer FRORniaOiVP Rn the Rther hand the “Arab Spring” haV giYen iPpetXV tR a neZ PRYePent RI 3aOeVtinianV reViVting ,VraeOi RFFXpatiRn and 3aOeVtinian diVpRVVeV- ViRn that RperateV be\Rnd the 2VOR paradigP RI OiberaO peaFePaN- ing :hiOVt the “Arab Spring” heraOdV the end RI the aOread\ deIXnFt 2VOR 3eaFe 3rRFeVV it ViPXOtaneRXVO\ highOightV the neFeVVit\ IRr a PRre MXVt apprRaFh tR peaFe PaNing in ,VraeO3aOeVtine Keywords: ,VraeO 3aOeVtine FRnÁiFt FRORniaOiVP reViVtanFe Arab Spring * This article is largely the result of observations and discussions conducted during two visits to Palestine, in 2011 and 2012, as part of a British Academy-funded International Partnership Scheme between the University of Warwick (Centre for the Study of Women and Gender) and Birzeit University (Institute for Women’s Studies). I thank Islah Jad, Rema Hammami, Eileen Kuttab and Penny Johnson of the Institute for Women’s Studies, Palestinian activists in and around Ramallah, Nablus, Nabi Saleh, Hebron, Bethlehem and the Jordan Valley, Vanessa Farr, then of UNDP and Mandy Turner, Kenyon Institute, amongst many others, for fascinating discussions and insights. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at seminars at the Kenyon Institute, Jerusalem, al-Najah University, Nablus, the University of St. Andrews, UK, and to a workshop on the “Arab Spring” at Richmond University, UK. I thank all those who provided their feedback and thought-provoking questions. I especially thank ÖzlemTür, Middle East Technical University, for her feedback, encouragement and efforts on this article. ** Assoc. Prof. Dr., Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK. Nicola Pratt, The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict: Settler Colonialism and Resistance in the Midst of Geopolitical Upheavals, Ortadoğu Etütleri, Volume 5, No 1, July 2013, pp.9-40. Nicola Pratt ´$UDS%DKDU×µYHĈVUDLO)LOLVWLQdDU×ċPDV× -HRSROLWLN 'HĊLċLPOHULQ2UWDV×QGD'LUHQLċYH $QDKWDU .HOLPHOHU ĈVraiO )iOiVtin oat×ċPa V|PrgeFiOiN direniċ Arap %ahar× 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 10 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict ,QWURGXFWLRQ :ithRXt a dRXbt the pRpXOar XpriVingV prRteVtV and in VRPe FaVeV arPed inVXrreFtiRnV that haYe Vpread aFrRVV the Arab ZRrOd VinFe 'eFePber are reVhaping the pROitiFV RI the 0iddOe (aVt ThiV artiFOe e[aPineV the iPpOiFatiRnV RI Zhat haV FRPPRnO\ FRPe tR be FaOOed the “Arab Spring” IRr the ,VraeO-3aOeVtine FRnÁiFt ,t beginV b\ prRYiding an RYerYieZ RI the FXrrent XnderVtandingV RI the “Arab Spring” aV either an RppRrtXnit\ IRr Rr aV a threat tR ,VraeO-3aOeVtine peaFePaNing The ne[t VeFtiRn e[aPineV the Vhared aVVXPptiRnV Xnderpinning theVe eYaOXatiRnV ZhiFh FharaFteriVe the ,VraeO-3aO- eVtine FRnÁiFt aV a VtrXggOe betZeen tZR natiRnaO PRYePentV RYer the VaPe pieFe RI Oand ,n FRntraVt bXiOding Rn a grRZing ÀeOd RI FritiFaO VFhROarVhip that reFRnFeptXaOiVeV the FRnÁiFt aV Rne RI in- digenRXV reViVtanFe againVt a IRreign VettOer FRORniaO prRMeFt , YieZ the FXrrent PRPent in a ORnger FRnte[t RI =iRniVt FRORniVatiRn RI 3aOeVtine and reViVtanFe tR thiV in additiRn tR ,VraeOi and :eVtern paFiÀFatiRn RI thiV reViVtanFe The IROORZing VeFtiRnV e[aPine Zhat VXFh a reFRnFeptXaOiVatiRn RI the FRnÁiFt PeanV IRr reinterpreting the eYROXtiRn RI the ,VraeO-3aOeVtine FRnÁiFt in the ZaNe RI the “Arab Spring” The artiFOe argXeV that the PRVt VigniÀFant FRnVeTXenFe RI the “Arab Spring” IRr the ,VraeO-3aOeVtine FRnÁiFt iV in FhaOOenging bRth FRnFeptXaOO\ and in reaOit\ the OiberaO peaFe bXiOding PRdeO RI 2VOR and RIIering a neZ Vtrateg\ IRr a MXVt peaFe 8QGHUVWDQGLQJVRIWKH,VUDHO3DOHVWLQHFRQÁLFWLQWKHZDNHRI WKH´$UDE6SULQJµ 'iVFXVViRnV RI the iPpOiFatiRnV RI the “Arab Spring” IRr the ,Vra- eO-3aOeVtine FRnÁiFt IRFXV Rn VpeFiÀF eYentV that haYe XnIROded partiFXOarO\ VinFe the RXVter RI +RVni 0XbaraN and hiV regiPe in )ebrXar\ &RPPentatRrV and aFadePiFV VpeFXOating abRXt the iPpaFt RI theVe eYentV generaOO\ IaOO intR Rne RI tZR FategRrieV YieZing the “Arab Spring” aV either an RppRrtXnit\ IRr peaFe PaN- ing Rr aV a threat tR peaFe PaNing , ZiOO brieÁ\ diVFXVV bRth theVe apprRaFheV beORZ 1 I place the term “Arab Spring” in scare quotes to indicate that this is a contested term. I use it as an easily recognisable short-hand for the popular uprisings, revolutions and protests that have taken place across the Arab world since the end of 2010. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 11 Nicola Pratt Peace Now? ThRVe ZhR YieZ the “Arab Spring” aV heraOding a neZ iPpetXV IRr peaFe PaNing betZeen ,VraeO and the 3aOeVtinianV aV ZeOO aV the Zider Arab ZRrOd generaOO\ ePphaViVe the need tR adapt tR the riVe RI peRpOe pRZer and reVpRnd tR itV iPpOiFatiRnV IRr the 3aOeVtin- ian OeaderVhip IRr the ,VraeOi gRYernPent and IRr :eVtern gRYern- PentV +anan AVhraZi VpeaNing at a VePinar RrganiVed b\ the 8S thinN tanN the &arnegie (ndRZPent IRr ,nternatiRnaO 3eaFe Fhar- aFteriVed the “Arab Spring” aV iOOXVtrating a neZ PRRd aPRngVt Arab Fiti]enV ZhR are IrXVtrated Zith the VtatXV TXR Zhether that iV RppreVViYe diFtatRrV bOatant FRrrXptiRn Rr FRntinXing indignitieV and hXPiOiatiRn inFOXding ,VraeO·V RFFXpatiRn RI 3aOeVtine ,ndeed the 3aOeVtinianV in the :eVt %anN and *a]a Strip OiNe their FRXnterpartV IrRP 0RrRFFR tR %ahrain haYe been prRteVting againVt the IaiOXreV RI their OeaderVhip riVing XnePpOR\Pent and FRVtV RI OiYing TheVe prRteVtV in the :eVt %anN *a]a Strip aV ZeOO aV b\ 3aOeVtinianV in Rther Arab FapitaOV began aV dePRnVtratiRnV RI VROidarit\ Zith the (g\ptian XpriVing in -anXar\ %Rth the )ateh-dRPinated 3aOeVtinian AXthRrit\ in the :eVt %anN and the +aPaV gRYernPent in the *a]a Strip tried tR VXppreVV theVe prR- teVtV Iearing the iPpOiFatiRnV RI peRpOe pRZer IRr their RZn gRY- ernPentV There haYe been nR eOeFtiRnV in the 2FFXpied 3aOeVtin- ian TerritRr\ VinFe the eOeFtiRnV that brRXght +aPaV tR pRZer in The terP RI RIÀFe RI the 3aOeVtinian /egiVOatiYe &RXnFiO the 3A OegiVOatXre e[pired in and nR eOeFtiRnV haYe been heOd VinFe Zhether in the :eVt %anN Rr *a]a Strip³e[Fept IRr PXniFi- paO eOeFtiRnV in the :eVt %anN in 3aOeVtinian dePRnVtratiRnV in VROidarit\ Zith the (g\ptianV tXrned intR FaOOV IRr pROitiFaO reIRrP RI the 3aOeVtinian OeaderVhip 2n )ebrXar\ the 3aOeVtinian 1*2 Network FaOOed Rn )ateh and +aPaV tR reFRnFiOe “tR ¶VeFXre and deIend the 3aOeVtinian peRpOe·V inaOien- abOe right tR IreedRP independenFe and retXrn tR their OandV·”3 2n 0arFh \RXth grRXpV Oed RrganiVed prRteVtV in VeYeraO 3aOeVtin- ian tRZnV and FitieV FaOOing IRr reFRnFiOiatiRn neZ eOeFtiRnV in the 2 Hannan Ashrawi, “Palestine and the Arab Spring”, Summary of discussion hosted by Carn- egie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 27 May 2011. http://carnegieen- dowment.org/2011/05/27/palestine-and-arab-spring/1qb (accessed 21 June 2013). 3 “81 NGOs Urge Rival Factions to Reconcile”, Ma’an News Agency, 21 February 2011. http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=361995 (accessed 17 June 2013). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 12 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict 2FFXpied 3aOeVtinian TerritRr\ and the inFOXViRn RI aOO pROitiFaO IaF- tiRnV in a reVtrXFtXred 3aOeVtine /iberatiRn 2rganiVatiRn Xnder the VORgan RI “(nd the diYiViRn 2ne peRpOe againVt =iRniVP”4 3reVVXre IrRP the Vtreet FRPbined Zith the ORVV RI e[ternaO patrRnV 0XbaraN in the FaVe RI )ateh and the S\rian regiPe in the FaVe RI +aPaV XndRXbtedO\ pXVhed )ateh and +aPaV tR enter intR taONV A reFRnFiOiatiRn agreePent brRNered b\ the (g\ptian SXprePe &RXn- FiO RI the ArPed )RrFeV neZO\ eVtabOiVhed aV (g\pt·V rXOerV ZaV Vigned in ApriO VtipXOating that eOeFtiRnV tR the 3aOeVtinian /egiVOatiYe &RXnFiO the OegiVOatiYe bRd\ RI the 3aOeVtinian AXthRrit\ and 3aOeVtinian 1atiRnaO &RXnFiO the OegiVOatiYe bRd\ RI the 3aOeV- tine /iberatiRn 2rganiVatiRn VhRXOd be heOd nR Oater than Rne \ear Oater The &arter &enter haiOed the reFRnFiOiatiRn YieZing it aV “part RI the Oarger dePRFratiF trend VZeeping the regiRn” and aV inFreaV- ing “the OiNeOihRRd RI a tZR-Vtate VROXtiRn and peaFeIXO RXtFRPe” 'eVpite the (8·V pRVitiRn againVt +aPaV (8 IRreign pROiF\ FhieI &atherine AVhtRn aOVR FaXtiRXVO\ ZeOFRPed the reFRnFiOiatiRn aV a Vtep in the right direFtiRn IRr peaFe negRtiatiRnV SRPe FRPPentatRrV Vee an ineVFapabOe ORgiF in the ZaNe RI the “Arab Spring” preVVXring OeaderV tR reVpRnd tR pRpXOar e[peFta- tiRnV RI peaFe AV Rne FRPPentatRr argXeV “,VraeO Vigned pROitiFaO agreePentV Zith aXthRritarian regiPeV 1RZ the peRpOe haYe a Va\ in pROitiFV IRr the ÀrVt tiPe ZhiFh PeanV that ,VraeO haV nR FhRiFe bXt tR IXOÀO itV reVpRnVibiOitieV aFFRrding tR the agreePentV beFaXVe the peRpOe ZiOO nR ORnger be ViOent Rr tXrn a bOind e\e tR ,VraeO·V in- abiOit\ tR IXOÀO itV agreePentV inFOXding the &aPp 'aYid AFFRrdV Zith (g\pt ZhiFh reTXireV ,VraeO tR PRYe Rn the peaFe prRFeVV Zith the 3aOeVtinianV”7 AORng ViPiOar OineV the (Pir RI 4atar tROd a FRn- IerenFe in 0a\ 3 that “the Arab Spring haV tRda\ pXt ,VraeO in direFt FRnIrRntatiRn Zith the Arab peRpOe nRt RnO\ Zith their rXOerV 4 P. Bailey, “Palestinians call for unity protest on 15 March”, Electronic Intifada, 28 February 2011. http://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinians-call-unity-protest-15-march/9249 (accessed 17 June 2013). 5 N. Mozgovaya, “Carter Hails Hamas-Fatah Reconciliation”, Haaretz.com, 29 April 2011. http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/carter-hails-hamas-fatah-reconciliation-1.358895 (ac- cessed 21 June 2013). 6 A. Eldar, “EU’s Ashton: With its Changing Neighbourhood, Now is the Time for Israel to Move”, Haaretz.com, 24 June 2011. http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/eu- s-ashton-with-its-changing-neighborhood-now-is-the-time-for-israel-to-move-1.369401 (accessed 21 June 2013). 7 W. Salem, “The Arab Revolutions from a Palestinian Perspective”,Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2012. http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=1419 (accessed 21 June 2013). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 13 Nicola Pratt TheVe peRpOe ZiOO nR ORnger aFFept that negRtiatiRnV are the gRaO in thePVeOYeV”8 The (8·V AVhtRn aOVR reFRgniVeV theVe neZ d\naP- iFV teOOing an ,VraeOi MRXrnaOiVt in “ :ith the aVVXPptiRn that Arab gRYernPentV ZRXOd beFRPe PRre aFFRXntabOe tR their Fiti]enr\ and Zith the riVe RI PRre pRZerIXO pRpXOar PainO\ ,VOaPiVt PRYePentV VRPe FRPPentatRrV beOieYe that VROYing the ,VraeO-3aOeVtine FRnÁiFt iV in ,VraeO·V VeFXrit\ inter- eVtV ,n the ZRrdV RI Rne aXthRr “,I ,VraeO IaiOV tR engage Zith the neZ reaOitieV in itV neighbRXrhRRd it FRXOd FRnFeiYabO\ Ànd itVeOI in a VitXatiRn ViPiOar tR the pre-979 0iddOe (aVt Zhen aOO RI itV neigh- bRXrV Zere in an Rpen Vtate RI Zar Zith it” ,n additiRn VRPe ZriterV beOieYe that the “Arab Spring” VhRXOd Oead :eVtern gRYernPentV tR aOVR reFRnVider their pROiFieV tRZardV the regiRn AV an 2p (d in the Financial Times in reVpRnding tR the ZaYeV RI pRpXOar XpriVingV in the Arab :RrOd argXed “The internatiRnaO FRPPXnit\·V ROd apprRaFh ZaV tR priRritiVe VtabiOit\ RYer dePRFraF\ and pXrVXe ,VraeOi-Arab peaFe Rn a tRtaOO\ Vepa- rate dipORPatiF traFN ThiV pROiF\ prRYed tR be a IaiOXre ² VtabiOit\ RYer dePRFraF\ brRXght neither and iVROated peaFe eIIRrtV Zent nRZhere” SiPiOarO\ :iOOiaP 4Xandt a Yeteran e[pert Rn 8S pROiF\ and the Arab-,VraeOi FRnÁiFt Zriting abRXt 8S dipORPaF\ tRZardV the ,VraeO-3aOeVtinian peaFe prRFeVV argXeV that the XpriVingV aF- tXaOO\ “PaNe it aOO the PRre iPpRrtant that the 8S aOignV itVeOI Zith bRth dePRFraF\ and peaFe in a YitaO part RI the ZRrOd” Another Zriter ZarnV :eVtern goYernPentV that “an iPportant VtXPbOing bOoFN >in a diaOogXe Zith the neZ dePoFraFieV oI the region@ FoXOd 8 R. Doherty, “Qatar: Arab Spring makes Israeli-Palestinian peace more pressing”, Reuters, 20 May 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/20/us-qatar-arabs-israel-idUSBRE- 94J0NW20130520 (accessed 21 June 2013). 9 A. Eldar, “EU’s Ashton: With its Changing Neighbourhood, Now is the Time for Israel to Move”. 10 A. Dessi, Israel and the Palestinians after the Arab Spring: No Time for Peace, IAI Working Paper 1216, May 2012, pp. 12-13. 11 M. Muasher and J. Solana, “Push Ahead Now For A Solution In Palestine”, The Financial Times, 9 March 2011. 12 W. Quandt, “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Now”, Cairo Review of Global Affairs online, 2011. http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=1 (ac- cessed 21 June 2013). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 14 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict be the 3aOeVtinian iVVXe and the roOe oI a groZing FhaXYiniVt ,VraeO in the region ,I the\ do not Fhange their FoXrVe the “Arab Spring” FoXOd beFoPe not onO\ a OoVt opportXnit\ bXt aOVo a VoXrFe oI neZ tenVionV”3 Peace Later? +oZeYer Ior ,VraeO and VoPe oI itV VXpporterV the XnFertaintieV oI the “Arab Spring” PaNe it XnZiVe to pXrVXe peaFe Zith the 3aOeVtin- ianV at thiV PoPent ,ndeed the ,VraeOi goYernPent haV ZatFhed the Vo-FaOOed Arab Spring XnIoOd Zith VoPe diVPa\ ,n 1oYePber 30 %in\aPin 1etan\ahX attaFNed the “Arab Spring” aV an “,VOaP- iF anti-ZeVtern anti-OiberaO anti-,VraeOi XndePoFratiF ZaYe”4 It iV FonFerned that IVOaPiVt groXpV haYe ePerged aV the VtrongeVt poOitiFaO IorFe in neighboXring FoXntrieV The 0XVOiP %rotherhood haV Zon eOeFtionV in (g\pt thereb\ ending +aPaV·V iVoOation in the *a]a Strip IVOaPiVt groXpV doPinate the oppoVition in S\ria and in -ordan the IVOaPiF AFtion )ront OeadV FaOOV Ior poOitiFaO reIorP AV 'anieO %\Pan argXeV “IVraeO iV a VtatXV TXo poZer in Pan\ Za\V >@ So Fhange eYen iI it PeanV the toppOing oI regionaO IoeV riVNV roFNing thiV proVperoXV boat” The PoVt VigniÀFant FonVeTXenFe oI the “Arab Spring” Ior the IV- raeOi goYernPent haV been the oYerthroZ oI the regiPe oI +oVni 0XbaraN The 979 peaFe treat\ betZeen IVraeO and (g\pt haV been VtrategiFaOO\ iPportant to IVraeO·V VeFXrit\ b\ rePoYing the OargeVt Arab arP\ IroP the Arab-IVraeOi FonÁiFt and the O\nFhpin oI :eVtern VeFXrit\ Vtrateg\ toZardV the region )roP XntiO the oYerthroZ oI the oOd regiPe (g\pt Fooperated Zith IVraeO to Paintain the bOoFNade oI the *a]a Strip and agreed Zith IVraeO oYer the need to Fontain +aPaV and to preYent Iran IroP inFreaVing itV inÁXenFe throXghoXt the region IVraeO·V aOOianFe Zith (g\pt beFaPe eYen Pore iPportant aIter itV reOationV Zith TXrNe\ a Oong-tiPe aOO\ beFaPe inFreaVingO\ IroVt\ aV a reVXOt oI the *a]a Zar³FoP- poXnded b\ IVraeO·V NiOOing oI TXrNiVh Fiti]enV on a Vhip Farr\ing aid in 0a\ 13 R. Aliboni, “The International Dimension of the Arab Spring”,The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 4, p. 9. 14 H. Sherwood, “Binyamin Netanyahu attacks Arab spring uprisings”, Guardian Online, 24 November 2011. (accessed 4 March 2012). 15 “Gloom and Bloom: Eyeing the Arab Spring”, The Economist, 11 February 2012, p. 50. 16 D. Byman, “Israel’s Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, Summer 2011. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 15 Nicola Pratt The SXprePe &oXnFiO oI the ArPed )orFeV ZhiFh tooN oYer poZer aIter 0XbaraN Vtepped doZn XntiO preVidentiaO eOeFtionV Zere heOd in 0a\ VignaOOed itV breaN Zith the 0XbaraN regiPe and itV re- VponViYeneVV to popXOar opinion Zith regard to itV poOiFieV toZardV the TXeVtion oI 3aOeVtine It did not FanFeO the peaFe treat\ bXt it opened the 5aIah FroVVing aObeit VporadiFaOO\ thereb\ breaN- ing the internationaO bOoFNade oI the *a]a Strip and VXFFeVVIXOO\ broNered reFonFiOiation taONV betZeen +aPaV and )ateh The IVraeOi goYernPent oppoVed both oI theVe PoYeV ZhiFh eIIeFtiYeO\ ended the poOitiFaO and geographiFaO iVoOation oI +aPaV 1etan\ahX toOd )ateh in 0a\ that it had to FhooVe betZeen peaFe Zith IVraeO and peaFe Zith +aPaV and ZithheOd PiOOion oI ta[eV FoOOeFted on behaOI oI the 3aOeVtinian AXthorit\ IVraeO haV aOVo been FonFerned b\ Zhat it regardV aV a VeFXrit\ YaFXXP aOong the (g\ptian-IVraeOi border and the Sinai 3eninVX- Oa Pore broadO\ In AXgXVt VXVpeFted 3aOeVtinian gXnPen FondXFted a FroVV-border raid into IVraeO and in 5aPadan another attaFN aOong the (g\ptian-*a]a border ZhiFh reVXOted in the deathV oI (g\ptian VoOdierV In addition there haYe been repeated aFtV oI Vabotage oI the gaV pipeOine betZeen (g\pt and IVraeO VinFe 0XbaraN Vtepped doZn In IVraeO reVponded to the FroVV-border raid iPPediateO\ b\ pXrVXing the attaFNerV into (g\pt reVXOting in (g\ptian poOiFePen being NiOOed ThiV oXtraged (g\ptian pXbOiF opinion and hXndredV oI (g\ptianV proteVted oXt- Vide the IVraeOi ePbaVV\ in &airo and then VtorPed the ePbaVV\ Oeading to IVraeOi ePbaVV\ VtaII being eYaFXated 17 B. Sasley, “‘Israel and the Arab Spring: But the Season Doesn’t Matter”, 28 December 2011, Huffington Post on-line (accessed 4 March 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 16 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict 'espite the faFt that both the ¶peaFe noZ· and the ¶peaFe later· ap- proaFhes offer different interpretations of the eYents that haYe Xn- folded sinFe the beginning of the “Arab Spring” neYertheless both share a set of assXmptions aboXt the natXre of the Israel-3alestine FonÁiFt +aYing brieÁ\ e[amined the different interpretations of the “Arab Spring” in this seFtion the folloZing seFtion disFXsses and FritiTXes their shared assXmptions that the Israel-3alestine FonÁiFt represents a strXggle betZeen tZo national moYements that Fan onl\ be solYed throXgh the “Fompromise” of a tZo-state solXtion =LRQLVW&RORQLVDWLRQ5HVLVWDQFHDQG3DFLÀFDWLRQ The main aFtors in the international FommXnit\ 8S (8 5Xssia &hina 81 :% etF as Zell as a signiÀFant part of sFholarship on the sXbMeFt YieZ the FonÁiFt betZeen Israel and the 3alestinians as a FonÁiFt betZeen tZo national groXps -eZs and Arab 3alestin- ians oYer a FirFXmsFribed pieFe of territor\ historiF 3alestine 8 +aYing FharaFterised the natXre of the FonÁiFt thXs the solXtion is identiÀed as a “Fompromise” betZeen the tZo FonÁiFting national groXps b\ partitioning the land betZeen them enabling both na- tional groXps to aFhieYe their goals of self-determination Zithin a soYereign state The goal of the internationall\-sponsored peaFe negotiations sinFe 993 has been to transform the Israelis· and 3alestinians· perFep- tions of a “]ero-sXm game”9 into a FooperatiYe and mXtXall\ ben- eÀFial relationship ie a liberal peaFe bXilding model This is the thinNing behind the 2slo proFess ZhiFh most antiFipated ZoXld resXlt in a “tZo-state solXtion” (Yen realists belieYe that a solX- tion to the Israel-3alestine FonÁiFt throXgh the implementation of a tZo-state solXtion is in the interests of the 8S Israel and the 3alestinians :ritings in the ZaNe of the “Arab Spring” share these assXmptions aboXt the Israel-3alestine FonÁiFt and its solXtion Their FonFerns 18 Among others, for example see, J. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict, (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 2005); C. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (Bedford:St. Martin’s Press, 2010). 19 Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict, p. 256. 20 S. Walt, “The Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace”, Foreign Policy online, 15 March 2010. Available at: http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/15/the_boston_study_ group_on_middle_east_peace (accessed 14 June 2013). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 17 Nicola Pratt reYolYe aroXnd Zhether the “Arab Spring” renders the neFessar\ Fompromise more or less liNel\ Those Zho regard the “Arab Spring” to be an opportXnit\ for peaFe maNing belieYe that eYents maNe a Fompromise more neFessar\ not neFessaril\ for the saNe of peaFe bXt for the saNe of regional stabilit\ and Israeli and :estern seFXrit\ interests Those Zho regard the “Arab Spring” as a threat to peaFe maNing belieYe that eYents maNe the Fompromise too risN\ for the Israelis and possibl\ also for the 8S and its allies and Xndermines the sort of trXst neFessar\ for peaFe maNing +oZeYer the\ all Fon- tinXe to assXme that the tZo-state solXtion is the onl\ paradigm for resolYing the FonÁiFt betZeen Israel and the 3alestinians SinFe man\ obserYers haYe Falled time on the 2slo 3eaFe 3roFess This proFess Zas sXpposed to lead to an end to the Fon- ÁiFt betZeen Israel and the 3alestinians b\ Ànding a Za\ to share the land and solYe Ne\ problems namel\ refXgees -erXsalem set- tlements and seFXrit\ At the end of this proFess dXe to FonFlXde in 997 it Zas implied that a 3alestinian state ZoXld be Freated e[isting side b\ side Zith an Israeli state This neYer happened )olloZing the failXre of the & 'aYid talNs betZeen (hXd %araN and -onathan 5\nhold has sXmmarised Xnderstandings of the failXre of 2slo as either a a ÁaZed proFess beFaXse the liberal prinFiples of the 2slo peaFe proFess Zere not implemented or b ÁaZed aFFords beFaXse the aFFords Fontained ¶destrXFtiYe ambigXit\· regarding the nationalist aspirations of eaFh groXp 21 J. Rynhold, “The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed Implementa- tion?”, Working Paper, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, March 2008. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 18 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict A groZing bod\ of literatXre on the histor\ of 3alestine has reFon- FeptXalised the Israel-3alestine FonÁiFt thereb\ offering an alterna- tiYe e[planation for the failXre of the 2slo peaFe proFess A nXmber of sFholars YieZ the FonÁiFt as rooted in indigenoXs resistanFe to the =ionist Folonisation and ethniF-Fleansing of 3alestine ZhiFh is not limited to the period before 948 bXt FontinXes Xntil this da\ Xnder the banner of the so-Falled peaFe proFess )rom the dis- possession of 3alestinians in the 948 Zar the implementation of the absentees propert\ laZ the preYention of the retXrn of 3alestin- ian refXgees the appropriation of 3alestinian lands inside the *reen /ine the 97 oFFXpation of the :est %anN and *a]a Strip to the on-going settlement bXilding proMeFt restriFtions on 3alestinian home bXilding the strangXlation of 3alestinian eFonomiF aFtiYit\ throXgh FheFNpoints and FlosXres the bXilding of the :all and the siege on the *a]a Strip Israel enaFts a sloZ motion ethniF Fleans- ing aimed at driYing oXt as man\ 3alestinians as possible Zhilst segregating or “ZharehoXsing” 3 the remaining 3alestinians Zithin %antXstans behind :alls and Xnder bloFNade -oseph 0assad Fomparing Israel to the 8nited States SoXth AfriFa and 5hodesia argXes that “>these states@ institXted themselYes as postFolonial states territories and spaFes and institXted their politiFal statXs as independent in order to render their present a postFolonial era Amongst those Zho Xse a Folonial lens to YieZ the FonÁiFt there are some bXt not all Zho oppose the “tZo-state” solXtion as a 22 For example, N. Abdo, Women in Israel: Gender, Race and Citizenship, (London: Zed Books, 2011); J. Massad, “The “post-colonial” colony: time, space and bodies in Palestine/Israel”, in FawziaAfzal-Khan and KalpanaSeshadri-Crooks (eds.), The Preoccupation of Postcolonial Studies, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); L. Taraki (ed.), Living Palestine: Fam- ily Survival, Resistance and Mobility under Occupation, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006); O. J. Salamanca, et al., “Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine”, Settler Colonial Studies, Vol. 2, No.1, pp. 1-8. 23 Jeff Halper, “Wharehousing Palestinians”,Counterpunch , 16 September 2008: http://www. counterpunch.org/2008/09/16/warehousing-palestinians/ (accessed 27 June 2013). 24 J. Massad, “The “post-colonial” colony: time, space and bodies in Palestine/Israel”, p. 311. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 19 Nicola Pratt MXst solXtion to the FonÁiFt partiFXlarl\ from amongst the 3alestin- ian diasporarefXgees and 3alestinian Fiti]ens of Israel This op- position has inFreased sinFe the release of the “3alestine 3apers” in earl\ Zhere it beFame Flear that the 3/2 leadership Zas Zilling to Fompromise signiÀFantl\ on the “right of retXrn”³long a Fentral aim of the 3alestinian national strXggle³as Zell as to agree to possible land sZaps along the 97 borders that FoXld haYe inFlXded 3alestinian Fiti]ens of Israel in retXrn for a 3alestinian state This disFontent Zith the tZo-state solXtion as it has been pXrsXed throXgh the 2slo proFess has led to a groZing moYement Falling for a one-state solXtion in ZhiFh Israelis and 3alestinians ZoXld haYe eTXal rights Zithin a demoFratiF and seFXlar state +oZeYer it shoXld be noted that the one-state proposal appears to be a proMeFt promoted more amongst the 3alestinian diaspora rather than amongst 3alestinians in the :est %anN and *a]a Strip As one aFademiF notes it is XnrealistiF to e[peFt that 3alestinians ZoXld be Zilling to sZap the strXggle against Israeli oFFXpation for \et another strXggle for eTXal rights in a shared state Zhere -eZish Israelis ZoXld haYe the Xpper hand7 :hether the end game is tZo states or one state the signiÀFanFe of a Folonial lens is to reFonFeptXalise the FonÁiFt as a prodXFt of =i- onist Foloni]ation Indeed the 3/2 Fharter of 98 deFlared its re- sistanFe to =ionist Foloni]ation bXt this FonFeptXalisation of Israel and resistanFe to it Zas abandoned b\ the 3/2 Zhen it signed the 2slo AFFords in 993 An Xnderstanding of the FonÁiFt as rooted in the =ionist proMeFt esFheZs both realist and liberal FonFlXsions aboXt the need for a tZo-state solXtion instead it sees a MXst solX- tion as the halt to Israel as a proMeFt of ¶settler Folonialism· In addition to enabling Israel·s FontinXed Foloni]ation of historiF 3alestine the 2slo AFFords haYe sXFFeeded in paFif\ing the 3/2 25 Amongst other articles on Al-Jazeera English’s Palestine Papers pages, see G. Carlstrom, “Expelling Israel’s Arab population?”, AlJazeera.com, The Palestine Papers, 24 Janu- ary 2011 (accessed 4 March 2012); A.Howeidy, “PA relinquished right of return”, AlJa- zeera.com, The Palestine Papers, 24 January 2011: http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepa- pers/2011/01/2011124121923486877.html (accessed 4 March 2012); L. Al-Arian, “PA selling short the refugees”, AlJazeera.com, The Palestine Papers, 25 January 2011(accessed 4 March 2012). 26 Amongst others see, A. Abunimah, One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestin- ian Impasse, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); S. Makdisee, Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008). 27 G.Karmi, “The One-State Solution: An Alternative Vision for Israeli-Palestinian Peace”,Journal of Palestine Studies,Vol. 40, No. 2, 2011, p. 72. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 20 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict and led to the fXrther fragmentation of the 3alestinian people SinFe 993 there has been a bifXrFation of the 3alestinian national moYe- ment 2ne Zing )ateh e[erFising poZer as the 3alestinian AXthor- it\ Fan be Fonsidered to haYe adopted Zhat 5ima +ammami has termed an “earned soYereignt\” approaFh8 This approaFh aims at demonstrating to the international FommXnit\ that 3alestine “de- serYes” soYereignt\ b\ abiding b\ the donor-imposed state-bXild- ing proFess A Fentral element of e[ternall\-driYen state-bXilding has been the paFiÀFation of 3alestinian resistanFe to Israel throXgh reform of the 3alestinian seFXrit\ serYiFes Zhose main Mob is noZ to FraFNdoZn on 3alestinians9 The ¶5oad 0ap· in Xshered in inFreased donor pressXre on the 3alestinian AXthorit\ to ¶reform· that is bring in neo-liberal and good goYernanFe reforms in order to beFome a ¶sXitable· partner for peaFe that is as 0and\ TXrner argXes sXitable to the Israeli goYernment 3 The failXre of these reform efforts to address the groZing impoYerishment of 3alestin- ian soFiet\ and the FontinXing Israeli oFFXpation FontribXted to the eleFtion of +amas in 3 :hilst there has been disFXssion oYer Zhether 3alestinians Yoted for +amas beFaXse of its anti-ForrXp- tion stanFe or beFaXse of its resistanFe to Israel in effeFt these tZo are greatl\ intertZined beFaXse of the linN betZeen ForrXption state-bXilding and FapitXlation to Israeli interests Zithin the )ateh- dominated 3alestinian AXthorit\ +amas together Zith IslamiF -ihad as Zell as some faFtions of the 3/2 represent the resistanFe approaFh and belieYe that ne- gotiations Zith Israel haYe failed to aFhieYe 3alestinian rights and therefore YiolenFe is the onl\ Za\ to aFhieYe 3alestinian self-de- termination &onseTXentl\ folloZing the eleFtion of +amas to the 3alestinian AXthorit\ the international FommXnit\ bo\Fotted the 3A and sXpported 3resident 0ahmoXd Abbas )ateh This resXlted in the politiFal and geographiFal fragmentation of the 3alestinian national moYement³Zith )ateh taNing Fontrol of the 3A in the :est %anN and +amas forming a neZ administration and taNing Fontrol 28 R. Hammami, “Neo-liberalism, Good Governance and ‘Earned Sovereignty’ in Palestine”, paper presented at a workshop, ‘Reconceptualising Gender: Transnational Perspectives’, In- stitute of Women’s Studies, Birzeit University, April 2011. 29 Ibid; Y. Sayigh, “Policing the People, Building the State: Authoritarian transformation in the West Bank and Gaza”, Carnegie Papers, Beirut: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010. 30 M. Turner, “The Power of “Shock and Awe”: the Palestinian Authority and the Road to Reform”, International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No.4, 2009. 31 Ibid. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 21 Nicola Pratt of the *a]a Strip in 7 SinFe then the international FommXnit\ has sXpported )ateh as the “sXitable partner for peaFe” and Fon- tinXed to sXpport its state-bXilding proMeFt in the :est %anN Zhilst bo\Fotting +amas and taFitl\ sXpporting Israel·s bloFNade on the *a]a Strip as Zell as its militar\ onslaXght on the Strip in 89 2slo has not onl\ led to the bifXrFation of the 3alestinian national moYement and the separation of 3alestinians in the :est %anN from those in the *a]a Strip The 2slo AFFords Fontain Zithin them the separation of 3alestinians in the :est %anN betZeen Areas A % and & Zith onl\ Area A being fXll\ Xnder 3A Fontrol This has not onl\ enabled Israel to impede 3alestinian freedom of moYement maN- ing soFial and eFonomiF aFtiYities difÀFXlt and Fostl\ In addition it has Freated a differentiated regime of oFFXpation aFross the :est %anN 3alestinians in Areas A beneÀt from the 2slo proFess to the degree that the\ are dependent Xpon the 3A for Mobs and seFXrit\ and therefore haYe a Yested interest in its FontinXed e[istenFe Those 3alestinians Zho protest against the 3A or tr\ to hold the 3A to aFFoXnt are XsXall\ met Zith repression 0eanZhile 3ales- tinians in Areas % faFe FontinXing settlement enFroaFhment land grabbing and settler YiolenFe ZithoXt e[perienFing the beneÀts of the 3A Their ZeeNl\ protests are met Zith repression b\ Israeli se- FXrit\ serYiFes )inall\ 3alestinians in Areas & faFe on-going eth- niF Fleansing as Israel FontinXoXsl\ demolishes homes and denies 3alestinians basiF serYiFes 3alestinians are eYen dependent Xpon Israeli settlements as praFtiFall\ the onl\ soXrFe of emplo\ment The 3alestinian AXthorit\ has no presenFe or MXrisdiFtion in Areas &3 The sitXation in (ast -erXsalem is different again althoXgh not too dissimilar from Areas & 3alestinians are being pXshed oXt of their homes and faFe inFreasing impoYerishment Zhilst -eZish set- tlement bXilding FontinXes In addition 3alestinian -erXsalemites faFe the possibilit\ of their residenF\ being ZithdraZn b\ the Israeli aXthorities 3alestinians in +ebron also faFe partiFXlar Fhallenges liYing in a diYided Fit\ and in fear of settler YiolenFe 1ot to mention the speFiÀF sitXation of *a]ans liYing Xnder eFonomiF bloFNade and sXbMeFt to sporadiF militar\ FonÁiFt resXlting in a high nXmber of FiYilian FasXalties and destrXFtion of FiYilian infrastrXFtXre This fragmentation of the 3alestinian people in the 2FFXpied Territories 32 Mandy Turner, “The State-building Programme of the Palestinian Authority: Achievements and Challenges”, paper presented to the United Nations Seminar on Assistance to the Pales- tinian People, Helsinki, 28 & 29 April 2011. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 22 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict adding to the different e[perienFes of 3alestinians inside the *reen /ine as Zell as the diaspora FonstitXtes a seYere Fhallenge to the XniÀFation of the 3alestinians behind a single strateg\ The 2slo peaFe proFess the 5oad 0ap and the reaFtions of the international FommXnit\ to the eleFtion of +amas haYe all had deY- astating FonseTXenFes for the 3alestinian national moYement and for the 3alestinian people Israel has been able to fXrther entrenFh its oFFXpation33 and apartheid rXle34 2FFXpation and apartheid ma\ be Fonsidered as a FontinXation of the FonTXest and Fontrol of land and the transformation of the ethniF strXFtXre of soFiet\ that is Fentral to the settler Folonial proMeFt of =ionism3 +oZ has the “Arab Spring” Fhanged this on-going proFess of Foloni]ation and paFiÀFation" ,VUDHODQGWKH´$UDE6SULQJµ =LRQLVPUHQHZHG The XnFertaint\ throZn Xp b\ the “Arab Spring” ma\ be represent- ed b\ Israeli ofÀFials as a serioXs Fhallenge to the FoXntr\·s seFXrit\ bXt argXabl\ this XnFertaint\ has been an opportXnit\ for Israel The “Arab Spring” has proYided a prete[t for Israel to fXrther its pol- iF\ of separation and disengagement from the 3alestinians and the Arab Zorld 2ne Israeli Zriter has FharaFterised Israel·s response to the “Arab Spring” as a form of “Zinter hibernation” argXing that “/iNe a polar bear Israel retreated into its FaYe ZithdreZ into itself and Zaited Xntil the rage passed %Xilding seFXrit\ barriers on the border Zith (g\pt and -ordan enlarging the seFXrit\ bXdget and abstaining from an\ gestXre toZard the 3alestinians haYe been onl\ some of the steps taNen”3 0oreoYer eYents in (g\pt /ib\a 33 See for example: J. Halper, “The 94 percent solution: A Matrix of Control”, Middle East Report, No. 216, 2000;N. Gordon, Israel’s Occupation,(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 34 O. Yiftachel, “Creeping Apartheid in Israel-Palestine”, Middle East Report, No. 253, 2009; U. Davis, Israel: An Apartheid State,(London: Zed Books, 1987/2003). 35 M. Rodinson, Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?,(Pathfinder Press, 1973); P. Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native”, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2006, pp. 387-409; O. Yiftachel, “’Ethnocracy’: the Politics of Judaising Israel/Palestine”, Constellations: International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1998, pp. 364-390. 36 B. Ravid, “The Arab Spring and Israel’s winter hibernation”,Haaretz.com , 8 December 2011 (accessed 4 March 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 23 Nicola Pratt Israel-3alestine FonÁiFt This has been to the beneÀt of Israel·s Fon- tinXing settlement bXilding and Folonisation of 3alestinian lands SinFe there haYe been inFreasing nXmbers of demolitions of homes in Area & of the :est %anN ZhiFh represents per Fent of the :est %anN and is Xnder Israeli Fontrol aFFording to 2slo II a moYe that Zas sXpposed to be temporar\ Xntil a fXll peaFe settlement betZeen Israel and the 3alestinians Zas reaFhed This area is Fonsidered strategiF for Israel·s seFXrit\ and also Fontains the Yer\ fertile agriFXltXral and hortiFXltXral land of the -ordan 9al- le\ ZhiFh is home to seYeral Israeli settlement Fompanies sXFh as &armel The Israeli aXthorities emplo\ disFriminator\ planning regXlations against 3alestinians in Area & Israeli aXthorities de- stro\ an\ strXFtXres inFlXding sFhools ZhiFh haYe not reFeiYed the reTXired permit +oZeYer the\ rarel\ grant 3alestinians the re- TXired permissions AFFording to the 81 2rganisation for the &o- ordination of +Xmanitarian Affairs 2&+A “the approYed planning sFhemes for 3alestinian FommXnities enFompass less than per Fent of Area & This is in Fontrast to the 8 per Fent of Area & Zhere planning sFhemes haYe been approYed for Israeli settle- ments and the additional per Fent of Area & land ZhiFh Fomes Xnder the MXrisdiFtional areas of the settlements· loFal and regional FoXnFils and ZhiFh Fan be made aYailable for settlement plan- ning and deYelopment in the fXtXre”37 2&+A reports that in 3alestinian-oZned strXFtXres demolished in Area & Fomprised residential strXFtXres and 37 liYelihood and animal strXFtXres in- frastrXFtXre and other strXFtXres This resXlted in the displaFement of 8 people inFlXding 474 Fhildren38 2&+A states that these nXmbers “Zere almost as high as the highest sinFe 2&+A started s\stematiFall\ Follating statistiFs in 8”39 In effeFt these measXres amoXnt to forFed displaFement for 3alestinians liYing in Area & man\ of Zhom are forFed to migrate to other areas of the :est %anN in order to seFXre their liYelihoods %edoXin are par- tiFXlarl\ targeted b\ Israeli aXthorities for forFed displaFement This displaFement of 3alestinians faFilitates Israel·s possible fXtXre an- ne[ation of the -ordan 9alle\4 as Zell as the e[pansion of 0aale 37 OCHA, Fragmented Lives: Humanitarian Overview 2012,(Jerusalem: OCHA, 2013), p. 20. 38 Ibid, p. 21. 39 Ibid. 40 F. Barat and J. Halper Israel’s gone way beyond apartheid: an interview with Jeff Halp- er”, 12 April 2012, New Internationalist online. http://newint.org/features/web-exclu- sive/2012/04/26/jeff-halper-interview-israel-palestine/ (accessed 19 June 2013). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 24 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict AdXmXmin settlement and its linNing to -erXsalem leading to the FXtting off of (ast -erXsalem from the :est %anN4 3alestinian -erXsalemites liYing Xnder illegal Israeli anne[ation also faFe similar obstaFles to those in Area & in terms of difÀFXlties of obtaining permits to bXild obliging indiYidXals to bXild ZithoXt permits and risN demolitions 2&+A reports that hoXse demolitions in (ast -erXsalem inFreased in Fompared to 4 In addi- tion 2&+A reports an inFreased nXmber of eYiFtions b\ settlers of 3alestinians from their (ast -erXsalem homes in Fompared to as Zell as an inFreased nXmber of reYoNed residenFies in Fompared to 43 2Yerall Israeli Fontrols on bXilding as Zell as Xnder-fXnding of those mXniFipalities Zhere 3alestinians are in the maMorit\ is helping Israel to aFhieYe demographiF sXpremaF\ in -erXsalem (ast and :est 44 0oreoYer in 1oYember Israel annoXnFed neZ settlement bXilding proMeFts aroXnd -erXsalem in the so-Falled ( area and in the soXth of the Fit\ ZhiFh threaten to FXt (ast -erXsalem off from the :est %anN and to smother 3alestin- ian neighboXrhoods4 Settler harassment is also a serioXs problem for 3alestinians and appears to be inFreasing4 In 2&+A reForded 98 settler Yio- lenFe inFidents resXlting in 3alestinian inMXries in addition to 8 inFidents resXlting in damage to 3alestinian priYate propert\ This represents a deFrease Fompared to bXt still an inFrease oYer in ZhiFh there Zere 9 3alestinian FasXalties and 43 inFidents of propert\ damage against 3alestinians b\ -eZish set- tlers47 Settler damage to priYate propert\ Meopardises 3alestinian 41 ICAHD (Israeli Committee Against Home Demolitions),Nowhere Left to Go: Arab al-Jaha- lin Bedouin Ethnic Displacement,(Jerusalem: ICAHD, 2011). 42 OCHA, Fragmented Lives: Humanitarian Overview 2012, p. 25. 43 Ibid, pp. 25-26. 44 ICAHD (Israeli Committee Against Home Demolitions), No Home, No Homeland: A New Normative Framework for Examining the Practice of Administrative Home Demolitions in East Jerusalem,(Jerusalem: ICAHD, 2011). 45 ICG (International Crisis Group), Extreme Makeover? (I): Israel’s Politics of Land and Faith in East Jerusalem, 20 December 2012. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east- north-africa/israel-palestine/134-extreme-makeover-i-israels-politics-of-land-and-faith-in- east-jerusalem.aspx (accessed 21 June 2013). 46 Y. Knell, “Bedouin oppose Israeli plans to relocate communities”, BBC News Online, 11 November 2011 (accessed 4 March 2012). 47 OCHA, Fragmented Lives: Humanitarian Overview 2012, pp. 9-10. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 25 Nicola Pratt liYelihoods for e[ample b\ destro\ing oliYe trees ZhiFh proYide 4 of the agriFXltXral inFome of the 2FFXpied 3alestinian Ter- ritor\48 Israel has also FontinXed to appropriate 3alestinian land throXgh settlement bXilding despite demands from the 3A that a settlement free]e be a prereTXisite for re-starting peaFe negotiations Indeed 3eaFe 1oZ reported in 3 that neZ FonstrXFtions in settlements in the Àrst TXarter of that \ear Zitnessed a 7 per Fent inFrease reaFhing a seYen-\ear high “Zhilst those in the same period in- side Israel deFreased 89 despite FontinXed pXbliF oXtFr\ oYer inFreasing eFonomiF hardship and the Fost of hoXsing”49 The spirit of Tahrir STXare appeared to spill oYer into the streets of Tel AYiY in the sXmmer of as Israelis tooN to the street in large nXmbers to protest against their goYernment·s eFonomiF poliFies ZhiFh haYe led to inFreasing Fosts of liYing sTXee]ing the middle Flasses Some protesters made a linN betZeen the goYernment·s Zillingness to spend on the settlements and the laFN of fXnds aYail- able for soFial Zelfare programmes +oZeYer most protest lead- ers haYe limited their demands to soFio-eFonomiF grieYanFes and aYoided Zhat the\ see as the politiFall\ diYisiYe issXe of Israel·s oFFXpation of the :est %anN 2ne Fommentator has aFFXsed the protests of failing to go be\ond the demands of the AshNena]im middle Flass to inFlXde the demands of others on the peripher\ of Israeli soFiet\ inFlXding 3alestinians inside and be\ond the *reen /ine The tensions Zithin the protest moYement oYer Zhose MXs- tiFe and Zhat sort of MXstiFe Zas illXstrated in a disFXssion betZeen different Israelis inFlXding a Fo-foXnder of the protest moYement and a 3alestinian-Israeli member of the .nesset dXring The &afe programme on Al--a]eera (nglish netZorN3 48 OCHA,Olive Harvest Fact Sheet,(Jerusalem: OCHA, 2012). 49 Peace Now,“Construction Starts in Settlements Reach 7 Year High”, 9 June 2013. http:// peacenow.org.il/eng/ConstructionStarts1-3-2013 (accessed 19 June 2013). 50 H. Sherwood, “Israeli protests: 430,000 take to streets to demand social justice”, Guardian Online, 4 September 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/04/israel-protests- social-justice (accessed 19 June 2013). 51 J. Beinin, “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Arab Awakening”, MERIP Online, 1 August 2011. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero080111 (accessed 19 June 2013). 52 L. Grinberg, “The success of Israel’s social protest failure”,Haaretz Online, 23 January 2013.http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/the-success-of-israel-s-social-protest-failure.premi- um-1.495740 (accessed on 19 June 2013). 53 “Transcript: The Cafe, Tel Aviv: The enemy within?”,Al-Jazeera, 8 January2013. http://www. aljazeera.com/programmes/thecafe/2012/10/20121099127566396.html (accessed: 19 June 2013). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 26 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict The failXre of Israeli protesters to oppose Zider goYernment meas- Xres is partiFXlarl\ alarming giYen that some of these are against Israeli Fiti]ens These disFriminator\ measXres do not FonstitXte a trend emerging onl\ sinFe the “Arab Spring” Israel has been termed an ¶ethniF demoFraF\· that is a demoFraF\ Zith ethniF dominanFe for the -eZs gXaranteed4 2thers haYe FritiFised the ethniF de- moFraF\ label and termed Israel an ¶ethnoFraF\· that is a demoF- raF\ onl\ for -eZs Adalah an 1*2 that addresses disFrimination against 3alestinians in Israel reports that there are more than laZs that disFriminate against 3alestinian Fiti]ens of Israel “inFlXd- ing their rights to politiFal partiFipation aFFess to land edXFation state bXdget resoXrFes and Friminal proFedXres” ArgXabl\ the trend toZards the inFreasing ¶ethniFisation· of Israel is related to a nXmber of faFtors inFlXding the “ethniF seFXrit\ regime” that has emerged as a resXlt of Israel·s oFFXpation sinFe 97 the right- Zing shift in Israeli politiFs and the groZing demands of 3alestin- ians Zithin Israel for eTXalit\ as Fiti]ens of the state sinFe 977 This disFrimination is obYioXs in the passage of laZs that dispro- portionatel\ impaFt Xpon 3alestinian-Israelis or are targeted against those Zho adYoFate for 3alestinian rightsIn a series of pro- posed bills in the right-Zing-dominated .nesset soXght to pXnish man\ of the aFtiYities of Israeli hXman rights organisations sXFh as reporting Zar Frimes sXpporting Falls for bo\Fotts of Israel as- sisting refXgees and reFeiYing foreign fXnding8 2ne of those laZs Zas passed into laZ in -Xl\ pXnishing an\ Israeli indiYidXal or groXp Falling for a bo\Fott of Israeli settlements in the :est %anN In -anXar\ the Israeli SXpreme &oXrt Xpheld a 3 laZ prohibit- ing Israelis from liYing Zith their :est %anN*a]a spoXses in Israel a laZ that almost XniTXel\ affeFts 3alestinians of Israeli Fiti]enship The Telegraph reported that “The Israeli right has defended the 54 S. Smooha, “Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel”,Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1990, pp. 389-413. 55 Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel , “Discriminatory Laws in Is- rael”, Adalah.org,n.d. http://adalah.org/eng/Israeli-Discriminatory-Law-Database, accessed 17 June 2013. 56 M. Klein, The Shift: Israel-Palestine, from Border Struggle to Ethnic Conflict,(New York: Co- lumbia University Press, 2010). 57 S. Smooha, Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2010). 58 HRW (Human Rights Watch), “Israel: Withdraw Legislation Punishing Human Rights Ac- tivists”, 25 July 2010. http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/23/israel-withdraw-legislation- punishing-human-rights-activists (accessed 17 June 2013). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 27 Nicola Pratt moYes sa\ing the\ are needed to proteFt the -eZish identit\ of the state”9 Another on-going trend in Israel has been the appropriation of Arab 3alestinian lands inside the *reen /ine This is not a reFent phe- nomenon bXt dates baFN to the establishment of Israel in 948 Then land Zas FonÀsFated from Arabs3alestinians b\ the -eZ- ish 1ational )Xnd to be Xsed e[FlXsiYel\ b\ -eZs in Israel Israeli state Fontrols on land Xse b\ Arabs haYe preYented Arab toZns and Yillages from e[panding in line Zith their popXlation The 3raZer 3lan approYed b\ the Israeli Fabinet in threatens to displaFe Xp to 3 %edoXin b\ forFibl\ eYiFting them from their historiF lands and obliging them to moYe to a handfXl of toZns reFognised b\ Israel AFFording to the hXman rights 1*2 Adalah “:hile the Arab %edoXin popXlation in the 1aTab stands at aroXnd 7 persons or 4 of the total popXlation in the 1aTab the Fom- bined areas of the goYernment-planned and neZl\-reFogni]ed Arab %edoXin toZns and Yillages in the 1aTab aFFoXnt for MXst 9 of the land in the distriFt” The %edoXin Yillage of al-AraTib one of seYeral ¶XnreFognised· %edoXin Yillages has been repeatedl\ de- molished b\ aXthorities and rebXilt b\ its residents sinFe %oth the 81 &ommittee on the (limination of 5aFial 'isFrimination and the (Xropean 3arliament Falled on the Israeli goYernment to Zith- draZ the 3raZer 3lan It is not possible to establish a FaXsal linN betZeen the “Arab Spring” on the one hand and Israel·s poliFies against 3alestinians inside and be\ond the *reen /ine on the one hand 1eYertheless it Fan be argXed that Israeli politiFal leaders and Fommentators haYe framed the “Arab Spring” as a potential threat to Israel ZhiFh has thriYed on the statXs TXo ante thereb\ proYiding a legitimis- ing disFoXrse for its FontinXing Foloni]ation and ethniF Fleansing measXres as Zell as its militar\ threats against Iran ZhiFh Àt into a =ionist ZorldYieZ of the need to seFXre Israel as a -eZish state at an\ Fost In other Zords the “Arab Spring” represents an opportX- 59 A. Blomfield, “Israel’s Supreme Court accused of racism over residency ban on Palestinians who marry Israeli Arabs”, The Telegraph online, 12 January 2012 (accessed 4 March 2012). 60 Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel,The Inequality Report: The Pal- estinian Arab Minority in Israel,(Haifa: Adalah, 2011), p. 10. 61 J. Khoury, “European Parliament Condemns Israel’s Policy towards Bedouin Population”, Haaretz.com, 8 July 2012. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/european-par- liament-condemns-israel-s-policy-toward-bedouin-population-1.449687 (accessed 17 June 2013). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 28 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict nit\ for rather than a threat to the FontinXation the =ionist settler Folonial proMeFt and the latter poses the biggest obstaFle to peaFe maNing in Israel3alestine 7KH3DOHVWLQLDQVDQGWKH´$UDE6SULQJµ As noted aboYe the 3alestinians haYe raised demands for reFon- Filiation betZeen +amas and )ateh and for reform of the 3/2 'e- spite reFonFiliation agreements betZeen +amas and )ateh e[ist- ing on paper neither side Zishes to maNe FonFrete moYes ZhiFh ZoXld Fompromise their respeFtiYe poZer 1otZithstanding the failXre to aFhieYe their demands for 3alestin- ian politiFal reforms the ¶ 0arFh· moYement has eYolYed It is leading direFt aFtion against Israeli oFFXpation from Fampaigning for 3alestinians to abide b\ a bo\Fott of Israeli goods to protesting oXtside Israeli prisons in solidarit\ Zith 3alestinian hXnger striNers and Fondemning normalisation b\ 3alestinian politiFians and bXsi- ness elites AlthoXgh it is not an aim of the moYement to oppose )ateh or +amas for man\ of these aFtiYists there is little loYe for either part\ and their positions against Israel deÀnitel\ pXt them at odds Zith the :est %anN leadership As 1oXra (raNat argXes “The moYement·s hori]on ma\ render e[isting politiFal parties meaning- less as inYigorated \oXth aFtiYists searFh for FreatiYe Za\s to shat- ter the stagnation of their domestiF Fondition in an effort to bXt- tress their ongoing strXggle against Israeli Foloni]ation”3 Indeed it remains to be seen not onl\ hoZ )ateh and +amas ma\ pXt aside their politiFal riYalries bXt more signiÀFantl\ hoZ the\ Zill reFonFile demands for a neZ politiFal leadership Zith their oZn promises to hold eleFtions ZhiFh Zill sXrel\ bring their popXlarit\ into TXestion as Zell as raise TXestions aboXt ZhiFh strategies shoXld be pXr- sXed to end Israel·s oFFXpation 2ne e[ample of FreatiYe efforts b\ 3alestinians to resist Israel·s oF- FXpation Zas the deFlaration of a ¶third intifada· for 0a\ ²the anniYersar\ of the Nakba In line Zith mXFh of the soFial media oriented aFtiYism of the “Arab Spring” a groXp of Arab and 3al- 62 A. Tartir, “Fatah and Hamas: An Elusive Reconciliation”, opendemocracy on-line, 2012. http://www.opendemocracy.net/alaa-tartir/fatah-and-hamas-elusive-reconciliation (accesse d 5 November 2012). 