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Regulating Big Techs in Finance

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Regulating Big Techs in Finance BIS Bulletin No 45 Regulating big techs in finance Agustín Carstens, Stijn Claessens, Fernando Restoy and Hyun Song Shin 2 August 2021 BIS Bulletins are written by staff members of the Bank for International Settlements, and from time to time by other economists, and are published by the Bank. The papers are on subjects of topical interest and are technical in character. The views expressed in them are those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS. The authors are grateful to Leonardo Gambacorta, Jon Frost, Giulio Cornelli, Ilaria Mattei, Philip Wooldridge, Patrick McGuire, Neil Esho, Nikola Tarashev, Blaise Gadanecz, Gong Cheng and Aidan Lawson for their input and to Louisa Wagner for administrative support. The editor of the BIS Bulletin series is Hyun Song Shin. This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). © Bank for International Settlements 2021. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated. ISSN: 2708-0420 (online) ISBN: 978-92-9197-501-2 (online) Agustín Carstens Stijn Claessens Fernando Restoy Hyun Song Shin [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Regulating big techs in finance Key takeaways Big tech firms entering financial services can scale up rapidly with user data from their existing business lines in e-commerce and social media, and by harnessing the inherent network effects in digital services. In addition to traditional policy concerns such as financial risks, consumer protection and operational resilience, the entry of big techs into financial services gives rise to new challenges surrounding the concentration of market power and data governance. The current framework for regulating financial services follows an activities-based approach where providers must hold licences for specific business lines. There is scope to address the new policy challenges by developing specific entity-based rules, as proposed in several key jurisdictions – notably the European Union, China and the United States. The centrality of data in the digital economy has enabled the entry into financial services and rapid growth of big tech firms. Big techs have existing businesses in e-commerce and social media, among others, from which they can expand into finance. Their business model revolves around the direct interactions of users and the data generated as an essential by-product of these interactions. The distinguishing feature of big techs is that they can overcome limits to scale by utilising user data from their existing businesses to scale up rapidly by harnessing the inherent network effects in digital services. In turn, the greater user activity generates yet more data, reinforcing the advantages that come from network effects. In this way, big techs can establish a substantial presence in financial services very quickly through the so-called “data-network- activities” (DNA) loop.1 This gives rise to concerns about the emergence of dominant firms with excessive concentration of market power and a possibly systemic footprint in the financial system. The rapid growth of big tech firms in financial services presents various policy challenges. Some are variations of familiar themes that lie squarely within the traditional scope of central banks and financial regulators, such as the mitigation of financial risks and the oversight of operational resilience and consumer protection. Assessing big techs’ resilience through a financial cycle will necessitate more systematic monitoring and understanding of big tech business models on the part of the authorities, for instance on whether learning algorithms may inject systematic biases to the detriment of financial stability. As well as issues that arise from traditional financial stability concerns, there are new and unfamiliar challenges stemming from the potential for excessive concentration of market power, as well as broader issues concerning data governance. These new challenges lie outside the traditional scope of the central bank’s remit, but they can nevertheless impinge on the central bank’s core mission of ensuring sound money as well as the integrity and smooth functioning of the payment system. While some central banks’ oversight authority includes the competitive functioning and efficiency of the payment system, their mandates do not normally encompass the broad range of competition and data privacy issues that arise in relation to the activities of big techs in financial services. Nevertheless, since the central bank issues the 1 See BIS (2019), Frost et al (2019) and Croxson et al (forthcoming). BIS Bulletin 3 unit of account in the economy, trust in the currency rests ultimately on the trust placed in the central bank itself. Any impact on the integrity of the monetary system arising from the emergence of dominant platforms ought to be a key concern for the central bank. This Bulletin reviews the policy challenges for central banks and financial regulators in their oversight of the activity