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The discursive construction of national identity by the newspapers in North Cyprus.
Sanem Sahin
School of Media, Arts and Design
This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of Westminster. © The Author, 2008.
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In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail [email protected] THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY BY THE NEWSPAPERS IN NORTH CYPRUS
SANEM $AHIN
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the degreeof Doctor of Philosophy
May 2008 ABSTRACT
The researchinvestigates the discursive construction of a Turkish Cypriot national identity by the newspapersin North Cyprus. The aim is to discover the representation and reconstructionprocesses of national identity within the pressand examinethe various practicesemployed to mobilise readersaround certain national imaginings. Therefore, as well as examining the changing conceptsof Turkish Cypriot identity throughout history, it focuseson how theseconcepts have beenmoulded through the Turkish Cypriot media. Highlighting historical, political, economicand cultural factors, which contributed to shapingnational identities, the study locatesthe Turkish Cypriot media within theserelations to offer an understandingof the media environment in which the news texts are produced.
Using Critical DiscourseAnalysis, in particular the discourse-historicalapproach, the researchanalyses ongoing transformationsin the definition of self and `other' and the linguistic construction and reproduction of national identity in the news discourses. Focusing on three significant eventsthat occupied the public and media agendawithin the last decade,the news discoursesare studied basedon their content, strategiesused in the production of national identity and the linguistic meansemployed in the process. With this, the nationalist tendenciesembedded in news discoursesas well as discriminatory and exclusive practices are sought out.
Finally, the studydiscusses the findingssuch as the conceptualisationof Turkish Cypriot identity showedvariations in time, the newspapersdid not divergefrom the universeof official discourseand rarely challengedthe nationalistdiscourses. Yet, the newspapers had differencesmainly basedon their stanceto the Cyprusissue and their definition of nationalinterest and identity. The conclusionsthat arisefrom the research,one of which is a suggestionfor furtherresearch, are debated in the study. CONTENTS
Acknowledgments vi
PART ONE
Introduction 2
Chapter 1- Nation, Identity and the Media 10 Nationalism 10 National Identity 17 Media and National Identity 24
Chapter 2- Evolving National Identities 32 Identity Definitions 32 Cyprus' Encounterwith Modernity and Nationalism 35 Developmentof Nationalism and National Identity in Cyprus 39 After the Division 51 Analysis of Turkish Cypriot Nationalism and National Identity 58
Chapter 3-Media and National Identity 63 a) Historical Background 63 The Developmentof the Turkish Cypriot Press 63 Turkish Cypriot Pressafter 1974 75 Turkish Cypriot Broadcastingin Cyprus 80 b) Journalismin North Cyprus 87 Political Factorsand the `National Cause' 88 News Sources 91 Economic Factors 93 ProfessionalCulture and the Productionof News 94 TechnologicalFactors 96
PART TWO 98
Chapter 4- Applying Critical Discourse Analysis 99 Social ConstructionistApproach 99 From Languageto Discourse 101 ResearchParadigm: Critical DiscourseAnalysis 103 The DiscourseHistorical Approach 108 Why study Media Discourse 111 Methodsand ResearchTools 113 ResearchLimitations 116
Chapter 5- Border Clashes in Cyprus in 1996 119 Introduction 119 The Setting - Brief Description of the Context within Which the Border Clashes Took Place 119 The Position of the Newspapers 121 Analysis of Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News 122 Discourse Analysis 125 On the Understanding of Nation and National Consciousness 125 Positive Self and Negative `Other' Representation 137 The Construction of Collective History 150 Conclusion 153
Chapter 6- Opening the Border in 2003 157 Introduction 157 The Setting- Brief Description of the Context within Which the BordersOpened 157 The Position of the Newspapers 160 Analysis of JournalisticPractices and the Structureof the News 161 DiscourseAnalysis 162 On the Conceptof Nation 163 The Constructionof a Common Past 175 Identifying the `Other' 181 The Linguistic Constructionof CommonCulture 185 National Space 188 Conclusion 192
Chapter 7- Lokmaci Crisis in 2007 196 Introduction 196 Which The Setting - Brief Description of the Context within the Bridge Was Removed 196 The Position of the Newspapers 200 Analysis of JournalisticPractices and the Structureof the News 201 DiscourseAnalysis 204 On the Conceptof Nation 205 National Interestand the Categorisationof `Us' and `They' 216 Yenidüzen 218 Kibris 222 Halkin Sesi 224 Differencesin the Representationof the `Other' 225 The Linguistic Constructionof a CommonPast: Time beforethe Lokmaci Barricade 229 Future: Will the Wall be demolished? 231 Conclusion 232
PART THREE 237
Conclusion 238 Overview of the Findings 238 On Thematic Contents 238 Nation, National Identity and Differentiation 238 The CommonPast 246 The Constructionof a Political Future 247 On Turkish Cypriot Media 248 The Newspapersand National Identity 248 JournalisticPractices 250 On Strategiesand Linguistic Means 252 Conclusions 253
Bibliography 257
Appendix 271 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This project has beencompleted with the supportand contribution of many people. Without them, it would not havebeen possible to get throughthe work for this doctoral dissertation.
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Roza Tsagarouisianou who has been supportive and very patient with me throughout my research. From the start, she has given me academic advice and guidance and has always been encouraging. I also thank Prof Steven Barnett, my associate supervisor, for his valuable suggestions to my thesis. It has been very useful in improving the text of my dissertation.
I would also like to thank my family who supportedme and havebeen a sourceof encouragementthroughout my studies.To my mum I especiallythank for being patient, understandingand loving. I am also grateful to Sueand Arthur Frodsham,my parent-in laws, for their supportand encouragementwhen I neededit.
I specially thank my friends Özlem Caykent,Ash Giray, Gill tnanc and Gita Farivarsadri who have beenwith me from the start and patiently listenedto me as I went through the difficult stagesof my dissertation.I owe specialthanks to Ash Giray for helping me with translations.I also want to expressmy gratitudeto JamieReid who painstakingly went through my dissertationand edited my language.To Guilia Brusco and Steph Baldini, thank you for putting me up wheneverI was in London and for being very understandingand supportive.I thank Hüseyin Güvenand Cenk Mutluyakah who provided me with valuable assistanceduring my research.
The greatestthank I owe is to my husbandDan Frodshamwho has beenvery patient, supportiveand encouragingthroughout my study. I am grateful to him for being with me at every stageof my dissertation,editing my work and putting up with me during stressfultimes. I thank him for being there wheneverI neededhim.
V1 PART ONE INTRODUCTION
Five months after the border in Cyprus was openedto public crossingsin both directions, a protest took place at the main checkpoint in Nicosia. A donkey appeared at the Turkish Cypriot checkpoint with a fake passportthat identified it as `Mr Cyprus'. The Turkish Cypriot police arrestedthree people, two Greek Cypriots and a Turkish Cypriot in relation to the protest.Afrika, a Turkish Cypriot daily, reported the incident with the headline `2 Greeks, 1 Turk and 1 true Cypriot were arrested' (Afrika, 23 September2003, p. 1). By calling the donkey `the true Cypriot', Afrika did not insult Cypriots but mocked the nationalist idea that there were no Cypriots but only Turks and Greeks.The idea had found embodimentin the expressionof Rauf Denkta§,the TRNC president at the time, who it was claimed, assertedthat `there's only one living Cypriot in Cyprus and that is the Cypriot donkey' (caglar, 1995)1.The protest and its coverageby Afrika are good examplesof how problematic the self-identification of Turkish Cypriots has been.They indicate the ongoing struggle betweendifferent conceptsof national identity such as Turkish, Turkish Cypriot and Cypriot as well as revealing Turkish Cypriots' searchfor an identity. Pointing to this searchfor identity, Cenk Mutluyakali, a journalist, also suggestedthat despite owning different identity cardsthroughout the years that identified them as one or the other, Turkish Cypriots still suffered an identity crises. He highlighted this ambivalent experienceof Turkish Cypriots in one article with the question `Have you ever had a collection of identities' (Mutluyakah, 2005).
Nationalidentity hasnot only beena problemin the contextof Cyprusand Turkish Cypriots.The endof the Cold War era,globalisation and the revivedtensions over ethnicidentity raisedquestions about nationalism and national identity. On the one hand,globalisation led to an increasein the interactionof peoplethrough the advancementin communication technologies,travel and population movements. These changesnot only seemedto decentrenational identity and challenge
1 In an interview in Kibns FM radio Denktabdenied having said that the only true Cypriots are wild had donkeysin Cyprus. He explainedthat it was the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios who used in that expressionin a news interview and that he only reiteratedthis story of Makarios a conference. 2005 For further details seeKibris, Silahlanip, Savaciru, 22 November or http://www. kibrisgazetesi.com/index. php/cat/2/news/25002/PageName/Ic Haberler.
2 establishednation-states but also, by eroding traditional ways of life, made it difficult for individuals and groups to define themselves.On the other hand, the resurgenceof nationalism following the end of the Cold War led to a `widespread(re)construction of identity basedon nationality' (Castells, 2004, p.30). The emergenceof nationalism was not only in the form of ethnic conflicts, as seenin EasternEurope with the fall of the Soviet Union, but also extreme forms of it reappearedin Europe in placeslike France,Germany and the UK (Jenkins and Sofos, 1996). In either case,national identity has becomea key concept and a heavily politicised issue.
Local, ethnic, or religious identities have also becomean arenafor identity politics and sometimesare seenas undermining national identity. However, national identity is like a `trump card' that overcomesall other identities and binds people together, despitetheir differences (Calhoun, 1997). It still plays the crucial role in identifying who `we' are and connectsus to a place, culture and history, giving a senseof belonging in a world systemof nations. As it is basedon difference from the `other', dependingon the context, time and the `other', national identity is constantly redefined and renegotiated.It is debatablewhether there has ever beena homogenous nation but the presenceof foreigners/outsidershas not only created`us' and `them' groups but also erodedthe definition of national homogeneityrevealing the hybrid nature of national identity.
Nationalism and national identity, which constitute a significant part of everyday life, cannot be reducedto only extreme manifestations.This is where the importance of studying national identity derives: The banal forms of nationalism not only allow nationhood to be taken for grantedbut also shapethe way people seeand understand the world within a national frame. Thus, studying its production and reproduction helps to createawareness of the conflicts and tensionsproduced by theseprocesses aswell asincreasing discriminatory and exclusive practices committed for the sake of nationalism(Wodak et al., 1999).
imagination The role the media play in this processis not only in the and it, construction of a national identity but also in the articulation of which also in influences political decision making processes.The power of the media the ideas large opinion-shapingprocess and the ability to communicate to numbersof
3 people make the media an important participant in the production and propagationof national identity. However, contrary to the image of a unified nation enhancedby the national media, the global media provide a fragmentedsocial and cultural world to both individuals and groups. The new communicationstechnologies have not only disrupted the simultaneousexperience shared by the membersof a nation but also deconstructednational cultures by introducing new ones,thus bringing changesin the participation in public life (Morley and Robins, 1995).A resourcefor different identity discourses,the global media encouragedthe questioningof the conceptof national identity as homogenousand enactedthe formation of hybrid identities.
Yet, the media is an influential instrument in uniting people, especially dispersed populations, around their national and ethnic identities. A recent study showedhow the USA governmentand military officials usednational American core values and promoted a senseof national identity to mobilize public support behind the `war on terrorism' after September11 attack in 2001. According to the study, the media contributed to attemptsto createa united American nation againsta demon `enemy' (Hutchesonet. al., 2004). In the sameway, the media can also have a divisive effect as the discoursesand representationsin the media that resort to stereotyping, ignorance and bias can encourageintolerance towards the `other' and in some cases be an initiator of violence (Bromley, 1998; Howard, 2002). As seenin the examples of conflicts in Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia, the media have the power to manipulate the concept of national identity in order to mobilise the public and lead to a violent conflict. The manipulation of the media for a certain political purposecan result in political crises and conflicts, the media being the main facilitator. At the sametime, they can be instrumental in conflict resolution. By providing accurateand balanced accountsof events,as well as representingdiverse views and building confidence, the media can contribute to the reduction or even prevention of conflict. Thus, a new approachcalled peacejournalism has been developedto highlight awarenessof the responsibility of the media in attemptsat conflict resolution.
This is why the discoursesand representationsof national identity in the media in important in Cyprus, where a searchfor a peaceful settlementcontinues, are terms of identity their practicesrelated to nationalism. In Cyprus, the politics of played a central role in the increaseof inter-communal tension and the creation of the Cyprus
4 problem. Consideringthe role nationalist movementsand the politics of identity played in fuelling of the conflict betweenthe two communitieson the island and the creation of the Cyprus problem, the importanceof the debatesabout national identity becomesclear. In the past, attemptsto forge a Cypriot identity failed as the two communities cultivated Hellenic and Turkish national identities basedon ethno- nationalist concepts.Changing social, political and economic conditions such as globalisation and population movementsnot only challengedthe conceptof a homogeneousTurkish Cypriot national identity but also led to a hegemonicstruggle betweendifferent constructionsof national identity. Recently, as the searchfor a solution to the Cyprus problem intensified, the questionof identity becamethe focus of public debateagain. Internationally and within Cyprus, there is growing recognition that, for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem, there should be reconciliation betweenthe island's two communities but the question is `how can two communities with distinct sensesof national identity live under a common state'.