63 N. Erekat, “Palestinian Youth: New Movement, New Borders”, Jadaliyya.com, 6 May 2011. (accessed 4 March 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 29 Nicola Pratt estinian aFtiYists Freated a )aFebooN page in 0arFh ZhiFh Zas initiall\ remoYed b\ )aFebooN for allegedl\ inFiting YiolenFe 1eYertheless the page reappeared and attraFted hXndreds of thoXsands of folloZers The Third 3alestinian Intifada Falled on all Arabs not MXst 3alestinians and internationals to protest peaFefXll\ oXtside Israeli embassies and FonsXlates globall\ against the oF- FXpation and for the implementation of the right of retXrn for 3ales- tinian refXgees A nXmber of protests tooN plaFe in Arab FoXntries the 2FFXpied 3alestinian Territor\ and Israel 0arFhes in (g\pt and -ordan Zere preYented b\ seFXrit\ forFes from arriYing at the bor- ders of historiF 3alestine as planned +oZeYer in XnpreFedented images protesters from /ebanon S\ria the :est %anN and *a]a Strip marFhed toZards the FeaseÀre lines de faFto borders Zith Israel and thoXsands of protesters breaFhed the border betZeen S\ria and the Israeli-oFFXpied *olan +eights4 As one (g\ptian Zrote “It is Yer\ trXe that the Zhole Arab spring >@ has nothing to do Zith Israel as far as motiYation is FonFerned bXt that doesn·t mean that Israel is immXne from its ripple effeFt If the Arab peo- ple deFided to address \ears of Xnmet soFio-politiFal demands then the 3alestinian issXe shoXld XndoXbtedl\ Fome on top of that list” 8ntil noZ these aFts of resistanFe haYe not eYolYed into a mass moYement 3alestinians are aZare of the Fhallenges separation of 3alestinians liYing in the :est %anN *a]a Strip and Israel as Zell as fragmentation Zithin the :est %anN as a resXlt of FheFNpoints and settler onl\ roads and separation betZeen 3alestinians in his- toriF 3alestine and those in the diaspora The militarisation of the “Arab Spring” in /ib\a and S\ria has made 3alestinian refXgees YXlnerable to fXrther displaFement 3alestinians in the *a]a Strip faFe poYert\ and XnsXstainable liYelihoods as the resXlt of a \ear bloFNade (Yen :est %anN 3alestinians are faFing threats to their liYelihoods as a resXlt of the Fombination of neoliberal eFonomiF poliFies slaYishl\ folloZed b\ the 3A and Israel·s FontinXing Fontrol of the eFonom\ In September thoXsands of 3alestinians pro- tested aFross the :est %anN against rising liYing Fosts 64 H. Sherwood, “Thirteen killed as Israeli troops open fire on Nakba Day border protests”, Guardian Online, 15 May 2011. (accessed 4 March 2012). 65 Ashraf Ezzat, “Third Intifada Underway”, Dissident Voice, 9 May 2011. http://dissidentvoice. org/2011/05/third-intifada-underway/ (accessed 4 March 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 30 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict :estern donors and also *Xlf donors to paFif\ the 3alestinians 3alestinian resistanFe FontinXes The Xse of soFial media is a sig- niÀFant tool enabling 3alestinians to oYerFome geographiFal dis- persion :hilst protests and other direFt aFtion sinFe haYe not led to a “3alestinian Spring” Ze are Zitnessing the YoiFing of different positions Zithin the 3alestinian moYement and these are no longer along the lines of )ateh Ys +amas Instead YoiFes predominantl\ from amongst \oXng people independent of these tZo parties are Falling for non-Yiolent resistanFe against Israel and greater demoFraF\ Zithin the 3alestinian moYement in order to end the oFFXpation This is a reMeFtion of the ¶earned soYereignt\· approaFh of )ateh and the armed resistanFe approaFh of +amas %oth approaFhes haYe failed to end Israel·s oFFXpation Zhilst both parties are FXrrentl\ ZithoXt a demoFratiF mandate ZhiFh e[pired in These neZ 3alestinian YoiFes are potentiall\ sXpported b\ a re-energised Arab solidarit\ moYement7 as Zell as a groZing international solidarit\ moYement foFXsed aroXnd %o\Fott 'iYest- ment and SanFtions %'S It is this reinYigorated resistanFe and the failXre of :estern FoXntries Xntil noZ to paFif\ it that represents the greatest Fhallenge to Israel·s FontinXed Foloni]ation &RQFOXVLRQ The “Arab spring” does not immediatel\ beneÀt the resolXtion of the Israel-3alestine FonÁiFt³at least as the proFess is FXrrentl\ FonFeptXalised If Ze FonFeiYe of the FonÁiFt-resolXtion proFess as one in ZhiFh tZo national groXps -eZish and 3alestinian engage in negotiations on hoZ to “Fompromise” to share historiF 3alestine then the “Arab Spring” appears to haYe throZn Xp more barriers to this alread\ difÀFXlt endeaYoXr Israel has retreated to its bXnNer and has not Feased those poliFies that are damaging to a tZo-state solXtion primaril\ settlement bXilding Zhilst fXrther eroding the trXst of 3alestinian Fiti]ens of Israel in the demoFratiF natXre of the state 0eanZhile Xnit\ talNs betZeen )ateh and +amas haYe not reFonFiled the tZo different strategies of the tZo parties diplomaF\ Ys armed strXggle let alone reFonFiled the parties themselYes al- 66 L. Alsaafin, “Linah Alsaafin on Social Media and Palestine”,Jadaliyya.com , 7 June 2013. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12099/linah-alsaafin-on-social-media-and-palestine (accessed 27 June 2013). 67 R. Abou El-Fadl, “The Road to Jerusalem through Tahrir Square: Anti-Zionism and Pales- tine in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol 41, No. 2, Winter 2012, pp. 6-26. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 31 Nicola Pratt thoXgh it ma\ represent a taFit aFNnoZledgement b\ +amas of the tZo-state solXtion +oZeYer the “Arab spring” has shaNen things Xp It has highlighted the need for a neZ strateg\ to replaFe the 2slo proFess in solYing the Israel-3alestine FonÁiFt It has giYen impetXs to neZ politiFal aF- tors partiFXlarl\ from Zithin the 3alestinian diaspora and amongst 3alestinian \oXth sXpported b\ reenergised Arab and global soli- darit\ moYements Freating neZ Za\s to resist Israel·s settler Folo- nial proMeFt The neZ methods of non-Yiolent resistanFe inFlXding protests against Israeli land e[propriation for the rights of 3alestin- ian prisoners and against normalisation aFtiYities b\ the 3A as Zell as the %o\Fott 'iYestment and SanFtions Fampaign Fhallenge the legitimaF\ of Israel·s settler Folonial proMeFt 1oXra (raNat soXnds Zords of FaXtion argXing that there is a need for the artiFXlation of a politiFal programme and not merel\ the Xse of neZ strategies to aFhieYe 3alestinian self-determination8 3RVWVFULSW SinFe Fompleting this artiFle (g\ptian 3resident 0ohammed 0orsi Zas deposed b\ the militar\ on 3 -Xl\ 3 folloZing massiYe pop- Xlar demonstrations against his presidenF\ and his 0Xslim %rother- hood baFNers In addition the Israeli goYernment and the 3alestin- ian AXthorit\ annoXnFed the resXmption of peaFe negotiations on 3 -Xl\ These eYents pose neZ opportXnities for Israel to FontinXe its proMeFt of settler Folonialism and neZ obstaFles to the aFhieYe- ment of 3alestinian rights 'espite Israel·s FonFerns aboXt the instabilit\ that the oXster of 0orsi ma\ bring the militar\-baFNed (g\ptian goYernment Zill XndoXbtedl\ FontinXe if not strengthen seFXrit\ Fooperation Zith Israel in the name of Zaging its deFlared ¶Zar against terrorism· 0orsi·s departXre is a bloZ to +amas in the *a]a Strip as Zell as potentiall\ Xndermining (g\ptian popXlar solidarit\ Zith the 3ales- tinians Zho haYe been represented in the media as allies of the deposed president and threats to (g\ptian seFXrit\ 68 N. Erekat, “Palestinian Youth: New Movement, New Borders”. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 32 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict :ith regards to the resXmption of peaFe talNs these Zill not lead to a MXst peaFe in ZhiFh the hXman rights of 3alestinians are fXll\ addressed 8S SeFretar\ of State -ohn .err\ annoXnFed that all Ànal statXs issXes are open for negotiation meaning that the 3A Zill be forFed to negotiate oYer rights that are alread\ enshrined in international laZ These talNs Fan be Fonsidered to be a Fon- ÁiFt management strateg\ on the part of :ashington rather than a moYe toZards real peaFe 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 33 Nicola Pratt Bibliography ´1*2V8UJH5LYDO)DFWLRQVWR5HFRQFLOHµ0D·DQ1HZV$JHQ- cy)HEUXDU\KWWS ZZZPDDQQHZVQHWHQJ9LHZ'- HWDLOVDVS[",' $EGR1:RPHQLQ,VUDHO *HQGHU5DFHDQG&LWL]HQVKLS /RQGRQ =HG%RRNV $ERX(O)DGO5´7KH5RDGWR-HUXVDOHPWKURXJK7DKULU6TXDUH $QWL=LRQLVP DQG 3DOHVWLQH LQ WKH (J\SWLDQ 5HYROXWLRQµ -RXUQDORI3DOHVWLQH6WXGLHV9ROQRSS $EXQLPDK $2QH&RXQWU\ $%ROG3URSRVDOWR(QGWKH,VUDHOL 3DOHVWLQLDQ,PSDVVH 1HZ $GDODK 7KH/HJDO&HQWHUIRU$UDE0LQRULW\5LJKWVLQ,VUDHO7KH ,QHTXDOLW\5HSRUW 7KH3DOHVWLQLDQ$UDE0LQRULW\LQ,VUDHO +DLID $GDODK BBBBBBBBBB´'LVFULPLQDWRU\ /DZV LQ ,VUDHOµ KWWS DGDODKRUJ HQJ,VUDHOL'LVFULPLQDWRU\/DZ'DWDEDVH. $O$ULDQ/´3$VHOOLQJVKRUWWKHUHIXJHHVµ$O-D]HHUDFRP7KH 3DOHVWLQH3DSHUV-DQXDU\ $O-D]HHUD´7UDQVFULSW 7KH&DIH7HO$YLY 7KHHQHP\ZLWKLQ"µ -DQXDU\ KWWS ZZZDOMD]HHUDFRPSURJUDPPHVWKH- FDIH KWPO $OLERQL 5´7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'LPHQVLRQ RI WKH $UDE 6SULQJµ 7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6SHFWDWRU ,WDOLDQ -RXUQDO RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $IIDLUV9RO1RSS $OVDDÀQ/LQDK´/LQDK$OVDDÀQRQ6RFLDO0HGLDDQG3DOHVWLQHµ -DGDOL\\DFRP-XQHKWWS ZZZMDGDOL\\DFRPSDJHV LQGH[ OLQDKDOVDDÀQRQVRFLDOPHGLDDQGSDOHVWLQH $VKUDZL +´3DOHVWLQH DQG WKH $UDE 6SULQJµ 6XPPDU\ RI GLV- FXVVLRQKRVWHGE\&DUQHJLH(QGRZPHQWIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO3HDFH 0D\ :DVKLQJWRQ '& KWWS FDUQHJLHHQGRZPHQW RUJSDOHVWLQHDQGDUDEVSULQJTE %DLOH\3´3DOHVWLQLDQVFDOOIRUXQLW\SURWHVWRQ0DUFKµ(OHF- WURQLF,QWLIDGD)HEUXDU\KWWS HOHFWURQLFLQWLIDGDQHW FRQWHQWSDOHVWLQLDQVFDOOXQLW\SURWHVWPDUFK 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 34 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The “Arab Spring” and the Israel-Palestine Conflict %DUDW ) DQG - 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Bill Park, Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas – Syria, Iraq and at Home; How They Are Related, and Where They Might Lead, Ortadoğu Etütleri, Volume 5, No 1, July 2013, pp.41-63. Bill Park m× haNN×nda tahminlerde bXlXnmaNtad×r A\n× ]amanda TrNi\e·nin .rt politiNalar×n× Ye sorXnlar×n× daha geniċ b|lgesel Ye Nresel dina- miNler ioinde saptama\a oal×ċmaNtad×r $QDKWDU.HOLPHOHU .rtler TrNi\e SXri\e IraN I.%< 3.. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 42 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas ,QWURGXFWLRQ 7XUNH\·VPXOWLSOHDQGRYHUODSSLQJGLOHPPDV As AnNara embarNs on the ¶Imrali proFess· in its latest endeaYoXr to find some Nind of resolXtion to its domestiF problem of .Xrdish Xnrest and alienation it is more eYident toda\ eYen than has been the Fase in the past that TXrNe\·s .Xrdish TXestion is a trans-state one that is b\ no means Fonfined to or solXble Zithin TXrNe\·s oZn national borders AlthoXgh the latest ¶.Xrdish opening· is sXrel\ primaril\ motiYated b\ TXrNe\·s pXrel\ domestiF politiFal needs the emergenFe of a more or less self-goYerning .Xrdish enFlaYe in S\ria has added to AnNara·s sense of XrgenF\ This assessment is strengthened b\ the apparent pre-eminenFe amongst S\rian .Xrds of the 3<' Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat or 'emoFratiF 8nion 3art\ ZhiFh is generall\ presXmed in TXrNe\ to be an offshoot of the 3.. Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan or .Xrdistan :orNers 3art\ The de- Yeloping Xnrest in S\ria that folloZed the Assad regime·s FraFN- doZn in Spring Zas soon aFFompanied b\ a ZithdraZal of goYernment forFes from S\ria·s .Xrdish areas in the FoXntr\·s north and northeast In Zhat might \et proYe to be an eFho of the Fon- seTXenFes of Saddam +Xssein·s ZithdraZal of goYernment forFes from northern IraT in 2Ftober 99 this proYided the opportXnit\ for the 3<' to effeFt a taNeoYer and to introdXFe aXtonomoXs goY- erning strXFtXres The S\rian .Xrdish taNeoYer Zas preFeded and partl\ aFFompanied b\ a spiNe in 3.. YiolenFe inside TXrNe\ in ZhiFh it Zas estimated that more than seYen hXndred people Zere Nilled in the foXrteen months Xp to AXgXst ² the highest leYel of 3..-related Yio- lenFe for thirteen \ears3 TXrNe\ feared that it might find itself faFed Zith a tZo-front Fampaign b\ 3.. fighters from aFross both the IraTi and S\rian borders This fear is perhaps Xnderstandable giYen that as man\ as one third of the 3.. membership ma\ be of S\r- ian .Xrdish origin4 and also in the light of AnNara·s FonYiFtion that 1 This is the theme running throughThe Kurdish question and Turkey: an example of a trans- state ethnic conflict, Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, (London and Portland, Oregon; Frank Cass, 1997). 2 Scott Bobb, “Syrian conflict gives Kurds new freedom”, Voice of America News, 20 August 2012, http://www.voanews.com/content/syrian-conflict-gives-kurds-partial-control-of- north/1491341.html, accessed 5 June 2013. 3 Turkey: the PKK and a Kurdish settlement, Europe Report no. 219, International Crisis Group, 11 September 2012, p.1, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey- cyprus/turkey/219-turkey-the-pkk-and-a-kurdish-settlement, accessed 28 May 2013. 4 Nihat Ali Ozcan and H.Erdem Gurkaynak, “Who are these armed people on the moun- tains?”, February 2012 http://www.tepev.org.tr, accessed 17 May 2012. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 43 Bill Park 'amasFXs resXsFitated its sXpport for TXrNe\·s .Xrds in retaliation for AnNara·s sXpport for the S\rian opposition Indeed TXrNe\·s sponsorship and hosting of the S\rian 1ational &oXnFil S1& and the Flose linNs it has Zith the )ree S\rian Arm\ )SA both of ZhiFh Zere headTXartered in TXrNe\ Xntil 1oYember in effeFt made TXrNe\ a part\ in the fight oYer S\ria·s fXtXre AnNara·s preferenFe has been that S\ria·s .Xrds Fommit to the S1&·s strXggle against the Assad regime +oZeYer most of the diYerse and sTXabbling elements that maNe Xp the inFreasingl\ IslamiF and Arab nationalist S\rian opposition laFN s\mpath\ Zith .Xrdish aspirations In an\ Fase S\ria·s .Xrds are almost as diYided as the S1& bXt most ap- pear to distrXst the opposition to Assad as mXFh or more than the\ distrXst Assad and the\ haYe generall\ Nept their distanFe from it 1otZithstanding Flashes betZeen the 3<' and pro-goYernment forFes in late and sXbseTXentl\ and the 3<'·s demands for S\rian .Xrdish aXtonom\ AnNara sXspeFts the 3<' is in an allianFe of sorts Zith the regime &lashes betZeen 3<' and anti-goYern- ment forFes that broNe oXt in late and earl\ 3 might giYe some FredenFe to the TXrNish YieZ7 althoXgh man\ .Xrds - and not a feZ TXrNs ² belieYe TXrNish-baFNed Arab forFes proYoNed the e[Fhanges8 Iran too has a traFN reFord of aiding the 3.. as a leYer against TXrNe\ and AnNara·s differenFes Zith Tehran oYer both the S\rian Frisis and IraT·s eYolXtion ma\ also haYe prompted Iran to offer sXstenanFe to the 3..9 TXrNe\·s role in the simmering seFtar- ian tensions in the region fXrther FompliFates its .Xrdish dilemmas In short the region·s Yolatilit\ and TXrNe\·s response to it has high- lighted its oZn YXlnerabilit\ to 3.. YiolenFe +enFe AnNara·s need to initiate a peaFe proFess at home 5 Serkan Demirtas, “Syria supporting PKK, says intelligence report”, Hurriyet Daily News, 23 March 2012. 6 For analyses of Syria’s Kurdish politics, see Denise Natali, “Syria’s Kurdish Quagmire”, 3 May 2012, www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/5/syriakurd486.htm, accessed 3 May 2012; Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle, International Crisis Group (ICG), Middle East Report No.136, 22 January 2013; Who Is the Syrian Kurdish Opposition?: The Develop- ment of Kurdish Parties, 1956-2011, KurdWatch, Report 8, December 2011. 7 For details, see www.kurdwatch.org. 8 Statement Regarding Terrorist Attacks on Syrian Kurdish Town Sere Kaniye/Ras al-Ain, Na- tional Coordination Body for Democratic Change in Syria, 20 January 2013, www.ekurd. net/mismas/articles/misc2013/1/syriakurd726.htm, accessed 22 January 2013. 9 Cengiz Candar, “Turkey claims Iran providing logistical support for PKK”, Al-Monitor, 30 December 2012. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 44 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas It is also reasonable to assXme that AnNara·s apparent readiness to enter into dialogXe Zith the leadership of TXrNe\·s .Xrds is Fon- neFted to the glaring parado[ of its eYer-Floser relationship Zith the .Xrdistan 5egional *oYernment .5* of northern IraT 5eFent \ears haYe Zitnessed a steadil\ intensif\ing FraFNdoZn against members of the .Xrdish &ommXnities 8nion Koma Civikan Kurd- istan or .&. in TXrNe\ a pro-.Xrdish Xmbrella organisation &om- menFing as earl\ as April 9 and leading to Xp to ten thoXsand arrests Xp to the present time the detainees inFlXde eleFted of- fiFials of the pro-.Xrdish 3eaFe and 'emoFraF\ 3art\ %DU×ċ YH Demokrasi Partisi, or %'3 hXman rights aFtiYists laZ\ers trades Xnionists intelleFtXals and the liNe The deYeloping energ\ relationship betZeen TXrNe\ and the .5* is partiFXlarl\ Fompelling The estimates of energ\ reserYes in IraT·s north haYe inFreased sXbstantiall\ sinFe (rbil deFided to enter into its oZn e[ploration agreements a poliF\ regarded as illegal b\ %aghdad The problem for the .5* and the Fompanies that oper- ate there ² ZhiFh inFlXde sXFh energ\ ¶sXpermaMors· as ([[on0o- bil &heYron and Total - is hoZ to e[port the oil and gas that has been disFoYered 1otZithstanding %aghdad·s opposition to IraTi energ\ trade that it does not itself sanFtion TXrNe\ has emerged as a Zilling destination and transit roXte for .5* oil and gas &Xr- rentl\ small TXantities of oil are being trXFNed aFross the border bXt pipelines are Xnder FonstrXFtion ZhiFh FoXld Farr\ the .5*·s oil and gas direFtl\ aFross the TXrNish border In addition to the 10 For background, see “Iraq and the Kurds: the high stakes hydrocarbons gambit”, Interna- tional Crisis Group Middle East Report no.120, 19 April 2012. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 45 Bill Park alleged XnFonstitXtionalit\ of sXFh trade %aghdad fears that the .5*·s aXtonomoXs energ\ poliF\ FoXld resXlt in (rbil·s eFonomiF independenFe from the rest of IraT and threaten the FoXnt\·s ter- ritorial integrit\ -Xst a feZ \ears ago this Zas AnNara·s position too and emphatiFall\ so bXt TXrNe\ noZ appears either to haYe altered its assessment of the politiFal impliFations of an inFreasingl\ finanFiall\ self-sXffiFient .5* or to haYe embraFed the possibil- it\ of IraT·s fXrther deFentralisation and eYen fragmentation (Yen :ashington is nerYoXs at AnNara·s boldness %DU]DQL 7XUNH\·VQHZ¶EHVWIULHQG·LQWKHUHJLRQ" )igXres in both AnNara and (rbil haYe desFribed their relationship as ¶strategiF· %oth haYe poor relations Zith the Shia-dominated regime of 1oXri al-0aliNi in %aghdad haYe a shared staNe in the de- Yelopment of the .5*·s energ\ resoXrFes and onFe the neZ pipe- lines are in operation Zill also haYe a shared staNe in the safe e[- portation of energ\ throXgh TXrNe\·s .Xrdish popXlated soXtheast )Xrthermore the popXlarit\ of gFalan amongst more radiFal .Xrds and the e[ample set b\ the 3.. fighters holed Xp in northern IraT·s .andil moXntains poses a politiFal Fhallenge to the IraTi .Xrdish aXthorities Zho are also Fompromised b\ TXrNish militar\ attaFNs against 3.. bases Zithin .5* territor\ 8nsXrprisingl\ .5* lead- ers ZoXld prefer to see an end to AnNara·s FonfliFt Zith the 3.. .5* 3resident 0assoXd %ar]ani and other leading .5* figXres haYe repeatedl\ Falled for the 3.. to end its armed Fampaign and enFoXraged both sides to seeN a peaFefXl solXtion 'Xring his Yisit to TXrNe\ in April %ar]ani deFlared that he “Zill not alloZ the 3.. to preYail in the .5* region” In %ar]ani AnNara noZ be- lieYes it has foXnd a .Xrdish leader Zho it Fan relate to This is more a paradigm shift than a simple resXrreFtion of earlier taFtiFal allianFes sXFh as that dXring %ar]ani·s strXggle against the Tehran- baFNed 38. in the 99s althoXgh both sides retain a Zariness borne of earlier periods of mXtXal antipath\ 11 Sevgi Akarcesme, “Ambassador Tan: U.S. rhetoric at times resembles that of Iran’s on the issue of Iraq,” Sundays Zaman, www.todayszaman.com/news-303463-ambassador-tan-us- rhetoric-at-times-resembles-irans-on-the-issue-of-iraq.html, ; Serkan Demirtas, “Turkey, U.S., to hold intensified Iraq talks,Hurriyet Daily News, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/tur- key-us-to-hold-intensifed-iraq-talks.aspx?pageID=238&nID=38575&NewsCatID=338, both 8 January, 2013, accessed 27 January, 2013; Turkey defies Washington and Baghdad to pursue Iraqi Kurdistan energy ties,” 19 February, 2013, www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/ misc2013/2/turkey4532.htm, , accessed 20 February, 2013. 12 “Massoud Barzani says won’t allow PKK to operate from Iraqi Kurdistan,” 20 April 2012, www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/4/turkey3893.htm, accessed 26 April 2012. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 46 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas :hether AnNara noZ enYisages that Fomparabl\ FonstrXFtiYe rela- tionships Fan be established Zith gFalan andor the %'3 leader- ship ² and perhaps the 3<' too - is XnFlear That gFalan apparentl\ reFentl\ hailed %ar]ani as the leader of all .Xrds might be regarded as a positiYe indiFation3 as might a reFent meeting betZeen 3<' leader Salih 0Xslim and TXrNish offiFials4 AlthoXgh 0Xslim Flaims to ZelFome the talNs betZeen AnNara and the 3.. it is also eYident that he remains highl\ sFeptiFal of TXrNe\·s goodZill toZards .Xrd- ish aspirations in general :hat does seem Flear is that (rbil ² or rather %ar]ani·s .Xrdish 'emoFratiF 3art\ .'3 - and AnNara haYe adopted Fomplementar\ approaFhes to the Frisis in S\ria at least to some degree As Ze haYe noted for AnNara the 3<' is often seen as s\non\moXs Zith the 3.. 0an\ TXrNs are also FonYinFed that 'amasFXs resXsFitated its sXpport for TXrNe\·s .Xrds in retalia- tion for AnNara·s sXpport of the S\rian opposition and that the Zith- draZal of S\rian forFes from the .Xrdish²popXlated areas of the FoXntr\ dXring the earl\ phase of the Xprising Zas intended to giYe TXrNe\ paXse for thoXght In other Zords deYelopments in S\rian .Xrdistan FonstitXte a Yital part of TXrNe\·s general FonFern oYer deYelopments in S\ria and as earl\ as -Xl\ TXrNe\·s prime minister Zas Zarning of the possibilit\ of TXrNish air striNes against 3.. elements in northern S\ria7 Again as alread\ noted %ar]ani shares AnNara·s distaste for the 3.. and 3<' and is Xnhapp\ at the 3<'·s apparent domination of the noZ TXite aXtonomoXs S\rian .Xrdish regions In -Xl\ he soXght to moderate their XndoXbted inflXenFe amongst S\ria·s .Xrds b\ broNering a Xnited front betZeen the 3<' and the .Xrd- 13 “Ocalan calls Barzani the leader of all Kurds”, Kurdpress, 9 June 2013, http://www.kurd- press.com/En/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=4718#Title=%0A%09%09%09%09%09%09% 09%09Ocalan calls Barzani the leader of all Kurds%0A%09%09%09%09%09%09%09, accessed 20 June 2013. 14 Sevil Kucukkosum, “PYD leader meets Turkish officials”, 3 June 2013, Hurriyet Daily News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pyd-leader-meets-turkish-officials.aspx?pageID=238& nID=48066&NewsCatID=352, accessed 20 June 2013. 15 See the interview with Muslim, “Turkish-Kurdish peace process benefits Syrian Kurds”, re- produced in Al Monitor, 17 April 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/04/ interview-salih-muslim-syria-kurds.html, accessed 20 June 2013. 16 Serkan Demirtas, “Syria supporting PKK,” 23 March 2012, op.cit; Oytun Orhan, “Syria’s PKK game,” Today’s Zaman, 14 February 2012, www.todayszaman.com, accessed 27 Febru- ary 2013; ‘Turkey enlists northern Iraq’s help in countering threat of Syria-PKK alliance’, Abdullah Bozkurt, Today’s Zaman, 23 March 2012, www.todayszaman.com, accessed 27 February 2013. 17 “Turkey warns it would strike Kurdish PKK fighters inside Syrian Kurdistan,” www.ekurd. net/mismas/articles/misc2012/7/turkey4047.htm, 26 July 2012, accessed 25 January 2013. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 47 Bill Park ish 1ational &oXnFil .1& a more pro-%ar]ani bXt diYided groXp of S\rian .Xrdish faFtions8 )Xrthermore his .'3 has also been engaged in establishing and training a S\rian peshmerga that FoXld form a fighting arm for the more pro-%ar]ani elements of the .1& and ZhiFh might also proYe more s\mpathetiF to S\ria·s Arab oppo- sition forFes as is TXrNe\ of FoXrse +oZeYer the 3<' has soXght to preYent them from Frossing into S\ria from their northern IraTi bases ZhiFh is MXst one indiFation of hoZ XnsXFFessfXl %ar]ani·s efforts to forge greater S\rian .Xrdish Xnit\ haYe been thXs far and of hoZ dominant the 3<' remains in S\rian .Xrdistan9 )Xrther- more in 0a\ 3 the 3<' arrested seYent\-foXr members of an armed pro-.'3 faFtion that apparentl\ did manage to Fross into S\ria In retaliation %ar]ani Flosed the .5*-S\rian border SNir- mishes betZeen the 3<' and other S\rian .Xrdish faFtions haYe reportedl\ oFFXrred on a nXmber of oFFasions at least sinFe mid- *iYen that IraTi .Xrdistan·s other rXling part\ the 3atriotiF 8nion of .Xrdistan 38. appears to faYoXr - and some of its mem- bers might eYen haYe Moined forFes Zith - the 3<' S\rian .Xrd- ish diYisions FoXld Xndermine the Xnit\ of the .5* 2n the other hand %ar]ani has e[pressed his sXpport for the S\rian federation idea3 and he reFognises the disadYantages that diYision Farries for the S\rian .Xrdish FaXse The interest %ar]ani has taNen in the possible emergenFe of an aXtonomoXs S\rian .Xrdish region has introdXFed a note of disTXiet into AnNara-(rbil relationships An- Nara is Xneas\ at the prospeFt of the emergenFe of an aXtonomoXs .Xrdish ]one in S\ria and seems simXltaneoXsl\ mistrXstfXl of the role %ar]ani might be pla\ing thoXgh sXpportiYe of his attempts to 18 David Pollock, “Syrian Kurds unite against Assad, but not with opposition,” Policywatch 1967, The Washington Institute, 31 July 2012. For more on the KNC, see The“ Kurdish National Council in Syria,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 15 February 2012, www.carnegie- mec.org/publications/?fa=48502, accessed 25 January 2013. 19 Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle, International Crisis Group (ICG), Middle East Report No.136, 22 January 2013, pp.4-5, 25. 20 Wladirmir van Wildenburg, “Border arrests reveal disunity, conflict among Syrian Kurds”, Al Monitor,21 May 2013, accessed 5 June 2013. 21 Wladimir van Wildenberg, “Danger of Kurdish civil war in Syrian Kurdistan,” Rudaw, 8 July 2012, www.rudaw.net/english/science/columnists/4931.html, accessed 25 January 2013. Also see www.kurdwatch.org. 22 Eric Bruneau, “Taking the fight to Syria: Kurdish rivalries play out over the border”,Niqash, 30 May 2013, http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3228, accessed 5 June 2013. 23 Ipek Yezdani, “Syrian Kurds aim to establish ‘federal state’”, Hurriyet Daily News, 7 February 2012, www.hurriyetdailynews.com, accessed 27 February 2013. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 48 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas Xndermine the 3<'4 In short it is a set of FirFXmstanFes that is shot throXgh Zith parado[ and FontradiFtion :KHUHPLJKWWKHVHGHYHORSPHQWVOHDG"7KH3.. The ¶Imral× proFess· has been a FXrioXs initiatiYe thXs far and re- mains hard to assess It is of FoXrse MXst the latest of a nXmber of attempts b\ the A.3 goYernment to address TXrNe\·s .Xrdish diffiFXlties throXgh non-militar\ means The A.3 enMo\s Fonsider- able sXpport amongst TXrNe\·s .Xrdish Yoters espeFiall\ from the roXghl\ half of them that reside in TXrNe\·s Fities It is in eleFtoral Fompetition Zith the %'3 in TXrNe\·s soXtheast and ma\ also be motiYated b\ the aspiration to fXrther limit the domestiF politiFal role of the TXrNish militar\ ZhiFh in the past has been largel\ re- sponsible for ¶seFXritising· TXrNe\·s approaFh to its .Xrdish TXes- tion )Xrthermore the draZn oXt strXggle against the 3.. has been eFonomiFall\ politiFall\ and soFiall\ Yer\ Fostl\ for TXrNe\ Xpset- ting its Zestern friends draining the national bXdget and pitting Fiti]en against Fiti]en The A.3 goYernment·s efforts started Zith 3rime 0inister (rdoĊan·s reFognition in a speeFh in 'i\arbaN×r in AXgXst that TXrNe\ has a ¶.Xrdish issXe· and that ¶mistaNes· had been made in the handling of it +is ansZer to the problem then Zas more demoFratisation in TXrNe\ generall\ Indeed reforms did prodXFe a softening of the restriFtions on the Xse of the .Xrdish langXage notabl\ in the media +oZeYer it Zasn·t Xntil the 9 laXnFh of the ¶.Xrdish opening· that an\ real progress seemed liNe- l\ The Za\ for this had been paYed b\ the so-Falled 2slo 3roFess a series of seFret talNs Zith .Xrdish elements that Zere led on the TXrNish side b\ +aNan )idan noZ the head of TXrNe\·s 1ational IntelligenFe 2rganisation 0LOOL,VWLKEDUDW7HċNLODW×or 0IT There Zere deliberations Zith FiYil soFiet\ and a 1ational Assem- bl\ debate bXt for a Yariet\ of reasons the initiatiYe Fame to a halt in The goYernment FoXpled the initiatiYe Zith an intensifiFa- 24 “Turkey warned Iraqi Kurds that autonomy would not be applied in Syria: PM,”, Hurriyet Daily News, 2 November 2012, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-warned-iraqi-kurds- that-autonomy-would-not-be-applied-in-syria-pm.aspx?pageID=238&nID=33802&News CatID=338, accessed 20 February 20, 2013. 25 For an overview, see Turkey: the PKK and a Kurdish settlement, International Crisis Group, 2012, op.cit. 26 Umit Cizre, ‘The emergence of the government’s perspective on the Kurdish issue’, pp.1-12; Cengiz Candar, ‘The Kurdish question: the reasons and fortunes of the ‘opening’, pp.13-19, both Insight Turkey, 11(4), Fall 2009. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 49 Bill Park tion of its repression of .Xrdish s\mpathisers and a hardening of its langXage ² or rather the Xse of inFonsistent and FontradiFtor\ langXage - sXFh that in April (rdoĊan Flaimed ¶there is no .Xrdish issXe in this FoXntr\·7 0ore broadl\ the goYernment·s de- moFratisation reform programme sloZed or eYen reYersed 3XbliFl\ the goYernment rXled oXt talNing to the 3.. or its leader AbdXllah gFalan notZithstanding the insistenFe on the part of man\ .Xrdish figXres that he remained the head of TXrNe\·s .Xrdish moYement (rdoĊan also refXsed to shaNe the hand of %'3 Fo-leader Selahat- tin 'emirtaċ he still refXses to do so TXrNe\·s opposition parties FritiFised the initiatiYe and Zithheld their sXpport and partiFipation /arge sZathes of the TXrNish pXbliF shared the sFeptiFism and eYen hostilit\ This sentiment Zas hardened b\ the 3..·s FontinXing aFts of YiolenFe ZhiFh intensified in and b\ the festiYe Mo\ Zith ZhiFh the homeFoming of thirt\ foXr 3.. militants Zas greeted as the\ Frossed into TXrNe\ from northern IraT in 2Ftober 9 .Xrdish spirits Zere dampened b\ the sXbseTXent detention of a nXmber of the retXrnees All in all it seemed there Zere reasons to doXbt the good faith of both the goYernment and the .Xrdish moYe- ment the obMeFtiYes of both sides remained obsFXre and neither the pXbliF nor the politiFal Flass had been prepared The 'eFem- ber 8lXdere bombing of 34 smXgglers Zho Zere mistaNen for 3.. fighters the sXbseTXent failXre to fXll\ apologise or e[plain the inFident 8 the intensifiFation of the detention of thoXsands of .&. aFtiYists the FontinXing harsh rhetoriF sXrroXnding the .Xrd- ish issXe of the prime minister in partiFXlar and the intensifiFation of YiolenFe alread\ noted all reinforFed the impression that TXrNe\ Zas not at all read\ for a breaNthroXgh So does the ¶Imral× proFess· sXggest that an\thing has Fhanged in TXrNe\" 3erhaps the most remarNable differenFe is that the for- merl\ demonised 3.. leader AbdXllah gFalan is noZ Fentral to the proFess althoXgh (rdoĊan someZhat FXrioXsl\ seeNs to distanFe the eleFted goYernment from the proFess b\ insisting that FontaFts Zith gFalan haYe been made b\ offiFials rather than members of the goYernment The deFision to engage Zith gFalan seems in part 27 Tulin Daloglu, “Erdogan’s many positions on the Kurdish issue”, Al Monitor, 23 April 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/erdogan-kurdish-issue-flip-flop-tur- key-peace.html, accessed 6 June 2013. 28 Amberin Zaman, “AKP report on Uludere airstrike condemned as ‘whitewash’”, Al Monitor, 2 May 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/uludere-massacre-kurd- ish-smugglers-peace.html, accessed 6 June 2013. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 50 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas to haYe been inspired b\ his sXFFessfXl appeal in 1oYember to aroXnd seYen hXndred imprisoned .Xrdish aFtiYists to end their tZo month old hXnger striNe The appeal appeared to demonstrate both his XnmatFhed inflXenFe and also his good Zill9 After a se- ries of FonsXltations Zith the 3.. leaders in the .andil moXntains .Xrdish aFtiYists based in (Xrope and the %'3 ² members of ZhiFh also aFted as go-betZeen ² a message from gFalan Zas read oXt at the .Xrdish neZ \ear or Newroz, gathering on 0arFh 3 in 'i\arbaN×r3 In his message he referred to the Fommon past of TXrNs and .Xrds asserted that the\ liYe together Xnder the “flag of Islam” and that the\ need to Freate a Fommon fXtXre In partiFXlar he pronoXnFed that “the period of armed strXggle is ending and the door is opening to demoFratiF politiFs” +e Zent on to insist that “Ze haYe noZ arriYed at the stage of ZithdraZing oXr armed forFes oXtside the borders” 2n 8 0a\ 3.. fighters did begin to treN throXgh the moXntains to their northern IraTi bases a proFess that is e[peFted to be Fompleted sooner rather than later +oZeYer and Fontrar\ to (rdoĊan·s Zishes the\ did not first disarm and in earl\ -Xne a brief firefight broNe oXt betZeen 3.. fighters and TXrN- ish soldiers inside the IraTi border3 5emarNabl\ perhaps gFalan·s address made no direFt mention of Zhat FonFessions AnNara had made in retXrn 1or has (rdoĊan been at all forthFoming althoXgh it is for the goYernment to initiate the ne[t phase of the proFess ² at the time of Zriting no details of Zhat this might looN liNe had \et emerged 3erhaps it needs time to digest the oXtFome of the noYel althoXgh someZhat FXrioXs inno- Yation of the si[t\-tZo (rdoĊan-approYed ¶Zise people· tasNed to FonsXlt FiYil soFiet\ throXghoXt TXrNe\ and organi]ed on a regional basis3 In faFt there are feZ indiFations that the prime minister Zill be Zilling or able to meet .Xrdish e[peFtations AlthoXgh these re- main largel\ XnspeFified the\ are belieYed to inFlXde gFalan·s re- 29 Jenna Krajeski, “After the hunger strike”, The New Yorker, 29 November, 2012, http://www. newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/11/after-the-kurdish-hunger-strike-in-turk- ish-prisons.html accessed 6 June 2013. 30 For the full text, see http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/3/turkey4603.htm, accessed 6 June 2013. 31 “BDP hopeful of end to clashes with PKK”, Hurriyet Daily News, 5 June 2013, http://www. hurriyetdailynews.com/bdp-hopeful-of-end-to-clashes-with-pkk.aspx?pageID=238&nID= 48228&NewsCatID=338, accessed 19 June 2013. 32 Kadri Gursel, “Erdogan asks ‘wise people’ to make case for peace”, Al Monitor, 15 April 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/erdogan-wise-people-commis- sion-peace-process.html, accessed 19 June 2013. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 51 Bill Park lease or transfer to hoXse arrest ² something that (rdoĊan has spe- FifiFall\ denied he has agreed to the Zinding doZn of the so-Falled ¶Yillage gXard· s\stem of goYernment-sponsored and armed .Xrd- ish Fiti]ens the release of the thoXsands of .&. aFtiYists FXrrentl\ held in detention a reform of TXrNe\·s notorioXs anti-terror laZs that are freTXentl\ Xsed against politiFal aFtiYists thoXght to be s\mpa- thetiF to the .Xrdish FaXse and ZhiFh at the time of Zriting being threatened against TXrNe\·s ¶*e]i 3arN· protestors 33 edXFation in .Xrdish establishing .Xrdish as Fo-eTXal Zith TXrNish as an offiFial langXage of the 5epXbliF the replaFement of the FXrrent ethniF def- inition of Fiti]enship Zith a FiYiF one an end to the ten perFent eleF- toral hXrdle for parliamentar\ representation and aboYe all some Nind of deYolXtion self-determination or ¶demoFratiF aXtonom\· that ZoXld in effeFt introdXFe something tantamoXnt to a federal politiFal s\stem in TXrNe\34 There appear to be feZ indiFations that (rdoĊan his part\ the opposition parties or pXbliF opinion is at all read\ to FonFede man\ if an\ of these demands (rdoĊan appears to thinN in terms of an IslamiF ¶brotherhood· betZeen TXrNe\·s TXrN- ish and .Xrdish Fiti]ens and appears not to reFogni]e the pressXre to adopt a plXralistiF approaFh that is inherent in .Xrdish ethniF identit\ demands3 )Xrthermore the behaYioXr and rhetoriF of the goYernment dXring the past feZ ZeeNs and months of protest in TXrNe\ hardl\ sXggests that it is set firml\ on a FoXrse of fXrther demoFratisation reform and inFlXsiYeness ² an obserYation made b\ 3.. and %'3 leaders3 8nsXrprisingl\ then again at the time of Zriting there is disTXiet amongst some .Xrdish leaders In addition to impatienFe YoiFed b\ gFalan among others at the goYernment·s someZhat tard\ re- sponse in the ZaNe of the 3.. ZithdraZal to aFross the border37 33 “Police to consider protestors in Istanbul’s Taksim Square terror organisation members: Minister”, Hurriyet Daily News, 16 June 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police- to-consider-protesters-in-istanbuls-taksim-square-terror-organization-members-minister.as px?pageID=238&nID=48875&NewsCatID=338, accessed 17 June 2013. 34 “Kurdish conference ends with list of demands from gov’t”, Today’s Zaman, 17 June, 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-318516-kurdish-conference-ends-with-list-of-de- mands-from-govt.html, accessed 17 June 2013. 35 Johanna Nykanen, “Identity, narrative and frames: assessing Turkey’s Kurdish initiatives”, Insight Turkey, 15 (2), Spring 2013, pp.85-101. 36 “PKK says Turkish police crackdown may hurt Kurdish peace process”, Reuters, 5 June 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/us-turkey-protests-kurds-idUS- BRE95410T20130605, accessed 17 June 2013. 37 “Government needs to move on: PKK leader”, Hurriyet Daily News, 17 June 2013, http:// www.hurriyetdailynews.com/government-needs-to-move-on-pkk-leader.aspx?pageID=238 &nID=48932&NewsCatID=338, accessed 19 June 2013. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 52 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas 3.. fighters in partiFXlar led b\ 0Xrat .ara\×lan haYe been sNepti- Fal from the beginning38 Indeed .ara\×lan has openl\ e[pressed his doXbts regarding AnNara·s sinFerit\ and the prospeFt of a re- neZed and eYen intensified Zar39 At the -Xne 3 .Xrdish gather- ing in 'i\arbaN×r Ahmet TrN a senior %'3 figXre YoiFed similar doXbts aboXt AnNara·s intentions4 It does indeed seem XnrealistiF to assXme that so long and bitter a FonfliFt Fan be oYerFome easil\ or TXiFNl\ and ZithoXt Fonsiderable saFrifiFe on the goYernment side too In short a satisfaFtor\ oXtFome to the proFess shoXld not at all be taNen for granted The maMor obstaFles are still to be oYer- Fome A Fase Fan eYen be made that neither the goYernment nor the 3.. are in great need of a settlement (aFh deepl\ mistrXsts the other The 3.. remains able to reFrXit and raise fXnds might reasonabl\ feel that time is on its side in light of the Zider deYelop- ment in the region and Zill seeN to preserYe its legitimaF\ )or his part (rdoĊan rXns the risN of inFXrring the Zrath of TXrNish nation- alist sentiment of seeming to legitimise gFalan and the 3.. and of failXre 1or is it neFessaril\ the Fase that gFalan for all the statXs and s\mboliF signifiFanFe he XndoXbtedl\ possesses entertains aspirations that preFisel\ aFFord Zith all elements of TXrNe\·s Zider .Xrdish moYement4 :KHUHPLJKWWKHVHGHYHORSPHQWVOHDG"7KH.5* 1o doXbt reFalling earlier Flashes Zith the 3.. sXFh as dXring the mid-99s %ar]ani is Zar\ of the e[panded 3.. presenFe on .5* territor\ that is a FonseTXenFe of the ¶Imral× proFess· seeing it as a potential riYal and as posing the risN of intensified TXrNish militar\ aFtiYit\ inside .5* territor\ shoXld the proFess be derailed4 +e 38 Patrick Markey and Isobel Coles, “Insight: Hopes, suspicions over peace in Kurdish rebel hideout”, Reuters, 27 March 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/27/us-iraq- turkey-pkk-insight-idUSBRE92Q0J520130327, accessed 19 June 2103. 39 Tim Arango, “Rebel keeps Kurds’ guns close at hand in peace talks with Turkey”, New York Times, 11 April 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/12/world/middleeast/rebel-kurd- karayilan-defiant-in-turkish-talks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed 19 June 2013. 40 “Ahmet Turk blames Ankara government, warns the peace talks will fail”, Kurdpress, 11 June 2013, http://www.kurdpress.com/En/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=4733#Title=%0A%09% 09%09%09%09%09%09%09Ahmet Turk blames Ankara government, warns the peace talks will fail%0A%09%09%09%09%09%09%09, accessed 19 June 2013. 41 For these arguments, see Gunes Murat Tezcur, “Prospect for resolution of the Kurdish ques- tion: a realist perspective”, Insight Turkey, 15 (2), Spring 2013, pp.69-84. 42 Denise Natali, “PKK challenges Barzani in Iraqi Kurdistan”, Kurdnet, 10 May 2013, http:// www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/5/state7069.htm , accessed 19 June 2013. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 53 Bill Park has also e[pressed his hope that “Ze are e[peFting that after the problem is solYed the\ Zill go baFN to their homes”43 As Ze haYe seen hoZeYer the .5* aXthorities haYe ZelFomed TXrNe\·s at- tempt to resolYe its domestiF .Xrdish strXggle In an\ Fase (rbil is far more preoFFXpied Zith its relations Zith %aghdad and Zith An- Nara and deYelopments in neighboXring S\ria In -Xne IraTi 3rime 0inister 1oXri al-0aliNi paid a Yisit to (rbil in the latest attempt to patFh Xp the goYernment·s mXlti-faFeted TXarrel Zith the .Xrds in the north %ar]ani desFribed these talNs as the ¶last FhanFe· to re- solYe the differenFes betZeen (rbil and %aghdad and onFe again appeared to threaten .Xrdish seFession shoXld the\ fail44 The Yisit resXlted in the establishment of seYen Moint Fommittees to address the energ\ bXdgetar\ territorial border Frossing responsibilities and other differenFes that haYe broXght %aghdad and (rbil to the brinN of armed FonfliFt ZhiFh eYen noZ Fonsists of armed stand- offs aroXnd .irNXN and ZhiFh has led to a deepening of the Fhasm betZeen them4 Again it is not at all self-eYident that mXFh progress Zill ensXe :ithin a feZ da\s of the meeting in moYes Fertain to infXriate %agh- dad fXrther (rbil annoXnFed that an agreement had been signed to giYe a TXrNish Fompan\ e[ploration rights to si[ bloFNs Zithin the .5*·s territor\ 4 that the 8S Fompan\ &heYron has been granted a third e[ploration bloFN in the .5* 47 and that an oil pipeline from the .5* to TXrNe\ ZoXld be Fompleted b\ September 3 that the Anglo-TXrNish Fompan\ *enel (nerg\ ZoXld begin e[porting oil Yia the pipeline in 4 and that gas e[ports to TXrNe\ ZoXld begin in 48 Alongside the progressiYe remoYal of .Xrds from the federal goYernment of .Xrdish offiFers from the federal arm\ and of .Xrdish bo\Fotts of the federal parliament the .5* appears 43 Isobel Coles, “Iraqi Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani says Baghdad talks last chance”, Reuters, 3 June 2013, http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/6/state7108.htm, accessed 19 June 2013. 44 Ibid. 45 Armando Cordoba, “Maliki visit to Erbil results in joint committees to resolve disputes”, Rudaw, 9 June 2013, http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/090620132, accessed 19 June 2013. 46 “Iraqi Kurdistan gives Turkish company six oil exploration blocks”, Reuters, 18 June 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/18/turkey-kurdistan-oil-idUSL5N0EU44120 130618, accessed 19 June 2013. 47 “US energy giant Chevron signs oil deal with Iraqi Kurdistan”, Kurdnet, 18 June 2013, http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/6/invest921.htm, accessed 19 June 2013. 48 “Turkey-Kurdistan oil pipeline to be completed September”, Kurdnet, 19 June 2013, http:// www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/6/invest922.htm, accessed 19 June 2013. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 54 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas to be beFoming eYer more distant from %aghdad ² and eYer Floser to AnNara It is Yer\ diffiFXlt to enYisage Xnder Zhat FirFXmstanFes this trend FoXld noZ be reYersed althoXgh there is Flearl\ a risN to IraT·s .Xrds that the\ might beFome oYer-dependent on a TXrNish neighboXr that has proYed Xnreliable in the past and that has oYer deFades earned a repXtation for its hostilit\ to .Xrdish aspirations for self-determination 2n the other hand and for all %ar]ani·s oF- Fasional blXster the .5* does not appear read\ to deFlare fXll in- dependenFe It ZoXld inFXr the Zrath of its neighboXrs inFlXding TXrNe\ ZoXld not gain :ashington·s sXpport and it is in an\ Fase not ² \et ² in a finanFiall\ seFXre enoXgh position to go it alone In- deed giYen its relianFe on energ\ e[ports IraTi .Xrdish independ- enFe FoXld onl\ sensibl\ be enYisaged if AnNara proYed read\ to FoXntenanFe it This ZoXld be more liNel\ shoXld Arab IraT desFend into deeper seFtarian FonfliFt ZhiFh Fannot be rXled oXt :KHUHPLJKWWKHVHGHYHORSPHQWVOHDG"6\ULD :hateYer the oXtFome of the S\rian FonfliFt the prediFament of that FoXntr\·s .Xrdish minorit\ - partiFXlarl\ those that liYe along the borders Zith IraT and TXrNe\ - Zill FonstitXte a Ne\ element of it 2ne sFenario for the FoXntr\ as a Zhole is a FontinXed and Yiolent proFess of fragmentation ² perhaps on parallel to IraT·s and /eba- non·s - in ZhiFh AlaZite .Xrdish and perhaps other groXps FarYe oXt preFarioXs and fortified self-goYerning entities S\ria·s ¶Zest- ern .Xrdistan· is alread\ TXite aXtonomoXs from the rest of S\ria and it FoXld beFome dependent on TXrNe\ and the .5* Zhether it Zishes it or not 2n the other hand shoXld the Assad%a·athist AlaZite regime emerge intaFt it Zill be interesting to see Zhether it ZoXld be prepared to moXnt a Fhallenge to a 3<'-goYerned .Xrd- ish ]one or Zhether it might instead aFFede to some limited aX- tonom\ inFlXding respeFt for .Xrdish FXltXre The prospeFts for sXFh a happ\ aFFord ZoXld perhaps be redXFed in the XnliNel\ eYent that pro-%ar]ani elements amongst S\ria·s .Xrdish 1ational &oXnFil gain more inflXenFe in the region A YiFtor\ for the S1& ZoXld probabl\ be the most Fhallenging oXtFome for the FoXntr\·s .Xrds &lashes betZeen .Xrds and the more Islamist elements Zithin the S\rian opposition haYe been the fierFest - and TXrNe\ is sXspeFted of enabling these partiFXlar elements of the S\rian op- position 2n the other hand some TXrNish-sXpported elements of the S1& FoXld perhaps emerge as more aFFommodating toZards a more pro-%ar]ani .Xrdish entit\ TaNen as a Zhole hoZeYer the 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 55 Bill Park otherZise fragmented S1& remains impatient Zith an\ in indiFation of .Xrdish e[Feptionalism and a fXtXre Arab-.Xrdish Flash in S\ria FoXld Zell be in prospeFt regardless of Zho eYentXall\ emerges as triXmphant in 'amasFXs *iYen its relationship Zith the .5* and the ¶Imral× proFess· it ZoXld seem sensible that AnNara prepares itself to ZorN Zith ZhateYer realit\ emerges in northern S\ria At the time of Zriting it is XnFlear Zhether AnNara is fXll\ prepared to aFFommodate itself to S\rian .Xrdish aXtonom\ It is Fertainl\ the Fase that sXFh an oXtFome might be more palatable to TXrNe\ - and (rbil - if it Zere Xnder .'3.1& rather than 3<'3.. Fontrol The\ are XnliNel\ to get Zhat the\ Zant on this sFore hoZeYer bXt the\ need be FarefXl lest the\ enFoXrage a sFenario of interneFine FonfliFt among .Xrds ZhiFh FoXld eYen split the .5*·s 38. from the .'349 SXFh a sFe- nario ZoXld appear still more liNel\ if the ¶Imrali proFess· falters and FoXld pit a 3..3<' and perhaps 38. groXping against a .'3 S\rian .1& faFtion in a regional intra-.Xrdish strXggle Zith TXrNe\ faYoXring the latter and Iran and 5Xssia the former 2ne impliFation of the S\rian Frisis has been the resXrgenFe of seFtarian rifts in the region ZhiFh haYe fXrther damaged AnNara·s relationship Zith %aghdad and indeed Iran Iran has stood b\ its all\ in 'amasFXs Zhile 0aliNi too has e[pressed his s\mpath\ for the Assad regime *iYen the largel\ AlaZite maNeXp of the S\rian regime and the essentiall\ SXnni natXre of the opposition the faFt that Iran and TXrNe\ foXnd themselYes on the side of their respeF- tiYe S\rian Fo-religionists has - rightl\ or Zrongl\ ² been interpreted as sXggesting that a seFtarian XnderFXrrent is noZ eYident in re- gional diplomatiF alignments TXrNe\·s A.3 goYernment·s eYident preferenFe for the S\rian 0Xslim %rotherhood faFtion Zithin the S1& has added fXrther to these rifts These deYelopments might Zell enFoXrage Iran IraT and S\ria to ZorN to Xndermine TXrNish interests inFlXding its approaFh to the region·s .Xrdish issXes In partiFXlar Tehran is Xneas\ at the Flose relationship betZeen An- 49 Eric Bruneau, “Taking the fight to Syria: Kurdish rivalries play out over the border”,Niqash, 30 May 2013, http://www.niqash.org/articles/print.php?id=3228&lang=en, accessed 21 June 2013; Syria’s Kurds: a struggle within a struggle, Middle East Report no. 136, Interna- tional Crisis Group, 22 January 2013. 