5º Encontro Nacional Da ABRI Redefinindo a Diplomacia Em Um Mundo Em Transformação
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5º Encontro Nacional da ABRI Redefinindo a Diplomacia em um Mundo em Transformação 29 a 31 de Julho de 2015 Belo Horizonte – MG – Brasil Análise de Política Externa DILMA ROUSSEFF’S PRESIDENCY AND ARAB COUNTRIES: AN OVERLOOKED FOREIGN POLICY? Danillo Alarcon Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Goiás Dilma Rousseff’s Presidency and Arab Countries: an overlooked foreign policy? ABSTRACT: Despite her poor results in terms of foreign policy, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has been applying the constitutional principles of the country’s international relations. Nonetheless, in a country such as Brazil, where the president usually has a great amount of power, particularly because of the “presidential diplomacy” of both Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva, Rousseff has had problems to operationalize her foreign policy objectives, if there are any critics could argue on. One exemplificative case happened in the second half of 2014, when she openly criticized the United States and its allies attacks against the Islamic State. Brazilian media was not sympathetic to her. It is clear, from a Foreign Policy Analysis standpoint, that her speech was not aimed at denying the horrific acts of the so-called terrorist organization, but at trying to bring back respect for international law and the United Nations role in those situations. However, according to Christopher Hill, the decision-making process in a democracy has to bear in mind a great amount of constituencies, from the media, that has a huge influence on public opinion, to the finance donors of elections and all other kinds of activities. In this sense, the objective of this paper is to analyze Rousseff’s administration relations with Arab Countries, specially focusing on the country’s view on the Arab Spring movements and its subsequent consequences. The president’s speeches at the opening of the United Nations General Assemblies (and other deemed necessary) and data from think tanks and governmental institutes about trade between Brazil and Arab Countries will be useful in the research. The hypothesis here presented is that the Brazilian positions did not dramatically change, but what lacked was leadership in foreign affairs as the country, pledging the status of a global power, didn’t have the resources to do so. Keywords: Brazil; Rousseff; Foreign Policy; Arab Countries 2 Introduction President Lula da Silva’s Foreign Policy (FP) was remarkably outstanding in some aspects. He developed, together with his Chancellor Celso Amorim, an active foreign policy aimed at the international insertion of Brazilian companies together with a South-South emphasis on the global political agenda. However, his successor, Dilma Rousseff, from the same party (“Partido dos Trabalhadores” – PT, in Portuguese) has been criticized for being lofty and clumsy when it comes to operationalizing her foreign policy principles – developed first with Antonio Patriota, and later with Luiz Alberto Figueiredo as Ministers of External Relations –, both due to internal and external constraints (CERVO; LESSA, 2014. CORNETET, 2014). In that sense, it is imperative to analyze how the country has been dealing with its various partners. With regard to the Arab Countries, Brazilian relations have as a remarking point the 1970s. There were obvious economic needs in both sides, but they managed to work on a political agenda as well. Already in the XXI century, President Lula launched in 2004 the initiative to host an Arab and South American countries Summit in Brazil, which was held in Brasília in 20051. The ASPA Summits (América do Sul – Países Árabes, in Portuguese) were an important occasion for political understanding, but they also were a good opportunity for business. Pragmatism has always been, in that sense, the key to understand Brazil’s relations towards its Arabs counterparts. Dilma Rousseff, however, had to face more difficulties when dealing with these partners. The “Arab Spring” erupted in December 2010 in Tunisia and lead to a political overturn in the region. Ben Ali (Tunisia), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt) and Muammar al-Qaddafi (Libya) were ousted from power. Bashar Al-Assad (Syria) is facing a deadly civil war, followed by the rise in mid-2014 of the so-called “Islamic State”, that not only grabbed the opportunity to raise itself from the dust left of the Iraq War (2003) but also seized the moment to gather important gains in the civil war scenario. In the second half of 2014, when Dilma openly criticized the United States and its allies’ attacks against the Islamic State, Brazilian media was not sympathetic to her. It is clear, from a Foreign Policy Analysis standpoint, that her speech was not meant to deny the horrific acts of the so-called terrorist organization, but it aimed at trying to bring back respect for international law and the United Nations role in those situations, which are the principles Brazil stands for. Thus, the objective of this paper is to analyze Rousseff’s administration relations with Arab Countries, specially focusing on the country’s view on the Arab Spring movements and 1 Two other summits were held: the second, in Doha (2009); the third, in Lima (2012). According to information at the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Ministry website, the fourth is going to happen in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), in 2015. 