Self-identification has been a problematic issue for Turkish Cypriots. The various terms they use to define themselves,such as Turkish, Turkish Cypriot, and Cypriot, sometimesused interchangeably,shows the ongoing battle for the acceptanceof a specific identity. Each term indicates a particular conceptionof nation and national belonging that the person or the group identifies with. For example,one nationalism, which developedduring the years of inter-communal struggle, seesTurkish Cypriots as part of the Turkish nation, making no distinction betweenTurks and Turkish Cypriots. Another nationalism, developedin reaction to Turkish nationalism, asserts cultural differences from Turks to maintain a distinctive and separateidentity as Cypriots. This version of Cypriot nationalism is constructedmainly in opposition to Turks rather than Greek Cypriots. Today, `located betweenTurkish nationalism and expressionsof Cypriotism' (Ramm, 2006, p. 523), both the `Turkish' and `Cypriot' identities are trying to establishtheir legitimacy and the media are one of the sites where the struggle has been taking place.
As the identity issue increasingly becameimportant among Turkish Cypriots, so its construction and renegotiation by the media also gained significance. For example, the Turkish Cypriot media have been in a key position in the formation and later, Cypriot maintenanceof public attitudes towards Greek Cypriots and as
5 nationalism developed,in reaction to Turkish nationals.This is why, as the attempts for a settlementto the problems createdby the inter-communalconflict and division in Cyprus continue, the role the media play in either reinforcing or lesseningdivision through the construction of identities or in encouragingreconciliation or provoke conflict becomessignificant.
This researchinvestigates the construction of Turkish Cypriot national identity in North Cyprus. It examinesthe changing conceptsof Turkish Cypriot identity and focuseson how they have beenmoulded through the Turkish Cypriot media, specifically the newspapers.Considering their efficacy in the opinion-building process,their influence on political decision-makingand the effect that may have on communities' perceptionsof self and the `others', the main objective of the research is to examine the media texts to seewhich conceptof Turkish Cypriot national identity they articulate and also to study the ways in which they construct it. In North Cyprus, the role of the media in conceptualisinga national belonging has not been questionedextensively and studiesexploring the media's relationship with national identity and nationalism have been minimal. This is why one of the main aims of the is study to contribute to the enlivened debatewithin the Turkish Cypriot community about the issuesof identity, citizenship and the role of the media, rather than provide definite answersto the national identity problem.
There are four hypothesesthat underlie the framework of this research:The first assumptionis that national identity is discursively constructed.Its definition changes dependingon the national project pursuedor its context of production. It is basedon the oppositional metaphorsof `us' and the `other' to createunity among the members of the `us- group' and assertits distinction from the `they-group'. Such collectivisation helps to emphasisethe homogeneity of the membersof the national community as well as assertits difference from other communities.Attributing certain characteristicsto the `national we' while casting the `other' in a negative light are some of the featuresof the discursive construction of national identity.
Secondly,there is not a single national identity. Since national identity is a dynamic concept that can shift with different circumstancesand contexts, diverse conceptsof
6 national identity can coexist. In the context of North Cyprus, various discoursesand conceptualisationsof nationalidentity arein an ongoingstruggle for hegemony.
Thirdly, the media not only contribute to the production of national identity but also, by reproducing it everyday,naturalise the ideologies of nationalism and national identity. Mediation of national symbols, which are embeddedin the social practices of everyday life, helps national identity to be internalised and taken for granted.By shapingnational attachmentsinto a common sense,the media also encouragea portrayal of nations and national identities as natural phenomena.
Finally, the prevalenceof a nationalist discoursein the media is an obstacleto discussionabout the formation of a pluralistic and democraticsociety and citizenship. Putting communal rights aheadof individual ones leavesno spacewithin the media for the constitution of a democratic conceptof citizenship and different collective identities. Existing discourses,even the onesthat claim to be anti- nationalist, replaceone form of national identity with another.
Taking the scholarly literature as the starting point, Chapter 1 introducesthe key conceptsand argumentsto be used in the research.Outlining the definition of terms and the relevant theoretical perspectivesaims to provide a framework for discussions on the conceptof Turkish Cypriot national identity in the North Cyprus context. Divided into three parts, the first one examinesthe various approachesto nationalism and nation. Nationalism, a discursive construction, is not only an extreme manifestation but discernible in everyday life and integratedinto daily practices.It is this naturalisedform that hides its constructednessand strengthensthe ideological power of nationalism. Examining the cultural and social sourcesof identity in the secondpart, it discussesthe boundary-drawingprocess during the production of national identity. The last part of the chapter is on the role of the media in the conceptualisationof national identity. It looks into how the discourseand representationsin the media contributes to the construction and renegotiationof national identity.
The subsequenttwo chaptersprovide historical backgroundto Turkish Cypriot identity and the Turkish Cypriot media. Chapter 2 studiesthe constitution of various
7 conceptsof Turkish Cypriot identity over the years and the diversemeans of self- identification that bring with them a particular national imagination. The story of the identity formation of Turkish Cypriots, which includes competing conceptions,is told in relation to both Greek Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey who are both in the position of the `other'. It gives a descriptive historical analysisof how Turkish Cypriot identities evolved and also offers an analysisof the main featuresof these identity conceptions.
Chapter3 focuseson an historical investigation of the role the Turkish Cypriot media in the construction and redefinition processof national identity. The struggle against the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement not only employedthe media as a crucial instrument in disseminatingthe nationalist ideology and forming public support for it but also set the boundarieswithin which the news media have been operating.An examination of media dynamics, mostly basedon the accountsof journalists and academicsin North Cyprus, offers a picture of the factors that influence the conditions and practicesof current news production.
Chapter 4 outlines the methodological and theoretical guidelines of the research paradigm as well as describing the researchtools that are used in the analysis. Since one of the main assumptionsof the study is that national identity, a phenomenontaken for granted, is constructeddiscursively, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a critical approachto discourse,is adoptedas the research paradigm. Among various methodsof the CDA, the investigation usesthe `discourse-historicalapproach' developedby the Vienna School of Discourse Analysis. Basedon the theory that situational, institutional and social contexts shape or affect discursive acts, this method combineshistorical, social-economic-political and linguistic perspectivesto identify the relationship betweentexts and social practices (Wodak et al., 1999, Wodak, 2001b).
The following three chapters,5,6 and 7, test the data using the analytical tools as suggestedby the discourse-historicalapproach against the hypothesesoutlined. Each chapter,concentrating on a chosencase study, investigatesthe news texts to locate the various definitions and dimensionsof national identity. Chapter 5 studiesthe in discursive construction of national identity as it was reflected news reports of the
8 border clashesbetween the demonstratorsfrom both sidesin 1996.Focusing on the themesof linguistic constructionof the nation, the `us' and `them' dichotomy and national history, the analysisexamines newspaper texts to seewhich conceptof identity was articulated in relation to Greek Cypriots and mainland Turks on the island.
Chapter 6 also includes an analysisof news reports of the opening of the border crossings.The border in Cyprus, a manifestationof separationand severanceof communicationbetween communities (Gumpert & Drucker, 1998),was openedin April 2003 for public crossings,allowing people from both communitiesto go to the `other' side they had not seenfor 29 years.The conceptof `home' and the construction of the past and common culture are someof the themesthis chapter focuseson.
Chapter 7 investigatesattempts to open anothercrossing in Lokmaci, one of the military barricadesin the divided city of Nicosia. Regardedas a symbol of the division, the debatesconcerning the opening of this crossingraised issuesabout the sovereignty of the nation, national interest and differencesin the treatmentof the `other'. The coverageof thesedebates in the pressalso holds light to the dominant conceptualisationof national identity and revealswhether there has been any change over the years.
The concludingchapter highlights the main issuesthat aroseduring the examination of the dataand ascertains whether the main assumptionsof the studyare validated. It presentsan evaluationof the mostimportant findings of the researchwhich, outside of Cyprus,could be helpful in similar studiesof nationalidentity, especially in states experiencing conflict. As statedpreviously, rather than give definite answersto questionsof identity, the study aims to contribute to the ongoing debateas well as prove a useful resourceto those engagedin social policy and the developmentof the media.
9 CHAPTER 1: NATION, IDENTITY AND THE MEDIA
This chapterdiscusses the working definitions related to the study as well as present argumentsabout national identity and the role of the media in the conceptualisation of a national identity. Divided into three sectionsto offer a more detailed debateon eachissue, the first part of the chapterfocuses different understandingsof nation and nationalism and the secondpresents various approachesto national identity, while the third part studiesthe relationship betweenthe media and national identity. Defining such key conceptsand setting out the main assumptionsof the study provides a framework for discussionsof the conceptof Turkish Cypriot national identity.
Nationalism
Different theories of nationalism make it difficult to study it under one general theory. Whether nations are invented or reconstructedbased on the pre-existing groups are the dominating debateson nationalism. The description of what the nation and nationalism are and also of their origins is different for primordialists, ethno- symbolists and modernists.While primordialists stressthe antiquity and naturalness of nations and seenational identity as a natural part of human beings, ethno- symbolists highlight the role of pre-existing ethnic ties in the formation of modern nations. Modernists, on the other hand, believe in the modernity of nations and nationalism. They disagreewith the idea that nations grow out of certain ethnic groups and instead argue that ethnicity gained significance in the age of modernism (Özkinmli, 2005). Furthermore,new approachesthat questionthe absenceof women, ethnic minorities and the everyday dimension in thesetheories have also emerged,enriching the debateon nationalism and national identity (Özkinmli, 2000). Highlighting the difficulties of studying nationalism under one generaltheory Özkinmli becauseof the diversity of approachesand theories on the issue, (2000) its daily suggestsfocusing on the discourseof nationalism and reproduction on a idea basis as the common denominator.In this research,adopting the of the
10 modernityof nationalismand nations, I alsostudy them as discursive formations and ideologicalforces.
In contrastto the argumentsof primordialists or ethnosymbolists,nationalism is a feature of modernity and the nation stateis a modem institution. The transformation of sovereigntyfrom monarchsto people played an important role in the construction of modem states.The rise of notions such as the `will of people' and `democracy' not only constitutedpeople as citizens who give nation-statestheir power and legitimacy but also replacedthe power of divine right with the legitimacy of the people (Calhoun, 1994). Thus, as Habermas(1998) puts it, the invention of the nation was a catalyst in the transformation of early modem statesinto democratic republics. Belonging to a nation createdsolidarity and connectionthrough a concept of citizenship betweenpeople who had sharedno relation before and provided the statewith a sourceof legitimation. Yet, despiteits relationship with the `will of people', nationalism is not always be related to democracy.As Jenkinsand Sofos (1996) state,albeit being linked to popular sovereigntyand being an expressionof national will, nationalism doesnot always representall social identities and interests within the national community. Nationalism also has a potential for totalitarianism, which can be used to repressthe diversity within the community and promote sameness.Calhoun (1994) also stressesthat `nationalism is all too often the enemy of democracyrooted in civil society' (p. 325). Therefore, despitebeing related to democracythere is `nothing inherently democratic about nationalism' (Calhoun, 1997,p. 126).
The processesof modernity such as new communicationtechnologies, social mobility, commerce,education and a changing conceptof time made it easierfor people to gain national consciousnessand imagine themselvesas part of a national community. In these `imagined communities', as Anderson (1993) describesthem, image even though membersof a nation have never met eachother, they have the of by communion in their minds. The sharedimage of the community is strengthened language. the media's reflection of national histories, sharedcultural symbols and is Thus, the reproduction of nations or the imagining of communities a mental act is that requires people to believe and participate (Anderson, 1993). It this psychological dimension of nations that requiresthe self-consciousnessof being a
11 political community that constructsand strengthensnations (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Renan(1990) describesthis mental act as a `daily plebiscite' becausea nation's existencedepends on `consent,the clearly expresseddesire to continue a common life' (p. 19). Peopleparticipate in the existenceof nations by believing and identifying with them. Therefore,it is important that people define themselvesand are defined by others as a `nation' (Billig, 1995). However, as Sofos (1996) points out, this imagination of communities is not just a mental or an intellectual exercise, but also a very material one as witnessedby acts of war, genocide,ethnic cleansing and displacement.He also arguesthat, rather than aiming at ethnic unity alone, multiculturalism, democracyand civil society could also be the goals of an imagined community.
Markers such as blood, language,culture, religion or citizenship, on which national identity is based,influence the conceptof nation and the understandingof `our' identity and `others' (Mansbachand Rhodes,2007). A nation can be imagined based either on cultural similarities such as language,history and ethnic ties, or on political will, which gives the priority to citizens. In the first imagination, nation is established beliefs on about the characteristicsof ethnic origin and the common descentof the community. Basedon the `Germanmodel', such a nation is called Kulturnation (Knischewski, 1996). The secondform of an imagined nation takespolitical citizenship as the basis of belonging to the nation, regardlessof ethnic origin. Categorisedas the `French model', this type of nation is namedStaatsnation (Knischewski, 1996). Despite this common distinction, someresearch shows that such a dichotomy cannot strictly be applied to nation states(Wodak et al., 1999) as different forms of existing nationalisms combine cultural and political elementsin different ways at the sametime (Wodak et al., 1999,Biswas, 2002). This study also tests the data to find out if such a dichotomy is valid and whether such a distinction can be applied to nations.