50 Christopher Phillips, Into the Quagmire: Turkey’s Frustrated Syria Policy, Chatham House Briefing Paper, December 2012, p.7 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 56 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas Nara and (rbil and might Zell seeN Za\s to Xndermine it In this some Zithin the 38. might be Zilling aFFompliFes 7XUNH\·VGUHDPRULWVQLJKWPDUH" TXrNe\·s approaFh to the .5* appears to haYe Xndergone a para- digm shift in reFent \ears In so far as it is driYen b\ a residXal ¶]ero problems· ¶soft poZer· motiYation that seeNs the loZering of bar- riers a redXFtion of tensions and eFonomiF integration and inter- dependenFe it might be regarded as ¶neo-2ttoman· +oZeYer as it stra\s toZards a deeper inFlXsiYeness toZards IraT·s .Xrds that serYes to draZ the .5* aZa\ from %aghdad it smaFNs of a ¶1a- tional 3aFt· preferenFe for a TXrNish-.Xrdish federation based on the notion that there is or shoXld be a Nind of ¶brotherhood· betZeen the tZo peoples The ¶Imral× proFess· again Zith (rdoĊan·s appar- ent emphasis on ¶brotherhood· rather than ethniF plXralism Fan be interpreted in the same Za\ The S\rian Fase is more Fomple[ bXt there is little doXbt that AnNara has Yer\ partiFXlar FonFerns aboXt hoZ northern S\ria eYolYes and hoZ it interaFts Zith the .Xrdish regions of TXrNe\ and IraT This e[tension of TXrNish inflXenFe into neighboXring .Xrdish popXlated areas does not reTXire a redraZing of the map ² in that sense Ze ma\ not be Zitnessing the end of the S\Nes-3iFot arrangement and the breaN Xp the region·s states nor the arriYal of a soYereign .Xrdish state AnNara does not Zant this to happen +oZeYer this sFenario does Fhallenge the regional bal- anFe of poZer and inflXenFe and this is its problem TXrNe\ Fannot paFif\ the region·s .Xrds ZithoXt a degree of .Xrdish Fontentment and FompliFit\ and it is as \et too earl\ to sa\ Zhether TXrNe\ Zill taNe the steps neFessar\ for this to emerge inside its oZn borders 1or Fan Ze be Fertain hoZ eYents Zill pan oXt in S\ria and to Zhat degree AnNara Zill learn to liYe Zith an\ aXtonomoXs .Xrdish ]one that might establish itself there A resetting of TXrNe\·s relationships Zith the region·s .Xrds Zill also reTXire the aFTXiesFenFe of %aghdad 'amasFXs and Tehran :ill %aghdad and perhaps 'amasFXs too aFFept a sitXation in ZhiFh ¶their· .Xrds moYe deeper Zithin AnNara·s eFonomiF politiFal and energ\ trade orbit" 2r Zill the\ Zith Iran and driYen b\ seFtarian 51 B. Mohammed, “Barzani’s foreign policy risks damaging Kurdistan’s interest,” Kurdish As- pect, 3 February 2013, www.kurdishaspect.com/doc020413BM.html, accessed 22 February 2013; “A PUK leader warns against Turkish ‘trap’,” Insight Kurdistan, 3 January 2013, www. insightkurdistan.com/tag/tigris/, accessed 22 February 2013. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 57 Bill Park Fonsiderations as Zell as .Xrdish ones prefer to Xndermine .Xrd- ish aXtonom\ and an\ paFifiFation of TXrNish-.Xrdish relations that might appear Zithin reaFh" :ill seFtarian Fhaos and FonfliFt in IraT and S\ria ¶deliYer· the .Xrdish regions of those FoXntries to TXrNe\ as the onl\ soXrFe of stabilit\ eFonomiF e[Fhange and eYen pro- teFtion" In the meantime Arab reFonFiliation to .Xrdish aXtonom\ does not looN liNel\ and nor does Tehran·s passiYit\ in the faFe of its deepened isolation ² shoXld that isolation persist Iran·s hold oYer its oZn .Xrdish popXlations is also in the mi[ and Tehran has a traFN reFord of Xsing the 3.. to Xnsettle TXrNe\ In the FXrrent FirFXmstanFes a disaffeFted 3.. might also be XsefXl in obstrXFt- ing TXrNe\·s ambition to rel\ on .Xrdish energ\ sXpplies in plaFe of Iranian In short for TXrNe\ to aFhieYe peaFe on its .Xrdish borders it ma\ need to both satisf\ .Xrdish aspirations and ZeaNen the FapaFit\ or inFlination of %aghdad 'amasFXs and Tehran to Xn- dermine the benefits to TXrNe\ that this might bring These are tall orders and both TXrNish poliFies and regional FirFXmstanFes FoXld preFlXde sXFh a happ\ oXtFome 52 Wladimir van Wildenburg, “Iranian Kurdish struggle linked to Turkey, Syria”, Al Monitor, 14 June 2013, accessed 23 June 2013. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 58 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas Bibliography ´2FDODQFDOOV%DU]DQLWKHOHDGHURIDOO.XUGVµ.XUGSUHVV -XQH KWWS ZZZNXUGSUHVVFRP(Q16LWH)XOO6WRU\1HZV ",G 7LWOH $ 2FDODQ FDOOV%DU]DQLWKHOHDGHURIDOO.XUGV$ ´$38.OHDGHUZDUQVDJDLQVW7XUNLVK¶WUDS·µ,QVLJKW.XUGLVWDQ3 -DQXDU\ZZZLQVLJKWNXUGLVWDQFRPWDJWLJULV ´$KPHW7XUNEODPHV$QNDUDJRYHUQPHQWZDUQVWKHSHDFHWDONV ZLOOIDLOµ.XUGSUHVV-XQHKWWS ZZZNXUGSUHVVFRP (Q16LWH)XOO6WRU\1HZV",G 7LWOH $ $KPHW 7XUN EODPHV $QNDUD JRYHUQPHQW ZDUQVWKHSHDFHWDONVZLOOIDLO$ ´%'3KRSHIXORIHQGWRFODVKHVZLWK3..µ+XUUL\HW'DLO\1HZV -XQHKWWS ZZZKXUUL\HWGDLO\QHZVFRPEGSKRSHIXO RIHQGWRFODVKHVZLWKSNNDVS["SDJH,' Q,' 1H ZV&DW,' ´*RYHUQPHQW QHHGV WR PRYH RQ 3.. 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Ofra Bengio tXr Asl×nda bX b\N deĊiċim oeċitli eNonomiN Nltrel Ye si\asi alanlar× da NapsamaNtad×r S|] NonXsX oal×ċma ċX sorXlara FeYap aramaNtad×r 'eĊiċimden |nFe AnNara Ye %aĊdat aras×ndaNi iliċNiler ne tr bir \ap×\a sahipti" %X iliċNiler ogenin o ortaĊ× aras×nda \a- ċanan deĊiċim nas×l ao×Nlanabilir" S|] NonXsX deĊiċimde A%'·nin rol nedir" $QDKWDU.HOLPHOHU 3aradigma deĊiċimi iNilemler iliċNiler ogeni 99 .|rfe] SaYaċ× Ye 3 IraN SaYaċ× A%'·nin oeNilmesi 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 66 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas At the beginning of 3 a neZ booN Zas pXblished in TXrNe\ Xnder the title This essa\ seeNs to ansZer the folloZing TXestions :hat Zas the natXre of the relations betZeen AnNara and %aghdad before the shift" :hat is the e[planation for the Fhange among the three part- ners of the triangle" :hat is the role of the 8S in this Fhange" To Zhat e[tent are the Fhanges taFtiFal and to Zhat e[tent strategiF" This essa\ argXes that there Zas a paradigmiF shift among all pla\- ers that in this shift TXrNe\ appears to be the initiator the .5* the aFtiYist and %aghdad the reaFtiYe partner and Ànall\ that all pla\- ers haYing had to Fhoose betZeen tZo eYils are noZ on a horn of a dilemma regarding the possible oXtFomes of their FhoiFe 7KHFRROLQJRIUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ$QNDUDDQG%DJKGDG +istoriFall\ speaNing there Zas a Nind of natXral allianFe betZeen AnNara and %aghdad Indeed %aghdad·s relations Zith AnNara Zere the smoothest and the least troXbled of all its other neigh- bors These relations Zere based on YarioXs Fommon denomina- tors &ommon eFonomiF and geopolitiFal interests Fommon inter- nal enemies namel\ the .Xrds and at the time also e[ternal riYals sXFh as S\ria and Iran as Zell as Fommon ideologiFal and politiFal 1 Simla Yerlikaya, Yeni Komşumuz Kürdistan, (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2013). 2 In 1995 a female Kurdish human right lawyer, Eren Kesken, was sentenced to three years imprisonment because she had used the term Kurdistan in one of her articles. Heidi Basch Harod, “Kurdish Women of Turkey: Rewriting Their Historical Legacy”. (MA thesis, Tel Aviv University, 2013). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 67 Ofra Bengio afÀnities ThXs eYen thoXgh the regimes in both FoXntries deFlared themselYes to be seFXlar and opposed to politiFal Islam there Zas still strong SXnni bonds betZeen the goYernments of the tZo states ZhiFh Zere led b\ SXnnis Xntil 3 In Fertain periods the tZo states also shared a pro-Zestern orientation This partnership foXnd e[pression among other things in Saadbad 3aFt of 937 and %aghdad 3aFt of 9 Similarl\ dXring the IraTi ²Iranian Zar 98-988 the tZo parties signed a hot pXrsXit agree- ment against the .Xrdish TXrNish 3arti\e .arNeren .Xrdistan 3.. (FonomiFall\ speaNing IraT and TXrNe\ bXilt the strategiF oil pipe- line ZhiFh beFame aFtiYe in 977 and ZhiFh Zas the onl\ oXtlet to IraTi oil dXring the FrXFial \ears of the Zar Xp Xntil 99 IraT·s total dependenFe on the TXrNish oXtlet Zas dXe to the FlosXre of the pipeline to the Shatt al-Arab immediatel\ at the Áare Xp of the Zar in 98 and the FlosXre of the IraTi-S\rian pipeline b\ 'amas- FXs in 98 2n the Zhole eFonomiF relations betZeen IraT and TXrNe\ ÁoXrished dXring the Zar and Zere beneÀFial to both 2n the politiFal leYel it Fan be argXed that dXring the 98s there Zere also Fertain afÀnities betZeen the tZo goYernments that reaFhed poZer b\ Za\ of a pXtsFh and militari]ed their soFieties in one Za\ or another The gradXal Fooling of relations betZeen AnNara and %aghdad be- gan in the aftermath of the 99 *Xlf Zar after ZhiFh at eaFh neZ phase another bXilding bloFN of the ties Follapsed Zith relations reaFhing their nadir b\ 3 The Fatal\st for this deYelopment Zas the AmeriFan tZo Zars on IraT in 99 and 3 hoZeYer internal proFesses in eaFh part of the triangle aFFoXnted for the teFtoniF Fhange The Àrst Fomponent to be seYerel\ hit Zas eFonomiF relations )ol- loZing the IraTi inYasion of .XZait in AXgXst 99 TXrNe\ Moined the allies in their sanFtions against IraT b\ Flosing the strategiF oil pipeline to &e\han in TXrNe\ In faFt TXrNish president TXrgXt g]al tooN the initiatiYe b\ FXtting off IraT·s pipeline to TXrNe\ eYen before 3resident *eorge %Xsh asNed him to do so3 This moYe FaXsed a seYere bloZ to IraTi eFonom\ bXt it hit TXrNe\ as Zell At the same time TXrNe\ alloZed for smXggled oil emanating from the .5* to 3 Morton Abramowitz, “Remembering Turgut Özal: Some personal recollections”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, No.2, 2013, p.40. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 68 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas reaFh TXrNe\ b\ Za\ of tanNers (Yen thoXgh eFonomiFall\ speaN- ing this Zas far from Fompensating AnNara for the loss of diYidends from the Flosed IraTi pipeline the moYe nonetheless neFessitated direFt ties betZeen TXrNe\ and the .5* thXs granting the latter Fertain legitimaF\ The seFond bXilding bloFN sXffered a bloZ as a resXlt of the .Xrd- ish Xprising serhildan in the aftermath of the Zar in 99 and the FonFomitant ZithdraZal of the IraTi arm\ from the .Xrdish region These tZo moYes broXght the IraTi .Xrdish problem to the Yer\ door of TXrNe\ )or one thing as a resXlt of the Xprising aboXt half a million IraTi .Xrds ÁoFNed to the TXrNish borders in an attempt to Ànd refXge in TXrNe\ from the IraTi arm\ )or another the ZithdraZ- al of the IraTi arm\ sXggested that IraT Zas no longer the master of the Fommon borders betZeen the tZo FoXntries ZhiFh meant that AnNara had to deal direFtl\ Zith the .5* in order to aYert the spillo- Yer effeFts of these deYelopments into TXrNe\ The direFt dealing Zith the .5* Zas all the more pressing sinFe the XpheaYals in the region enabled the 3.. to fXrther enlarge its bases inside the IraTi .Xrdistan region Zhile the\ also helped enhanFe ties betZeen IraTi and TXrNish .Xrds /ittle Zonder then that TXrgXt g]al the TXrNish 3resident at the time Zas behind the idea of a safe haYen for the .Xrds of IraT ZhiFh alloZed for the retXrn of the .Xrdish refXgees to their home bXt at the same time gaYe birth to the .Xrdish aXtonom\ in IraT4 The *Xlf Zar of 3 and the rise of the ShiCis to poZer in IraT FaXsed gradXal estrangement betZeen the goYernments of AnNara and %aghdad This Zas no FoinFidenFe as at almost one and the same time the tZo goYernments ZhiFh Fame to poZer had Xnam- bigXoXs religioXs inFlinations ThXs for the Àrst time in modern his- tor\ the tZo goYernments in AnNara and %aghdad had FonÁiFting Zorld YieZ on Islam The A.3 goYernment in TXrNe\ Zas SXnni and the goYernment in %aghdad Zas led b\ the ShiCi maMorit\ The TXrNish MoXrnalist Semih Idi] desFribed the neZ deYelopment sa\- ing that TXrNe\ Zas Zitnessing Islami]ation and SXnniÀFation of its foreign poliF\ The faFt that this trend FoinFided Zith the Islami]a- 4 Özal’s policy fit in well with his opening towards the Kurds of Turkey. For Özal’s being “the forerunner of the Kurdish issue”, see, Cengiz Çandar, “Turgut Özal twenty years after: The man and the politician”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 15., No.2, 2013, pp.32-34. 5 Semih Idiz, Al Monitor, 3 March 2013. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi- nals/2013/03/akp-sunni-foreign-policy-turkey-sectarianism.html 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 69 Ofra Bengio tion and ShiCi]ation of IraT·s foreign poliF\ tXrned the estrangement betZeen the tZo parties almost ineYitable It Zas trXe that as late as 0arFh (rdoĊan Fame on a Yisit to IraT ZhiFh inFlXded (rbil %aghdad and 1aMaf ThoXgh the Yisit to 1aMaf Zas indeed XnXsXal for a SXnni 0Xslim leader it still did not manage to bridge the groZing gap betZeen the tZo goYernments in AnNara and %aghdad 1or did the poliFies of IraTi 3rime 0inister 1Xri al-0aliNi maNe relations an\ easier 0aliNi·s groZing aXthori- tarian tendenFies and his ongoing poliFies to isolate the SXnni Fom- mXnit\ and marginali]e the SXnnis in his Foalition goYernment onl\ inFreased the SXnni-ShiCi diYide betZeen AnNara and %aghdad Adding fXel to the Àre Zas (rdoĊan·s sXpport in the IraTi eleF- tions to al-CIraTi\\a the SXnni list against that of al-0aliNi (rdoĊan Zent on to giYe refXge to one of the leaders of this part\ TariT al- +ashemi against Zhom the 0aliNi goYernment issXed death pXn- ishment This is another e[ample of hoZ TXrNe\ initiated Fertain moYes against the Fentral goYernment in %aghdad to ZhiFh the latter Zas mainl\ reaFtiYe The tZo other deYelopments ZhiFh aFFelerated the paFe of es- trangement betZeen AnNara and %aghdad Zere the XpheaYals in S\ria ZhiFh started in 0arFh and the Ànal ZithdraZal of the AmeriFan forFes from IraT at the end of )olloZing the Zith- draZal of the AmeriFan forFes there started a strong Fompetition betZeen AnNara and Tehran to Àll the YaFXXm left b\ the 8S And Zhile Iran deepened its penetration into the Arab part of IraT TXr- Ne\ did so in the .Xrdish part )Xrthermore dXe to religioXs afÀni- ties betZeen the IraTi and Iranian goYernments there Zas for the Àrst time in deFades a shift in IraTi Zorld YieZ and orientation :hile Xntil 3 %aghdad looNed at AnNara as a Nind of strategiF depth against ShiCi Iran noZ %aghdad began to YieZ Iran as a strategiF depth for faFing a hostile SXnni neighborhood ZhiFh Zas relXFtant to grant real legitimi]ation to a ShiCi-led goYernment It seems hoZeYer that the maMor faFtor that pXt AnNara and %agh- dad at geopolitiFal loggerheads Zere the XpheaYals in S\ria :hile AnNara beFame the pioneer in seeNing to oXst its erstZhile all\ %ashar al-Asad from poZer %aghdad Moined the Iranian Zagon b\ all\ing itself Zith the S\rian %aCth regime +ere too the seFtarian diYide pla\ed an important role :hile AnNara granted all oXt sXp- port to the SXnni S\rian opposition %aghdad faFilitated sXpport to 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 70 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas the AlaZite goYernment in 'amasFXs Zith its pro-ShiCi tendenFies A ShiCi IraTi minister eYen Zent as far as to deFlare that the sXpport ZhiFh TXrNe\ granted to the rebels in S\ria Zas tantamoXnt to a deFlaration of Zar on IraT beFaXse the seFtarian strXggle in S\ria might spill into IraT and endanger it as Zell This shift in disFoXrse and praFtiFe is all the more ironiFal sinFe after the 3 IraTi Zar it Zas S\ria Zho Zas the main e[porter of terrorist aFtiYities into IraT To sXm Xp all these parameters demonstrate seYere erosion in the %aghdad-AnNara relationship ZhiFh shifted the Zeight of TXrNe\·s foreign poliF\ priorities toZards (rbil 0eanZhile deep Fhanges haYe taNen plaFe in the .5* too ZhiFh haYe faFilitated TXrNe\·s dramatiF shift (YROXWLRQLQWKH.XUGLVKFDPS :hile the 3 :ar seYerel\ destabili]ed the Fentral goYernment in %aghdad broXght to the sXrfaFe the SXnni-ShiCi diYide and ZroXght haYoF to the eFonom\ different d\namiFs Zere at ZorN in the .5* Zhere a TXasi state has been emerging Anal\]ing the politiFal s\s- tem in IraT politiFal sFientist Aram 5afaat sXggested that in that FoXntr\ there Zere tZo TXasi states the .Xrdish and the IraTi one Zith the main differenFe betZeen them being that the former laFNed reFognition ZhiFh the latter did haYe 5egarding the TXasi state 5afaat mentions foXr maMor elements FharaFteri]ing sXFh entit\ a proFess of nation bXilding militari]ation of the soFiet\ and the establishment of an arm\ independentl\ from the e[isting state ZeaNness of the state ZhiFh brings aboXt a Fhange in the balanFe of poZer betZeen itself and the TXasi state and Ànall\ the e[ist- enFe of e[ternal patronage7 ([amining these Friteria it is doXbtfXl that one Fan talN aboXt IraT as a TXasi state rather it is a failed state +oZeYer the .Xrdish entit\ Fertainl\ Àts this model beFaXse the foXr elements do e[- ist there The nation-bXilding proFess has been aFFelerated sinFe the 3 :ar inFlXding all the trappings of an independent entit\ 6 Hurriyet Daily News, 27 February 2013. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/rebel-win- could-spread-war-iraq.aspx?pageID=238&nid=41979 7 Aram Rafaat, “The Kurdish and Iraqi Counter-Quest for Nationhood and the Transforma- tion of Iraqi Kurdistan into a Quasi-State” (PHD Thesis, University of Adelaide, 2012), pp. 226-231. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 71 Ofra Bengio both on the politiFal leYel sXFh as an independent parliament and goYernment and on the s\mboliFal leYel sXFh as an anthem and a Áag 5egarding the Friterion of militari]ation the .5* has tXrned the gXerrilla forFe the peshmerga into an arm\ Zith some soldiers8 and heaY\ arms ZhiFh inFlXded “a large Áeet of 5Xssian- made Zarplanes left from the Saddam era”9 as Zell as tanNs ZhiFh Zere taNen as boot\ from the tZo Zars of 99 and 3 The ZeaNness of the Fentral goYernment needs no elaboration SXfÀFe it to mention that %aghdad has lost Fontrol altogether on the .Xrdish region eYen thoXgh the s\stem is a federal one ThXs on paper IraT is still the soYereign in the .Xrdish region bXt in praFtiFe it is not The ZeaNness of the IraTi goYernment Zas demonstrated in its reFent Fall on the .5* to hand oYer the Zarplanes and tanNs at its disposal if it Zanted to remain “Zithin a Xnited IraT” +oZeYer not onl\ did the .5* ignore the Fall bXt it eYen Zent on to pXrFhase neZ Zeapons As to patronage it is TXite parado[iFal that in the last feZ \ears TXrNe\ has assXmed the role of patron of the .5* or ma\ be better said its main lifeline Seen from a historiFal perspeFtiYe this region ZhiFh represented the Yila\et of 0osXl Xnder the 2ttomans Zas indeed natXrall\ linNed to the northern part of the 2ttoman (mpire and the -a]ira rather than to the Yila\et of %aghdad and %asra In addition to the foXr Friteria mentioned b\ 5afaat one shoXld add tZo other important ones ZhiFh highlight the aXtonomoXs dispo- sition of the .5* namel\ foreign relations and eFonom\ (Yen thoXgh foreign relations shoXld haYe been the e[FlXsiYe domain of the Fentral goYernment in the XniTXe federatiYe s\stem ZhiFh has eYolYed in IraT the .Xrdish region is FondXFting its oZn foreign relations almost independentl\ from %aghdad This is eYident in the FonsXlates ZhiFh man\ FoXntries haYe established in (rbil and ZhiFh fXnFtion as embassies in all bXt name The freTXent Yisits 8 Kurdnet, 17 January 2011. http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/1/state4537. htm 9 Press TV, 29 April 2012. http://www.presstv.com/detail/238746.html 10 Illustrating the loss of Iraqi sovereignty over the Kurdish region are the checkpoints which serve as a kind of border line between the Arab and Kurdish part. 11 Press TV, 29 April 2012. http://www.presstv.com/detail/238746.html 12 There are 31 such representations in Erbil. For its part the KRG has 15 representations in various countries. http://dfr.krg.org/p/p.aspx?p=37 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 72 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas of the 3resident of .Xrdistan 0asCXd %ar]ani to different FoXntries inFlXding the 8S and 5Xssia Zhere he is being aFForded a ZelFome of a head of state is another indiFation of this aXtonomoXs statXs The same is trXe for all the other .Xrdish ofÀFials Zho haYe beFome persona grata in man\ of these FoXntries Similarl\ man\ FoXntries and Fompanies feel at greater ease to FXt deals Zith (rbil rather than Zith %aghdad beFaXse the .5* is more stable prosperoXs and seFXre In the Fase of Fertain Arab FoXntries the antipath\ to- Zards the ShiCi-led goYernment in %aghdad adds another inFentiYe for maintaining relations Zith the .Xrds The eFonomiF realm is eYen more intrigXing beFaXse of the hXge oil and gas resoXrFes ZhiFh Zere foXnd in .Xrdistan region and ZhiFh tXrned them into the main bone of Fontention betZeen (rbil and %aghdad The .5*·s independent poliF\ is eYident in its deals Zith YarioXs Àrms and Fompanies ZhiFh more often than not b\pass the Fentral goYernment·s inMXnFtion (Yen more dangeroXs from the Fentral goYernment point of YieZ is the neZ pipelines ZhiFh are be- ing bXilt in fXll steam in the .5* and ZhiFh Zhen Fompleted ma\ grant the .5* eFonomiF aXtonom\ and thXs aFFelerate the paFe of politiFal independenFe 7XUNH\·VFKDQJLQJFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ 8nder the A.3 goYernment ZhiFh Àrst Fame to poZer in there Zere dramatiF Fhanges in this part\·s perFeption of the .Xrdish is- sXe in TXrNe\ ZhiFh in tXrn had its reperFXssions on AnNara·s ties Zith the .5* And YiFe Yersa the dramatiF Fhanges in the .5* had reperFXssions on the domestiF .Xrdish issXe in TXrNe\ moYing AnNara to artiFXlate a neZ poliF\ toZards the .Xrds3 *enerall\ speaNing the domestiF .Xrdish issXe has alZa\s been an impor- tant Fomponent of TXrNish foreign poliF\ bXt in the last deFade this faFtor Zas aFFelerated signiÀFantl\ so that the domestiF .Xrdish issXe beFame intertZined Zith the e[ternal one in a Za\ that the\ Fannot be separated an\ more An\Za\ the Fhanging paradigm in TXrNe\·s approaFh to the .5* Fan be sXmmari]ed as folloZs Zhile in the past the .5* Zas perFeiYed as part of TXrNe\·s internal .Xrd- ish problem in the last feZ \ears the .5* Fame to be perFeiYed as a partner to the solXtion 13 For the Kurdish angle see, Cengiz Gunes, The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to resistance (New York: Routledge, 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 73 Ofra Bengio 3arado[iFall\ enoXgh in its deeds and misdeeds the A.3 goYern- ment FontribXted immensel\ to the establishment and ÁoXrishing of the .5* %\ not permitting the allies to attaFN IraT from its lands in 3 AnNara enabled the .5* to sei]e this golden opportXnit\ to Fonsolidate its TXasi state and pXt itself on the regional and in- ternational map )irst the .5* managed to deYelop open relations Zith e[ternal poZers most importantl\ the AmeriFans SeFond it proYed its lo\alt\ and proZess Zhen it helped oFFXp\ the northern part of IraT and later also in establishing the neZ IraTi goYernment Similarl\ it proYed its importanFe to the 8S in Fomparison to TXrNe\ and forFed the latter to aFFept the .5* as a fait aFFompli Indeed the A.3·s approaFh beFame noZ the old diFtXm “if \oX Fannot beat \oXr enem\ Moin him” &onFXrrentl\ there Zere important Fhanges Yis a Yis the .Xrds in TXrNe\ itself In its driYe to ZeaNen the militar\ and Zin the .Xrdish Yote the A.3 initiated a neZ approaFh to the .Xrdish issXe ZhiFh Zas not based solel\ on militar\ means4 The “.Xrdish opening” of 9 ZhiFh pXrported to solYe the .Xrdish issXe b\ peaFefXl means Zas MXst this program It seems that it Zas no mere FoinFi- denFe that the “.Xrdish opening” in TXrNe\ FoinFided Zith the neZ opening toZards the .5* AnNara·s doXble traFN poliF\ Zas meant to marginali]e and neXtrali]e the 3.. at home Zhile also Xsing the .5*·s good Zill in order to Fontain the 3.. Zhose bases are in the .5* +oZeYer Zhile the internal traFN failed to materiali]e at least Xntil 3 the e[ternal one sXFFeeded be\ond e[peFtations :hile Xntil 8 TXrNe\ perFeiYed the .Xrdish entit\ as a great danger to itself from that period on AnNara began to tilt toZards the .5* at the e[pense of %aghdad In other Zords TXrNe\ forged an XnZritten allianFe Zith the .5* Zhile dropping the historiFal Flose relation- ship Zith %aghdad An illXstration of this shift Zere 0asCXd %ar]a- ni·s Yisits to TXrNe\ in three FonseFXtiYe \ears and Zhere he Zas aFForded a reFeption of a head of state and not that of a tribal leader as before ThXs Zithin one \ear from 7-9 14 For an early stage of AKP’s experimentation with the Kurdish issue see, Rabia Karakaya Polat, “The AKP and the Kurdish issue: What went wrong?”, SETA, Policy Brief, May 2008, No. 14. 15 It should be noted though that MIT started secret contacts with the KRG already in 2006 but they came to fruition only in 2009. 16 One indication of the close relationship is Barzani’s participation in the AKP Congress on 30 September 2012 where he delivered a speech. National Turk, 3 October 2012. http://www. nationalturk.com/en/applause-for-kurdish-leader-barzani-at-akp-congress-condemned-by- turkish-opposition-26421. On the other hand, Maliki declined to participate. Today’s Za- 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 74 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas there Zas a dramatiF shift in the relations from near erXption of militar\ FonÁiFt betZeen TXrNe\ and the .5* to one of Xnderstand- ing and Flose relationship A TXrNish Fommentator desFribed the Fhange sa\ing “In the past TXrNe\ and %ar]ani had Yer\ different relations bXt toda\ the\ meet as tZo Flose allies”7 Another Fom- mentator had this to sa\ on the neZ role of %ar]ani “Some time ago he Zas Fonsidered as a loFal bandit 1oZ he is Fonsidered as statesman”8 7XUNH\·VPRWLYDWLRQVIRUWKHVKLIW (FonomiF interests Zere the Àrst trigger for the Fhange and onl\ later Zere the\ folloZed b\ geopolitiFal ones 2Yer time the .5* managed to attraFt TXrNish entrepreneXrs Zhose Yested interests in the region tXrned them into the best adYoFate for strong relations Zith the .5* 0ore importantl\ the riFh oil and gas resoXrFes in the .Xrdistan region Zere so attraFtiYe to the TXrNish goYernment that it Zas Zilling to sign agreements Zith the .5* inFlXding for the bXilding of tZo oil pipelines and one gas pipeline from the .5* oYer the strong obMeFtion of %aghdad A goYernment Zhose main pillar of poZer Zas eFonomiF sXFFess did not Ànd it so difÀFXlt to Fhange partners espeFiall\ Zhen in the Xnstable Arab part of IraT sXFh rela- tions Zere far from promising ThXs Zithin a feZ \ears TXrNe\ be- Fame the main pla\er in IraTi .Xrdistan Xsing soft poZer as its main tool for inFreasing its inÁXenFe in the region9 1Xmbers speaN for themselYes of all the Fompanies aFtiYe in the .5* are TXrN- ish emplo\ing TXrNs The YolXme of trade betZeen TXrNe\ and the .5* reaFhed 9 billion in eTXaling that betZeen TXrNe\ and Iran In this sense there is a shift in the roles of TXrNe\ and Iran Zho Zas the .Xrds· patron dXring the 97s and 98s man, 2 October 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-294091-akp-and-iraqi-kurds- the-participation-of-massoud-barzani-in-the-akp-general-congress-by-aziz-barzani*.html. Barzani came earlier in April of that year to Turkey where he met the highest officials in the state. 17 Today’s Zaman, 18 April 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-277894-krg-leader- barzani-visits-turkey-as-alliance-with-iraqi-kurds-deepens.html. 18 Voice of America, 18 April 2012. http://m.voanews.com/a/179182.html 19 On Turkey’s soft power see, Meliha Benli Altunışık, ”The possibilities and limits of Turkey’s soft power in the Middle East”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 10. No.2, 2008, pp.41-54. 20 By 2010 it was reported that 3200 Turkish firms were active in various areas in the KRG. Today’s Zaman, 6 July 2010. http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById. action?load=detay&link=215263 21 Today’s Zaman, 2 October 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-294091-akp-and- iraqi-kurds-the-participation-of-massoud-barzani-in-the-akp-general-congress-by-aziz-bar- zani*.html 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 75 Ofra Bengio /inNed to this is the geopolitiFal Fonsideration The stable and prosperoXs .Xrdistan region is noZ performing as a Nind of bXffer ]one betZeen TXrNe\ and the tXrbXlent Arab part of IraT It is also a Nind of safet\ YalYe against the spread of ShiCism into TXrNe\ 1o less important the faFt that it is Irbil and not %aghdad ZhiFh is Fontrolling the Fommon border Zith TXrNe\ tXrns the .5* into a more important partner for seFXrit\ Fooperation along the border and be\ond Similarl\ the latent and sometimes open Fompeti- tion betZeen TXrNe\ and Iran on spheres of inÁXenFe in IraT and elseZhere in the region made the FontigXoXs .5* a natXral FhoiFe for TXrNish inÁXenFe The Yision of so-Falled neo-2ttomanism ZhiFh Zas promoted b\ TXrNish )oreign 0inister Ahmet 'aYXtoĊlX Àts Zell in the neZ poliF\ of engaging the .5* *enerall\ speaNing this ideolog\ sets to en- FoXrage engagement Zith regions ZhiFh had been preYioXsl\ Xnder the 2ttoman (mpire and indeed 'aYXtoĊlX Zas the mastermind be- hind the opening toZard the .5*3 'aYXtoĊlX Fame on a “historiF” Yisit to the .5* in 2Ftober 9 Zhere he deFlared that TXrNe\ FoXld serYe as a bridge to (Xrope for the .5* Zhile the .5* FoXld serYe as a gateZa\ to the *Xlf for TXrNe\4 In a Za\ this TXrNish moYe for “integrating” the .5* appears as a YindiFation for the loss of 0osXl Yila\et to IraT baFN in 9 IroniFall\ enoXgh the .5* appears to be the onl\ region Zhere the other pillar of 'aYXtoĊlX·s foreign poliF\ arFhiteFtXre the “]ero problems Zith the neighbors” is being reali]ed Then there Zas the religioXs-ideologiFal Fonsideration As the SXn- ni-ShiCi diYide betZeen AnNara and %aghdad FontinXed to deepen the religioXs afÀnities Zith the SXnni .Xrds made them appear more reliable or pliant partners than %aghdad A TXrNish professor Ta\\ar Ar× maintained that “espeFiall\ after 0aliNi·s poliFies in IraT it be- Fame FompXlsor\ for TXrNe\ and the .5* to be in Flose FontaFt 0aliNi·s insinFere attitXde toZards SXnnis led TXrNe\ to taNe more 22 During Mas`ud Barzani’s visit to Turkey in April 2012 the two parties discussed com- mon security issues. Today’s Zaman, 18 April 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news- 277894-krg-leader-barzani-visits-turkey-as-alliance-with-iraqi-kurds-deepens.html. 23 The Kurds label it “Mr. Davutoglu policy”. Today’s Zaman, 6 July 2010. http://www.today- szaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=215263 24 Kurdistan Regional Government, 31 October 2009. http://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?r=223&l =12&s=02010100&a=32216&s=010000. 25 Interestingly, the term “integration” is used by the Turkish but not the Kurdish side reflect- ing the divergent outlook of the two parties regarding the relations between them. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 76 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas initiatiYes toZards the SXnni issXe” A s\mboliFal reÁeFtion of this approaFh Zas that AnNara and (rbil Fooperated in granting safe haYen to TariT al-+ashemi It seems therefore that AnNara had to Fhoose the lesser of tZo eYils and in that point of time (rbil ap- peared the right FhoiFe Still of all the other Fonsiderations that of the internal .Xrdish one tipped the balanFe in TXrNe\·s deFision to open Xp toZards the .5* The faFt that AnNara initiated the opening toZards its oZn .Xrds and the .5* simXltaneoXsl\ speaNs for itself )or one thing the .5* appeared a faFtor that ma\ help Fontain or rather paFif\ the .Xrds of TXrNe\ &engi] ANtar desFribed %ar]ani·s role sa\ing that the TXrNish goYernment Zas tr\ing “to sXbFontraFt the solXtion of its oZn .Xrdish problem to him”7 Indeed the .5* espeFiall\ 3resident 0asCXd %ar]ani has assXmed an important role in the mediation betZeen AnNara and the 3.. in the neZ phase of the peaFe proFess ZhiFh started in earl\ 38 )Xrthermore FontribXting its oZn FrXFial part to the A.3-3.. deal the .5* agreed to the ZithdraZal of 3.. militants to its oZn region This moYe Zas Yehementl\ opposed b\ %aghdad ZhiFh regarded it as an infringement on its soYereignt\ and a fXrther boost to the .5*·s independent foreign poliF\ aFtiYities +oZeYer its Zarning that the ZithdraZal ZoXld threaten IraT·s seFXrit\ and stabilit\ Zent Xnheeded and the ZithdraZal tooN plaFe oYer %aghdad·s obMeFtion as had happened in other Fases in the past9 Iran too Zas totall\ opposed to the TXrNish-.Xrdish peaFe proFess for three reasons )irst it feared that the peaFe proFess ZoXld inspire its oZn .Xrds SeFond that a bolstered 3.. in the .5* ZoXld bolster 3arti\a -i\ana A]ad a .Xrdistane 3-A. the .Xrdish Iranian opposition groXp ZhiFh is related to the 3.. and ZhiFh has its bases in the .5* too Third that the 3.. ZoXld assist the emerging .Xrdish aXtonomoXs enFlaYe in S\ria It Zas eYen reported that at a Fertain point Iran offered militar\ assistanFe to the 3.. if the\ remained in 26 Today’s Zaman, 18 April 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-277894-krg-leader- barzani-visits-turkey-as-alliance-with-iraqi-kurds-deepens.html. 27 Voice of America, 18 April 2012. http://m.voanews.com/a/179182.html 28 The new Kurdish process has emboldened the Kurds in Turkey so that in a conference in Diyarbakır in June they referred to themselves for the first time as “North Kurdistan”. Radi- kal, 16 June 2013. 29 Ibrahim Karagül, “Maliki ve PKK korkusu,” Yenisafak.com.tr, 10 May 2013, http://yenisa- fak.com.tr/yazarlar/IbrahimKaragul/malikinin-pkk-korkusu/3762 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 77 Ofra Bengio TXrNe\3 %Xt this did not ZorN either and the 3.. began to fXlÀll their part in the agreement b\ ZithdraZing to the .5* :ith the erXption of XpheaYals in S\ria and the establishment of .Xrdish aXtonom\ there in the sXmmer of the .5* assXmed another role in the TXrNish perFeption namel\ a possible paFiÀer of that region as Zell or as a balanFing poZer to the inÁXenFe of the 3.. there (Yen before the taNeoYer 0asCXd %ar]ani·s Yisit to TXr- Ne\ in April of that \ear Fentered on the topiF of the .Xrds of S\ria and their possible moYes in Zhat the\ desFribed as post-Assad S\ria In faFt TXrNe\ Zas Zar\ that the .Xrds of S\ria ZoXld deFlare aXtonom\ or eYen independenFe3 An indiFation of these Zorries Zas the Yisit of TXrNish )oreign 0inister Ahmet 'aYXtoĊlX to the .5* immediatel\ after the -Xl\ taNeoYer of the .Xrdish region in S\ria b\ the .Xrds3 All in all the .5*·s aFFeptanFe of the 3.. militants to its region and the role it has been pla\ing in paFif\ing the .Xrds in S\ria ma\ in the longer rXn proYe as a balanFing tool against possible fXtXre TXrNish enFroaFhment on the .5* In other Zords its neZ regional role ma\ grant the .Xrds a Fard Yis-j-Yis TXrNe\ 7KH$PHULFDQDPELJXRXVUROH )or the greater part of the tZentieth FentXr\ the 8S Nept aloof from the .Xrdish issXe in IraT one of the main reasons for ZhiFh Zas the AmeriFan XnZillingness to antagoni]e TXrNe\ its main all\ in the region )or indeed the 8S Zas e[tremel\ sensitiYe toZards An- Nara·s apprehensions of the .Xrdish issXe not MXst at home bXt in the neighboring FoXntries as Zell ZhiFh threatened to haYe spilloYer effeFts on the .Xrds in TXrNe\33 Another reason Zas that the Ameri- Fan administration has alZa\s prioriti]ed the integrit\ of the nation- states that had emerged after the Follapse of the 2ttoman (mpire at the end of :orld :ar oYer an\ other ethnonational Fonsidera- tion +oZeYer deYelopments on the groXnd in IraT forFed the 8S 30 Lara Vergnaud, Middle East, 9 May 2013. http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeat- world/2013/05/09/iraq-rejects-pkk-withdrawal-but-lacks-leverage/ 31 Voice of America, 18 April 2012. http://m.voanews.com/a/179182.html 32 It should be noted that PM Erdoğan threatened to intervene there “since those terrorist formations would disturb our national peace”. The Kurdish Globe, 31 July 2012. http://www. kurdishglobe.net/display-article.html?id=E2564C82CB3871AD1E5DA4801448F156 33 It was this consideration that moved the US to keep secret its symbolical support to the Kurds of Iraq in the years 1972-75. See Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State within a State, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012) pp.76-78. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 78 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas to Fhange its poliFies thoXgh not its striFt FonFepts The erosion in the AmeriFan poliF\ started in the 99 *Xlf :ar Zhen it deFided to establish a “safe haYen” region for the .Xrds from ZhiFh then emerged the .Xrdish aXtonom\ in IraT )rom that time onZards the 8S beFame enmeshed in the .Xrdish issXe in IraT prioriti]ing this time the ethnonational groXp oYer the %aCthi IraTi state Zith ZhiFh it Zas in a state of Zar +oZeYer the main tXrning point in the Ameri- Fan poliF\ toZards the .Xrds tooN plaFe in the aftermath of the 3 IraTi Zar in ZhiFh the .Xrds pla\ed a piYotal role in the libera- tionoFFXpation of IraT The .Xrds Zere reZarded b\ haYing been granted a leading role in the formation of post-Saddam IraT as Zell as Zith the entrenFhment of their aXtonom\ This AmeriFan poliF\ toZards the .Xrds FonÁiFted Zith its tZo other FonFepts namel\ preserYing the integrit\ of the nation-state and assXaging AnNara·s fears regarding the spilloYer effeFts of the .Xrdish aXtonom\ in IraT on the .Xrds in TXrNe\ AFFordingl\ in a poliF\ of eating the FaNe and haYing it too the 8S FontinXed to adYoFate the integrit\ of IraT Zhile fXrther empoZering the .5* as Zell as pla\ing the paFiÀer betZeen the .5* and TXrNe\ This AmeriFan ambigXoXs stanFe is indeed one of the greatest iro- nies of the Xnfolding sitXation in the TXrNish-.Xrdish-IraTi triangle :hile for the greater part of the last tZo deFades the 8nited States had pla\ed the role of paFiÀer betZeen AnNara and (rbil in the last feZ \ears it has Fhanged its approaFh b\ 8 degrees34 1oZ :ashington is tr\ing to pXt braNes on the eYer e[tending relations betZeen AnNara and (rbil Zarning both of Floser relations +oZ- eYer Zhile the administration FontinXes to stiFN to the idea of a XniÀed IraT a groZing nXmber of YoiFes in AmeriFan thinN tanNs do enFoXrage the administration to Fhange FoXrse and sXpport an independent .Xrdistan3 The main FaXse for the ofÀFial AmeriFan stanFe is that it foXnd it- self noZ betZeen the TXrNish hammer and the IraTi anYil betZeen TXrNe\ ZhiFh is one of its Flosest allies in the region and IraT Zhom :ashington had hoped to tXrn into a strategiF asset and a model of demoFraF\ for all the Arab states 3Xt differentl\ the AmeriFan ad- 34 In his first visit to Turkey in April 2009 President Obama called for closer Turkish coop- eration not only with the central government in Baghdad but also with the Kurds. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 April 2009. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/ pubs/090408_turkey_update.pdf 35 See for example Michael Rubin’s article quoted in Press TV, 14 May 2013. http://www. presstv.ir/detail/2013/05/14/303540/us-preparing-for-iraqi-kurds-to-split/ 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 79 Ofra Bengio ministration has been endeaYoring to balanFe betZeen eTXall\ fail- ing models of demoFraF\ ZhiFh it had hoped to e[port to the Arab Zorld that of post-Saddam IraT sponsored b\ 3resident *eorge : %Xsh and that of TXrNe\·s A.3 sponsored b\ 3resident %araN 2bama3 And Zhile TXrNe\ has softened on the idea of a XniÀed IraT pa\ing it mere lip serYiFe :ashington FontinXes to hope and ZorN for this elXsiYe target &learl\ for all the sXpport ZhiFh the .Xrds had grant- ed the 8nited States :ashington does not Zant to be perFeiYed as the one ZhiFh had split IraT +oZeYer for all of the AmeriFan endeaYors and Zarnings AnNara and (rbil are going their oZn Za\ bXilding pipelines ZhiFh might Fhange the geopolitiFal map of the region This deYelopment is \et another s\mptom of the ZeaNening FloXt of the 8S in the region as a Zhole Its ZithdraZal at the end of onl\ serYed to aFFentXate this ZeaNness &RQFOXVLRQ The teFtoniF Fhanges in the region Fhanged the balanFe of poZer Zithin the state s\stem as Zell as betZeen the state s\stem and the .Xrdish sXbs\stem 2n the Zhole all the pla\ers are on a horn of a dilemma As far as %aghdad is FonFerned if it pXts too mXFh pressXre on (rbil for toeing al-0aliNi·s line it might pXsh it to de- Flare independenFe if it does not it might lose the sXpport of ShiCis and SXnnis Zho looN Zith an[iet\ at the Yanishing dream of a Xni- Àed IraT As to %aghdad-AnNara relations the\ are in sXFh a fragile state that shoXld %aghdad strain them fXrther it might pXsh TXrNe\ to inFrease its sXpport to the .5* eYen to a point of sXpporting independenFe SXFh TXrNish stanFe hoZeYer Zhile might be ben- eÀFial eFonomiFall\ and strategiFall\ Fan soZ the seeds of .Xrdish separatism in TXrNe\ (rbil too has its oZn dilemmas 2n the one hand it needs TXrNe\ as its most liNel\ oXtlet to the sea 2n the other hand a too Flose relationship Zith AnNara might risN it beFom- ing a TXrNish satellite loose eFonomiF assets in IraT and e[pose itself to Iranian threats and manipXlations Alread\ noZ Iran Zarns (rbil against forging Flose relations Zith AnNara or thinNing aboXt 36 For Obama’s view of Turkey as a model for the Muslim world, see: Ariel Cohen, “Obama’s best friend? The Alarming evolution of US-Turkish relations”,Mideast Security and Policy Studies, BESA, No.100, pp. 16-18. For the failing models see, Ofra Bengio, “Are Iraq and Turkey models for democratization”? The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. XIX, No.3, Summer 2012, pp.53-62. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 80 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas independenFe37 1or is the 8S more Fomfortable Zith its FhoiFes AmeriFan oil Fompanies TXrNe\ and groZing nXmber of states and Fompanies seeN to do bXsiness Zith the .5* far from IraTi Fontrol bXt if :ashington giYes them the green light it Zill help breaN IraT In faFt hoZeYer the 8S is no longer in a position to deFide either Za\ As to the TXestion if these Fhanges are taFtiFal or strategiF I tend to thinN that the\ are strategiF beFaXse of the eFonomiF interests in- YolYed the deepening SXnni-ShiCi diYide and the sZeeping Fhanges in the geopolitiFal map in the region The paradigmiF shifts are also Yer\ apparent TXrNe\·s Fhanging stanFe toZards the .5* Fan be sXmmed Xp as folloZs :hile the .5* Zas Fonsidered as part of the .Xrdish domestiF problem in TXrNe\ noZ it is Fonsidered as a partner to the solXtion As for IraT Zhile in the th FentXr\ it per- FeiYed TXrNe\ as its strategiF depth against Iran after the 3 :ar the ShiCi-led goYernment in %aghdad perFeiYes Iran as its strategiF depth against a hostile SXnni neighborhood ZhiFh inFlXdes TXrNe\ as Zell 5egarding the -anXs-faFed .Xrds in the last tZent\ \ears the\ haYe been distanFing themselYes from their IraTi past Zhile aFFelerating their moYement toZards a TXrNish oriented fXtXre The 0iddle (ast is noZ in a state of ÁX[ The XpheaYals ZhiFh haYe engXlfed man\ FoXntries in the region inFlXding its Flosest neigh- bors IraT and S\ria did not stop at TXrNe\·s doorstop bXt Fame to inFlXde it as Zell The TaNsim-*e]i 3arN demonstrations ZhiFh Zere Xnleashed in TXrNe\ at the end of 0a\ 3 ma\ proYe to be a Zatershed not MXst for the fXtXre TXrNish-.Xrdish relations bXt for the Yer\ strXFtXre of allianFes and a[es in the 0iddle (ast The old TXrNish-IraTi allianFe has Follapsed and so did the deFade long TXrNish-Iranian-S\rian a[is leaYing TXrNe\ Zith onl\ the .5* as an all\ of sort in the )ertile &resFent If and Zhen Assad·s regime falls TXrNe\ might Zant to fXrther strengthen its relations Zith the .5* as a FoXnterbalanFe to probable groZing Iranian penetration into IraT The great Arab poet of the tenth FentXr\ Al-0Xtanabbi Zrote in one of his poems “The Zinds bloZ not to the liNing of the ships” Indeed this metaphor sXits ZonderfXll\ the sitXation in the 0iddle (ast The Zinds of Fhange are so strong that the goYernments in these states Fannot bXt Zait patientl\ Xntil the storm is oYer SXr- YiYal is the name of the game 37 Pakistan Defense, 17 February 2013. http://www.defence.pk/forums/middle-east- africa/235610-iran-iraq-s-kurds-don-t-think-about-independence-closer-ties-turks.html 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 81 Ofra Bengio Bibliography $EUDPRZLW]0RUWRQ´5HPHPEHULQJ7XUJXWg]DO 6RPHSHUVRQDO UHFROOHFWLRQVµ,QVLJKW7XUNH\9RO1R $OWXQ×ü×N0HOLKD%HQOLµ7KHSRVVLELOLWLHVDQGOLPLWVRI7XUNH\·V VRIW SRZHU LQ WKH 0LGGOH (DVWµ ,QVLJKW 7XUNH\ 9RO 1R SS %HQJLR2IUD´$UH,UDTDQG7XUNH\PRGHOVIRUGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQµ" 7KH0LGGOH(DVW4XDUWHUO\9RO;,;1R6XPPHUSS %HQJLR2IUD7KH.XUGVRI,UDT %XLOGLQJD6WDWHZLWKLQD6WDWH %RXOGHU /\QQH5LHQQHU3XEOLVKHUV dDQGDU&HQJL]´7XUJXWg]DOWZHQW\\HDUVDIWHU 7KHPDQDQG WKHSROLWLFLDQµ,QVLJKW7XUNH\9RO1R &HQWHU IRU 6WUDWHJLF DQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6WXGLHV $SULO KWWS FVLVRUJÀOHVPHGLDFVLVSXEV BWXUNH\BXSGDWH SGI &RKHQ $ULHO ´2EDPD·V EHVW IULHQG" 7KH $ODUPLQJ HYROXWLRQ RI 867XUNLVK UHODWLRQVµ 0LGHDVW 6HFXULW\ DQG 3ROLF\ 6WXGLHV %(6$1R *XQHV&HQJL]7KH.XUGLVK1DWLRQDO0RYHPHQWLQ7XUNH\ )URP 3URWHVWWRUHVLVWDQFH 1HZ +DURG+HLGL%DVFK´.XUGLVK:RPHQRI7XUNH\ 5HZULWLQJ7KHLU +LVWRULFDO/HJDF\µ 0$WKHVLV7HO$YLY8QLYHUVLW\ +XUUL\HW 'DLO\ 1HZV )HEUXDU\ KWWS ZZZKXU- UL\HWGDLO\QHZVFRPUHEHOZLQFRXOGVSUHDGZDULUDT DVS["SDJH,' QLG ,GL]6HPLK$O0RQLWRU0DUFKKWWS ZZZDOPRQLWRU FRPSXOVHRULJLQDOVDNSVXQQLIRUHLJQSROLF\WXU- NH\VHFWDULDQLVPKWPO .DUDJO,EUDKLP´0DOLNLYH3..NRUNXVXµ 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 82 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Ankara, Erbil, Baghdad: Relations Fraught with Dilemmas .uUGLVWDQ 5HJLRQDO *RYHUQPHQW 2FWREHU KWWS ZZZNUJRUJDGDVS["U O V D V .XUGQHW-DQXDU\KWWS ZZZHNXUGQHWPLVPDVDU- WLFOHVPLVFVWDWHKWP 1DWLRQDO7XUN2FWREHUKWWS ZZZQDWLRQDOWXUNFRP HQDSSODXVHIRUNXUGLVKOHDGHUEDU]DQLDWDNSFRQJUHVVFRQ- GHPQHGE\WXUNLVKRSSRVLWLRQ 3DNLVWDQ'HIHQVH)HEUXDU\ KWWS ZZZGHIHQFHSNIRUXPVPLGGOHHDVWDIULFD LUDQLUDTVNXUGVGRQWWKLQNDERXWLQGHSHQGHQFHFORVHUWLHV WXUNVKWPO 3RODW5DELD.DUDND\D´7KH$.3DQGWKH.XUGLVKLVVXH :KDW ZHQWZURQJ"µ6(7$3ROLF\%ULHI0D\1R 3UHVV 79 $SULO KWWS ZZZSUHVVWYFRPGH- WDLOKWPO BBBBBBBBBB0D\KWWS ZZZSUHVVWYLUGHWDLO XVSUHSDULQJIRULUDTLNXUGVWRVSOLW 5DGLNDO-XQH 5DIDDW$UDP´7KH.XUGLVKDQG,UDTL&RXQWHU4XHVWIRU1DWLRQ- KRRG DQG WKH 7UDQVIRUPDWLRQ RI ,UDTL .XUGLVWDQ LQWR D 4XDVL 6WDWHµ 3+'7KHVLV8QLYHUVLW\RI$GHODLGH 7KH .XUGLVK *OREH -XO\ KWWS ZZZNXUGLVKJOREH QHWGLVSOD\DUWLFOHKWPO"LG (&&%$'('$ ) 7RGD\·V =DPDQ -XO\ KWWS ZZZWRGD\V]DPDQFRP QHZV'HWDLOBJHW1HZV%\,GDFWLRQ"ORDG GHWD\ OLQN BBBBBBBBBBBB $SULO KWWS ZZZWRGD\V]DPDQFRP QHZV NUJOHDGHUEDU]DQLYLVLWVWXUNH\DVDOOLDQFH ZLWKLUDTLNXUGVGHHSHQVKWPO 7RGD\·V =DPDQ 2FWREHU KWWS ZZZWRGD\V]DPDQ FRPQHZV DNSDQGLUDTLNXUGVWKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRI PDVVRXGEDU]DQLLQWKHDNSJHQHUDOFRQJUHVVE\D]L]EDU]DQL KWPO 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 83 Ofra Bengio 9HUJQDXG/DUD0LGGOH(DVW 0D\KWWS EORJVEORXLQ- QHZVFRPEORXLQEHDWZRUOG LUDTUHMHFWVSNN ZLWKGUDZDOEXWODFNVOHYHUDJH 9RLFHRI$PHULFD$SULOKWWS PYRDQHZVFRPD KWPO 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 84 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 'enatXrali]ing the 'eep 'ilemma An (pisodiF Anal\sis of 3artial1on-&ooperation 'isFoXrses in TXrNe\·s IraT 3oliF\ Mehmet Akif KUMRAL* Abstract )Xll rather than partial Fooperation seems to be the more desirable if not natXral option for foreign poliF\ maNers The FXrrent state of TXrNe\·s partialnon-Fooperation Zith IraT Fhallenges this FonYen- tional Zisdom The TXrNish *oYernment ofÀFials haYe not \et fXll\ aFhieYed their goal of FomprehensiYe Fooperation Zith their IraTi FoXnterparts In the reFent \ears AnNara and %aghdad haYe Fome Floser to politiFal Fonfrontation rather than institXtional Foordina- tion International regional and other e[ternal FaXses FoXld be held aFFoXntable for the miring of these relations .H\ZRUGV TXrNe\·s IraT 3oliF\ 3artial1on-&ooperation 3olitiFal 'isFoXrse and &onte[t 3olitiFal )rames (pisodiF Anal\sis * Dr. Mehmet Akif Kumral recently received his PhD from the International Relations Department of the Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. Mehmet Akif Kumral, Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma: An Episodic Analysis of Partial/Non-Cooperation Discourses in Turkey’s Iraq Policy, Ortadoğu Etütleri, Volume 5, No 1, July 2013, pp.85-116. Mehmet Akif Kumral 'HULQ 'LOHPPDQ×Q 'RĊDV×Q× '|QċWUPHN 7UNL\H·QLQ ,UDN LOH .