3 its subsequent consequences. The president’s speeches at the opening of the United Nations General Assemblies (and other documents deemed necessary) and data from think tanks and governmental institutes will be useful in the research. The hypothesis here presented is that Brazil’s positions did not dramatically change, but what lacked was leadership in foreign affairs as the country, pledging the status of a global power, didn’t have the resources to do so. Brazil even attempted, with Minister Antonio Patriota (2011), to launch the principle of “responsibility while protecting” (RwP). It will be discussed in the paper that, even though it was well received by some part of the international community, there were other factors that overshadowed it. Brazil is facing the maturation of its democracy, and, as it will be advanced further in the next pages, that ought to bring more interest groups into the foreign policy debate. However, this is not a setback for the country’s FP, but it will bring considerable challenges. As democracy was mentioned above, a few considerations regarding it and foreign policy are going to be made. It is important to notice that Brazil’s international relations are determined by fundamental principles established in its 1988 constitution. The document was the result of a long process towards the democratization of the country. According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1999), president Sarney, who was in power when the 1988 constitution was drafted, still had to deal with the armed forces meddling in the government issues, as he was the first civil president to serve after the military regime. For instance, he had six military ministers which influenced at the Constitutional Assembly. The president and the Army, in the end, agreed not to support parliamentarism and that strongly affected how the country’s international relations would be conducted in the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. However, the aforementioned 1988 constitution clearly and irrevocably brought in its fourth article the commanding principles of the country’s international relations: I – national independence; II – prevalence of human rights; III – self-determination of the peoples; IV – non-intervention; V – equality among the states; VI – defense of peace; VII – peaceful settlement of conflicts; VIII – repudiation of terrorism and racism; IX – cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind; X – granting of political asylum (BRASIL, 1988, p. 13). What this article expresses is in accordance with the country’s tradition in foreign policy. Thus, Dilma Rousseff’s choices and actions in foreign policy, even though they were somehow criticized, were in accordance with these principles. Her position towards the “Islamic State” issue in 2014 is symbolic in that sense. A critical analysis of it as it is here 4 presented, goes hand in hand with what Charles Lister (2014, p. 3) pointed out: “the key to undermining IS’s [Islamic State] long-term sustainability (…) is to solve the socio-political failures within its areas of operation”. It seems that even though there has been less Brazilian proactivity in the international arena, the country does not seem to have lost its enduring constitutional international relations principles and its sensitivity towards the need for development and self-determination of the Global South. 1. Brazil’s Foreign Policy towards Arab Countries: from the 1970s to the ASPA Summits The approximation between Brazil and the Arab countries, with the exception of the large migration flows, mainly of Syrians and Lebanese in the late XIX century, deepened in the 1970s. Already in 1969, Itamaraty (as the Brazilian Foreign Ministry office is called) started to shape itself to deal better with the opportunities presented by those far, but possible, partners (CERVO; BUENO, 2008, p. 423). Despite the dynamics of the region (the Gulf, for example only became effectively independent from the United Kingdom in the late 1960s), Brazil remained attentive to the possibilities of economic and diplomatic relations with the area in question. At the end of 1973, Brazil had already opened embassies in Iraq, which would become an important partner in the following years, and in Saudi Arabia. As Élodie Brun (2012) mentioned, Brazil only began seeking true partnership with Arab Countries during the 1970s, mainly for economic reasons. The country was dependent on oil imports from Iraq and Saudi Arabia due to its fast growing GDP rate (at least until the beginning of the 1980s). Those years, when Brazil was ruled by military presidents, were unambiguously marked by a pragmatic view of the country’s foreign policy, which forced the opening of new opportunities in the international arena, both for financing the process of industrialization Brazil was facing and to sell its surplus.