Nationalism is a discursive construction, which makesit difficult to talk about one form of nationalism. Depending on the political project targeted,it is constructedin various ways and therefore has different meaningsto different membersof the nation, sometimesconflicting with each other (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). What unites all theseconcepts of nationalisms is its discourse,which is a kind of language
12 that fosters solidarity and national identity as well as contributing to the production of nationalist self-understandingamong the membersof the community. Nationalistic discourseshapes the aspirationsof people in terms of a nation and national identity and also producesnationalist thought and language(Calhoun, 1997). Highlighting the role of nationalistic discoursein the unification process, Herzfeld (2005) defines it as a `doctrine of reification' (p. 117). According to Özkirimli (2000), there are three common characteristicsof nationalist discourses: The first one is that the interestsand values of a nation overrule all other interests and values. Acting like a `trump card', nationality overridesother particularistic identities (Calhoun, 1997,p. 126). Even though thesenational interestsand values are defined as unchanging,they actually transform dependingon the imagination of the nation. Second,a nation is the only sourceof legitimacy. Existing in the world of nations and as the symbol of peoples' will, the nation has control over economic, political and military relations of a community within a boundedterritory and can justify its actions on the basis of national interest. Third, it operatesthrough the binary division of `us' and `them' and defines `us' in terms of the `other'. It is this dichotomy that acts as a unifying processwithin `us' by producing a senseof distinctivenessfrom the `other'.
Far from having a fixed meaning or being unitary, nationalism can be perceived either as a modernising and unifying processor as a separatistmovement. It could even be differentiated as `good' or `bad' nationalism dependingon the context (Calhoun, 1997). In nationalist discourses,while the nationalism of `others' is portrayed in terms of `irrational emotions' or as `bad' nationalism, `our' love of country is describedas `patriotism' (Billig, 1995). Such a narrow definition of nationalism neither reveals its ideological power that shapeseveryday life, nor takes `our' nationalism into account. In this projection, the power of nationalism is taken in for granted and seenas the problem of peripheries,something that happens developing countries rather than in establisheddemocracies. In contrast,loyalties to a nation are seenas `patriotic' and as necessary.Alternatively, the `others" struggle for the power of their nationalist projects is regardedas `nationalism' and something dangerous(Billig, 1995; Calhoun, 1997).
13 The manifestationsof nationalism are not only limited to extremeconditions but are also integratedinto daily life without being realised.An ideology that integrates people and helps them to join the collective life of nation, nationalism provides people with a specific form of reality and shapestheir consciousnessto seeand interpret the world in a certain way. Thus, it makesa nation a sourceof identity and makesbelonging to a nation necessaryand inevitable in a world of nations (Pickering, 2001). The ideological power of nationalism makesnations seemas if they have always existed rather than being constructions.For nationalism to be effective, its constructednessshould not be apparentbut on the contrary should be naturalisedand embeddedin the routines of everyday life (Özkinmli, 2000; Billig, 1995; Edensor,2002). To maintain its power, nationalism should also reproduce itself in daily practices. Billig (1995), who describesthe processas `banal nationalism', emphasisesthat certain habits, representationsand practicesof everyday life not only hide the ideological role of nationalism but also reproducesit as a part of everyday life. For example, by constantly flagging nationalism, the media and politicians remind citizens of their national identity in so many ways that it is not even registered.History and languageare also the other elementsthat enhancethe naturalisation and integration of nationalism in everydaylife. Thus, embeddedin the routines of daily life and internalised,nationalism has actually been shapedinto common senseand a self-evident truth (Herzfeld, 2005).
Imposing a common language,education, and military service producesstandardized citizens for a nation and establishesa unitary image of nation (Jenkins & Sofos, 1996). The production of this unitary image requires the subversionof the differences betweenthe membersof a national community and the production of a senseof `us' as the `sametogether' (Pickering, 2001). Such a construction of national community leadsto the perception of `us' in a particular way, which is also useful in assuringa difference betweennationals and non-nationals.Despite being acceptedas fixed, the category definitions such as `who belongsto the nation' and `who doesn't' also changedepending on who to mobilize and how to mobilize them in support of the political projects of nationalism (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Thus, alternative constructionscoexist with the dominant nationalist interpretationsand createtensions between the official and ordinary representationsof nation. These counter constructionsor narratives could challengethe totalising boundariesand
14 essentialistidentities produced by the dominantnationalist ideologies (Bhabha, 1994).
The production of standardizedcitizens has tightened the relation betweenthe conceptsof `nation' and `society', ignoring cultural and ethnic diversity and leading to theseterms being used as coterminous.Billig (1995) points at how society is imagined,just like a nation state,as a boundedand independententity. He notesthat `society is in image the (p.53). According to Calhoun .... created the of nation state' (1997), the notions of `nation' and `people' becamehistorically intertwined with the rise of claims to popular sovereignty and nation becamea way of describing `people'. Habermas(1998) also arguesthat `nation' and `people' have the same connotation in a political community shapedby common descentor at least by common language,history and culture.
Identification with nation is a crucial part of nationalism. Symbols,traditions and myths help people to identify themselveswith a nation and also remind them of their nationhood. Giddens (1995) describesthis emotional power of nationalism as `a psychological phenomenon' (p. 193) and stressesthat in the contemporaryworld where traditions are shaken,feelings of commonality such as a sharedlanguage and a senseof belonging to a national community help to maintain ontological security. Identification with leadershipand symbols not only provides people with security but createsa link with nationals and a differentiation from non-nationalsas well. Thus, certain narratives and cultural symbols are adoptedto enhancethis senseof belonging and unity within the membersof the community as well as to asserta cultural distinctivenessfrom other nations.
by linking Nationalism enhancesthe senseof continuity of its national community lose the presentwith the past. As Bhabha (1990) puts it `nations, like narratives, their origins in the myth of time' (p. 1). The narrative of national histories constructs nations as entities that existed acrosstime, regardlessof whether the conceptof nation existed or not (Calhoun, 1997). This continuity, which emphasisesthe similarities of a nation in the past and the present,strengthens the idea of an essential in national identity. As Reicher and Hopkins (2001) state `the past is powerful defining contemporary identity becauseit is representedin terms of a narrative
15 structurewhich invites those in the presentto seethemselves as participants in an ongoing drama' (p. 150). Thus, a temporal link is achievedthrough `structural nostalgia' that reconstitutesthe past by highlighting the similarities betweenancient and modern cultures (Herzfeld, 2005). The assertionof a fixed national identity not only concealsits modernity and constructednessbut also reifies the essentialising strategiesof nationalism. Although presentedas such,nations do not have a single history but competing ones.The construction and reconstructionprocesses of national histories reflect the struggle for hegemonybetween different versions of nationalism. As part of the ideological power of nationalism, national histories not only provide continuity with the past but also act as the collective memory of a nation. Therefore, in the production of a collective memory, rememberingis as important as forgetting or as Renan(1990) puts it, forgetting `is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation' (p. 11) becausethe violence utilised in the formation of a nation state clasheswith the view of nation being given rather than createdby force (Calhoun, 1997).
The impact of globalisation on nationalism and nation statesis still an ongoing discussion.On the one hand, globalisation is said to causethe demiseof nation-states and affect their coherence.On the other hand, nationalist movementsin the wake of the Cold War showedthat nationalism is still a powerful ideology. Describing such nationalist movementsas `forces of fragmentation', Biswas (2002, p. 185) claims that even though such sub-nationalismcould threatenthe integrity of a nation state,it also functions strengthensand reproducesthe idea of a nation. The transfer of some state which had been under the control of national governmentsto supranational is organisationshas reinforced the argumentthat the sovereigntyof nation states diminishing with economic and cultural globalisation. Challenging this view, Biswas (2002) stressesthat rather than undermining the power of a nation statesuch changes have creatednew expectationsin people and may result in nation statesbetter performing and meeting demandsof their people.
is International recognition is another important aspectof being a nation. It not enoughto define itself as a nation in order to be recognisedas a nation but gaining the acknowledgmentof other nation statesis also important. Joining in world affairs requires imagining the nation among other nations. In Billig's (1995) description, the
16 consciousnessof national identity normally assumesan international context, which itself needsto be imagined as much as the national community does.Pointing at the relationship betweennationalism and state,Bauman (1991) notesthat `nationalism without the statehas been as flawed and ultimately impotent as statewithout nationalism to the point of one being inconceivablewithout the other' (p. 64). In this context, the systemof the world of nations could be an incentive to nationalism but as, Calhoun (1997) states,it could also be a constraint on it becauseof the assumptionthat many nation statesalready exist. Such an approachcan make it difficult for a new stateto achieveinternational recognition.
National Identity
Modernity has replacedidentification with kinship or the local groups of pre-modern times, with nation states.Giddens (1991) statesthat modernity has broken down the protective framework of the social relations of traditional communities,replacing them with other, impersonal institutions. This should not be taken to meanthat identity kinship or local communities have lost their significance. They still shape and give a senseof belonging but they no longer offer a model for identification (Calhoun, 1994; Moores, 2000). The time and spacedistanciation of modern times development no longer ties relations to a place and hence face-to-facerelations. The of the media has transformed the processof identity formation by providing individuals with mediated images.In a way, modern times have `madethe conceptof identity distinctively problematic' (Calhoun, 1994, p. 10). It does not mean that it has identity has been questionedmore in this era than previous ones,but that becomemore difficult to establishidentity. The nation state,another modern it institution, has becomean entity on which identity can be basedbecause provides identities people with a way of seeingand thinking of themselves.Consequently, are primarily `anchoredin national space' (Edensor,2002, p. 1).
National identity is a special kind of collective identity. It did not emergeas a criticism of institutionalism and centralisation of power and resources,but appeared to influence and assimilate the population to join national collectivity and unity (Gutierrez, 2001). Thus, it is the primary form of identity that createscoherence and
17 a senseof belongingby offering peopleauthenticity, historical continuity and rootednessin a commonterritory (Dieckhoff& Gutierrez,2001).
National identity is basedon the conceptsof samenessand difference. It could be associatedwith togetherness,based on somecommonality where collective unity is highlighted, or it could be establishedthrough difference to the `other'. In either case,the existenceof the `other' is crucial in the construction of national identity because,like any identity, it doesnot exist in a vacuum but gains its meaning in relation to the `other' (Hall, 1996). In a way, `there can be no `us' without `them" (Billig, 1995,p. 78). Similar to an imagined community, national identity is an invented phenomenonbased on establishinga difference betweenself and the others. Therefore, difference from the `other' is crucial in the definition of identity: anything that the `other' is, `we' are not. As Hall (1996) describes`... it is only in relation to the `other', the relation to what is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the positive meaning of any term - and thus its identity can be constructed' (p.4). Cavallaro (2001) also draws attention to how the `other' not only enablesan individual to build a self-imagebut also gives meaningto it by either helping or forcing it to adopt a worldview in relation to itself.
The construction and reconstructionprocess of national identity involves the struggle betweendifferent versions of identity for hegemony.Different definitions of national identity are produced for different political projects. Dependingon the definition of national interest, the categorisationof who national identity includes or excludes changes(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As Evans (1996) suggests,the production of national identity, which is `the categorizationof self or of `other', inclusion and exclusion is an arenaof contest betweencompeting groups and institutions within society' (p.34). In other words, with changesin the conceptof national identity, new `others' also emerge.
National identity is not a fixed or natural thing basedon somecommon essence,as the essentialistwould argue, but a conceptthat changeswith different circumstances and contexts. In other words, it does not mean that it is passiveand determinedby social changesbut is, on the contrary, a reflexive project that also contributesto these transformations.In this sense,reflexivity is the use of knowledge as a constitutive
18 element,as well as being a constantrevision of it (Baker, 1997). Similar to the self in modern times, which `hasto be explored and constructedas a part of a reflexive processof connectingpersonal and social change' (Giddens, 1991,p. 32), national identity also has a flexible form. Yet, despite its dynamic nature,national identity exhibits itself as a natural and fixed phenomenon.McCrone (2002) stressesthat individuals considertheir identity as fixed and immutable in any particular time and context. Furthermore,they claim particular national identities in different contexts and over time and space.
The notion of a dynamic national identity clasheswith the conceptof `authentic', traditional forms of identity, which emphasizesprimordial ties. Essentialist approachesview national identity as centred,unified and fixed. Their assumptionis that there is an underlying essenceof identity that is natural and belongsto a shared culture. Contrary to this assumption,national identity is socially and discursively constructedand changesdepending on the circumstancesrather than being a natural or `given' phenomenon.Therefore, it is not tradition-bound or homogenous,but a phenomenonthat benefits from different sourceswhich provide for different national identifications. However, as Reicher and Hopkins (2001) emphasise,`national identity is always a project, the successof which dependsupon being seenas an essence'(p. 222). For national identity to be effective it should not be seenas constructedbut on the contrary, should be perceived as given or natural. This is why national identity is always produced as an essentialand natural aspectof a nation.
Symbols, rituals, images and spacesare the resourcesfor the production of national identity. These spatial, material, performative and embodiedexpressions of national identity are interlinked with each other, constituting a supply for a senseof national belonging(Edensor, 2002). However, their sharednessdoes not guaranteea consensuson their meanings.Rather than providing a fixed set of ideas,these cultural materials can be used and interpreted in different ways and henceact as diverse and multiple sourcesfor the construction of national identity. The reflexive nature of these cultural representationscontributes to the flexible characterof national identity as well. Their dialectic relationship meansthat changesin the in meaning.of one also influence the meaning of the other. It is also that the production processof a national identity, sometimesnew symbols and rituals are
19 invented and circulated for membersto identify with the nation and sometimes existing or old ones are evoked, reclaimed and reinterpretedto be embeddedback into contemporaryforms. The employment of cultural representationsin the production of national identity dependson whether they support or underminethe construction of that identity. If they support it, then they are employedto essentialize the identity but if they undermine it then they are describedas contingent factors (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).
