Financial Regulations for Improving Financial Inclusion a CGD Task Force Report
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Financial Regulations for Improving Financial Inclusion A CGD Task Force Report Chairs: Stijn Claessens Liliana Rojas-Suarez CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT Financial Regulations for Improving Financial Inclusion A CGD Task Force Report Chairs: Stijn Claessens Liliana Rojas-Suarez c Center for Global Development. 2016. Some Rights Reserved. Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Center for Global Development 2055 L Street NW, Floor 5 Washington DC 20036 www.cgdev.org ISBN 978-1-933286-96-9 Cover photos, clockwise from top left: c Erik Hersman, CC BY 2.0; Arne Hoel/World Bank, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0; Tim Moffatt, CC BY 2.0; Meena Kadri, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. Editing, design, and production by Communications Development Incorporated, Washington, D.C. Task force members Chairs Stijn Claessens Liliana Rojas-Suarez Task force members Thorsten Beck,Professor, Cass Business School Massimo Cirasino, Head of the Payment Systems Development Group, World Bank Stijn Claessens, Senior Adviser, Federal Reserve Board Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Director of Research, Development Research Group, World Bank Alan Gelb, Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development James Hanson, Former Senior Financial Policy Advisor, World Bank Ishrat Husain, Former Governor, Central Bank of Pakistan Ben Leo, Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development Nachiket Mor, Member of the Board, Reserve Bank of India Mark Napier, Director, Financial Sector Deepening (FSD), Africa Mthuli Ncube, Former Vice President, African Development Bank Njuguna Ndung’u, Former Governor, Central Bank of Kenya Lois Quinn, Senior Payment Systems Specialist, World Bank Beth Rhyne, Managing Director, Center for Financial Inclusion Liliana Rojas-Suarez, Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development Lemma Senbet, Executive Director, African Economic Research Consortium Tommaso Valletti, Professor, Imperial College London and University of Rome Tarisa Watanagase, Former Governor, Bank of Thailand The recommendations and views expressed in this report are those of the task force as a whole; not all recommendations are necessarily supported by all members. Affiliations are for identification purposes only. Task force members participate in their individual capacity, and the views expressed should not be attributed to the institutions listed. iv Contents Glossary vi Acknowledgments viii Abbreviations ix Executive summary xi Chapter 1 Introduction 1 The opportunities of greater financial inclusion 1 Purpose, approach, and scope of the report: the role for regulation 2 Chapter 2 Competition policy 7 The regulatory challenge 7 Market entry 7 Market exit 10 Abuse of market power 10 Interoperability 11 Contestability of inputs 12 Chapter 3 Leveling the playing field 15 The regulatory challenge 15 Defining and differentiating between services 16 Regulating functionally equivalent services equally 17 Payment services 17 Providers of store-of-value services 18 Providers of credit services 21 Consumer protection 23 Establishing clear supervisory assignments 24 Chapter 4 Know-your-customer rules 26 The regulatory challenge 26 Improving cross-border coordination 28 Scaling KYC requirements to client size 28 Strengthening national identification systems 29 Clarifying and graduating penalties 31 Encouraging international account-to-account transactions 31 v Recognizing the need for different approaches for difficult cases 32 Chapter 5 Achieving financial inclusion in retail payments 33 Promoting effective competition 34 Leveling the playing field 36 Ensuring consumer protection and KYC 37 Annex 1 Three main principles for pro-inclusive regulation 39 Annex 2 Examples of approaches to defining payments services: European Union, Australia, and Kenya 41 References 43 Boxes 1.1 A scorecard of the players and evolving business models in digital finance 3 1.2 The approach of the report: Three principles for pro-inclusive regulation 4 1.3 Payment services: Why they are special for financial inclusion 6 2.1 Branchless banking through correspondent networks 8 2.2 Full interoperability as a market solution versus as ex post regulation 13 2.3 Barriers to Unstructured Supplementary Service Data channel access hindering competition 14 3.1 Indonesia: How regulation can undermine the growth of mobile money networks 16 3.2 M-Pesa and other models for ensuring liquidity and safety for digital payments 19 3.3 Direct versus indirect provision of (deposit) insurance for digital accounts 22 3.4 Kenya’s M-Shwari: A standard bank-based deposit and credit service offered via mobile means 23 4.1 Biometric screening: How a risk-based approach can inform technology choices 27 