This is a repository copy of The Political Determinants of Corporate Reorganization in China.
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Version: Accepted Version
Book Section: Tomasic, R and Zhang, Z (2016) The Political Determinants of Corporate Reorganization in China. In: Antons, C, (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Asian Law. Routledge , pp. 125-146. ISBN 9780415659406
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in the Routledge Handbook of Asian Law on 1st July 2016, available online: http://www.routledge.com/9780415659406
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[email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 8 The Political Determinants of Corporate Reorganisation in China
Roman Tomasic and Zinian Zhang
In Christoph Antons (ed), Routledge Handbook of Asian Law (Routledge 2017) 125-146.
Introduction
This chapter examines the political factors that have influenced the management of court- supervised corporate reorganisations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) following the passage of the PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 (EBL 2006). It follows a wider body of research that has pointed towards the political determinants affecting the way in which corporate governance is structured in different countries, including China. 1 Examples of political considerations affecting the implementation of the EBL 2006 are discussed. China’s new bankruptcy law has been hailed as representing ‘a large step forward in clarifying and strengthening’ the rights of creditors (Peerenboom and He, 2009: 13). To some degree, this is true. The Law has sought to move away from the largely political and administrative mechanisms for dealing with corporate insolvency, and to make much greater use of the courts. However, China’s law reforms seeking to support the rapidly developing market economy have taken place in an environment in which the state remains a dominant player in markets and in shaping and implementing legal reforms. Professors Peerenboom and He (2009: 13) have reminded us that ‘[w]hile the government’s role has been diminished, there are still various opportunities for the government to intervene to pursue non-economic policy goals such as social stability’. This problem is especially evident in regard to corporate reorganisations, in which local protectionism remains a powerful factor. Indeed, the eminent China scholar Jerome Cohen (2001: 403) has described local protectionism as ‘the greatest weakness in China’s judicial system’.2 This problem continues to be felt in the way in which corporate reorganisation has taken place in China since 2006. With regard to the handling of commercial disputes in China generally, it has been suggested that local protectionism may be decreasing in some major urban areas, such as in Guangdong; as a result of successful reform efforts, this has led some to note that, in urban areas in this region, ‘the direct influence of major political forces on the courts has decreased’ (He, 2009: 453). Whilst this may be so in regard to routine contractual disputes between commercial