Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula
CHAPTER III
INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN YEMEN
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Historical background of Yemen shows that the present security and development challenges have been mainly influenced by two factors: the geographic condition of Yemen and its vague political past. Roots of present development and security challenges are discernible in early past. Socio- economic transformation still continues in Yemen. However democratic societal values are gradually rooting in the Yemeni society. Yemeni society is looking a culturally united society, but, it is composed by many socio-religious clans and elite families. This diversity is responsible to create threats to internal security and peace. However, the main challenges to security are because of political parties, educational and economic backwardness in Yemen. Thus, this chapter is devoted to explain major internal security challenges and its effect on national security in Yemen.
Yemen is one of the least developed countries in the world, ranking 153rd in the Human Development Index.1 It is facing severe economic problems in contemporary times. Yemen is one of the poorest nations in the Arab region. The country’s most pressing development problems (poverty, food security, water scarcity and population growth) compete for government attention with internal tensions. A recent report on poverty assessment in Yemen said poverty rate dropped from 40 per cent in 1998 to 35 per cent in 2006. Titled 'Yemen Poverty Assessment', the report was prepared by the government of Yemen, World Bank, and UN Development Program (UNDP). This report was based on
82 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula a household budget survey conducted from April 2005 to March 2006.2 However, the decline in poverty is not a remarkable phenomenon because; there are many hurdles in the process of sustainable development. There is no politically and democratically enlightened society, which can think freely to solve the problem of national development and security and cooperate with the government. Beside this, Government is struggling to give safety to people from various security threats like violence, armed conflicts, terrorism and poor law and order.
3.2. NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES 3.2.1. POLITICAL TURMOIL
Following unification in May 1990, Yemen has evolved as a democratic state based on a multiparty parliamentary system, elected directly by the citizens. The executive branch comprises the President and the Council of Ministers (government). The President is elected by direct popular vote and the Presidential term of office has recently been extended from five to seven years. The Council of Ministers is appointed by the President upon the advice of the Prime Minister. The legislative branch is composed of the Shura Council (upper house) and the House of Representatives (lower house). The 111 members of the Shura are appointed by the president. The 301 deputies of the House of Representatives are elected by direct popular vote every six years. By regional standards, democracy is reasonably well-developed in Yemen. However, progress towards a full democracy has been slow in recent years, as the elections have mainly resulted in the strengthening of the government’s power. The ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) has also consolidated its position through decisions extending the prerogatives of the executive branch and limiting the powers of the House of Representatives, for example by extending the legislative powers of the Shura
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Council, appointed by the President. The opposition, and increasingly the ruling party’s parliamentary bloc as well, provide a degree of political competition, but the main opposition party, the Islamic Congregation for Reform (Islah), has not seriously challenged government policy. 3
A range of complex interlinked processes and institutions determine patterns of development in Yemen. While many aspects are challenging, there are also positive trends and reform minded elements. The incentive structures throughout government are not clearly aligned with development needs, since accountability does not create sufficient pressure to deliver. Influential groups consist of overlapping elements of the political leadership, the armed forces, tribal sheikhs, and some top officials, with linkages to the private sector.4
The three multi-party elections for parliament in 1993, 1997 and 2003, and the Presidential elections of 1999, were judged to be sufficiently free and fair by international observers, despite some flaws. The last elections in 2003 saw an extended competition with 22 parties participating, and a good participation of voters (turnout was 76.5 per cent). Nonetheless, the result was a further consolidation of the ruling party’s power: the GPC won a large majority, gaining 58 per cent of the votes and 76 per cent of the seats; Islah got 22 per cent of the votes and 45 seats, and the Yemen Socialist Party 5 per cent of the votes and 7 seats. The elections lacked uniformity in procedures and transparency. The representation of women was reduced to just one Member of Parliament, demonstrating extremely serious obstacles to women’s political participation and representation. Opposition parties suffered from limited access to the media, due to the Government’s control of Television and radio, crucial in a country where 50 per cent of the population is not literate. The next parliamentary elections were expected in 2009, (postponed till further order), while Presidential elections took place in September 2006, in conjunction with local council elections. 5 84 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula
There is the phenomenon that the popularity of some parties is based on personality, family, or tribe. Personal connections and patronage assume greater importance than the programmes and policies. Lack of intra-party democracy leads to the party being treated as it is a private asset. The party activities and the political agenda, if at all, are centered on the personality of the leader.” 6
Due to many reasons political turmoil is a fact in Yemen. Various religious clans, slow pace of rooting democratic values in society, politics of elite families and tribal leaders, low economic development and more importantly foreign interferences are responsible factors that bring instability to government. Providing security to people becomes tough when government is unstable.
3.2.2. VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM
It can be said that violence and terrorism have become international phenomena in all under developing, and the developed countries. There are certain deep rooted factors that help in the development and the continuation of these phenomena. Almost all societies suffer the outcomes of violence and terrorism, and the burden of their effects on the society. There is no country on this planet that has not experienced some form of violence or the other.
We find that there is a general agreement that the phenomenon of violence and terrorism has certain political, social and economic motives and reasons. The major reason for such violence is that the ruling systems, whether in the form of groups or organizations or parties or tribal groups, are looking to further certain personal interests by initiating acts of terror and violence such as hijacking planes, holding hostages, and indulging in explosions and political conspiracies that makes the security unstable. There are various types of violence and
85 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula terrorism depending on their motives, which are usually economic, political or religious.7
The economic factor plays a major role in the spread of violence because it gains the interest of the majority of the public. It is more strongly supported especially by those who are trivialized by the society. On the other hand, the political factor influences the security and the stability of the country through acts of violence and terror practiced by the governing systems of some great countries that adopt various forms and sources of terrorism to achieve certain economic and political interests.8
Violence and Terrorism in Yemen
Since the first revolution of 1962, Yemen has encountered many serious problems with regards to its security and stability. For about four decades, the country has suffered greatly from cruel events in which a lot of blood was shed in both parts of Yemen, both before and after unity. Most of these acts of violence were because of the conflicts for the leadership. Due to this violence, many people were killed irrespective of whether they were soldiers or innocent citizens. The feeling of revenge and vengeance has, thus, increased among people, especially in the southern parts of the country.9
Even after the unity of the two parts of Yemen, violence did not stop but instead increased and developed into organized terrorism. This was because of the new conflict between the ruling authorities and the other political parties and organizations for the leadership of the country. This led to cruel and aggressive military confrontation between the socialist party and the Moatamar party in 1994. It was believed that this war would put an end to the violence and acts of terrorism in the country. Unfortunately, this phenomenon continued and took on
86 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula new forms and more developed techniques and some foreign hands were got involved in it. In the following section, we will try to discuss the different stages of the development of violence and terrorism in Yemen during the past four decades, before and after unity.10
Even after Unity in 1990, violence and terrorism did not reduce. This period was characterized by organized violence and terror acts among the political parties that participated in the unification of Yemen as each party tried to win the leadership of the country. In this period, many attempts of assassination took place targeting some important political leaders and high ranking officials in the ruling party as well as in the opposition parties. Alongwith these terror acts, there appeared a new type of violence in Yemen in the form of kidnapping, targeted to tourists and foreigners, as an attempt to spread fear and terror in the society. This new form of violence directed towards the foreigners was an attempt to bring down the tourism and investments in the country and to threaten its security and stability. Moreover, more military confrontations took place between the armed forces of the two conflicting parties in the government, which led to vicious terror attacks and a civil war. More than fifteen thousand people were killed and injured in this war and huge numbers could flee to the neighboring countries and there are still many Yemeni refugees in these countries.11
During the last fifteen years, the most dangerous form of violence and terrorism appeared in Yemen with new shapes and techniques targeting certain prominent public institutions related to the government as well as some civil and military bases of some foreign countries friendly to Yemen, such as France and USA. The organized kidnapping activities increased and reached to the diplomats and other foreign experts working in some economic and social services in Yemen. All those actions abeted to spread more terror acts in the country. Many innocent people, Yemenis as well as other nationals, were the victims of those
87 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula terror acts and violence. Furthermore, the disagreements among the various political parties and the tribal and regional conflicts among the citizens paved the way for more terror acts in the country and threatened the security and the stability of the country during that period. Towards the end of this period a new international conflict took place between the Islamic Groups and the American Imperialism and Yemen was considered as a platform for such conflicts and exposed it to a worse violence and organized international terrorism of which influence is expected to appear in the near future.12 The Yemeni society has encountered different forms of violence and terrorism. A great deal of this violence or terror acts emerges from inside the country but the most dangerous terrorism acts come from outside the country. However, all these terrorism acts stem from political and economic motives beside some social and religious reasons.
Political Violence
Sa’dah Insurgency
Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi was a Zaidi religious leader. He was an instrumental figure in the Sa'dah conflict against the Yemeni government in 2004. al-Houthi was accused of trying to set himself up as Imam, of setting up unlicensed religious centers, creating an armed group called Shabab al- Muomineen or Believing Youth, and of staging violent anti-American protests.13
Sheik al-Houthi, who was a one-time political aspirant in Yemen, had wide religious and tribal backing in Yemen, centered mostly in Yemen's northern mountains. al-Houthi's followers felt Yemen's government was too closely allied with the United States and lead protests against the United States and Israel at mosques.14
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In June 2004, the Yemeni government offered a bounty of $55,000 for al- Houthi's capture and launched an operation aimed at ending his rebellion. After months of battles between Yemeni security forces and the Believing Youth, the Yemeni Interior and Defense Ministries released a statement in which it declared that Sheikh al-Houthi had been killed with a number of his aides.15
From June to August 2004, government troops battled supporters of al- Houthi in the north. It is estimated that the dead range was from 500-550. In September, Yemeni forces killed al-Houthi.16 Since then, the rebellion is led by one of his brothers, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.
This insurgency is not ended since many of followers are still organized and challenging the national authority by act of violence. The religious groups in Yemen are misguiding the poor people for their own interest. Result of this phenomenon is the Sa'dah insurgency began in June 2004 when dissident cleric Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, head of the Shi’a Zaidism, launched an uprising against the Yemeni government. Most of the fighting has taken place in Sa'dah Governorate in northwestern Yemen.17
The Yemeni government alleges that the Shabab al-Muomineen seek to overthrow it and to implement Shi‘a religious law. The rebels counter that they are "defending their community against discrimination" and government aggression. The Yemeni government has accused Iran of directing and financing the insurgency,18 while Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani described the Yemeni government's operations as a "jihad".19
Between March and April 2005, more than 200 people were killed in a resurgence of fighting between government forces and supporters of the slain cleric.
