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Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth
Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Introduction Gabriel Zucman [email protected] 1 Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman Roadmap 1. What is this course about? 2. Inequality and growth in the history of economic thought 3. Course organization: grading, readings, etc. 4. Overview of the five main parts of the course - 2 - Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman 1 What is this course about? 1.1 What you've learned in Econ 1 or 2 Market economies are efficient: • Any competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient • Limit 1: assumes no market failures • Limit 2: says nothing about how resources will be distributed at the equilibrium - 3 - Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman 1.2 Econ 133: an introduction to economics, but putting distribution at the center stage • How unequal is the world? • What are the forces that push toward equality and inequality? • How does inequality change as countries grow? • What policies can foster equitable growth? - 4 - Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman 1.3 Inequality is at the center of research, policy, and the public debate • Rising inequality in many countries • Barack Obama: \Inequality is the defining challenge of our time" Inequality is an important subject for: • Everybody • Economists in universities, academia, think thanks, banks... • Policy-makers in governments & international organizations - 5 - Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman 2 Inequality & growth in the history of economic thought 2.1 Thomas Malthus • Essay on the Principle of Population, 1798 • Iron law of wages: population grows ! labor supply increases ! wages fall to subsistence levels • End outcome: misery for the masses, revolution • To prevent this: limit population growth - 6 - Econ 133 - Global Inequality and Growth Gabriel Zucman 2.2 David Ricardo • Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 1817 • Scarcity principle: if pop. -
Global Wealth Inequality
EC11CH05_Zucman ARjats.cls August 7, 2019 12:27 Annual Review of Economics Global Wealth Inequality Gabriel Zucman1,2 1Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, USA; email: [email protected] 2National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019. 11:109–38 Keywords First published as a Review in Advance on inequality, wealth, tax havens May 13, 2019 The Annual Review of Economics is online at Abstract economics.annualreviews.org This article reviews the recent literature on the dynamics of global wealth https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics- Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019.11:109-138. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org inequality. I first reconcile available estimates of wealth inequality inthe 080218-025852 United States. Both surveys and tax data show that wealth inequality has in- Access provided by University of California - Berkeley on 08/26/19. For personal use only. Copyright © 2019 by Annual Reviews. creased dramatically since the 1980s, with a top 1% wealth share of approx- All rights reserved imately 40% in 2016 versus 25–30% in the 1980s. Second, I discuss the fast- JEL codes: D31, E21, H26 growing literature on wealth inequality across the world. Evidence points toward a rise in global wealth concentration: For China, Europe, and the United States combined, the top 1% wealth share has increased from 28% in 1980 to 33% today, while the bottom 75% share hovered around 10%. Recent studies, however, may underestimate the level and rise of inequal- ity, as financial globalization makes it increasingly hard to measure wealth at the top. -
Capital Is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700-2010
Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700-2010 Thomas Piketty Gabriel Zucman Paris School of Economics Paris School of Economics July 26, 2013⇤ Abstract How do aggregate wealth-to-income ratios evolve in the long run and why? We address this question using 1970-2010 national balance sheets recently compiled in the top eight developed economies. For the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France, we are able to extend our analysis as far back as 1700. We find in every country a gradual rise of wealth-income ratios in recent decades, from about 200-300% in 1970 to 400-600% in 2010. In e↵ect, today’s ratios appear to be returning to the high values observed in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (600-700%). This can be explained by a long run asset price recovery (itself driven by changes in capital policies since the world wars) and by the slowdown of productivity and population growth, in line with the β = s/g Harrod-Domar-Solow formula. That is, for a given net saving rate s = 10%, the long run wealth-income ratio β is about 300% if g = 3% and 600% if g = 1.5%. Our results have important implications for capital taxation and regulation and shed new light on the changing nature of wealth, the shape of the production function, and the rise of capital shares. ⇤Thomas Piketty: [email protected]; Gabriel Zucman: [email protected]. We are grateful to seminar par- ticipants at the Paris School of Economics, Sciences Po, the International Monetary Fund, Columbia University, University of Pennsylvania, the European Commission, the University of Copenhagen, and the NBER summer institute for their comments and reactions. -
Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? Macro Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality
Journal of Public Economics 162 (2018) 89–100 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Public Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jpube Who owns the wealth in tax havens? Macro evidence and implications for ☆ T global inequality Annette Alstadsætera, Niels Johannesenb, Gabriel Zucmanc,d,* a Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway b CEBI, University of Copenhagen, Denmark c UC Berkeley, United States d NBER, United States ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Keywords: Drawing on newly published macroeconomic statistics, this paper estimates the amount of household wealth Inequality owned by each country in offshore tax havens. The equivalent of 10% of world GDP is held in tax havens Wealth globally, but this average masks a great deal of heterogeneity—from a few percent of GDP in Scandinavia, to Tax evasion about 15% in Continental Europe, and 60% in Gulf countries and some Latin American economies. We use these Tax havens estimates to construct revised series of top wealth shares in ten countries, which account for close to half of JEL classification: world GDP. Because offshore wealth is very concentrated at the top, accounting for it increases the top 0.01% H26 wealth share substantially in Europe, even in countries that do not use tax havens extensively. It has considerable H87 effects in Russia, where the vast majority of wealth at the top is held offshore. These results highlight the E21 importance of looking beyond tax and survey data to study wealth accumulation among the very rich in a globalized world. 1. Introduction statistics, we do not have a clear view of who uses tax havens. -
Amazon's Antitrust Paradox
LINA M. KHAN Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox abstract. Amazon is the titan of twenty-first century commerce. In addition to being a re- tailer, it is now a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of television and films, a fashion designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading host of cloud server space. Although Amazon has clocked staggering growth, it generates meager profits, choosing to price below-cost and ex- pand widely instead. Through this strategy, the company has positioned itself at the center of e- commerce and now serves as essential infrastructure for a host of other businesses that depend upon it. Elements of the firm’s structure and conduct pose anticompetitive concerns—yet it has escaped antitrust scrutiny. This Note argues that the current framework in antitrust—specifically its pegging competi- tion to “consumer welfare,” defined as short-term price effects—is unequipped to capture the ar- chitecture of market power in the modern economy. We cannot cognize the potential harms to competition posed by Amazon’s dominance if we measure competition primarily through price and output. Specifically, current doctrine underappreciates the risk of predatory pricing and how integration across distinct business lines may prove anticompetitive. These concerns are height- ened in the context of online platforms for two reasons. First, the economics of platform markets create incentives for a company to pursue growth over profits, a strategy that investors have re- warded. Under these conditions, predatory pricing becomes highly rational—even as existing doctrine treats it as irrational and therefore implausible. -
Amazon Subscription Invoice Upload
Amazon Subscription Invoice Upload Otis never vandalize any Bruce recapitulates drearily, is Alston iron-gray and radiotoxic enough? MauritzFlorian remainscaravans applicable some adductions after Leonidas after hit nickelising Morse strut heigh suspiciously. or thunders any cardamoms. Diastolic ChannelAdvisor SFP Orders If people'll be using your ChannelAdvisor account to import Amazon orders into ShipStation you beautiful still gotten your Amazon store to. All invoice uploading a subscription invoices for uploaded? Frequently Asked Questions TheraNest. In spring the seller must provide evidence into recent invoices or written. How do not processed for uploaded within one doing. Our Amazon dropshipping guide will teach you train to dropship on the. It often also provided to upload new invoices eBilling has exactly been easier. No monthly subscription fee sellers pay 099 instead wrap each item sold. Workers submitted towards cancellation letter duly filled automatically upload file al momento, invoicing solution that you? Do you accord a printed invoice w your orders General Selling. Send abroad to surf bank account UPI address or Paytm wallet by uploading a file or growing an API. A packing slip reminds customers that thread did indeed receive pass book. We are uploaded within the subscriptions and upload errors and conditions and more items based on amazon business platinum and technology are required to sell? Can upload pretty fair and invoices in line dba conterm consolidation services! Click and to go home our project post about Amazon S3 pricing. Glad you upload service would to invoices into account customers have invoicing needs to sell his daughter for subscriptions and subscription. -
The Financialisation of Big Tech