4.2 Restricted bank accounts in three developing countries 29 4.3 Safaricom’s tiered accounts for mobile money 30 4.4 Technology-driven identification in India: Carrots versus sticks 30 4.5 A “safer corridor” for Somalia 32 5.1 Application of pricing recommendations for treatment of mobile off-net fees 35 vi Glossary See box 1.1 for definitions of other digital financial services provid- ex ante regulation. Government rules and regulations that set ers and business models. An asterisk indicates that the definition prerequisites on financial services providers as conditions for was taken or adapted from World Bank (2012a). their entry and continued participation in a market. ex post regulation. Government regulatory intervention agent network. A collection of independent businesses, such as that occurs only after a problem or market failure has been retailers, with which a bank or other financial services provider identified. contracts to serve as points of interaction with the provider’s float. The aggregate of funds that, for a short interval after a trans- customers. action, have been credited to the account of the recipient but cash-in, cash-out. Transaction to convert a balance in a transac- not yet debited from the account of the sender. tion account into cash, or incrementing a balance by paying in functional approach. An approach to financial services regulation cash, often structured as a transfer between an agent’s account in which services of the same nature are regulated in the same and a customer’s account, with the payer compensated in cash. way, rather than, for example, according to the type of provider. chip card. A plastic card in which is embedded a computer chip con- interchange fee. A fee charged by one provider of payment ser- taining information about the cardholder’s identity and account. vices to another–for example, the fee charged by a merchant’s competition policy. The set of government policies that governs bank (acquirer) to a cardholder’s bank (issuer) to compensate the state of market competition in an economy, including entry the issuer for the benefits that merchants receive when they and exit rules, antitrust enforcement, contestability of infra- accept electronic payments. structure, and related issues. interoperability.* A situation in which instruments belong- contestability. The absence of barriers to the entry of new compet- ing to a given scheme may be used in platforms developed by itors in a market (market contestability) or to the use of infra- other schemes. Interoperability requires technical compatibil- structures and other inputs necessary for participation in the ity between systems, but it can take effect only when agree- market (input contestability). ments have been concluded between the schemes concerned. digital (financial) services provider. A mobile network operator In mobile money markets, interoperability implies the ability of or other nonbank entity that offers various financial services users of one network to transact with users of another network, but only by electronic means, for example, using a mobile phone which can be achieved at different levels — at the customer level, or the Internet. at the agent level, or at the platform level. e-money.* A record of funds or value available to consumers that know-your-customer regulation. Government rules and regula- is stored on a payment device, such as a chip, a prepaid card, or tions that require a financial services provider to exercise due a mobile phone, or on a computer system as a nontraditional diligence in establishing the identity of its users, specifically, account with a banking or a nonbanking entity. E-money prod- to ensure that the user is not engaged in money laundering or ucts can be further differentiated into network money, mobile terrorist financing. money, electronic purse, and electronic wallet (e-wallet). macroprudential regulation; microprudential regulation. See e-wallet.* An e-money product for which the record of funds is prudential regulation. stored on a specific device, typically a chip on a card or in a mobile money.* An e-money product for which the record of mobile phone. funds is stored on a mobile phone or a central computer system vii and from which funds can be drawn down using specific pay- prudential regulation. Government rules and regulations that ment instructions that are issued from the bearer’s device. limit risk taking and some other behaviors of financial services mobile network operator. A provider of wireless communica- providers to ensure the safety of an individual financial insti- tions services that owns or controls the infrastructure neces- tution or of customers’ funds (microprudential regulation) or sary to deliver those services. to preserve the soundness of the financial system as a whole narrow bank. A bank that invests its funds (typically deposits) (macroprudential regulation). in only the safest instruments,