In May 2005, the rebels rejected an offer of a presidential pardon by President Ali Abdullah Salih after their conditions for surrender were refused by 89 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula the government and minor clashes continued. On May 21, the government released estimates of the impact of the rebellion, announcing that it was responsible for 552 deaths, 2,708 injures, and over United States dollar (USD) 270 million in economic damages.20 In March 2006, the Yemeni government freed more than 600 captured Shi’a fighters.21
A new spate of fighting broke out in late December 2006. On January 28, 2007, when militants attacked multiple government installations, killing six soldiers and injuring 20 more.22 Further attacks on January 31, 2007, left six more soldiers dead and 10 wounded.23 Also ten soldiers died and 20 were wounded in an attack on an army roadblock near the Saudia Arabian border on February 1, 2007.24 Though there was no official confirmation of militant casualties in the attacks, government sources claim three rebel fighters were killed in a security operation following the January 31, 2007 attacks.25
In February2007, the government launched a major offensive against the rebels involving 30,000 troops. By February 19, 2007, almost 200 members of the security forces and over 100 rebels had died in the fighting.26 A further 160 rebels were killed in the subsequent two weeks.27
A ceasefire agreement was reached on June 16, 2007. The rebel leaders agreed to lay down arms and go into exile in Qatar (by whom the agreement had been mediated), while the government agreed to release rebel prisoners, help pay for reconstruction and assist with Internally displaced person (IDPs) returning home.
Armed incidents resumed in April 2008, when seven Yemeni soldiers died in a rebel ambush on April 29.28 On May 2, 2008, 15 worshippers were killed and 55 wounded in an explosion at a mosque in Sa'dah. The blast occurred as crowds of people left Friday prayers at the Bin Salman Mosque. The government blamed the rebels for the bombing, but Houthi's group denied being responsible29
90 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula shortly after the attack, three soldiers and four rebels died in overnight skirmishes.
On May 12, 2008, clashes between Yemeni soldiers and rebels near the border with Saudia Arabia killed 13 soldiers and 26 rebels.30 However, President Salih declared an end to fighting in the northern Sa’dah governorate on July 17, 2008.31
This refers to the organized violence and generally it is for political reasons and its source is the system of the government and it is mainly targeted towards the citizens in person or organizations or political parties. There are two types of violence. The first type of this violence takes the form of conflicts between the political parties for the leadership whereas the second type of violence is used by the governments against the citizens. The Yemeni society has suffered from the first type of violence because of the periodic conflicts between the parties for the leadership of the country. The harmful effects of this conflict can be witnessed even till today. Moreover, after the national war of 1994 many of the central leaders of the socialist party had migrated to the neighbouring countries because they failed to secure the leadership of the country through the democratic elections and also through the military encounters that followed. Consequently, a political opponent front was formed in order to gain the leadership for the second time whether by force and violence or through the national reconciliation. This received some promotion from certain legalized political parties who realized that the national reconciliation was the only way to stop violence and bring the security and stability crucial to the realization of the economic development. Those opposition parties threatened an upsurge in violent activities if the government neglected their issue.32 However the ruling party didn’t pay any heed to the demands of those parties as they were later called as separatists (infisalyeen) and threatened them and their supporters from 91 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula other parties or religious groups and refused any reconciliation with them.33 The same policy was also followed by the Islah (Reform) Party.34
On the other hand, the opposition front outside the country (Maw Front) assured that national reconciliation had to be comprehensive and no peace and no economic development can be realized without such reconciliation between parties. They also warned from the rising of violence and conflict in the country if the authorities refused the national reconciliation. Hence, Sana’a government had only two options: the first was confrontation and not accepting the reconciliation and this would lead to the continuation of violence and the security and the policy of the country would remain unstable. The second option was to realize the security and the peace for the country even if they had to accept the reconciliation with some undesired parties whose loyalty is suspected because the latest leaders of the socialist party committed unforgettable crimes that affected the country and its unity. The return of this party to rule the country or their participation in government was totally rejected.35
However it was necessary to forget the past quarrels and disagreements and to think about the interest of the country. Therefore they took the second option i.e. to discard all the previous conflicts and disagreements and start to work together to unify the country as this, of course, the only way to encounter all the contemporary challenges. For this reason, the reconciliation was the first step to realize the unity of the country but since this reconciliation would include some people whose loyalty to the country was suspected, it had to be conditioned and based on serious and rigid principles. Hence the principles for the reconciliation were as follows:36
1. The acceptance of unity should be the prerequisite for any negotiation between the parties and protecting it from any conspiracies whether from inside or outside the country should be a major principle.
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2. The leadership of the country should be by the current political authority which is elected by the public and all the others are mere citizens under the control of the authority.
3. The acceptance and believe in democracy and democratic negotiation will solve any problems or disagreement instead of opting for violence.
4. The main purpose of the reconciliation should not be to solve the personal problems between the two parties only. The major concern should be to achieve social justice and economic development for all the citizens in the country regardless of the political or regional allegiance.
Every society on the globe, however developed, has to encounter one form or another form of violence specially the violence of authorities against certain persons or groups in the society. Hence, Yemeni society also suffers from this type of violence as there are thousands of homeless and unemployed people. Moreover, there are a lot of people who are illiterate and are unable to have access to education. Some people also suffer due to the capture and tyranny of some government officials. One of the important official reports indicated that even the basic human rights of prisoners were violated. And worse than that many innocent people were imprisoned (without any charges or legal proof of their guilt) by orders from certain diplomatic figures who had influence in the authority. There were also some prominent and important figures that were conservative about the policy used by the authority at that time, but they were abandoned by the government and some of them expelled and exiled. There were also some groups of educated people who tried to stop the mental and verbal persecution imposed on them by certain decision makers in the authority. Lots of people were unable to get any jobs that help them earn a living because all the employments in the public sector are given to certain people whose relatives are in the authority or those who belong to certain political party that supports the authority.
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In addition to what is mentioned above, there are also many other forms of violence and terror acts practiced by certain military or tribal leaders against public such as defrauding some citizens of their properties by issuing illegal documents or changing the results of the elections for the advantage of certain candidates or parties or by using the verbal violence against some people or groups because of political reasons. All these types of violence can be included in the domain of the violence of the authority and imposed periodically on the citizens and often leads to the dissatisfaction of the public with the authority.37
Due to political instability the people suffer economically and educationally. When government is busy in power and handling insurgency, it can not pay attention to socio-economic problems.
The Organized Terrorism:
This refers to the pre-organized violence and it usually has certain motives and objectives. This type of violence in Yemen appeared in the form of kidnapping and explosions.
Kidnapping in Yemen:
Kidnapping in Yemen began in 1991. And this phenomenon increased year after year. However, this increase was more noticeable during the years (1996, 1997, and 1998) and according to the official records the number of people kidnapped till today is about 116 and most of them were foreigners mostly Europeans and Americans. Some of them were experts working with certain economic and social institutions and the others were mere tourists.38 Most of these kidnapping activities did not target the kidnapped persons or the countries to which they belong to except in one case which occurred on the 18th December, 1998, when four British tourists were killed out of sixteen who were
94 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula kidnapped in Abyan city by an Islamic group of fundamentalists called Aden- Abyan Army. It was believed that this Islamic Group received political and financial support from abroad mostly the Islamic organization at the British capital London, which is headed by Abi Hamzah Almasri.39 It seems that this action was completely different from all the earlier actions in regard to its motives and the persons who executed it. On the other hand, the Yemeni government accused some of the socialist leaders who fled to the neighboring countries of being responsible for planning, supporting and funding those terror acts in Yemen through certain tribes in Yemen such as Babi Jabr tribe in Khawlan, Alhadaa tribe in Dhamar and Tuayman tribe in Marib.40 It was believed that the some neighboring countries particularly Saudia Arabia also supported those terror acts in Yemen especially after the disruption of its diplomatic relations with Yemen during the civil war of 1994, which was against those separatists who tried to divide the country.41
Kidnapping of foreign tourists by tribes was an ongoing problem in Yemen as late as early 2006. In many instances, the kidnappers attempted to use hostage taking to gain political leverage in negotiations with the government. One victim of kidnapping was former German Secretary of State Jorgen Chrobogs a man who himself had conducted negotiations with kidnappers while in office.42
However, some of the opposition parties accused the ruling authority for being tolerant with those who executed all the destructive operations trying to conceal the real reasons for the economic crisis and for their failure to lead the country towards progress. It seems that the real motives for such practices were economic and mostly political and serves certain bodies inside and outside the county which have certain motives in sharing the authority.43
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The Phenomenon of Terror Blasts in Yemen:
Among other forms of violence, blasts or explosions are considered the most dangerous to the security and the stability of the country. The sources and the reasons for these blasts can be internal or external, political or nonpolitical. It occurs in form of terror attacks with explosives and bombs and targeted at some of the economic projects of the country as well as some of the economic and military institutions of some foreign countries such as France and USA. The terror attacks began at the end of 1998 44 when some American soldiers were attacked with bombs and with some other dangerous weapons at Aden airport and in some nearby hotels.45 This was followed by a more dangerous terror attack against the American warship destroyer USS Cole (October 2000) at Aden port. The explosion came from a remotely controlled missile on a small boat in the harbor.
This attack perplexed the Yemeni authorities and threatened the American existence in Yemen. About 17 American soldiers were killed and 28 were seriously injured in this attack.
In March 2002, a Yemeni man threw a stun grenade into the grounds a day after the US Vice-President, Dick Cheney, made a stop for talks with officials at Sana'a airport. The attacker, who reportedly wanted to retaliate against what he saw as American bias towards Israel, was jailed for 10 years, though his sentence was later reduced to seven. In March 2003, two people were fatally shot and dozens more injured when police clashed with demonstrators trying to storm the embassy as tens of thousands rallied against the US-led invasion of Iraq.