National identity plays a crucial role in the construction of nations.An identity is createdand imposed on people to encouragethem seeand think of themselvesin a similar way. Gramsci's notion of hegemonyis achievedthrough the ideological state apparatusesas suggestedby Althusser (Biswas, 2002). Shapedby state,politics, the media and everyday social practices,national identity is learnedand internalised during the courseof socialisation.The state,especially, has a role in the construction of national consciousnessby a common educationand military. It `shapesforms of perception, of categorisation,of interpretation and of memory which serveas the basis for a more or less orchestrationof the habitus which becomesthe basis for a kind of `national common sense'through the school and the educationalsystem' (Wodak et al., 1999,p. 29). Apart from daily practices,the importanceof habitus becomesclearer in conflict situations,which makesone's group characteristicsseem natural and inherent while the difference of the `other' group is viewed as unnatural and reprehensible(Mennell, 1994).
This differentiation or creation of boundariesis an important factor in the construction of national identity. Imagining national identity involves considering who is included in the nation and who is not. As Evans (1996) points out `the articulation of identity is premised upon the identification of symbolic boundaries' (p.33). The crucial role of boundaries,whether they are in the minds of individuals or apparent,is to highlight the differences and similarities between `us' and `them'. its Constructedin relation to the `other', they help to identify the self by identifying difference from the `other'. Borders contribute to the production of national identity `through a processof negation, the creation of coherentsense of self through explicit rejections and denials' (Evans, 1996, p.33). Drawing boundariesby defining the criteria of inclusion and exclusion strengthensnotions of purity and unity. The
20 boundariesor bordersprovide the membersof a group with a feeling of solidarity by allowing them to imagine themselvesas a community, distinct and separatefrom the `others'. As Goldman (1997) stresses,`a unified senseof self and nation dependson the exclusion or `othering' of any foreign elementthat disruptsthat image of unity' (quoted in Morley, 2000, p.3 1). Just like in the formation of national identity, the boundary-drawingprocess also usesthe resourcesof history, roots, cultural traditions, symbolic images and rituals (Edensor,2002). However, the dynamic nature of national identity and multiple `others' in a global world have madethe processof boundary drawing more difficult.
In the discursive production of national identity, the conceptsof spacean d time play crucial roles. For example, the discourseof national identity is generally rooted in a distant time. The primordial origins of nations that createcontinuity over time go together with their common project for the future. In the elaborationof national identity, the relationship betweenthe past and the presentis linked by the continual and selective reconstitution of traditions and social memory (Schlesinger,1991). Formed as narratives,they allow the construction of national identity in a coherent temporal structure despite its dynamic context. Evolving around temporal axes of past, presentand future, narratives createa biographical continuity and provide national identity with a collective memory as well as with a future orientation that representsthe interestsof the nation (Moores, 2000). Positioning identities in time and spacecreates a meaning and coherenceas the basis of that identity and also allows it to presumecontinuity (Giddens, 1991). By arranging,interpreting, rearranging and reinterpreting, the past offers meaningto identity narratives as a way of expressingone's identity (Wodak et al, 1999).
National identity is constructedwithin a bounded spacethat createsan attachmentto it. As Schlesingersuggests, a nation state does not resolve the problem of how a national identity is constructedbut limits the possible elaborationsof it and the national spaceis where theseelaborations take place (Schlesinger,1991). Nations, surroundedand separatedfrom other national spacesby borders,bring people who live in it together and give them a senseof belonging and solidarity. While a nation resemblesa big family, national spaceis treated as `home' in nationalist discourses. Tablor's (1998) statementsummarises this relationship well: `a houseidentified with
21 the self is called a `home', a country identified with the self is called a `homeland" (quoted in Morley 2000, p.266). Thus, in many discursive constructionsand embodimentsof national identity, the notion of `home' and `nation' are used synonymously.The employment of the conceptof `home' for `nation' not only gives a feeling of security and belonging but also as they are depictedas united and homogenousplaces, the construction of both involves the exclusion of anything foreign (Morley, 2000).
The impact of globalisation on the nation stateis one of the common debatesin studiesof nationalism and globalisation: Does globalisation lead to the demiseof nations? Globalisation has different definitions, varying from cultural homogenisationto Westernisation,that highlight different aspectsof it (Özkinmli, 2005). The economic and political challengesof globalization to the statecannot be ignored. It can also be arguedthat globalisation has disruptedthe idea of nation as a homogenousand united entity. Developmentssuch as new communication technologiesand increasedmobility have made it difficult to basethe production of identity on a place (Jenkins & Sofos, 1996). The formation of multi-cultural societies crashedthe myth of pure and homogenousnations, providing sourcesfor cultural hybridization. As Bhabhaputs it, the juxtaposition of culture from the native locale and culture of the place of migration producesa `culture in-between' (Bhabha, 1996, p.54) and hybrid identities becomean inevitable condition. Theseidentities `disassembleall forms of homogenousnational identity' (Baker, 1997,p. 194). They also demanda new vision of that culture and national identity that includes hybrid identities or embracesmultiple ways by which people identify themselves(Edensor, 2002; Morley, 2000).
As well as increasingthe range of resourcesavailable for identity construction, globalisation also led to the emergenceof multiple `others' that madethe inclusion and exclusion processmore complicated. Hence, the establishmentand maintenance of boundariesnecessary for the preservationof `national unity' have becomemore difficult. Permeableboundaries have allowed the arrival of foreigners or `others' easier,breaching national borders and disrupting notions of the `purity' and unity of nation. It was as if `all the membersof the community lived in a paradisical stateof socialharmony' and that things `havechanged for the worseunder the influenceof
22 immigrants and their alien ways' (Morley, 2000, p.210). Therefore,in an effort to protect the unity of nation and national identity, nationalism increasinglyarticulates homogeneity among the memberswhile assertingthe difference and inferiority of `others'.
Despite the challengesof globalisation to the state,nation is still an important source of political and cultural identity. Globalisation has raised questionsabout the power of national identity but, contrary to the argumentthat national identity is eliminated under the influence of globalisation, it is renegotiatedand reconstructed.For example,the globalisation of nationalist ideas enhancesthe notion that nations should have unique and distinct identities. As suggestedby Biswas (2002), `assertion of collective identity both as an elementof, as well as in responseto, globalisation is then more nation producing then nation destroying' (p. 194). Edensor(2002) also arguesagainst the idea that globalisation is weakeningnational identity. Implying that globalisation and national identity should not be taken as binary terms but as two interlinked processes,Edensor stressesthat lack of spatial and cultural fixednessin the global world reinforces a new senseof belonging. For example, faced with the threat of the deterritorialisation forces of globalisation, national identity reconstitutes itself by re-territorializing either in local or national contexts.Özlurimli (2005) also describesa revival of nationalism and ethnicity as being a meansof countering the threats of globalization to national distinctiveness.
Nationsare assumed to havea distinct characterthat separatesthem from other nationsthat canbe definedas the nationalcharacter. National character, `a form of positive stereotyping,a collective `we' through an imagined personification', (Pickering, 2001, p. 95) not only generalisescertain characteristicsto the population in general but also representsnational identity as natural or given rather than a social construction (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Pickering, 2001). In other words, it portrays the traits that are the products of social relations as the essentialand natural characteristic,which again can be used to gain consensusfor certain nationalist projects. Herzfeld (2005) highlights that stereotypingcan be used as a homogenising tool or act as a `totalising iconicity' (p.29), which helps to managethe population. Having deprived the `other' of certain positive properties,stereotyping could also be employed by the totalitarian regimes as an instrument in the repressionof minority
23 groups. While stereotypingcan be employedto emphasise`our' national distinctiveness,it can also be used to attribute prejudice to outside groupsthat justifies their exclusion (Pickering, 2001).
National characteralso provides commonality and distinctivenessfor the membersof a nation in a world that consistsof many nations. Even though both national identity and national characterseem to have the samemeaning, as Perry Anderson (1992) notes,there is a distinction betweenthese two concepts.According to Anderson, characteras a concept covers all the traits of an individual or a group, while identity as a notion involves self-awareness: Identity in other words, always possessesa reflexive or subjectivedimension, while charactercan at the limit remain purely objective, somethingperceived by others without the agentbeing consciousof it. What obtains for individuals holds good for peoples.If national characterwas thought to be a settleddisposition, national identity is a self-consciousprojection (Anderson, 1992,p. 268).
Andersonalso argues that therehas been a shift from the discourseof national characterto the discourseof nationalidentity andit wasthe declineof the notion of nationalcharacter that allowedthe rise of the discourseof nationalidentity.
Media and National Identity
Just like nations and national identity, the developmentof the media cannot be separatedfrom the developmentof modern societies.Acting as a manufacturerand distributor of symbolic materials, the media have transformedthe individual's sense of self and community and restructuredthe ways in which individuals relate to one another and to themselves.However, it is not a one-way process,because as well as reflecting and constituting the modern society, the media were also constitutedby it (Thompson, 1995).
One of the important impacts of the developmentof the media has been a changein the senseof place and time. In many traditional communities, it was the shared experienceand spatial proximity that defined the senseof belonging. With mediated
24 experiences,this commonality is no longer defined by a sharedlocale. Fostering relations betweenthe absentothers as if they were presentand creating a co- existence,the media have weakenedself-formation and createdcommunities without a place (Thompson, 1995).As a result, now individuals can be a part of a community without sharingthe samelocale.
An increasein mediatedexperiences created the conditions for temporal simultaneity. The temporal simultaneity of mediatedexperiences enhances a senseof co-existenceeven among people who are in other physical places(Giddens, 1991).It has `an effect of synchronisationof cultural experiencesacross large distances' especially for migrant populations (Morley, 2000, p. 168).New communication technologiesnot only createa link betweenthe dispersedmigrant populationsand their nations but also promote a senseof belonging and social unity among its audience.They allow immigrants to maintain a link betweentheir homelandand national identity. For example,in the caseof Kurdish people, MED TV not only presentedan opportunity for ethnic broadcastingthat national regulationsin Turkey did not allow at the time, but also createda feeling of community in the Diasporas. But, Bhabha (1999) raises a concern about the notion of `national temporality' by asking `if the virtual community sharesthe essentialtemporal structureof the modern nation-form and its social imaginary, then what will prevent the reproduction on the net of the worst excessof nationalism and xenophobia' (p.ix).
The media transform the processof construction of self-identity by introducing new forms of symbolic materials. Constantly introducing new worlds, new lifestyles, different beliefs and cultures, the media expandand transform the resourcesavailable to individuals for self-formation. In a sense,`mediated experience' (Giddens, 1991, p.26) or `mediatedworldliness' (Thompson, 1995,p. 34) shapethe individuals' changing senseof the world. However, it does not meanthat local experiencesand face-to-faceinteractions are no longer important, but that many materials that contribute to the senseof personal identity have becomemediated (Moores, 2000).
As well asintroducing new forms of symboliccultural materials to people'slives, the mediaalso benefit from traditions,especially in the articulationof national identity.Like collectivememory and symbols, traditions also contribute to the sense
25 of belonging, strengtheningthe links with the past, giving a senseof continuity and transmitting a national identity. Even though traditions seemto be threatenedby modern culture, the media have reshapedthe identity formation aspectsof traditions. They have taken traditions out of face-to-facecontexts and re-embeddedthem in new locales and in new contexts.By fixing them on a medium and transferring them from generationto generation,the mediation of traditions actually enablesthem to survive rather than lead to their demise(Thompson, 1995). The repetition or practice is an important factor in the lifespan of traditions, especially consideringthat most traditions are invented (Hobsbawnand Ranger, 1983). Theseinvented traditions face the risk of disappearingunless they are integratedinto daily life and repeatedin everyday activities. It is important to note, however, that despiteappearing to be fixed and unchanging,traditions are constantlynegotiated and transformed.
The formation of nations, accordingto Anderson (1993), happenedin part as a result of the massmedia. Print media such as fictional books and newspapersparticularly, contributed to the rise of national consciousnessand the nation as `imagined community'. With print media, languagebecame standardised and gave people the opportunity to better understandand communicatewith eachother. This standard language,that later became`national', helped to disseminatenational consciousness among people. Anderson also suggeststhat the conceptof `empty time' allowed people to imagine the simultaneousoccurrence of eventsacross time and space. Knowing that the media were being consumedby the absentothers led, in a similar way, to the imagining of a community and the conceptualisationof nation. However, advancesin new media technologiesmake it necessaryto extendAnderson's theory about the relationship betweenthe print media and nation as the developmentof different forms of media have also contributed to the conceptualisationof nation. For example,broadcasting has played a crucial role in promoting a senseof national identity and helped to foster a senseof national unity as well as providing a focus for national identification (Morley & Robins, 1995; Barker, 1997).
The media play a crucial role in defining and renegotiatinga national identity by contributing to the processof imagination and invention of a national identity through the representationof cultural forms such as landscapes,everyday places, is events,cultural beliefs, habits and routines. The articulation of national identity
26 sustainedby the disseminationof mediatedimages, narratives, landscapes, events, habits and tradition through programmes,adverts, books, films and so on. These forms work becausethey are naturalisedand interwoven into the daily practicesof life; they are embeddedin the routines of everydaylife and disseminatedas part of the daily ritual. By circulating imagesand narrativesof national cultural symbols,the national media also provide a basefor a national identity (Edensor,2002). Also, the media do not just representa nation but also redefine it in the way they representit. By articulating national cultural values and mediating national symbols embeddedin the social routines of life, the media presentsits audiencewith a nation in symbolic form. In its representation,the national media generally portray the nation as united, homogenousand stable,making differencesbased on gender,ethnicity and class invisible.
