23 icUJ research article

Global Affairs Concerning the and China: Articles featured in this section focus more generally on global issues and foreign affairs as they pertain to the United States and China individually. Baikal Sinophobia: A Threat to the Russo-Chinese Strategic Partnership?

Alexander Naumov[1] [1]Alexander is graduating from George Mason University in December 2020 with two bachelor’s degrees in Russian and Eur- asian studies and international politics. Born in Yoshkar-Ola, Russia, he is an aspiring graduate student with research interests in Russian security, diaspora issues, politics of history, and great power competition in Eurasia.

Abstract This paper compares and contrasts Russo-Chinese strategic convergence since the Published online Ukraine crisis in 2014 with popular Russian perceptions of China, focusing on two explo- January 2021 sive local protests against Chinese-owned businesses near Lake Baikal in 2018 and 2019. While many Russians see the Chinese government as a political ally, public opinion data and Citation the protests demonstrate that bottom-up perceptions of China may interpose future Chinese Naumov, Alexander. 2020. investment in Russia. It is evident that converging strategic interests, shared semi-authori- “Baikal Sinophobia: A Threat tarian political values, and accomplishments in bilateral relations since 2001 neither cause to the Russo-Chinese Strategic nor correlate with improved Russian societal views of China, especially Chinese people and Partnership?” IUCJ 1, no. 1 businesses. (Winter 2021), 23-26. Keywords: sinophobia; Ukraine crisis; Russo-Chinese relations; Lake Baikal

Introduction Strategic Convergence: The View from Mos- cow What’s good for a Chinese is bad for the Baikal,” read a “protest poster in Irkutsk, Siberia, in May 2018 (“V Irkutske Russian foreign policy accelerated into a strategic partnership 60 chelovek vyshli na miting” 2018). The demonstration called with China in the early 2010s. Putin initiated a ‘Pacifc Russia’ for federal restrictions on foreign development around Lake pivot shortly after re-assuming the presidency in May 2012 Baikal, the world’s largest freshwater lake, and was triggered (Calder 2019). This succeeded the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neigh- by a “resistance” movement in the lakeside settlement of borliness and Friendly Cooperation and the 2008 settlement of Listvyanka. The so-called war began in early 2018 when a the last Russo-Chinese border dispute, which left Cold War-era private Chinese-owned construction site threatened to block animosities frmly in the past (Charap 2017). According to a Russian-owned hotel’s view of the lake (Postnikova and Calder, the most important factor in the two powers’ conver- Luk’yanova 2019). An even larger scandal for China’s presence gence was the Ukraine crisis in 2013-2014, which resulted in around the Baikal occurred a year later, when over a million multiplied Western sanctions against Russian energy, defense, people, including Prime Minister , called for and sovereign debt sectors, compelling to look east. and secured the suspension of a Chinese bottling factory in the Overall, Russia’s ruling elite has embraced the partnership with area (Telegina 2019). China, despite Russia’s acknowledged junior status, since Rus- sia’s prioritization of maintaining the domestic status quo and The two crises in Sino-Russian public relations are symbolic of regime survival is incompatible with goals in the West (Chase a wider degradation of Russian public opinion of China. This et al. 2017). trend is a stark contrast to the comprehensive and public em- brace of Moscow and Beijing elites. President Policymakers increasingly viewed converging interests with awarded President Xi Jinping the Order of St. Andrew, Russia’s China in national security, such as developing Eurasian land highest award, in 2017. The Chinese leader reciprocated by trade free of US Navy domination, and energy, where Russia awarding the Medal of Friendship, debuted just for Putin on has a comparative advantage as the world’s ffth top producer his visit to Beijing, during which Xi referred to him as “an old of natural gas, while China is the top energy consumer (Calder friend” and a “good friend” (Xinhua 2018). 2019). In addition, Russia sees foreign investment as critical for the development of the Far East, even as the region itself This paper will analyze the threat of Sinophobic protest in is more concerned with Moscow’s subsidies than with foreign southern Siberia and the Far East to the “Russia-China compre- investment (Zuenko 2020). hensive strategic partnership of cooperation” that Putin lauded on his June 2018 visit. It will frst discuss the Power of Siberia The most important tangible symbol of this partnership’s as- pipeline, the most overt, capital-intensive symbol of high-lev- pirations is the Power of Siberia, which was approved in 2014 el bilateral relations. Next, two Baikal-related scandals will with a price tag of (U.S.) $70 billion (Sassi 2019). The pipe- illustrate echoes of local opposition that has already damaged line’s activation ceremony in December 2019 was a bilateral, Chinese projects in Central Asia, signaling a need for Chinese nationally televised public event. Putin opened his speech investment in Russia’s east. with “你好,” Mandarin for “hello,” in Moscow and ordered research article IUCJ 24