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Similar terror attack took place in Almokala sea Port in Hadramout at the beginning of October 2002 when huge French tanker carrying oil was attacked and a great part of it was destroyed46 because of the fire ignited on the board. Meanwhile, several terror attacks by hand grenades took place against the American Embassy and British Embassy in Sana’a.47
In March 2008, three mortar rounds targeting the embassy hit a high school for girls next door. A Yemeni security guard was killed and more than a dozen girls were wounded. In 2006, a gunman opened fire outside the embassy and was shot and arrested by Yemeni guards.
Local television networks in Yemen have reported that one of the embassy buildings had caught fire after a car bomb exploded on September 2008 at the gates to the compound. Other blasts happened shortly afterwards, followed by gunfire lasting around 10 minutes.48
The Yemeni government reports have indicated that Al-Qaeda organization was responsible for the first two attacks Aden and Almokala. It was stated that such terror acts were executed by certain important members of Al- Qaeda organization such as (Ali Alharithy) who was killed together with five of his companions during a sudden air attack by a US craft. This sudden attack put Yemeni government in a highly critical position in front of the mass media in Yemen as well as in the Arab World especially when the security authorities was unable to present a clear description for this US attack.49 They were also unable to counter such American acts.
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Figure 3. Yemen: places of violence, Oil fields and Pipeline, source
http://cominganarchy.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/yemen4.jpg
As regard to the reasons for the above mentioned revengeful attacks (though it is called terrorism)50, this can be concluded as follows: firstly, it is a conflict against the US existence in the Arabian Peninsula, secondly, it is considered as a reaction to the American aggressive policy against Islam and Muslims. The last reason is the objection to the American support for Israeli terrorism practiced against Palestinians and Arab nation. 51 According to the Yemeni leadership, all these terror acts were considered as a form of terrorism and, therefore, the confrontation of the same is a legal issue.52
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Social Violence as a Phenomenon of Revenge
Revenge phenomenon has seriously affected the security and stability of Yemen. Some security resources have stated that most of the assassinations and killings emerged because of the revengeful acts among some tribal families or between one tribe and another. These revengeful acts are common in the main cities mostly in Sana’a city. Many innocent civilians were victims of such revengeful acts.53 Moreover, the confrontations among some tribes led to real civil wars that spread all over the country.
3.2.3. EXISTENCE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM
The phenomenon of religious extremism in Yemen is one of the forms of social violence, and was originally used as a means of bringing the ideas held by the extremists. 54 Ideological differences among various clans of Shiite and Sunni Muslims are used for the purposes of religious extremism and political unrest.55 Many violent incidences occur with a range of violence, and charging persons to leave Islam.56 The highlight of the embodied nature of religious extremism after violent Yemen recent war (1994) is noticeable when in South Yemen the militant group captured a school of thought (Salafi) to destroy some of the shrines and tombs of some parents. That time some Shiite groups got involved which resulted in the violent clashes between different religious groups and then evolved into a limited confrontation with the police. Many were left dead in those calashes including some policemen. Religious extremists and militants many times attacked in weddings ceremonies in the governorate of Aden, which further caused armed clashes between them and the police. That time also many policemen were killed.57
Similar events aimed at foreign (US- European) tourist where many lost their lives in Yemeni province of Abyan in late 1998. Sporadic violence occurred
99 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula to control mosques and religious forums in different locations. And virtual reality is that the religious factor has played a role in these events. To the extent that one of the main religious parties considers the southern regions as war house.58
Security checks revealed that most of the elements involved in the violence of religious groups that are fighting in Afghanistan was returned to Yemen after unification (1990), who included a number of Afghan Arabs, Egyptians and Algerians were handed over to Egyptian authorities in the majority and the rest left the territory with Some Yemenis and returned to Afghanistan and have been linked to Al-Qaeda. Yemenis are involved in war of Afghanistan, recently some Yemenis were arrested in Afghanistan following the US-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.59
The implication of violence and terrorism
Republic of Yemen has suffered a lot due to the increasing violence of terrorism and terrorist operations that come at the expense of the national economy and overall development of the nation. It has resulted to as many as the hundreds of casualties of convoys of martyrs of the armed forces and security finest sons and heroes as well as loss of property and equipment worth tens of billions of riyals. It also bring losses in the tourism sector, which has been growing steadily and beneficial to the public treasury of the state and members of the community, but after the terrorist attacks that targeted foreign tourists. Since then, the tourism sector was paralyzed and tourists stopped almost completely and deprived the treasury of the state of a main earner in the arteries of the national economy. The investment sector in Yemen is also affected by the terrorist, both foreign investment or domestic investment, investors looking for safe and stable environments to ensure the safety of their investments and their money, which lacks the Yemen, unfortunately because of the terrorist acts that
100 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula has occurred in Yemen, which make the Arab and foreign investors are reluctant to invest in Yemen. Yemen has lost large amounts of capital that could have been brought to Yemen for the rehabilitation of economic life and provide tens of thousands of jobs, but the hardest of this is that some foreign investors began pulling their investments from Yemen. Today, the local investors began to think about investing their money out of Yemen because of the deteriorating security situation caused by the terrorists in same the governorates with killings, assassinations, and interruptions by terrorist groups that do not want to Yemen, security, stability and wellbeing.60
3.2.4. LAW AND ORDER
A major challenge to security is the incompleteness of government control over the entire territory and its inability to enforce the rule, law and order. This is mainly because of tribal rule as the tribes consider themselves not under the control of the central authority. Also, some tribe leaders have immunity from the law, which contributes to lawlessness among social groups, and this is evident in clashes between citizens and security forces and in illegal seizures of property. For example, some tribe leaders, who operate outside the rule of law have the common practice of holding people in private jails while they await tribal judgment. Apart from this, the weakness of the rule of law has resulted in a lack of investor confidence to invest in Yemen and many projects have been halted because of the absence of security and powerlessness of the judicial system.
Moreover, the limited government control on the borders has resulted in a serious smuggling problem that has affected the country’s economy. For example some government-subsidized goods, particularly gasoline and grains, are smuggled to neighbouring countries. At the same time, consumer goods and drugs are smuggled easily into Yemen and as a result the government suffers a
101 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula loss in customs revenues and unfair competition has been created with locally produced goods.61
Along with this, weak borders allow many Somali immigrants to come to Yemen for green pasture. Yemen has historically enjoyed good relations with Somalia, its neighbour to the south and fellow Arab League member. Following the civil war in Somalia, Yemen has maintained a vast network of refugee camps where it accepts thousands of asylum seekers, in addition upto a million Somali nationals already living and working in Yemen. Ethnic Somalis for the most part blend in well with Yemeni society, as they share centuries of close Islamic, migratory and Arab origin. Non-ethnic Somalis such as the Bantus face the greatest hardship, as they are shunned by both Yemeni and Somali society. The World Refugee Survey 2008, published by the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, estimates that 110,600 Somali refugees and asylum seekers lived in Yemen in 2007.62
The phenomenon of Immigration of Somalis and return of thousands of Yemenis in Yemen during last 15 years is the third important part responsible for weakening law and order. These people live in urban areas and contribute for many violent acts, unemployment and poverty.
3.3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC SECURITY CHALLENGES
Yemen has been through several economic crises since unification in 1990. The most important was the Gulf War in 1990, which occurred after less than three months of Yemen unity. At that time Yemen was the only Arab country on the UN Security Council supporting neutrality and advocacy of a non- military Arab Diplomatic solution. Yemen naturally was against any foreign military intervention in the region which was seen as de facto support for Sadam Hussein.63 As a result Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf States cut off their substantial financial assistance to Yemen, including a US $300 million aid 102 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula package from Saudia Arabia and Kuwait alone. The US government reduced its assistance programme from US $42 million a year to US $3 million. Moreover two million Yemeni workers were expelled from Saudia Arabia and the Gulf. Workers’ remittances had declined steadily from a high of nearly US $2 billion annually in the late 1970s and early 1980s to US $300 million in the early 1990s.64 This seriously harmed the Yemen economy and abetted in one way or another to increase the political struggle that led to civil war in 1994. The second major event was the civil war in 1994 that continued for two months. These two major events, along with Yemen’s official foreign debt that was estimated at close to $10 billion in 1995, were responsible to intensify the economic crisis in Yemen and forced the government to make a desperate request for aid from the World Bank and International Monitory Funds (IMF). Because of this, in December 1995, a package of reforms and measures was agreed by the government and the international institutions. Even after economic reforms the dependency of economy on oil revenue is not reduced. Stagnant poverty and educational backwardness need more attention by government but the lack of funds is forcing the government to foreign aid which means more dependency on other countries.
The Reasons and Factors of the Economic Crises in Yemen
The Yemen economic suffers a lot of continues crises since long time and can be described as deep-seated crises. These deficiencies divided to three groups describes as follows [7]: a) Yemen Economic Structural Problem. The Yemen Economic Structural has some deficiencies because of weakness of the main construction and depending on the external support more than on the national indigenous production.
103 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula b) The Economic problem of due to Gulf war of 1990. This created many problems for the Yemen's economic. Especially when the most external supports have been stopped and two million workers return to the country. This added to the unemployment. c) Other resultant Factors and reasons as: 1- Effect of civil war on resulted in social institutions, financial organization, other civil and military organisation. 2- Decreased production agricultural and industrial sectors, which is considered as the backbone of the domestic economic infrastructure. 3- Reduced domestic product (agricultural and industrial) further resulted with unemployment of labour in these sectors. 4- Limited suitable lands for agriculture further is being corroding because of the desertification and different challenges of environment and also because of extended in Qat agriculture against other primarily crops, which give the good value for the domestic product for instance Coffee and some other fruits. 5- Insufficient and decreased water resources (Groundwater and seasonal Rainwater) are badly affecting the related production. 6- The traditional methods, which have been used in agriculture and limited scientific researches in this area, also limited agricultural product, and unavailability of modern agricultural technologies techniques, biotechnology and new machines restructed the agree production. 7- The industrial sector suffered badly and it blocked the implementation of the high level of development and also minimizing of important of the domestic economic. These may be because of many factors as: this is because of many factors which are as follows: I) Lack of industrial infrastructure II) Lack of basic industries III) Lack of technology and engineering IV) Lack of quality control
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V) Lack of strict tolerance VI) Lack of standard
Failure of investment sector The economists in Yemen rely on the national and international investments to improve the economic situations in the country and exalting the development level of the people but unfortunately the sector faced some difficulties as: lack of administrative body that has knowledge to support the investors and lack of independence judicial body that has knowledge of modern treatment and has ability to protect investors, in addition to drop off a local purchasing value which not include part from investors products. The more critical problem of the basic rule of most important factor of guarantee investment, which is supposed to provide the prosperity, stability and security, could not provide the same.
