NACLAReport

Beyond official rationales, the parallels to ENTERING THE are most vividly present on the battle- field. , the doctrine devel- QUAGMIRE oped specifically for Vietnam, is today the es- sence of U.S. aid and advice to the Salvadorean junta. Search-and-destroy missions, aerial bombardments, pacification-all the tech- niques of Vietnam are now being used to ter- rorize and kill yet another peasant population. Let me assure you that we are [providing Administration officials are sensitive to the military assistance to El Salvador] with the domestic impact of the analogy. Parallels in lan- greatest prudence and caution and with the guage and actions are discussed at national lessons of the past in mind. El Salvador is security meetings, while official briefings on El not another Vietnam. Our objectives are Salvador are punctuated by assurances that limited: to help the government with its problems of training, equipment, repair and maintenance, mobility and re-supply." Walter J. Stoessel, Under-Secretary for Polit- ical Affairs, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, .

Comparisons between El Salvador and Viet- nam are heard frequently these days-in Con- gress, at protest rallies, in editorials and at State Department briefings. Some see dangerous par- allels between the two wars, while others dismiss the Vietnam analogy as "an exercise in emo- tion, not analysis."' After careful examination, we think the anal- ogy to Vietnam is appropriate and even com- pelling. It has been injected into the policy de- bate on El Salvador not by "nervous Nellies," as Senator Jesse Helms would have it, nor by loose leftist rhetoric. The Administration itself, by replaying the rationales and formulas of the 1960s, has evoked the memory of Vietnam and made the analogy stick. The official rationale for more arms and ad- visers to El Salvador plugs new variables into an old equation. Substitute Soviet expansionism for "the red tide of communism in Asia." Plug in Cuba as the surrogate where North Vietnam once fit. Add the FMLN guerrillas as the new puppets of a foreign master. Stretch the equation across the Central American isthmus to imperil Mexico, the super-domino that succeeds Japan as the ultimate target of this creeping menace. You now have the all-purpose formula for ex- plaining to the American people why U.S. pres- tige is at stake in a country so intrinsically unim- portant to U.S. interests and security. MaylJune 1981 3

"another Vietnam" is not in the making. It is of from a serious examination of their policies and little comfort, however, to hear that 56 U.S. deeds. So we all drew our own lessons from military advisers in El Salvador will not go out Vietnam. Some called it "a tragic mistake" be- on combat missions (the first 500 advisers in cause so many lives were lost in support of a cor- Vietnam were technically "civilians"). It is no rupt and ruthless regime; others saw the war as more reassuring to be told that President Rea- part of a system-imperialism-that would con- gan does not foresee the need for American tinue to pit the United States against wars of na- combat troops. (Did Eisenhower, Kennedy or tional liberation until fundamental changes took Johnson?) And most disturbing of all is the no- place at home; and still others called it a "noble tion that Vietnam will not be repeated because war" that was lost through failure of will.2 the lessons of that war have not been forgotten. Reagan and Haig fall into this last category. What lessons are they referring to? National What lesson did they learn from Vietnam? That debate was smothered by sheer relief at the war's step-by-step escalation only encourages the conclusion and buried by those with little to gain enemy and gives domestic dissidents an issue.