Gazprom’s CEO on site to open the valves, before Xi gave the There are several explanations for poor attitudes toward command from Beijing to receive the gas. The largest pipeline China in Russia, with Irkutsk being the epicenter of anti-Chi- in the Far East, projected to pump 38 Billion cubic metres of nese protest in the last two years. The Listvyanka protestors natural gas per year to China, is critical for Russia’s state bud- expressed resentment at Chinese businesses and residents get, over 46% of which was comprised of natural gas profts in allegedly not paying taxes and sending “all money” to China 2018 (Sassi 2019). (Postnikova and Luk’yanova 2019). It is extremely diffcult to dodge taxes on such a scale given the mandatory registration of The current pipeline is not close to the Baikal, which has be- these businesses (the most controversial of which were hotels come the epicenter of anti-Chinese protest, but it will approach in 2018), even though Chinese registrations often appear as the cherished lake around the end of 2022. Therefore, the sharp Russian or Bahamian (Zuenko 2020). Illegal logging for the Sinophobic reactions of 2018-2019 might be a preview of what Chinese black market is another source of resentment (Telegina is to come. 2019). Members of the “resistance” are opposed to what they perceive as a general Chinese expansion, and the absence of a Bilateral Public Diplomacy: The View from purely economic rationale is evident in an interview with Yuri the Baikal Sharapov, the Listvyanka hotel owner who helped launch the 2018 protests. When asked about the proft value of hosting The growth in bilateral ties appears to correlate with Russia’s Chinese tourists, Sharapov replied: “I was offered a full load: public perception of China as an ally: In August 2020, a Levada 20 Chinese tourists, all year. I estimated that this is around 14 Center poll ranked China second in Russians’ list of closest million [rubles, or around (U.S.) $200,000]. Good money, but I friends and allies (after Belarus), at 40%. This was down 2% don’t need money like that (Postnikova and Luk’yanova 2019). from the previous year (Levada Center 2020a). Sinophobia, as opposed to economic competition, is at least partially to blame for this hostility. As the Power of Siberia pipeline was built, China and Russia engaged in a public diplomacy campaign to improve each The next year’s fashpoint over Lake Baikal is even more sig- other’s image. In 2015, Chinese and Russian media leaders met nifcant, as it entailed federal involvement. A social media cam- in St. Petersburg and signed cooperation agreements aimed to paign on Instagram and Change.org mobilized public opinion “reduce misinterpretation by Western media (People’s Daily against the AkvaSib bottling plant in Kultuk, 99% of which was 2015). Liu Qibao, head of the Publicity Department of the Chi- owned in Daqing (Telegina 2019). The half-built factory was nese Communist Party, called on both countries’ media to help closed by local court order and its lease was revoked. In a rare integrate China’s Silk Road Economic Belt with the Russia-led case for Russia, NTV, a state-controlled TV channel, fanned Eurasian Economic Union and to continue supporting “cooper- the fames of public protest, with Prime Minister Medvedev ation in the spirit of mutual trust.” vowing to investigate AkvaSib’s environmental compliance on (Dmitry Medvedev, March 12, 2019). AkvaSib was In addition, the conference designated 2016-2017 as the by far not the frst Baikal factory with questionable environ- China-Russia Media Exchange Year. This project connected mental standards. One reason it was noticed in spring 2019 was hundreds of Russian and Chinese business leaders, experts the result of the previous year’s Listvyanka protests, which led and scholars at forums in Rostov-on-Don, Moscow, and to tightened environmental controls, and its pollutive effect was Guangzhou, and was celebrated in a Beijing closing ceremony not clearly distinguishable from nearby Russian factories. attended by Premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (State Council Information Offce 2017). Li praised Most Chinese involvement in the Far East is in agriculture, the campaign’s support of “high mutual trust” between the two timber, construction, resource extraction, service, and sea countries and Medvedev highlighted that over 250 events took food, and in contrast to popular belief, entails