DEPENDENCY ON OIL REVENUE The issue of oil in Yemen began in 1938, with the exploration processes in Hadramout city and Maharah city in the eastern part of the country. The beginning of the 60s saw some geological and geophysical projects being executed in various stages. Furthermore, additional oil wells have been built in various locations along the Red Sea coast in the areas of Salif, Hodeidah & Zaydiah. However, no oil was discovered in these areas. The story of oil in Yemen has unfolded in different stages along the ages.
Following the revolution of 26th September, 1962 in the Northern part of Yemen, and the independence of South Yemen in 1967, Algeria offered to explore oil in these two territories of Yemen between 1968 and 1969; and received consent from the governments of these two parts. However, after three years of hard work, the Algerian company failed to detect any oil within the
105 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula southern or the northern parts. The main reason for this failure was the lack of appropriate technology and technical expertise in the field.65
In 1970, two British companies decided to make another attempt to explore for oil in Yemen for a couple of years, but they were also unable to discover any oil in the area. These same companies returned in 1980 to dig for oil at one of the islands off the Red Sea coast, but soon gave up, as the quantities that they managed to discover there, were not encouraging. This led to the Yemeni government contacting some international oil exploration companies for the purpose. They, however, discovered that any exploring for oil in Yemen had been banned by order from Saudia Arabia under threat of boycott and deprivation of all privileges related to the Saudia oil. Moreover, they would also be forbidden from participating in any projects concerned with Saudia oil, whether exploring, marketing, selling or purchasing. All the prominent international oil companies succumb to this order from Saudia Arabia. Such was the status of oil exploration in the area till 1985. All oil exploring companies that came to Yemen during this period were afraid of the Saudia threat so they refused all offers to explore oil from the Yemeni government.66
Prior to that, the Yemeni government had tried to put an end to this Saudia restriction on the international oil exploring companies. They tried to tempt some French Oil companies during the rule of De Gaulle to come and explore oil in Yemen instead of the British companies and offered them better terms and conditions. But unfortunately, even the French were not ready to anger Saudia Arabia, for fear of affecting diplomatic relations between the two nations. Thus, all offers for oil exploration in Yemen were refused by France on account of their vested interests in Saudia Arabia. In 1992, The French exploring companies finally agreed to start exploring for oil in Yemen. However, as soon as they started the exploration process, the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia warned them to cease working in the area, claiming that the land belonged to them. This, of
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course was not true, as in reality, the land in question was in dispute between Yemen and Saudia Arabia over its ownership. In 1984, an American exploring company was given the privilege to explore for oil in Al-Jawf city, in the north and in Marib, in the east of Yemen. Three oil wells were dug, out of which, oil was discovered in the first two wells only. The third well was found to be dry.
Another American oil company came to explore for oil in the same area. Subsequent findings suggested that large untapped reserves of oil and gas were present in Marib and Al-Jawf fields, and further on in the western Mosaylah field, which was explored by a Canadian company. It has been mentioned in the history of Arabia, that the Marib region is full of salt deposits. And geological studies state that such salt structures indicate the presence of oil deposits in the area.67
Gradually, the production of oil in Yemen increased and Yemen started exporting oil in December 1993. Different International oil companies from America, Kuwait and Russia began to cooperate with some Yemeni companies also in other sectors.
More Oil has been discovered in Yemen and the American interests in Yemen increased, and Yemen began to be more and more dependent on American companies. This was the beginning for American vested interests in Yemen. Meanwhile in Southern Yemen, two American companies in collaboration with some Korean companies explored and discovered oil in the area. Those explorations were of great political and economic importance to the western countries. This importance is due to the following:68
The fear of extension of the Iraq-Iran war into the neighboring Gulf countries, as this could affect the flow of oil in the Gulf area.
Minimizing the Iranian exports of oil due to the policy of the Iranian authorities which supported the western countries.
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The existence of Soviet weapons in the Northern part of Yemen that threatened the American influence in the area.
The existence of some Yemeni forces allied to then Soviet Union on the Southern borders of North Yemen.
The consideration of North Yemen as neutral territory between that part of South Yemen that is allied to Soviet and the American interests in Saudia Arabia.
This strengthened the relationship between Saudia Arabia and USA.
With the advent of 1993, America and the other western nations no longer had interests in Yemen, and consequently, income of Yemen from oil became unstable. In 1997, the production of Yemeni oil was dependent on:69
- Marib fields being explored by American companies
- Al-Mosaylah fields being explored by a Canadian company.
- East of Shabuah fields being explored by a French company.
- Jannah Fields, being explored by various companies.
In South Yemen, the oil had a different story. Various exploration companies have been employed to explore for oil in the area since 1945. The first exploration works started before independence in Hadramout and Maharah. Later, on an American company started the process of exploration but could not discover any oil. After independence another Algerian company was employed. This company continued for two years but could not find any oil either. After that some Soviet company began explorations in different areas. The last area was the area of oil in Shabuah. Oil was found in the fields of Ayad. An Italian company gained permission later and worked in certain areas like Hadramout and Maharah. They could discover oil in Shormah well in 1983. This was followed by the exploration by another Russian company. This company extended oil pipes from Shabuah to the Red Sea coast. They dug two other wells called Eyad 1 and Eyad 2. Some other companies have done explorations in Jottah field. This 108 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula area was located in the division between South Yemen and North Yemen before the unity. 70
The oil from east of Shabuah was exported through Dhabbah seaport on the Arabian Sea, whereas oil from the other areas was exported through Raas Eissa seaport on the Red Sea. In all, there were three ports for exporting Yemeni oil - two on the Arabian Sea and one on the Red Sea.71
Aden city has owned its own oil refinery plant since the British colony in the 1950s. Half of the oil of the peninsula used to be refined in Aden. The activities of this refinery have deteriorated gradually since the closure of Suez Canal for the first time in 1956, and for the second time in 1967 and became worse after the British withdrawal from Aden after the independence of South Yemen. However, it is expected that this refinery plant will regain its importance in the future with the increasing production of oil in Yemen.72
At present, the Aden refinery is used to refine the oil, which is consumed locally. Some other companies working in Southeast Asia also get their oil refined in Aden. It is expected that this refinery will develop especially after the exports of Yemeni oil to more Asian countries increases. As far as gas is concerned, it was discovered in big quantities in Yemen in the mid 90’s. Yemen is now considered as one of the major four countries in the area that produces gas in large quantities. The other countries are Qatar, Emirates and Oman. And before the signing of the Borders Treaty between Yemen and Saudia Arabia, there were two other wells located in the region divided the two countries. The ownership for this area did not belong to either of the two. However, Yemen was more active in the exploration processes in the area and most of the companies were given the right for the exploration after the Unity of Yemen in 1990.73
Recently the Yemeni government has faced a crisis for the first time in crude oil exploration and production operations of sector 18 in Maarib city.
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Engineers and managers in the sector affirmed that drilling, exploration and production operations have stopped in Maarib as the government-owned Safir Company, which took over the sector from Yemen Hunt Oil Company, is lacking legal and operational requirements necessary for routine operations.
This is the first time ever that drilling operations stopped in this sector without any technical or security impediment. Safir Company, which was recently established by the Yemeni government, had said earlier that it was ready to fully resume work in the sector without problems. However, this readiness was denied by engineers on the ground and other workers who have indicated some problems with operations.74
Meanwhile, a new press statement has been issued by the American Hunt Oil Company noting that it has decided to refer to an international tribunal to sue the Yemeni government in an effort to “protect the company’s rights”, which were allegedly confiscated by the Yemeni regime. The Yemeni government is accused of not honoring an agreement signed on January 4, 2004. The agreement was supposed to be effective on November 15, 2005 and would have lasted for five years. However, the Yemeni government cancelled the contract with the American company after the Yemeni parliament rejected and nullified the agreement, which apparently was signed without the prior approval of the parliament.75
Hunt Company was the first to produce Yemeni oil in commercial quantities more than 21 years ago. This is the first time in more than 70 years that Hunt Oil Company filed a lawsuit against a government, a source at the company said. The owner of the company said he regretted having to take Yemen’s government to court but emphasized his pride in his work and history in Yemen.76
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Hunt filed arbitration with the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. The company continues to produce oil in a separate area of Yemen. “The company has spent millions of US dollars since 2004 upon signing the agreement based on the request of the Yemeni government” Hunt said, adding "Unfortunately, Hunt Company is now forced to respond to the Yemen government's failure to honor the sanctity of our legal contract by filing this arbitration," Ray L. Hunt, chief executive of Hunt Oil, said in a statement. The position of Hunt was supported by Sarah Tays, a spokeswoman for Exxon Mobil. She told the New York Times in a phone conversation from Austin, Texas, that "Exxon Mobil supports the position of Hunt Oil as the operator of Block 18." Hunt’a general counsel Dennis Grindinger had told an American newspaper that Yemen didn't give the company a reason for retracting the contract, though countries have the prerogative to do so. 77
Since 2004, the company “has invested millions of dollars at the direction of the Yemeni government," said Michael Goldberg, a partner in the Houston law firm of Baker Botts, which is representing the venture. "Up until November 15, 2004, we fully expected that they would honor the contract. The government of Yemen had no right to take over this operation, and although we did not want to file arbitration, they gave us no choice." Mr. Grindinger said Yemen invited Hunt to begin negotiating an extension to the original 20-year deal in 2003 before it signed the agreement in 2004.