The languageof the media contributesto the definition of who `we' are. The usage of `we' in the media discoursecreates a bond betweenthe audienceand the media. The media `usethe nationalisedsyntax of hegemony,speaking to and for the nation' (Billig, 1995,p. 98), especially in the political and editorial columns of the print media, to enhancethe senseof unity. The nationalist discoursethat dominates particularly the foreign news createsa senseof `we'. Moreover, the structureof the news that separates`home' and `foreign' news also encouragesthe processof imagining a national community (Billig, 1995). In this way, the media help nationalism to be naturalisedand internalisedwithout being questioned.
In contrastto the positivelight shedon `us', the `others'are identified by negative stereotypesin the media.By giving a stereotypicalrepresentation of the `other',the media also provide a basefor the reconstructionof `our' identity becausethe depiction of the `other' is related to `us' and how `we' define ourselves.Creation of `enemies' of the nation by the national media enforcesethnocentric and nationalist perceptionsamong people. Thus, with their representationof the `enemy', the media contribute to the construction of a nation and a feeling of unity among the members of the nation (Tsagarousianou,1999). Another way of reinforcing people's attitudes and perceptionsis disseminatingold cultural myths or negativeportrayals of minorities or neighbouring countries. As well as reinforcing the conceptof `enemy', `our' articulation of such representationsby the media also leadsto the fear of losing
27 identity,purity andbecoming a minority in `our' homeland.As a result,nationalistic feelingsand perceptions are enhanced towards the `others'.
The media can also be an important weaponduring conflicts by provoking hatred. Such employmentof the media was as seenin the examplesof Rwandaand the former Yugoslavia. Terzis (2001) also points to how both the Greek and the Turkish media initiated a conflict in the Imia/ Kardak Aegeanislets crisis in 1996,nearly bringing both countriesto the brink of war. A flag had beenplaced on the islet by a Greek politician and was later removedby Turkish journalists. The story was reported in both countries and led to further incidents and media coveragefull of nationalistic discoursesand representations.As a result, both the Turkish and the Greek media increasedtension betweenthe two countries.Although the media is a strong instrument in shapingnationalist perceptionsabout the `other', the audienceis not passively influenced by them. In receiving the messageand renegotiatingits meaning it should be noted that not everyonein the audienceaccepts the categorisationor placementof the `us' and `them' division. Somechallenge the binary opposition constructionsof the media and resist their messages.
The media link national public life with the private lives of its citizens and mediatea senseof personaland collective identity. The term `public' is related to state activities while `private' refers to the personalrelations outside the control of the state(Thompson, 1995). By penetratinginto the private lives of people, especially broadcasting,the media forge `a link betweenthe dispersedand disparatelisteners and the symbolic heartland of national life' and have `a role in promoting a senseof communal identity within its audienceat both regional and national level' (Cardiff & Scannellquoted in Morley, 2000, p. 106). With the developmentof the media, any event can be turned into a public event, even though the public is not presentat the place of its occurrence.By demonstratingsocial eventsas public eventsand taking them into the private spheresof homes,the media are linking the national public spherewith the private lives of its citizens (Morley, 2000). For example,nationalist ceremonies,in which national identities are performed in the most recognisable ways, are broadcastinto the homes of individuals. Repetition of theseceremonies, as well as their increasedmediation helps them to be inscribed in the memory and acceptedas a part of social life (Edensor,2002). The media also connectthe
28 dispersedaudience together. Watching television or listening to radio can give a senseof unity by knowing that many others are doing the samething at the same time. It helps people relate to others and produce coherenceamong the audience, contributing to a sharedsense of reality (Morley, 2000). Yet, suchpractice is not only limited to broadcasting,as newspapersalso provide imaginary links with other membersof a national community (Anderson, 1993).
The media are an arenain which different representationsof `us' and `others' struggle for dominance.Despite the attemptsof hegemonicdiscourse and representationsto fix the meaning of national identity, there is an ongoing struggle for alternative representationsand constructionsof it. Even representationsof the samenational cultural forms can be usedto reconstructnational identity in contradicting forms. The hegemonicversion of national identity is reflected through the media because,in the public sphere,the national media representthe nation: Whoever is included or excluded from this public sphereis also included and excluded from the symbolic nation they produce.As Morley (2000) observes,`when the culture of that public sphere(thus of the nation) is in effect racialisedby the form the find naturalization of one ... of ethnicity, then only somecitizens of nation it a homely and welcoming place' (p. 118).
The media have not only becomeglobal themselvesbut have also contributed to globalisation through their circulation of imagesand discourses.The introduction of new worlds, new life styles, beliefs and different cultures through the media has increasedthe range of sourcesfor identity construction.Using globally transformed cultural products, people constantly define their conceptsof nation and national identity. As well as providing multiple resourcesfor identity formation, the global media also make people aware of cultures different from their own and encourage awarenessof the `others'. Such representationof the `other' may facilitate the production of a national identity basedon difference from the `other' as well as develop an understandingand tolerance towards the different `other', dependingon how they are represented.
It hasbeen argued that globalisationhas diminished and threatened the powerof nationstates within which the mediaoperate. Combined with the increasedmobility
29 that makesboundaries more permeable,the new communicationtechnologies have brought somefear that they underminethe capacity of national statesto police the circulation of the mediatedinformation. The issueof controlling who crossesthe threshold and entersthe sacredspace of nation and home has becomemore challenging (Morley and Robins, 1995;Morley, 2000). There is also a fear that with the globalisation of the media, national culture is invaded by foreign cultural factors and that national identity is being threatened.Yet, focusing only on the negative impact of media technologieson the nation and national identity, and claiming that nations have lost their power, is undervaluing the continuing importanceof nations. Because,through market definitions, frequency licensing, cultural policy and advertising,the power of nation statesstill continues(Straubhaar, 2001). When globalisation is perceivednot only as a threat to national sovereigntyand national identities but as surpassingthe regulatory capacity of nations as well, attemptsto 're- territorialize the media' becomeexpressions about the distinctivenessand integrity of regional and local cultures againstthe forces of globalisation (Morley &Robins, 1995). Despite the global circulation of information, national cultural factors still play a role in the selection and interpretation of messages.Edensor (2002) notesthat the globalisation of the media has not diminished the ways in which national identity is representedbut on the contrary `hasunleashed a torrent of national representations, comprising a welter of stereotypicalportrayals and symbols as well as avenuesfor dissentingand dissonantrepresentations' (p. 142). Audienceswho receive symbolic forms are situatedin a specific time and place, which meansthat the sourceof appropriation is still national. Therefore, the national media still play a central role in people's everyday lives. People still read national newspaperand watch and listen to national broadcasts.Straubhaar (2001) suggeststhat the oneswho watch the globalized channelsare mostly the middle and upper classelites, as the accessto thesechannels is limited by economic and cultural capital.
On the other hand, the impact of globalisation on national cultures through the media cannot be ignored. Even though national cultures still shapethe content of their cultural forms, they are also affected by the spreadof global models. Straubhaar (2001) arguesthat adaptationof thesemodels to national cultures and circumstances results in the localisation or hybridisation of theseglobal patterns.Using these patterns,new materials and symbolic resources,national producerscreate cultural
30 products that are adaptedto national audiences.In other words, hybridization is the interaction of local elementswith global onesto createnew forms of culture: Sometimesthe local culture only slightly adaptsto foreign elementsbut sometimes the result is the extinction of local culture and language(Straubhaar, 2001).
The global media are seenas a threat to national identities becausethey replace national identities with hybrid ones.Barker (1997) states`globalisation has increased the range of sourcesand resourcesavailable for identity constructionsallowing for the production of hybrid identities' (p. 191). Hence, it can be arguedthat rather than threateningor leading to the demiseof national identities, hybrid identities demanda new vision of that culture and national identity as globalisation has created conditions for a more inclusive version of national identity as well as making cultural purity a fantasy (Edensor,2002). Therefore,a new re-articulation of national identity is required which will include thesehybrid identities or embracemultiple ways in which people identify themselves.
31 CHAPTER 2: EVOLVING NATIONAL IDENTITIES
This chapterdiscusses how different conceptsof Turkish Cypriot identity have been constituted over the years.In the analysis,as well as focusing on historical factors, I also study the economic,political and cultural perspectivesthat may have produced, renegotiatedand transformedthe conceptof Turkish Cypriot identity. The aim of this part of the study is not to discussthe existenceof a genuineTurkish Cypriot identity but to concentrateon the processof its construction.
Identity Definitions
The construction of an identity is an ongoing processwhich becomesvery clear in Cyprus in the different ways by which both communitiesrefer to themselves:One describesitself as Greek, Greek Cypriot, Cypriot Greek or Cypriot while the other calls itself Turk, Turkish Cypriot, Cypriot Turk, Cypriot or, as somewriters do, Turkishcypriot. Each term indicatesa particular conceptionof national identity that the person identifies with (Ramm, 2002/2003;Papadakis, 2005) and each signifies a certain type of cultural and political belonging as well as a vision for the future. For example, while Greeksand Turks view themselvesas the extensionof their respectivemotherlands, Greece and Turkey, the term Cypriot refers to the idea that `Cyprus has its own sui generis characterand thus must be viewed as an entity independentfrom both the motherlandsof the two main communities' (italics in original) (Kahn, 2002/2003,p. 58).
Turkish Cypriot, on the other hand, is a generalterm that containsthese two oppositional terms, Turkish and Cypriot'. In somecontexts, people use the term with a stresson Turkishness,yet in others it highlights Cypriotness.Who the `other' is also has an influence on its definition and meaning. For instance,Turkish Cypriots stresstheir Cypriotnessin relation to mainland Turks but their Turkishnesswhen
1 In this study, I will use the term Turkish Cypriot, not as an indication of its preferredmeaning but becauseit is the commonreference in the literature about Cyprus. I will also employ the term Cypriot rather than Turkishcypriot becauseagain it is a more common and widely usedterm.
32 positioned against Greek Cypriots. Even though word-by-word translation of the term Turkish Cypriot (which is how the community is referred to in English) is Türk Kibrisla, what Turkish Cypriots call themselvesgenerally in Turkish is Kibrisla Türk (Cypriot Turk). Examining the meaningsof both terms, one could perceive that Turkish Cypriot conceptualisesthe community as being Cypriot but characterisesit as Turkish while the other, Cypriot Turk (or Kibrish Türk) describesitself as being Turkish but being from Cyprus2.Recent developments, adding to this confusing list of identities, have brought new identity conceptualisationsas well. Now accordingto research(KADEM, 2007), rather than being a term that connoteseither Turkishness or Cypriotness,being Turkish Cypriot or Kibrish Türk refers to a new meaning that consistsof equal degreeof Turkishnessand Cypriotnesswhich, it can be argued, indicates a national identity distinct from both mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, the conceptof Cypriotism is now also being expressedwith a stresson ethnicity that shows itself especially in written literature as Turkishcypriot.
The politics of identity has played an important role in the creation of the Cyprus Problem as identity has always been expressedthrough nationalist discourses (Calotychos, 1998). Attempts to construct a Cypriot identity failed as a result of competing nationalisms in Cyprus that did not allow the formation of a common Cyprus state and nationhood (Kizilytirek, 2002/2003; Kahn, 2002/2003).Despite having lived together for centuries,Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots developed different and competing visions of identity and belonging that resulted in two conflicting visions for the future. The national/ethnic consciousnessof both communities was cultivated by Hellenic and Turkish nationalismsand led both to see themselvesas part of Greek and Turkish nations rather than a separateCypriot nation. Nationalist narratives and ethnicization of politics over the years overcame the principles of tolerance and recognition of identities on which Cypriotism needed to be constructed(Kahn, 2002/2003). Instead,as Constantinou(2007) stresses, Cypriot identities are constructedin a hyphenatedform which meansthat Cypriots had to becomeGreeks or Turks:
2 Turkish Cypriots call Greek Cypriots Kibrulr Rum or Rum. In a similar way, in English the term Greek Cypriot emphasisesCypriotness but describesit as Greek. In Turkish Kibrish Rum means Greeksfrom Cyprus. For Turkish Cypriots there is also a distinction betweenthe mainland Greeks and the onesin Cyprus: Greeksin Greeceare referred to as Yunanli but the onesin Cyprus are called Rum. In this researchI will translateKibrish Rum or Rum as Greek Cypriots.
33 The most disturbing thing about being a Cypriot is that one can only be a Greek or Turkish Cypriot. PostcolonialCypriot identity is quintessentiallyand inescapably hyphenated;and hyphenatedacross a fixed Greek-Turkishaxis. Being simply and singly Cypriot is a constitutional impossibility' (Constantinou,2007, p.248).
The organisationof public life along ethnic lines by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus enhancedthe institutionalisation of separateethnic identities. Thus, as Constantinou(2007) maintains, modern governmentsand a politics basedon the ethnic-nationaldistinction not only made it difficult to use identities more flexibly but were also far from creating Cypriotness.