Army regulars and their mutilated victims, ChalatenangoProvince. 4 NACLA Report 4 NACLA Report

So give the Salvadoreans what they need now to win the war-and a little bit extra for insurance. Convince the real enemy (Moscow) that the United States will not hesitate along the way, and will stop at nothing short of victory. And convince the American people that it is far less painful to take the plunge than to wade into icy waters slowly and cautiously. The cure must be short and drastic. El Salvador is not another Vietnam, then, only if the strategy works and "our side" wins before there's a need for American combat troops. The Administration's argument is as simple as that. It implies an assessment of the guerrilla forces in El Salvador as a less formid- able enemy than Vietnam's victorious NLF, with no dense jungles to hide in and, as we were also asked to believe in Vietnam, diminishing support from the local population. It requires convincing the American public that it's time to shake "the Vietnam Syndrome" once and for Bodies pile up behind the San Salvadormorgue. all. agreed to "draw the line" in El Salvador even Vietnam Had White Papers Too while admitting that its junta members are "as Jimmy Carter tried to justify U.S. support for unpopular with their own people as was Viet- the Salvadoreanjuntas (there were four of them nam."' 3 between and ), by The press was equally amenable to this new citing their efforts to reform the oligarchic struc- formula for intervention. The State Depart- tures of Salvadorean society. But each wave of' ment summary of the White Paper was re- resignations by respected civilian politicians, printed and regurgitated in every major paper.4 each massacre of peasant farmers and each Forgotten by the once again gullible press were body found with tied thumbs and missing limbs, the two White Papers on Vietnam which (inves- frustrated his efforts to affix a centrist label to a tigations revealed only much later) had merely government that just wouldn't behave. provided the public, press and even part of Con- quickly dropped all pretense gress with a rationale for policy which had been of tying U.S. aid to reform, and embarked on a put in place months before. policy utterly consistent in its conspiratorial The authenticity of 18 pounds of documents, analysis of events. For Reagan, the nature of the allegedly captured from guerrilla safe-houses by Salvadorean junta is irrelevant; all that matters Salvadorean security forces, was never ques- is the nature of the alternative. By depicting the tioned. Ralph McGehee, a 25-year veteran of the opposition as puppets of the , any CIA and recipient of the Agency's Career In- amount of U.S. military aid can be justified on telligence Medal, wrote this response to the national security grounds alone. miraculous discovery: "Where the necessary cir- The White Paper released by the State De- cumstances or proofs are lacking to support U.S. partment on February 23, 1981, purporting to intervention, the CIA creates the appropriate prove "the central role played by the Commun- situations or else invents them and disseminates its ist countries" in El Salvador, was essential to distortions worldwide via its media operations."5 supplying that justification and shedding Car- , who admits to having forged many a ter's burden of proof as to the junta's good in- document in his days with the CIA, examined the tentions. At least initially, Congress fell into cache and concluded that at least two of the line. Senator Charles Percy (R-Ill.), a late-fly- documents are partly or wholly fabrications, in- ing dove on Vietnam, currently Chairman of cluding the two most sensational: one that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, describes a shopping trip for arms through socialist MaylJune 1981 5 countries and one that purports to show a link be- took the time to compare the State Department tween the guerrillas and the Cuban Department claims of arms shipments to battlefield condi- of Special Operations.6 tions. Francis Pisano of Le Monde wrote that, But even if authentic, the captured docu- "Sixty-odd guerrilla fighters at San Lorenzo ments fall far short of substantiating the conclu- had between them a single bazooka and an auto- sions drawn by the State Department in its eight- matic rifle, which had been taken from the page "summary." A Wall Street Journal article, Salvadorean Army only a few days earlier.... which appeared several months after the White Some of the guerrilla fighters on the slopes of the Paper made headlines around the world, pre- San Vicente volcano were armed with pistols, sents a thorough indictment of the White rifles, machetes and even slings. The regular Paper's accuracy, and casts doubt upon the guerrillas had FAL [Belgian] automatic authenticity of the documents themselves.7 rifles."" Other reports indicated a similar scar- Based on lengthy interviews with State De- city of arms in battle areas across the country. 2 partment officials, includingJon Glassman, the As for captured weapons displayed by the man who allegedly discovered the documents in Salvadorean National Guard, the Financial San Salvador, the article points out the follow- Times of wrote, "The haul from Con- ing: "Several of the most important documents, chagua was typical: two dozen First World War it's obvious, were attributed to guerrilla leaders rifles, two 19th-century Mausers, three Russian who didn't write them. And it's unknown who hand grenades, and one automatic rifle of the did. Statistics of armament shipments into El type used by the Atlantic Alliance.""3 Salvador, supposedly drawn directly from the Such accounts cast doubt on the extent of out- documents, were extrapolated, Mr. Glassman side aid alleged by the Reagan Administration, concedes. And in questionable ways, it seems. and tend to substantiate guerrilla claims that Much information in the White Paper can't be arms are bought on