×VPLĈċ%LU OLNVL] OLĊL6|\OHPOHULQHĈOLċNLQ'|QHPVHO%LU$QDOL] Özet '×ċ politiNa \ap×mF×lar× ao×s×ndan tam iċ birliĊi N×smi iċ birliĊine na- ]aran daha ooN istenen belNi de daha doĊal g|rnen bir opsi\on olaraN orta\a o×NmaNtad×r TrNi\e·nin IraN ile N×smi iċ birliNsi]liĊinin gnm]deNi dXrXmX bX \a\g×n Nanaate tam olaraN X\mamaNta- d×r TrNi\e hNmeti \etNilileri IraNl× mesleNtaċlar×\la Napsaml× iċ birliĊi hedeÁerini hen] tam olaraN geroeNleċtirememiċtir Son \×l- larda AnNara %aĊdat ile iliċNilerinde NXrXmsal Noordinas\ona de- Ċil si\asi gerilime daha fa]la \aN×n hkle gelmiċtir ĈliċNilerin N|t\e gidiċi XlXslararas× b|lgesel Ye\a diĊer d×ċsal sebeplere baĊlanabi- lir AnFaN bX argman TrNi\e·nin hklen \aċamaNta oldXĊX derin oeliċNinin oeroeYelenmesine \ard×mF× olma] 'aha |nFe de oldXĊX gibi TrNi\e·nin IraN ile X]Xn erimli strateMiN ortaNl×N Yi]\onX beċ \×ldan daha a] bir ]aman ioinde o|]nme\e baċlam×ċt×r TrNi\e·nin IraN·a \|neliN strateMiN iċ birliĊi s|\lemi ontoloMiN anlam×n× Ye reto- riNsel gFn Na\betme\e \] tXtmXċ g|rnmeNtedir AnNara (rbil ile \aN×nlaċt×Noa %aĊdat·tan ×raNlaċm×ċt×r 0erNe]v IraN +Nmeti ile iċ birliĊinin ]a\×Áamas× TrN +Nmeti ao×s×ndan mali\etli ola- bileFeN sonXolara \ol aoabilir <NseN olas×l×Nla AnNara \erel Ye b|lgesel politiNalar×n× %aĊdat ile Noordine etme ihti\aF×n× dX\abilir An×lan baĊlamda bX maNale TrNi\e·nin IraN ile N×smi iċ bir liNsi] liĊi s|\lemlerindeNi sreĊen Narmaċ×Nl×Ċ× anlat×sal bir \aNlaċ×mla inFelemeNtedir SonXo olaraN bX oal×ċma TrNi\e-IraN iliċNilerinde \aċanan iċ bir liNsi] liĊi dinamiNlerinin doĊallaċt×r×lmamas×na \|neliN baĊlamsal-s|\lemsel bir ao×Nlama sXnmaNtad×r '|nemsel olaraN \ap×lan anali]de o |nemli ola\ temel al×nm×ċt×r TrNi\e·nin %aĊ- dat %\NeloiliĊinin 993 \×l×nda teNrar ao×lmas× 3 \×l×nda IraN·×n A%' taraf×ndan iċgal edilmesi Ye TrNi\e·nin (rbil %aċNonsoloslXĊX- nXn \×l×nda resmv olaraN ao×lmas× $QDKWDU.HOLPHOHU TrNi\e·nin IraN 3olitiNas× .×smi Ĉċ %ir liNsi] liĊi Si\asi S|\lem Ye %aĊlam 3olitiN deroeYeler '|nemsel Anali] 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 86 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 87 Mehmet Akif Kumral ,QWURGXFWLRQ It is Zidel\ aFFepted that TXrNe\ has alZa\s been interFonneFted to IraT in man\ respeFts 0aterial border trade oil-Zater e[Fhange and non-material soFio-FXltXral interaFtion faFtors establish strong ties betZeen the tZo FoXntries *iYen this interFonneFtedness one e[peFts the preYalenFe and FontinXit\ of Fooperation in TXrNish-Ira- Ti relations 2n the Fontrar\ the ongoing state of affairs betZeen AnNara and %aghdad does not neatl\ fit into this piFtXre 0aNing sense of the reFent deterioration in AnNara-%aghdad relations haYe presented a theoretiFall\ pX]]ling piFtXre eYen for the established sFholars and e[perienFed obserYers In reFent \ears goYernments in AnNara and %aghdad haYe Fome Floser to politiFal Fonfrontation rather than institXtional Foordina- tion International regional and other e[ternal FaXses FoXld be held aFFoXntable for the miring of these relations *iYen these liNel\ prospeFts for the foreseeable fXtXre it beFomes all the more ironiF if one reYisits ambitioXs goals of Fo-operation pXt forZard in the “Moint politiFal deFlaration”4 signed on -Xl\ 8 b\ the 3rime 0inister of TXrNe\ 5eFep Ta\\ip (rdoĊan and the 3rime 0inister of IraT 1oXri al-0aliNi In less than fiYe \ears it seemed that TXrNe\-IraT “+igh-/eYel &ooperation &oXnFil” began 1 See for instance, Ramazan Gözen, İmparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası, (Ankara: Palme Yayıncılık, 2009), p. 212. 2 Henry Barkey, “Turkey-Iraq Relations Deteriorate with Accusations of Sectarianism,” 30 April 2012, http://www.al-monitor.com (accessed 11 October 2012). 3 Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weak- nesses,” World Politics, Vol. 44, April 1992, p. 467. 4 “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Hükûmetleri Arasında Yüksek Düzeyli İşbirliği Konseyi’nin Kurulmasına İlişkin Ortak Siyasi Bildirge,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/, 24 April 2011. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 88 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma to lose its raison d’être :h\ did TXrNe\·s YieZing of “long-term strategiF partnership” Zith IraT die doZn in sXFh a short time" Is TXrNe\ entering into another episode of intended bXt failed Foop- eration Zith IraT" 2r is AnNara onFe again moYing toZards eTXi- libriXm of partialnon-Fooperation Zith %aghdad" Time Zill e[aFtl\ tell ZhiFh one of the paths aFtXall\ holds Against the baFNdrop of these TXestions the aim of this artiFle is to FritiFall\ anal\]e the reFent episode of partialnon-Fooperation in TXrNish-IraTi relations The episodiF anal\sis is based on three Ne\ eYents ie the re-opening of TXrNe\·s %aghdad (mbass\ in 993 the 8S InYasion of IraT in 3 and the offiFial inaXgXration of TXrNe\·s (rbil *eneral &onsXlate in The artiFle is diYided into three parts In part one episodiF beginning I Zill la\ oXt the Fonte[tXal baFNgroXnd of partial Fooperation in TXrNish-IraTi rela- tions The seFond part episodiF middle FoYers the period betZeen the FommenFement of 8S air bombardment on 0arFh 3 and the fall of %aghdad on 9 April 3 In this seFtion I anal\]e politiFal frames that Zere pXblished in the pro-goYernment dail\ After the episodiF middle Fonte[tXal d\namiFs of FomprehensiYe Fooperation are e[amined in part three The offiFial inaXgXration of TXrNe\·s (rbil *eneral &onsXlate on 9 0arFh marNed the epi- sodiF end of TXrNe\·s post-Zar IraT poliF\ In other Zords this inFi- dent bears sXffiFient signifiFanFe to Flose this episode In the Fon- 5 Electronic archive was available at http://yenisafak.com.tr, accessed on 1-30 April 2012. 6 Fehmi Koru has been a close friend of Abdullah Gül. Koru staunchly defended that Turkey should not get involved in the Iraq War whatsoever. See Murat Yetkin, Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 2004), p. 113. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 89 Mehmet Akif Kumral FlXsion episodiF findings are presented 2Yerall the artiFle argXes that TXrNe\·s IraT poliF\ disFoXrse has Fhanged TXite dramatiFall\ oYer the reFent \ears AnNara·s FooperatiYe and non-FooperatiYe approaFhes to %aghdad and (rbil haYe beFome more salient than eYer before )inding a reasonable solXtion to the .Xrdish TXestion on both sides of the border has still formed the maMor prediFament for TXrNe\·s disFoXrse of FomprehensiYe Fooperation Zith IraT 3DUW2QH (SLVRGLF%HJLQQLQJ &RQWH[WXDO%DFNJURXQGRI 3DUWLDO&RRSHUDWLRQ In the post-*Xlf :ar era implementation of militar\ and eFonomiF measXres against %aghdad has Freated seYere FonseTXenFes for AnNara *oYernments of TXrNe\ seemed to haYe almost no FhoiFe bXt e[tend their sXpport to the 8S for the implementation of 81- mandated northern no-fl\ ]one oYer IraT As a resXlt of the 2p- eration 1orthern :atFh 21: ³initiall\ 2peration 3roYide &omfort 23& ³laXnFhed from the TXrNish territories the &entral IraTi *oY- ernment &I* had to Fease its tight militar\ grip oYer northern IraT 5egional poZer YaFXXm Zas filled b\ emergent .Xrdish groXps :ithoXt fXrther ado “the embr\o of a .Xrdish state” has been soZn b\ .Xrdistan 'emoFratiF 3art\ .'3 and 3atriotiF 8nion of .Xrdis- tan 38. %esides the region had tXrned oXt to be a safe haYen for the 3.. terrorist aFtiYities %etZeen 99 and 993 “the 3.. Zas to find it easier than eYer before to operate from northern IraT”7 TXrNe\ FoXld not breaN the Fross-border impasse b\ onl\ resorting to militar\ poZer As 3resident TXrgXt g]al saZ the militar\ solXtion Zas not in the offing on both sides of the border +enFe he opted for politiFal-eFonomiF measXres in dealing Zith northern IraT8 In )ebrXar\ 993 TXrNe\·s %aghdad (mbass\ Zas re-opened Then the tZo Fapitals Zere FontinXoXsl\ Yisited b\ YarioXs delegations9 In this period TXrNish-IraTi relations displa\ed a retXrn toZards the seFXrit\ Fooperation disFoXrse 7 Philip Robins, “The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue,” International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4, 1993, p. 674. 8 Tarık Oğuzlu, “Turkey’s Northern Iraq Policy: Competing Perspectives,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2008, p. 10. 9 Robert Olson, “The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Foreign Policy, 1991-1995: From the Gulf War to the Incursion into Iraq,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, Fall 1995, pp. 13- 14. See also Gül İnanç, Türk Diplomasisinde Irak (1978-1997), (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008), pp. 104-107. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 90 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma Returning to Security Cooperation Discourse g]al engaged Zith the leaders of .'3 and 38. 0asoXd %ar]ani and &elal Talabani %\ doing so he attempted to driYe the head of 3.. AbdXllah gFalan toZards a Feasefire ZhiFh ZoXld be de- Flared as of 0arFh 993 After the sXdden death of g]al on 7 April 993 the Feasefire Zas pXt on a baFNbXrner The Nilling of 33 TXrNish arm\ reFrXits in the 3.. ambXsh broNe the Feasefire on 0a\ 993 In almost rest of the 99·s the TXrNish arm\ had sXs- tained its Xpper hand in national seFXrit\ and foreign poliF\ maNing proFesses TXrNe\ Zas driYen toZards more militaril\ oriented poli- Fies partiFXlarl\ in northern IraT &onseTXentl\ this state of mind led TXrNe\ to enhanFe its seFXrit\ Fooperation Zith Iran and S\ria After the trilateral meeting held in 'amasFXs on 3 AXgXst 993 TXrNish Iranian and S\rian foreign ministers “e[pressed their Xnal- terable opposition to the fragmentation of IraT” presXmabl\ b\ the 8S The fear of IraT·s partition proYoNed “the SqYres s\ndrome”3 This age-old phobia has Freated haYoF in TXrNish domestiF and foreign poliF\ Xp Xntil the FaptXring of gFalan in 9994 2n the other hand FonseFXtiYe TXrNish goYernments inFlXding the one led b\ 1eFmettin (rbaNan in 99 alloZed the 8S Air )orFe Xnits³stationed in TXrNe\³to FontinXe their operation 1orthern :atFh oYer northern IraT b\ Xsing the air spaFe of TXrNe\ The e[istenFe of northern-no-fl\-]one gaYe a free hand to the TXrNish militar\ to deYise intermittent operations against the 3.. strong- holds in northern IraT 3arado[iFall\ hoZeYer IraTi territor\ in the 10 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No.1, Winter 1997, pp. 68-72. See also Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “Orta Doğu’yla İlişkiler, 1990-2001,” in Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Cilt II: 1980-2001), 10th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), pp. 557, 558. 11 İlhan Uzgel, “Ordu Dış Politikanın Neresinde?,” in Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu (eds.), Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye’de Ordu, (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2004), pp. 311-318. See also Erol Kurubaş, “Etnik Sorun-Dış Politika İlişkisi Bağlamında Kürt Sorununun Türk Dış Politikasına Etkileri,” Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi, Vol. 8, No.1, 2009, pp. 39-69. 12 Olson, “The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Foreign Policy, 1991-1995: From the Gulf War to the Incursion into Iraq”, op.cit., 5. 13 Dietrich Jung, “The Sevres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and its Historical Legacies,” in Bjørn Møller (ed.), Oil & Water: Cooperative Security in the Persian Gulf, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers 2001), pp. 131-159. The republished version of this chapter was accessible http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_07-09/jung_sevres/ jung_sevres.html (accessed 25 March 2010). 14 Baskın Oran, “Dönemin Bilançosu, 1990-2001,” in Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt II), p. 219, 235, 236. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 91 Mehmet Akif Kumral north of the thirt\ si[th parallel ZhiFh Zas dominated b\ the .Xrd- ish popXlation beFame more aXtonomoXs The aXtonom\ might be regarded as a step toZards federal statXs %\ 99 the TXrNish *eneral Staff T*S Zas designated as the Foordinating institXtion for TXrNe\·s northern IraT poliF\ In the same \ear the former &hief of T*S retired *eneral 1eFip TorXmta\ argXed that the 3.. presenFe and the proto-federation of .Xrds in northern IraT ZoXld Freate serioXs seFXrit\ problems and so- Fial reperFXssions for TXrNe\ In this regard TorXmta\ proposed a three-fold strateg\ elimination of the 3.. proteFtion of the IraTi territorial integrit\ normali]ation of politiFal-eFonomiF relations7 This three-tiered strateg\ more or less defined the parameters of TXrNe\·s IraT poliF\ Xp Xntil the 8S inYasion It seems that the so- Falled ¶red lines· oXtlined b\ the TXrNish 0inistr\ of )oreign Affairs 0)A long before the IraT Zar Zas an e[tension of this strateg\ The red lines Zere aboXt the establishment of an independent .Xrd- ish state in northern IraT8 the statXs of .irNXN and 0osXl and the safet\ of TXrNmen popXlation liYing in IraT Moving towards the Invasion :hen the -XstiFe and 'eYelopment 3art\ A.3A. 3A5Ti9 Fame to poZer on 3 1oYember IraT Zar Zas still at the top of 8S foreign poliF\ agenda As of 3 'eFember the 8S 'epXt\ SeFretar\ of 'efense 3aXl :olfoZit] and 8nder SeFretar\ of State 15 İlhan Uzgel, “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler,” in Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt II), p. 265, 266. See also Michael Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey, (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 53. 16 İlhan Uzgel, “Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele”, in İlhan Uzgel and Bülent Duru, (eds.), AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2009), p. 373. Uzgel cites Fikret Bila, “Özel Siyaset Belgesi ve Rumsfeld,” Milliyet, 20 July 2003. See also Uzgel, “Ordu Dış Politikanın Neresinde?”, p. 314. 17 Necip Torumtay, Değişen Stratejilerin Odağında Türkiye, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1996), pp. 58-60, 226-232, 242-251. 18 Baskın Oran, “Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği,” in Baskın Oran, (ed.), “Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Cilt I: 1919-1980), 14th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), p. 26. Oran quotes from an official MFA report, which was leaked to Cumhuriyet on 13 May 2001. 19 Throughout the article, AKP (common scholarly reference) and AK PARTi (institutional reference) are taken as co-acronyms of the Justice and Development Party. For the institu- tional reference, see “AK PARTi Kurum Kimliği Klavuzu (2006),” http://www.akparti.org. tr/AKPARTi%20Kurumsal.pdf (accessed 24 March 2008). 20 Raymond Hinnebusch and Rick Fawn (eds.), The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences, (Boul- der, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 92 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma 0arF *rossman Zere in AnNara The\ had talNs Zith 3rime 0inis- ter AbdXllah *l This Zas the first offiFial meeting Zhen the 8S side offered a militar\ Fooperation plan ZhiFh inYolYed three inFre- mental stages ie “site inspeFtion site preparation and aFtXal op- eration” %oth sides agreed to go Zith the plan 2n 'eFember A.3 leader 5eFep Ta\\ip (rdoĊan Yisited the :hite +oXse 'Xring the Yisit (rdoĊan hinted the serioXs prediFament for the 8S Foalition bXilding efforts 3artiFipation of regional Arab-0Xslim FoXntries liNe SaXdi Arabia (g\pt S\ria and -ordan Zas deemed important b\ (rdoĊan :hile A.3 offiFials Zent on negotiating Zith the 8S TXrNish peo- ple b\ and large Zere getting Zar\ aboXt the sitXation Almost 9 perFent of TXrNish pXbliF Zas opposing to an\ Nind of Zar against IraT A.3 Zas Zedged betZeen enormoXs 8S pressXre and rising popXlar opposition )or A.3 8S politiFal and eFonomiF sXpport Zas FrXFial Total debt Zas aroXnd billion dollars International 0onetar\ )Xnd I0) program had to be sXstained A.3 goYern- ment needed 8S finanFial and diplomatiF sXpport Therefore it FoXld not reMeFt 8S Zar demands in an open and more direFt Za\ Ignoring domestiF pXbliF opinion ZoXld also be too Fostl\3 ThXs A.3 opted for FontinXation of statXs TXo and bX\ some time 3rime 0inister AbdXllah *l 0inister of )oreign Affairs 21 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 87, 88. See also Yetkin, Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü, pp.,99-105. 22 Yetkin, Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü, p. 109. 23 Meliha Altunışık, “Turkey’s Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond,”Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, August 2006, pp. 187-189. Altunışık provides a long list including Washington’s overtly ambitious demands from Ankara. Among those demands most significant were opening of several air bases and seaports without any notification requirement, deployment of 120,000 US and British combat troops, troop contribution of around 35,000 to 40,000. In exchange, the US offered six billion dollars in aid, in addition to some 26 billion dollars in loan guarantees. 24 Nuri Yeşilyurt, “Orta Doğu’yla İlişkiler,” in Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Cilt III: 2001-2012), (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), pp. 405, 406. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 93 Mehmet Akif Kumral FolXmnist of pro-goYernment dail\ *iYen his intelleFtXal Fredentials 'aYXtoĊlX FoXld Zell be re- garded as the master mind Zho had been tr\ing to orFhestrate A.3·s foreign poliF\ maNing proFess behind the sFenes 'aYXtoĊlX strongl\ opposed TXrNe\·s FonFrete FontribXtion to and direFt in- YolYement into the Zar The 8S Zar against IraT FoXld not serYe TXrNe\·s oZn interests7 1onetheless A.3 goYernment did not haYe the ZhereZithal to thZart Zar ambitions of the %Xsh admin- istration against the Saddam regime The Xnfolding of eYents also reiterated the faFt that AnNara FoXld not preYent the Zar betZeen :ashington and %aghdad Therefore TXrNe\·s state politiFal-mili- tar\ bXreaXFraF\ sided Zith the idea of opening the northern front Their deFision Zas based on seFXrit\ reasons liNe eliminating the 3.. threat and balanFing the .Xrdish ambitions in northern IraT8 +oZeYer 3resident Ahmet 1eFdet Se]er tooN a normatiYe stanFe and argXed for a mXltilateral militar\ aFtion onl\ if it is based on in- ternational legitimaF\ T*S also ZoXld haYe preferred to aFt on the basis of a 81 mandate or some Nind of a 1AT2 Xmbrella or eYen a regional initiatiYe These options Zaned b\ the end of -anXar\ 3 Zhen signifiFant amoXnt of 8S and %ritish troops Fompleted their deplo\ment into the 3ersian *Xlf9 To a Fertain e[tent it Zas seFXrit\ interests that had driYen A.3 toZards Fooperation Zith the 8S for pre-Zar arrangements ie site sXrYe\ and base moderni]ation 2n )ebrXar\ 3 the first mo- tion Zas passed Zith a 38 to 93 margin A.3 sXffered 3 against 25 Yetkin, Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü, 113. 26 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001). 27 Gürkan Zengin, Hoca: Türk Dış Politikası’nda “Davutoğlu Etkisi, (İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitapevi, 2010), p. 142, 143. Gürkan Zengin, Editör Programı, CNN Türk, 12 February 2002. This interview was reprinted in Ahmet Davutoğlu, Küresel Bunalım:11 Eylül Konuşmaları, ed. Faruk Deniz, 14th ed., (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2013), pp. 197-207. See also Derya Sazak, “Sohbet Odası,” Milliyet, 13 January 2003. This interview is reprinted in Ahmet Davutoğlu, Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar, eds. Semih Atiş-Sevinç Alkan Öz- can, 2nd ed., (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2013), pp. 89-94. 28 Fikret Bilâ, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları: Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Gizli Belgelerle 1 Mart Tezkeresi, (İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2007), pp. 160-165, 277-279, 283-307. Deniz Bölükbaşı, 1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası, (İstanbul: Doğan Yayıncılık), pp. 36-51. 29 Mim Kemal Öke, Derviş ve Komutan: Özgürlük-Güvenlik Sarkacındaki Türkiye’nin Kimlik Sorunsalı, (İstanbul: Alfa, 2004), pp. 360-369. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 94 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma Yotes from its oZn ranNs3 'espite strategiF interests and militar\ Fonsiderations the sitXation in northern IraT Zas also a matter of identit\ for A.3 offiFials As the leader of A.3 (rdoĊan artiFXlated a dXal position in mid-)ebrXar\ 3 (Yen thoXgh he Zas morall\ against the Zar the goYernment ZoXld do ZhateYer neFessar\ in order to proteFt TXrNe\·s interests :hile dealing Zith the issXe of Zar in IraT he opted for a mi[ed approaFh in order to aFhieYe eFo- nomiF and seFXrit\ interests ZithoXt frXstrating soFio-politiFal and ethno-religioXs FonFerns3 3resident Se]er·s normatiYe attitXde beFame inflXential dXring the 1ational SeFXrit\ &oXnFil 1S& meetings inFlXding the last one on 8 )ebrXar\ 3 1S& did not taNe an\ binding deFision and did not reFommend an\ speFifiF FoXrse of aFtion either The seF- ond motion ZhiFh ZoXld YirtXall\ open Xp the northern front Zas Yoted on 0arFh 3 2f 33 parliamentarians in that session 9 abstained and Yoted against the motion The nXmber of adYoFates reaFhed 4 bXt fell short of meeting the FonstitXtional reTXirement of 8 In a sense the motion Frisis marNed the Ne\ moment after ZhiFh TXrNe\·s disFXrsiYe framings began to shape the episodiF middle The ne[t part helps sXbstantiating this point 3DUW7ZR (SLVRGLF0LGGOH 'LVFXUVLYH)UDPLQJVRI 1RQ&RRSHUDWLRQ 3rime 0inister 5eFep Ta\\ip (rdoĊan read his goYernment pro- gram on 9 0arFh 3 The program stipXlated that TXrNe\·s poliF\ toZards the IraTi problem Zas rationali]ed aroXnd politiFal militar\ and eFonomiF interests 3roteFtion of interests Zas the most salient politiFal frame At this point the neZ goYernment Zas read\ if not eager to reneZ the seFond motion 1o sooner had the 8S 3resident *eorge : %Xsh deFlared 48 hoXrs XltimatXm³for Saddam +Xssein and his sons 8da\ and .Xsa\ to leaYe IraT³the IstanbXl stoFN-e[Fhange faFed a sharp deFline )inanFial Follapse of 7 0arFh 3 Zas Falled as “the %laFN 0onda\”3 In order to eliminate the Yolatilit\ in domestiF marNet the third motion had to be passed eYen before the neZ goYernment ZoXld seeN the Yote of 30 Yetkin, Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü, pp. 116-119, 128-130, 149. See also Öke, Derviş ve Komutan, pp. 187-189. 31 Altunışık, “Turkey’s Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond”, p. 189, 195. 32 “Küresel Kriz Çıkar,” “Piyasalar Sakin,” “Borsa Normale Döndü,” http://yenisafak.com.tr/ Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/ (accessed 26 March 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 95 Mehmet Akif Kumral FonfidenFe on 3 0arFh 3 1otZithstanding the domestiF pXb- liF opinion33 the A.3 offiFials Zere Fertain that this time the motion Zith the minor Fhanges onl\ in its Zording FoXld be approYed b\ the maMorit\ of A.3 depXties34 Sta\ing oXt of the game in northern IraT seemed to be too risN\ for AnNara +enFe the TXrNish diplo- maF\ Nept open its FontaFt Fhannels Zith almost all pla\ers of the Foming Zar in IraT In this regard the indispensabilit\ of TXrNe\ for the 8S Zar effort Zas one of the maMor frames deplo\ed b\ TXrNish poliF\ and opinion maNers Deployment of Indispensability Theses )ehmi .orX Taha .×Yano argXed that “all of the 8S Zar plans de- pend on the opening of a front in the north ie in TXrNe\ :ash- ington does not haYe a 3lan % if it does 3lan % as Zell as 3lan & inFlXded TXrNe\” As AnNara tooN a toXgher line against Moining the Zar diplomatiF position of the 8S espeFiall\ in the 81 platform had been ZeaNened In faFt this Zas the seFond thesis of .×Yano The third thesis Zas bXilt on the first and the seFond :ithoXt the 81 blessing and the TXrNish sXpport “the 8S FoXld do nothing” to instigate an illegitimate Zar3 /iNe .×Yano TXrNe\·s former 0inister of )oreign Affairs 33 “Halk, Irak’a Saldırısında ABD ile İşbirliği İstemiyor”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/ Mart/19/e4.html (accessed 26 March 2012). 34 Nevzat Demirkol-Bilal Çetin, “Hükümet Tezkereden Emin”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Ar- siv/2003/Mart/19/p5.html; Veli Toprak, “ABD’nin ‘Mali’ Baskısı Tezkereyi Erkene Aldırdı”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/p7.html (accessed 26 March 2012). 35 Taha Kıvanç, “Savaş Üzerine Tezler”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/tkivanc. html (accessed 26 March 2012). 36 “Kuzey Cephesiz Olmaz”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/; “ABD Kuzeye Mahkum”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/p2.html (accessed on 26 March 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 96 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma .×Yano also reiterated that eFonomiF doZntXrn FoXld not proYide a good e[FXse for the A.3 goYernment to inFline toZards a pro-Zar stanFe TXrNe\ shoXld not be a FoXntr\ that appeared to “FoXnt mone\ as a FaXse of Zar”37 .×Yano·s negatiYe framing of 8S eFo- nomiF assistanFe Zas almost eFhoed b\ 3rime 0inister (rdoĊan At his first in-FoXntr\ Yisit in dorXm he asserted that the\ did not “speaN >in terms of finanFial@ nXmbers” Zith the 8S “1oZ all of oXr FalFXlation is politiFal and militar\” :ith regard to the neZ motion there is no “XnFertaint\” TZo things haYe been Flarified )irst and foremost the motion ZoXld alloZ “the entr\ of TXrNish militar\ into northern IraT” SeFondl\ “the air Forridor oYer flights ” ZoXld be opened for the 8S Zar planes38 In a sense framing of the third mo- tion demonstrated AnNara·s disFXrsiYe desire to FonstrXFt reasons for re-entering into northern IraT Constructing Reasons for Re-Entering into Northern Iraq *l and the 8S SeFretar\ of State &olin 3oZell made it Flear that eFonomiF dimension of the TXrNish-8S bilateral negotiations almost Follapsed 2n the other hand the 8S goYernment remained TXite FondXFiYe to AnNara·s politiFal-militar\ demands ie the stationing of TXrNish troops in northern IraT and the aFFeptanFe of TXrNmen as FonstitXent elements of IraT TXrNish soldiers Zere e[peFted to “enter into IraT as part of international Foalition” Xnder the leader- ship of “TXrNish Fommander” In e[Fhange the TXrNish goYernment agreed to proYide air aFFess for transit pXrposes39 AFFording to TXrNe\·s 3resident Ahmet 1eFdet Se]er the “proFess” at the 81 SeFXrit\ &oXnFil had to be finali]ed :ithoXt the FonFlXsion of that proFess the 8S tooN a “Xnilateral” aFtion +e reasserted that the 8S deFision to Zage Zar against IraT Zas not “right”4 1onethe- less the motion that handed aXthorit\ to the goYernment for si[ months Zas aFFepted b\ the 3arliament The motion inFlXded the opening of TXrNish airspaFe to the foreign read 8S militar\ forFes and the sending of TXrNish troops to FontingenFies in abroad read 37 Taha Kıvanç, “Savaşa Yuvarlanıyor muyuz?”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/ tkivanc.html (accessed 26 March 2012). 38 “Erdoğan: ABD ile Para Konuşmuyoruz”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/ politika.html; Veli Toprak, “ABD ile Anlaşma Sadece Siyasî ve Askerî”, http://yenisafak. com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/ (accessed 26 March 2012). 39 “Powell’dan Çirkin Oyun”, “Powell’den Çirkin Diplomasi,” “Tezkere Genişleyebilir”, http:// yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/ (accessed 26 March 2012). 40 “ABD’nin Savaş Kararı Doğru Değil”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/politika. html (accessed 26 March 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 97 Mehmet Akif Kumral northern IraT Among the present 3 depXties abstained and Yoted against The motion passed Zith 3 Yotes The nXmber of defeFtors among the A.3 Zas aroXnd %oth (rdoĊan and *l pXt personal pressXre on their oZn ranNs to Neep the impaFt of de- feFtions at a marginal leYel This time their argXments might haYe seemed to be more FonYinFing (rdoĊan asserted that TXrNe\ had done its best for peaFe As he pXt the aFFeptanFe of motion Zas a reTXirement Zith regard to enhanFement of border seFXrit\ b\ the TXrNish Armed )orFes and sXstenanFe of good relations Zith the 8S4 The 8S sXpport for the eFonom\ Zas still FritiFal espeFiall\ in terms of managing the I0) program 'Xe to the IraTi Frisis ad- ditional eFonomiF measXres had to be taNen4 The motion had passed eYen before the 0emorandXm of 8nder- standing 0o8 Zas drafted The first 0o8 for the site sXrYe\s and base moderni]ations Zas signed and pXt into effeFt %ased on a fXll-sFale militar\ Fooperation inFlXding the Xse of TXrNish air spaFe the seFond 0o8 Zas drafted and negotiated 1eYertheless it Zas not signed dXe to the reMeFtion of the seFond motion To delineate neZ modalities of Fooperation 5obert 3earson the 8S Ambassador in AnNara and 8ĊXr =i\al 8nderseFretar\ of the TXrN- ish 0)A started a neZ roXnd of talNs43 In starN Fontrast to the *Xlf :ar TXrNe\ deFided not to Flose the .irNXN- 41 “Tezkere Kabul Edildi”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/politika.html; Bilal Çetin-Veli Toprak, “1 Milyar Dolarlık Teklif”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/ p2.html (accessed 26 March 2012). 42 “Millî Direniş”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/e2.html; Hüseyin Özay, “Ek Tedbirler Alacağız”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/ekonomi.html (accessed 26 March 2012). 43 Kaan İpekçioğlu, “Mutabakat Sözde Kaldı”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/ p4.html; “İngiliz ‘Hava’ Peşinde”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/p5.html (ac- cessed 26 March 2012). 44 “Yumurtalık’tan Petrol Sevkiyatı Devam Ediyor”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/ mart/21/e7.html (accessed 26 March 2012). 45 “Türkiye’yle Dostuz Ama...”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/p6.html; Kaan İpekçioğlu, “Ankara’da Türkmen ve Asker Pazarlığı”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/ Mart/19/p6.html (accessed 26 March 2012). . 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 98 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma As of 3 0arFh 3 the statXs of TXrNe\·s militar\ inYolYement in northern IraT has \et to be Foordinated Zith the 8S4 )or the 8S side the piFtXre Zas slightl\ different The 8S 3resident %Xsh aFNnoZledged that “FXrrentl\ TXrNs had no reason to enter into northern IraT :e are Neeping Xp Fonstant FontaFt Zith the TXrNish arm\ as Zell as the TXrNish politiFians The\ NnoZ oXr poliF\ This is a striFt poliF\ :e haYe told Flearl\ that Ze e[peFted them not to enter into northern IraT The\ NnoZ that Ze ZorN together Zith the .Xrds in order to preYent an\ inFident that ZoXld Freate a prete[t for >the TXrNish@ entr\ into northern IraT”47 TXrNe\·s insistenFe on re-entr\ into northern IraT broXght serioXs ramifiFations An intense international pressXre has been moXnted against TXrNe\·s entr\ into northern IraT not onl\ b\ the 8S bXt also b\ the (8 In order to address the disinformation in the international media T*S issXed a pXbliF statement to e[plain the realit\ on the groXnd The international neZs that Flaimed aroXnd one thoXsand TXrNish soldiers· entr\ into northern IraT Zas farfetFhed48 In addition to the rising of international tensions AnNara·s relations Zith %aghdad Zere also at risN The IraTi 0inister of )oreign Affairs 1aFi Sabri stated that “TXrNe\·s assistanFe to the 8S-led Zar ZoXld giYe a great damage to the >bilateral@ relations«:e hope that oXr TXrNish neighbors ZoXld reali]e Zhat their real interests are :ho- eYer attempts to giYe damage to IraT ZoXld >inadYertentl\@ inFXr a hXge damage on itself”49 2n 0arFh 3 the 8S began to Xse the TXrNish airspaFe in order to transport troops into northern IraT TXrNe\·s permission Zas TXite important for the 8S Zar effort 1eYertheless the 8S 46 “Gül: ABD ile Görüşmeler Sürüyor”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/24/p3.html (accessed 26 March 2012). 47 “Bush: Türkiye’nin K.Irak’a Girmesi İçin Bir Gerekçe Yok”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/ar- siv/2003/mart/24/dunya.html (accessed 26 March 2012). 48 “Dünya ABD’yi Bıraktı Türkiye’yi Tartışıyor”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/23/ politika.html (accessed 26 March 2012). 49 “Irak: Türkiye’nin ABD’ye Desteği İlişkileri Zedeler”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/ mart/24/politika.html (accessed 26 March 2012). 50 “Türkiye’nin Zaten K.Irak’ta Askeri Var”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/ p3.html (accessed 14 April 2012). 51 “B Planı Bozgunu Bush’u Madara Etti”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/29/poli- tika.html (accessed 15 April 2012); “Ensar’a İki Cepheden Saldırı”, http://yenisafak.com. tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/dunya.html (accessed 14 April 2012); “Amerika ve Kürtler Ensar’a Saldırıyor”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/27/d3.html (accessed 15 April 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 99 Mehmet Akif Kumral side Zas against TXrNe\·s Xnilateral militar\ aFtions in northern IraT These aFtions shoXld not giYe the “impression of oFFXpation” This Zas the FrXFial prediFament FaXsing ambigXit\ in AnNara 0ore than an\thing the disFXrsiYe ambiYalenFe refleFted the limi- nal meaning of &oalition for TXrNe\ Discursive Meaning of the Coalition AmbiYalent pXbliF statements on the issXe of entering into north- ern IraT began to Fhallenge the Fredibilit\ of the A.3 goYernment ThXs *l had felt the need to aFNnoZledge that their pXbliF e[pla- nations Zere trXe and “all of them haYe to be belieYed 2n this issXe >of entering into northern IraT@ of FoXrse TXrNe\ Zill itself taNe the deFision it needs :ithin Zar Fonditions it is onl\ natXral that Ze haYe been in Foordination Zith oXr allies” The opening of TXrNish airspaFe Zas aimed to “bXild peaFe proYide seFXrit\ and preYent threatening postXres” %ased on three intentions ie border seFX- rit\ against terrorist infiltrations Fontrol of mass migration and hX- manitarian assistanFe TXrNe\ might deFide to enter into northern IraT AnNara had no desire for anne[ation AFFording to *l the *oYernment had been pXrsXing an aFtiYe poliF\ in line Zith “na- tional interests” rather than passiYel\ ZatFhing the deYelopments Xnfolded in the region and the globe :ith this poliF\ TXrNe\ as- sXmed “a Fentral position”3 In faFt TXrNe\ had Zanted to reinforFe its militar\ presenFe alread\ e[isting in northern IraT4 Xnder the prete[t of the preYention of ter- ror and the Fontrol of mass migration 1eYertheless AnNara·s inten- tions toZards northern IraT haYe been targeted b\ the international media &ornered b\ international media allegations and politiFal pressXre the TXrNish 0)A assXred the (8 1AT2 and Arab /eagXe members that TXrNe\ has “no intention of militar\ interferenFe” or interYention into northern IraT “other than the aims of preYention of hXmanitarian disaster>s@ and hXmanitarian assistanFe” 52 “ABD: Girin Ama İşgal Görüntüsü Vermeyin”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/ politika.html; “Kuzey İçin Pazarlık”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/index. html (accessed 14 April 2012). 53 “Gül: K.Irak Kararını Türkiye Verir”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/26/p8.html (accessed 14 April 2012); “Gül: Gayet Açık Söyledik”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/ Mart/27/p2.html; “Gül’den AB’ye: Niye Heyecanlanıyorsunuz?”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/ arsiv/2003/mart/29/p4.html (accessed 15 April 2012). 54 See İlhan Uzgel, “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler,” in Türk Dış Politikası III, p. 277. 55 “AB’nin Kriterler[i] Türkiye İçin Geçerli”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/26/ p6.html (accessed 14 April 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 100 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma )or either seFXrit\ or hXmanitarian reasons the TXrNish side Zant- ed to preserYe reinforFe militar\ presenFe in northern IraT At the same time AnNara insisted that their Xnits remain oXtside of &oali- tion Fontrol and henFe had to be Fommanded b\ a TXrNish general In order to address the disinformation Fampaign in the 8S media the TXrNish side assXred that the TXrNish militar\ ZoXld not be a forFe of oFFXpation in northern IraT and sta\ there Xntil the Fomple- tion of their designated mission 1onetheless the TXrNish goYernment remained FaXtioXs in order not to giYe the impression of an opportXnist FoXntr\ *l aFNnoZl- edged that “on the issXe of proteFting IraT·s territorial integrit\” TXr- Ne\ has been “the most sensitiYe FoXntr\” )rom the Yer\ oXtset AnNara has pXrsXed a Flear poliF\ toZards northern IraT TZo Fon- ditions³the deYelopment of mass migration and the rise of 3.. terrorist aFtiYities in Fross-border areas³Zere set to assess the need for TXrNish militar\ interYention As of that da\ the goYern- ment Zas in a better position to looN after three maMor priorities &ontrar\ to the general presXmptions relations Zith the 8S Zere deYeloping SeFondl\ TXrNe\ managed to remain oXt of the Zar 0ost importantl\ the TXrNish eFonom\ Zas Nept to float on a right traFN7 /iNe *l (rdoĊan e[pressed his Fontent Zith TXrNe\·s IraT poliF\ 'espite all goYernmental efforts AnNara FoXld not preYent the on- set of Zar 1onetheless the three motions Zere not issXed to giYe sXpport to the initiation of Zar Those motions Zere reTXirements emanating from “the allianFe relations of oXr state and oXr >national@ seFXrit\” In this regard the A.3 goYernment did not fall into a dXal trap 2n one side it did not aFFept to taNe a pro-Zar stanFe MXst for the saNe of mone\ 2n the other side it did not aFt against the Zorld realities )aFed Zith this doXble-sided trap the goYernment Zas driYen toZards politiFal and militar\ rather than eFonomiF pri- orities As enYisioned b\ (rdoĊan TXrNe\·s approaFh to the IraT problem Zas mXlti-dimensional TXrNe\ has not had an intention to 56 “Mehmetçiğin Komutası Görüşmeleri Kilitledi”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/ Mart/26/politika.html (accessed 14 April 2012). See also “Zalmay Halilzad Kürt Grupları İkna Edecek”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/27/p7.html (accessed 15 April 2012). 57 Mustafa Karaalioğlu, “AB Bize Söylüyor ABD’ye İşittiriyor”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/ar- siv/2003/mart/30/p2.html (accessed 15 April 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 101 Mehmet Akif Kumral oFFXp\ or anne[ northern IraT8 TXrNe\·s militar\ goal FoXld onl\ be threat preYention not oFFXpation As for the post-Zar IraT (rdoĊan disFlosed TXrNe\·s desire for “bXilding of peaFe and free and demo- FratiF goYernment” +e seemed ZishfXl to restore good eFonomiF relations Zith TXrNe\·s longtime seFond largest trading partner9 %\ helping to end the Zar the A.3 goYernment ZoXld FontribXte to preYent more bloodletting and henFe more losses in hXman liYes 3rime 0inister (rdoĊan sXFFinFtl\ framed TXrNe\·s preFarioXs straddle betZeen Zar and peaFe “TXrNe\ together Zith the 8S³its strategiF partner and more than fift\ \ears old all\³is determined to maintain Flose Fooperation in order to proYide peaFe and dXra- ble stabilit\ in the region *l and 3oZell reYerberated “TXrNe\ has been in the &oalition” All of the logistiFal aid ZoXld be proYided Xnder “the gXise of hX- manitarian assistanFe” (rdoĊan pXbliFl\ e[plained that arms and ammXnition FoXld not be inFlXded into the logistiFal sXpport *l e[plained that “TXrNe\ is not a belligerent FoXntr\ ZhiFh had en- tered >and@ has been aFtiYel\ FontribXting to the Zar TXrNe\ is not in the Zar TXrNe\ does not giYe aFtiYe sXpport to the Zar”3 .orX argXed that the emphasis on TXrNe\·s being in the &oalition implied A.3 goYernment·s inFlination for finding a better plaFe in post-Saddam regional designs In his Zording “the FonFept of ¶&oalition· Farries this Nind of meaning” Another strong signal of being inside the &oalition Zas the goYernment·s latest deFision 58 “Tuzaklara Düşmedik”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/30/politika.html (accessed 15 April 2012). 59 “Avrupa’ya K.Irak Mesajı”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/31/politika.html (ac- cessed on 15 April 2012). See also “Erdoğan Wall Street Journal’e Makale Yazdı”, http:// yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/01/p8.html (accessed 15 April 2012). 60 Fehmi Koru, “Savaş Üzerine Düşünceler...”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/01/ fkoru.html (accessed 15 April 2012). 61 “Erdoğan Wall Street Journal’e Makale Yazdı”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Ni- san/01/p8.html (accessed 15 April 2012). 62 Veli Toprak-Bilal Çetin, “Musul ve Kerkük’e Kimse Göz Dikmesin” http://yenisafak.com. tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/03/p2.html; “Halilzad’ın Görevi Ankara’yı Oyalamak” http://yenisafak. com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/01/p7.html (accessed 15 April 2012). 63 “Savaşın İçinde Değiliz”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/05/p4.html (accessed 20 April 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 102 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma to deport three IraTi diplomats from TXrNe\4 This eYent almost Fame toZards the fall of %aghdad 2n 9 April 3 the 8S forFes “reaFhed )irdos 3aradise STXare dominated b\ one of the man\ statXes of Saddam +Xssein«The fall of the Saddam statXe on 9 April teleYised aFross the Zorld Zas taNen b\ its media to marN the fall of the Saddam rpgime” The reperFXssions of Saddam·s fall for TXrNe\·s IraT poliF\ disFoXrse are anal\]ed in part three 3DUW7KUHH (SLVRGLF(QG &RQWH[WXDO'\QDPLFVRI &RPSUHKHQVLYH&RRSHUDWLRQ In the aftermath of Zar regime Fhange did oFFXr in IraT 3arado[i- Fall\ hoZeYer IraT tXrned into a failed state liYing on the Yerge of YirtXal FiYil Zar 3artiFXlarl\ Fentral and soXthern areas of IraT Zere draZn into Fhaos The Fomplete Follapse of seFXrit\ institXtions paYed the Za\ for seFtarian ethno-religioXs strife and henFe mili- tant insXrgenF\7 8nder FhaotiF FirFXmstanFes 38. and .'3 folloZed a proYoNing poliF\ As earl\ as April 3 the .Xrdish militias began loot- ing first in the oil-riFh Fit\ of .irNXN and later in 0osXl The alarm bells began to ring for the national seFXrit\ establishment in TXrNe\ AnNara Zas Xtterl\ distXrbed b\ the enhanFed militar\ Foopera- tion betZeen the 8S and the .Xrdish groXps in northern IraT The “hood inFident” of 4 -Xl\ 3 has added an insXlt to the inMXr\ 8 2n the same da\ SXle\mani\ah based TXrNmen politiFal and FXl- tXral institXtions Zere also targeted 'etained TXrNish soldiers Zere interrogated for fift\ fiYe hoXrs in %aghdad 8pon 3rime 0inister 64 Fehmi Koru, “Koalisyon Üyesi”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/06/fkoru.html; “Iraklı 3 Diplomat Sınırdışı Ediliyor”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/06/ p4.html; “Dışişleri’nde Delil Var!”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/07/p4.html (accessed 21 April 2012). 65 “Bağdat Boşalıyor”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/07/g7.html; “Bağdat Direni- yor”, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/07/dunya.html (accessed 21 April 2012). 66 John Keegan, The Iraq War, (NY: Vintage Books, 2005), pp. 201- 202. See also “İşgalciler Bağdat’ta” http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/10/d2.html (accessed 21 April 2012). 67 Keegan, The Iraq War, pp. 204-212. 68 As acknowledged by the Chief of TGS General Hilmi Özkök, the “hood incident” consti- tuted an unforgettable event for the Turkish Armed Forces. It was a deliberate act committed by “friendly and allied” US forces against a Turkish military unit stationed in northern Iraq. The incident was provocative since Turkey’s 3 officers and 8 non-commissioned officers were taken into custody just like insurgents. Detention measures were quite unprecedented and disturbing, went as far to put hoods onto the heads of Turkish soldiers. See Bilâ, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları, pp. 233-246. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 103 Mehmet Akif Kumral (rdoĊan·s reTXest from 8S 9iFe 3resident &hene\ TXrNish soldiers Zere released9 SinFe .Xrdish aggressions haYe not been preYented 38. and .'3 Fame Flose to anne[ .irNXN b\ the beginning of 4 “The issXe Zas at the top of TXrNe\·s agenda dXring the -anXar\ 4 high leYel Yisit to :ashington 3rime 0inister (rdoĊan Zarned the .Xrds not to pla\ Zith fire”7 3olitiFal-militar\ an[iet\ has risen after Zhen the 3.. terrorist organi]ation began to reinforFe its strong- holds in northern IraT and began to target seFXrit\ forFes in TXr- Ne\ :ithoXt loFal sXpport from the .Xrdish aXthorities this region FoXld not be a safe haYen for the 3.. %etZeen and 7 the deepening relationship betZeen 3.. .'3 and 38. Zas perFeiYed as a serioXs threat for seFXrit\ interests of TXrNe\ The disFXrsiYe position of AnNara indiFated a dXal desire ie FondXFt of Fross- border operations into northern IraT and to a lesser e[tent gradXal reneZal of bilateral Fooperation Zith %aghdad Cross-Border Operations and Renewal of Bilateral Cooperation 'Xring the politiFal Fampaign for the general eleFtions of -Xl\ 7 the FondXFt of Fross-border operations beFame a dominant theme 2n 3 -Xne 7 3rime 0inister (rdoĊan e[plained that the primaF\ shoXld be giYen to militar\ operations inside the bor- ders The eleFtion resXlts shoZed that A.3 read the soFio-politiFal FirFXmstanFes TXite Zell In eastern and soXth eastern eleFtoral distriFts Zhile the independents sXpported b\ 'T3 'emoFrat- iF SoFiet\ 3art\ reFeiYed almost perFent of the Yotes A.3·s perFentage Zas aroXnd %ehind the eleFtoral sXFFess of A.3 (rdoĊan·s politiFal disFoXrse beFame TXite inflXential7 In this re- gard (rdoĊan·s 'i\arbaN×r speeFh on AXgXst has to be noted .Xrdish issXe belongs to the Zhole nation not onl\ to one part of it )or this reason«that issXe is m\ problem prior to an\one 69 Uzgel, “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler,” in Türk Dış Politikası III, pp. 277, 278. 70 Bill Park, “Between Europe, the United States and the Middle East: Turkey and European Security in the Wake of the Iraq Crisis”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol .5, No. 3, 2004, p. 502. See also Gunter, The Kurds Ascending, pp. 15-16. 71 “AKP’li Kurt: DTP’nin Oy Kaybında Başbakan’ın Konuşması da Etkili Oldu”, Milliyet, 30 June 2007, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/07/30/son/sonsiy18.asp (accessed 24 March 2008). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 104 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma else :e are a great state and Ze handle eaFh TXestion Zith more demoFraF\ more laZ for Fiti]enship and more Zell-fare Ze Zill FontinXe to do so :e do not den\ an\ issXe of the FoXntr\ Ze aF- Fept that eYer\ TXestion is real and Ze are read\ to faFe Zith these problems 7 %\ looNing at (rdoĊan·s framing one FoXld easil\ reali]e that (rdoĊan first and foremost internali]ed the .Xrdish TXestion Zith- oXt maNing an\ Flear referenFe to the sitXation in northern IraT (rdoĊan·s disFXrsiYe stanFe Yis-j-Yis the .Xrdish TXestion and b\ e[tension toZards IraT ma\ fXrther be delineated from his ĉemdinli speeFh on 1oYember In that speeFh (rdoĊan sXggested that .Xrdish ethniFit\ shoXld be reFogni]ed as a “sXb-identit\” :e haYe three red lines )irst Ze said that there ZoXld not be a nationalism based on ethniFit\ :e Zill eradiFate this«TXrNs .Xrds«Ze are all going to Xnite Xnder the sXpra-identit\ of TXrNish 5epXbliF Fiti]enship :e Zill respeFt the sXb-identities as sXFh«a .Xrd ZoXld be able to sa\ she is a .Xrd«An\one shoXld not be offended b\ this ZoXld not do so beFaXse this is oXr &onstitXtion- al Fiti]enship It is not possible to aFt aFFording to ethniF identit\ Zithin this FoXntr\73 )Xrthermore A.3 goYernment sNillfXll\ pXrsXed a FomprehensiYe poliF\ in order to oXtreaFh all parts %aghdad 0osXl %asra and (rbil and segments SXnniShi·i Arabs and .Xrds of IraT :ith the personal effort of 'aYXtoĊlX AnNara had managed to integrate the alienated SXnni Arab groXps inFlXding Tar×T al-+ashimi Zho ZoXld later beFome 9iFe 3resident into the domestiF politiFal proFess in %aghdad &onseTXentl\ the neZ IraTi &onstitXtion Zas promXl- gated on 2Ftober and the 3arliamentar\ eleFtions Zere held on 'eFember 74 In addition loZ-profile politiFal FontaFts haYe been maintained Zith the loFal .Xrdish aXthorit\ of northern IraT ie the .5* .Xrdistan 5egional *oYernment ZhiFh Zas established in 0a\ 7 %\ the 72 Cengiz Çandar, “Başbakan ve Diyarbakır, 12 Ağustos 2005-21 Ekim 2008”, Radikal, 22 October 2008. 73 “Başbakan Şemdinli’de Konuştu”, http://www.haber7.com/haber/20051121/Basbakan- Semdinlide-konustu.php (accessed 1 January 2009). 74 Zengin, Hoca: Türk Dış Politikası’nda “Davutoğlu Etkisi, pp. 265-271. 75 Gunter, The Kurds Ascending, pp. 17- 18. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 105 Mehmet Akif Kumral same month %aghdad had a neZ Fentral goYernment too 1oXri al-0aliNi a Shi·i Arab Zas Fhosen as prime minister and .Xrdish 38. leader Talabani emerged as the president :hile FaXtioXsl\ ZatFhing the .Xrdish asFendanFe in the &I* and the federali]ation of relations betZeen (rbil and %aghdad AnNara has Nept militar\ pressXre oYer the 3.. strongholds in northern IraT7 In the eFonomiF front TXrNe\·s ties Zith the .5* began to deYelop in “TXrNish trade and >other@ eFonomiF relations Zith the .5* Zere e[peFted to reaFh 3 billion in ”77 In spite of the eFonom- iF deYelopments the relations betZeen AnNara and (rbil remained Xnder the dXsN of XnFertaint\ emanating from the fXtXre statXs of .irNXN The neZ &onstitXtion “proYided that a referendXm be held b\ the end of 7” In this regard “al-0aliNi promised that %agh- dad ZoXld aFFept the oXtFome of the referendXm to be held before the end of 'eFember 7” %\ the end of none of the IraTi groXps demonstrated “Zillingness to Fompromise on their ma[imal demands” 8nder those FirFXmstanFes the “%aNer-+amilton” re- port “reFommended that the referendXm be postponed in order to preYent fXrther FonfliFt”78 In spite of the .irNXN stalemate AnNara did not hesitate to pXrsXe its FomprehensiYe poliF\ toZards IraT TXrNe\·s 0osXl *eneral &onsX- late Zas re-opened in )ebrXar\ 779 :ithin the same month the 8S sent e[tra Fombat troops to IraT to implement the sXrge seFX- rit\ strateg\ in %aghdad After the sXrge beFame sXFFessfXl the 8S and IraT signed an agreement that pledged the ZithdraZal of 8S Fombat forFes from IraT betZeen -Xne 9 and 'eFember In this period the first TXrNish high-leYel Yisit to %aghdad Zas paid b\ *l on 3 2Ftober 7 'Xring 0aliNi·s AnNara Yisit on 7 AXgXst 7 the tZo sides e[pressed mXtXal intentions for the opening of their seFond general FonsXlates in %asra and *a]iantep In a draft “0emorandXm of 8nderstanding 0o8 ” both sides agreed to enhanFe bilateral seFXrit\ Fooperation in the fight against terror- ist organi]ations inFlXding the 3.. 