Identity becamea problematic issuefor Cypriots with the emergenceof nationalism in the age of modernity which, accordingto somescholars, provides a good example for the study of issuessuch as the different effects of modernity and the development of nationalism and ethnicity (Bryant, 2004; Theophylactou,1995). Cyprus' encounterwith modernity did not form a Cypriot identity but resulted in the emergenceof two conflicting nationalismswith two different conceptionsof national identity. This is why, rather than being singular, there are different approachesto and readingsof the history of Cyprus. As one scholar describes,`there's no "history" of Cyprus, there are "histories"' (Nevzat, 2005, p.28). Struggling for acceptance,both nations' competing histories try to tell the story of their nation in their own way. According to Lacher and Kaymak (2005), it is the competing and diverse understandingsoffered by the official Cyprus histories of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots that actually lies at the heart of the Cyprus conflict. For example, claims about the existenceof two national communities on the island have two different referencepoints in history: While Greek Cypriots claim a 3,000 years legacy to Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots take the Ottoman conquestin 1571 as the starting point of their history on the island (Calotychos, 1998; Bryant, 2004). Even the description of the Cyprus problem is different for the two communities on the island: Greek Cypriots emphasizethe eventsof 1974 and presentthe Cyprus problem as an international issue in which Turkey invaded an independentstate. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, claim that it is an inter-communal issueand focus their arguments on the inter-communal fighting in the 1960's and the Greek Cypriot nationalism 1998; movement called enosis (union with Greece)(Calotychos, 1998; Papadakis,
34 Anastasiou,2002; Tocci, 2001). As the Greek Cypriots' version of history tries to normalize the pre-1974 era by ignoring the strife in the aftermathof independence, the Turkish Cypriots' version tries to legitimize the Turkish intervention as the logical outcomeof the inter-communalviolence and their senseof insecurity in relation to Greek Cypriots.
Cyprus' Encounter with Modernity and Nationalism
It was around the end of the Ottoman administration and the start of the British rule in 1878 that Cyprus' encounterwith modernity brought many significant changesto Cypriots' lives. Adopting an ideology of modernization,they also developedethnic nationalism. The emergenceof two conflicting nationalismsand political claims as a result of modernity led to what Bryant (2004) describesas `ethnic estrangement' (p.2). The demarcationof the communities in Cyprus as `Greeks' and `Turks' seemedmore obvious with the nationalist imaginations developedin modern times, especiallywhen they constructedeach other as the enemy.
The Ottoman conquestof Cyprus in 1571 is an important starting point in Cyprus history as it was with their arrival that Turks and Turkish ethnicity cameto exist on the island (Kizilytirek, 1983;Nevzat, 2005; Beratli, 1993)3.Having taken the island from the Venetians,the Ottoman Empire brought a number of Turkish people to settle in Cyprus. By organizing a settlementprogramme for a large number of Anatolians, mainly of Turkish ethnic origin, the Ottomansintroduced a Muslim community to the island that already had a predominantly Greek Orthodox community (Berath, 1993). The traditional Ottoman systemwas basedon the millet system,which organizedthe communities according to their religious identity. Each millet had its own religious leader and was autonomousin administering its own affairs. Therefore, membershipof the community and definitions of identity were basedon religion rather than ethnicity or nationality. The identities were constructed as Christian and Muslim, not as Greek and Turk.
3For a brief timetableof events,see Appendix.
35 The changefrom the traditional Ottoman systemto modern politics and the new institutional and administrative structureof the British administration had a transforming effect on the people of Cyprus. Replacingthe existing religious autonomy and communal foundationswith a centralizedstate was instrumentalin the transformation of the identities (Pollis, 1998). First of all, the existing hierarchies changed:For Muslim Turks, even though the British administration of the island was seenas a temporary situation, it not only loosenedtheir links with the Ottoman government (if not cut them completely), but also reducedthem from being a minority that governedto a minority being governed(Nevzat, 2005). The first experienceof this changecame as the British establishedthe Legislative Council, a representativebody constitutedof the electedmembers from both communities as well as the representativesof the British administration.Although a similar representativebody had existed under the Ottomansand was not so extraordinary, according to Nevzat (2005), it made a big difference for the Muslim Turks. The difference was that the Ottoman council was basedon equal representationof each community, irrespectiveof their numbers,while the British legislative council was basedon the representationof the communities,not on equal basis,but on their proportion to the overall population. As a result, the British legislative council included nine Christian Orthodox and three Muslim Turks with six British members. `This', Nevzat states,`came as the first rude shock of British rule' (p. 117). This process,notes Pollis (1998), also facilitated the reformation of identities as Greeks and Turks to representthe interestsof two communities. She claims that `this organ not only fostered the creation of distinct ethnic identities but ascribedto them political significance by structurally pitting each group againstthe other in competition for resourcesand power' (p.93).
The replacementof the Ottoman governing systemwith the British administration also forced people to redefine their allegiancesand relationship to the state.The most important redefinition was the transformation of Cypriots from being `subjects' to `citizens'. The modern politics that the British introduced in Cyprus basedits mode of legitimisation on the concept of equal citizenship. Taking part in such decision- making processesprovided Cypriots with the self-consciousnessthat turned them into individuals and politically active citizens, as well as developing the idea of political autonomy (Nevzat, 2005). According to Habermas(1998), the
36 implementation of citizenship combined with membershipto a culturally defined community strengthenssocial integration and pavesthe way towards imagining a national community which was also the casefor the membersof eachof the two communities of the island.
In this context, the issue of identity becameincreasingly problematic for Cypriots. As the conceptof national community developedthe demandto stateone's allegianceto it increasedas well. In Cyprus, this was especiallythe casewith a sect called linobambakol which was Greek Orthodox but convertedto Islam during Ottoman rule to avoid persecutionand benefit from the opportunities available to Muslims. Even though linobambakoi (or linobambakoi) claimed to be Muslim and had the appearanceof Turks, they practiced Christianity in secret.Not having a fixed religious identity led them to be called linobambakol, which meant linen and cotton. The shifting nature of their religious identities was mainly ignored by both communities,but when ethnic/nationalistclaims and aspirationsgained strength,the linobambakoi were pressuredto choosean identity betweenOrthodox Greek and Muslim Turk (Gtirkan, 2006; Constantinou;2007; Bryant, 2004). The shifting or
perhapsambivalent identities of linobambakoi, saysBryant (2004) `became important only in a period in which it was consideredimportant for them to declare their "true" Greek identity through professing their "true" faith' (p. 66).
The pressand seculareducation in Cyprus, which were two important tools in the disseminationof nationalism and the imagining of a nation, developedduring British Ünlü rule. Referring to The Cyprus Blue Book of statistics in 1889-1990, mentions that there were seven Greek newspapersand one Turkish newspaperbeing published in the first years of British rule (Ünlü, no date). Claude Deleval Cobham,who compiled and published a bibliography of Cyprus also mentionedthe publication of 47 newspapersbetween 1878 and 1908,28 of them being in Greek, 11 in English and six in Turkish (Cobham, 1908). The print media contributed to the imagining of a national community by creating relations with the `absentones', encouraginga sense of co-existencewith other membersof their community. Politicians in particular benefited from this characteristicof the media as they neededthe newspapersboth to instruct and createa `public' for themselvesin order to get support for their causes.
37 They took advantageof thesenewspapers, as the main sourceof information in Cyprus at the time, by using them to control public opinion (Bryant, 2004). Languagewas anotherelement in the developmentof the national consciousness among Cypriots. In Cyprus, although there is no convergencebetween the language Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots use, languageand religion were not always separatedas distinctly. In somevillages, many Muslim Turks actually spoke Greek as their first language.Being isolated from their ethnic community due to poor transportationand communication,these Muslim Turks adoptedGreek as their main language(Nevzat, 2005; Kizilyürek & Gautier- Kizilyt rek, 2004). The domination of the middle classby Greek Cypriots might have also increasedthe economic and social motivation for Turkish Cypriots to use Greek (Kizilyürek & Gautier- Kizily(Irek, 2004). Apart from the languageitself, dialects spokenon the island were different from the official forms of theselanguages. As Bryant (2004) explains, the Greek spokenby Cypriots was different from katharevousa,the official form of Greek or dhimotiki, the spokenlanguage in Greece.In the Turkish Cypriots' case, even though their dialect was not too different from the languagespoken in Anatolia, they still had difficulties with the languageused for bureaucraticpurposes which was influenced by Arabic.
Education, which was another important tool in the disseminationof nationalism, went through a transformation during the British administration as well. Under the Ottoman Empire, lessonswere conductedby religious leaders.While the content of it focused educationin the schools of Muslim Turks was basedmostly on religion, on national issuesin the Greek Orthodox schools(Kizilytlrek, 1983). Describing the educationas ineffective, the British administratorsset out to changethe content and context of educationin Cyprus which also increasednational narratives.In order to give children education in their own languages,teachers and teaching materials were brought from Greeceand Turkey. The new curriculum included Greeceand Turkey's histories and geographieswhich encouragedthe construction of national identities be it among the Cypriot youth as Greeksand Turks. It can arguedthat was through Bryant (2004) educationthat Cypriots learnedhow to be Greeksand Turks or, as but how be puts it, `through education Cypriots learnednot how to think nationally to Cyprus just nationally' (p. 127). The education in the schoolsof was not a nationalistic propagandatool, but also a socialization process,which taught the
38 young generationto identify with their community's values and keep those values alive. Pollis (1998) suggeststhat by separatingthe schoolsfor Greek and Turkish studentsand allowing theseschools to recruit teachersfrom Greeceand the Ottoman Empire (later Turkey), the British actually encouragedthe constructionand politicization of ethnic and national identities through education.However, as well as acceptingthat educationwas a prime areain which community segregationwas institutionalized, Nevzat (2005) challengesthe idea that it was the British who createdthis segregation.He arguesthat when the British arrived, nationalism was already in place and, to someextent, being disseminatedthrough Greek Cypriot educationalchannels.
Development of Nationalism and National Identity in Cyprus
The changesthat took place in Cyprus during its encounterwith modernity were expressedthrough the medium of nationalism. Calhoun (1997) claims that nationalism has different dimensions:as discourse,project and evaluation. While nationalism producesparticular versions of thought and languageas discourse,it also setsout to advancethe interestsof the nation as its project. In evaluation, it fosters political and cultural ideologies to createa senseof loyalty and belief. In Cyprus, nationalism within the two main ethnic communities on the island developedas different discourses,projects and evaluation and failed to construct a collective sense of Cypriotism. Despite having lived in Cyprus together,both communities imagined themselvesas part of other nations, namely Greeceand Turkey. As Stavrinides (1999) explains `thus, although Andreas and All may be natives and residentsof Cyprus and regard the island as their common homeland,they do not normally regard themselvesas compatriots but rather as neighbours' (p. 15). Therefore, rather than joining together in an anti-colonial struggle for independencefrom British rule, thesetwo communities' nationalism movementsdemanded enosis (unification with Greece)and taksim (partition) and they both struggledto integrate with their so- called motherlandsof Greeceand Turkey insteadof working towards independence. As a result, the conceptof Cypriotism did not develop among Cypriots until recent years.
39 There are many suggestedreasons for the developmentof such nationalismsin Cyprus. Some explain it as the result of the foreign policy goals of countries such as Britain, Greeceand Turkey as well as a result of Britain's colonial policies (Pollis, 1998). It is also explainedby the internal dynamics that point at the elites and leaders of both communities who shapedtheir nationalistic frameworks along with their nationalistic ideals (Kizilyürek, 1988). Even though the modernisationprocess and colonial policies, as well as geography,demographic changes, socio-cultural factors and economic factors played a role in the Cyprus conflict (Morag, 2004), they fall short of explaining the continuing stalematetoday. Therefore,it is hard not to agree with Tocci (2001) who highlights irrational fear and prejudice in the communities as the main culprits.
The fear and anxiety of Turkish Cypriots about being a minority in a Greek state developedin the form of Turkish nationalism and as a resistanceto the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement.From the start, Turkish Cypriots opposedthe enosis movement and were concernedthat the island would be incorporatedinto Greece (Kizilytirek, 2002,2003; Beratli, 1991;Nevzat, 1005). Even though a nationalist consciousnessamong Turkish Cypriots becameobvious during the 1920's, which suggeststhat they were influenced by the developmentstaking place in Turkey, nationalism was discernible among the elites even as early as Britain's arrival to the island. Nevzat (2005) recalls that the nationalism among Turkish Cypriots emerged first as the concept of an Ottoman nation and then in the wake of the Young Turk revolution in Turkey, as the idea of a Turkish nation. After the establishmentof the Republic of Turkey, a strong identification with the Turkish nation took place among Turkish Cypriots. In other words, Turkish nationalism among the Turkish Cypriots was not just the consequenceof the Greek Cypriot enosisdemands but also the nationalistic movementsdiffusing from the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey. In either case,as Kizilyiirek (2002) summarizes,Turkish Cypriots went through a transformation of their identity from being a `post-Ottoman' minority in isolation to being consciousof their Turkish identity as part of the Turkish nation. Meanwhile, at the time of Britain's arrival, there was already discernible nationalism among the Greek Cypriot elite. Influenced by the Greek Independencewar againstthe Ottomans,the reconstruction of Greek religious identity into an ethnic/nationalist identity was already underway (Pollis, 1998).
40 The start of the First World War and the entry of Britain and the Ottoman Empire into the war on opposing sidescreated an ambivalent situation for Turkish Cypriots. On the one side was the administration that ruled them and on the other, the Ottoman Empire to whom they were still emotionally attached.With the start of the War, the ruling groups in particular expressedtheir support for and allegiancewith the British (Kizilyttrek, 2003,1983; Egemen,2006; Evre, 2004). Yet, the decline of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War brought fresh anxiety about their future in terms of security and at the prospectof being a minority in a Greek state,making them feel isolated. Meanwhile, the new generationof Turkish Cypriots who were influenced by Turkish nationalist ideas identified themselveswith the Kemalist movement and were critical of the British administration (Canefe,2007, Egemen, 2006, Kizily(irek, 2003,2002). The emergenceof a Turkish resistancemovement in Anatolia gave them new hope. The establishmentof the new Turkish stateplayed an important role in the reconstructionof the identity of Turkish Cypriots, which meant sheddingtheir identity as the Muslims of Cyprus and adopting an ethnic/national Turkish identity. Now they were not the Muslims of Cyprus but Turks (Nevzat, 2005; Assmusen,2004). However, they were not just adopting a national identity but also the Turkish nationalism that had encouragedit.