Since 1984, contribution of oil revenue in steadily increased the national income. Today, the oil sector is an important contributor of economic sectors and tributary of the development process in Yemen, as it offers the financial resources of the State's general budget each year. The fact is that oil revenue is the primary source of financing the public expenditure. During the year 2008, oil revenue contributed to 76 per cent of the total general revenue of the State, and 111 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula
90 per cent of total commodity exports, and 30 per cent of gross domestic product. It is clear that Yemeni economy is depended more on oil. Therefore, there are high chances of economic and political instability due to insurgencies affecting oil production or lower international price of oil. Since one of the key strategic objectives in the field of oil is the constant balance between production and reserves, but it is hard to get this balance due to internal insurgencies.
Negotiations in oil productions involve foreign countries vested political interests. It invites interference in country’s internal affairs mainly because of Yemeni government’s thrust of increasing oil revenue. Many political burdens come over security of Yemen due to high dependency of Yemeni economy on oil income. Due to this, government can not pay attention to other fields of economic development or if economic development is highly depended on oil income, disturbances to oil income adversely affect the process of economic development. Other economic sectors like agriculture sector, development of water resource, higher education, Technical Universities and related research and development, trade of non-oil products, fishery and seafood sector have been considered as potential to develop employment and economy.
In agriculture sector, Yemen is taking good production Millet, Coffee, Oranges, and Bananas and exporting it internationally. Same time seafood production and export has high potential for development.
Yemen is historically well-known country and many historical monuments and natural sites are attracting foreign tourists in Yemen. Tourist industry has also high potential to be developed if government pays attention to it. Better communication, transportation and safety of tourist are governing factor in the promotion of tourism.
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3.3.1. POVERTY
Yemen is not only a poor country but also it is the first in the world as regards the rate of increase in population. It is a fact that the population explosion in Yemen is the main cause of the problem of funding education in our country. If the situation remains as it is, education, health and housing will not be the only victims but also the whole Yemeni people will suffer from more poverty year after year. The Yemen Poverty Assessment published towards the end of 2007 concludes that, although overall poverty is declining, the rate of change and its characteristics are far behind the requirements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). There has been virtually no improvement in rural areas since 1998 (the baseline year for Yemen); indeed in 3 out of 7 rural provinces poverty has significantly increased. The Assessment observes that the country’s oil-based economy benefits only urban elite whilst 75 per cent of the population lives in rural areas.78
This conclusion is reinforced by figures, which show that the proportion of the population below the $1 per day MDG benchmark for extreme poverty has increased rather than reduced – from 10.7 per cent in 1998 to 15.7 per cent in 2005. Over 40 per cent of the rural population remains below the higher non- food poverty line.79
Poverty is linked to Yemen’s high adult illiteracy rate of 45 per cent which in turn stems from the fact that 46 per cent of primary age children are not in school. Furthermore, this average figure conceals the vastly lower enrolment rate for girls, which sinks to 30 per cent in rural areas. In an effort to reverse this trend, the Ministry of Education announced its decision to waive primary school tuition fees for female students. The Goal of education for all by 2015 is the only MDG predicted to be achieved in Yemen. The country was in the midst of its own food crisis before global food prices became headline news. Almost 13 per cent of Yemenis exist below the food poverty line and the World Food 113 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula
Programme (WFP) is actively assisting 1.6 million people. At present, 46 per cent of children under-five are underweight compared with 30 per cent in 1992. 80
The source of the problem is linked to decline in Yemen’s grain production brought about by inadequate attention to environmental sustainability, in particular depletion of groundwater and degradation of soil resources in a region highly prone to desertification. An investigation by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) warns that water basins may be depleted “in the very near future” unless Yemen introduces painful measures to divide both agricultural water consumption and the wastage in urban use. Furthermore, farmers have reported unusual delays in the onset of rains, a reminder that potential climate change creates additional uncertainty. Food security in Yemen is also seriously undermined by the use of good land for the cultivation of Qat (a mild narcotic with amphetamine-like properties) which by contrast to grain production is increasing at over 10 per cent per annum and relies on traditional inefficient groundwater irrigation.
The consequence is that Yemen imports as much as 75 per cent of its food requirements from other countries like India and China. …etc. Although protected by the parallel rise in the value of oil exports, the country is vulnerable to shortages in world stocks and its poorest households may have no mechanism to cope with astronomical prices. The WFP says that higher prices have already forced 6 per cent of the population below the poverty line. In the longer term, economic vulnerability caused by the food deficit will rise as Yemen’s hydrocarbon reserves continue to diminish.
Using more water for Qat production forced Yemen to import food from abroad though Yemen can produce more food items internally. Government can not take any action against Qat production because of many rich elites are involved in this sector. Any action again invites violence and political
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insurgency. Due to lack of food production prices of food items are skies rocking keeping many people below poverty line in Yemen.
Based on the causes and factors that determine the probability of falling into poverty, and the results of the surveys and studies that undertaken during the last two years, three major sets of factors abet to poverty in Yemen , which are as the follows: a. Decline in income and its association with the nature and extent in economic growth. b. High population growth and the poor development resources and infrastructure. c. Weak level of social protection.
The government of Yemen has set for itself, as part of its commitment with the international community and partners of development, a number of goals as reflected in the Second Five Years Plan (SFYP) and the Strategic Vision 2025. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) targets reduction of poverty by 13.1 per cent during the period 2003-2005, but nothing could achieve.
This may be achievable through appropriate economic growth that will lead to increasing real (GDP) by about 4.7 per cent, depending on the growth of the non-oil sectors by an annual average rate of 6.3 per cent to ensure increases in Gross Domestic Product.(GDP) per capita and improvement in the living standard.81
This growth is expected to keep pace with effects of the population policies that seek to reduce the annual population growth rate to 3 per cent by 2005. The strategy also seeks to achieve a number of sectoral objectives leading to overall poverty reduction. The Yemeni government and its partners in development recognize that poverty reflects more than just the insufficiency of
115 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula income or provision of the basic needs of the population. Rather, it also shows facing suffering and lack of capacity to express opinions as well as lack of representation, capacity build-up and improvement. Poverty reduction policies are distinguished by the fact that they proceed coincidentally within a broad consistent and harmonious front and take in the order of priorities for intervention and the urgent measures in the middle period (2003-2005) and also take into consideration the long-term period of the strategic vision.82
The PRSP based on the direction of the second five years plan (SFYP) with regard to the priorities with special focus towards poverty reduction efforts. Public expenditures during three years of the PRSP were prepared under the macro economic framework of the strategy that strives to achieve high and increasing economic growth rates within a sustainable fiscal policy in the medium and long terms and in the light of estimated external financing and the absorptive capacity of the economy.
In May 2006 the World Bank adopted an assistance strategy for Yemen under which it will provide approximately US$400 million in International Development Association (IDA) credits over the period FY 2006 to FY 2009. In November 2006, Yemen’s development partners pledged a total of US$5 billion in grants and concessional loans for the period 2007–10 to finance projects outlined in Yemen’s five-year (2006–10) Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (DPPR). Recognizing that the country’s oil reserves are rapidly depleting, the DPPR focuses on the development of the country’s non-oil resources: natural gas, agriculture, fisheries, trans-shipment, and tourism. The Yemen Consultative Group announced that as of December 2007, 70 per cent of the funds pledged (increased to US$5.3 billion) had been allocated. However, several attendees raised concerns about Yemen’s lack of economic expansion, high population growth, and inability to contain security threats, all of which 116 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula threaten to diminish the efficacy of international financial support. Yemen remains one of the poorest of the world’s low-income countries; more than 45 per cent of the population lives in poverty.
3.3.2. WATER AND FOOD SCARCITY
The water crisis in Yemen back to 1970 the process of economic and social development faces a great challenge, i.e. scarce water resources and increasing consumption of underground water reserves. This exacerbates the water shortage year after year. Yemen suffers an imbalance between annual rainfall on one hand and water demand on the other. Average renewable water resources are 125 cubic meters(m3) per capita, approximately 10 per cent of the amount consumed by a Middle Easterner or North African, who use an average of 1,250 cubic meters each, and only 2 per cent of per capita usage internationally, which is 7,500 cubic meters. These indicators place Yemen among the 10 water-poorest countries in the world.
The water volume in Yemen or what is called in economic jargon as the total offer of renewable water, is about 5.1 billion cubic meters. Rainwater is the country’s main source, comprising 93 per cent of the current total water resources, while surface water, ground water and unconventional source waters (seawater distillation, reuse of sewer water, etc.) represent 4.86 per cent, 2.08 per cent, and 00.01 per cent of overall water resources respectively.
Nationwide, about 60 per cent of urban households are estimated to be connected to main supply - but often that supply is inadequate. In Sana'a, the public utility, Government Water, supplies only 36 per cent of households: two thirds of the water consumed in Sana'a does not come from a safe public supply, and much comes from shallow wells in contaminated groundwater beneath the city. The urban poor are faced with higher costs. The National Water and Sanitation Authority (NWSA) supply is cheap - as little as riyal 20/m3 (13US
117 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula cents), but poor people usually have to buy their water from private vendors at very much higher prices - riyal 50- 200/m3 (35-140 US cents). As a result, the costs for the poor are much higher and the quantity purchased is very much lower. In Sana'a, for example, those buying from the private sector exclusively (including most of the poor) consume only 28 liters per day, against 80 liters per day for those connected to the NWSA system. In addition, private supply is unregulated and often contaminated; being pumped from the shallow aquifer.
The negative impact of inadequate water supplies on the poor is even more marked in rural areas, where 81 per cent of the population and most of the poor live. Only about 20 per cent of rural households (49 per cent) have access to safe water, compared to the average for the Middle East and North Africa Region of 82 per cent. Access to safe sanitation is limited to 19 per cent of households. Government programs for rural water supply have concentrated on the area around the capital to the neglect of the poorer, further-flung areas. Sanitation has been largely neglected, with consequent environmental and health problems.83
The total water demand is increasing rapidly, from 4.5 billion cubic meters in 1990 to an estimated 13 billion cubic meters in 2020. The current demand for water seems to be limited to three main areas: agriculture (95 per cent), households (3.2 per cent) and industries (1.8 per cent).
Taking into consideration the volume of available water resources along with that expected to be consumed by 2020, water shortage is expected to reach 15 billion cubic meters in 2020, assuming that the country continues to produce basics such as grains, vegetables and fruits to maintain the food demands of its ever-increasing population.