the black market, manufac- found in the documents at all. This information tured in underground plants or captured in mili- now is attributed by the State Department to tary actions. But how many Americans read Le other, still-secret sources." Monde? In American newspapers, on radio and Ex-Ambassador White, in a reversal of his on TV, the "sinister" notion of outside aid to previous position, told theJournal inJune, "The the guerrillas was reinforced daily until it be- only thing that ever made me think that these came a litany. documents were genuine was that they proved Furthermore, the flow of U.S. aid to El Salva- so little."' dor's military, begun in 1950, escaped media com- To cite one example, the White Paper claims ment. Thus the State Department distinction was that the documents provide "definitive evidence swallowed: aid to a revolutionary movement is im- of the clandestine military support given by the moral and conspiratorial, while aid to an "estab- Soviet Union." Yet a reading of the documents lished government" is a legitimate and disinter- shows a one-way plane ticket from Moscow to ested act. That the government in question came Vietnam for a guerrilla emissary as the only con- to power by a coup d'etat, and rules by terror, is ir- crete instance of Soviet aid. Moreover, the docu- relevant to the argument. ments include frequent complaints of Soviet But the Reagan Administration forgot its own "indecisiveness" and a cool reception in distinction when it announced it was considering Moscow. 9 supplying military aid to the defeated UNITA As for the vast flow of arms to guerrilla forces, forces in their effort to overthrow the government that too has been called into question-months of Angola. The real distinction then, is that the after it served as the pretext for emergency air- United States, as the grand imperial power, views lifts of U.S. arms. Where the summary cites 800 itself as having the exclusive prerogative of prop- tons pledged by socialist countries, and 200 tons ping up or felling whomever it deems desirable. delivered by the time of the January offensive, El Salvador is supposed to stay squarely within the documents themselves suggest that only 10 what is called the U.S. sphere of influence. The tons ever made it across the Salvadorean border. right of self-determination, and what's more, the Nowhere in the documents is there any mention ability of Salvadoreans to judge their own interests 0 of 800 or 200 tons. and decide their own future, finds no space within Way back in January, the European press the Reagan world view. MaylJune 1981 35 ladino and indigenous sugar workers on the ated....."26 For Reagan it's a matter of taking a southern coast in . Negotiations little bad with the good; as he explains, one cannot between the government and the officially un- resist "aggression" and implement reforms at the recognized CNUS ultimately forced agro- same time. exporters to concede to a minimum wage in- But Reagan faces real domestic and interna- crease from $1.20 per day for sugar workers to tional problems by throwing his lot with Lucas. $3.20 for all agricultural workers. *25 The Guatemalan government is too clearly impli- cated in the violence to be treated as anything but a Options for the Reaganauts pariah in international circles. Even if the Chris- This, then is the reality Reagan confronts in tian Democratic Party, or a sector of it, joined the Guatemala. He has shown himself determined to 1982 elections, chances are the charade would not stop the revolutionary volcanos exploding one wash internationally. The FDCR in particular has after another the length of Central America. How a great deal of support from the Socialist Interna- will he confront yet another people for whom tional and individual governments in Europe, death, be it by hunger or violence, is nothing new? Canada and Mexico. The international religious "Moderate" conservatives in Washington community has made too strong a stand on El Sal- argue that the crisis requires more than a military vador to be taken in by such maneuvers, particu- solution. This position finds a small echo within larly since many priests and lay workers have been the Guatemalan ruling class, but even such victims of the regime's violence. And finally, the "reasonable" elements would be loathe to concede mushrooming domestic opposition to U.S. in- any but the most miniscule reforms. Recent volvement in El Salvador will surely include events, however, have shown the Reagan team, Guatemala as soon as Reagan makes his first overt while still giving occasional lip service to improve- move. ments in the Guatemalan system, to be more in- In short, Washington will find itself standing dined to strengthen the hand of those within alone in support of another old order that well may Guatemala who argue that the "Communist crumble in the next few years. It will assure that threat" must be met with old, trusted methods. isolation if it wades even deeper into the Big Mud- According to one report, "Military strategists dy-intervening militarily to avoid accepting the around President Lucas Garcia have estimated victory of the revolutionary forces in Guatemala. that 50,000 'subversives' will have to be elimin- Many thanks to Peter Shiras, afree-lance writer who *While this was an astounding victory in Guatemalan helped prepare the articles on Honduras and Nicara- terms, there are qualifiers. First, a study by the Nutrition- gua; to ProfessorPiero Gleijeses, whose work provided al Institute for Central America and Panama showed that the conceptual basisfor our analysis of Guatemala; and meeting only the very basic needs of rural workers requires a minimum of $8.60 per day, and second, the government to Reggie Norton of the Washington Office on Latin is turning a blind eye to the fact that many bosses have America, who shared his knowledge of Guatemala's refused to pay the increase. history and people.