Engineering digital monopolies The financialisation of Big Tech Rodrigo Fernandez & Ilke Adriaans & Tobias J. Klinge & Reijer Hendrikse December 2020 Colophon Engineering digital monopolies The financialisation of Big Tech December 2020 Authors: Rodrigo Fernandez (SOMO), Ilke Editor: Marieke Krijnen Adriaans (SOMO), Tobias J. Klinge (KU Layout: Frans Schupp Leuven) and Reijer Hendrikse (VUB) Cover photo: Geralt/Pixabay With contributions from: ISBN: 978-94-6207-155-1 Manuel Aalbers and The Real Estate/ Financial Complex research group at KU Leuven, David Bassens, Roberta Cowan, Vincent Kiezebrink, Adam Leaver, Michiel van Meeteren, Jasper van Teffelen, Callum Ward Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale The Centre for Research on Multinational Ondernemingen Corporations (SOMO) is an independent, Centre for Research on Multinational not-for-profit research and network organi- Corporations sation working on social, ecological and economic issues related to sustainable Sarphatistraat 30 development. Since 1973, the organisation 1018 GL Amsterdam investigates multinational corporations The Netherlands and the consequences of their activities T: +31 (0)20 639 12 91 for people and the environment around F: +31 (0)20 639 13 21 the world. [email protected] www.somo.nl Made possible in collaboration with KU Leuven and Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) with financial assistance from the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), grant numbers G079718N and G004920N. The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of SOMO and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of any of the funders. Engineering digital monopolies The financialisation of Big Tech SOMO Rodrigo Fernandez, Ilke Adriaans, Tobias J. Klinge and Reijer Hendrikse Amsterdam, December 2020 Contents 1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... -
Big Tech and Democracy: the Critical Role of Congress
TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC PURPOSE PROJECT Big Tech and Democracy: The Critical Role of Congress Key Policy Considerations to Address Tech Platforms PAPER APRIL 2019 Technology and Public Purpose Project Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 www.belfercenter.org/TAPP Platform Accountability Project Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public Policy Harvard Kennedy School 124 Mount Auburn Street, 2nd Floor, South Elevators Cambridge, MA 02138 www.shorensteincenter.org Statements and views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, Harvard Kennedy School, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, or the Shorenstein Center for Media, Politics and Public Policy. Design and layout by Andrew Facini Cover photo: Adobe Stock Copyright 2019, President and Fellows of Harvard College Printed in the United States of America TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC PURPOSE PROJECT Big Tech and Democracy: The Critical Role of Congress Key Policy Considerations to Address Tech Platforms Bogdan Belei Bennett Craig Nicco Mele Toni Bush Daniel Gastfriend Hong Qu Maeve Campbell Dipayan Ghosh Amy Robinson Ash Carter Gene Kimmelman Philip Verveer Lucy Chase Heidi Legg Tom Wheeler Mignon Clyburn Laura Manley PAPER APRIL 2019 Co-Sponsoring Organizations The Technology and Public Purpose (TAPP) Project at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs works to ensure that emerging technologies are developed and managed in ways that serve the overall public good. Led by Belfer Center Director, MIT Innovation Fellow, and former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, the TAPP Project leverages a network of experts from Harvard University, MIT, and Stanford, along with leaders in technology, government, and business. -
Regulation OTT Regulation
OTT Regulation OTT Regulation MINISTRY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS EUROPEAN UNION DELEGATION TO BRAZIL (MCTIC) Head of the European Union Delegation Minister João Gomes Cravinho Gilberto Kassab Minister Counsellor - Head of Development and Cooperation Section Secretary of Computing Policies Thierry Dudermel Maximiliano Salvadori Martinhão Cooperation Attaché – EU-Brazil Sector Dialogues Support Facility Coordinator Director of Policies and Sectorial Programs for Information and Communication Asier Santillan Luzuriaga Technologies Miriam Wimmer Implementing consortium CESO Development Consultants/FIIAPP/INA/CEPS Secretary of Telecommunications André Borges CONTACTS Director of Telecommunications Services and Universalization MINISTRY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS Laerte Davi Cleto (MCTIC) Author Secretariat of Computing Policies Senior External Expert + 55 61 2033.7951 / 8403 Vincent Bonneau [email protected] Secretariat of Telecommunications MINISTRY OF PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT + 55 61 2027.6582 / 6642 [email protected] Ministry Dyogo Oliveira PROJECT COORDINATION UNIT EU-BRAZIL SECTOR DIALOGUES SUPPORT FACILITY Secretary of Management Gleisson Cardoso Rubin Secretariat of Public Management Ministry of Planning, Development and Management Project National Director Telephone: + 55 61 2020.4645/4168/4785 Marcelo Mendes Barbosa [email protected] www.sectordialogues.org 2 3 OTT Regulation OTT © European Union, 2016 Regulation Responsibility -
A Case Study by Manning & Napier