The water problem is getting worse due to pollution resulting from human activity which negatively impacts water quality and may shrink the volume of available water resources. There is a possibility for increased untreated sewer
118 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula water to make its way down to the water-bearing layer. The problem is going to exacerbate in the future, given the quick-paced population growth coupled with overuse of existing water resources, not to mention the sustained pollution and growing demand for fresh water.
Water pollution primarily affects the health and well-being of a large number of women, men and children, especially the poor and marginalized who are more vulnerable than others. They are mainly herders and small farmers whose livelihood depends fundamentally on water. Similarly, considering the increasing population, the shortage and low quality and quantity of water affect the poor urban centers where it is difficult to find any source of water.
Water security is a pillar of national security of any country, particularly when such a country suffers a scarcity of water resources like Yemen. If country is full of basic natural resources, then it should not look to others help. The army marches on its belly. Suppose the oil income is dried and there is no income in hands of people to buy enough water, violence and rioting will break up to control water resources. This is happening in many places of Yemen creating threat to national security. The importance of water is not only limited to its use for drinking and irrigation to produce crops and food but it is equally important for sustainable development because water availability is inextricably linked to public health, unemployment, poverty, girl’s education and development in general. Therefore, water scarcity and competition for it may be a cause for economic and social instability, harming social peace and national security, especially in light of the fact that 53 per cent of Yemen’s workforce is employed in the agricultural sector.
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3.4. GOVERNMENT’S INADEQUATE EFFORTS TO SOLVE PROBLEM Consecutive (one after the other) Yemeni governments has adopted improper policies and measures for managing water affairs. Usually, centralized policy focused on cost management, which implies that the government provided fresh water at the lowest cost possible for households, agriculture and industry. It gave little attention to fair distribution, sustainability of water systems and quality of water.
The Yemeni government committed a mistake when it invested in the water sector. Estimates indicate that there are 1,459 water facilities (560 dams) with a storage capacity of 94 million cubic meters, with an average of 64.4 thousand cubic meters each. The cost of those facilities reached $113 million, an average of $1.20 per cubic meter, which is high by all means.
Qat, which covers some 40 per cent of the irrigated area, consumes 60 per cent of the usable water in Yemen, according to the figures of some experts. For example, the total volume of water used annually in Qat irrigation in Sana’a province surpasses 60 million cubic meters, around double the volume of water consumed by the city of Sana’a itself.
With Yemen’s freshwater being depleted, it is crucial to maintain water resources and optimize their use quantitatively and qualitatively. This could be achieved through Water Demand Management (WDM), which means the adoption of a package of measures in order to urge individuals to regulate the quantity and price of water, the way they access it and the way they dispose of it, thus, lessening pressure on freshwater reserves and ensuring water quality.
Water Demand Management (WDM) can be achieved through a number of measures and practices such as awareness campaigns, the use of technology, incentives and pricing, regulations and laws, etc. It is necessary that WDM adopt
120 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula a comprehensive view of water as an essential component of any good governance strategy, a crucial factor for environmental balance and biodiversity, and a vital element of public health. Water issues must be incorporated into school curricula and become a subject of scientific research and knowledge transfer activities.
The water crisis has implications for health, agriculture and other activities. Per capita drinking water consumption in Yemen is just 2 per cent of the global average - and sanitation in rural areas is almost entirely primitive. Malaria is a further threat to rural communities with over 800,000 cases reported annually.
Further, according to a recent UNICEF report, Yemen has the world's fourth fastest growing population, which will increasingly reduce each person's available share of fresh water. Experts in the government and from donor nations describe the problem as a looming national disaster.
"Sustainability is no longer attainable in over-exploited areas," states the government's five-year water plan for 2005-2009, adding that such areas represent most of the country.
The government predicts that as the crisis progresses, "increasing numbers of the population will acquire feelings of inequities in access to water, which will lead to growing social tensions". This growing social tension caused by scarcity of water may be seen as a threat to national security in coming years if permanent solutions are not found for water supply immediately. Sacristy of water leads to rioting and by force controlling of water resources, which keep poor people from accessing water. Due to this violence and armed clashes took place in Yemen.84
Observers in the field, meanwhile, argue that the government is moving far too slowly to solve the problem. Water experts explained that many of the plans to improve water efficiency that were introduced ten years ago had run out 121 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula of steam. Muhammad Salih Ali, chairman of a parliamentary water committee, who recently toured through eight water-critical governorates, agreed that more actions needed to be implemented immediately. “In my opinion, the problem will need more solutions,” he said, adding that none of the committee’s proposals had been implemented. According to news reports, armed clashes between the two sides forced many families to leave their homes and migrate. Recent News reports confirmed that authorities arrested 20 hostages from the two sides in an attempt to stop the fighting, which continues as of this writing.
This is not the first or only such clash to occur between Yemeni tribes or individuals due to water. The struggle takes many forms. For example, Qat farmers pay more to transport water to their farms, thereby preventing other community members from using water for other purposes.
This is exactly what happened in Dhamar governorate wherein citizens complained that some farmers transported water by water tankers from the governorate to other regions to water Qat farms, which directly affected the governorate’s water supply. Dhamar authorities later established outposts (road bases) to prevent the water tankers from going outside the governorate.
The struggle takes place even among government sector experts and technicians who demand reconsidering each sector’s water share. For example, agricultural sector experts, whose sector consumes around 90 per cent of annual water use, according to the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program 2005-2009 National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (NWSSIP), warn of constant pressures upon farmers.
According to the experts, such pressures reflect negatively on agricultural production, leading to economic and nurture problems. Since all groundwater around cities effectively is harnessed and overexploited for agricultural use, the
122 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula cost of new urban water supplies is likely to rise sharply, as water must be brought from further field and from greater depths.
Many main cities currently are experiencing unprecedented water shortage, particularly as Water Authorities are unable to keep pace with new housing and industrial developments. Water Supply of such Cities in basins is reducing dramatically.
For example, some families in Taiz city are allowed a water share only once every 10 days. However, this period has been extended to a month for water to reach houses. Therefore, city authorities negotiated 10 years with the nearby rural area of Habir before reaching an agreement in 2002. Taiz is allowed to extract water from a previously untapped deep aquifer in exchange for investments in the village’s water supply, schools and women’s centres, as well as joint monitoring of water extraction to ensure a sustainable flow.
Such struggle or competition is not strange in Yemen, wherein total annual renewable water resources are estimated at 2.4 billion cubic meters. Thus, with a population of around 21 million, this amounts to little more than 125 cubic meters per person annually, compared with the Middle East and North Africa average of 1.250 cubic meters per person.
According to World Bank reports, Yemen’s problem is more critical given that water resources are distributed unevenly and that 90 per cent of the population has less than 90 cubic meters of water annually for domestic use, which is 10 per cent below the worldwide norm. Reports estimate that only 44 per cent of the population has access to main water supplies and only 12 per cent to safe sanitation. Rest are badly affected due to shortage of water.
In general, all surface water resources – 60 per cent of Yemen’s renewable resources – already are being exploited beyond the level of renewal. This very rapid development has brought with it major problems. Groundwater is being 123 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula mined at such a rate that parts of the rural economy could dry up. Areas under greatest pressure are the central highlands, the western escarpment and coastal plains.
Yemen’s water crisis is not only creating economic problems, it is also opening the door to tribal clashes, as is happening nowadays. Therefore, it is important that the government create partnership between local communities and involved authorities. Community participation in choice of technology and selecting the level of service it can afford is a possible means to reducing costs and expanding coverage to a larger population. Such participation can be achieved through public awareness campaigns, clear and realistic priorities, and close partnership with water users.
3.4.1. EDUCATIONAL BACKWARDNESS A low level of education continues to plague development of the state; however, the number of students has greatly expanded in recent years. Primary education begins at age 6 and lasts for 6 years. Secondary education, beginning at age 12, lasts for another 6 years. As a proportion of the school-age population, the total enrolment at primary and secondary schools was 56 per cent (85 per cent males, 25 per cent females).
In 2004, attendance was 80 per cent for boys and 50 per cent for girls at the primary level. Attendance was 55 per cent for boys and 22 per cent girls at the secondary level. Literacy was 50 per cent overall, including 70 per cent of males, 30 per cent of female. Due to less literacy among female infant mortality rate was --76/1,000 live births. In the country, Life expectancy was 62 years.
The backwardness in education has religious roots since many religious clans are fighting over the syllabi of books. The tension between the government’s attempts to undermine traditional Zaydi authority, while at the same time seizing for itself the anti-sectarianism of the Wahhbi Islam are 124 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula continued to affect education system in Yemen. As before, references to Zaydi authority were subtle – encoded in historiography or occasional condemnations of the Imamate’s backwardness. Anti-sectarianism was a clearer current, especially in the language of unity – the ‘repudiation of division’ was seen as a religious duty. By 1996, we find that Islamic instruction had been consolidated into a single range of textbooks entitled Islamic Pedagogy, rather than the individual texts on tafs"r (Tafsir), f"qh and so forth – each with different authors – characteristic of the pre-Civil War period. The new range of books was the culmination of state efforts to impose an authoritative ‘official’ brand of Islam; a primary school Islamic Pedagogy textbook published in 1997, just after the GPC had re-assumed control of the Education Ministry, includes sections on the had"th, tawh"d, f"qh, and stories from the life of the Prophet Mohammad, presented in a clear and codified manner.
Accounting and commerce education have high importance in Yemen and it is demanded in present time. Its roots can be found in the early 1400s with the flourishing commercial activities of Florence and Venics. Accounting evolution hand in hand with commerce and business activities according to needs both business and societal activities.85
In Yemeni accounting curriculum, the necessary areas are financial accounting, management accounting, cost accounting, taxation and auditing. There are also specialist subjects in petroleum accounting, international accounting, hotels accounting, banking accounting and insurance companies accounting. Currently, some accounting departments in commerce colleges provide its students accountancy terminologies in English. The students also have been given subjects on the business and economy.86
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The Yemeni accounting education and practicing accountant found that practice outside the colleges had so many obstacles comprising educational, professional and other problems. The most important educational obstacles are the lack of relevant and effective accounting curricula, lack of sufficient qualified institutions and lack of the new accounting textbooks written are translated in Arabic language. Accounting education in Yemen is based on USA accounting, which cope with the developments and improvement that happened in USA during last decades. Education quality in Yemen still lack to modern syllabus.87
In addition, there is a negative influence of social and cultural factors on the professional accounting, which is an important barrier to the development of education and practice of accounting in Yemen, since the professional accounting in Yemen had not perceived to be an important and prestigious profession comparing with other professional groups such as doctors and lawyers. Yemen is suffering from several problems such as illiteracy, poverty, corruption, taxation evasion and smuggling- all these are security challenges. Inter tribal manner in governance and all other factors influenced negatively on the accounting education and related profession. The accounting function is very difficult and can not be applied in situation like Yemen had it.