Following the Treaty of Lausanne,the separationbetween the two communities becamemore apparent,leading to'the formation of two separatepublic spheresin Cyprus (Tombazos,2003). The Treaty4saw Turkey renounceits rights to Cyprus, leaving it out of the national territories of the new Turkish state,and made Turkish Cypriots the citizens of a British Crown Colony but attachmentand identification with the Turkish nation continued to exist among Turkish Cypriots (Nevzat, 2005). The decision to follow Atattirk's project of modernization was an indication of the Turkish Cypriots' orientation towards Turkey. Reforms such as secularisation,the exchangingof the Arabic alphabetfor the Latin one and the replacing of the fez with European-stylehat were not obligatory for Turkish Cypriots, who were British citizens, but `Muslims in Cyprus immediately and voluntarily adoptedthese new statementsof their identity, even while their presumed"brothers" in Anatolia were in
4 The Treaty of Lausannewas signed on the 24thJuly 1923,but came into force on the 60'of June 1924.
41 the throes of cultural upheaval' (Bryant, 2004, p.233). However, even though it seemedthat the majority in Cyprus supportedKemalist reforms (Nevzat, 2005), `as there was no social power enabling the adoption of theseissues on behalf of its own class interest within the social practice of Cyprus, they merely remainedas an ideology which excited the intellectuals' (Ya§in, 1990,p. 67).
Meanwhile, educationbecame one of the main centresfor cultivation of a nationalistic ideology. When the British administration realisedthe role education played in the developmentof nationalism and the constructionof national identities, there were already two fledgling nationalismson the island. Following the 1931 revolt, which startedas a protest againsta taxation proposal and later turned into a nationalistic demonstrationfor enosis,the British administration applied many restrictive measuresto society in generalsuch as abolishing the Legislative Council and bringing educationunder their strict control. They took sectionsthat encouraged Turkish and Hellenic nationalism out of the curriculum, as well as banning the from recruitment of teachersand importation of teaching materials Greeceand Turkey (Kizilyürek, 2002).
Education had a transforming effect on Turkish Cypriots' national identity. Turkish Cypriots saw educationas a way of improving their community, by bringing culture and sophistication and creating politically aware people. Thus, they adopted Atatürk's attemptsat modernization and nationalism into the educationof Turkish Cypriot youth (Bryant, 2004). The teachersand the teachingmaterials that came from Turkey told Turkish Cypriot youth not just about how Atatürk's reforms were history modernizing the country but also the achievementsof Turks throughout that language, encouragedpride in being a Turk. Through such teachingsof the culture and history of Turkey, a conceptof nation and identity was constructedaround the facilitated notion of Turkishnessamong the youth. Education the conceptualisation into of a Turkish Cypriot identity as part of the Turkish nation, socialising the youth identifying with the Turkish nation. In other words, educationtaught Turkish Cypriot youth how to be Turkish. When the British administration realised the strengthof Turkish national sentimentin Turkish Cypriot schoolsthey tried to stop it. As an Islam Lycee in example,they changedthe name of Turkish Lycee to an attempt to prevent identification with Turkish nationalism and once again make religion and
42 tradition the focus of identity (Kizilyurek, 2002; Nevzat, 2005). Yet the modernisationprocess had already led Turkish Cypriots to shedtheir religious identity as `Muslims' and define themselveswith an ethnic and secularone as `Turks of Cyprus' (Kizilyürek & Gautier-KizilyUrek, 2004). Even though representativesof the Turkish Cypriot community initially employed both terms in their official correspondences,they increasingly adoptedthe term `Turk' to refer to the community (Gt rkan, 2006; An, 1997)5.
Overall, there were two important factors that shapedthe nationalism movement among Turkish Cypriots: One of them was Turkish nationalism and the other was opposition to enosis(Kizilyürek, 2002). In the Turkish Cypriots' view, there were two ethnic communities on the island with different language,culture and religion from each other's but similar to the nations they belongedto. Turkish Cypriots believed that they belongedto the Turkish nation and that they should be a part of it. Hence, when it becameclear with the Treaty of Lausannethat Turkey would not reintegrateCyprus, some choseto emigratethere. Economic motives, insecurity and fear causedby the island's possible integration with Greecewere among the reasons for the emigration, but nationalistic sentimentstowards Turkey also facilitated the emigration of Turkish Cypriots from the island. The first Turkish consul, Asaf Bey, who was appointedto Cyprus in 1925,was claimed to have encouragedTurkish Cypriots to take Turkish nationality and emigrateto Turkey (Gürkan, 2006, Nevzat, 2005, Kizilyiirek, 2002). Actually, from the start of the British rule, a considerable number of Turkish Cypriots had already emigratedto Turkey, bringing the number of Turkish Cypriots on the island to a considerablylower level.
The other factor that shapednationalism among Turkish Cypriots was the Greek Cypriot nationalism movement, enosis.Regarding enosis as a Greek Cypriot project that neither included them nor held a future for them, Turkish Cypriots opposedthe union of the island with Greece.The sufferings of the Muslim community in Crete after joining Greecein 1915, and during the invasion of Izmir in Turkey in 1919- 1922 were still fresh in the collective memories of Turkish Cypriots which made the idea of being part of a Greek statea sourceof anxiety for them (Kizilyürek, 1983;
s Theofficial useof the term 'Turks of Cyprus'started in the mid-1949(An, 1997).
43 2002, Nevzat, 2005). They believed that the annexationof Cyprus to Greecewould be the end of their community. Therefore,whenever Greek Cypriots raised such demandsduring the Ottoman time, Turkish Cypriots arguedthat the island should be returned to the Ottomansand later, with the establishmentof the new Turkish state, they demandedthat Turkey should annex the island. Otherwise,they supported British rule which they regardedas being better than under Greek rule (Nevzat, 2005) leading interpret loyalty British. , someto this as to the
The opposition to enosisnot only took the shapeof Turkish nationalism but actually they both fed on each other (Kizilyürek, 2002). By emphasizingthe samenessof the language,religion and culture, Turkish nationalism was not just creating commonality among Turks but also, by reminding them of the victories of the Turks throughout history, it was providing Turkish Cypriots with a mythical past to be proud of. On the other hand, by reviving memoriesof Greek atrocities in Turkey and linking thesewith the Greek Cypriots' enosiscampaign, this nationalism was creating a threat and an enemy for Turkish Cypriots to unite and fight against.So the adoption of Turkish nationalism not only camewith its Turkish identity and its modernisationprocess but also with the notion of an enemy,the `other' that is required for the construction of a national identity.
Despite the deteriorating relationship betweenand contradictory political demandsof the two communities, the Greek Cypriots' armed struggle was to throw off the British and fulfil enosisand initially didn't include Turkish Cypriots. According to Stavrinides (1999), that was because`they assumedthat once enosiswas achieved, the Turkish minority would still be a Turkish minority within a Greek Cyprus, enjoying security and all the other acknowledgedminority rights' (p.33). However, this is not how Turkish Cypriots viewed the issue and the British benefited from this divergence.The British responseto Greek Cypriot attacksinvolved recruiting Turks as an auxiliary police force to control the riots and to help them fight EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston- National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), the armed organisationthat startedthe struggle againstthe British. As a consequence,the relationship betweenthe two communities deterioratedfurther in such a way that Greek Cypriots started seeingTurkish Cypriots as anotherobstacle in the achievementof their national cause.
44 Britain's suggestionof self-determinationafter the SecondWorld War made Turkish Cypriots very uncomfortable. Self-determinationwould be basedon the views of the majority and would have meant unity with Greece.When the suggestionwas made, Greek Cypriots had already united behind the leadershipof the Greek Orthodox Church who had transformeditself from being a spiritual to an ethnic/national leadership(Pollis, 1998). Comparedto their neighbours,Turkish Cypriots lacked such leadership,unity and organisation(Gürkan, 2006, An, 1997). Increased nationalist sentimentscombined with insecurity about the future becauseof Greek Cypriots' demandsand Britain's suggestionof self-determinationled to Turkish Cypriot leadersdeciding to organisefor resistance.The formation of Kibris Adast
TürkAzinliklar Kurumu (KATAK - Association of Turkish Minorities of the Island of Cyprus) in 1943 that later becameKibris Türk Milli Birlik Partisi (the Cyprus Turkish National Union Party) was the first massorganisation of Turkish Cypriots. Its aim was to protect Turkish Cypriots' rights as well as to unite and mobilize them behind nationalistic policies. It was also to help and direct the developmentof the Turkish Cypriot community in economic and cultural issuesin which, comparedto Greek Cypriots, they had been left far behind (Gürkan, 2006).
Meanwhile, the Turkish nationalism that developedin Cyprus was unlike the one in 6 Turkey in that it had a 'pan-Turkist flavour' (Yqin, 1990,p. 67). This could be living explained by four reasons:First, it was normal for a community outside national bordersbut adopting the identity of the Turkish nation to take it on in such a form. Second,the racist and chauvinist ideasthat were spreadingaround the world influenced and specifically in Turkey following the SecondWar World Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. Third, the cultural and ideological sources,values and symbols used in Cyprus to construct a Turkish identity among Turkish Cypriots were in mostly the sameas those used by the pan-Turkist groups Turkey. Fourth, the ruling groups in Cyprus used such nationalism as an ideological weaponto control the population (Yam, 1990).
The Turkish Cypriots' separatistattempt camein the form of a resistancegroup itself Tiurk called Volkan (Volcano), which later restructuredand renamed as
6Pan-Turkism is an ideologyand movement that aims to uniteall Turkic people(Landau, 1995).
45 MukavemetTeckilati (TMT - Turkish Defence Organisation).Its main aim was to fight against Greek Cypriot nationalism and the EOKA militants whom they regardedas their enemy.Now there were two nationalistic groups,opposed to each other, on the island.
In the meantime,Turkish Cypriots developedtheir national policy as taksim (the partition). The importanceof this policy, claims Kizilyürek (1993), is that by making and demandingtaksim, Turkish Cypriot leaderswere making a decision on their future for the first time. He points out that until that time their demandsfor the return of the island or the continuation of the statusquo were dependenton the decisionsof other countries. Their own actions were limited to writing letters or sending telegrams,which didn't go further than expressingtheir reactions.However, with the separatisttaksim policy, they moved to a `historical participation' level which meant they could make decisionson their own initiative and act accordingly rather than relying on others (p.32). The establishmentof TMT in line with the taksim policy was actually a sign of Turkish Cypriot attemptsto operatein this new way.
The establishmentof the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 createda statebut not a nation. That was becausethe republic was not set up as a result of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots' sharedvision of an imagined community but was imposed as a joint effort by Britain, Turkey and Greece.Competing national identities had not allowed a joint national building processbut separateones. The lack of Cypriot nationalism did not support a Cypriot nation and the imagined community for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had already been founded on two different notions and had taken two different shapes.There were no symbols of Cypriotism. Even creating a Cypriot flag proved to be difficult. As Ahmet An (1998) points out, Greek Cypriots protested againstthe red colour of the Turkish flag being used in the Cypriot flag while Turkish Cypriots made the sameobjection to the blue colour of the Greek flag. Thus, a yellow map of Cyprus on a white surfacewith two green olive brancheswas used. Not adopting the flag as theirs and only using it in state offices, both communities continued to wave the Turkish and Greek flags on their national days. A national anthemwas never composedfor the new state;instead the Greek and Turkish national anthemswere played (An, 1998; Tombazos,2003). Meanwhile, both communities had already been celebratingthe national days of their motherlandsand
46 continued to do so even after the establishmentof the Cypriot state.The common elementwas that they both excluded eachother but included two other nations, Greeceand Turkey. Despite their co-existence,sometimes in mixed villages, the social, political and cultural structure of everyday life on the island was at times basedon two separatecommunities and emphasisedthe divergencesbetween them. Communication and collaboration betweenthe two communitieswas actually preventedor made increasingly difficult by the existing political, cultural and educationaldynamics. Having been founded on such a structure,the establishmentof the Republic of Cyprus maintained and reinforced identities along ethnic lines rather than unifying and creating a Cypriot identity (Theophylactou, 1995). In other words, setting up a republic on the basis of two communities actually institutionalised the existing division (Faiz, 2003).
Cypriotismdidn't exist asan identity before1974 and both communitiesdescribed themselvesas Greeks and Turks insteadof Cypriot (Asmussen,2004). Quoting Markides'social categorisation of the identitiesof GreekCypriots, which he suggestscould also be attributed to Turkish Cypriots, Asmussen(2004) notesthat the definition of identity in Cyprus was basedon family, the community of origin (or village) and then the nation in this order. Thus, expressionsof identity would be in the form of a seriesof statementssuch as `I'm Yorgos of the Pantel family, I'm a Potamian (from the village Potamia in the Nicosia district), I'm a Greek Cypriot, and I'm a Greek. I'm Ahmet of the Özgür family, I'm a Potamian,I'm a Turkish Cypriot, and I'm a Turk' (Asmussen,2004, p. 1135).However, in the modern era the order of such classification of identity has changedand the senseof belonging and the definition of identity aligned more with the nation than the region or the family. As Calhoun (1997) remarked,national identities acted as the `trump card' (p. 126) and overcameall other identities in Cyprus. With the emergenceof national consciousness,national identity rather than place or kinship becamethe sourceof identity and solidarity.