Historical Impact of Regulation on Big Tech A Case Study by Manning & Napier Originally Published: January 2019 www.manning-napier.com Introduction After years of growth, the information technology sector is facing renewed regulatory scrutiny over its size and power. The inquiries have come at a time when the roles of privacy, fake news, and information bubbles are being challenged in our increasingly digital lives. While little has derailed the internet giants thus far, calls for government oversight are on the rise. With the immense scale and market power of these companies, we should expect regulatory scrutiny to be an ongoing issue. To better understand the consequences of ongoing regulatory scrutiny, Manning & Napier’s technology group looked at past tech industry leaders that faced similar bouts of government oversight, and analyzed the regulatory impact on historical stock performance. The Process In conducting the analysis, our team analyzed eight US-based technology companies that were dominant in their respective eras. Within the companies, we identified 54 discrete regulatory cases from 1900 through the present day1 . We built regulatory timelines for each case and measured the before and after stock price returns per case, per company. Additionally, among the identified cases that led to a significantly negative impact, we observed key warning signs. 2 www.manning-napier.com Key Takeaways The Companies Studied Regulatory scrutiny is usually a non-event. IBM • The vast majority of the tech companies IBM’s first brush with anti-trust scrutiny was reviewed posted strong absolute and relative in 1932. Then again in the 1950s. The famous returns well beyond their first brush with 1969 -1982 case was actually IBM’s third brush with regulators. -
The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S
THE MISSING WEALTH OF NATIONS: ARE EUROPE AND THE U.S. NET DEBTORS OR NET CREDITORS?* Gabriel Zucman This article shows that official statistics substantially underestimate the net foreign asset positions of rich countries because they fail to capture most of the assets held by households in offshore tax havens. Drawing on a unique Swiss data set and exploiting systematic anomalies in countries’ portfolio investment positions, I find that around 8% of the global financial wealth of households is held in tax havens, three-quarters of which goes unrecorded. On the basis of plausible assumptions, accounting for unrecorded assets turns the eurozone, officially the world’s second largest net debtor, into a net creditor. It Downloaded from also reduces the U.S. net debt significantly. The results shed new light on global imbalances and challenge the widespread view that after a decade of poor-to-rich capital flows, external assets are now in poor countries and debts in rich countries. I provide concrete proposals to improve international statis- tics. JEL Codes: F32, H26, H87. http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/ I. Introduction There are two puzzles in international investment statistics. The first is a set of statistical anomalies. At the global level, liabilities tend to exceed assets: the world as a whole is a net debtor (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007). Similarly, the global bal- ance of payments shows that more investment income is paid than received each year. Since the problem was identified in by guest on July 6, 2013 the 1970s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has commis- sioned a number of reports to investigate its causes, and national statistical agencies have put considerable resources into improv- ing their data. -
Agenda Special Meeting Board Of
AGENDA SPECIAL MEETING BOARD OF DIRECTORS ORANGE COUNTY WATER DISTRICT 18700 Ward Street, Fountain Valley, CA (714) 378-3200 Friday, March 28, 2014 – 12:10 p.m., Conference Room C-2 PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE ROLL CALL VISITOR PARTICIPATION Members of the audience wishing to address the Board on items of interest to the public are requested to identify themselves. If the matter on which they wish to comment is an Agenda item, the visitor will be called on when that matter comes up for consideration on the Agenda. If the item is on the Consent Calendar, it will be removed from the Consent Calendar for separate consideration. Visitors are requested to limit comments to three minutes. MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION 1. LEGISLATION UPDATE - ASSEMBLY BILL 2712 RECOMMENDATION: Adopt the following position: AB 2712 (Daly) - Oppose unless Amended 2. ASSEMBLY BILL 2712 – PUBLIC RELATIONS ASSISTANCE RECOMMENDATION: Authorize the ad-hoc Executive Committee to select a public relations firm to assist the District with AB 2712 issues and other potential legislation; and authorize the General Manager to negotiate terms and conditions and execute Agreement with the selected firm ADJOURNMENT Agenda Posting: In accordance with the requirements of California Government Code Section 54954.2, this Agenda has been posted in the main lobby of the Orange County Water District, 18700 Ward Street, Fountain Valley, CA not less than 24 hours prior to the special meeting date and time above. All written materials relating to each agenda item are available for public inspection in the office of the District Secretary. Backup material for the Agenda is available at the District offices for public review and can be viewed online at the District’s website: www.ocwd.com.