mostly small and place in this framework. medium business (Zuenko 2020). A demographic and economic imbalance does exist in the North Asian region—6.3 million However, the two governments’ celebration of “mutual trust” people in the Russian Far East compared to 39.3 million in appears to refect the relationship at the highest level more than neighboring Heilongjiang province—and imposes a national Russia’s bottom-up views of China. Nationally representative security dimension to Russian strategic thinking (Gabuev and polling from the period of the campaign showed growth of Repnikova 2017). However, according to Gabuev and Rep- anti-Chinese views, alongside an increase in contempt for mi- nikova, there is no economic or demographic evidence for a grants in general. According to the Levada Center, the percent- current or future migratory Chinese expansion: the highest pop- age of Russians supporting restrictions of Chinese permanent ulation of Chinese is in Moscow, not any eastern city, and the residence in Russia more than doubled between 2015 and 2017, average salary in Heilongjiang is over (U.S.) $100 higher than jumping from 15% to 31%. This fgure increased to 39% in that of neighboring Primorye. Their 2017 analysis of static, if August 2019, in the wake of the Baikal bottling plant scandal not declining, Chinese migration would be compounded today (Levada Center 2020b). This poll’s correlation with the Media by COVID-19 travel restrictions and Sinophobic narratives that Exchange Year presents a serious red fag to Chinese public accompany the ongoing pandemic. diplomacy and Russian state media’s declared cooperation with it. It also contrasts with the aforementioned perception of China Overall, the national decline of positive perceptions of China’s as Russia’s number two ally: In August 2020, 52% of respon- presence in Russia, amid a growing strategic relationship and dents to the Levada Center called for denying Chinese citizens’ an outpouring of mutual affection between Putin and Xi, re- entry to Russia or allowing it only temporarily (Levada Center veals dissonance between local Russian residents, local leaders, 2020c). and the national strategic elite. 25 icUJ research article

Implications for Chinese Interests in Russia saw this as another elite project. Perhaps Russian Sinophobia can better be quelled through increasing programs to study in Two lessons that can be drawn from the 2018 and 2019 Irkutsk China for Russian high school and college students, teachers, protests deal with the local political climate. Shortly after the and local journalists in small cities and villages, especially in Listvyanka construction scandal, a local investigation found the Far East and Siberian regions. Other bottom-up measures that all of the building permits issued under the then-mayor could include building schools, hospitals, or other infrastructure were illegal (Postnikova and Luk’yanova 2019). Similar legal that is sorely needed in places like Irkutsk Oblast. One Kultuk nebulousness was present when securing the bottling factory. city councilwoman who opposed the AkvaSib factory in 2019 These crises demonstrate that Russian messages supportive of (but supported its opening in 2015) recalled asking the project’s Chinese presence from the top do not necessarily translate into investor to build a public bathhouse as well; her request was legal security on the ground. So far, this is less of an issue for denied (Telegina 2019). To improve Russian local perceptions large, coordinated national projects like Power of Siberia. But of China, Chinese companies and BRI fnanciers should consid- Sinophobia can clearly be a threat to small and medium-size er being more generous to such requests. Chinese businesses, and the recent bilateral public diplomacy campaigns are not enough to contain it. A counterargument can be made that the aforementioned Rus- sian resistance has little to do with the Chinese presence alone. The frst implication is that Chinese public diplomacy must After all, general anti-migrant sentiment has increased in par- transform its message on Chinese presence in Russia. This is allel, and Sinophobia is still lower than it was in October 2013, especially important because PR scandals with private Chinese when 45% of Levada Center respondents called for restricting businesses, such as that in Irkutsk, can damage the reputation Chinese residence in Russia. However, skeptics of Sinopho- of Beijing’s foreign policy at large, particularly the Belt and bia’s seriousness must acknowledge that the bilateral relation- Road Initiative. The BRI is more a brand than a unitary policy ship has never been so important to both Moscow’s domestic project, a label that encompasses new Xi-era infrastructure, agenda and its grand strategy than in the post-2013 period of pre-Xi projects retroactively labeled “BRI,” and even for- Ukraine crisis isolation. Russian ruling