umbia Journalism Review (New York), May-June, 1981. references Also, Hodding Carter III's critical commentary on press coverage, "The El Salvador Crusade," Wall StreetJournal, March 19, 1981. ENTERING THE QUAGMIRE 5. Ralph McGehee, "The C.I.A. and the White 1. Editorial, "Salvaging El Salvador," The New Paper on El Salvador," The Nation, April 11, 1981. Republic, March 21, 1981, p. 5. 2. For an excellent analysis of these lessons un- 6. Latin America Weekly Report (London), April 3, learned, see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The 1981. pp. 4-5. Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: 7. Wall Street Journal,June 8, 1981. South End Press), 1979. 8. Ibid. 3. Washington Post, February 20, 1981. 9. Sources for this example, and many others, in- 4. See "Text of State Department Report on Com- clude: Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1981; John Dinges, munist Support of Salvadorean Rebels," New York Times, "Documents Tell a Different Tale," In These Times February 24, 1981. For an excellent analysis of U.S. press (), April 1-7, 1981; James Petras, "White Paper treatment of the "captured documents," see Jonathan on the White Paper," The Nation, March 28, 1981; Wash- Maslow and Ana Arana, "Operation El Salvador," Col- ington Post, June 9, 1981. 36 NACLA Report

10. Wall Street Journal,June 8, 1981. 22. See accounts, for example, in Miami Herald, April 11. Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 8, 1981. 12, 1981; Financial Times, March 9, 1981; and Journal oj 12. Maslow and Arana, "Operation El Salvador," Commerce, March 31, 1981. Newsweek, March 16, 1981. 23. El Dia, April 24, 1981, as cited in Intercontinental 13. Financial Times (London), March 9, 1981. Press, June 1, 1981, p. 579. 24. For a comprehensive evaluation of the agrarian NO EASY VICTORY reform, see Laurence Simon and James Stephens, El Sal- 1. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on vador Land Reform, 1980-81 (Boston: OXFAM-America), Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture, 90th Con- 1981. Also, James Stephens, "Agrarian Reform: Hope gress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Print- Turns to Terror," NACLA Report on theAmericas, Vol. XV, ing Office, 1967), p. 1425. No. 1 (January-). 2. For an important analysis of counterinsurgency, 25. Washington Post, April 5 and 9, 1981. then and now, see Michael Klare, "The New Counterin- 26. A series of articles by Edward Schumacher in the surgency," The Nation, March 14, 1981. New York Times consistently stresses the bright spots of the 3. For a discussion of foco theory, see Regis Debray, agrarian reform. This most blatant reversal of Phases II "Revolution in the Revolution," Monthly Review, Vol. 19, and III appears in , April 15 and 30, No. 3 (July 1967) and Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, 1981. Regis Debray and the Latin American Revolution (New York: 27. "Central America Watch," The Nation, April 18, Monthly Review Press, 1968). 1981, p. 455. 4. See, "El Salvador: Why Revolution?" NACLA 28. Miami Herald, February 2, 1981. Report on the Americas, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (March-April 29. Punto Final, May 1981, p. 7. 1980), and "El Salvador: A Revolution Brews," NACLA 30. David Blundy, "Victims of the Massacre That Report on the Americas, Vol. XIV, No. 4(July-). the World Ignored," The London Times, February 22, 1981. For a moving and inciteful account of the Catholic 31. The London Times, April 26, 1981. Church's role in El Salvador, see Placido Erdozain, Arch- 32. Ibid. bishop Romero (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books), 1981. 