Using technology in the education makes teachers keeping up with new developments. In Yemen, use of Information Technology in education is not at good rate. Lack of funds and lack of knowledge of English are main hurdles in using new technology in education.88
Educational backwardness is a crucial factor which has adverse effect on process of human development. Low human development itself is the big threat to national security because it increases country’s dependency on others countries.
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3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter generally, presented a review of the political and socio- economic factors that are directly related to security in Yemen. The challenges to the security of any society are numerous, including the challenges of violence and terrorism, which is organized and raised in Yemen since the recent civil war, the threats increased after the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States of America, which has stepped up its war against Islamic groups, particularly Al- Qaeda as Yemen had become one of the theaters of that conflict and war, the serious present problems and perhaps in future also.
The terrorist attacks take place against certain targets, the organization and foreign interests (the military-economic - political) on the security and stability of Yemen as well as the sovereignty and independence of the State. This invites foreign military interference in Yemen. We give an example of American violations of the sovereignty of Yemen, which were represented in the assassination of a number of citizens in the Yemeni province of Shabwa and a US aircraft, including the grounds that Al-Qaeda and the operation took place without the knowledge of Yemeni authorities on the sovereignty of Yemeni origin.
The phenomenon of kidnapping and violence against foreigners attracts media attention and makes local and foreign public opinion negative towards Yemen. It harms the reputation of Yemen and is a responsible factor that greatly damage image of Yemen. It also creates dire political and economic consequences. It shows that Yemen security infrastructure is not able to fight terrorism and to provide protection and security to tourism and domestic and foreign investors due to continue incidences of kidnapping, and violence against tourists.
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The phenomenon of violence and kidnappings in Yemen is a blow to one of the most important resources of the State, the reluctance of many of the tourists on tourism in Yemen, and some foreign countries have advised their nationals to leave Yemen and to refrain from travel.
State bore the financial burden to meet the great acts of terrorism by taking security measures and barriers and build a large military and security posts to monitor the activities of terrorist groups, specifically suspected of belonging to Al Qaeda, as well as mobilizing troops and security updates to guard against any terrorist. Similarly, the state faced economic problems, including cancellation of emergency contracts for investment and tourism due to violation of security and stability in the country. Yemen has consequent loss of thousands of work opportunities, as well as loss of millions of dollars. At the same time it reduced the proportion of cash transfers by Yemeni employees and experts from abroad. 89
The phenomenon of terrorism is reflected on the national security of Yemen. Current US presence becomes necessary within the borders of Yemen and in the Navy to monitor and prosecute suspected Al-Qaeda since Yemeni government attributed the responsibility of their presence to the elements and militant groups, which supports the terrorists. 90
Socio-economic challenges to security are severe in Yemen. The first is that high dependency of Yemeni economy on oil revenue. And the second is water scarcity. Water security is a pillar of national security of any country, particularly when such a country suffers a scarcity of water resources like Yemen. The importance of water is not only limited to its use for drinking and irrigation to produce crops and food but it is equally important for sustainable development because water availability is inextricably linked to public health,
128 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula unemployment, poverty, girl’s education and development in general. Therefore, water scarcity and competition for it may be a cause for economic and social instability, harming internal peace and national security, especially in light of the fact that 53 per cent of Yemen’s workforce is employed in the agricultural sector.
Qat, which covers some 40 per cent of the irrigated area, consumes 60 per cent of the usable water in Yemen, according to the figures of some experts. For example, the total volume of water used annually in Qat irrigation in Sana’a province surpasses 60 million cubic meters, around double the volume of water consumed by the city of Sana’a itself. Many influential people are heavily involved in agriculture – especially the farming of Qat In general, all surface water resources – 60 per cent of Yemen’s renewable resources – already are being exploited beyond the level of renewal. This very rapid development has brought with it major problems. Groundwater is being mined at such a rate that parts of the rural economy could dry up. Areas under greatest pressure are the central highlands, the western escarpment and coastal plains.
The depletion of water resources in some rural areas forced their inhabitants to emigrate to nearby cities or the capital, therefore, causing a bigger crisis in cities where there is over-demand on water, electricity, sanitation services, hospitals and schools.
The level of poverty in Yemen is high: in fact, poverty levels doubled between 1992 and 1998, with the proportion of households below the poverty line rising from 19 per cent to 33 per cent. A 1996 World Bank study showed that 81 per cent of all of Yemen’s poor and 83 per cent of the absolute poor lived in rural areas. In addition, the health care situation is inadequate with only 55 per cent of the population having access to health services. This could make many
129 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula people uninterested in democracy because they do not believe that democracy would help to improve their living standards. As David Held stresses, “where the lot of the masses is often that of acute hunger, or where disease runs rampant, the expectation of any genuine democracy among such masses is naive”.
The problem of educational backwardness is severe in Yemen. The majority of Yemenis are illiterate. It was estimated that the total of adult illiteracy is 47.3 per cent of the population (44 per cent male and 72 per cent female). A recent report released by the government-controlled Social Fund for Development indicated that education levels in Yemen were the worst in the Middle East and North Africa.87 This affects the democratic transition because most of the people are not aware of their rights and still do not have the capacity to make rational electoral choices. Ahmed Saif described how voters participated in elections in Yemen, noting, “With the high rates of illiteracy, voters can recognize and choose their candidates on a personal basis.” Apart from this, the high level of illiteracy is the cause for unemployment, religious militancy, poor use of resources and political unrest. The education system is weak and suffers from poor quality teaching, and the prevalent educational methods do not provide a congenial breeding ground for human rights and democracy.
Poverty and illiteracy are leading to high population growth in Yemen. Yemen’s population is estimated to be 20 million with an average of increase of around 3.5 per cent per annum, which is one of the highest growth rates in the world. Moreover, more than half of the population is under the age of 15, which leads to a high dependency ratio, and about 76 per cent of the population lives in rural areas. 88 This puts a strain on the government’s already limited ability to provide adequate services, and it also puts severe pressure on the country’s
130 Security Challenges in the Arabian Peninsula natural resource management and employment opportunities as well as the overall standard of living.
References and Endnotes
1. Jeremy M Sharp, Yemen: Background and US Relations, Congressional Research Service, www.crs.gov, June 22, 2009. 2. Yemen Poverty Assessment', Report, Government of Yemen, World Bank and UN Development Program (UNDP), 2007, taken from the website of UNDP, http://www.undp.org.ye/poverty report.php 3. Balqies Ahmed Mansoor, Political Parties and the Democratic Transition: A Study Case of Yemen and other countries (Madboli Library, Egypt, 2003), p. 344. (Arabic) news paper 31/7/2002 and Alahiam 5/1/2000 and Ilriai (اﻟﺤﺮﯾﺔ) Alhorea .4 ,law of demonstrations (اﻟﻘﺴﻄﺎس) and aljistas 2000/4/24 (اﻻﯾﺎم) Alham October 1998. (Arabic) 5. Rober, D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab-Republic: the Politics of Development 1962-1986 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press; London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 40-70. 6. Saif Ahmed, ‘The Politics of Survival and the Structure of Control in the Unified Yemen 1990-97, MA, Dissertation, Department of politics, University of Exeter, 1997”, available at http://www.al- bab.com/yemen/artic accessed on 5/6/2004.) 7. Abrahms Max, "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy" (PDF). International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) 32 (4), Available at http://maxabrahms.com/pdfs/DC_250- 1846.pdf. March 2008.pp, 11-04.
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8. Ahmed Alsofi and others, The Transition to Democracy in Yemen, (Sana’a: Yemen Institute for Development of democracy, 2003), pp. 134-7. 9. Fares Saqqaf, Islamic movements and violence in Yemen, Yemen symposium, Scientific Center for Future Studies, the French Center for Yemeni studies. Cairo, Madbouli, 2002. (Arabic) 10. Grant Wardlaws: Political Terrorism (Theory – Tactics- Measures) 2edition, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 175. 11. Walter, Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism, New Rules for an Old Game”, Foreign Affairs, September-October 1996. 12. Abdomalek Saeed Abdu, “Terrorism and fierceness peace perspective and Middle East”, Althawbet Journal, 19 Mar, 2002. (Arabic) 13. Ahmad Ahobishee, “The plight of the search for betting saadah sedition”, 26 September news paper on Thursday, 2/3/2006. (Arabic) 14. See, “Al-Shabab al-Mum’en, Shabab al-Moumineen (Believing Youth)", 17-12 2006 Retrieved on 2008, pp. 2-5. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/shabab-al moumineen.htm . 15. Anwar Qasim Alhatharey, “Houthi and Paper Sectarian Losers” Episode III, Key reports, May 6, 2006. (Arabic). 16. "Clashes leave 118 dead in Yemen", BBC News. 2004. pp. 3-9. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle East. 17. Hill, Ginny, "Yemen Fears Return of Insurgency" 2007, BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk east/6331149.stm, Retrieved on 2008-05-23. 18. Abdullah Mohammed Sanaani, War in Saadah of the first shout out to the last shot” , Backgrounds and repercussions of the war against the movement (Cairo: Dar Al Amal, 2005), First ed. (Arabic) 19. Johnsen, Gregory D, "Yemen Accuses Iran of Meddling in Its Internal Affairs", February 20, 2007, pp. 3–4
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http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news 004_002.pdf, Retrieved on 2007-04-07. 20. Al-Mahdi Khaled, "95 Killed in Yemen Clashes" ArabNews 15/2/2007. http://arabnews.com . Retrieved on 2007-04-11 21. Arrabyee, Nasser, "Rebellion Continues”, Al-Ahram Weekly, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005, Retrieved on 2007- 4-11. 22. "Yemen Tells Shi'ite Rebels to Disband or Face War” Diego.com (Reuters), 2004-01-29. 23. See, “Shia Gunmen' Kill Yemeni Troops" BBC News. 2004-01-28., http://news.bbc.co. , Retrieved on 2007-01-30. 24. See, "Shi'ite Rebels Kill Six Yemen Soldiers-Web site", Reuters. 2007-02- 01, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews, Retrieved on 2007-02-03. 25. See, "Yemeni Soldiers Killed in Attack". Al Jazeera English. 2007-02-01. Available at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/24D55138-C57E- 455A-93D3-7B29E3D21C93.htm. Retrieved on 2007-02-02. 26. See, "10 Soldiers Killed in Attack in Yemen", Middle East, 2007-02-02, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english, Retrieved on 2007-02-03. 27. See, “More Than 100 killed in 5 Days of Clashes between Army and Shiite Rebels Clashes in Yemen, Officials Say" International Herald Tribune,2007-02-19, http://iht.com/articles/ap/2007/02/19/africa/ME- GEN-Yemen-Rebels.php., Retrieved on 2007-04-11. 28. See, “160 rebels killed in Yemen" Israel Herald. 2007-03-07. http://story.israelherald.com/index.php. 29. Al-Hajj, Ahmed, "Yemen's government, Shiite rebels negotiate end to 3- year conflict".The Seattle Times, 2007, p. 17. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com. 30. Associated Press, "7 die as Yemeni troops, rebels clash after mosque attack" The Jerusalem Post. http://www.jpost.coml Retrieved on 2008-05- 23.