elites realize that they eign ventures that are “BRI” in name only and without direct need Chinese investment and markets more than the other Chinese involvement, such as “One Belt One Road” camel way around. Heilongjiang’s relative prosperity to the Far East, milk in Kazakhstan and the Anaklia port in Georgia (Shepard and the ever-increasing attractiveness of internal migration, 2020). Such vagueness creates a vacuum for popular suspicion mean that taking money elsewhere is a growing temptation for and resentment in host countries—a reaction already present Chinese private business, especially considering the uptick in in much of Central Asia (Baldakova 2019). In Kyrgyzstan, a Sinophobia fueled by the COVID-19 pandemic. US$275 million Chinese logistics center was recently scrapped after sustained local protest in Naryn province (Putz 2020). In Conclusion August 2019, protests were even more explosive, as hundreds of Naryn residents stormed a Zhong Ji Mining compound. As a This analysis reviewed a key point in Chinese public diploma- result, the Chinese ambassador had to visit 39 Chinese citizens cy in Russia—the Media Exchange Year of 2016-2017—de- in the hospital (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in spite which Sinophobia increased and cumulated in two public the Kyrgyz Republic 2019). relations scandals for China’s presence there. The 2018 Irkutsk protests demonstrated the power of xenophobic local anxiety Second, Chinese public diplomacy is unlikely to succeed to stop Chinese small and medium businesses from operating, without narrative unity with Russian state media. NTV and even at the cost of tourism profts for Russian hosts. The bot- Prime Minister Medvedev intervening against AkvaSib, even tling factory protests the next year went further, in a rare case though other factories posed similar environmental threats long of a federal news channel and the head of government standing before, cast doubt on the spirit of “mutual trust” established in alongside local protestors. The negative news coverage and the 2015 agreements with Chinese media. While uncontrolled public opinion surrounding the Chinese business presence in ethnonationalism can become a destabilizing force, the Krem- Siberia and the Far East does not align with the narrative of a lin did demonstrate an ability to “activate intense nationalist grand strategic partnership symbolized by Putin and Xi’s so- sentiment during the Ukraine crisis and calm it down later called “bromance” and operationalized through the Power of (Laruelle 2017). This suggests that a similar calming effect can Siberia pipeline. be achieved with more articulate and coordinated media cam- paigning by Russian state media. Chinese business advocates, The bilateral economic, political, and security relationship diplomats, and the CCP’s Publicity Department can privately with Russia is highly benefcial to China. The countries have reach out to the contacts that they cultivated during the Media complementary economies: Russia as an energy producer and Exchange Year and advance this informational proposal. raw material exporter, and China as an energy-hungry import- er. Both regimes share national security interests in repelling Third, public diplomacy operators on both sides must recog- American military power projection capabilities in their nize the necessity to further engage “Ivan Ivanov,” the “ev- regions. Additionally, as members of the Shanghai Cooperation eryday Russian citizen” in the country, to make the case for Organization, both regimes share principles of “non-interfer- Russia-China cooperation. Pompous celebration of the strategic ence” in domestic affairs (i.e., no democracy promotion) and partnership, such as the Power of Siberia TV link-up in Decem- semi-authoritarian “stability.” With all these drivers for align- ber, evidently does not reconcile societal concerns about China, ment, it is easy for outside observers, and Russian proponents despite the clear advantages of engaging with Beijing to ad- of alliance with China, to focus solely on Russia’s positive vance Moscow’s strategic interests. Media summits and forums strategic perceptions of China, including its number two place were aimed to build societal bridges by bringing together busi- among Russian “friends and allies.”(Levada Center 2020). nessmen and experts, but it is possible that everyday Russians However, it is evident in Siberia that converging strategic research article IUCJ 26 interests, semi-authoritarian political values, and strategic-level “Press-reliz Posol’stva KNR v KR ob intsidente napadeniya na accomplishments in bilateral relations since 2001 neither cause kitaiskuyu kompaniyu «Zhong Ji Mining» v Narynskoi nor correlate with improved societal views of China—especial- Oblasti.” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China ly Chinese people and businesses. in the Kyrgyz Republic, August 6, 2019. Gabuev, Alexander, and Maria Repnikova. 