of big tech firms in financial services, especially as it relates to the payment system. Traditional demarcations that separate the roles of financial regulators from those of competition authorities and data privacy regulators may become blurred in the case of big techs in finance. Rules that were formulated with specific financial stability risks in mind (credit and liquidity risk, market risk etc) may be inadequate for addressing the unique combination of policy concerns to which big techs give rise. These concerns bear on the central bank’s core mission to maintain the integrity of the monetary system. In this regard, the central bank should work more closely with competition and data privacy authorities. Big techs’ growing footprint in the financial system The market for retail payments is a particularly stark example of the potential for rapid concentration. Graph 1 (left-hand panel) illustrates how rapidly the user base of big techs can take off through the DNA loop once a critical mass of users has been established. The growth of user numbers may also be reinforced through merger and acquisition activity whereby smaller potential competitors are absorbed into the ecosystem of services around the core big tech platform. Big techs’ rapid growth in users underpins their dominance in some markets Graph 1 Big techs’ monthly active users Development of mobile payments in China Billions Billions Market share, % CNY trillions 2.4 0.06 90 360 1.6 0.04 60 240 0.8 0.02 30 120 0.0 0.00 0 0 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Lhs: Alibaba Tencent Rhs: Kakao Lhs: Sum of the market share of Alipay and Tenpay2 Facebook Google1 Groupon Rhs: Transaction value of mobile payments on Alipay Tenpay3 Other third-party mobile payment providers in China 1 The number of Chrome users is used as a proxy for Google’s number of active users. 2 Market shares for 2012 are estimated based on market evidence. 3 Tenpay includes WeChat Pay and QQ Wallet. Sources: BIS (2019); Enfodesk; S&P Capital IQ, company reports, analysys.cn; Statista, Industries; BIS calculations. In some jurisdictions, big techs have gained a substantial presence in the retail payment system (FSB (2019a,b)). For instance, in China the two big tech payment firms jointly account for 94% of the mobile payments market (Graph 1, right-hand panel). The rapid growth in payment transactions within a few years shows how quickly big tech firms can establish their footprints. Beyond payments, big techs have also become lenders to individuals and small businesses in some markets as well as offering insurance and wealth management services (Cornelli et al (2020)). 4 BIS Bulletin Even in those jurisdictions where big techs do not currently have a dominant position in the financial system, their potential for rapid growth warrants close attention from central banks. Stablecoin projects and other big tech initiatives could be a game changer for the monetary system if their entry leads to closed loop systems reinforced by network effects from data drawn from social media or e-commerce platforms. Strong network effects and the entrenchment of closed networks could lead to a fragmentation of payment infrastructures to the detriment of the public good nature of money. Given the potential for rapid change, the absence of currently dominant platforms should not be a source of comfort for central banks. Rather, they should anticipate developments and formulate policy based on possible scenarios where big tech initiatives may already have reshaped the payment system, instead of focusing on the market structure of the payment system as it currently stands. Market dominance and data governance Entrenchment of market power also carries implications for the high costs of payment services. High merchant service costs associated with credit and debit cards have remained one of the stubborn shortcomings of the existing payment system, although the costs vary across jurisdictions.2 These costs are not immediately visible to consumers, as charges are usually levied on the merchants, who are not allowed to pass these fees on to consumers. However, the ultimate incidence of these costs depends on how much of the merchant fees are passed on to consumers through higher prices at the checkout (Mariotto and Verdier (2017)). A possible concern is that when big tech firms achieve a dominant position, the economics of platform competition may lead to merchant fees that are even higher than the high costs that exist currently. Merchant fees as high as 4% have been reported in some cases.3 Competition policy does not normally fall within the central bank’s purview. Some central banks are directed to consider the competitive functioning of the financial system (eg Reserve Bank of Australia, Bank of England) or its efficiency (eg Bank of Korea, Netherlands Bank) in implementing their policies. In any case, the central bank’s oversight of the payment system and its mission to ensure its efficiency mean that there is a strong case for the central bank to work closely with the competition authorities.
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