33. William Safire, "The Savings of El Salvador," 5. Manchester Guardian Weekly, February 1, 1981. New York Times, February 26, 1981. 6. Interview with FMLN Commander Ferman 34. A New York Times editorial, March 6, 1981, Cienfuegos, published in Punto Final (Mexico), No. 193 warned that, "by dramtically subordinating all politics to (May 1981), p. 7. the military campaign, the Reagan Administration 7. Ibid., p. 7. strengthened the right-wing forces it now fears...(the 8. Journal of Commerce, January 15, 1981. United States) has to use its aid not only to protect Mr. 9. Interview with FMLN Commander Alejandro Duarte's office but also to promote his social program and Montenegro, published in IntercontinentalPress, March 16, his effort to reach out to the democratic leaders in the op- 1981, p. 238. For further analysis of the strike, see Mario position." Aguinada, "El momento actual en El Salvador," in Pensa- 35. Robert White, "In Defense of the Junta," Carib- miento Revolucionario(El Salvador), No. 8 (April 26, 1981). bean Review, Vol. X, No. 1. 10. On persecution of the Church in this period, see 36. Wall StreetJournal, , 1981. Simon Smith, "San Salvador: A Chronicle of Intimida- 37. Diario Las Americas, , 1981. tion," America, March 28, 1981. On reprisals against the 38. "Central America Watch," The Nation, , independent press, seeJorge Pinto, " From Exile, A Salva- 1981. dorean Editor Still Pits Pen Against Sword," Los Angeles 39. Washington Post, April 21, 1981. Times, March 1, 1981. 40. New York Times, , 1981. 11. Punto Final, May 1981, pp. 6-7. 41. Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1981. 12. Alex Drehsler, "The Rebels of El Salvador," The 42. "Central America Watch," The Nation, , Boston Globe, March 8, 1981. This is one of a four-part 1981. series of life behind the FMLN lines. THE WIDER WAR 13. Ibid. 1. See Wall Street Journal, February 25, 1981, on U.S. 14. Leo Gabriel, "El Salvador: Report from the Lib- Navy build-up; The Nation, March 14, 1981 on Marines in erated Zones," Liberation News Service, No. 1013 (, Cuba; and Third World, No. 7 (March 14, 1981) on general 1981). U.S. military build-up toward the region. 15. Ibid. 2. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, 16. Alex Drehsler, "Guerrillas Say Why They March 26, 1981. Fight," The Boston Globe, March 10, 1981. 3. Washington Post, February 22, 1981. 17. Diario Las Americas, May 30, 1981. 4. Tom J. Farer, "Reagan's Latin America," New 18. Cynthia Arnson, "Background Information on York Review of Books, March 19, 1981. El Salvador and U.S. Military Assistance to Central 5. For a detailed analysis of this notion, see Philip E. America," Resource Update, No. 4 (Washington, D.C.: In- Wheaton, "The Iron Triangle: The Honduran Connec- stitute for Policy Studies), . tion;" copies available from EPICA, Washington, D.C. 19. Stewart Klepper, "The United States in El Sal- vador," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 12 (April HONDURAS 1981). 1. Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales and 20. Karen DeYoung, "White Hand of Terror," Military Assistance Facts, , p. 6; State De- MotherJones, Vol. VI, No. 5 (), p. 28. partment information released to Congressional commit- 21. El Dia (Mexico City), April 9, 1981. tees.