2017. “Why Fore- The Baikal fareups reveal a trend that has already posed a casts of a Chinese Takeover of the Russian Far East formidable obstacle to the important Central Asian portion of Are Just Dramatic Myth.” Carnegie Moscow Center, the Silk Road Economic Belt. They demonstrate how local July 14, 2017. anti-Chinese sentiment can grow in a vacuum of details on Kremlin. 2017. “Presenting the Order of St Andrew the Apostle China’s intentions. Sinophobia, like nationalism at large, can be to President of China Xi Jinping.” July 4, 2017. instrumentalized by local business and political entrepreneurs, ———. 2019. “Russian Gas Exports to China Launched via with Chinese projects as collateral damage. Beijing can address the Eastern Route.” Dec. 2, 2019. this challenge by detailing state and private investment in an Laruelle, Marlene. 2017. “Putin’s Regime and the Ideological accessible manner for everyday Russians; increasing coordina- Market: A Diffcult Balancing Game.” Carnegie En- tion with Russian media and fact-checking coverage of Chinese dowment for International Peace, March 16, 2017. investment; and persuading the Russian public of China’s Levada Center. 2020a.“Druz’ya’ i ‘vragi’ Rossii.” Sept. 16, goodwill through educational projects and infrastructure invest- 2020. ment in small cities and villages. Levada Center. 2020b. “Monitoring ksenofobskih nastroenii.” Sept. 18, 2019. Interestingly, it was Xi, not Putin, who emphasized Power of Levada Center. 2020c. “Ksenophobiya i natsionalizm.” Sept. Siberia’s environmental friendliness and positive impact on so- 23, 2020. cioeconomic development, while Putin focused on the project’s State Council Information Offce of the People’s Republic of world status (Kremlin 2019). This illustrates the key takeaway: China. 2017.“Media’s Role in Strengthening Chi- Chinese and especially Russian elites must address the disso- na-Russia Ties.” Nov. 1, 2017. nance between the media’s hyper-focus on their grand partner- ———. 2020. “Premier Li, Medvedev Attend China-Russia ship and the socioeconomic anxieties on the local level. Media Exchange Year Event.” Nov. 1, 2017. Postnikova, Tatiana and Luk’yanova, Yulia. 2019. “Spornoe This trend calls for more research on Chinese involvement in more. Reportazh ob antikitaiskih nastroeniyah na Bai- Russia’s East, given the vague, but not opaque, practices of kale.” Proekt, Jan. 30, 2019. local business registration and terrifying public overestimations Putz, Catherine. 2020. “Kyrgyz-Chinese Joint Venture of Chinese migration. Future Chinese outreach campaigns, and Scrapped After Protests.” The Diplomat, February 20, Russian reactions to them, can be improved through methodol- 2020. ogies similar to the AidData project at the College of William Sassi, Francesco. “What the ‘Power of Siberia’ Tells Us About & Mary, which quantifed China’s promotion of its “peaceful China-Russia Relations.” The Diplomat, Dec. 7, 2019. rise” narrative in Pacifc developed countries (Japan, South Shepard, Wade. “How China Is Losing Support For Its Belt Korea, and Australia) and developing country recipients of BRI And Road Initiative.” Forbes, Feb. 28, 2020. investment (Custer et al. 2018). One present question is to what Telegina, Natalya. 2019. “Xenophobia Masquerading as degree the Russian public, which perceives itself as the heir of Environmentalism: How Politics, Money, and Racism superpower status and an unquestionable great power, wants to Turned Irkutsk against a Chinese Bottling Factory at hear the story of China’s rise in the frst place. Lake Baikal.” Meduza, May 17, 2019. “V Irkutske 60 chelovek vyshli na miting v zashchitu Baikala.” References BG Irkutsk (blog), May 22, 2018. “Xi Awards Putin China’s First Friendship Medal.” Xinhua, Baldakova, Oyuna. 2019. “Protests along the BRI: China’s June 8, 2018. Prestige Project Meets Growing Resistance.” Mercator Zuenko, Ivan. 2020. “Russia’s Far East Seeks Partners Beyond Institute for China Studies, December 10, 2019. China.” Carnegie Moscow Center, March 13, 2020. Calder, Kent. 2019. Super Continent: The Logic of Eurasian Integration. Stanford University Press. Charap, Samuel, John Drennan, and Pierre Noël. 2017. “Russia and China: A New Model of Great-Power Relations.” Survival 59, no. 1 (January): 25-42. https://doi.org/10. 1080/00396338.2017.1282670. Chase, Michael S., Evan S. Medeiros, J. Stapleton Roy, Eugene B. Rumer, Robert Sutter, and Richard Weitz. 2017. “Russia-China Relations: Assessing Common Ground and Strategic Fault Lines.” NBR Special Report 66, July, 2017. “China, Russia Step up Media Cooperation with 9 Deals Inked.” People’s Daily, June 27, 2015. Custer, Samantha, Brooke Russel, Matthew DiLorenzo, Meng- fan Cheng, Siddhartha Ghose, Jacob Sims, Jennifer Turner, and Harsh Desai. 2018. “Ties That Bind: Quantifying China’s Public Diplomacy and Its ‘Good Neighbor’ Effect.” AidData, June 27, 2018.