3ledges for the boosting of 76 Ibid., 54. Gunter cites and quotes “Nechirvan Barzani: Iraq Will Not Be Used as a Base for Attacking Neighboring States,” The Globe, 22 July 2006. 77 Ibid., 42. Gunter cites the Turkish Daily News, 23 January 2006. 78 Ibid., 45, 48. Gunter cites James A. III Baker and Lee H. Hamilton (Co-Chairs), The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach, (NY: Vintage Books, 2006). 79 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Bolgeler/, 30 April 2011. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 106 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma eFonomiF Fooperation partiFXlarl\ in the oil and natXral gas seFtor haYe been made In terms of their planning for regional poliFies AnNara and %aghdad haYe reaFhed an Xnderstanding to enhanFe their Moint standing for the “%roadened 1eighbors of IraT”8 .irNXN- Policy of Comprehensive Engagement A.3·s FomprehensiYe engagement poliF\ Zith northern IraT had positiYe reperFXssions oYer the .Xrds liYing in TXrNe\ In parallel domestiF poliFies based on respeFt for the soFio-FXltXral signifi- FanFe of .Xrdish identit\ haYe had a positiYe impaFt on TXrNe\·s northern IraT poliF\ As a resXlt of rising eFonomiF inYestment and the boosting of soFial serYiFes aYailable to the loFal popXlation or- dinar\ people on the street felt that the\ Zere treated deFentl\ As A.3 nXrtXred the feeling of dignit\ among the .Xrds politiFal frXits natXrall\ ripened In Fontrast to A.3·s aFtiYe poliF\ at the mXniFi- pal leYel the performanFe of mXniFipalities rXn b\ 'T3 remained TXite loZ SinFe the\ Zere primaril\ bXs\ Zith ethno-nationalist and ideologiFal FonFerns the\ paid the politiFal priFe heaYil\ Zithin the .Xrdish FonstitXenF\8 SoFio-politiFal FleaYage among the .Xrdish FommXnit\ has been more apparent in the Yoting for the motion ZhiFh Zas designed to aXthori]e the TXrNish Armed )orFes to FondXFt Fross-border opera- tions in northern IraT for a period of one \ear 2n 7 2Ftober 7 onl\ parliamentarians from the 'T3 Yoted against The motion passed ZithoXt an\ signifiFant defeFtion from the A.383 Despite the faFt that the 3arliament had giYen aXthorit\ for Fross-border operations the inFXrsion of 3.. terrorists into DaĊl×Fa proYinFe of +aNNari on 2Ftober 7 pXt serioXs pressXre on the A.3 goYernment In response (rdoĊan sealed the militar\-intelligenFe 80 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Bolgeler/, 30 April 2011. 81 Yeşilyurt, “Orta Doğu’yla İlişkiler”, p. 409. 82 Rabia Karakaya Polat, “The AKP and the Kurdish Issue: What Went Wrong?,” SETA Policy Brief, No.14, (Ankara: SETA, May 2008). Mustafa Akyol, Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek: Yanlış Giden Neydi? Bundan Sonra Nereye?, 5th ed., (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2007), pp. 14-25. “Erdoğan: Öncelik Yurt İçi Mücadelede,” Sabah, 13 June 2007, http:// arsiv.sabah.com.tr (accessed 23 June 2008). 83 “AKP Milletvekili Abdurrahman Kurt: Kuzey Irak Bataklıktır”, http://www.haber5.com (ac- cessed 20 April 2008). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 107 Mehmet Akif Kumral Fooperation deal Zith the 8S on 1oYember 7 &ross-border air striNes started in DeFember 7 The Fross-border land opera- tions proYed to be sXFFessfXl in earl\ )ebrXar\ 884 2n 0arFh 8 (rdoĊan had disFlosed A.3·s FomprehensiYe paFNage for the soXtheast region +e aFNnoZledged that the soXth- east problem has soFio-eFonomiF ps\FhologiFal and FXltXral di- mensions Therefore his plan inFlXded the opening of a .Xrdish broadFasting Fhannel in the offiFial state teleYision namel\ T5T In order to fXrther deYelop relations Zith IraT opening of a TXrNish FonsXlate in %asra Zas also on A.3·s agenda8 (rdoĊan Zent on to folloZ poliF\ of fXll Fooperation Zith IraT 0inister of )oreign Af- fairs Ali %abaFan reaffirmed that FontaFts Zith northern IraT Zill be e[tended and diYersified8 2n the first of 0a\ (rdoĊan·s foreign poliF\ adYisor DaYXtoĊlX and speFial representatiYe for IraT 0Xrat g]oeliN Zere in %aghdad to meet Zith the IraTi offiFials inFlXding the 3rime 0inister of .5* 1eFhirYan %ar]ani 2n the same da\ DepXt\ IraTi 3resident Tar×T al-+ashimi fleZ to AnNara for diplomatiF meetings In e[Fhange (rdoĊan·s historiF Yisit to %aghdad on -Xl\ 8 proYed to be sXFFessfXl SeFXrit\ eFonom\ and FXltXral issXes Zere all dis- FXssed dXring the bilateral talNs 3.. terrorism b\ impliFation the .Xrdish TXestion dominated the agenda %\ reFonFiling their maMor differenFes TXrNe\ and IraT signed a “Moint politiFal deFlaration”87 to form a “+igh-/eYel &ooperation &oXnFil” ZhiFh ZoXld be tasNed Zith the improYement of bilateral relations in man\ respeFts88 84 “AK Parti ile Ordunun Flörtü”, 7 Mart 2008, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/438254.asp (accessed 24 March 2008). 85 “Erdoğan’ın Yok Dediği Güneydoğu Paketi 12 Milyar” Milliyet, 12 March 2008, http:// www.milliyet.com (accessed on 3 January 2009); “İşte Başbakan’ın NYT’ye Açıkladığı Güneydoğu Paketi,” http://www.nethaber.com (accessed 3 January 2009). 86 “Babacan: K.Irak’la Temaslar Sıklaşacak”, Milliyet, 29 April 2008. On 2 January 2009, Ba- bacan was the guest speaker of Enine Boyuna at TRT-1. During that program, he declared that Turkey was at the very early stage of security cooperation with the regional administra- tion in northern Iraq. Referring to the report prepared by Sönmez Köksal—who served as the ambassador in Baghdad between 1986 and 1990 and later became the chief of National Intelligence Agency—Babacan stated that there would be a possibility for Turkey to open a consulate in Erbil when political conditions were met. 87 “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Hükûmetleri Arasında Yüksek Düzeyli İşbirliği Konseyi’nin Kurulmasına İlişkin Ortak Siyasi Bildirge”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/, 24 April 2011. 88 “Irak Politikasında Kırmızı Çizgiler Değişti”, http://www.dunyabulteni.net/, 24 October 2008. Information is based on Devrim Sevimay’s interview with Haşim Haşimi in the Mil- liyet daily. “Erdoğan’dan Irak’a Teşekkür”, Milliyet, 11 July 2008. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 108 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma In parallel TXrNish air striNes haYe FontinXed intermittentl\ Xntil 3..·s ANttn inFXrsion on 3 2Ftober 8 The 3arliament Yoted for the motion on 8 2Ftober 8 to e[tend the aXthori]ation for Fross-border operations for one \ear In order to eliminate 3.. mili- tants AnNara enhanFed seFXrit\ Fooperation Zith (rbil89 %\ then the TXrNish domestiF politiFal stage has been set for the loFal eleF- tion Fampaigns of 9 0arFh 9 (rdoĊan intensified his YoFal bid for Zinning the eleFtion in Di\arbaN×r mXniFipalit\ ZhiFh Zas held b\ the DT3 Again Di\arbaN×r beFame a spatial s\mbol of .Xrd- ish TXestion The politiFal battle betZeen A.3 and DT3 oYer the eastern-soXtheastern mXniFipalities has Freated impliFations for TXrNe\·s .Xrdish problem In this respeFt (rdoĊan·s FontroYersial speeFh in +aNNari on 1oYember 8 has to be noted notZithstanding the faFt that its main target aXdienFe Zas domestiF “A .Xrd Fan sa\ that she is a .Xrd %Xt Ze haYe Xnited Xnder one flag :hat Ze haYe said is one nation one flag one FoXnt\ one state«There is no plaFe in this FoXntr\ for the one Zho oppose this YieZ She ma\ go ZhereYer desired”9 SinFe (rdoĊan·s disFXrsiYe frames gaYe signs of seFXrit\ rationale he Zas indireFtl\ aFFXsed of aFFommodating the militar\ bXreaXFraF\9 AFFording to the MoXrnalistiF aFFoXnt of &engi] dandar (rdoĊan reFeiYed a taFit Fonsent from the militar\ before the opening of T5T- .Xrdish broadFasting Fhannel of of- fiFial state teleYision on -anXar\ 99 The broadFasts of T5T- Freated important ramifiFations both internall\ and e[ternall\ The most striNing reaFtion Fame from the 3.. Zho aFFXsed all of the .Xrds ZorNing either in A.3 or in the T5T- Zith betra\al93 In the post-3 period AnNara·s partiFXlar diplomatiF and mili- tar\ moYes betZeen 9 and gaYe important signs of a neZ Fhapter in TXrNe\·s IraT poliF\ After the opening of %asra *eneral 89 “PKK Attacks Prompt Security Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government,” Terrorism Focus, Vol. 5, No. 36, 22 October 2008. (accessed 6 August 2011). 90 “AK PARTi Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan Erdoğan Hakkari Merkez İlçe Kongresi’nde Konuştu”, http://www.rte.gen.tr/ (accessed 10 January 2009). 91 Mehveş Evin, “AKP’nin Dili Değişti,” Akşam, 18 November 2008. 92 Cengiz Çandar, Mezopotamya Ekspresi: Bir Tarih Yolculuğu (Türkiye-Kürtler-Ortadoğu-Batı), (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012), pp. 38, 44, 45. 93 Cevdet Aşkın, “TRT 6 DTP’de Kafa Karıştırdı, Kandil’e Askeri Baskı Arttı,” Referans, 6 January 2009, http://www.referansgazetesi.com/ (accessed 10 January 2009). “TRT’nin Yeni Kürtçe Kanalı TRT 6, PKK’yı Şişledi,” http://www.ekoayrinti.com/ (accessed 10 Janu- ary 2009). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 109 Mehmet Akif Kumral &onsXlate on 8 0arFh 9 the TXrNish-IraTi bilateral militar\ Fo- operation frameZorN agreement Zas signed on 9 -Xne 994 (rdoĊan·s offiFial inaXgXration of (rbil *eneral &onsXlate on 9 0arFh 9 marNed the episodiF end of TXrNe\·s post-Zar IraT poliF\ *iYen the pre-Zar historiFal baFNgroXnd and disFXrsiYe Fon- te[t oFFXrrenFe of this eYent Zas almost Xnimaginable In those da\s TXrNish foreign poliF\ maNers Zere tr\ing to maNe reasons for re establishing militar\ rather than diplomatiF presenFe in north- ern IraT After the Zar AnNara began to fXll\ embraFe (rbil despite the disma\ of %aghdad9 As a FonseTXenFe of its offiFial engage- ment Zith the .5* the TXrNish *oYernment began to faFe serioXs Fhallenges in its relations Zith the &I* AnNara-%aghdadrelations haYe fXrther strained b\ the beginning of as the IraTi bod\ politiF had been embroiled Zith a fierFe ethno-seFtarian poZer strXggle TXrNe\ Zas deFlared as an “enem\ state” b\ the Shi·i Arab IraTi 3rime 0inister 1oXri al-0aliNi on April 97 This Zas mainl\ dXe to the stepping Xp of eFonomiF Fooperation betZeen AnNara and (rbil espeFiall\ in the energ\ oil seFtor 0oreoYer the TXrNish goYernment did not hesitate to proteFt their SXnni Arab politiFal protpgpe DepXt\ IraTi 3resident Tar×T al-+ashimi after he had been indiFted and sentenFed Zith a Fapital pXnishment The politiFal rift betZeen AnNara and %aghdad has been fXrther Zidened b\ the reperFXssions of the FiYil Zar in S\ria :hile AnNara opted to side Zith the predominantl\ SXnni-Arab )ree S\rian Arm\ attempting to liberate at least the north of Aleppo from the rest of FoXntr\ %aghdad fell YiFtim to the Shi·i inflXenFe of Tehran and FoYertl\ Fooperate Zith the rXling AlaZite1Xsa\ri regime in Da- masFXs In midst of the regional instabilit\ aroXsed b\ ethniF Arab- .Xrd and seFtarian SXnni-Shi·i1Xsa\ri YiolenFe the .5* FoXld tXrn into a seFXrit\ partner for the TXrNish goYernment 94 “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Savunma Bakanlığı Arasında Askeri Alanda Eğitim, Teknik ve Bilimsel İş Birliği Mutabakat Muhtırası (İmza Tarihi)”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.tr.mfa, 25 April 2011. 95 “Erdoğan, Erbil Başkonsolosluğu’nu Açtı,” 29 March 2011, http://www.dunyabulteni.net/ (accessed on 25 May 2012). 96 “SC-8, 21 Nisan 2012, Dışişleri Bakanlığı Sözcüsünün Irak Başbakanlığı İnternet Sites- inde Ülkemize İlişkin Olarak Yayımlanan Basın Açıklamasına Dair Görüşümüz Hakkındaki Soruya Cevabı”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ (accessed 4 August 2012). 97 Henry Barkey, “Turkey-Iraq Relations Deteriorate with Accusations of Sectarianism,” 30 April 2012, http://www.al-monitor.com/ (accessed 11 October 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 110 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma 3artial Fooperation if not non-Fooperation in AnNara-%aghdad re- lations haYe beFome more FontroYersial on AXgXst Zhen the TXrNish 0inister of )oreign Affairs Ahmet DaYXtoĊlX paid an XnpreFedented Yisit to northern IraT98 DaYXtoĊlX did not reFeiYe diplomatiF FlearanFe from the &I* for this Yisit and did not hesitate to maNe it Zith the diplomatiF serYiFes proYided b\ .5* DaYXtoĊlX held talNs Zith the 3resident of .5* 0asoXd %ar]ani in (rbil In their Moint pXbliF statement dated AXgXst politiFal Fommit- ments for the sXstenanFe of bilateral eFonomiF Fooperation es- peFiall\ in the energ\ oil and natXral gas seFtor Zere highlighted %oth sides deFlared that emergent “poZer YaFXXm” ensXing of ethniF-seFtarian YiolenFe and the aFtiYities of terrorist groXps in S\ria posed a “Fommon threat” for TXrNe\ and .5* +enFe the\ agreed to ZorN together in order to preYent instabilit\ emanating mainl\ from northern S\ria99 &RQFOXVLRQ (SLVRGLF)LQGLQJV In the post-*Xlf :ar period TXrNe\·s disFoXrse of Fooperation Zith IraT Zas based on seFXrit\ rationale This reasoning Zas largel\ a response to the d\adiF Fonte[tXal Fhanges that emerged in the aftermath of the *Xlf :ar The implementation of northern no-fl\ ]one oYer the thirt\ si[th parallel and its enforFement b\ the 21: Freated a poZer YaFXXm in northern IraT SinFe %aghdad lost most of its militar\ Fontrol oYer (rbil .D3 and 38. foXnd more faYora- ble enYironment to reali]e their politiFal aspirations The\ moYed in the direFtion of aFhieYing federal goYernanFe andor regional aX- tonom\ In addition to dealing Zith this politiFal Fhallenge AnNara had to address the militar\ threat posed b\ the 3.. in northern IraT %ased on the balanFe of threat rationale AnNara sided Zith %aghdad and .D3 against the rapproFhement betZeen Iran 38. and 3.. 8p Xntil the 8S inYasion in 3 reshXffling of allianFes and Fonte[tXal moYes haYe marNed the logiF of Fooperation and non-Fooperation in TXrNish-IraTi relations 98 “Davutoglu’s Kirkuk Visit Ignites Rage in Baghdad”, 3 August 2012, http://www.al-moni- tor.com/ (accessed 11 October 2012);. “Davutoğlu’dan 75 Yıl Sonra Bir İlk”, http://yenisa- fak.com.tr/02.08.2012 (accessed 17 September 2012); “75 Yıl Sonra Kerkük’te”, http:// yenisafak.com.tr/03.08.2012 (accessed 17 September 2012). 99 “Dışişleri Bakanı Ahmet Davutoğlu ile IKB Başkanı Mesud Barzani Arasındaki Görüşmeye İlişkin Ortak Basın Açıklaması, 1 Ağustos 2012, Erbil”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ (accessed 4 August 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 111 Mehmet Akif Kumral %efore the 8S inYasion AnNara Zas mainl\ FonFerned aboXt pro- teFtion of politiFal militar\ and eFonomiF interests %alanFing of the 3.. threat and elimination of the .Xrdish statehood Zere tZo dominant frames that rationali]ed the Xtilit\ of Fooperating Zith :ashington against %aghdad To a Fertain e[tent AnNara Zas also interested in hindering of militar\ Fooperation betZeen :ashington and (rbil In this regard predominantl\ seFXrit\ rationale has pro- Yided the disFXrsiYe basis for the *l goYernment to initiali]e mili- tar\ Fooperation parliamentar\ approYal of the first motion for site sXrYe\ and base moderni]ation Zith the 8S notZithstanding the domestiF pXbliF and politiFal opposition emerged eYen Zithin their oZn ranNs In terms of TXrNe\-8S Fooperation the Frisis of 0arFh 3 parliamentar\ disapproYal of the seFond motion for land-air transit rights Zas Flearl\ a bargaining failXre 2ne of the main rea- sons of this inFident Zas misrepresentation of TXrNe\·s bargaining position Despite the graYe domestiF finanFial problems disFXrsiYe framing of eFonomiF interests did not FonstitXte a good reason to enter into Zar together Zith the 8S side That is to sa\ the motion Frisis demonstrated the diffiFXlt\ of Fooperating Zith :ashington against %aghdad It re-presented the signifiFanFe of both domes- tiF Yeto pla\ers and aXdienFe Fosts for TXrNe\·s disFoXrse of non- Fooperation Zith IraT %\ the beginning and in the midst of Zar the indispensabilit\ frame dominated TXrNe\·s foreign poliF\ disFoXrse and implied geopoliti- Fal thinNing This predetermined logiF diFtated that the opening of northern front Zas indispensable for the 8S In this rationale it Zas presXmed that sXpport for the 8S ZoXld also alleYiate AnNara·s se- FXrit\ FonFerns emanating from northern IraT In e[Fhange for the opening of its airspaFe TXrNe\ ZoXld enter into northern IraT in or- der to preYent rise of 3.. terrorism and mass migration This FoXld be regarded as a maMor reason that made the third motion disFXr- siYel\ defensible and perhaps politiFall\ possible for the A.3 goY- ernment After the third motion “allianFe Zith the 8S” and “national seFXrit\ interests” haYe been re-deplo\ed into the goYernmental disFoXrse as basiF politiFal frames In this instanFe AnNara faFed both Foordination and Fredibilit\ problems 2n the one hand the TXrNish politiFal-militar\ offiFials oXght to resolYe Fommand-Fontrol issXes Zith their 8S FoXnterparts 2n the other hand TXrNish mili- tar\ shoXld not giYe the impression of oFFXpation or anne[ation b\ aFting alongside the &oalition forFes As framed b\ (rdoĊan An- Nara faFed a “dXal trap” after the 8S-led Zar in IraT TXrNe\ FoXld 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 112 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma not taNe the risN of neither aFtiYe inYolYement nor passiYe non-in- terYention dXring the 8S inYasion of IraT AFFording to him TXrNish goYernment aFted along the realities on the groXnd The\ did not taNe an opportXnistiF pro-Zar stanFe bXt tooN a position to proteFt TXrNe\·s seFXrit\ interests In the end TXrNe\·s seFXrit\ Foopera- tion Zith the 8S and probable entr\ into northern IraT Zas MXstified b\ disFXrsiYe framing of hXmanitarian reasons ToZards the end of Zar the signifiFant frame Zas “being both in the &oalition and oXt of the Zar” ZhiFh refleFted the doXble-faFed natXre of TXrNe\·s IraT poliF\ disFoXrse In the post-Zar period FomprehensiYe Fooperation Zith IraT be- Fame part of TXrNe\·s goYernmental disFoXrse 1onetheless the impliFations of this disFoXrse for the d\adiF Fonte[t still remain elX- siYe That is to sa\ disFXrsiYe Fhange has Freated lingering both positiYe and negatiYe inflXenFe on the aFtXal d\namiFs of AnNara- %aghdad AnNara-(rbil and %aghdad-(rbil relations As AnNara got Floser to (rbil it began to fall apart from %aghdad 3rimaril\ dXe to the XnFertain natXre of the .Xrdish TXestion on both sides of the border the impasse of partialnon-Fooperation in TXrNish-IraTi rela- tions might proYe to be an endXring and XnnatXral phenomenon As TXrNe\·s historiFal relations Zith IraT moYe toZards the first Fenten- nial there is still an Xnending need for deFiphering and denatXral- i]ing the Fonte[ts and the disFoXrses of partialnon-Fooperation 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 113 Mehmet Akif Kumral Bibliography $N\RO0XVWDID.UW6RUXQXQX $OODZL$OL$7KH2FFXSDWLRQRI,UDT :LQQLQJWKH:DU/RVLQJWKH 3HDFH 1HZ+DYHQDQG/RQGRQ $OWXQ×ü×N0HOLKD%HQOL´7XUNH\·V,UDT3ROLF\ 7KH:DUDQG%H- \RQGµ-RXUQDORI&RQWHPSRUDU\(XURSHDQ6WXGLHV9RO1R $XJXVW $üN×Q &HYGHW ´757 '73·GH .DID .DU×üW×UG× .DQGLO·H $VN- HUL %DVN× $UWW×µ 5HIHUDQV -DQXDU\ KWWS ZZZUHIHU- DQVJD]HWHVLFRP %DUNH\+HQUL-DQG*UDKDP()XOOHU´7XUNH\·V.XUGLVK4XHV- WLRQ &ULWLFDO7XUQLQJ3RLQWVDQG0LVVHG2SSRUWXQLWLHVµ0LGGOH (DVW-RXUQDO9RO1R:LQWHU %LOk)LNUHW$QNDUD·GD,UDN6DYDüODU× 6LYLO'DUEH*LULüLPLYH*L]- OL%HOJHOHUOH0DUW7H]NHUHVL úVWDQEXO *QFHO %|ONEDü× 'HQL] 0DUW 9DNDV× ,UDN 7H]NHUHVL YH 6RQUDV× úVWDQEXO 'RùDQ.LWDS dDQGDU &HQJL] 0H]RSRWDP\D (NVSUHVL %LU 7DULK BBBBBBBB ´%DüEDNDQ YH 'L\DUEDN×U $ùXVWRV (NLP µ5DGLNDO2FWREHU 'DYXWRùOX $KPHW 6WUDWHMLN 'HULQOLN 7UNL\H·QLQ 8OXVODUDUDV× .RQXPX (úVWDQEXO .UH BBBBBBBB.UHVHO%XQDO×P (\OO.RQXüPDODU×LQ)DUXN'HQL] HG WKHG úVWDQEXO .UH BBBBBBBB7HRULGHQ3UDWLùH 7UN'×ü3ROLWLNDV×h]HULQH.RQXüPDODU LQ6HPLK$WLü6HYLQo$ONDQg]FDQ HGV QGHG úVWDQEXO .UH (YLQ0HKYHü´$.3·QLQ'LOL'HùLüWLµ$NüDP1RYHPEHU *|]HQ5DPD]DQúPSDUDWRUOXNWDQ.UHVHO$NW|UOùH7UNL\H·QLQ '×ü3ROLWLNDV× $QNDUD 3DOPH 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 114 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Denaturalizing the Deep Dilemma *XQWHU0LFKDHO07KH .XUGV$VFHQGLQJ 7KH(YROYLQJ6ROXWLRQ WRWKH.XUGLVK3UREOHPLQ,UDTDQG7XUNH\ 1< 3DOJUDYH0DFPLO- ODQ +LQQHEXVFK5D\PRQGDQG5LFN)DZQHGV7KH,UDT:DU &DXV- HVDQG&RQVHTXHQFHV %RXOGHU&2 /\QQH5LHQQHU3XEOLVKHUV úQDQo *O 7UN 'LSORPDVLVLQGH ,UDN úVWDQEXO 7UNL\Húü%DQNDV×.OWU -XQJ 'LHWULFK ´7KH 6HYUHV 6\QGURPH 7XUNLVK )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ DQG LWV +LVWRULFDO /HJDFLHVµ KWWS ZZZXQFHGXGHSWVGLSOR- PDWDUFKLYHVBUROOB MXQJBVHYUHVKWPO .HHJDQ-RKQ7KH,UDT:DU 1< 9LQWDJH%RRNV .XUXEDü (URO ´(WQLN 6RUXQ'×ü 3ROLWLND úOLüNLVL %DùODP×QGD .UW6RUXQXQXQ7UN'×ü3ROLWLNDV×QD(WNLOHULµ$QNDUD$YUXSD dDO×üPDODU×'HUJLVL9RO1R 2ùX]OX+7DU×N´7XUNH\·V1RUWKHUQ,UDT3ROLF\ &RPSHWLQJ3HU- VSHFWLYHVµ,QVLJKW7XUNH\9RO1R 2OVRQ5REHUW´7KH.XUGLVK4XHVWLRQDQG7XUNH\·V)RUHLJQ3RO- LF\ )URPWKH*XOI:DUWRWKH,QFXUVLRQLQWR,UDTµ -RXUQDORI6RXWK$VLDQDQG0LGGOH(DVWHUQ6WXGLHV9RO 1R )DOO 2UDQ %DVN×Q HG 7UN '×ü 3ROLWLNDV× .XUWXOXü 6DYDü×QGDQ %XJQH2OJXODU%HOJHOHU BBBBBBBB HG 7UN'×ü3ROLWLNDV× .XUWXOXü6DYDü×QGDQ%XJQH 2OJXODU %HOJHOHU 3DUN%LOO´%HWZHHQ(XURSHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKH0LGGOH (DVW 7XUNH\DQG(XURSHDQ6HFXULW\LQWKH:DNHRIWKH,UDT&UL- VLVµ3HUVSHFWLYHVRQ(XURSHDQ3ROLWLFVDQG6RFLHW\9RO1R 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 115 Mehmet Akif Kumral 3RODW5DELD.DUDND\D´7KH$.3DQGWKH.XUGLVK,VVXH :KDW :HQW :URQJ"µ 6(7$ 3ROLF\ %ULHI 1R $QNDUD 6(7$ 0D\ 5RELQV3KLOLS´7KH2YHUORUG6WDWH 7XUNLVK3ROLF\DQGWKH.XUG- LVK,VVXHµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$IIDLUV9RO 1R 7RUXPWD\ 1HFLS 'HùLüHQ 6WUDWHMLOHULQ 2GDù×QGD 7UNL\H úVWDQEXO 0LOOL\HW 8]JHOúOKDQ´2UGX'×ü3ROLWLNDQ×Q1HUHVLQGH"µLQ$KPHWúQVHO DQG$OL%D\UDPRùOX HGV %LU=PUH%LU3DUWL 7UNL\H·GH2UGX úVWDQEXO %LULNLP 8]JHOúOKDQDQG%OHQW'XUX HGV $.3.LWDE× %LU'|QüPQ %LODQoRVX $QNDUD 3KRHQL[ Zengin*UNDQ+RFD 7UN'×ü3ROLWLNDV×·QGD´'DYXWRùOX(WNLVLµ úVWDQEXO úQN×OkS.LWDSHYL 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 116 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 TXrNish 0edia )ramings of the 1AT2-/ed InterYention in /ib\a Işık GÜRLEYEN* Abstract There is a general FonsensXs among the sFholars that foreign poli- F\ maNing in TXrNe\ is traditionall\ an elite-driYen proFess ZhiFh is largel\ immXne to pXbliF opinion inÁXenFes In this Fonte[t the role of TXrNish media in foreign poliF\ proFesses Fonforms to the elitist model ZhiFh restriFts it to transmitting information from politiFal elites to the masses rather than to the plXralist model ZhiFh Fites a Zide-arra\ of media impaFt on the proFesses of foreign poliF\ This stXd\ TXestions the Yalidit\ of sXFh Fontentions b\ anal\]ing the argXments of foreign poliF\ FolXmnists in a remarNable Fase /ib\a in TXrNish foreign poliF\ dramatiFall\ shifted dXring the Frisis in /ib\a partiFXlarl\ on the TXestion of militar\ inter- Yention against 4addaÀ forFes The A.3 -XstiFe and DeYelopment 3art\ goYernment Àrst resolXtel\ opposed to the 1AT2-led militar\ interYention in /ib\a bXt a short Zhile after stepped baFN SXFh dramatiF Fhange presents an opportXnit\ to anal\]e Zhether the media maintains an independent position from the goYernment ZhiFh is neFessar\ bXt not sXfÀFient Fondition for media impaFt on deFision-maNers In this Fonte[t the artiFle presents a Fontent anal\sis of seleFted foreign poliF\ FolXmns Zithin the TXrNish me- dia regarding the A.3 goYernment·s /ib\a poliF\ before and after the 1AT2 interYention in The artiFle aims to FontribXte to oXr Xnderstanding of the natXre of media·s role in TXrNish foreign poliF\ and addresses the folloZing TXestion Is the effeFt of media limited to transmitting information from poliF\-maNers to the masses or is it an aFtiYe effort to inÁXenFe foreign poliF\ deFision-maNers" .H\ZRUGV TXrNish foreign poliF\ /ib\a Frisis media elitist model plXralist model * Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of Political Science and International Relations, İzmir University of Economics, Sakarya C. 156 Balçova 35330 İzmir/Turkey. [email protected] Işık Gürleyen, Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya, Ortadoğu Etütleri, Volume 5, No 1, July 2013, pp.117-139. Işık Gürleyen 7UNL\H·GH1$72·QXQ/LE\D·\D0GDKDOHVLQLQ0HG\DGDĈċOHQLċL Özet ANademiN oeYrelerde TrNi\e·de d×ċ politiNa \ap×m×n×n geleneNsel olaraN NamXo\X etNilerinden geniċ |lode mXaf seoNin-merNe]- li bir sreo oldXĊXna dair bir ÀNir birliĊi meYFXttXr %X baĊlamda TrNi\e·de med\an×n d×ċ politiNa sreolerinde o\nad×Ċ× rol med\a- n×n oeċitli etNileri oldXĊXnX ifade eden ooĊXlFX modelden ]i\ade bX rol si\asi seoNinlerden Nitlelere bilgi aNtar×m×na s×n×rla\an seoNinFi modele X\maNtad×r %X oal×ċma d×ċ politiNa \a]arlar×n×n diNNat oe- NiFi bir YaNa olan /ib\a Nri]i NonXsXndaNi saYlar×n× inFele\e- reN s|]NonXsX Nanaatin geoerliliĊini sorgXlamaNtad×r TrN d×ċ po- litiNas× /ib\a·daNi Nri]i esnas×nda |]elliNle 4addaÀ golerine Narċ× 1AT2 mdahalesinde \eralma NonXsXnda Nendisi\le oeliċen bir g|rnm ar] etmeNte\di A.3 Adalet Ye .alN×nma 3artisi h- NXmeti 1AT2·nXn /ib\a·\a asNeri mdahalesine |nFe Nararl× bir ċeNilde Narċ× o×N×p N×sa bir sre sonra\sa geri ad×m att× %X NesNin deĊiċim med\an×n d×ċ politiNa NonXsXnda hNXmetten baĊ×ms×] bir po]is\ona sahip olXp olmad×Ċ× NonXsXnX inFeleme f×rsat× sXnmaN- tad×r %aĊ×ms×] po]is\on med\an×n Narar-al×F×lar× etNile\ebilmesi ioin gereNli anFaN \eterli olma\an bir NoċXldXr %X baĊlamda maNale 1AT2·nXn mdahalesi |nFesi Ye sonras×nda \a\×nlanan Ye A.3 hNXmetinin /ib\a politiNas×n× NonX edinen d×ċ politiNa N|ċe\a- ]×lar×n×n ioeriN anali]ini sXnmaNtad×r 0aNale med\an×n TrN d×ċ po- litiNas×ndaNi rolnn doĊas×n× anlama oabalar×na NatN×da bXlXnma\× amaolamaNtad×r Ye ċX sorX\a \an×t aramaNtad×r 0ed\an×n etNisi politiNa-\ap×F×lardan Nitlelere bilgi aNtar×m× ile mi s×n×rl×d×r \oNsa d×ċ politiNa Narar al×F×lar×n× etNileme \|nnde etNin bir oaba m×d×r" $QDKWDU.HOLPHOHU TrN d×ċ politiNas× /ib\a Nri]i med\a seoNinFi model Ye ooĊXlFX model 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 118 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 119 Işık Gürleyen ,QWURGXFWLRQ TXrNish foreign poliF\ maNing has traditionall\ been an elite-driYen proFess largel\ immXne to the inflXenFes of domestiF aFtors and faFtors &onseTXentl\ their impaFt on foreign poliF\ deFision-maN- ers has remained Fonsiderabl\ Xnder-researFhed althoXgh more reFentl\ domestiF faFtors sXFh as pXbliF opinion and FiYil soFietal organi]ations haYe been more Zidel\ stXdied in the Fonte[t of TXr- Ne\·s integration Zith the (Xropean 8nion 1onetheless the impaFt of domestiF aFtors in other areas of foreign poliF\ is still rarel\ stXd- ied and the role pla\ed b\ the TXrNish media in foreign poliF\ has been negleFted as Zell This artiFle aims to FontribXte to oXr Xnderstanding of the role pla\ed b\ the media in the foreign poliF\-maNing proFess in TXrNe\ b\ anal\]ing media framings regarding poliF\ Fhange dXring the popXlar Xnrest in /ib\a in 0ore speFifiFall\ the artiFle aims to anal\]e foreign poliF\ FolXmns on the issXe of 1AT2-led mili- tar\ interYention against 4addafi to determine the model that the TXrNish media adhere to Zhether elitist or plXralist 2n the basis of the /ib\a Fase this artiFle argXes that TXrNish neZs media do not displa\ a monolithiF FonfigXration on foreign poliF\ issXes and that ideologiFal differenFes might e[plain the diYiding lines That is Zhile some foreign poliF\ FolXmnists pla\ a more limited role sXFh as transmitting information from goYernment offiFials to the mass- es others aFtiYel\ tr\ to inflXenFe foreign poliF\ deFision maNers The artiFle is diYided into foXr parts The first disFXsses hoZ realist and liberal theories of international relations perFeiYe the media·s role in the foreign poliF\ deFision-maNing proFess The seFond e[- plains the A.3 goYernment·s /ib\a poliF\ Zithin a broader foreign poliF\ frameZorN to demonstrate the Fhallenges it faFed in shift- ing its poliF\ from a 4addafi-friendl\ stanFe to a hostile one after the oXtbreaN of popXlar protests SXFh a shift in the goYernment·s position Zas also obserYed regarding the 1AT2-led militar\ opera- tion in faYor of 4addafi·s opponents The third part Fonsiders the argXments presented in the TXrNish media regarding the possibilit\ of a 1AT2-led interYention in /ib\a and Flassifies them in line Zith elitist and plXralist models This part also addresses the TXestion of Zhether there Zas a Fhange in media framings folloZing the shift in the TXrNish goYernment·s position to sXpport 1AT2 interYention in /ib\a The last seFtion presents the findings and sXggestions for fXrther researFh 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 120 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya 7KH0HGLD·V5ROHLQWKH)RUHLJQ3ROLF\'HFLVLRQPDNLQJ 3URFHVV The literatXre on politiFal FommXniFation foFXses on the TXestion of hoZ media pressXre on the goYernment inflXenFes its foreign poliF\ 5esearFh shoZs that the media pla\s a FrXFial role in demo- FratiF soFieties as a mediating aFtor betZeen the masses and the deFision-maNing elites The media has YarioXs fXnFtions in a de- moFraF\ ZhiFh help the pXbliF to determine their poliF\ preferenF- es both domestiFall\ and internationall\ SFholarl\ attention to the media·s inflXenFe in the foreign poliF\ deFision-maNing proFess has been inFreasing sinFe 99 Zhen &11 emerged as an inflXential aFtor in international politiFs This attention has gained momentXm Zith the FXrrent Xprisings in the Arab Spring Among the YarioXs media instrXments neZspapers are still seen as pla\ing a signifi- Fant role despite the rise of neZ media forms There are tZo fXndamentall\ different perspeFtiYes on the signifi- FanFe of the media for Xnderstanding foreign poliF\ proFesses the elite model and the plXralist model The elite model argXes that the media depend on politiFal elites for information on foreign poliF\ issXes and therefore haYe little independent inflXenFe The media are therefore YieZed as being largel\ sXbserYient to foreign poli- F\ maNers tending to perFeiYe international politiFs “throXgh the FXltXral and politiFal prisms of their respeFtiYe politiFal and soFial elites” There are YarioXs stXdies that demonstrate hoZ the media Fan fXnFtion as a sophistiFated tool for FonfliFt resolXtion in the hands of offiFials In this YieZ beFaXse of the Flose relationship betZeen MoXrnalists and offiFial soXrFes the media fXnFtions solel\ as a FommXniFator of poliF\ maNers· YieZs Zith MoXrnalists defer- ring to offiFial soXrFes oXt of an aZareness of the risNs of offending poZerfXl eFonomiF and politiFal interests3 In Fontrast to the elite model the plXralist model YieZs the media as a Fonstraining faFtor for deFision-maNers emphasi]ing that the 1 Piers Robinson, “Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics: Models of Media Influence on Foreign Policy”,European Journal of Communication, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2001, p. 525. 2 Eytan Gilboa, “Media-Broker Diplomacy: When Journalists Became Mediators”, Critical Studies in Media Communication, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2005, pp. 99-120. 3 Piers Robinson, “The Role of Media and Public Opinion” inSteve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (eds.), Foreign Policy: Themes, Actors, Cases, Oxford:( Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 138, 143. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 121 Işık Gürleyen media Fan liNe other domestiF aFtors remain independent from politiFal inflXenFe SFholarl\ ZorN sXggests YarioXs media effeFts ranging from limiting the poliF\ alternatiYes aYailable to deFision- maNers to stronger inflXenFes sXFh as forFing a Fertain poliF\ on politiFal leaders4 2Yerall this perspeFtiYe argXes that the media performs tZo main fXnFtions in the foreign poliF\ deFision-maNing proFess )irst the\ pla\ a role in edXFating and informing the pXb- liF b\ proYiding obMeFtiYe information and faFilitating debate SeF- ondl\ the\ hold deFision-maNers aFFoXntable b\ sFrXtini]ing their deFisions and representing pXbliF opinion 5egarding the media·s first fXnFtion there are three meFhanisms throXgh ZhiFh the\ shape pXbliF opinion namel\ agenda setting priming and framing These three meFhanisms refer to different abil- ities of the media Agenda setting meFhanism is the abilit\ of media to direFt people·s attention on Fertain issXes b\ foFXsing on some issXes rather than others :hile priming means media·s abilit\ ¶to prepare and direFt pXbliFs to the issXes b\ ZhiFh the\ shoXld MXdge their leaders· and ¶framing refers to the Za\ solel\ in ZhiFh the aFtXal presentation of neZs information inflXenFes hoZ people per- FeiYe speFifiF issXes· )irstl\ stXdies foFXsing on agenda setting searFh for Forrelations betZeen the amoXnt of FoYerage of a foreign poliF\ eYent and the importanFe that pXbliF opinion attribXtes to that eYent SeFondl\ stXdies that foFXs on priming e[plore neZs Fontent assXming that pXbliFs Xse speFifiF issXes as benFhmarNs to eYalXate the foreign poliF\ performanFe of their goYernments )inall\ the FonFept of framing anal\sis is Xsed to Xnderstand hoZ foreign poliF\ issXes are FharaFteri]ed in the media and hoZ sXFh FharaFteri]ations inflXenFe pXbliF opinion7 In all sXFh stXdies the main aim is to anal\]e the media·s indireFt inflXenFe on deFision maNers Yia pXbliF opinion That is the literatXre assXmes a triangX- lar relationship betZeen media FoYerage pXbliF opinion and poliF\ maNing8 The folloZing broad issXes are addressed +oZ do Fertain international politiFal issXes beFome a priorit\ for the pXbliF" +oZ are Fiti]ens primed to MXdge the abilit\ of politiFal leaders to handle 4 Gilboa, “Media-Broker Diplomacy: When Journalists Became Mediators”, p. 37. 5 Robinson, “The Role of Media and Public Opinion”, pp. 138-142. 6 Ibid, p. 145. 7 Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury,. “Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models”,Journal of Communication, Vol. 57, 2007, p. 11. 8 Gilboa, “Media-Broker Diplomacy: When Journalists Became Mediators”, p.37; John E. Richardson, Analyzing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 122 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya international Frises" Is framing more eYent-oriented foFXsing spe- FifiFall\ on militar\ matters eg militar\ teFhnolog\ the progress of a Zar or thematiF dealing Zith broader diplomatiF issXes and matters related to the rationale and MXstifiFation for a Zar" The media·s direFt inflXenFe on deFision-maNers is Fonsiderabl\ Xnder-researFhed +oZeYer as reFogni]ed b\ YarioXs sFholars this line of researFh faFes a maMor obstaFle namel\ the diffiFXlt\ of aF- FXratel\ measXring media inflXenFe SpeFifiFall\ “researFhers Fan- not direFtl\ obserYe inflXenFe oFFXrring Zithin the minds of poliF\ maNers and the mXltitXde of faFtors inflXenFing an\ giYen deFision FompliFates efforts to measXre the preFise impaFt media has”9 In addition sXFh an anal\sis reTXires the assessment of man\ faFtors inYolYed in the aFtXal deFision-maNing proFess bXt these are often not aFFessible for reasons of national seFXrit\ )Xrthermore teFh- nologiFal adYanFes mean there is noZ a Zide arra\ of media t\pes neZspapers teleYision internet etF ZhiFh adds to the diffiFXlties of asFertaining the speFifiF effeFt on deFision-maNers of partiFXlar media forms In order to oYerFome sXFh methodologiFal diffiFXlties 5obinson proposes distingXishing media impaFts at tZo different leYels sXb- stantiYe and proFedXral At the sXbstantiYe leYel media inflXenFe is related to the initial phases of the foreign poliF\ deFision-maNing proFess in terms of media eYalXations of the MXstifiFations and ra- tionale of foreign poliF\ deFisions In Fontrast the proFedXral leYel is related to media inflXenFe on the aFtXal implementation of an\ foreign poliF\ deFision The literatXre proYides eYidenFe that the media are more inflXential at the proFedXral than sXbstantiYe leYel althoXgh media inflXenFe on foreign poliF\ deFision-maNers is also possible at the sXbstantiYe leYel 5obinson for e[ample argXes that media inflXenFe is more liNel\ in Fases of hXmanitarian Frises as long as this does not go against Zell-established goYernment poliF\ In short the elitist model reMeFts the idea of a media independent from the politiFal elites shaping pXbliF opinion andor pressXring 9 Gilboa,“Media-Broker Diplomacy: When Journalists Became Mediators”, p. 39; Robinson, “The Role of Media and Public Opinion”, p. 146. 10 Robinson, “The Role of Media and Public Opinion”, p. 146. 11 Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention, (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 25-35. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 123 Işık Gürleyen poliF\ maNers Zhile the plXralist model aFFepts the media·s inflX- enFe on foreign poliF\ bXt maNes tZo important distinFtions )irst it distingXishes betZeen the media in demoFratiF soFieties and aX- thoritarian regimes Zhere the media are striFtl\ Fontrolled SeFond it differentiates betZeen tZo leYels of media inflXenFe sXbstantiYe and proFedXral and betZeen the YarioXs meFhanisms throXgh ZhiFh the media e[ert their inflXenFe %ased on the literatXre it might be e[peFted that the media ZoXld haYe some degree of inflXenFe oYer foreign poliF\ deFision maNers in TXrNe\ assXming that it is a demoFratiF FoXntr\ partiFXlarl\ in Fases ZhiFh reTXire the inYolYement of the armed forFes +oZeYer it is partiFXlarl\ diffiFXlt to e[amine the media·s impaFt in TXrNe\ as the TXrNish foreign poliF\-maNing proFess remains ¶a blaFN-bo[· for anal\sts )or this reason this stXd\ is limited to reYealing the media·s priming and framing effeFts on the goYernment·s foreign poliF\ b\ foFXsing on the Fase of /ib\a To do this it first identifies the neZs media framings FonFerning the /ib\an Frisis Then it inYestigates hoZ the media in TXrNe\ Zere able to prepare and direFt pXbliF opinion regarding the issXes on ZhiFh A.3 foreign poliF\ Zas to be MXdged SXFh data are XsefXl for testing the elitist model in order to demonstrate Zhether or not the role of TXrNish media is in faFt limited to transmitting information from poliF\ maNers to the pXbliF As for the plXralist model there ma\ be YarioXs effeFts of the media on deFision-maNers as this per- speFtiYe assXmes that media haYing an independent position from poliF\ maNers in demoFraFies Among these mXltiple effeFts in this Fase priming and framing effeFts are anal\]ed beFaXse independ- enFe is a neFessar\ bXt not sXffiFient Fondition for media inflXenFe it also reTXires in-depth anal\sis of deFision-maNing proFess ThXs fXtXre stXdies Fan bXild on the findings of this stXd\ b\ measXr- ing the media·s inflXenFe on the foreign poliF\ deFision-maNers in TXrNe\ and Fan demonstrate Zhether it limits the poliF\ alternatiYes aYailable to deFision-maNers or has stronger inflXenFes sXFh as forFing a Fertain poliF\ on politiFal leaders /LE\D&ULVLVDQGWKH$WWLWXGHRIWKH7XUNLVK*RYHUQPHQW TXrNe\·s relations Zith modern /ib\a haYe been flXFtXated sinFe 99 Zhen &olonel 4addafi tooN poZer Despite deep-rooted 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 124 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya historiFal relations and soFio-FXltXral affinities bilateral relations Zere TXite Xnstable sometimes leading to serioXs Frises3 There are YarioXs faFtors that might aFFoXnt for these Xnstable relations sXFh as TXrNe\·s allianFe Zith :estern FoXntries partiFXlarl\ its Flose relations Zith the 8SA /ib\ans· resentments regarding the 2ttoman past and the personal traits of 4addafi 1eYertheless eFonomiF Fooperation Zas frXitfXl dXring periods of rapproFhe- ment and TXrNe\·s FonserYatiYe politiFians in partiFXlar soXght to improYe politiFal and eFonomiF relations b\ referring to Fommon religioXs YalXes4 Similarl\ to the FonFerns of the TXrgXt g]al goYernments of the 98s eFonomiF Fonsiderations onFe again beFame the driYing forFe of TXrNish foreign poliF\ in the aftermath of the seYere Frisis in As eFonomiF ambitions dominated the A.3·s foreign poliF\ after it tooN poZer in the FoXntries in the 0iddle (ast Zere regarded as an alternatiYe destination to :estern marNets partiFX- larl\ b\ the FonserYatiYe bXsiness FommXnit\ ZhiFh formed the Yoting base of the A.3 +oZeYer there Zere politiFal and FXltXral Fomponents as Zell partiFXlarl\ after Ahmet DaYXtoĊlX beFame the 0inister of )oreign Affairs As .ahraman notes there are simi- larities betZeen A.3·s FXrrent aFtiYism and engagement in the 0id- dle (ast region Zith the foreign poliF\ of the 99s in that A.3 has a strategiF Yision Zith “a long-term regional hegemoniF proMeFt”7 12 The Ottoman Empire ruled Libya from 1551 to 1911, although this was not always di- rect rule. For a detailed historical account of bilateral relations between Turkey and Libya, see Orhan Koloğlu, 500 Years in Turkish-Libyan Relations,(Ankara: Center for Strategic Re- search, 2007). 13 For instance, Qaddafi apparently insulted Turkey in 1996 during an official visit by the then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. Stephen Kinzer “Tirade by Qaddafi Stuns Turkey’s Premier”, New York Times, 9 October 1996.http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/09/world/ tirade-by-qaddafi-stuns-turkey-s-premier.html (accessed 15 May 2013). 14 Official visits were paid by political parties with conservative and/or Islamist roots. Turkish Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations- with-libya.en.mfa (accessed 17 May 2013). 15 Kemal Kirişçi explains this process with the concept of ‘trading state’ and argues that Tur- key’s process of becoming a trading state started in the 1980s, but was interrupted by preva- lence of traditional factors, such as military-political and territorial ones. Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspec- tives on Turkey, Vol. 40, 2009, pp: 29-57. 16 Özlem Tür, “Economic Relations with the Middle East under the AKP—Trade, Business Community and Reintegration with Neighbouring Zones”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2011, pp. 591-595. 17 Sevilay Kahraman, “Turkey and the European Union in the Middle East: Reconciling or Competing with Each Other?”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 12, No.4, 2011,p. 701. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 125 Işık Gürleyen In line Zith these Fhanges to TXrNe\·s traditional foreign poliF\ in the 0iddle (ast that had an imprint of its :estern allianFe8 the A.3 goYernment also adopted an eFonomiFall\-oriented poliF\ that enYisaged stronger ties Zith 4addafi·s /ib\a Zhen it first Fame to poZer in This friendl\ relationship peaNed dXring the third (8-AfriFa SXmmit in Zhen TXrNe\·s 3rime 0inister 5eFep Ta\\ip (rdoĊan reFeiYed the 4addafi +Xman 5ights AZard as the gXest of honor9 AltXn×ċ×N and 0artin argXe that A.3·s attempts to Fhange TXrNish foreign poliF\ had to be tested in order to “see Zhether TXrNe\ Xnder the A.3 has aFTXired the poZer to inflXenFe the direFtion of deYelopments in the >0iddle (ast@ region” The /ib\a Frisis and the 1AT2 militar\ interYention haYe proYided sXFh test and it proYed that TXrNe\ is not read\ to meet the Fhallenges stemming from the region and to Fontrol the FoXrse of eYents :hen the popXlar Xnrest of the Arab Spring shooN the e[isting aX- thoritarian regimes in the 0iddle (ast and 1orth AfriFa TXrNish for- eign poliF\-maNers Zere sloZ to sXpport the protesters demanding the oYerthroZ of their goYernments SXFh a hesitant reaFtion Zas Flearl\ eYident folloZing the oXtbreaN of protests and sXbseTXent YiolenFe in /ib\a 3robabl\ diFtated b\ politiFal and eFonomiF Fon- Ferns the TXrNish goYernment not onl\ Zas hesitant to sXpport the Xprisings bXt also strongl\ opposed militar\ operations Xrged b\ 1AT2 allies most of all b\ )ranFe These operations Zere Farried oXt Xnder the aXthorit\ of 8nited 1a- tions SeFXrit\ &oXnFil 81S& 5esolXtion 973 dated 7 0arFh in referenFe to &hapter 9II of the 8nited 1ations &harter This MXstified the aXthori]ation of enforFement measXres and imposing a no-fl\ ]one oYer /ib\a ([plaining the reasons for 1AT2 militar\ aF- tion in /ib\a the SeFretar\ *eneral of 1AT2 Anders )ogh 5asmXs- 18 Altunışık and Martin argue that the alterations that the AKP government made in Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern countries were largely products of domestic fac- tors. Meliha B. Altunışık and Lenore G. Martin, “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2011, pp. 569-587. 19 İbrahim Varlık, “Erdoğan receives Gaddafi Human Rights Award”,Today’s Zaman,1 Decem- ber 2010 http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=228386 (accessed 17 May 2013). 20 Altunışık and Martin, “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP”, p.584. 21 Ibid, pp. 583-584. 22 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, 17 March 2011, http://www.un.org/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973%282011%29 (accessed 30 March 2013). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 126 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya sen stated that “:e tooN aFtion in /ib\a beFaXse Ze haYe a strong mandate from the SeFXrit\ &oXnFil and solid sXpport from FoXn- tries in the region That is a XniTXe Fombination ZhiFh Ze haYe not seen elseZhere”3 +oZeYer this statement Zas at odds Zith TXr- Ne\·s position dXring the earlier phases of the Frisis in /ib\a Zhen some 1AT2 members first broXght the AllianFe·s inYolYement on to the agenda TXrNe\ in Fontrast to some of the allies argXed against the neFessit\ of militar\ operations toZards /ib\a in general or a possible role for 1AT2 in partiFXlar The A.3 opposed an international militar\ interYention in /ib\a from the beginning of the Xprisings Xntil the mid-0arFh (rdoĊan boldl\ deFlared his opposition to an\ militar\ inYolYement in the /ib\an Frisis emphasi]ing the differenFe of opinion Zith other 1AT2 member leaders As he argXed « Zhat has 1AT2 to do Zith /ib\a" 1AT2·s interYention in /ib\a is oXt of the TXestion 1AT2 Fan bring sXFh a thing to the agenda in Fase of an interYention against one of its members Apart from this hoZ Fan there be interYention against /ib\a" « As TXrNe\ Ze are against this sXFh a thing Fannot be disFXssed Fannot be Fonsidered4 The TXrNish goYernment stated its FonFerns that a militar\ interYen- tion ZoXld e[aFerbate the sitXation in /ib\a and ZoXld generate negatiYe reaFtions in the 0iddle (ast and 1orth AfriFa +oZeYer in the sXbseTXent phases of the Frisis TXrNe\ Zas forFed to shift its position and to Fhange its opposition to militar\ interYention later eYen deFiding to taNe part in 1AT2-led hXmanitarian operations in mid-0arFh It has been argXed that TXrNish goYernment Zas Fompelled ¶to shift its priorities from ties Zith the e[isting regimes to popXlar demands and e[peFtations· TZo faFtors ma\ aFFoXnt for this shift in position AlthoXgh 81S& 5esolXtion 973 Zas giYen as the offiFial reason it Zas also Flaimed that a ¶)renFh IDLWDFFRPSOL· 23 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and the Arab Spring”, New York Times, 31 May 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/opinion/01iht-edrasmussen01.html?_r=0 (accessed 02 May 2013). 24 Benitez, Jorge, “Turkey rules out NATO intervention in Libya”, 28 February 2011, http:// www.acus.org/natosource/turkey-rules-out-nato-intervention-libya (accessed 21 June 2012). 25 Kahraman,“Turkey and the European Union in the Middle East: Reconciling or Competing with Each Other?”, p. 712. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 127 Işık Gürleyen had FaXsed tensions Zithin 1AT2 that had had to be oYerFome b\ other members in partiFXlar the 8nited States Zho had FonYinFed the TXrNish goYernment to Fhange its position 5egardless of the FaXses of sXFh poliF\ Fhanges the deFision to interYene in the /ib\an Frisis proYides a YalXable opportXnit\ to Xn- derstand the role pla\ed b\ the media in the foreign poliF\ deFision- maNing proFess in TXrNe\ This stXd\ maNes Xse of the opportXnit\ presented b\ the shifting positions of the A.3 goYernment on TXr- Ne\·s partiFipation in the 1AT2-led interYention in /ib\a and anal\- ses media framings in order to reYeal Zhether the TXrNish media maintained an independent perspeFtiYe from the goYernment To do this the folloZing seFtion identifies the positions of YarioXs Fol- Xmnists in the most Zidel\ distribXted neZspapers before and after the Fhange in the goYernment·s /ib\a poliF\ The anal\sis foFXses on foXr alternatiYe poliF\ options aFtiYe sXpport for 4addafi non- inYolYement mediation betZeen the opposition and 4addafi and sXpport for the insXrgents 0HGLD)UDPLQJV5HJDUGLQJ1$72OHG0LOLWDU\ 2SHUDWLRQVLQ/LE\D 2n the sXbstantiYe leYel the A.3 goYernment had the foXr poliF\ alternatiYes mentioned aboYe AFtiYe inYolYement inFlXded arms sXpplies to the insXrgents training or the direFt Xse of forFe in militar\ operations against 4addafi forFes AlthoXgh it Zas neYer oYertl\ e[pressed and Fonsidered morall\ XnaFFeptable sXpport- ing 4addafi Zas another possible poliF\ preferenFe The A.3 goY- ernment FoXld haYe Fhosen to proYide militar\ assistanFe to help 4addafi sXppress the rebels 2n the proFedXral leYel the alterna- tiYes relate to the teFhniFal aspeFts of militar\ operations Zhether the\ shoXld be restriFted to a no-fl\ ]one or e[tended to inFlXde bombing the militar\ headTXarters of 4addafi·s forFes or eYen a fXll-sFale interYention 26 Immediately after the French efforts to carry out air strikes against Libya, Egemen Bağış, Minister and Chief Negotiator for EU Talks, criticized French President Nicolas Sarkozy for exploiting Libya for political gains. Referring to the air strikes on Libya, Bağış stated that ‘a European leader began his election campaign by organizing a meeting that led to a process of air strikes against Libya. He has acted before a NATO decision and his act was based on his subjective evaluation of a United Nations resolution’. Egemen Bağış, 22 March 2011, http://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/30711--a-leader-of-an-eu-country-tries-to-begin-a-process- that-is-against-internatinal-laws--bagis (accessed 21 June 2012). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 128 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya This seFtion anal\]es media framings regarding these poliF\ alter- natiYes at both leYels )irst it foFXses on hoZ the /ib\an Frisis Zas framed one Fontrast is betZeen framing the Frisis as /ib\a·s inter- nal affairs meaning that TXrNe\·s role shoXld be either non-inYolYe- ment or mediation YersXs inYoNing the responsibilit\ of the inter- national FommXnit\ inFlXding TXrNe\ meaning TXrNe\ shoXld taNe part in an\ militar\ interYention SeFond it foFXses on the e[tent to ZhiFh the media implied that if TXrNe\·s inYolYement is sXpport- ed it shoXld engage in fXll-sFale or restriFted militar\ operations These media framings are also eYalXated in relation to the soXrFes· ideologiFal positions Zhether Islamist or seFXlar in terms of their liNelihood to sXpport TXrNe\·s inYolYement in /ib\a After identif\ing the media framings on these issXes the priming role of the media is anal\]ed to identif\ the Ninds of FritiFism direFted against A.3 poliF\ on the Frisis and the Friteria that the media offered for the TXrNish pXbliF to MXdge the goYernment·s foreign poliF\ In order to determine the positions of the FolXmnists all artiFles related to the /ib\a Frisis Zere anal\]ed before and after the dra- matiF Fhange in the TXrNish goYernment·s position All releYant arti- Fles betZeen )ebrXar\ and 3 0arFh Zere anal\]ed for the folloZing dail\ papers 5adiNal 0illi\et +rri\et =aman and 2Yerall the seleFted FolXmnists agreed that the 4addafi regime Zas a brXtal diFtatorship that oXght to be ended and the\ all sXp- 27 The Turkish media reflects the main political polarization between secular and Islamist actors. While the secular media were strong opponents of the AKP foreign policy in the first period of AKP rule (2002-2007), this opposition was suppressed in the second and third periods. There have been unprecedented heavy fines on oppositional media conglom- erate (Doğan Media Group) on alleged tax dodging. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/ domestic/11336001_p.asp (accessed 21 June 2012)There has been massive self-censorship as well as firing of anchormen and women, mainly critical of the AKP policies. Certainly, such claims of government censorship cannot be verified, however, there are domestic and international concerns. For instance, European Commission in its annual Progress Report in 2012 states that ‘(…) freedom of media continued to be further restricted in practice. The increasing tendency to imprison journalists, media workers and distributers fuelled these concerns.’European Commission, Turkey 2012 Progress Report, 10.10.2012, pp.21-22. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 129 Işık Gürleyen ported the popXlar Xprisings to topple his regime +oZeYer the\ disagreed on both the legitimaF\ of interYention and on the A.3 goYernment·s performanFe in dealing Zith the Frisis If the folloZing anal\sis shoZs that the TXrNish media·s position Fhanged in line Zith shifts in the A.3 goYernment·s position then this Zill indiFate that it pla\ed a role Fonsistent Zith the elitist model ie transmitting information from the offiFials to the masses rather than the plXralist model ie aFting as an inflXenFe to Fhange goYernment poliF\ Non-involvement versus military intervention The TXrNish media Zas diYided on both the form and Fonte[t of TXrNe\·s inYolYement in the /ib\an Frisis 2n the one side Zere Fol- Xmnists Zho framed it as a hXmanitarian issXe that the interna- tional FommXnit\ had a responsibilit\ to respond to and praised the 81S& resolXtion on hXmanitarian groXnds8 In their YieZ this resolXtion Zas analogoXs to earlier deFisions on %osnia +er]egoYi- na and .osoYo more than Afghanistan and IraT ThXs the\ eTXated opposition to militar\ operations as taNing sides Zith 4addafi be- FaXse ending operations ZoXld proYide an opportXnit\ for him to strengthen his position The\ also argXed that non-inYolYement and non-partiFipation in 1AT2·s operations ZoXld ZorN against TXr- Ne\·s national interest as the\ Fonsidered its strength to stem from its membership of the :estern allianFe9 At the same time hoZeYer sXFh positiYe argXments Zere also aF- Fompanied b\ FaXtion oYer idealistiF e[peFtations 2ne FolXmnist for e[ample distingXished betZeen the hXmanitarian and politiFal motiYes of militar\ interYention in terms of preYenting FatastrophiF FiYilian losses YersXs oYer throZing 4addafi )or this FolXmnist the legitimaF\ of the operations ZoXld beFome doXbtfXl in Fase of pro- longed resistanFe b\ 4addafi3 2ther FolXmnists Fontrasted the /ib\an Fase to the :est·s general indifferenFe to preYioXs hXmani- tarian Frises in order to sXggest that the :estern FoXntries· interest 28 Ferai Tınç, “Libya’da kuru kabadayılığın anlamı yok”, Hürriyet, 28 February 2011; Sami Kohen, “Yaptırımlar neye yarar?”, Milliyet, 28 February 2011, “Çelişkiler dünyası”, Milliyet, 22 March 2011; Kadri Gürsel, “Bu savaş başladığı gibi bitmeyebilir”, Milliyet, 21 March 2011. 29 Cengiz Çandar, “Türkiye, Kaddafi’nin ‘utanç müttefiki’ mi?”,Radikal, 22 March 2011, “Türkiyeve Bölgede ‘özgürlük alevleri’…”, 26 March 2011. 30 Kadri Gürsel, “Bu savaş başladığı gibi bitmeyebilir”, 21 March 2011. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 130 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya in /ib\a FoXld be e[plained in terms of their oil-related eFonomiF interests3 +oZeYer not all Zriters sXpported interYention b\ the international FommXnit\ Some reMeFted international interYention Xnder the 81 Xmbrella on the groXnds that it ZoXld be an abXse of the 81 that ZoXld lead to a :estern inYasion of /ib\a Those FolXmnists Zho perFeiYed the Arab Spring as a means for reali]ing Zhat the\ YieZed as :estern imperialist designs in the 0iddle (ast and 1orth AfriFa praised the TXrNish goYernment·s initial position of non-inYolYement in militar\ operations The\ argXed that an\ interYention inFlXding an eFonomiF embargo ZoXld solel\ serYe the interests of the 8nit- ed States Israel and other :estern states In strong sXpport of the goYernment·s position the\ reformXlated (rdoĊan·s TXestion asN- ing Zhat bXsiness 1AT2 has in /ib\a as ¶Zhat bXsiness the 8nited States and (Xrope haYe in /ib\a· The\ Fonsidered that based on the preYioXs e[perienFe of IraT the deFision to Freate a no-fl\ ]one oYer /ib\a merel\ represented an e[FXse to masN the :est·s ob- MeFtiYe of oFFXpation3 )or e[ample .aragl sXggested that /ib\a ZoXld beFome another IraT argXing that the 8nited States the 8nited .ingdom and )ranFe Zere e[ploiting the need for hXmani- tarian assistanFe as a prete[t to implement imperialist poliFies to Fontrol /ib\a·s energ\ resoXrFes Flaiming that 81 deFisions FoXld not proYide legitimaF\ in this Fase33 +e therefore opposed TXrNe\·s partiFipation in the 1AT2-led operations34 Another FolXmnist op- posed to militar\ operations %iliFi argXed that )ranFe had Xnder- mined the legitimaF\ of the 81S& resolXtion and Flaimed that the :est·s “one-sided and Xnprepared” operations had pXt at risN the liYes of millions of people3 The FhoiFe betZeen limited or fXll-sFale inYolYement reFeiYed the least attention among TXrNish foreign poliF\ FolXmnists Some of 31 Sami Kohen, “Dünya Libya için ne yapabilir?”, Milliyet, 26 February 2011, “Çelişkiler dünyası”, 22 March 2011. 32 İbrahim Karagül, “Petro-dolarlar ve silahlar sizi nasıl kurtarsın şimdi!”,Yeni Şafak, 24 Febru- ary 2011, “Akdeniz’de aç kurtlar dolaşıyor, dikkat!.. ”, 25 February 2011, “Libya’yı işgal: Öfke Avrupa’yı vuracak! ”, 2 March 2011, “Libya’yı işgal: Yeni bir Ömer Muhtar çıkacak..”, 3 March 2011. 33 İbrahim Karagül, “Çekiç Güç: Libya Irak mı olacak?”, Yeni Şafak, 10 March 2011; “Bizi aptal mı sandınız siz?”, 22 March 2011. 34 İbrahim Karagül, “Bu öfke Fransa’yı çok kötü çarpacak! ”, Yeni Şafak, 23 March 2011, “Yüzyıllık hesap bu, farkında mısınız?”, 24 March 2011, “Türkiye, çok acil bir müdahale gücü kursun!”, 29 March 2011, “Aynı utancı bir kez daha yaşamayalım”, 5 April 2011. 35 Abdülhamit Bilici, “Sarkozy’nin Şovu, Türkiye’nin Kaygısı?”, Zaman, 22 March 2011. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 131 Işık Gürleyen those in faYor of militar\ interYention disFXssed the teFhniFal as- peFts of this option argXing that the 81S&·s deFision to impose a no-fl\ ]one oYer /ib\a had been inYalidated beFaXse 4addafi·s forFes Zere also targeted The failXre of the no-fl\ ]one poliF\ also raised the issXe of assisting the rebels ZhiFh ZoXld also be against the 81S& deFision3 )inall\ there Zere also FritiFisms regarding FiYilian losses dXring the international air operations37 Priming The priming role of the media in this Fase is related to their Friti- Fisms of A.3·s foreign poliF\ in /ib\a Frisis In addition to the aboYe framings FolXmnists eYalXated the adYantages and disadYantages of the A.3 goYernment·s poliF\ toZards /ib\a These indiFate the benFhmarNs presented b\ the media to eYalXate the goYernment·s foreign poliF\ performanFe 0edia reporting on the /ib\an Frisis proYided both MXstifiFations and FritiFisms of goYernment deFisions emplo\ing tZo basiF per- formanFe Friteria The first Zas its sXFFess in defending TXrNish nationals and inYestments in /ib\a Zhile the seFond Zas strength- ening TXrNe\·s regional leadership role The goYernment Zas gen- erall\ praised for its sXFFessfXl eYaFXation of TXrNish Fiti]ens from /ib\a38 The onl\ e[Feption to this Zas .adri *rsel Zho Flaimed that the sXFFessfXl eYaFXation FoXld not be attribXted to the goY- ernment itself bXt Zas rather the sXFFess of the bXreaXFraF\39 Re- garding other aspeFts of the goYernment·s /ib\a poliF\ hoZeYer there Zere diYerging perFeptions 2ne of the main differenFes Fon- Ferned the impliFations of the TXrNish goYernment·s inFonsistent stanFe &ontradiFtions in goYernment poliF\ toZards /ib\a Zere noted b\ the maMorit\ of FolXmnists Zith three different FontradiFtions being 36 Sami Kohen, “Libya’da ucu açık belirsizlik dönemi”, Milliyet, 21 March 2011; “Libya ikile- mi”, 1 April 2011. 37 Sami Kohen, “Libya’da ucu açık belirsizlik dönemi”, Milliyet, 21 March 201; “Çelişkiler dünyası”, 22 March 2011. 38 Ferai Tınç, “Libya’da kuru kabadayılığın anlamı yok”, Hürriyet, 28 February 2011; İbrahim Karagül, “Petro-dolarlar ve silahlar sizi nasıl kurtarsın şimdi!”, Yeni Şafak, 24 February 2011; Sami Kohen, “Libyalı çocukların sesi…”, Milliyet, 10 March 2011, “Ortadoğu’daki değişim Türkiye için fırsat mı sıkıntı mı?”, 28 March 2011; Abdülhamit Bilici, “Türkiye Kaddafi’nin Yanında mı?”, Zaman, 05 March 2011. 39 Kadri Gürsel, “Sahiden, sizin Libya’da ne işiniz var?”, Milliyet, 23 March 2011. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 132 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya highlighted in partiFXlar The first FonFerned FontradiFtor\ state- ments b\ different Fabinet members ¶In his speeFh in AnNara \es- terda\ the 3rime 0inister argXed that this position >the Xnified in- ternational position on the 81 ResolXtion@ and the SeFXrit\ &oXnFil resolXtion Zas sFathing +oZeYer )oreign 0inister DaYXtoĊlX has said that TXrNe\ Zill taNe part in the implementation of the &oXnFil·s deFision ZhiFh also reYeals a FontradiFtion in the goYernment·s attitXde on this issXe·4 SeFondl\ the goYernment Zas FritiFi]ed for folloZing an inFonsistent poliF\ toZards /ib\a and other Arab FoXntries in that althoXgh TXrNe\ Zas taNing a pro-Fhange position on the Arab Spring in general this Zas FontradiFted b\ its /ib\a poliF\4 The final FritiFism FonFerned the inFonsistenF\ of poliF\ oYer time ZhiFh beFame a media prime for MXdging goYernment poliF\ )or instanFe *rsel Flaimed that the /ib\a poliF\ Fontained FontradiFtions despite goYernment statements aboXt folloZing a prinFipled foreign poliF\ +e also argXed that a prinFipled foreign poliF\ reTXired Fondemnation of 4addafi before the international operation deFision Zas taNen in order to be Fonsistent and inflXen- tial4 “+oZeYer b\ opposing the interYention initiall\ the A.3 goY- ernment sided Zith the statXs TXo”43 *rsel noted that the TXrNish goYernment tooN a strong moral position against Israeli sXppres- sion of 3alestinians bXt apparentl\ forgot this regarding the repres- siYe poliFies of Arab regimes toZards their oZn Fiti]ens44 AlthoXgh the FolXmnists agreed that goYernment poliF\ Zas inFon- sistent there Zere differenFes of opinion on the FaXses and impli- Fations of this inFonsistenF\ 2n the one hand a minorit\ of Fol- Xmnists offered rationali]ations for this )irst there Zas an attempt to e[plain that the FaXtioXs stanFe in /ib\a had been motiYated b\ a Zish to proteFt TXrNish ZorNers and inYestments4 +oZeYer it 40 Sami Kohen, “Yaptırımlar neye yarar?”, Milliyet, 28 February 2011. 41 Ferai Tınç, “Libya’da kuru kabadayılığın anlamı yok”, Hürriyet, 28 February 2011; Sami Ko- hen, “Libyalı çocukların sesi…”, Milliyet, 10 March 2011, “Ortadoğu’daki değişim Türkiye için fırsat mı sıkıntı mı?”, 28 March 2011; Kadri Gürsel, “Sahiden, sizin Libya’da ne işiniz var?”, Milliyet, 23 March 2011. 42 Kadri Gürsel, “Bu savaş başladığı gibi bitmeyebilir”, Milliyet, 21 March 2011. 43 Kadri Gürsel, “Boşluktaki Türk dış politikası”, Milliyet, 30 March 2011. 44 Kadri Gürsel, “Sahiden, sizin Libya’da ne işiniz var?”, Milliyet, 23 March 2011. 45 Cengiz Çandar, “Libya: Osmanlı dominosu…”, Radikal, 22 February 2011, “Kaddafi’yi dinlerken, Türkiye’yi (ve İran’ı) izlerken…”, 23 February 2011; FeraiTınç, “ “Libya’da kuru kabadayılığın anlamı yok”, Hürriyet, 28 February 2011; Sami Kohen, “Libyalı çocukların sesi…”, Milliyet, 10 March 2011, “Ortadoğu’daki değişim Türkiye için fırsat mı sıkıntı mı?”, 28 March 2011; Abdülhamit Bilici, “Sarkozy’nin Şovu, Türkiye’nin Kaygısı?”, Zaman, 22 March 2011. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 133 Işık Gürleyen Zas also argXed that this inFonsistent or FaXtioXs poliF\ Zas onl\ MXstifiable Xntil the eYaFXation of TXrNish nationals from /ib\a had been Fompleted in order to aYoid possible retaliation against them b\ 4addafi4 Another argXment Zas that the inFonsistent poliF\ Zas natXral as part of a Fase-b\-Fase approaFh :hile the goYern- ment opposed an embargo beFaXse it prediFted that it ZoXld haYe a negatiYe impaFt on /ib\a·s popXlation it also opposed militar\ operations beFaXse of the insXrgents· opposition :estern interest in /ib\an oil and lessons learnt from preYioXs Fases liNe Afghani- stan47 2n the other hand the maMorit\ of FolXmnists FritiFi]ed sXFh inFon- sistenFies +oZeYer the\ did not Fomment mXFh on the impaFt of this Zhether as the neFessar\ resXlt of a Fase-b\-Fase approaFh or as a faFtor that FoXld Xndermine TXrNish foreign poliF\ in general 2Yerall the goYernment·s inFonsistenF\ Zas mainl\ FritiFi]ed for its oZn saNe rather than for its perFeiYed negatiYe impliFations for TXrNish national interests &olXmnists also FritiFi]ed A.3·s inFonsistent poliF\ for Xndermin- ing TXrNe\·s moral leadership aspirations48 argXing that the Arab Spring proYided an opportXnit\ for TXrNe\ to pla\ a more aFtiYe role in the 0iddle (ast and 1orth AfriFa The\ Flaimed that the goYern- ment·s inFonsistent poliFies Zere maNing it diffiFXlt for TXrNe\ to pla\ that desired role of regional leadership49 )or e[ample T×no argXed that A.3·s inFonsistent poliFies Zere Xndermining TXrNe\·s potential role in post-4addafi /ib\a as the A.3 goYernment Zas opposing international operations eYen Zhile /ib\an insXrgents Zere demanding e[ternal assistanFe Some FolXmnists FritiFi]ed the goYernment·s /ib\a poliF\ from a hXmanitarian perspeFtiYe )or instanFe .ohen stated that goYern- ment had been too pragmatiF in /ib\a rather than Fonforming to 46 Ferai Tınç, “Ne isyancılara ne Kaddafi’ye yaranabildik”,Hürriyet , 25 March 2011; Sami Ko- hen, “Libyalı çocukların sesi…”, Milliyet, 10 March 2011, “Ortadoğu’daki değişim Türkiye için fırsat mı sıkıntı mı?”, 28 March 2011. 47 Abdülhamit Bilici, “Türkiye Kaddafi’nin Yanında mı?”, Zaman, 5 March 2011; “Ortadoğu’nun BOP’u?” 26 March 2011. 48 Cengiz Çandar, “Türkiye, Kaddafi’nin ‘utanç müttefiki’ mi?”, Radikal, 22 March 2011. 49 Sami Kohen, “Ortadoğu’daki değişim Türkiye için fırsat mı sıkıntı mı?”, Milliyet, 28 March 2011. 50 Ferai Tınç, “Ne isyancılara ne Kaddafi’ye yaranabildik”, Hürriyet, 25 March 2011. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 134 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya the prinFiple of sXpporting all popXlar Xprisings against diFtators :riting as one faYoring inYolYement in the Frisis .ohen FritiFi]ed (rdoĊan·s opposition to an embargo &ommenting on (rdoĊan·s opposition to international interYention .ohen FonFeded that the best regime Fhange happens throXgh domestiF d\namiFs bXt added that in FoXntries liNe /ib\a the aim of foreign interYention shoXld not be regime Fhange bXt rather hXmanitarian aid to proteFt the loFal popXlation against the atroFities of diFtators .ohen noted the Fhange in international perFeptions regarding the traditional FonFept of national soYereignt\ sXggesting that dela\ing hXmani- tarian interYention onFe the TXrNish ZorNers had been resFXed Zas XnMXstifiable3 A fXrther obMeFtion Zas raised against the 3rime 0inister·s FritiFism of :estern FoXntries· sXpposed indifferenFe b\ noting that both the 81·s embargo deFision and 1AT2·s no-fl\ ]one plan had both been reMeFted b\ TXrNe\4 AFFording to .ohen for e[ample the :est·s deFision to interYene militaril\ and its Zillingness to taNe aF- tion despite the risNs Zere fXrther proof of the international FolleF- tiYe FonsFienFe .ohen also noted that the TXrNish goYernment had Fhanged from its FaXtioXs position folloZing the 81 deFision to aXthori]e militar\ operations A final inFonsistenF\ primed b\ the media FonFerned S\ria The faFt that Assad had begXn to aFt in a similar Za\ to 4addafi Zas seen as haYing negatiYe impliFations for TXrNe\ At the same time FritiFal media YoiFes argXed that TXrNe\·s /ib\a poliF\ might also damage TXrNe\·s reFent good relations Zith S\ria7 *rsel ForreFt- l\ prediFted that S\ria ZoXld beFome TXrNe\·s ne[t FritiFal foreign poliF\ issXe argXing that dXe to S\ria·s pro[imit\ to TXrNe\ and its important role in regional affairs it ZoXld represent a serioXs Fhal- lenge8 51 Sami Kohen, “Yaptırımlar neye yarar?”, Milliyet, 28 February 2011. 52 Sami Kohen, “Karışmalı mı, karışmamalı mı?”, Milliyet, 24 March 2011. 53 Sami Kohen, “Libyalı çocukların sesi…”, Milliyet, 10 March 2011. 54 Sami Kohen, “Ülkeye göre politika”, Milliyet, 17 March 2011. 55 Sami Kohen, “Kaddafi şimdi pes edecek mi?”, Milliyet, 18 March 2011. 56 Cengiz Çandar, “Türkiyeve Bölgede ‘özgürlük alevleri’…”, Radikal, 26 March 2011, “Ortadoğu’nun özgürlük şafağında (Türkiye-Suriye)”, 27 March 2011. 57 Sami Kohen, “Ortadoğu’daki değişim Türkiye için fırsat mı sıkıntı mı?”, Milliyet, 28 March 2011. 58 Kadri Gürsel, “Boşluktaki Türk dış politikası”, Milliyet, 30 March 2011. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 135 Işık Gürleyen &RQFOXVLRQ It Fan be argXed that althoXgh there is an e[tensiYe literatXre on TXrNish foreign poliF\ there has been insXffiFient researFh on the aFtors Zho pla\ a role in the foreign poliF\ deFision-maNing pro- Fess Among man\ reasons for sXFh a laFN of anal\sis is the opaTXe natXre of the deFision-maNing proFesses in TXrNe\ in that there is little aYailable data regarding the faFtors and aFtors inflXenFing for- eign poliF\ deFisions and deFision-maNers )or these reasons this artiFle foFXsed on media framings and their potential impaFt on the deFision-maNing proFess In this Fonte[t this stXd\ determined the differing interpretations of seleFted Fommentators Zithin the TXrNish print media regarding the A.3 goYernment·s FontradiFtor\ and shifting poliFies toZards the Frisis in /ib\a The anal\sis foFXsed on the positions taNen b\ Ne\ foreign poliF\ FolXmnists on tZo issXes The first Zas Zhether TXr- Ne\ shoXld interYene in /ib\an Frisis on hXmanitarian groXnds The seFond FonFerned the sXFFess or not of the A.3 goYernment·s foreign poliF\ The FolXmnists framed the /ib\an Frisis in sharpl\ Fontrasting Za\s in the period from )ebrXar\ to 3 0arFh Zhen the Fase beFame one of the top items on TXrNe\·s foreign poliF\ agenda Re- garding the seFXlar-Islamist speFtrXm there Zere Flear differenFes in MXdgments of the sXFFess of the goYernment regarding the Frisis The FolXmnists in the seFXlar mainstream media sXpported an in- ternational responsibilit\ to interYene and preYent mass Nillings b\ 4addafi forFes on hXmanitarian groXnds Zhile the Islamist media strongl\ opposed an\ interYention on the basis that :estern states Zere motiYated b\ self-interested imperialist goals The aboYe anal\sis proYides some insights regarding media im- paFts on goYernment in the foreign poliF\ deFision-maNing pro- Fess Identif\ing the positions of the media is the first step to Xnder- stand Zhether the\ haYe an\ inflXenFe on foreign poliF\ deFision maNers in TXrNe\ The anal\sis shoZs that the elite model Zas not sXpported in that the media didn·t Fhange position folloZing shifts in the goYernment position thXs it Fan be FonFlXded that Fertain segments of the TXrNish media preserYed their independent posi- tion from the goYernment in the Fase of /ib\a *iYen that the goY- ernment sXbseTXentl\ Fhanged its position this sXggests that the 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 136 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya media ma\ haYe had an impaFt on the deFision-maNers althoXgh the realit\ of sXFh an impaFt Fannot be Yerified at this stage The ne[t step ZoXld be to anal\]e the deFision-maNing proFess and e[plore the media·s effeFts on foreign poliF\ maNers )or noZ it is possible to FonFlXde that the FritiFal stanFes of the seFXlar TXrN- ish media ma\ haYe had onl\ a limited inflXenFe on TXrNish foreign poliF\ maNing led b\ Islamist-rooted A.3 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 137 Işık Gürleyen Bibliography $OWXQ×ü×N 0HOLKD % DQG /HQRUH * 0DUWLQ ´0DNLQJ 6HQVH RI 7XUNLVK)RUHLJQ3ROLF\LQWKH0LGGOH(DVWXQGHU$.3µ7XUNLVK 6WXGLHV9RO1R'HFHPEHUSS %Dù×ü(JHPHQ´$/HDGHURIDQ(8&RXQWU\7ULHVWREHJLQD3UR- FHVVWKDWLVDJDLQVW,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZVµ0DUFKKWWS ZZZDDFRPWUHQQHZVDOHDGHURIDQHXFRXQWU\ WULHVWREHJLQDSURFHVVWKDWLVDJDLQVWLQWHUQDWLQDOODZVEDJ- is. %HQLWH]-RUJH´7XUNH\UXOHVRXW1$72LQWHUYHQWLRQLQ/LE\Dµ )HEUXDU\ KWWS ZZZDFXVRUJQDWRVRXUFHWXUNH\ UXOHVRXWQDWRLQWHUYHQWLRQOLE\D. (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ7XUNH\3URJUHVV5HSRUW *LOERD (\WDQ ´'LSORPDF\ LQ WKH 0HGLD $JH 7KUHH 0RGHOV RI 8VHV DQG (IIHFWVµ 'LSORPDF\ 6WDWHFUDIW 9RO 1R SS BBBBBBBBBBB´7KH&11(IIHFWV 7KH6HDUFKIRUD&RPPXQLFDWLRQ 7KHRU\RI,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQVµ3ROLWLFDO&RPPXQLFDWLRQ9RO 1RSS +DIGHOO6RILD´7XUNH\1$725HODWLRQVDWWKHth$QQLYHUVDU\µ *OREDO3ROLWLFDO7UHQGV&HQWHU3ROLF\8SGDWH1R 0DUFK .DKUDPDQ6HYLOD\´7XUNH\DQGWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQLQWKH0LG- GOH (DVW 5HFRQFLOLQJ RU &RPSHWLQJ ZLWK (DFK 2WKHU"µ7XUNLVK 6WXGLHV9RO1R'HFHPEHUSS .LQ]HU 6WHSKHQ ´7LUDGH E\ 4DGGDIL 6WXQV 7XUNH\·V 3UH- PLHUµ 1HZ .LULüoL.HPDO´7KH7UDQVIRUPDWLRQRI7XUNLVK)RUHLJQ3ROLF\ 7KH5LVHRIWKH7UDGLQJ6WDWHµ1HZ3HUVSHFWLYHVRQ7XUNH\9RO SS .RORùOX2UKDQ 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 138 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Turkish Media Framings of the NATO-Led Intervention in Libya 0LOOHU'HUHN%0HGLD3UHVVXUHRQ)RUHLJQ3ROLF\ 7KH(YROYLQJ 7KHRUHWLFDO)UDPHZRUN 1HZ 5DVPXVVHQ$QGHUV)´1$72DQGWKH$UDE6SULQJµ1HZ 5LFKDUGVRQ-RKQ($QDO\]LQJ1HZVSDSHUV $Q$SSURDFKIURP &ULWLFDO 'LVFRXUVH $QDO\VLV 1HZ 5RELQVRQ 3LHUV ´7KHRUL]LQJ WKH ,QIOXHQFH RI 0HGLD RQ :RUOG 3ROLWLFV 0RGHOVRI0HGLD,QIOXHQFHRQ)RUHLJQ3ROLF\µ(XURSHDQ -RXUQDORI&RPPXQLFDWLRQ9RO1RSS² BBBBBBBBBB7KH&11(IIHFW 7KH0\WKRI1HZV)RUHLJQ3ROLF\DQG ,QWHUYHQWLRQ 1HZ BBBBBBBBBB ´7KH 5ROH RI 0HGLD DQG 3XEOLF 2SLQLRQµ LQ 6WHYH 6PLWK $PHOLD +DGILHOG DQG 7LP 'XQQH HGV )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ 7KHPHV$FWRUV&DVHV 2[IRUG 2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV 6FKHXIHOH'LHWUDP$DQG7HZNVEXU\'DYLG´)UDPLQJ$JHQGD 6HWWLQJDQG3ULPLQJ 7KH(YROXWLRQRI7KUHH0HGLD(IIHFWV0RG- HOVµ-RXUQDORI&RPPXQLFDWLRQ9ROSS 7U g]OHP ´(FRQRPLF 5HODWLRQV ZLWK WKH 0LGGOH (DVW XQGHU WKH $.3³7UDGH %XVLQHVV &RPPXQLW\ DQG 5HLQWHJUDWLRQ ZLWK 1HLJKERXULQJ=RQHVµ7XUNLVK6WXGLHV9RO1R'HFHPEHU SS 7XUNLVK 5HSXEOLF 0LQLVWU\ RI )RUHLJQ $IIDLUV KWWS ZZZPID JRYWUWXUNH\BVSROLWLFDOUHODWLRQVZLWKOLE\DHQPID. 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO 5HVROXWLRQ 0DUFK KWWS ZZZXQRUJJDVHDUFKYLHZBGRFDVS"V\PERO 6 5(6 . 9DUO×N úEUDKLP ´(UGRùDQ 5HFHLYHV *DGGDIL +XPDQ 5LJKWV $ZDUGµ7RGD\·V=DPDQ'HFHPEHUKWWS ZZZWRGD\- V]DPDQFRPQHZV'HWDLOBJHW1HZV%\,GDFWLRQ"QHZV,G 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 139 Internationali]ing Islamophobia Anti-IslamophobiF 3raFtiFes from the RXnn\mede TrXst to the 2rgani]ation of IslamiF &ooperation* Şerif Onur BAHÇECİK** Abstract (speFiall\ sinFe the September attaFNs the position of 0Xslim FommXnities liYing in :estern FoXntries has beFome Xnder foFXs 0an\ 0Xslim politiFal leaders aFtiYists as Zell as sFholars haYe pointed to the e[istenFe of Islamophobia or an irrational fear or preMXdiFe toZards Islam and 0Xslims as the FaXse for disFrimina- tion against 0Xslims The literatXre on Islamophobia has groZn YarioXs goYernmental programs haYe been implemented to repress it Zhile sFholars deYeloped means to measXre it as an attitXde Rather than foFXsing on Islamophobia itself this paper seeNs to shift the foFXs on anti-Islamophobia praFtiFes of YarioXs organi]a- tions espeFiall\ the 2rgani]ation of IslamiF &ooperation It looNs at the emergenFe of anti-IslamophobiF disFoXrse in the 9s hoZ this disFoXrse isolates and problemati]es Islamophobia b\ redeÀning Zhat 0Xslims stand for This paper argXes that anti-IslamophobiF praFtiFes Fannot be simpl\ taNen as a strateg\ to Fombat Islamo- phobia :hile it driYes its legitimaF\ from repression of [enophobia and disFrimination it simXltaneoXsl\ seeNs to goYern b\ promoting Fertain Za\s of soFial Fo-e[istenFe Keywords: Islamophobia International 2rgani]ations 2rgani]a- tion of IslamiF &ooperation *oYernanFe DisFoXrse ĈVODPRIRE\D·\×8OXVODUDUDV×ODċW×UPDN 5XQQ\PHGH9DNI×QGDQ ĈVODPĈċELUOLĊLgUJW·QHĈVODPRIRE\D.DUċ×W×3UDWLNOHU Özet (\ll sald×r×lar×ndan beri %at× toplXmlar×nda \aċa\an 0sl- man toplXmlar×n NonXmX ]erine \ap×lan oal×ċmalar artm×ċt×r 3eN ooN bilim insan× 0slman si\asi lider Ye e\lemFi 0slmanlara \|neliN a\r×mF×l×Ċ×n nedeni olaraN Ĉslamofob\a·\a \a da Ĉslam Ye * An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in Montreal, on March 18, 2011. ** Dr., Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University. Ankara, Turkey. Şerif Onur Bahçecik, Internationalizing Islamophobia: Anti-Islamophobic Practices from the Runnymede Trust to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Ortadoğu Etütleri, Volume 5, No 1, July 2013, pp.141-165. Şerif Onur Bahçecik 0slmanlara \|neliN aN×l d×ċ× NorNX Ye |n\arg×n×n Yarl×Ċ×na diNNat oeNmiċtir %ir \andan Ĉslamofob\a ]erine olan \a]×n b\\p h- NXmetler bX sorXnX ortadan Nald×rmaN ioin oeċitli programlar X\- gXlama\a baċlarNen diĊer \andan da bilim insanlar× bir bire\sel bir tXtXm olaraN Ĉslamofob\a·\× |lome\e giriċmiċlerdir %X oal×ċma ise Ĉslamofob\a ]erine odaNlanmaN \erine oeċitli |rgtlerin Ye |]elliNle de Ĉslam ĈċbirliĊi grgt·nn Ĉslamofob\a Narċ×t× pratiNlerine diNNati oeNme\e oal×ċmaNtad×r dal×ċma 9·l× \×llarda Ĉslamofob\a Narċ×t× s|\lemin orta\a o×N×ċ×n× Ye bX s|\lemin 0slmanlar×n ne\i temsil ettiĊini \eniden tan×mla\araN Ĉslamofob\a·n× nas×l i]ole ettiĊini Ye sorXnsallaċt×rd×Ċ×n× inFelemeNtedir %X oal×ċma Ĉslamofob\a Narċ×t× pratiNlerin basitoe bX olgX\la mFadele etmeN ioin X\gXlanan bir strateMi olaraN g|rleme\eFeĊini iddia eder Ĉslamofob\a meċrXi- \etini \abanF× dċmanl×Ċ× Ye a\r×mF×l×Nla mFadeleden al×rNen a\n× ]amanda belirli toplXmsal bir arada \aċama ċeNillerini |ne o×Nart- maNtad×r $QDKWDU.HOLPHOHU Ĉslamofob\a 8lXslararas× grgtler Ĉslam Ĉċbir- liĊi grgt <|netiċim S|\lem 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 142 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Internationalizing Islamophobia SinFe the September attaFNs on the 8nited States 0Xs- lims liYing in (Xropean and 1orth AmeriFan FoXntries haYe inFreas- ingl\ beFome the foFXs of disFoXrses and praFtiFes of disFrimi- nation seFXriti]ation and stigmati]ation Their presenFe religioXs soFial and politiFal identities haYe been problemati]ed not onl\ b\ opinion leaders and the media bXt also b\ goYernments In a sense this has not been an XnpreFedented phenomenon DisFrimination toZards the “2ther” has XnfortXnatel\ been a reFXrring featXre of hXman soFieties aroXnd the Zorld for FentXries 0Xslims and Asian popXlations liYing in “the :est” haYe been sXbMeFted to stereot\p- ing and preMXdiFe for man\ deFades These praFtiFes haYe long been MXstified on religioXs soFial and FXltXral groXnds ReligioXs identit\ and the ensXing “lifest\les” haYe been sFrXtini]ed long be- fore the September attaFNs The RXshdie Affair in the late 98s the *Xlf :ar in the earl\ 99s 2Nlahoma %ombing in 99 and similar inFidenFes haYe led to periodiF inFreases in the freTXenF\ of hostile praFtiFes toZards those Zho haYe been perFeiYed as 0Xs- lims 1eYertheless September attaFNs haYe beFome a signifi- Fant tXrning point in the intensifiFation of sXFh praFtiFes In the faFe of sXFh Fhallenges opinion leaders sFholars politiFians and others haYe Fome to emplo\ the term “Islamophobia” to FoXnter negatiYe representations of Islam and 0Xslims and to desFribe Zhat the\ haYe seen as the motiYation behind attaFNs on religioXs and FXltXral identit\ Islamophobia simpl\ defined as “fear toZards Islam and FonseTXentl\ 0Xslims” haYe moYed from being a Zord that Zas Xsed in sFholarl\ disFoXrses toZards a term freTXentl\ emplo\ed in politiFal and media disFoXrse It has beFome the main diagnosis of those seeNing to desFribe and Fombat disFrimination against 0Xs- lim popXlations in the :est +oZeYer Islamophobia had its FritiFs as Zell Some haYe argXed that not onl\ the term Zas inappropriate for Zhat it tried to de- sFribe it Zas abXsed b\ some radiFal figXres Zho Zanted to si- lenFe different points of YieZ in the 0Xslim FommXnit\ Some ar- gXed that it Zas an e[aggeration ArgXabl\ it Zas not possible to gaXge Zhether the attaFNs on 0Xslims Zere dXe to their religioXs identit\ or dXe to a more general hostilit\ toZards “foreigners” &rit- iFs haYe also pointed oXt that it is not possible to “measXre” Islam- ophobiF attaFNs beFaXse often the motiYation of the perpetrators Zas not Fertain SXFh interYentions in the formation of the term of 1 Kenan Malik , “Are Muslims hated?,” Index on Censorship, 34, No. 2, 2005, pp. 167-172. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 143 Şerif Onur Bahçecik Islamophobia generated debates that Fentered on Zhat Ze Fan Fall the ontolog\ of Islamophobia That is to sa\ sFholars and others haYe often FonFentrated their disFXssions on problems liNe Zhether Islamophobia e[isted the aFFXraF\ of the term for the phenomena at hand the featXres of Islamophobia and hoZ it Fan be Fredibl\ defined and stabili]ed as a term These disFXssions haYe prodXFed insightfXl and signifiFant stXdies on the sitXation of 0Xslims liYing in the :est :hile these disFXssions Zere most ZelFome in this paper I ZoXld liNe to Fhange the terms of debate on Islamophobia b\ anal\]ing the anti-IslamophobiF disFoXrses and praFtiFes from a different perspeFtiYe In stXd\ing these phenomena rather than limiting oXr- selYes to the searFh for a robXst definition of Islamophobia one FoXld adopt a radiFall\ empiriFal attitXde and looN at hoZ the term is being deplo\ed in different meanings for different pXrposes and Zhat the aFtors are Farr\ing oXt Zhen the\ are Xsing this FonFept This reTXires aFFepting that there are mXltiple Islamophobias :e shoXld foFXs not on e[FlXding the false definitions bXt on the mXl- tiple Xses that this term has been pXt to :e shoXld reFogni]e that Islamophobia is not onl\ a desFriptiYe term Xsed to define sFien- tifiFall\ a set of eYents in soFiet\ It is at the same time a deYiFe operated to maNe possible the goYernment of indiYidXals in a Fer- tain manner In other Zords Ze shoXld see “Islamophobia” and the praFtiFes that seeN to fight against it sXFh as monitoring report- ing lobb\ing for poliFies FonYinFing others maNing statements etF as praFtiFes Fomprising an anti-poliF\ The disFoXrse on Is- lamophobia and praFtiFes that people are engaged in to FoXnter it ie anti-Islamophobia are not onl\ praFtiFes of negation or rights Flaiming The\ do not simpl\ seeN to stop eradiFate and oppose Islamophobia bXt Zhile doing that the\ enFoXrage Fertain behaY- iors The\ enFoXrage the aXdienFes of their statements to YieZ the Zorld in Fertain Za\s the\ prioriti]e Fertain politiFal and soFial sXb- MeFtiYities oYer others the\ FonstitXte the soFial and the politiFal in Fertain Za\s That is to sa\ Ze shoXld looN at not onl\ Zhat is being opposed in the anti-IslamophobiF disFoXrse bXt also hoZ it is opposed In Zhat folloZs I Zill first proYide a disFXssion of some theoretiFal and FonFeptXal tools that Zill be emplo\ed throXghoXt this paper This Zill be folloZed b\ a short histor\ of the term Islamophobia 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 144 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Internationalizing Islamophobia After that I Zill proFeed to an anal\sis of the popXlari]ation of the term Islamophobia b\ the RXnn\mede TrXst In this seFtion I Zill tr\ to shoZ hoZ a term emplo\ed b\ some to desFribe their e[pe- rienFes in mostl\ northern /ondon Fame to be established as a trope in mXltiFXltXralism disFoXrses and then emplo\ed to desFribe sitXations in the 8. Third I Zill looN at the adoption and deplo\- ment of this term b\ international organi]ations sXFh as the 8nited 1ations (Xropean 8nion agenFies and the 2rgani]ation of IslamiF &ooperation %\ folloZing the term Islamophobia in different Fon- te[ts I shoZ not onl\ that there are mXltiple Islamophobias bXt also that Zhen different aFtors adopt this term the\ Xnderstand different things from it bXt perhaps most signifiFantl\ the\ modif\ its Fon- tent in aFFordanFe Zith their oZn proMeFts of goYernanFe &RQFHSWXDO7RROV &onYentional theories of International Relations YieZ global politiFs mostl\ as an interpla\ of Xtilit\-ma[imi]ing states Zhere poZer is Xnderstood as something that Fan be aFFXmXlated and possessed *lobal politiFal norms are often diFtated b\ the most poZerfXl states in the international s\stem and the international institXtions refleFt the distribXtion of poZer Zithin the s\stem3 ReFent post-strXFtXr- alist FontribXtions inspired b\ 0iFhel )oXFaXlt hoZeYer Fhallenge this FonFeptXali]ation of poZer b\ shoZing that modern poZer is not solel\ e[erFised b\ Fentral institXtions sXFh as the state In )oX- FaXlt poZer is not a FapaFit\ that FoXld be possessed bXt rather Xnderstood as the “FondXFt of FondXFt”4 0odern poZer is often e[erFised not throXgh the Xse or threat of YiolenFe b\ a soYereign state bXt b\ a range of institXtions that seeN to enFoXrage Fertain sorts of behaYior 0odern poZer is e[erFised not throXgh YiolenFe bXt b\ aFting Xpon the aFtions of others and not b\ direFt Fontrol of indiYidXals bXt b\ defining a field of possible aFtion 2 The Organization of the Islamic Conference changed its name to the Organization of Is- lamic Cooperation in June 2011. 3 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” Interna- tional Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3, 1990, pp. 283-315 and John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1994, pp. 5-49. 4 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 87–104. 5 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 145 Şerif Onur Bahçecik This noYel Za\ of FonFeptXali]ing politiFal poZer has signifiFant impliFations for the stXd\ of Zorld politiFs :hen poZer is Xnder- stood as the FondXFt of FondXFt it beFomes apparent that Fertain disFoXrses and praFtiFes FonYentionall\ Fonsidered as Xnrelated to politiFal poZer are indeed part of the goYernanFe of indiYidX- als states or other organi]ations :ith regard to the stXd\ of in- ternational organi]ations this approaFh maNes their miFro-ph\siFal poZers more apparent As 0erlingen argXes international organi- ]ations “e[erFise a moleFXlar form of poZer that eYades the ma- terial MXridiFal and diplomatiF limitations on their inflXenFe” )or instanFe in the Fase of neoliberal eFonomiF goYernanFe the neo- liberal FondXFt of states are seFXred throXgh FonstitXting them as FompetitiYe aFtors Zith the help of FompetitiYeness inde[es pre- pared b\ the :orld (FonomiF )orXm7 To giYe another e[ample the FonstrXFtion of a seFXrit\ FommXnit\ in (Xrope is aFFomplished b\ the appliFation of disFiplinar\ teFhniTXes to states Their seFXrit\ poliFies are Fonstantl\ obserYed b\ the 2S&( and Fompared to a golden standard of responsible statehood8 :hen anti-IslamophobiF praFtiFes of non-goYernmental and inter- national organi]ations are anal\]ed from this perspeFtiYe it beFomes apparent that these praFtiFes Fannot be taNen simpl\ as negations of Islamophobia or rights-Flaiming These praFtiFes not onl\ seeN to e[erFise poZer oYer other aFtors bXt the\ seeN to FonstitXte per- sons as religioXs sXbMeFts and help FonstrXFt a post-seFXlar Zorld order As sXFh anti-IslamophobiF praFtiFes Fan be Fonsidered as anti-poliFies or Zhat Fan be briefl\ defined as “sFhemes to goYern XnZanted things”9 Anti-poliFies inYolYe the FonstitXtion of sXb- MeFtiYities and the e[erFise of poZer As mXFh as anti-terrorism or anti-poYert\ praFtiFes are politiFal anti-IslamophobiF praFtiFes are politiFal as Zell 6 Michael Merlingen, “Governmentality: Towards a Foucauldian Framework for the Study of IGOs,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2003, pp. 361-84. 7 Tore Fougner, “Neoliberal Governance of States: The Role of Competitiveness Indexing and Country Benchmarking,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2008, pp. 303-326. 8 Merlingen, “Governmentality: Towards a Foucauldian Framework for the Study of IGOs”. 9 William Walters, “Anti-policy and Anti-politics: Critical Reflections on Certain Schemes to Govern Bad Things,” European Journal of Cultural Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2008, pp. 267- 288. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 146 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Internationalizing Islamophobia ,VODPRSKRELD $6KRUW+LVWRU\RIWKH:RUG The 2[ford (nglish DiFtionar\ defines Islamophobia as “hatred or fear of Islam esp as a politiFal forFe hostilit\ or preMXdiFe toZards 0Xslims” AFFording to this soXrFe one of the earliest reForded Xse of this term is in 97 in International -oXrnal of 0iddle (ast StXdies In a disFXssion pieFe AnaZati Xses this term ZithoXt reall\ defining it and ZithoXt Xsing inYerted Fommas +e Xses the term in a negatiYe Za\ +e argXes that if a sFholar of IslamiF stXdies in the FoXrse of his stXdies arriYed at FonFlXsions that ZoXld Fontra- diFt the preFepts of Islam he FoXld Zell be aFFXsed of Islamopho- bia AnaZati implies that the “penalt\ of being aFFXsed of Islamo- phobia” maNes the dissemination of Fertain sort of sFholarl\ stXdies Yer\ diffiFXlt and amoXnts to self-FensXre The manner that Ana- Zati emplo\s the term sXggests that it has been established as a Zord for some time and the reader does not need an\ e[planation as to Zhat it means Another Xse of term is foXnd in (dZard Said3 In a polemiFal artiFle based on his booN 2ULHQWDOLVP Said points oXt to the similarities betZeen anti-Semitism and Islamophobia +e too refrains from giYing a Flear definition of the term bXt it is Xnderstood that he Xses it to mean “hostilit\ to Islam in the modern &hristian :est”4 Said points oXt that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are Yer\ similar in terms of the “FXltXral meFhanisms” the\ Xse and the\ stem from the same soXrFe These Xses of Islamophobia b\ AnaZati and Said haYe some similarities and Fontrasts :hile the former Xses it in a negatiYe sense to disapproYe the timidit\ of 0Xs- lims toZards stXdies of Islam from an aFademiF perspeFtiYe Said approYes and adopts the term to desFribe some raFist phenomena AnaZati and Said·s Xse of the term hoZeYer Zere b\ no means the first Xse of the term in the (nglish langXage %oth %raYo /ope] and Allen report earlier Xses of the term in their stXdies %raYo /ope] indiFates that one of the first reForded Xse of Islamophobia Zas b\ 10 Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/248449?redirectedFrom=isla mophobia#eid, (accessed June 7, 2013). 11 Georges Anawati, “Dialogue with Gustave e. von Grunebaum,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 7, No: 1, 1976, pp. 123-128. 12 Ibid, p. 124. 13 Edward W. Said, “Orientalism Reconsidered,” Cultural Critique, Vol. 1, 1985, pp. 89-107. 14 Ibid, p. 99. 15 Fernando Bravo Lopez, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34, No: 4, 2010, pp. 556-573 and Chris- topher Allen, Islamophobia, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2010). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 147 Şerif Onur Bahçecik (tienne Dinet and Slimane ben Ibrahim Dinet Zas a )renFh painter Zho later FonYerted to Islam Their booN /·2ULHQWYXGHO·2FFLGHQW pXblished in 9 is deYoted to the FritiFism of some orientalists· YieZs on Islam and its 3rophet The\ emplo\ed the term aFFord- ing to %raYo /ope] to FritiFi]e those Zho had a sNeZed notion of Islam and attaFNed the religion simpl\ to disFredit it and its 3rophet That is to sa\ for Dinet and Ibrahim Islamophobia Zas not dXe to a simple laFN of NnoZledge aboXt Islam and 0Xslims it Zas also an attaFN of defamation Islam Zas deliberatel\ shoZn as a series of baFNZard FXstoms and the messages of the religion Zere deliber- atel\ misrepresented Dinet and Ibrahim did not see it neFessar\ to define Islamophobia bXt their Xsage sXggested that the\ YieZed it as efforts to “do aZa\ Zith Islam all together” It is also apparent that Dinet and Ibrahim loFated Islamophobia in the stXdies of ori- entalists rather than in the soFial and politiFal sphere These Islam- ophobiF disFoXrses %raYo /ope] argXes Zere direFted toZards the Folonial administrations and aimed to shoZ that goYernments shoXld Fombat against 0Xslims and Islam if the\ Zanted to imple- ment their Folonial proMeFts In this Za\ some &hristian missionar- ies tried to present themselYes as allies to the Folonialist proMeFt If the “natiYe” popXlations FoXld be FonYerted to &hristianit\ :est- ern states FoXld more seFXrel\ Fontrol these territories Dinet Ibrahim and %inger·s stXdies Zere earl\ instanFes of the dis- FoXrse on Islamophobia After their stXdies this disFoXrse Zas laid dormant for some time There Zere some referenFes to Islamopho- bia in the 9s and 98s bXt as I haYe indiFated in the opening of this seFtion these Zere some passing referenFes rather than stXdies aiming to e[pliFate and disseminate the FonFept The most signifiFant deYelopment Fame in 997 Zith the RXnn\mede Report ZhiFh Ze Zill tXrn in the ne[t seFtion 16 Bravo Lopez, “Towards a Definition of Islamophobia: Approximations of the Early Twenti- eth Century”, p. 6. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 148 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Internationalizing Islamophobia 5XQQ\PHGH5HSRUWDQGWKH'LVVHPLQDWLRQRI DQWL,VODPRSKRELF3URJUDP The most signifiFant moment for the rise of the disFoXrse on Islam- ophobia Fame in 997 Zhen a %ritish thinN-tanN NnoZn for its ZorN on mXltiFXltXralism pXblished a report titled “Islamophobia a &hal- lenge for 8s All” This report ZhiFh Zill be anal\]ed in greater detail beloZ established Islamophobia as a term that Zas aFFepted b\ man\ as the aFFXrate desFription of a series of phenomenon e[pe- rienFed b\ the %ritish 0Xslims It Zas embraFed b\ opinion leaders inFlXding 0Xslims and Fame to be Xsed b\ the media as a desFrip- tiYe term Soon the TXotation marNs aroXnd this Zord ZoXld disap- pear and it ZoXld be natXrali]ed as a term indiFating a Fhallenge for the mXltiFXltXral soFiet\ in not onl\ the 8. bXt aroXnd the Zorld AlthoXgh the term Islamophobia Zas not Foined b\ the RXnn\mede TrXst their report pXblished in 997 beFame the most sXFFessfXl and oft-Fited stXd\ on this topiF %efore looNing into the details of this report Ze shoXld Fonte[tXali]e in the 8. in the 99s The RXnn\mede TrXst Zas foXnded in 98 to FoXnter raFial disFrimi- nation and promote mXltiFXltXralism It defines itself as the 8.·s “leading independent raFe eTXalit\ thinN tanN”7 It seems that the thinN tanN Zas foXnded at a time Zhen anti-raFist initiatiYes Zere deYeloping in the FoXntr\ As /entin pXts it in the 9s there Zere tZo basiF strands of anti-raFism in the 8.8 2ne Zas the “soli- daristiF” anti-raFism of left and trade Xnion aFtiYists and the other Zas the “self-organi]ation” of the %laFN FommXnities that is to sa\ groXps Zho haYe been sXbMeFted to disFrimination9 As Modood argXes anti-disFrimination initiatiYes in the 8. Zere shaped b\ this anti-raFialism agenda ZhiFh Zas in tXrn borroZing from the e[- perienFe of the 8nited States That is to sa\ disFrimination Zas perFeiYed to be a raFe Folor and ethniF issXe RXnn\mede·s foXn- dation date of 98 is also signifiFant in this regard as it FoinFides Zith the FiYil rights moYement on the other side of the AtlantiF Re- ligioXs disFrimination Zas not perFeiYed as an issXe in these \ears and this approaFh Zas apparent in the RaFe Relations AFt of 97 17 Runnymede Trust, Impact Report 2010, http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/pdfs/Im- pactReport2010FINALWeb.pdf, (accessed on March 3, 2011). 18 Alana Lentin, Racism and Anti-Racism in Europe, (London: Pluto Press, 2004). 19 Ibid., p. 130. 20 Tariq Modood, “Muslims and the Politics of Difference” in Peter E. Hopkins and Richard Gale (eds.), Muslims in Britain ( (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009), pp. 193-209. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 149 Şerif Onur Bahçecik ZhiFh as Fan be gXessed from its title did not FoYer disFrimination dXe to belief ([Fept 1orthern Ireland religioXs disFrimination did not haYe an\ legal e[istenFe in the 8. This not onl\ Freated a gap in the legislation bXt also shaped the Za\ hXman rights Flaims Zere made Indeed MXslims Zhen the\ Zere disFriminated dXe to their religioXs identit\ or praFtiFes artiFXlated their grieYanFes in raFial terms MoreoYer in media and politiFal disFoXrses MXslims Zere inFlXded in the groXp of Asians Zith hardl\ an\ referenFe to their beliefs All of these started to Fhange in the 99s As %irt points oXt the RXshdie Affair Fan be taNen as the starting point of MXslim identit\ politiFs and the emergenFe of a MXslim FommXnit\ that inFreas- ingl\ beFame aZare of its religioXs identit\ This identit\ helped FonstitXte %ritish MXslims as disFrete from the Asian popXlation and Freated a FommXnit\ throXgh sXffering aFFording to %irt The sXffering that %irt mentioned Zas dXe to the Za\ SataniF 9erses and the IslamiF RepXbliF of Iran·s reaFtion to it Zas handled b\ the media in the 8. MXslims not onl\ regarded the noYel highl\ of- fensiYe bXt the\ Zere also distXrbed b\ the manner the\ Zere rep- resented as dangeroXs sXbMeFts %esides this formation of MXslim FommXnit\ tended to “oYerFome” national differenFes liNe being a 3aNistani or %angladeshi3 MXslims Zere Foming together on the basis of religioXs affiliations rather than throXgh their distant home- lands This deYelopment proYided the baFNgroXnd to the RXnn\mede Report %Xt the report had more reFent triggers as Zell After the RXshdie Affair geopolitiFal eYents sXFh as the *Xlf :ar and the 2Nlahoma %ombing MXslim presenFe in :estern nations Zere problemati]ed in the media The mass protests that some MXslims made in 99 in reaFtion to the *Xlf :ar Zere reported in an alarm- ist tone eg “TroXble at the MosTXe” Zhile the 2Nlahoma bombing ZhiFh had no linNs to the MXslims Zas seen as an IslamiF fXnda- mentalist attaFN on the 8S and led to harassment of MXslims4 21 Ibid. 22 Jonathan Birt, “Islamophobia in the Construction of British Muslim Identity Politics” in Hopkins and Gale, op. cit., pp. 210-227. 23 Allen, Islamophobia. 