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31. Al-Mahdi, Khaled (2007-02-15). "95 Killed in Yemen Clashes". ArabNews. http://arabnews.com. Retrieved on 2007-04-11. (Arabic) 32. Faress Alsaqaf, Future Symposium on the Nation Treatment, (Sana’a: Future Studies Centre 2000). Also look at: AbdulRhman AlJufri Alrai newspaper, 25.04.2000. (Arabic) 33. Interview of the President Ali Abdullah Salih with Alsafeer Journal, Quwait Alrai, and others Arabic and International Newspapers which has been televised by Yemen channel on 21 May 2005, Revolution: Althwra Newspaper 22 May, 2000. (Arabic) 34. Ahmed Abdu Qassem, issue of Extremism in Yemen (Aden. University of Aden, 2001), p. 97. (Arabic) 35. Abdulrahman Al-gephree, Al-Alam News, date of 16/1/1999. (Arabic) 36. Adel Hammed Alsealwi, Political Decision in Yemen, (Sana’a: Khalid Iben Alwalied Library, Alam Alkettab, 2002), pp. 20-34. (Arabic) 37. Ibid. pp. 40-54. 38. Fares Alsaqaf, Future Symposium, Issue of Kidnapping in Yemen (Sana’a: Future Studies Centre, 2002), p. 9. (Arabic) 39. Report of Taheyah Abdulwahab, “Killing Tourists in Yemen”, who has done it in Ruz Alussef, 11 Jan, 1999. (Arabic) 40. Alhayaʹat Newspaper, Laborers Newspaper, During 19, 23, Dec, 1998. And also See Abdulkarem Aleryani in Althwarah Newspaper on 15 Jan, 2001. (Arabic) 41. Faress ALSsaqaf, in Issue of Kidnapping, Previous reference and also in Salih Sumeeh, Althwaraʹa Newspaper on 16.11.2002, p. 9. (Arabic) 42. "Die Ehre der Daha" Spiegel, 1/2006, p. 90. (Arabic) 43. Faress Alsqaf, Almostaqbal Workshop: The Kidnap Phenomenon in Yemen, (Sana'a: The Mostaqbal Center of Study, 2002). pp. 12-25. (Arabic)
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44. Faress Alsqaf, The Islamic Militant and the Authority in Yemen: The Isalah Part Experience in Yemen", (Sana'a: the Mostaqbal Center for the study, 1997), pp. 15-55. (Arabic) 45. Speech of Ali Abdullah Salih, The President of Yemen in front of Haddramut Students on 31 Nov, 2000. Also See Ahmed Abdu Qassem, Issue of Extremism in Yemen (Aden: University of Aden, 2001), P. 97. (Arabic) 46. See, “Deadly explosions rock US embassy” available at Yemenhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep17/yemen.us 47. Brian Whitaker, “Threats close UK Yemen embassy” Monday 18 November2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk. 48. Alhayaʹat Newspaper on 5/10/2002, Lemonade, A. Oct.2002. (Arabic) 49. ALQudss Alarabi Newspaper, on 05.11.2002, Alhayaʹat Newspaper on 06- 11-2002, laborers /Alumaʹal Newspapers on 6-11-2002. (Arabic) 50. The Official Manifesto to the Minister of Interior in which States that the Car which Takes Alharethi and his Companions explode in Obscure Issues, according to the Manifesto of the Yemeni Interior on date 5th Nov. 2002. (Arabic) 51. Alhayaʹat Newspaper on 5th Nov 2002, ALQudss Alarabi Newspaper on 8th Nov 2002, and Fox news on 7Nov 2002. (Arabic) 52. Althwaraʹa Newspaper on 16.11.2002. (Arabic) 53. Abdullah Issmael Sabri, Democracy in Yemen (Cairo, Almuden House for Printing and Publishing, 1996). (Arabic) 54. D. Abdo Seac, Issues and views, Schools and religious extremism in Yemen,http://www.14october.com/news.newsid=a057e95e-a243-4353- 8be9-9d11ee39b39d.(Arabic) 55. Alwassat Newspaper and Alummah Newspaper, 30 May 2001. (Arabic) 56. Field campaign to renounce religious extremism, Almotamar net Monday, 14 - January –2008.
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57. Ahmed Abdu Qassem, n. 34, pp. 95-9. 58. Addwaʹah Alyemen Newspaper, Oct, 2000: p: 23. (Arabic) 59. Alaʹayam, Newspaper on 30.08.95. (Arabic) 60. D. Abdo Seac, n. 54. 61. Marta Colburn, The Dynamic of Development and democratization in Yemen (Friedrich – Ebert – Stiftung, Germany, 2002), p. 48. 62. "World Refugee Survey, US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 19- 06-2008. 63. Mohammed Almekhalafi, In ‘Future Symposium, 10th Years from the Yemen Unification, (Sana’a, Future Studies Centre, 2000), p. 39. (Arabic) 64. Marta Colburn, ‘The Dynamic of Development and Democratization in Yemen (Friedrich – Ebert – Stiftung, Germany, 2002), p. 48. 65. Nabeha Alhedare, and Others, Yemen and Terrorism, (Yemen: The Yemen News Saba and The Research Information Center, 2003), p. 25. (Arabic) 66. Martain Plaut, Yemen Faces Crises as Oil Ends, BBC, November 21, 2008. 67. Mark Katz, Eternal forces and the Yemen civil war forum on the war in Yemen, held at the Emirates Center for Strategic studies and Research. Abu dhabi, July 26-27 1994, p. 7. 68. See “Yemen Faces Crisis in Oil Production", News Yemen- Sana’a, 1803/12/2005. (Arabic) 69. Yemen Strategic Report 2001: (Sana'a Yemen centre for strategic studies 2002), pp. 223- 43. (Arabic) 70. Mohammed Alezi Alhemyari, Effect the international changes to the Yemen–America relation (1990-2002), Master Dissertation Institute of Arab researches and Studies Corio, 2003, pp.76-75. (Arabic) 71. Adel H Ameed Alsalwi, Political decision in Yemen (sana'a: Khalid bin Waleed Bookshop, Books universal, 2002), p. 163. (Arabic) 72. Ibid. 73. Alhemyari, n. 68, pp.78-9.
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74. Mohammed Bametraf & Abd Essattar Nany, Yemen Petroleum Discovery Authority Report, According to Ahmed Noman Jassim. 75. Abdullah, H., OPEC and the Oil Market after the Gulf Crisis, JIME Review, No. 13 (1991), pp. 51-70. (Arabic) 76. Ibid. 77. Jim Landers, “Hunt Oil continues good partnership with Yemen” vol. 9, Issue No.10, Tuesday, May 18, 2004. http://www.gasandoil.com. 78. Abdo Ali Othman. "The Strategy to Reduce the Poverty in Yemen", Althwabet, March 1998. (Arabic) 79. Library of Congress–Federal Research Division Country, Profile Yemen, August 2008. 80. Khalid Rageh Sheikh, The Food Security in Yemen, (Demashq, Arabic Center of the Strategic Studies, 1999), pp. 10-12. (Arabic) 81. Ibid. 82. Abdo Ali Othman, The Strategic of Reduce the Poverty in Yemen, Althwabet, March 1998, pp. 4-30. (Arabic ) 83. Rural Water Supply Sector Study, Cosgrove et.al. for World Bank, August 1996; and Yemen Poverty Assessment, World Bank Report No. 15158 - Yemen, June 26, 1996). 84. Saba, The regional conference on activating: the role of civil society in supporting Education for All Campaign in the Middle East, Sana’a , May 25 .and Mohammed al-Maitami, “Education as a strategic” Professor of Economics, Sana'a University. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen. 85. The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP), (Sana’a, December 2000), http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/econ/econ.htm, p. 2, accessed on 28 July 2004. 86. Mohammed al-Maitami, “Education as a strategic” Professor of Economics, Sana’a University. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen and David Held, in Gerog Sorensen, op. cit., p. 10.
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87. See, ‘Yemen education worst in Middle East’, United Press International, 11/8/2002, http://www.highbeam.com/Library accessed on 25 May 2004. 88. Gerd Nonneman, ‘Key Issues in the Yemeni Economy’, in E.G.H. Joffe et al, op. cit., p. 92. and: Oliver, Schlumberger, “The Arab middle east and the question of democratization” Democratization, 1743-890X, Volume 7, Issue 4, 2000. pp. 104– 132. 89. Dan McDougall, “The Next Afghanistan?, Times of India, Pune, 23 January, 2010 90. “US, UK Shut Yemen Embassies”, Times of India, Pune, 4 January 2010.
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