24 The Economist, “Trouble at the Mosque; the Gulf War Reveals the Growing Determination of Britain’s Muslims to Find a Political Voice”, January 26, 1991, pp. 51-52 and Human Rights Watch, “We are not the enemy”, Hate Crimes Against Arabs, Muslims, and Those Per- ceived to be Arab or Muslim After September 11, Human Rights Watch Report, 2002, Vol. 14, No: 6, (available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1102.pdf) 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 150 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Internationalizing Islamophobia In this enYironment RXnn\mede pXblished a report on Anti-Semi- tism AlthoXgh this Zas a report on the attitXdes toZards the -eZ- ish FommXnit\ in %ritain it had a seFtion on Islamophobia as Zell +oZeYer more signifiFantl\ the report FonFeded that the foXnd- ing philosoph\ of the RXnn\mede Zas noZ insXffiFient for mXlti- FXltXral %ritain The thinN-tanN had to taNe into Fonsideration the report sXggested that disFrimination Zas not onl\ taNing plaFe on the basis of Folor and raFe bXt also FXltXre langXage FXstom and religion In the FoXrse of its ZorN the TrXst·s &ommission on anti-Semitism foXnd that preMXdiFe against %ritish MXslims Zas an eTXall\ “alarming” issXe RXnn\mede TrXst sXggested that a more FomprehensiYe approaFh shoXld be adopted toZards all Ninds of “raFisms” inFlXding FXltXral raFism so that “the benefits of Fooper- ation Foordination and shared energ\” FoXld be deplo\ed b\ those FonFerned7 The report did not proYide a fXll-fledged definition of Islamophobia bXt limited itself to pointing oXt that it Zas s\non\- moXs Zith “anti-MXslim feeling”8 So Zhat Zere the impliFations of the report in terms of the goYern- ment of the FondXFts of %ritish sXbMeFts" The presFription that the report made Zas a s\nthesis of liberal demoFraF\ and FXltXral plX- ralism It Zas reFogni]ed that there Zas a tension betZeen the free- dom of e[pression that liberal demoFraF\ proYided and the FXltXral YalXes of FommXnities The latter FoXld be harmed b\ the former as Fan be seen from the RXshdie Affair The report reFogni]ed this as a Fhallenge bXt did not bring forZard direFt and FonFrete sXgges- tions Rather it sXggested that soFiet\ had to be prXdent and aYoid sXFh FonfliFts betZeen liberal demoFraF\ and FXltXral plXralism RXnn\mede TrXst in its report imagined a demoFratiF polit\ inflX- enFed b\ tZo basiF forFes of the media and opinion leaders %oth Zere giYen the tasN of Xpholding liberal and mXltiFXltXral YalXes and manage the FonfliFts betZeen them )or the media this ZoXld happen throXgh the appointment of “a speFifiF indiYidXal Zithin the organi]ation« to be responsible for deYeloping e[pertise on mat- ters relating to raFism in general”9 The opinion leaders espeFiall\ those Zho are inflXential Zere also tasNed to interYene in times 25 Runnymede Trust, A Very Light Sleeper - The Persistence & Dangers of Antisemitism, (London: Runnymede Trust, 1994). 26 Ibid., p. 9. 27 Ibid., p. 13. 28 Ibid., p. 55. 29 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 151 Şerif Onur Bahçecik of tension ThXs the report sXggested goYerning at a distanFe in )oXFaXltian terms The role giYen to the state and soYereign laZ Zas minimal IslamophobiF FondXFt ZoXld not be banned or perse- FXted bXt disFoXraged /aZ Zas onl\ a “safet\ net” to be deplo\ed in the last instanFe Zhile the state·s role Zas limited to training the teaFhers to render them sensitiYe toZards disFrimination issXes The Report entertained a TXite different notion of legislation ZhiFh in a sense did not haYe the forFe of laZ traditionall\ Xnderstood To TXote at length &hanges in the laZ ZoXld not neFessaril\ gXarantee that %ritain or indeed an\ soFiet\ ZoXld in praFtiFe be more MXst %Xt some Fhanges ZoXld be YalXable in proYiding safet\ nets so to speaN at times of an[iet\ or FonfliFt and ZoXld thXs haYe Fonsiderable YalXe in edXFating pXbliF opinion and in signaling the goYernment·s Fommitment to plXralism3 As seen from this TXotation to a great e[tent laZ Zas relieYed of its enforFement fXnFtion bXt FonstrXed as a different Nind of NnoZl- edge that ZoXld goYern the popXlation not throXgh penalties or le- gal YiolenFe bXt throXgh “edXFation” and politiFal signals The re- port had a seFond effeFt as Zell This Zas the faFt that RXnn\mede TrXst distanFed itself from a Fertain t\pe of demoFratiF politiFs Zhile emphasi]ing liberal demoFraF\ Instead of demoFratiF forms sXFh as protests letter Zriting and demonstrations the report enFoXr- aged a poliF\-maNing approaFh The problems ZoXld be solYed not throXgh “mass demoFratiF partiFipation” bXt throXgh opinion lead- ers media and the poliF\ proposals ZhiFh the RXnn\mede report FonstitXted an e[ample RXnn\mede TrXst did not end its ZorN on Islamophobia Zith this re- port on anti-Semitism In 99 the TrXst ZhiFh noZ defined itself as “an independent researFh and soFial poliF\ agenF\” established a &ommission on %ritish MXslims and Islamophobia3 It had a mXlti- ethniF and mXlti-religioXs Fomposition The &ommission prepared a FonsXltation paper and distribXted it to FoXnFils Fit\ aXthorities poliFe departments MXslim FommXnit\ organi]ations XniYersities etF In line Zith the responses to the FonsXltation paper The RXn- 30 Ibid., p. 60. 31 Runnymede Trust, , Islamophobia, a Challenge for Us All, Summary, http://www.runnymede- trust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/islamophobia.pdf (accessed on March 1, 2011). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 152 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Internationalizing Islamophobia n\mede TrXst prepared the report “Islamophobia A &hallenge for 8s All” The report defined Islamophobia first “as shorthand Za\ of referring to dread or hatred of Islam²and therefore to fear or disliNe of all or most MXslims”3 This definition Zas later Fhanged into “phobiF dread of Islam« the reFXrring FharaFteristiFs of Flosed YieZs” The Flosed YieZs indiFated series of YieZs that desFribed Islam as a homogeneoXs statiF monolithiF bloF This Zas FoXnter- posed Zith an open YieZ of Islam that desFribed the religion as pro- gressiYe mXltiple Zorth\ of respeFt etF ThXs the report eYalXated Islamophobia as a religioXs issXe as a reaFtion shoZn toZards Is- lam itself rather than MXslim sXbMeFts prinFipall\ This aspeFt of the report ZoXld proYe to be highl\ FontroYersial +allida\ for instanFe argXed that disFrimination and similar praFtiFes toZards MXslims in the 8. did not neFessaril\ emanate from a hostilit\ toZards the re- ligion33 +e argXed that these phenomena shoXld be thoXght Zithin the greater Fonte[t of raFism and immigration :hat Zas obserY- able for him Zas not anti-Islamism per se bXt an anti-MXslim at- titXde The emphasis on the religioXs dimension in the FonFeption of Is- lamophobia Zas apparent in the formation of the &ommission as Zell As Allen points oXt the &ommission Zas Yer\ mXFh designed as an inter-faith groXp34 In this Za\ %ritish Fiti]ens Zere FonstrXFt- ed primaril\ as religioXs sXbMeFts The Za\ the\ ZoXld relate to eaFh other ZoXld be throXgh the reFognition of religioXs identities and the open YieZ of Islam ZoXld be the model for this respeFt In line Zith the 994 report opinion leaders and media Zere seen as piYotal aFtors in the goYernment of religioXs sXbMeFtiYit\ In this Za\ grass roots anti-raFist strXggles Zere e[FlXded3 MoreoYer the anal\sis of Islamophobia throXgh the lens of open Ys Flosed YieZs of Islam neFessitated that emphasis be pXt on IslamiF identi- ties ZhiFh Zere aFFeptable for the liberal demoFraF\ :hile %ritish MXslims Zho are prone to YiolenFe Zere a faFt the\ Zere ignored so that Islam FoXld be shoZn as an “open” religion3 The open YieZ of Islam also made possible interfaith dialogXe As the report pXt it open YieZ meant that Islam ZoXld be “seen as an aFtXal or po- 32 As cited in Allen, Islamophobia, p. 15. 33 Fred Halliday, “’Islamophobia’ Reconsidered,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 22, No: 5, 1999, pp. 892 - 902. 34 Allen,. Islamophobia. 35 Ibid.. 36 Compare Allen, Islamophobia. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 153 Şerif Onur Bahçecik tential partner in Moint FooperatiYe enterprises and in the solXtion of shared problems”37 As an anti-IslamophobiF measXre open YieZ of Islam implied dialogXe and this in tXrn ZoXld neXtrali]e radiFal- ism and Fonfrontation betZeen the state and larger %ritish soFiet\ on the one hand and MXslim sXbMeFts on the other ,VODPRSKRELDDVDQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO3UREOHP RXnn\mede·s &KDOOHQJHIRU8V$OO report Zas a sXFFess in terms of media FoYerage Man\ %ritish neZspapers reported the ZorN of the &ommission and mostl\ in a positiYe light The disFoYer\ of Islam- ophobia b\ the RXnn\mede TrXst Zas TXite FonYinFing for the me- dia oXtlets38 Man\ MXslim groXps also laXded the report and saZ it as a signifiFant milestone for the %ritish MXslims39 The faYorable reFeption of the report beFame an important asset for those Zho Zanted to e[press their grieYanFes toZards harassment of MXslims and henFe made the message of the report more mobile aFross international sphere An important tXrning point in this regard Zas the deplo\ment of the term Islamophobia b\ the 8nited 1ations :orld &onferenFe against RaFism4 The FonferenFe infamoXs for its debates on the Israeli-3alestinian FonfliFt tooN plaFe in in DXrban SoXth AfriFa At the end of the FonferenFe a deFlaration Zas adopted ArtiFle of the deFlaration read “Ze reFogni]e Zith deep FonFern the inFrease in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in YarioXs parts of the Zorld as Zell as the emergenFe of raFial and Yi- olent moYements based on raFism and disFriminator\ ideas against -eZish MXslim and Arab FommXnities” Similar to Said·s point the artiFle linNed anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and essentiall\ re- garded the latter as a form of raFist disFrimination4 Interestingl\ Zhen the draft doFXments of the FonferenFe are stXdied Flosel\ it is seen that the delegates Fonsidered Islamophobia not neFessaril\ as a problem e[perienFed b\ MXslims liYing in :estern soFieties bXt a problem in the Middle (ast This is apparent from the faFt that 37 Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia, a Challenge for Us All, Summary. 38 Clare Garner, “The British ‘Are Becoming Muslim-Haters’,” The Independent, February 21, 1997, p. 7; Paul Myirea, “Laws Needed to Protect British Moslems-Report,” Reuters, Octo- ber 22, 1997; The Scotsman,”Prince Urges Tolerance for Islam,” March 1, 1997, p. 3; Alan Travis, “Ban on Religious Discrimination,” The Guardian, June 12, 1997, p. 9. 39 Allen Islamophobia. 40 United Nations, Report of The World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xeno- phobia and Related Intolerance (No. A/CONF.189/12), (Durban: United Nations, 2001). 41 Said, “Orientalism Reconsidered”. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 154 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Internationalizing Islamophobia artiFle mentioned here Zas listed Xnder the sXbtitle “paragraphs on the Middle-(ast and related issXes”4 This indiFates a signifi- Fant moYe on the part of the drafters of the deFlaration Islamo- phobia ZhiFh Zas disFoYered and insFribed as a phenomenon in %ritain Zas transferred to the Middle (ast This draft implied that Islamophobia Zas not onl\ a faFtor in the relations betZeen %ritish MXslims and other %ritish Fiti]ens It Zas also e[perienFed in the geopolitiFs of the Middle (ast presXmabl\ in the FonfliFt betZeen Israel and 3alestine The report inFlXded another indiFator that shoZed that Islamophobia Zas related to this geopolitiFal problem In the report itself anti-Semitism Zas alZa\s mentioned alongside anti-Arabism and Islamophobia It seemed that the drafters Zished to “balanFe” anti-Semitism Zith Islamophobia Indeed this Fan also be Fonfirmed from the speeFhes of some :estern diplomats in the report The\ Zere FritiFal of the deFlaration beFaXse there Zas no “independent” referenFe to anti-Semitism in the deFlaration A seFond moYe that internationali]ed or rather (Xropeani]ed the term Islamophobia Fame Zith its adoption b\ the (Xropean 8nion Monitoring &enter on RaFism and ;enophobia (8M& The (8M& Zas offiFiall\ established in 997 bXt in 7 its mandate Zas Zidened and it Zas renamed as the (Xropean 8nion AgenF\ for )Xndamental Rights43 After the September attaFNs the (8M& asNed its “1ational )oFal 3oints” to monitor the sitXation of MXs- lims and other minorities in (8 states The foFal points Zere asNed to monitor “aFts of YiolenFe or aggression and Fhanges in the attitXde of the (8 popXlations >«@ good praFtiFes for redXFing preMXdiFe YiolenFe and aggression >and@ reaFtions b\ politiFians and other opinion leaders”44 The term Islamophobia Zas emplo\ed throXghoXt the national reports bXt a definition of the term itself Zas not proYided to the national foFal points The definition of their tasN Zas monitoring aFts against and attitXdes toZards MXslims ZhiFh seemed to e[FlXde aFts against the religion itself as an issXe to be monitored In that sense the report departed from the defini- tion of RXnn\mede TrXst The national reports differed in the Za\ 42 United Nations, Report of The World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xeno- phobia and Related Intolerance, p. 108. 43 EUMC, “Frequently Asked Questions,” http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/faq/faq_ en.htm, (accessed on January 5, 2011). 44 EUMC, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU After 11 September 2001, http://fra. europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/199-Synthesis-report_en.pdf, 2002, (accessed on February 28, 2011), p. 12. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 155 Şerif Onur Bahçecik the\ emplo\ed the term Islamophobia 3ortXgal and AXstria Xsed “Islamophobia” Zith TXotation marNs Zhile SZeden Xsed the term ZithoXt TXotation marNs4 The “s\nthesis” report hoZeYer Xsed the term Islamophobia in its title The reports of the (8M& Zas not Xniform in terms of the resoXrF- es aYailable to the national foFal points or the methodolog\ and soXrFes Xsed in monitoring the sitXation of the MXslims in (Xrope4 1eYertheless the establishment of a monitoring proFedXre for Is- lamophobia Zas signifiFant This phenomenon ZhiFh Zas initiall\ thoXght as an oFFXrrenFe in %ritain Zas tXrned into a (Xrope-Zide issXe b\ these monitoring reports This not onl\ improYed the Fred- ibilit\ of the term itself bXt also made it more mobile and appliFable to other plaFes b\ separating it from its national and loFal Fonte[t In terms of the goYernanFe of the Islamophobia the (8M& initia- tiYe Zas again signifiFant The monitoring of Islamophobia meant that the term Zas being attaFhed to a sXrYeillanFe meFhanism in the )oXFaXltian sense47 The (8M& fXnFtioned as a sXrYeillanFe meFhanism Zhere potentiall\ all aFts of Islamophobia appear on its radar 1eYertheless the normali]ation effeFts of this sXrYeillanFe Zere not poZerfXl That is to sa\ the sXrYeillanFe fXnFtion·s FapaF- it\ to Fompare the FondXFt of the indiYidXals and the goYernment aFFording to an established norm Zas ZeaN This Zas both be- FaXse Islamophobia Zas represented as a soFietal issXe and be- FaXse the definition of Islamophobia Zas not Flearl\ established The aFts of Islamophobia Zere seen as rather aXtonomoXs aFts of the popXlation and the aFFoXntabilit\ of the goYernments in these aFts Zas not Flear The faFt that the (8M& gaYe the tasN of monitoring to national fo- Fal points and foFXsed on the media goYernments and opinion leaders had impliFations in terms of goYernanFe of Islamophobia as Zell :hile the initiatiYe (Xropeani]ed the problem the distribXtion of monitoring to national entities FonstrXFted national goYernments and pXbliFs as the main sites of interYention in Islamophobia De- spite the ZeaNness of its sXrYeillanFe the (8M& affirmed the Fir- FXlation of Islamophobia in international disFoXrses Its monitoring 45 EUMC, Anti-Islamic Reactions in the EU after the Terrorist Acts against the USA, http://fra. europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/216-Nat-Report-291101.pdf, 2002b, (accessed on February 28, 2011). 46 EUMC, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU After 11 September 2001. 47 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Prison, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 156 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Internationalizing Islamophobia initiatiYe Zas also signifiFant and inspired other international agen- Fies 3rime among these agenFies Zas the 2rgani]ation of IslamiF &ooperation 2I& the aFtiYities of ZhiFh Ze noZ tXrn to 7KH2,& $+\EULGDQWL,VODPRSKRELD3URJUDP The 2rgani]ation of IslamiF &ooperation 2I& Zas established in 99 in MoroFFo and aimed to Fombine the “efforts and speaN Zith one YoiFe to safegXard the interests and seFXre the progress and Zell-being of >Member States·@ peoples and of all MXslims in the Zorld”48 The 2I& has Fome to the attention of the media and sFholars espeFiall\ after the September attaFNs throXgh its ini- tiatiYes against Islamophobia Its initiatiYes to install international legislation to preYent Zhat it saZ as blasphem\ against Islam and disFrimination against MXslims proYed to be FontroYersial 2n the one hand some argXed that this initiatiYe Zas a demonstration of the 2I&·s “determination to sXppress FritiFal Fommentar\ on Islam- related themes”49 2n the other hand the organi]ation itself Fame to proMeFt an image that Zas inFreasingl\ embraFing demoFratiF goYernanFe and hXman rights )or instanFe in its 8 SXmmit in Antara Indonesia a neZ Fharter that Xnderlined hXman rights and demoFraF\ Zas adopted :hat Zas signifiFant for oXr pXrposes Zas the establishment of a monitoring bod\ b\ this organi]ation in This tooN plaFe in the 3rd ([traordinar\ Session of the IslamiF SXmmit &onferenFe that Fame together in DeFember as a reaFtion to the infamoXs Fartoon FontroYers\ The SXmmit adopted the 2I& Ten- 48 OIC, “About OIC,” http://www.oic-un.org/about_oic.asp, 2009, (accessed on January 5, 2011) The Organization has 57 members and the headquarters are located in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 49 Arch Puddington and Christopher Walker, “Saying the Unsayable: Revisiting International Censorship,” World Affairs, Vol. 173, No: 4, 2010, pp. 75-83. 50 Asia Pulse, “OIC adopts new charter with Focus on Human Rights,” March 15, 2008. 51 OIC, The updated Report of the OIC Observatory on Islamophobia to the 35th Session of The Council of Foreign Ministers for the Period of May 2007-May 2008, http://www.oic-un.org/ document_report/observatory_report_final.doc, 2008, (accessed on January 2, 2011). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 157 Şerif Onur Bahçecik prodXFes an annXal report that sXmmari]es aFts of Islamophobia and the aFtiYities of the 2I& to Fombat this phenomenon The 2I& seemed to adopt a definition of Islamophobia that Zas similar to the one foXnd in RXnn\mede TrXst report It Zas “an ir- rational or Yer\ poZerfXl fear or disliNe of Islam” bXt it also had dimensions liNe “raFial hatred intoleranFe preMXdiFe disFrimination and stereot\ping” The 2I& monitoring report referred to issXes liNe immigration raFism and [enophobia and reFogni]ed these as problems that e[aFerbated the problem of Islamophobia +oZeY- er it insisted that Islamophobia Zas essentiall\ a “religion-based resentment”3 The resentment had its roots in the historiFal rela- tions betZeen the MXslim Zorld and the :est and in this Fonte[t “historiFal reFonFiliation” Zas seen as an important aspeFt of the resolXtion of the Islamophobia problem4 The report also indiFated “apologi]ing to MXslims for the &rXsades and the reperFXssions of AmeriFa·s so-Falled Zar on terror is also a positiYe deYelopment to- Zards fostering toleranFe among religions and FXltXral beliefs and FoXntering Islamophobia” 2ne of the main FonFerns of the aXthors of the report Zas enroll- ment of other espeFiall\ :estern aFtors in the anti-Islamophobia program The monitoring reports pXt emphasis on FonYinFing their interloFXtors of the e[istenFe of the phenomenon of Islamopho- bia To aFFomplish that reports adopted tZo basiF taFtiFs )irst the\ based their Flaims of the e[istenFe of Islamophobia not on the stXdies of MXslim sFholars bXt on the reports of :estern or- gani]ations liNe the RXnn\mede TrXst the (8M& the &oXnFil of (Xrope and the 81 The\ freTXentl\ TXoted the te[ts prodXFed b\ sXFh aXthoritatiYe bodies The seFond taFtiF adopted b\ the 2I& Zas artiFXlation of the global legitimate disFoXrses of the :est Zith aFts of Islamophobia 2ne of these disFoXrses Zas the fight against terrorism and the maintenanFe of global seFXrit\ It Zas argXed that Islamophobia fostered e[FlXsion of MXslim popXlations from mainstream soFiet\ as a resXlt of disFrimination and harassment This ZeaNened the identifiFation of the MXslims Zith their adopted 52 Ibid., p. 8. 53 Ibid., p. 8. 54 Ibid., p. 26. 55 Ibid., p. 26. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 158 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Internationalizing Islamophobia FoXntr\ and rendered them eas\ pre\s for terrorist reFrXitment The seFond legitimate disFoXrse that 2I& tooN adYantage of Zas that of hXman rights (speFiall\ in the 3rd monitoring report 2I& adopted a hXman rights frameZorN to Fombat Islamophobia7 This meant on the one hand mobili]ation of international hXman rights legislation to Fombat attaFNs on Islam and definition of the problem as an abXse or hXman rights 2n the other hand the neZ frame- ZorN pointed oXt to the 2I& strateg\ of Farr\ing Islamophobia to hXman right YenXes liNe the +Xman Rights &oXnFil In this Fonte[t the 2I& Fame to define Islamophobia as a hate Frime and tooN initiatiYes to ban this throXgh anti-blasphem\ legislation8 In reFent \ears the 2I& e[panded its Xtili]ation of hXman rights frameZorN to Fombat Islamophobia As a resXlt of the initiatiYes the organi]a- tion in the th session of the +Xman Rights &oXnFil of the 8nited 1ations adopted the ResolXtion 8 ZhiFh Falled on the states to taNe neFessar\ preFaXtions to preYent the disFrimination of persons on the basis of religion The 2I&·s adopted tasN of Fombating against Islamophobia Zas a Fhallenge for the organi]ation 8ntil the mid-s the 2I& Zas not a Yer\ aFtiYe international bod\ )or instanFe it began to liaise Zith other international organi]ations and 1*2s onl\ Yer\ reFentl\ mainl\ Xnder its neZ SeFretar\ *eneral (Nmeleddin IhsanoglX Its toolbo[ Zas Yer\ mXFh limited to deFlarations and e[traordinar\ sXmmits In addition to these Fhallenges the 2I& Zas Fombating Islamophobia in the :estern FoXntries Zhere for man\ freedom of e[pression had to be interpreted broadl\ In other Zords it Zas tr\ing to maNe a Fase of hXman rights to a groXp of states Zho saZ themselYes as the pioneers of hXman rights and demoFratiF goYernanFe The freedom of e[pression issXe also limited its op- tions in terms of Fombating Islamophobia throXgh legal means of blasphem\ laZs In the faFe of these Fhallenges the 2I& had to adopt a strateg\ that s\nthesi]ed disFiplinar\ and liberal teFhniTXes of goYernment The monitoring praFtiFes of the 2I& Zere e[plained aboYe The liberal aspeFt of the 2I&·s anti-Islamophobia program Zas based on the 56 Ibid, p. 13. 57 OIC, 3rd OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (May 2009 to April 2010), http://www.oic- oci.org/uploads/file/Islamphobia/2010/en/Islamophobia_rep_May_22_5_2010.pdf.pdf, 2010, (accessed on January 5, 2011). 58 Ibid, pp. 22-24. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 159 Şerif Onur Bahçecik goYernanFe of :estern popXlations throXgh aZareness raising and dialogXe The 2I& FonstitXted :estern sXbMeFts as essentiall\ lib- eral sXbMeFts and soXght to FondXFt their behaYior b\ inflXenFing their mode of self-goYernment This entailed the e[erFise of “free- dom of e[pression« linNed Zith a sense of responsibilit\”9 The liberal sXbMeFts FoXld not be Fonstrained from the oXtside Zith pen- alties and similar measXres As long as the IslamophobiF aFts Zere Fonsidered as e[pressions of opinion bXt not disFrimination of per- sons on the basis of religion legal interYention in the issXes Zas not possible +oZeYer their FondXFt FoXld be modified b\ instilling a sense of responsibilit\ in them This responsibilit\ entailed not onl\ the reFognition of MXslims· religioXs identit\ bXt also an aZareness of the reperFXssions of the indiYidXal aFts for global peaFe and se- FXrit\ This aZareness shoXld be Freated throXgh training edXFa- tion and interFXltXral dialogXe The 2I& argXed that one of the tasNs Zere to “ReYise edXFational s\llabi at all leYels on both sides par- tiFXlarl\ in Ne\ disFiplines sXFh as histor\ philosoph\ soFial and hXman sFienFes Zith the aim of presenting a balanFed YieZ of other FXltXres and FiYili]ations” The 2I& hoped that disFrimination and harassment of MXslims FoXld be preYented throXgh the dissemination of aFFXrate NnoZl- edge of Islam The 2I& aimed to do this not throXgh direFt goY- ernment of the :estern popXlations b\ international legislation bXt throXgh an interYention in the edXFation of :estern sXbMeFts In this Za\ the 2I& hoped to seFXre the self-goYernment of :estern sXbMeFts in line Zith interFXltXral Xnderstanding Another taFtiF of liberal goYernanFe of :estern sXbMeFtiYities Zas Fooperation Zith the media The 2I& saZ the latter·s FoYerage of Islam and MXslims in a negatiYe light as one of the FaXses of rise of Islamophobia In line Zith this in 7 a ZorNshop Zas organi]ed b\ the 2I& in A]erbaiMan “3olitiFal leaders aFademiFs media per- sonalities international organi]ations and representatiYes of lead- ing 1*2s and FiYil soFiet\ partiFipated in that &onferenFe” In this ZorNshop the 2I& soXght to inflXenFe those aFtiYe in the formation 59 OIC, 2nd OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia (June 2008 to April 2009), http://www. oic-oci.org/uploads/file/Islamphobia/Islamophobia_rep_May_23_25_2009.pdf, 2009, (ac- cessed on January 5, 2011), p. 4. 60 Ibid., p. 30. 61 OIC, The updated Report of the OIC Observatory on Islamophobia to the 35th Session of The Council of Foreign Ministers for the Period of May 2007-May 2008, p. 23. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 160 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Internationalizing Islamophobia of opinion in the :est The logiF Zas that if these personalities and institXtions FoXld be enrolled to the anti-Islamophobia proMeFt the problem of disFrimination and harassment of MXslims and attaFNs on Islam FoXld be redXFed In this ZorNshop too the partiFipants Zere enFoXraged to e[erFise their freedom of e[pression responsi- bl\ In the :estern and MXslim &oXntries· )orXm in Astana in 8 the 2I& fXrthered this agenda of responsibili]ation b\ Falling on the MoXrnalists to establish a groXp “to aFt as adYoFates for promoting the inter-FiYili]ational dialogXe” &RQFOXGLQJ5HPDUNV This paper brings a radiFal empiriFal perspeFtiYe on the aFtiYities of those Zho soXght to FoXnter Islamophobia M\ obMeFtiYe Zas not to “deFonstrXFt” Islamophobia b\ e[posing its instabilities as a FonFept Rather I treated Islamophobia as a mobile “toNen” that Zas taNen Xp b\ mXltiple aFtors in YarioXs Za\s (aFh adoption of the term Islamophobia did not neFessaril\ mean that the original meaning of the term foXnd in earl\ th FentXr\ Zas Farried forZard b\ neZ agents 2n the Fontrar\ eaFh adoption meant a transfor- mation in the term itself and in its netZorNs The Za\ (dZard Said emplo\ed the term Zas highl\ different than the Za\ RXnn\mede TrXst did :hen the latter tooN Xp Islamophobia it translated it into a FonFept of anti-raFism and mXltiFXltXralism and established linNs Zith media goYernment hoXsing aXthorities mXniFipalities etF In RXnn\mede·s rendering Islamophobia Zas something to be taNen into Fonsideration Zhen pXbliF fXnds Zere being distribXted or de- Fisions on Xrban hoXsing made The 2I& translated it into an issXe of geopolitiFal signifiFanFe and linNed it Zith disFoXrses of hXman rights anti-terrorism and FiYili]ations ThroXghoXt these modifiFa- tions aFtors alternatiYel\ Fame to emphasi]e raFial and religioXs aspeFts of Islamophobia :hile folloZing these translations I haYe also demonstrated the programmatiF FharaFter of anti-IslamophobiF aFtiYities These ef- forts did not merel\ Zish to stop or sXppress Islamophobia The\ endeaYored to aFFomplish this throXgh different means :hile the RXnn\mede TrXst imagined a mXltiFXltXral soFiet\ Zhere different identities e[pressed themselYes freel\ Zhile respeFting the other 62 OIC, “About OIC,” http://www.oic-un.org/about_oic.asp, 2009, p. 43(accessed on January 5, 2011). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 161 Şerif Onur Bahçecik the (8M& FonstitXted a geograph\ Zhere different manifestations of Islamophobia FoXld be linNed The 2I& on the other hand im- agined a FiYili]ational spaFe of Fo-e[istenFe in peaFe :hile the RXnn\mede prioriti]ed poliF\ maNing and soXght to liaise Zith pro- mXltiFXltXralism groXps the 2I& engaged Zith goYernments diplo- mats and international organi]ations 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 162 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Internationalizing Islamophobia Bibliography $OOHQ&KULVWRSKHU,VODPRSKRELD %XUOLQJWRQ $VKJDWH3XEOLVK- LQJ $QDZDWL*HRUJHV´'LDORJXHZLWK*XVWDYHH9RQ*UXQHEDXPµ 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The &ase of AXstria Zana ÇİTAK* Abstract The management of religioXs diYersit\ has beFome one of the most signiÀFant issXes faFing (Xropean soFieties in the last feZ deFades The inFreasing Xse of religion as an instrXment of immigration poli- Fies in (Xrope sinFe the late 98s has led to YarioXs traMeFtories of institXtionali]ation of Islam in (Xropean FoXntries In an inFreasing nXmber of Fases institXtionali]ation of Islam entails among other things the establishment of MXslim representatiYe institXtions 2n the other hand as it has transformed itself sinFe the earl\ 98s from a domestiF instrXment of Fontrol oYer religion to an e[ternal instrXment to Fonsolidate national Xnit\ among indigenoXs or im- migrant TXrNish FommXnities be\ond its borders the organi]ations linNed to the TXrNish DireFtorate of ReligioXs Affairs the Di\anet has beFome an important aFtor in YarioXs MXslim representatiYe institXtions in (Xrope This artiFle e[amines the Fase of the institX- tionali]ation of Islam in AXstria Zith a partiFXlar foFXs on the role of the Di\anet in the IslamisFhe *laXbensgemeinsFhaft in gsterreiFh- I**ig IslamiF ReligioXs &ommXnit\ in AXstria An anal\sis of the Di\anet·s role in and its perFeption of the institXtionali]ation of Islam in AXstria demonstrates both the adYantages and difÀFXlties that the Di\anet faFes in promoting ¶TXrNish Islam· in (Xrope Keywords: InstitXtionali]ation Islam AXstria TXrNe\ Di\anet $YUXSD·GDĈVODP·×Q.XUXPVDOODċPDV×YH'L\DQHW $YXVWXU\DgUQHĊL Özet Dini oeċitliliĊin \|netiċimi meselesi son birNao on \×ld×r AYrXpa top- lXmlar×n×n en |nemli gndem maddelerinden biri olmXċtXr AYrXpa lNelerinde 98·lerden beri dinin g|o politiNalar×nda gittiNoe artan bir ċeNilde bir si\aset araF× olaraN NXllan×lmas× Ĉslam·×n farNl× NXrXm- * Assoc. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. Zana Çitak, The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe and the Diyanet: The Case of Austria, Ortadoğu Etütleri, Volume 5, No 1, July 2013, pp.167-182. Zana Çitak sallaċma bioimlerine \ol aom×ċt×r .XrXmsallaċma peN ooN dXrXm- da a\n× ]amanda Ye artaraN Mslman temsil NXrXlXċlar× NXrXlma- s× anlam×na gelmeNtedir gte \andan ioerde NXllan×lan bir Nontrol araF× olman×n \an×s×ra TrNi\e·nin s×n×rlar× |tesinde |]elliNle TrNi\e N|Nenli g|omen toplXmlar×ndaNi milli birliĊi golendirme\i amaola- \an bir d×ċ Nontrol araF× haline de gelen Di\anet Nendisine baĊl× NXrXlXċlar araF×l×Ċ× ile AYrXpa·daNi Mslman NXrXlXċlar×nda |nemli bir aNt|r oldX %X maNale AYXstXr\a·da Ĉslam·×n NXrXmsallaċmas×n× |]elliNle de ĈslamisFhe *laXbensgemeinsFhaft-I**ig·de AYXstXr- \a Ĉslam Dini ToplXmX Di\anet·in roln inFelemeNtedir Di\anet·in AYXstXr\a·da Ĉslam·×n NXrXmsallaċmas×ndaNi rol Ye bX sreFe ba- N×ċ× Di\anet·in AYrXpa·da ¶TrN Ĉslam×·n×n sponsorlXĊXnX \aparNen sahip oldXĊX aYantaMlar× Ye a\n× ]amanda Narċ×laċt×Ċ× ]orlXNlar× |r- neNlemesi ao×s×ndan |nemlidir $QDKWDU.HOLPHOHU Ĉslam NXrXmsallaċma AYXstXr\a TrNi\e Di- \anet 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 168 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe and the Diyanet: The Case of Austria The management of religioXs diYersit\ has beFome one of the most signifiFant issXes faFing (Xropean soFieties in the last feZ deFades The inFreasing Xse of religion as an instrXment of immigration poli- Fies in (Xrope sinFe the late 98s has led to YarioXs traMeFtories of institXtionali]ation of Islam in (Xropean FoXntries Defined broadl\ as the aFFommodation and reFognition of the religioXs rights and praFtiFes of MXslims Zithin the frameZorN of the established FhXrFh and state relations models in (Xrope institXtionali]ation of Islam inYolYes in man\ Fases the establishment of MXslim representa- tiYe institXtions 2n the other hand the TXrNish goYernment too has e[tended its long standing Xse of its DireFtorate of ReligioXs Affairs the Di\anet herafter from a domestiF instrXment of Fon- trol oYer religion to an e[ternal instrXment to Fonsolidate national Xnit\ among indigenoXs or immigrant TXrNish FommXnities be\ond its borders The transnational dimension of this Xse of religion repli- Fated almost e[aFtl\ the Di\anet·s domestiF mission and aFtiYities In (Xrope as in TXrNe\ the Di\anet aims at proYiding religioXs ser- YiFes ¶enlightening· people aboXt ¶trXe religion· and demonstrating that Islam is Fompatible Zith demoFraF\ and modernit\ It also pro- motes a Yersion of Islam that is still rooted in TXrNishness and one that is perFeiYed as a soXrFe of national Xnit\ :hile the Di\anet has been aFtiYel\ engaged in YarioXs proFesses of institXtionali]ation of Islam in different (Xropean FoXntries its aim of promoting ¶TXrNish Islam· in (Xrope Freates a d\namiF of tension Zhen faFed Zith of- fiFial goYernmental initiatiYes to Freate (Xropean Islams This artiFle Zill e[amine the Fase of the institXtionali]ation of Is- lam in AXstria Zith a partiFXlar foFXs on the role of the Diyanet in the ,VODPLVFKH*ODXEHQVJHPHLQVFKDIWLQgVWHUUHLFK-I**ig IslamiF ReligioXs &ommXnit\ in AXstria The AXstrian Fase is important for a nXmber of reasons )irst Zhile man\ other (Xropean FoXntries sXFh as Spain %elgiXm )ranFe and *erman\ haYe engaged in es- tablishing YarioXs Ninds of MXslim representatiYe bodies onl\ in 1 For the Diyanet, see İştar Gözaydın , Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Dinin Tanzimi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009); İştar B. Gözaydın, “Diyanet and Politics”, The Muslim World, Vol.98, No.2-3, 2008, pp. 216-227; İsmail Kara, Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi’nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2008); Amit Bein, Ottoman Ulema Turkish Repub- lic: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 2 For the institutionalization of Islam and establishment of Muslim representative bodies, please see Silvio Ferrari, “The Secularity of the State and the Shaping of Muslim Representa- tive Organizations” in Jocelyne Césari and Sean McLoughlin (eds.), European Muslims and the Secular State, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 11-23; Veit Bader,( ed.), “Governing Islam in Western Europe: Essays on the Governance of Religious Diversity”, Special issue, Jour- nal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.33, No.6, 2007, pp.871-1016; Brigitte Maréchal, 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 169 Zana Çitak the 99s I**ig Zas established in 979 the first of its Nind long before the Fhallenge of religioXs diYersit\ pressed itself on man\ (Xropean soFieties This as this artiFle shoZs beloZ Zas dXe to the historiFal legaF\ of a mXlti-FXltXral AXstro-+Xngarian (mpire SeFondl\ as man\ sFholars haYe obserYed AXstria is interesting also for the parado[iFal natXre of the interYoZen relationship be- tZeen immigration and goYernanFe of religioXs diYersit\ :hile the immigrant integration poliFies of the AXstrian state are Yer\ restriF- tiYe its poliFies of religioXs aFFommodation are e[Feptionall\ in- FlXsiYe3 Thirdl\ althoXgh the Di\anet as in man\ other (Xropean FoXntries has been the largest MXslim assoFiation in AXstria the main Di\anet-linNed Xmbrella organi]ation of mosTXes ATI%-Avus- WXU\D7UNĈVODP%LUOLĊL TXrNish-IslamiF 8nion in AXstria remained oXtside of I**ig Xntil reFentl\ Zith no representatiYes in it thoXgh this sitXation has Fhanged reFentl\ I**ig is in faFt headed sinFe b\ a president )Xat Sanao Zho is an affiliate of the Milli *|rċ another TXrNish-MXslim netZorN4 This sitXtion stands in sharp Fontrast to the MXslim representatiYe bodies in )ranFe Con- seil Français du Culte Musulman-&)&M or in %elgiXm /·([pFXWLI des Musulmans de Belgique-(M% in ZhiFh the Di\anet-led TXrNish assoFiations Fan be said to haYe seFXred a disproportionatel\ high signifiFanFe and representation This paper Zill first e[amine the institXtionali]ation of Islam in AXs- tria and Zhat role the Di\anet-linNed ATI% pla\s Zithin this proFess as Zell as the FXrrent transformations in the attitXde of ATI% to- Zards I**ig based on field researFh in TXrNe\ and AXstria Fon- dXFted betZeen MarFh and -Xne 9 inFlXding interYieZs Zith Di\anet offiFials and representatiYes of other TXrNish-MXslim as- soFiatons as Zell as AXstrian goYernment “Mosques, Organizations and Leadership” in Brigitte Maréchal, Stefano Allievi, Felice Das- setto and Jorgen Nielsen (eds.), Muslims in Enlarged Europe, (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp.151- 82; Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Tyler Golson, “Overhauling Islam: Representation, Con- struction, and Cooption of ‘Moderate Islam’ in Western Europe”, Journal of Church and State, Vol. 49, Summer 2007, pp. 487–515. 3 Julia Mourão Permoser and Sieglinde Rosenberger, “Religious Citizenship versus Policies of Immigrant Integration: The Case of Austria” in Paul Bramadat and Matthias Koenig (eds.), International Migration and the Governance of Religious Diversity, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009). 4 Milli Görüş (National Outlook) is a political Islamist movement of Turkish origin, with intimate links to the line of political Islamist movement and line of political parties, led by Necmettin Erbakan. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 170 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe and the Diyanet: The Case of Austria ,QVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQRI,VODPDQG$XVWULD AFFording to the &ensXs there Zere appro[imatel\ 33 MXslims FonstitXting 4 of the AXstrian popXlation 33 The estimates for 9 are MXslims or of the popXla- tion TXrNs maNe Xp the largest groXp more than one third Zhile the %osnian MXslims are the seFond largest groXp7 AboXt half of the MXslim FommXnit\ haYe AXstrian Fiti]enship8 AXstrian MXslim FommXnit\ is predominantl\ SXnni Shi·is and AleYis FonsititXte the seFond and third largest groXps9 AlthoXgh most AXstrian MXslims are of immigrant origin AXstria·s enFoXnter Zith Islam and MXslims is relatiYel\ old going baFN to 878 that is the oFFXpation of %os- nia and +er]egoYina from the 2ttoman (mpire and the eYentXal anne[ation of these territories in 98 It is therefore possible to talN aboXt three historiFal tXrning points in the emergenFe of a MXslim FommXnit\ in AXstria The first is as mentioned preYioXsl\ the anne[ation of predominantl\ MXslim- maMorit\ %osnia and +er]egoYina b\ the AXstro-+Xngarian (mpire The seFond is the ZaYe of labor forFe originating mainl\ from TXr- Ne\ in the 9s :hile the floZ of gXestZorNers Zas disFontinXed in 97s MXslim FommXnit\ of immigrant origin FontinXed to groZ Zith famil\ reXnifiFation after this date The third is the arriYal of a large nXmber of %osnian refXgees fleeing from the Zar in 5 Sabine Kroissenbrunner, “Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Austria: Socio-Political Net- works and Muslim Leadership of Turkish Immigrants”, Immigrants and Minorities, Vol.22, No.2&3, 2003, p. 188; Nora Gresch et al., “Tu Felix Austria? The Headscarf and the Politics of ‘Non-issues’” Social Politics, Vol.15, No.4, 2008, pp. 411-432. 6 Thomas Schmidinger, “Austria” in Samim Akgönül et al., (eds.), Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 4 (Leiden and Boston: E.J.Brill, 2012), p. 28. 7 Kroisenbrunner, “Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Austria”, p. 188. 8 Schmidinger, “Austria”, p. 28. 9 Permoser and Rosenberger, “Religious Citizenship versus Policies of Immigrant Integra- tion”, p. 260. 10 Ibid, p. 259; and Schmidinger, “Austria”, p.27. 11 Permoser and Rosenberger, “Religious Citizenship versus Policies of Immigrant Integra- tion”, p. 260. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 171 Zana Çitak (stablished in 979 I**ig has been the first MXslim representa- tiYe aXthorit\ of national sFope in :estern (Xrope long before sXFh reFent e[amples as Comisión Islámica de España 99 /·([pFXWLI des Musulmans de Belgique 999 and Conseil Français du Culte Musulman-&)&M in )ranFe 3 In the Fase of AXstria XnliNe in Spain %elgiXm *erman\ or )ranFe it is aboYe all the imperial legaF\ and not immigration that made possible this offiFial insti- tXtionali]ation :hile the demands of MXslims in AXstria for the es- tablishment of a MXslim representatiYe bod\ started in the 9s as a resXlt of the inflX[ of migrant ZorNers from predominantl\ MXs- lim FoXntries Xnder the leadership of the %osnian MXslims MXslim SoFial SerYiFe these demands themselYes Zere based on the /aZ of ReFognition from 874 and the Islam /aZ of 93 :hile the former broXght the general standards for the reFognition of a reli- gion or a religioXs FommXnit\ b\ the state and the prinFiple of eTXal treatment of all reFogni]ed religions the latter e[tended this reFog- nition to Islam in 9 Zith the anne[ation of %osnia +er]egoYina b\ the AXstro-+Xngarian (mpire in 98 &ombined the tZo laZs maNe the state-religion relationship an “inFlXsionar\” one4 ZhiFh entails the inFlXsion of all reFogni]ed religions in the pXbliF realm ThXs the establishment of the I**ig in 979 Zas a natXral re- sXlt of the AXstrian legal strXFtXre of FhXrFh and state relations and the historiFal legaF\ of an imperial poliF\ As sXFh I**ig has aFTXired the statXs of pXbliF Forporation liNe other religions ZhiFh is aFFompanied b\ some rights and priYileges These inFlXde first material rights sXFh as the finanFing of religioXs instrXFtion in sFhools Zith the state salar\ing religion teaFhers all the Zhile leaY- ing the I**ig the aXtonom\ to design the FXrriFXlXm as Zell as to 12 Other well-known examples are Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (CMO) (2004) in Netherlands, and Consulta Islamica Italiana (2004) in Italy. The Deustche Islamkonferenz (DIK) (2006), as a platform of dialogue between the representatives of the Muslim com- munity and the German government should also be included within the framework of insti- tutionalization of Islam in Europe. 13 W. Wieshaider, “The Legal Status of the Muslim Minority in Austria” in R. Aluffi and G. Zincone, G., (eds.), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe, (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), p. 31; Permoser and Rosenberger, “Religious Citizenship versus Policies of Immi- grant Integration”, pp. 264-265, 278. 14 Julia Mourão Permoser, Sieglinde Rosenberger and Kristina Stoeckl, “Religious Organiza- tions as Political Actors in the Context of Migration: Islam and Orthodoxy in Austria”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.36, No.9, 2010, pp. 1463-1481. 15 Kroisenbrunner, “Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Austria”, pp.191-192; Wieshaider, “The Legal Status of the Muslim Minority in Austria”, p. 31. 16 Wieshaider, “TheLegal Status of the Muslim Minority in Austria”, p.37. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 172 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe and the Diyanet: The Case of Austria hire train and sXperYise the religion teaFhers7 ThXs instrXFtion of MXslim religion in sFhools began in 98-983 and sinFe 998- 999 an IslamiF 3edagogiFal AFadem\ IR3A Zas estabished in 998-999 for the training of religion teaFhers SeFondl\ also po- litiFal rights emanate from the reFognition of Islam and I**ig as the representatiYe of the MXslim FommXnit\ in the form of politiFal FonsXltation in the poliF\-maNing proFess in relation to issXes Fon- Ferning religion8 2ffiFiall\ I**ig beFame the representatiYe of the Zhole AXstrian MXslim FommXnit\ as it Zas reFogni]ed b\ the bXreaX of religions Kultusamt of the AXstrian Ministr\ of &XltXre and (dXFation +oZ- eYer this offiFial monopol\ has been Fhallenged b\ a Yariet\ of faF- tors I**ig Fan be said to represent a Yer\ small perFentage of MXslims in AXstria In eleFtions a mere of all MXslims Zere eligible to Yote dXe to age reFord of pa\ment of registration fees or residenF\ reTXirement for Yoting At the same time the groZing diYersit\ Zithin the MXslim FommXnit\ has led to YarioXs demands on the part of some MXslims most notabl\ the AleYis for offiFial reFognition of their FommXnit\ as a religioXs FommXnit\ on eTXal footing Zith the I**ig9 /astl\ as in the Fase of Di\anet- linNed ATI% I**ig·s Flaim of monopol\ of representation has tradi- tionall\ made the ATI% XnFomfortable as the latter emphasi]es the signifiFanFe of ethniF Zeight of TXrNs As sXFh thoXgh not the onl\ one I**ig has Fertainl\ established itself as the most important aFtor in relation to TXestions and issXes related to Islam and Flaims despite YarioXs Fhallenges to be the onl\ interloFXtor for the AXstrian state in matters related to Islam and MXslim FommXnit\ There are seYeral reasons for the Fentral- it\ of the I**ig )irst the AXstrian legal strXFtXre alloZs onl\ the representatiYe bod\ of a reFogni]ed religioXs FommXnit\ the rights and priYileges that aFFompan\ the reFognition ThXs other MXslim 17 Permoser and Rosenberger, “Religious Citizenship versus Policies of Immigrant Integra- tion”, p. 271. 18 Ibid. 19 One success for official recognition has been obtained by one Alevi association, which is now recognized as Religiöse Bekenntnisgemeinschaft, which entails fewer privileges than that of “public corporation” but which nevertheless brings an offical status. Schmidinger, “Austria”, pp.29-30. 20 Author’s interviews with ATIB officials, Vienna, June 2009. 21 Kroisenbrunner, “Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Austria”, p. 200; Permoser and Rosen- berger, “Religious Citizenship versus Policies of Immigrant Integration”, p. 273. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 173 Zana Çitak assoFiations and organi]ations are dependent on the I**ig for the reFrXitment of religion teaFhers and issXing of Yisas for the imams e[Fept for ATI% ZhiFh on the basis of a speFial treat\ betZeen the AXstrian and TXrNish goYernments Fan reFrXit its imams on its oZn In the same Za\ the politiFal FonsXltation in the poliF\-maN- ing proFess reFogni]es onl\ I**ig henFe maNing this bod\ as the partner for the AXstrian goYernment in its relations Zith the MXslim FommXnit\ SeFondl\ representation in the I**ig is based on indiYidXal mem- bership XnliNe other MXslim organi]ations ZhiFh are TXite often of ethniF natXre This means that eYen thoXgh aFFording to the AXstrian laZ all MXslims are natXral members of the MXslim Fom- mXnit\ and Fan thXs benefit from all the serYiFes proYided b\ the I**ig representation in terms of right to eleFt and to be eleFted is reserYed for ¶registered members· onl\3 The prinFiple of indiYidXal membership also limits assoFiational membership in that YarioXs MXslim assoFiations are represented onl\ in the AdYisor\ &oXnFil and not in the ShX·ra &oXnFil the legislatiYe organ or the +ighest &oXnFil the e[eFXtiYe bod\4 Thirdl\ beFaXse the MXslim FommXnit\ of AXstria is predominantl\ an immigrant FommXnit\ Fonsisting of non-Fiti]ens or Fiti]ens of immigrant origin and beFaXse the maMorit\ of immigrants are MXs- lim the I**ig has beFome also an organi]ation representing im- migrants FonFerned Zith immigration-related issXes *iYen the restriFtiYe immigration poliF\ of AXstria Zith rigoroXs standards for the aFTXisition of Fiti]enship and ZhiFh limits politiFal rights sXFh as Yoting and standing for eleFtions to Fiti]ens onl\ politiFal representation beFomes possible almost onl\ throXgh religioXs or- gani]ations ThXs both the state and the MXslim immigrants find in I**ig a YehiFle for dialogXe7 22 Kroisenbrunner, “Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Austria”, p. 196. 23 Author’s interview with Amina Baghajati, Member of the Shu’ra Council of the IGGiÖ, Vienna, 15 June 2009. 24 Kroisenbrunner, “Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Austria”, p. 193. 25 Permoser, Rosenberger and Stoeckl, “Religious Organizations as Political Actors in the Con- text of Migration”, pp. 1466, 1469. 26 For an analysis of the contrast between a restrictive immigration policy and a pluralistic and generous policy of religious accommodation, see Permoser ad Rosenberger, “Religious Citizenship versus Policies of Immigrant Integration, pp. 259-289. 27 The IGGiÖ, like other religious oganizations, was consulted by the government in 2007 within the framework of Integrationsplatform to formulate new policies in relation to im- 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 174 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe and the Diyanet: The Case of Austria %esides these Zhat Fan be Falled as legalstrXFtXral reasons there are also more Fontingent reasons for the Fentral role pla\ed b\ the I**Ĉg The proFess of (Xropeani]ation has transformed the role of the I**ig )irst there has been a broadening of the issXes sXb- MeFt to politiFal FonsXltation +enFe I**ig has been inFreasingl\ soliFited for its mediating role in a Zider nXmber of issXes8 Differ- ent goYernments inFlXding the AXstrian one haYe foXnd it YalXable to demonstrate their respeFtiYe form of religioXs goYernanFe as a model for the rest of (Xrope9 In doing that the AXstrian aXthori- ties haYe inFreasingl\ resorted to the FonsXltation Zith the I**ig SeFondl\ rather than traditionall\ an almost alZa\s goYernment- initiated politiFal FonsXltation proFess one FoXld inFreasingl\ see I**Ĉg taNing the first step in initiating dialogXe Zith the goYernment in order to inflXenFe in its tXrn the YalXes of Zhat Fan be Falled as an emergent ¶(Xropean Islam· +enFe the aFtiYism of the I**ig in relation to the TXestion of headsFarf ZhiFh emerged in 4 Fan be Xnderstood Zithin this frameZorN3 7KHDiyanetDQGWKH,**Lg As immigrant ZorNers Fame to AXstria in 9s and 97s mainl\ from TXrNe\ the immigrant FommXnit\ of AXstria Fonsists oYer- Zhelmingl\ of TXrNs FonstitXting the largest groXp Zithin the MXslim FommXnit\ ² aboXt one third (stablished in 99 ATI%3 in tXrn represents the largest FlXster of mosTXes Zithin the TXrN- ish FommXnit\ again aboXt one third of all the TXrNish mosTXes3 or some mosTXe assoFiations33 as opposed to aboXt of Milli *|rċ and some XnNnoZn nXmber of IslamiF &XltXral &enter migration. Permoser, Rosenberger and Stoeckl, “Religious Organizations as Political Actors in the Context of Migration”, p. 1470. 28 Permoser, Rosenberger and Stoeckl, “Religious Organizations as Political Actors in the Con- text of Migration”, pp. 1467-1468. A good example is when the IGGiÖ was consulted by the Commission established by the EU on the assessment of the needs to implement sanctions against Austria following Haider’s anti-Semitic and xenophobic right wing party joining the ruling coaltion in 2000. Ibid. 29 The two conferences of imams in 2003 and 2006, the latter during the Austrian presidency of the EU, organized by the Austrian government can be seen as an example of this attitude. Ibid., p. 1471. 30 For the activism of IGGiÖ in the headscarf issue, see Gresch, Hadj-Abdou, Rosenberger and Sauer , “Tu Felix Austria?, pp. 1-22) and E. Holzleithner and Sabine Strasser,”Troublesome Issues: Current Debates on Tensions between Gender Equality and Cultural Diversity in Austria’, Working paper node cmc. (2006), pp. 6-7. 31 www.atib-hohenems.at. (accessed 19.12.2008), 32 Kroisenbrunner, “Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Austria”, p. 195. 33 Author’s interview with an ATIB official, Vienna, 17 June 2009. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 175 Zana Çitak Sle\manF× 34 Despite its importanFe Zithin the MXslim FommXni- t\ ATI% remained aloof from I**ig for a long time The legal statXs of I**ig as the representatiYe of the Zhole MXslim FommXnit\ as Zell as I**ig·s oZn Flaim to represent the MXslims of AXstria haYe been Fhallenged Xntil reFentl\ also b\ the striNing absenFe of ATI% in this institXtion Xntil -Xne eleFtions The statXs of pXbliF Forporation giYes the I**ig all the dXe rights and priYileges This limits the politiFal FonsXltation betZeen the goYernment and the MXslim FommXnit\ to the mediating role of I**ig onl\ henFe e[FlXding other MXslim assoFiations althoXgh these assoFiations of different ethniF groXps or religioXs tenden- Fies still are more important at the loFal leYel than I**ig3 :hile this ma\ be hoZeYer trXe for all organi]ations inFlXding ATI% the latter·s partiFXlar absenFe Xntil the adoption of a neZ FonstitXtion in in I**ig has been the resXlt of I**ig·s pre- FonstitX- tion limiting the representation of an\ ethniF groXp to at most 3 of the +igh &oXnFil foXr seats 3 no matter Zhat the si]e of a giYen ethniF FommXnit\ is This e[plains the disfaYoXrable representa- tion of MXslim TXrNs as a Zhole in this institXtion 2n this ATI% has fXndamentall\ disagreed Zith I**ig and has Fonsidered sXFh a Fondition and form of representation based on indiYidXal member- ship at the e[pense of ethniFdemographiF representation as ¶anti- demoFratiF·37 resXlting in its self-isolation for a long time ATI% has also been distXrbed b\ the inFreasing monopol\ of I**ig in the reFrXitment of religion teaFhers as Zell as imams :hile ATI% Fan still reFrXit religion teaFhers from TXrNe\ throXgh some bilateral agreements signed betZeen the AXstrian and TXrNish goYernments it has disapproYed of IslamiF 3edagogiFal AFadem\·s theologiFal edXFation of religion teaFhers ATI% does not see this edXFation as TXalified as the theologiFal edXFation of religion teaFhers Foming from TXrNe\38 Again in terms of the reFrXitment of imams ATI% has 34 The chair of the ICC gives the number of ICC mosques as 45. Author’s interview with the ICC representative, Vienna, 18 June 2009. As Kroisenbrunner also suggests, this number seems exaggerated. Krosienbrunner, “Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Austria”, p. 199. Süleymancılık is an Islamic order established by Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan. 35 Ibid, p. 198. 36 Ibid., p. 196 and Author’s interview with Amina Baghajati, Member of the Shu’ra Council of the IGGiÖ, Vienna, 15 June 2009. 37 Author’s interview with an ATIB official, Vienna, 17 June 2009. 38 Kroisenbrunner, “Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Austria”, p. 196.In the same way, IG- GiÖ argues that religion teachers coming from Turkey are ill-qualified to teach as their language ability in German is rather limited. Ibid. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 176 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe and the Diyanet: The Case of Austria been Xneas\ of I**ig·s issXing of FertifiFates and Yisas for imams Foming from TXrNe\ oXtside the Di\anet tiFNet In faFt most Milli *|rċ and Sle\manF× imams haYe been reFrXited from TXrNe\ b\ I**ig Fertif\ing them and issXing Yisas )or ATI% most of those imams reFrXited oXtside the Di\anet tiFNet haYe a religioXs edXFa- tion ²from YarioXs religioXs Fenters in the Arab Zorld sXFh as Al- A]har39 - not Fompatible Zith the Nind of Islam as the Di\anet has Flaimed to represent In that ATI% is similar to other Di\anet-linNed organisations in (X- ropean FoXntries in its Flaim to represent ¶TXrNish Islam· defined as harmonioXs Zith modernit\ and demoFraF\ Zith a potential of presenting a model for the emergent ¶(Xropean Islam·4 AFFord- ing to an offiFial of the ATI% there are in faFt three Xnderstand- ings of Islam in the Zorld the Xnderstanding of TXrNe\ the Iranian one and the Salafi one represented b\ SaXdi Arabia4 The Di\anet- linNed organi]ations sXFh as ATI% or DITI%s or Di\anet foXndations thXs tr\ to monopoli]e the TXrNish representation as the\ Fonsider themselYes the rightfXl representatiYe of a rational and moderate Islam of the seFXlar TXrNish state Di\anet·s self-image is also one of an institXtion that has proYed itself in Farr\ing oXt religioXs ser- YiFes ZhiFh maNes it XnFomparable to other institXtions in terms of historiFal e[perienFe4 ThXs the Di\anet both in terms of its Xnderstanding of religion and its institXtional mission and Fapabilit\ Flaims to be the trXe representatiYe of TXrNish people as Zell as an institXtional model for (Xropean FoXntries in their searFh for aF- Fommodating Islam in their e[isting state-religion strXFtXres It Fan be said that the Di\anet has both adYantages and disadYan- tages in its Flaim to monopoli]e TXrNish representation in (Xrope in general and in AXstria in partiFXlar 2n the one hand the Di\anet·s position is one of embraFing eYer\one as it Flaims to stand aboYe 39 Ibid, p. 202. In fact, in Europe, including Austria, Milli Görüş recruits its imams in an important number from among the former Diyanet employees. As for the Süleymancıs, Kroisenbrunner notes that they only recruit imams trained in their own religious training institutions. Ibid., pp. 202-203. 40 For an example of a similar attitude, see Zana Çitak, “Between ‘Turkish Islam’ and ‘French Islam’: The Role of the Diyanet in the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman’”, Journal of Eth- nic and Migration Studies, Vol. 36, No.4, April 2010, p. 619-634. 41 Author’s interview with an ATIB official, Vienna, 17 June 2009. 42 For a study of the Diyanet’s self-image, see Zana Çitak, “D’acteur national à transnational: La Diyanet en Europe”, Cahiers de l’Obtic, No.2, December 2012, pp.9-14. www.obtic.org. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 177 Zana Çitak all politiFal ideologies and seFts43 At the same time it also ap- peals to the not Yer\ religioXs people those Zho onl\ seeN for a minimXm leYel of religioXs serYiFe44 The Di\anet-linNed organi]a- tions liNe ATI% bring also the finanFial and organi]ational sXpport of the state4 and henFe preserYing FontinXit\4 2n the other hand hoZeYer this organiF linN of ATI% Zith the Di\anet and henFe the TXrNish state has led to a strongl\ entrenFhed and Zidespread im- age of the ATI% as an organi]ation of the TXrNish state ThXs one FoXld talN aboXt a Fertain sXspiFion and fear on the part of both the other TXrNish assoFiations as Zell as non-TXrNish assoFiations that ATI% ZoXld aFt liNe the offiFial spoNesperson of the TXrNish state in Zhat is seen as an AXstrian institXtion At the same time Zhile other TXrNish assoFiations sXFh as Milli *|rċ and I&& haYe to train and mobili]e their folloZers in order to sXrYiYe ATI% laFNs in mobili]a- tion as it relies on the FontinXit\ of the state as a s\mboliF poZer and state sXpport as material poZer47 ReFentl\ ATI% has Fhanged its long-standing self-isolation from I*- *ig It thXs deFided to aFtiYel\ partiFipate in I**ig b\ taNing part in the eleFtions It eYen sXpported the eleFtion of an affiliate of Milli *|rċ Mr )Xat Sanao as the president of the I**ig This reFent Fhange in ATI%·s long-standing attitXde Zas dXe aFFording to a Di\anet offiFial to an inFreasing reFognition b\ the Di\anet that isolation leads to a loss of an\ FhanFe for shaping FrXFial proFess- es ZhiFh are Xnder the legal monopol\ of I**ig dXe to AXstrian FonstitXtion sXFh as designing the FXrriFXlXm of religion FoXrses in sFhools At the same time throXgh negotiations ATI% has also sXFFeeded in Fhanging that proYision of I**ig·s FonstitXtion limit- ing the representation of an\ groXp to one third of the seats of the +ighest &oXnFil to half of the seats ZhiFh ATI% Fonsiders as an in- Fomplete bXt neYertheless Fonsiderable improYement from the pre- YioXs ¶anti-demoFratiF· sitXation48 In faFt it seems liNe the Di\anet has marNedl\ Fome to a reali]ation that I**ig is FonstitXtionall\ the onl\ interloFXtor for the AXstrian state and that it might haYe 43 Author’s interview with an ATIB official, Vienna, 17 June 2009. 44 Author’s interview with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria, Vienna, 18 June2009. 45 Nicole Landman, “Sustaining Turkish-Islamic Loyalties: The Diyanet in Western Europe” in H. Poulton, H.and Taji-Farouki, S. (eds) Muslim Identity and the Balkan State, (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), pp. 214-231. 46 Author’s interview with the president of a Turkish organization, Vienna, 16 June 2009. 47 Author’s interviews, Vienna, June 2009. 48 Author’s interview with an ATIB official, Vienna, 17 June 2009. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 178 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe and the Diyanet: The Case of Austria been a mistaNe to remain oXtside for sXFh a long time In faFt one interYieZee stated that Zhile the Di\anet Xsed to thinN that “ZithoXt TXrNs nothing is possible” it has reali]ed that I**ig Fan e[ist Zith- oXt it49 It is also aZare of its image as the offiFial representatiYe of the TXrNish state In this Fonte[t one interYieZee stated in relation to the representation of ATI% in I**ig that “>it is trXe that@ Ze don·t need a seFond ATI% after all” In that ATI% also tried to smoothen its image and eliminate the fears of other TXrNs in partiFXlar and MXslims in general that it Zants to dominate the I**ig and henFe empasi]ed that the neZ president after the eleFtions does not haYe to be an ATI% member bXt hopefXll\ a person of TXrNish origin This Fompromising attitXde itself hoZeYer refleFted ATI%·s FaXtion that if it Zere to insist on an ATI% Fandidate it might not get the sXpport of the rest dXe to the image of the Di\anet In other Zords ATI% did not Zant to Xndermine its oZn position Similarl\ Milli *|rċ and I&& also point oXt that regarding the presi- denF\ of the neZ I**ig abilit\ is more important than assoFia- tional membership3 In emphasi]ing that an able TXrNish Fandidate no matter Zhat hisher assoFiation might be ATI% Milli *|rċ and I&& seemed to be more in solidarit\ Zith eaFh other rather than in Fompetition in striNing Fontrast to the sitXation in &)&M in )ranFe and the ([pFXtif in %elgiXm Zhere Fompetition espeFiall\ betZeen the Di\anet-linNed organi]ations and Milli *|rċ has been more e[pliFit4 The impression of solidarit\ Zas reinforFed also b\ their Fommon emphases on the reFent rapproFhement among these dif- ferent groXps as in the e[ample of the Felebration of the 3rophet·s %irth .XWOX'RĊXP+DIWDV× ZhiFh haYe been organi]ed together b\ all three organi]ations or as Zhen the\ Xnderline the faFt that the\ don·t mind going to one another·s mosTXes ([Fept for the I&& ZhiFh does not refrain from pXtting aFFent on the e[istenFe of differenFes in their Xnderstanding and praFtiFe of Islam and the rest there is also a deliberate effort to Xnderpla\ an\ religioXs dif- ferenFes and to pXt on the forefront Fommonalities 49 Author’s interview with a an ATIB official, Vienna, 18 June 2009. 50 Author’s interview with an ATIB official, Vienna, 17 June 2009. 51 Author’s inteview with an ATIB official, Vienna, 17 June 2009. 52 Author’s interview with an ATIB official, Vienna, 18 June 2009. 53 Author’s interviews, Vienna, June 2009. 54 Çitak, “Between ‘Turkish Islam’ and ‘French Islam’”, pp. 619-634; Zana Çitak, “Religion, Etnicity and Transnationalism: Turkish Islam in Belgium”, Journal of Church and State, Vol.53, No.2, 2011, pp. 222-242. 55 Author’s interviews, Vienna, June 2009. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 179 Zana Çitak It is possible to e[plain this solidarit\ b\ tZo faFtors In the first plaFe the AXstrian legal strXFtXre b\ prioriti]ing one single inter- loFXtor in terms of rights and priYileges seems to sXppress open Fompetition There is a reFognition on the part of all three maMor TXrNish organi]ations that the\ haYe to aFt Zith and Zithin the I*- *ig In the Zords of one interYieZee “there is in faFt nothing to gain or lose” as the I**ig has inFreasingl\ monopoli]ed the field of religioXs instrXFtion and eYen to some e[tent the reFrXitment of imams7 Therefore one FoXld onl\ hope to haYe a greater inflXenFe in for e[ample shaping the FXrriFXlXm of religioXs instrXFtion In the seFond plaFe a faFtor related to TXrNish domestiF politiFs ²the Foming to poZer of the -XstiFe and DeYelopment 3art\ in Zith roots in the Milli *|rċ moYement³seems to haYe broXght aboXt a rapproFhement8 similar in faFt to that taNing plaFe in other (Xro- pean FoXntries as Zell9 &RQFOXVLRQ The stXd\ of the institXtionali]ation of Islam in AXstria highlights partiFXlarities of as Zell as similarities betZeen different e[amples of institXtionali]ation of Islam in (Xrope and of the Di\anet·s aFtiY- ism in these proFesses As this artiFle tries to shoZ the AXstrian Fase demonstrates that the role of the Di\anet in the I**ig as Zell as its perFeption of the institXtionali]ation of Islam in AXstria dem- onstrate that there are tZo main faFtors that determine this role and perFeption )irst the institXtional strXFtXre of the FhXrFh-state relations in AXstria SeFond the Di\anet·s self-image and its Zilling- ness to promote a ¶TXrNish Islam· Zhose FontoXrs it traditionall\ has Flaimed to represent In that the Di\anet has both adYantages and disadYantages As this artiFle has argXed on the one hand its Flaim to represent an Islam Fompatible Zith modernit\ and demoF- raF\ has an important appeal both for the MXslim FommXnit\ and the AXstrian state 2n the other hand hoZeYer its offiFial statXs beFomes a liabilit\ in the AXstrian Fonte[t of promotion of an ¶AXs- trian Islam· 56 Author’s interview with an Austrian state official, Vienna, 18 June 2009. 57 It can be said that ATIB has realized that it was wrong to believe that most Turkish pupils won’t follow religion classes in schools taught by non-Turkish teachers recruited by IGGiÖ as that did not happen. Author’s interview with an Austrian state official, Vienna, 18 June 2009. 58 Author’s interviews, Vienna, June 2009. 59 Çitak, “Religion, Ethnicity and Transnationalism”, p. 241. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 180 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe and the Diyanet: The Case of Austria Bibliography %DGHU9HLW HG ´*RYHUQLQJ,VODPLQ:HVWHUQ(XURSH (VVD\VRQ WKH*RYHUQDQFHRI5HOLJLRXV'LYHUVLW\µ6SHFLDOLVVXH-RXUQDORI (WKQLFDQG0LJUDWLRQ6WXGLHV9RO1RSS %HLQ$PLW2WWRPDQ8OHPD7XUNLVK5HSXEOLF $JHQWVRI&KDQJH DQG*XDUGLDQVRI7UDGLWLRQ 6WDQIRUG 6WDQIRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV dLWDN=DQD´%HWZHHQ¶7XUNLVK,VODP·DQG¶)UHQFK,VODP· 7KH 5ROHRIWKH'L\DQHW in the &RQVHLO)UDQoDLVGX&XOWH0XVXOPDQµ -RXUQDORI(WKQLFDQG0LJUDWLRQ6WXGLHV9RO1R$SULO SS dLWDN=DQD´5HOLJLRQ(WQLFLW\DQG7UDQVQDWLRQDOLVP 7XUNLVK ,VODP LQ %HOJLXPµ -RXUQDO RI &KXUFK DQG 6WDWH 9RO 1R SS BBBBBBBB´'·DFWHXUQDWLRQDOjWUDQVQDWLRQDO /D'L\DQHWHQ(X- URSHµ&DKLHUVGHO·2EWLF1R'HFHPEHUSS ZZZ obtic.org. )HUUDUL6LOYLR´7KH6HFXODULW\RIWKH6WDWHDQGWKH6KDSLQJRI 0XVOLP 5HSUHVHQWDWLYH 2UJDQL]DWLRQVµ LQ -RFHO\QH &pVDUL DQG 6HDQ0F/RXJKOLQ HGV (XURSHDQ0XVOLPVDQGWKH6HFXODU6WDWH $OGHUVKRW $VKJDWH SS *UHVFK 1RUD HW DO ´7X )HOL[ $XVWULD" 7KH +HDGVFDUI DQG WKH 3ROLWLFVRI¶1RQLVVXHV·µ6RFLDO3ROLWLFV9RO1RSS *|]D\G×QúüWDU'L\DQHW 7UNL\H&XPKXUL\HWL·QGH'LQLQ7DQ]LPL úVWDQEXO úOHWLüLP *|]D\G×Q úüWDU % ´'L\DQHW DQG 3ROLWLFVµ 7KH 0XVOLP :RUOG 9RO 1R +DGGDG +HLQH 6 ´,VODP LQ $XVWULD %HWZHHQ ,QWHJUDWLRQ 3ROLWLFV DQG 3HUVLVWLQJ3UHMXGLFHVµLQ6KDGLG:$5DQGYDQ.RQLQJVZHOG 36 HGV ,QWHUFXOWXUDO5HODWLRQVDQG5HOLJLRXV$XWKRULWLHV 0XV- OLPVLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ /HXYHQ 3HHWHUV SS 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 181 Zana Çitak +RO]OHLWKQHU(DQG6WUDVVHU6´7URXEOHVRPH,VVXHV &XUUHQW 'HEDWHVRQ7HQVLRQVEHWZHHQ*HQGHU(TXDOLW\DQG&XOWXUDO'L- YHUVLW\LQ$XVWULDµ:RUNLQJSDSHUQRGHFPF .DUDúVPDLO&XPKXUL\HW7UNL\HVL·QGH%LU0HVHOH2ODUDNúVODP úVWDQEXO 'HUJkK .URLVVHQEUXQQHU6DELQH´,VODPDQG0XVOLP,PPLJUDQWVLQ$XV- WULD 6RFLR3ROLWLFDO1HWZRUNVDQG0XVOLP/HDGHUVKLSRI7XUNLVK ,PPLJUDQWVµ,PPLJUDQWVDQG0LQRULWLHV9RO1R SS BBBBB ¶0XVOLPV DQG WKH ,VODPLF &RPPXQLW\ LQ $XVWULD· LQ 'HJUHHV(DVWDQG:HVW)HGHUDO0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV /DQGPDQ1LFROH´6XVWDLQLQJ7XUNLVK,VODPLF/R\DOWLHV 7KH'L- \DQHW LQ :HVWHUQ (XURSHµ LQ 3RXOWRQ +DQG 7DML)DURXNL 6 HGV 0XVOLP ,GHQWLW\ DQG WKH %DONDQ 6WDWH /RQGRQ +XUVW &RPSDQ\ SS 0DUpFKDO%ULJLWWH´0RVTXHV2UJDQL]DWLRQVDQG/HDGHUVKLSµLQ %ULJLWWH 0DUpFKDO 6WHIDQR $OOLHYL )HOLFH 'DVVHWWR DQG -RUJHQ 1LHOVHQ HGV 0XVOLPVLQ(QODUJHG(XURSH /HLGHQ %ULOO SS 3HUPRVHU -XOLD 0RXUmR 6LHJOLQGH 5RVHQEHUJHU DQG .ULVWLQD 6WRHFNO´5HOLJLRXV2UJDQL]DWLRQVDV3ROLWLFDO$FWRUVLQWKH&RQ- WH[W RI 0LJUDWLRQ ,VODP DQG 2UWKRGR[\ LQ $XVWULDµ -RXUQDO RI (WKQLF DQG 0LJUDWLRQ 6WXGLHV 9RO 1R 1RYHPEHU SS 3HUPRVHU -XOLD 0RXUmR DQG 6LHJOLQGH 5RVHQEHUJHU ´5HOLJLRXV &LWL]HQVKLS YHUVXV 3ROLFLHV RI ,PPLJUDQW ,QWHJUDWLRQ 7KH &DVH RI $XVWULDµ LQ 3DXO %UDPDGDW DQG 0DWWKLDV .RHQLJ HGV ,Q- WHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQDQGWKH*RYHUQDQFHRI5HOLJLRXV'LYHUVLW\ 0RQWUHDO .LQJVWRQ 0F*LOO4XHHQ·V 8QLYHUVLW\ 3UHVV SS 6FKPLGLQJHU 7KRPDV ´$XVWULDµ LQ 6DPLP $NJ|QO HW DO HGV :LHVKDLGHU:´7KH/HJDO6WDWXVRIWKH0XVOLP0LQRULW\LQ$XV- WULDµLQ$OXIIL5DQG=LQFRQH* HGV 7KH/HJDO7UHDWPHQWRI ,VODPLF0LQRULWLHVLQ(XURSH /HXYHQ 3HHWHUV SS 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 182 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 BOOK 2XU/DVW%HVW&KDQFH 7KH3XUVXLWRI3HDFHLQD REVIEW 7LPHRI3HULO King Abdullah II of Jordan, (New York: Viking, February 2011), 346 p. Zeynep SÜTALAN* The booN b\ .ing AbdXllah II of -ordan is an aXtobiograph\ ZhiFh Fan be regarded as a folloZ-Xp of a famil\ tradition in referenFe to the .ing +Xssein·s aXtobiograph\ named 8QHDV\/LHV7KH+HDG1 /iNe his father .ing AbdXllah has Zritten the booN in the tenth \ear of his reign The booN as an aXtobiograph\ proYides the reader Zith an insight into the .ing·s life inFlXding his Fhildhood and ado- lesFenFe his marriage Zith 4Xeen Rania and his asFendanFe to throne after the death of .ing +Xssein At the Yer\ same time the booN is a politiFal histor\ sinFe the .ing Zell portra\s the national and regional d\namiFs as a baFNgroXnd In addition despite his personal aFFoXnt .ing AbdXllah II deYotes a signifiFant portion of his booN to his e[perienFe and thoXghts aboXt the 3alestinian-Is- raeli FonfliFt AlthoXgh the booN Zas pXblished MXst before the Arab Spring and the .ing neither inFlXdes nor prediFts the reYolXtionar\ Fhanges of the Arab Spring he giYes a strong message aboXt the Xrgent need to solYe the 3alestinian-Israeli TXestion This message FoXld be no better timed than eYer and is still releYant for the region ZhiFh has Fhanged Fonsiderabl\ Zith the Zinds of the Arab Spring In speFial referenFe to the .ing·s refleFtions on the 3alestinian-Is- raeli FonfliFt the booN is Zorth reading in Xnderstanding the Middle (ast peaFe proFess and foreseeing its possible fXtXre The .ing attribXtes high importanFe to the 3alestinian-Israeli Fon- fliFt that he Xnderlines as a “politiFal FonfliFt oYer land and rights” rather than a religioXs strXggle p[iii AFFording to the .ing 3al- estinian-Israeli TXestion lies at the heart of the Arab-Israeli FonfliFt bXt its impaFt is not limited to that In FontradiFtion to the :est- ern approaFh that FonFeiYes the Fhallenges in the Middle (ast liNe “Iranian e[pansionism radiFal terrorism seFtarian tensions in IraT and /ebanon and a long-festering FonfliFt betZeen Israel and the 3alestinians” as separate issXes .ing AbdXllah II YieZs them as in- 1 King Hussein, Uneasy Lies The Head: The Autobiography By His Majesty King Hussein of Jor- dan, (Bernard Geis Associates, 1962). * PhD Candidate, Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. Zeynep Sütalan terFonneFted throXgh the 3alestinian-Israeli FonfliFt p[ii %esides the .ing asserts that the persistenFe of the FonfliFt is pla\ing into the hands of the e[tremists radiFals and the terrorists The\ manip- Xlate the FonfliFt for their oZn interests and tr\ to MXstif\ their illegal aFts in the e\es of the people b\ adopting the rhetoriF of liberating 3alestine -erXsalem from the Israeli oFFXpation and defending Is- lam Therefore he Xnderlines that resolYing the FonfliFt Zith a MXst and lasting peaFe Zill depriYe the e[tremists and terrorists from a tool for mobili]ation It ma\ not resolYe eYer\ Nind of e[tremism bXt at least “transform the pla\ing field” +enFe the .ing sa\s that establishing peaFe betZeen 3alestinians and Israelis shoXld not onl\ be an Arab bXt also an AmeriFan priorit\ p[iY )Xrthermore for .ing AbdXllah II the 3alestinian-Israeli FonfliFt is not merel\ a regional issXe bXt is a global FonFern sinFe it “resonates among all the Zorld·s billion MXslims” p[iii In addition to the signifiFanFe of the 3alestinian-Israeli TXestion for the Middle (astern regional Fonte[t and d\namiFs the FonfliFt is an inflXential faFtor in the domestiF and foreign poliF\ of -ordan AF- Fording to the data of the 8nited 1ations Relief and :orNs AgenF\ 81R:A for 3alestine refXgees there are aroXnd 9 million regis- tered refXgees in -ordan +oZeYer this nXmber does not inFlXde all -ordanians of 3alestinian origin AlthoXgh .ing AbdXllah II in his booN states that the 3alestinian popXlation FonstitXtes the 43 of the -ordanian popXlation different researFh points oXt differ- ent nXmbers ranging from one half of the popXlation to tZo third3 :hateYer the realit\ aboXt the demographiFs ma\ be the 3alestin- ian popXlation in -ordan has been YieZed as a Fhallenge to the raison d’etat of the +ashemite .ingdom b\ the -ordanians of (ast %anN origin and the regime SXFh perFeption has fXelled b\ the argXment adYoFated b\ the rightist Israeli politiFians as ¶-ordan is 3alestine· The +ashemite regime has strongl\ opposed the argX- ment 1eYertheless -ordanian nationalists haYe started opposing the poliFies of proYiding the 3alestinians in -ordan Zith Fiti]enship and politiFal rights In order to appease the -ordanian national- ists in fear the +ashemite regime promoted ¶-ordan )irst· poliF\ in ZhiFh Falled for Xnit\ among the -ordanians for sXpporting 2 UNRWA, In Figures, as of 1 January 2013, available at http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2012 0317152850.pdf 3 For the discussion, see Mudar Zahran, “Jordan is Palestinian”, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2012, pp. 3-12. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 184 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril the regime in its poliFies4 Additionall\ b\ signing the peaFe treat\ Zith Israel in 994 -ordan Zanted to ensXre its reFognition as a soYereign state in the e\es of Israel and pXt an end to the Flaims of ¶-ordan is 3alestine· After the 3alestinian /iberation 2rgani]a- tion 3/2 entered into direFt talNs Zith Israel in 993 Zith the 2slo proFess and -ordan signed a peaFe treat\ Zith Israel in 994 -or- dan is no more a part\ to the resolXtion of the 3alestinian-Israeli FonfliFt +oZeYer the +ashemite .ingdom has Yested interests in the establishment of a soYereign 3alestinian state and the resolX- tion of the 3alestinian-Israeli FonfliFt Therefore it is fair to sa\ that the deYelopment aboXt the 3alestinian-Israeli peaFe proFess has direFt effeFts on the -ordanian pXbliF opinion and sXrYiYal of the +ashemite regime :hen it Fomes to the failXres in the peaFe proFess .ing AbdXl- lah II FritiFi]es the past peaFe efforts b\ Flaiming that postponing the most diffiFXlt and problematiF issXes to a later date sXFh as -erXsalem refXgees borders and seFXrit\ haYe not broXght an\ benefits AlthoXgh this FritiFism has a right in it it shoXld be noted that the ¶gradXal approaFh to peaFe· has beFome the predominant paradigm that is applied to the entire Arab-Israeli FonfliFt so far The gradXal approaFh in its basiF premises means the breaNing Xp of the Arab-Israeli FonfliFt into ¶negotiable pieFes· on a step-b\ step basis to peaFemaNing :hen the Fomple[it\ of the Arab-Israeli FonfliFt is Fonsidered adopting a gradXal approaFh seems to be the most appropriate Za\ of dealing Zith the FonfliFt +oZeYer the opponents of the gradXal approaFh assert that it is bX\ing time for Israel to FontinXe settlements in the oFFXpied territories as long as it dela\ed and in the end postponed the final-statXs talNs in the 3alestinian-Israeli traFN :ithin this frameZorN the -eZish settle- ments issXe tXrns oXt to be the biggest impediment in the reso- lXtion of the 3alestinian-Israeli FonfliFt SinFe free]ing the -eZish settlements in the oFFXpied territories as a preFondition to start negotiations has not been aFhieYed the road to progress for the resolXtion of the FonfliFt has been bloFNed In this respeFt the .ing aFFXses Israeli 3rime Minister %enMamin 1etan\ahX for not Neeping Xp Zith his Fommitments on peaFe and being e[FessiYel\ preoF- FXpied Zith Iran rather than maNing peaFe Zith the 3alestinians )or him Zhereas 1etan\ahX is not a man of peaFe Ariel Sharon Zas no better p9 4 Beverly Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe,Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy, Second Edition, (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp.130-132. 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 185 Zeynep Sütalan ReFogni]ing the 8nited States as the onl\ FoXntr\ in the Zorld that Fan pXt pressXre on Israel the .ing belieYes in the role of AmeriFa as an honest broNer in the peaFe proFess In the booN .ing AbdXl- lah II giYes aFFoXnt of his interaFtions Zith the three presidents %ill &linton *eorge : %Xsh and %arraFN 2bama :hereas he giYes Fredit to the &linton administration for tr\ing to maNe peaFe he is FritiFal of the %Xsh administration After the 3alestinian-Israeli peaFe proFess is stXFN ZithoXt reaFhing an agreement on the final statXs issXes at & DaYid in and the proFess deteriorated Zith the oXtbreaN of the Al-ATsa Intifada it has not gone an\ fXrther The .ing does not e[pliFitl\ aFFXse the %Xsh administration for not shoZing an\ interest in reYitali]ing the peaFe proFess bXt he tries to e[plain hoZ the %Xsh administration did not get his Falls that a peaFe betZeen 3alestinians and Israelis is in the interest of the 8nited States :hat is more he also Xnderlines that eYen thoXgh he insisted that the inYasion of IraT ZoXld be a big mistaNe 3resident %Xsh tXrned a deaf ear to his Zarnings Therefore the inYasion of IraT in 3 has not onl\ Xnleashed the e[tremist forFes in the re- gion bXt also Fhanged the priorities of the 8nited States for almost a deFade and resXlted in the sXspension of the peaFe negotiations %esides the IraTi issXe folloZing the 9 terrorist attaFNs in the %Xsh administration has beFome obsessed Zith the global Zar on terrorism and has YieZed an\ issXe from that perspeFtiYe Then the 8nited States prioriti]ed the seFXrit\ of Israel and refrained from seeing the 3alestinian AXthorit\ Xnder the leadership of +e 3resident %Xsh insisted that Arafat had to do a better Mob in Fontrolling e[tremists otherZise the 8nited States ZoXld not spend politiFal Fapital tr\ing to resolYe the FonfliFt “:e Fan·t be h\poFrites on terror” he said and then made it Flear that he felt Arafat Zas siding Zith terrorist organi]ations As I feared he began to elide his oZn strXggle to taFNle Al 4aeda Zith the 3alestinian- Israeli FonfliFt p After the frXstration Zith the %Xsh administration for not haYing taNen an\ deFisiYe steps aboXt the resolXtion of the 3alestinian- Israeli FonfliFt .ing AbdXllah II seems to pin his hopes on 3resident 2bama Regarding him as a man Zho is speaNing the langXage of peaFe the .ing e[peFts 2bama to lead AmeriFa to taNe its de- FisiYe leadership in the peaFe proFess +oZeYer dXring his first 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 186 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril term 2bama·s efforts to bring the parties to the negotiation table remained inFonFlXsiYe (Yen the efforts for direFt negotiations in the absenFe of total free]e of -eZish settlements ZhiFh Zas a pre- Fondition b\ the 3alestinian side did not lead to progress sinFe 1etan\ahX “insisted that an\ seFXrit\ arrangement mXst ensXre a FontinXed Israeli presenFe on fXtXre 3alestinian eastern and Zest- ern borders to gXard against potential threats” p3 MahmXd Abbas the president of the 3alestinian 1ational AXthorit\ said that he FoXld FonFXr Zith the presenFe of international forFes bXt FoXld not aFFept Israeli presenFe on 3alestinian land In this respeFt hopes for a positiYe breaNthroXgh in the 3alestinian-Israeli negotia- tions seem to be left for the seFond term of the 2bama administra- tion Against this baFNgroXnd .ing AbdXllah II is afraid that the failXre to solYe the 3alestinian-Israeli FonfliFt toda\ Zill ineYitabl\ lead to a Zar in the region Zith FatastrophiF resXlts in the fXtXre +e belieYes in the tZo-state solXtion as the onl\ Yiable option to resolYe the 3al- estinian-Israeli FonfliFt and adYoFates the establishment of a 3al- estinian state on the :est %anN and *a]a Strip :ith 2slo 3eaFe 3roFess as alread\ dead he thinNs that the Arab 3eaFe InitiatiYe is ¶the last best FhanFe for peaFe· in the 3alestinian-Israeli FonfliFt (ndorsed on 8 MarFh b\ the Arab /eagXe the initiatiYe en- Yisages the Israeli ZithdraZal from the 2FFXpied Territories mean- ing tXrning baFN to the pre-97 :ar borders the establishment of the soYereign 3alestinian state in the :est %anN and *a]a the resolXtion of the 3alestinian refXgee TXestion on a MXst and mXtX- all\ agreed basis and the reFognition of the (ast -erXsalem as the Fapital of the soYereign 3alestinian state In retXrn Arab /eagXe states Zill reFogni]e the state of Israel and establish peaFefXl nor- mal relations p4- :hen the initiatiYe Zas also endorsed in the &oXnFil of )oreign Ministers of the 2rgani]ation of the IslamiF &oXntries 2I& the solXtion is enlarged to inFlXde the 7 members of the 2I& (Yen thoXgh Israel has not shoZn an\ interest in the InitiatiYe sinFe it Zas proposed .ing AbdXllah II sees it as the onl\ frameZorN to Fonsider and ZorN on bXt emphasi]es that the initia- tiYe is liYing on borroZed time :hen the FXrrent sitXation in the Middle (ast is Fonsidered Zith regard to the Arab Spring the immediate foFXs of the states in the region has tXrned to the Falls for reform b\ the people A seFond FonFern for regional states has beFome the oYerZhelmed regional 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 187 Zeynep Sütalan balanFe of poZer )Xrthermore the prolonged Frisis in S\ria ZhiFh has alread\ been regarded as a FiYil Zar has beFome the high- est priorit\ on the global and regional agenda +oZ mXFh attention 2bama administration as Zell as the regional aFtors that Fan haYe a mediating role liNe (g\pt SaXdi Arabia and eYen -ordan Fan draZ on the resolXtion of the 3alestinian-Israeli FonfliFt is highl\ TXes- tionable Despite the d\namiFs broXght b\ the Arab Spring the Fase of the 3alestinian-Israeli FonfliFt has beFome more Fompli- Fated Zith the deYelopments in past feZ \ears The diYision of the 3alestinian leadership betZeen +amas in the *a]a Strip and the 3alestinian 1ational AXthorit\ in the :est %anN maNes it highl\ dif- fiFXlt to aFhieYe a possible breaNthroXgh in the peaFe negotiations +amas is Fonsidered to be oXt of the eTXation sinFe it refXses to negotiate Zith Israel and the 3alestinian 1ational AXthorit\ seems to be the onl\ Yiable partner for peaFe not onl\ in the e\es of Israel bXt also the international :estern FommXnit\ +oZeYer Zhat Nind of a peaFe Fan Fome oXt of negotiations ZithoXt +amas is a matter of great FonFern :ithoXt doXbt these faFts shoXld not Meopardi]e the neFessit\ to resolYe the FonfliFt and tXrn a blind e\e to the Xr- gent need to reYitali]e the peaFe proFess As a FonseTXenFe it is fair to sa\ that the main obMeFtiYe of the booN b\ .ing AbdXllah II of -ordan is to Fall for aFtion in terms of the resolXtion of the 3alestinian-Israeli FonfliFt 1o matter hoZ Xn- Fertain the politiFal Flimate in the Middle (ast has beFome so far sXFh Fall neFessitates attention more than eYer Zith the time pass- ing to the detriment of the peaFe in the region 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 188 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 BOOK 7KH3ROLWLFVRI1DWLRQDOLVP LQ0RGHUQ,UDQ REVIEW Ali M. Ansari, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 327 p. Agah HAZIR* Iran FontinXes to oFFXp\ a speFial plaFe in the hotl\ debated Zorld agenda 1XFlear Frisis the fXtXre of the reform moYement and eleF- tions in addition Zith Iran·s role in the ongoing S\rian FiYil Zar has dominated global neZs TXrNe\ as a neighboring FoXntr\ is no e[- Feption to this fierFe foreign interest in Iranian affairs \et it Fannot be Flaimed that this interest stems from a solel\ aFademiF point of YieZ Iran oFFXpies a XniTXe role Zithin global politiFal disFoXrse and espeFiall\ so for TXrNe\ Iranian politiFs FaptXre the attention of both TXrNish aFademiFs and the TXrNish pXbliF bXt original ZorNs in TXrNish on Iranian politiFs are sFarFe &XrioXs parties are essen- tiall\ forFed to rel\ on (nglish literatXre to learn more aboXt Iran As Fan be seen in the popXlar debates of “:ill TXrNe\ be Iran"” ZhiFh emerged after the 1ational SeFXrit\ &oXnFil deFisions on 8 )ebrXar\ 997 Iran has been broXght to the attention of the TXrN- ish masses b\ means of popXlar politiFal moYements The nam- ing of the neZest IstanbXl %ridge as the 1 For a good example of this line of thought see Abdullah Bozkurt, “Iran Plays Subversive Role in Turkey” Today’s Zaman, 21 June 2013. 2 In fact, relations with Iran have always been double-sided. On one hand, Iran has been seen as a close ally of Turkey since the Seljuq period. The famous cooperation between Seljuq vizier Nizam ul-Mulk and sultan Malik-Shah is the quintessential example of such alliance. On the other hand, Iran is often seen as a political conspirator, most usually within Turkish borders. Inspection of the famous work of Mahmud al-Kashgari, Dīwānu l-Lu at al-Turk, can show us the dichotomy within these relations. Mahmud quoted two consecutive say- ings: No Turk without a Persian, No head without a helmet (Tatsiz Türk bolmaz Bassiz bork bolmaz)- Be aware of Persian, dig up the thorn-bush (Tatıg közre tikeniğ tüpre). * Research assistant of the Middle East Studies Programme and PhD Candidate at International Relations Department; Middle East Technical University, An- kara, Turkey. Agah Hazır 3rofessor Ali M Ansari of 8niYersit\ of St AndreZs in 7KH3ROLWLFVRI Nationalism in Modern Iran anal\]es the idea of Iranian nationalism throXgh the modern period &ontrar\ to popXlar readings of Iranian histor\ ZhiFh plaFe primar\ emphasis on religion Ansari stresses the role of nationalism Indeed this point is presented in the Yer\ first sentenFe of the booN AFFording to Ansari nationalism is the determining ideolog\ of modern Iran ZhiFh Xnited Iranians aFross all politiFal fraFtions +e goes on to assert that foXr main intelleF- tXal groXps Fan be distingXished in modern Iran three of ZhiFh are deriYatiYes of the nationalist line of thoXght These groXps Fomprise the seFXlar nationalists religioXs nationalists d\nastiF national- ists and the left An\ Xnderstanding of the histor\ of modern Iran shoXld thXs anal\]e the role of nationalist ideas Starting from the earl\ tZentieth FentXr\ Ansari striYes to e[pose hoZ nationalism Zas born and thriYed Zithin the Fonte[t proYided b\ modern state- bXilding on the one hand and FolleFtiYe historiFal memor\ on the other In Iran FXltXral histor\ is often intensel\ politiFal and Ansari depiFts the Za\s in ZhiFh politiFs eYolYed throXgh the Xse of his- tor\ +e shoZs Xs hoZ the rXling elite Flaimed legitimaF\ throXgh the Freation of m\ths and historiFal s\mbols %\ doing so he alloZs Xs to Fomprehend the role of nationalism as baFNgroXnd ideolog\ operating throXghoXt the FoXrse of the modern histor\ of Iran Ansari starts his booN Zith a Yer\ lXFid theoretiFal disFXssion on na- tionalistiF ideolog\ +is emphasis is heaYil\ plaFed on the ideologi- Fal relations betZeen the Zestern Zorld and Iran in the post-789 era More speFifiFall\ he proYides a Fonte[tXal frameZorN for the impaFt of Zestern thoXght on the deYelopment of Iranian national- ism &ontrar\ to Fommon e[planations of Iranian nationalism that MX[tapose it against (Xropean thoXght Ansari shoZs the reader the Za\s in ZhiFh Iranian nationalism forged its oZn path in a proFess of bargaining Zith the (Xropean line of thoXght This Zas not an antagonistiF relation it Zas rather defined b\ YoFabXlar\ born of a (Xropean Fonte[t Ansari argXes that (Xropean FonFepts sXFh as FonstitXtionalism laZ and rights Zere taNen from (Xrope bXt Zere nonetheless interpreted Zithin the limits of the Iranian politiFal agenda +is FonFeptXali]ation of the (nlightenment the topiF of his first Fhapter Fan also be Fonsidered as a YalXable FontribXtion to the literatXre In this sFhema the (nlightenment as an interna- tional and Fosmopolitan proFess paYes the Za\ for a more robXst mXtXal interaFtion betZeen (Xropean and Iranian soFial strXFtXres +e first starts b\ briefl\ disFXssing the Za\s in ZhiFh 3ersia has 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 190 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran been perFeiYed and imagined in the :est +e then proFeeds to an anal\sis of these Fommon m\ths sXFh as the Ar\an m\th ZhiFh is Fonsidered as another s\mbol of (Xropean interaFtion Zith Iranian FXltXre p 3 +e proposes that Iran or more speFifiFall\ the abilit\ of “Iranian identit\” to integrate itself Zithin a (Xropean frame of ref- erenFe is XniTXe among non-Zestern FoXntries dXe these speFifiF points +e also highlights the Fosmopolitan natXre of the (nlight- enment b\ desFribing the earl\ interest of (Xropean enlightened thinNers in ManiFhaeism as an alternatiYe line of thoXght in Fontrast to mainstream &hristianit\ The seFond part of the booN maNes fXrther YalXable FontribXtions to the field Zith the aXthor·s noYel periodi]ation of modern Iranian histor\ %orroZing from *ramsFi·s FonFeptXali]ation of historiFal bloFs Ansari diYides Iranian histor\ into three historiFal bloFs an Iranian (nlightenment The Age of ([tremes and the Age of Fon- testation &learl\ this *ramsFian FonFeptXal frameZorN enables him to foFXs on ideas of domination and reFogni]e the perYasiYe fX]]\ FharaFter of temporal borders leading to their amalgamation Zhen needed Ansari frames the “Iranian (nlightenment” betZeen the earl\ th FentXr\ and the first part of the 9s AFFordingl\ this period is FrXFiall\ important in terms of state bXilding and also in terms of the prodXFtion of a nationalist ideolog\ 1ot onl\ Zere FonFepts sXFh as rXle of laZ rights of Fiti]ens and mass edXFation first being ar- tiFXlated in these \ears bXt the Yer\ roots of basiF Iranian popXlar identit\-bXilding in the modern sense lie Zithin this period Dis- FXssing the intelleFtXal debates most Flearl\ in regard to the famoXs m\ths of the Shahnameh Ansari shoZs the relations betZeen po- litiFal deYelopments and the Xtili]ation of these m\ths The m\thiFal Zar betZeen Kaveh and Zehhak Zas FonstrXed in order to bXild a strong national identit\ in the faFe of a foreign t\rant3 AFFording to Ansari Iranian intelleFtXals Freate and Xtili]e the FolleFtiYe memor\ emanating from the Shahnameh so as to bXild a nationalist ideolog\ p- This nationalist ideolog\ emplo\s m\ths and narratiYes and sXFFessfXll\ soFiali]es them into the greater FXltXral fabriF Ansari then goes on to desFribe hoZ this soFiali]ation resXlted in 3 The tale of Kaveh and Zahhak is one of the most popular myths in Iranian-and Kurdish- historical memory. It is about a rebellion of a blacksmith (Kaveh) against a cruel ruler (Zah- hak). 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 191 Agah Hazır the transformation of “lateral” to “demotiF” nationalism throXgh the FoXrse of th FentXr\ Iran In this seFtion of the booN his most YalXable FontribXtion lies in shoZing the Za\s in ZhiFh these m\ths and narratiYes are pXrsXed and reFonstrXFted throXgh the histor\ of Iran in the th FentXr\ partiFXlarl\ in relation to the politiFal poZer strXFtXre of the FoXntr\ %\ Xndermining the standard periodi]ation that Flearl\ differentiates betZeen the FonstitXtional period and that of Re]a Shah Ansari demonstrates that the diFtatorship of Re]a Shah to a large e[tent stemmed from the intelleFtXal frameZorN of the &onstitXtional ReYolXtion Ansari shoZs the Za\s in ZhiFh the ZeaNness of the state of 4aMar paYed the Za\ for an “enlightened nationalism” ZhiFh then tXrned into an “enlightened despotism” In other Zords Ansari indiFates hoZ the intelleFtXal fathers of Iranian nationalism hailed Re]a Shah as the aZaited saYior of the nation The\ positioned him as the most probable Fandidate “to seFXre politiFal frameZorN for the pXrsXit of reforms and FXltiYation of a reinYigorated nation state” p Ansari Flearl\ demonstrates here hoZ these politiFal deYelopments Zere made possible b\ emplo\- ing prodXFing and reprodXFing FolleFtiYe historiFal memor\ The seFond part of the booN “Age of e[tremes” foFXses on the period from the ZaNe of the “:hite ReYolXtion of Mohammed Re]a 3ahlaYi to Xntil the death of .homeini AFFording to Ansari Zhat FharaFteri]es this period is the Zaning of FonstitXtionalism and the rise of a neZ sort of goYernanFe The \ears folloZing Re]a Shah·s departXre FontinXed to Zitness a partiFXlar Xnderstanding of “na- tion” and a rXler based on FonstitXtionalism 2nl\ after MXhammad Re]a Fonsolidated his poZer did a neZ form of relation betZeen the rXler and the nation emerged The line of thoXght sXpporting the FonstitXtional monarFh\ of Re]a Shah Zas transformed into sXpport for a saFral monarFh\ This neZ t\pe of monarFh\ had a different relationship Zith the diYine Mohammad Re]a himself did not feel Fonstrained b\ FonstitXtional FonFepts sXFh as the rXle of laZ :ithoXt a FonstitXtional limitation aFFording to Ansari Mo- hammad Re]a Shah·s rXle Zas a different form of rXling Zith a dif- ferent relation to the diYine Shah emerged as a mediator betZeen the diYine and the nation That said Ansari Flaims that Mohammad Re]a Shah·s Za\ of rXling and his relations Zith both the nation and the diYine Zere Yer\ similar to those of his sXFFessor A\atol- lah .homeini “both FonFeptXali]ed the rXler as the gXardian and proteFtor of the nation Zith a diYine mandate and aFFess to eso- teriF NnoZledge” p 9 In this Fonte[t .homeini emerged as the 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 192 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran better Fandidate to rXle sinFe as man of religion his relations Zith the diYine had more Fredentials Indeed the aXthorit\ that .homeini finall\ Flaimed Zas far greater than that of an\ preYioXs monarFh of Iran had eYer Flaimed .homeini Zent as far as to Flaim “>ve- layat@ the most important of DiYine Fommandments and has priorit\ oYer all deriYatiYe DiYine Fommandments >it is@ one of the primar\ Fommandments of Islam and has priorit\ oYer all deriYatiYe Fom- mandments eYen oYer pra\er fasting and pilgrimage to MeFFa” p The period Zas also marNed b\ the marginali]ation of the Shah- nameh as the soXrFe of Iranian national identit\ The FXlt of &\rXs the *reat Zas mobili]ed against the Shahnameh m\ths As epito- mi]ed in the famoXs 97 Felebration of \ears of the 3ersian (mpire &\rXs the *reat Zas emplo\ed as the TXintessential e[am- ple of an enlightened monarFh In Fontrast the age of e[tremes Zas the period in ZhiFh neZ m\ths Zere Xtili]ed These neZ m\ths orig- inated in partiFXlar from an IslamiF YoFabXlar\ Shariati and other intelleFtXals of ¶the Age of ([tremes· emplo\ed the histor\ of Islam so as to define a neZ Xnderstanding of Iranian identit\ MoreoYer a neZ langXage Zas artiFXlated for resisting the e[isting rXlers In this Fonte[t Kaveh has been replaFed b\ +XVHLQ as the neZ saYior After the foXndation of the IslamiF RepXbliF of Iran it beFame dif- fiFXlt not to Flaim that this neZl\ IslamiF-oriented langXage did not FXlminate in fXrther e[tremities The IslamiF RepXbliF had heaYier emphasis on its IslamiF heritage \et still Zith an aFNnoZledgement of the seFXlar Iranian FontribXtions :ithin the third period the Age of &ontestation Ansari engages Zith the post-.homeini era This era Zas a neZ phase in Iranian nation- alism in terms of the relation betZeen the nation and popXlar ideas )or the first time in the histor\ of modern Iran Zith the help of the neZ media and mass edXFation Iranians imagined their FommXnit\ for themselYes The\ Fontested neZ forms of identit\ and debated aboXt Zhat a “nation” entails .homeini·s death aFFording to An- sari reYiYed areas of Fontestation sXFh as the natXre of the state FonstitXtionalism and the role of religion The ideologiFal sphere ZhiFh Zas sXppressed dXe to .homeini·s personal Fharisma and the aboYe-mentioned politiFal relation Zith the diYine opened aY- enXes for the embraFement of neZ m\ths and transformation of the old Additionall\ the fall of the SoYiet 8nion and the neZl\ emerg- ing neighbors of Iran fXrther FompliFated the debate 2n the one 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 193 Agah Hazır hand IslamiF identit\ FontinXed to dominate the ideologiFal sphere bXt on the other hand Fommon historiFal heritage Zith the neZ neighbors onl\ one of ZhiFh Zas Shiite Zhile others often laFNed an\ interest in religion began to be emphasi]ed &ompetition Zith the RepXbliF of TXrNe\ for inflXenFe in &entral Asia resXlted in a FXltXral interpretation of identit\ in ZhiFh both Iran and the TXran haYe a Fommon FXltXral heritage 2bYioXsl\ this Fommon heritage Fan be seen in the Shahnameh In the folloZing .hatami period a FonstitXtional Xnderstanding of Iranian identit\ re-emerged 2ld FonFepts of rXle of laZ rights and enlightenment Zere again em- plo\ed b\ .hatami and the reformist line of thoXght Zas Fontested to bXild an Iranian identit\ in relation to these FonFepts 8nfortX- natel\ .hatami failed to fXlfill his politiFal promises paYing the Za\ to neZ popXlist leader AhmadineMad AhmadineMad·s position Zithin this realm of FonfliFt has leaned toZards FoXnter-enlightenment Ansari argXes that AhmadineMad has bXilt a neZ mXlti-sided narra- tiYe that offers something for eYer\one an amalgamation of anti- AmeriFanism and anti-Fapitalism merged Zith Shiite esFhatolog\ and national e[Feptionalism p 7 AhmadineMad·s Xnderstanding of Iran is a mi[ of all of these 7KH3ROLWLFVRI1DWLRQDOLVPLQ0RGHUQ,UDQ is of eTXal interest for sFholars speFiali]ing in the histor\ of Iran and for those Zho stXd\ nationalism in general Ali Ansari paints a brilliant portrait of the relationships of histor\ m\ths and nationalism +e is sXFFessfXl in introdXFing neZ approaFhes to the FonFeptXali]ation and pe- riodi]ation of an e[tensiYel\ stXdied area of nation-bXilding +is FontribXtion is also important for the TXrNish reader Zho XsXall\ enFoXnters Iran in terms of strateg\ and nXFlear issXes The booN is of great YalXe to go be\ond the biased and sometimes essential- ist aFFoXnts of Iran that Fonsider the Iranian IslamiF ReYolXtion as piYotal and often read the nation·s histor\ retrospeFtiYel\ Ansari re- minds Xs of another important faFtor that lies behind the histor\ of modern Iran nationalism +oZeYer he e[pliFitl\ foFXses on main- stream nationalism and onl\ Fonsiders non-3ersian nations in rela- tion Zith mainstream line of thoXght In other Zords non-3ersian minorities are seen Zithin the frameZorN of the mainstream nation- alism The relationship betZeen politiFs and histor\ in non-3ersian nations and their oZn Xnderstanding and emplo\ing of m\ths FoXld haYe been inFlXded in the anal\ses &onsidering the rise of minorit\ nationalism all oYer the Zorld it FoXld haYe been a fXrther FontribXtion to the literatXre In addition althoXgh attentiYe to an 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK 194 July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran arra\ of primar\ and seFondar\ soXrFes some of ZhiFh are still Xntapped at this time Ansari·s Zriting st\le remains XnFlXttered In an effort to appeal to the general reader the booN does not giYe enoXgh baFNgroXnd information on all releYant FharaFteristiFs and eYents hoZeYer at times this maNes it hard for the general reader to Xnderstand some important details Despite these FaYeats hoZ- eYer it is an intelleFtXall\ stimXlating ZorN one of the most detailed and masterfXl anal\ses of th FentXr\ Iran 1TVCFQþW'V×VNGTK July 2013, Volume 5, No 1 195 257$'2ć8(7h7/(5Ĉ Genel Hususlar 1TVCFQçW'VVNGTK1TVCFQçWnCNéëOCNCTéPC[QçWPNCëOéëDKTFëP- EGMWTWNWëWQNCP1TVCFQçW5VTCVGLKM#TCëVéTOCNCT/GTMG\K 145#/ 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