The Republicof Cyprusdid not diminishthe importanceof the nationalistprojects of enosisor taksimbut only quietedthem for a while. Actually, the newrepublic meant that `a numberof Greekswho had led the strugglefor enosisand a numberof Turks who hadled the resistanceto enosiswould cometogether to collaboratein the
47 running of the state' (Stavrinides, 1999,p. 38). On the other hand, there were some who advocateda more harmoniousrelationship and cooperationbetween the two communities.Among thesewere two Turkish Cypriot lawyers, Ayhan Hikmet and Ahmet M. Gürkan, who beganpublishing a newspapercalled Cumhuriyet (The Republic) on the day the republic was declared.Their articles not only supportedthe new republic but also criticised nationalistic policies and actions in Cyprus. As a result of theseviews, they were both murdereda mere two years after the start of the publication. Similarly, a Greek Cypriot businessman,Nikos Lanitis, who published a seriesof articles in the English languagenewspaper, the Cyprus Mail, supporting the Cyprus state and calling for collaboration betweenthe two communities was attacked for being unpatriotic (Stavrinides, 1998; An, 1998). Despite the existenceof the Republic, there was no tolerancein either community for any ideasthat diverged from nationalist ideals.
Bryant (2004) aguesthat the combination of democracyand ethno-nationalismdidn't work in the project of an independentCyprus. In her view, both nationalismswere fundamentally democraticas they were basedon popular representationsbut the political demandsand guaranteesthat eachcommunity wanted were conflicting and excluding each other.,The constitutional rights gained by Turkish Cypriots seemed unfair and undemocraticto Greek Cypriots. They believed that Turks were a minority and the constitution provided them with more rights than they deserved. The objectives of the majority were impededbecause of the existing constitution. For the Turkish Cypriots, though, the numberswere not an issue as they were not a minority but equal partners of a bi-communal republic (Stavrinides, 1999). In the constitution, they sought certain guaranteesnot to be `tyrannizedby the majority' (Bryant, 2004, p.221). In other words, while Greek Cypriots wanted `justice' and Turkish Cypriots `respect', in both casesthe `other' community was seenas an obstaclein achieving these ideals (Bryant, 2004). In the end, Greek Cypriots set out to changethe constitution that they thought of as undemocratic.President Archbishop Makarios' suggestionof 13 amendmentsin the constitution, which included taking the right of executive veto away from Turkish Cypriots, was seenby the latter as the destruction of their constitutional rights. Turkish Cypriots first withdrew from the legislative and executiveposts of the governmentand later, leaving their properties and jobs, moved into enclaves.Meanwhile, the inter-
48 communal violence had startedleading to Turkey's planesbombing Greek Cypriot targets and, following a truce, the first border, which resultedfrom a ceasefireline, was drawn in Nicosia in 1964.The so-called Green Line that still acts as the buffer zone/ border betweenGreek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots today was the first boundary that separatedthe national spaceof eachcommunity.
Having separatedfrom the Cyprus state,Turkish Cypriots set up their own administration within the enclaves,making them territories of a mini Turkish Cypriot state.Life in the enclavesmeant not only geographicalbut also psychological segregationfrom Greek Cypriots and also from the world. When Turkish Cypriots withdrew to armed enclaves,communications and contact betweenthe two communities becameminimal as neither Greek Cypriots were allowed in the enclavesnor Turkish Cypriots allowed out. Being separatedfrom Greek Cypriots by the enclavesgave Turkish Cypriots a senseof security and also a senseof unity and solidarity as well as strengtheningthe notion of `us' as the victims against `them' as the perpetrators.Little communication and contact made it difficult to seethe other group's point of view. By defining the enclavesas their territories, Turkish Cypriots were involved in a processof exclusion and distinguishing who belongedto the nation and who didn't. As Evans (1996) suggests,once the borders are established, they give a senseof belonging to the group membersand make it easierto impose unity and self-definition. They help minimise differenceswithin the community while exaggeratingdifferences from the `others' (Billig, 1995). In Cyprus, this was achievedby ignoring the common characteristicsbetween the two communities which was simpler once both communities were separated.For the Turkish Cypriot leaderswho were also operating the TürkMukavemet Teckilati (TMT- Turkish Defence Organisation),creating a unity and solidarity against Greek Cypriots was much easierwhen their community was confined within the enclaves.According to Yqin (1990), The Turkish speakers,the Muslims, the oneswith a commontradition, found themselvescoming together in the order of a military caste,surrounded by high barricades.They were only able to perceivethemselves as membersof a group, links when they were locked up in the enclavesand doing military service.Their The with the outside world and even with the neighboring villages ceased. structure of a closedsociety was firmly established.Just as in primitive tribes,they began to
49 regard their own conditions, existenceand values as the centre of the world and the only reality (p.60).
Apart from its military missions, TMT also set out to changethe consciousnessof Turkish Cypriots so that they could seeand define themselvesas Turks. Combining Turkish nationalism as both an ideology and a separatistmovement, TMT ran a set of campaignsto strengthenthe conceptof Turkishnessamongst Turkish Cypriots. These `Turkifying' projects (Kizilyürek, 2002) did not intend to turn non-Turks into Turks but to shapeTurkish Cypriots' nationalistic thinking. First of all, certain rules and restrictions were imposed on Turkish Cypriots with regardsto their relations with Greek Cypriots. The `From Turk to Turk' campaignwhich bannedany deal blow economic relations or trade with Greek Cypriots not only aimed to a to the Greek Cypriots' economy but also to createa Turkish Cypriot economy as it had is suffered greatly since the break up of the state.Language, which one of the crucial factors in the construction of a national identity, was also taken up by TMT as a forced unifying element. `Citizen speakTurkish' was a project that Turkish Cypriots to speakin Turkish, even those whose mother tongue was Greek. The rule caused hard times for many as not obeying it meant paying fines which forced many into Greek silence (Kizilyürek, 2002, Gökceoglu, 1994). As part of theseprojects, the days namesof villages were changedto Turkish names,and Turkey's national were celebratedmore vigorously (Kizilyürek, 2002; Kizilytirek & Gautier-Kizilyürek, 2004) so that, as Billig (1995) puts it, `the national flag can be consciously waved both metaphorically and literally' (p.45). Consideringthat the production of nations Turkifying requires a certain psychological imagination as well as actions,these TMT's ideology campaignswere designedto instil a nationalist psyche. of Turkish Cypriots but nationalism not only transformedthe national identity of made Having it part of their everyday life and shapedit as a common sense. createda Cypriots into its imagined national community, TMT actually forced Turkish believing As Ya§in community by imposing a certain way of thinking and onto them. formed in (1990) suggests,`the identity of Turkish Cypriot community was really those days' (p.60). Anyone who didn't believe in it or criticised it did not have a place in it.
50 While the inter-communaltension and violence continued between 1963 and 1974, an attempt to assassinateArchbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader,and to take control of the governmentled to Turkey's intervention on 20 July 1974 in the name of protecting Turkish Cypriots7.Following Turkey's military action, a massexodus took place; Greek Cypriots moved to the south part of the island and Turkish Cypriots to the north. Negotiations since then have failed to produce a solution to the problem. As a result, the country has been divided and the so-calledGreen Line becamethe official border betweenthe two communities.
After the Division
For Turkish Cypriot nationalists the Cyprus Problem was settled in 1974 with Turkey's military intervention. The north of the island, clearedof the majority of Greek Cypriots, becamea home for Turkish Cypriots under Turkey's control. State nationalism set out to build and shapethe nation socially, economically and culturally along the lines of Turkish nationalism. The processwas carried out primarily through educationand the media, which were under state control. For example, the content of educationin North Cyprus was (until recently) dominatedby the prevailing nationalistic discourses.Turkish Cypriot history books only referred to the atrocities of Greek Cypriots rather than positive experiencesshared by both communities8.Other school texts have been sourcedpredominantly from Turkey. Turkish rather than Turkish Cypriot literature, geographyand history have been at the centre of the curriculum. The media, on the other hand, were controlled by the stateand thus were tools for spreadingthe nationalist ideology. Followingthe massmovement of GreekCypriots and Turkish Cypriotsin 1975,the first waveof immigrantsfrom Turkeycame to the north.Their arrival wasnecessary to increasethe populationin the north andalso to fill the labourgap to createa
7 The term usedto describeTurkey's military action changesaccording to one's political position on the issue.While it is `invasion' for Greek Cypriots, for Turkish Cypriot nationalistsit is `liberation'. Intervention is the other widely usedterm for it (seealso Killoran, 1998,p. 160).
8 In the north of the island Cyprus history books are rewritten in 2004. Unlike the previous ones,new Cyprus history books do not focus only on the inter-communalconflict and the violence committed by the Greek Cypriot militia but includes other eventsand developmentsthat were significant for Turkish Cypriots.
51 working economy.However, apart from the economic one, the most important impact of this immigration was on the developmentof a Cypriot identity. Since Turkish Cypriots identified themselvesas part of the Turkish nation in relation to Greek Cypriots for years, immigrants were first welcomed as `our kinsmen', signifying a blood relation. However, having lived with them for sometimeand having discoveredsome differences, the positive feelings of Turkish Cypriots becameambiguous. The feelings were mutual though. While Turkish Cypriots becameaware that they were dissimilar from their Turkish `kinsmen', the immigrants discoveredthat the way Turkish Cypriots spoke,dressed and behaved were different from their own. Kizilyürek (2002) summarizesthis processas such: In the meantime, union with the `kinsmen' from Turkey couldn't be achievedand Turkish Cypriots gradually moved from the stageof `identifying with the Motherland' to a new stagewhere they begandiscovering their difference. People coming from Turkey also didn't find their kinsmen in Cyprus as they imagined them in their `national fantasies'.From the Turkish they speakto their clothing, from the loosenessof their women to impiousness,Turkish Cypriots had many manners, which did not look like Turkish (Kizilytirek, 2002, p.292).
In order to stresstheir separateidentity from mainland Turks, Turkish Cypriots startedhighlighting certain differences,especially cultural ones. Such attemptswere not necessarywith Greek Cypriots as there were clear dissimilarities but with mainlanders,Turkish Cypriots neededto exaggerateethnic distinctivenessand utilise cultural differencesto maintain their distinction (Ladbury, 1977). In other words, Turkish Cypriots built upon perceived differencesto establisha separateidentity for themselves.Differences in culture and tradition ranging from clothing to perception of genderroles and religion causedtension betweenTurkish Cypriots and Turkish immigrants. While Turkish Cypriots saw themselvesas `civilised', `educated'and `western' they referred to the immigrants as `uncivilised', `illiterate' and `oriental' (Ladbury, 1977,p. 317).
After the first waveof immigrants,the economiccrises created by the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and the Gulf War in 1991 affected the south easternregions of Turkey and led many people from those areasto come to North Cyprus in searchof employment. This influx of a secondwave of immigrants also causedcertain
52 resentmentsamong Turkish Cypriots as they were seenas having a negative impact on the political, social and economic lives of Turkish Cypriots. Lack of accurate demographicinformation combined with misinformation and propagandaalso fed such perceptions(Hatay, 2005). Consequently,they were blamed for taking Turkish Cypriots' jobs and causingunemployment among them, changingthe demographic structure of the country and maintaining a nationalist, pro-Turkish governmentand increasingcrime. The image of a `golden age' before the immigrants arrived and everyone lived in harmony was constructedagainst the negative image of today `when everything is held to have changedfor the worse, under the influence of immigrants and their alien ways' (Morley, 2000, p.215).
Turkish Cypriots mainly refer to theseimmigrants as Türkiyeli, meaning people from Turkey, rather than using terms like `settler' or `immigrant'. Türkiyeli, although not derogatory,is a term that constitutesthem as a homogenousgroup defined by their nationality of origin. This fails to distinguish social, cultural, ethnic or class differenceswithin this heterogeneousgroup. In other words, Turkish Cypriots do not but make any differentiation betweenTurks, Kurds or any other ethnic group consider them as people from Turkey.
Derogatory namesthat both communities use to refer to eachother hold light to the from ambiguousrelation betweenTurkish Cypriots and the immigrants Turkey. While Turkish Cypriots use garasakal (black beard),gaco (non-gypsy) andfica (seaweed)to refer to thesepeople, mainlanderscall Turkish Cypriots `English bastards' or `seedsof Greek Cypriots' to insult them. The word garasakal (or karasakal-black beard)was first associatedwith the Turkishmilitary in Cyprusin 1960'sand later with all the peoplefrom Turkey.Initially, to call someonegarasakal fear. was not an insulting word but to the contrary was associatedwith respectand is But now, as an identity tag for all people from Turkey, being called garasakal not derogatory a mark of respector fear but more an expressionof animosity -a word.
included Kurds initiated It was the secondinflux of immigrant workers which that is by the use of gaco (gajo) andfica (or fja). Even though, gaco a word used gypsies define to define non-gypsies,Turkish Cypriots paradoxically use this word to being immigrant workers-as `gypsies'. Theseworkers sharedthe samestereotype, of
53 dark-skinned,rough, dirty and backward, as that associatedwith gypsiesand also camemostly from the south-easternparts of Turkey where the workers often spoke Kurdish or Arabic which to someresembled a gypsy language.Fica, on the other hand, meansseaweed on the shore.Long, dark brown strips offica arrive by sea, making the water look dirty and unpleasant.For Turkish Cypriots, the workers are just likefica, washing up on their shores,uninvited. Yet Faiz (2004) explains that thesenames reflect a differentiation betweenTurkish immigrants: garasakal used for Turkish people with a higher socio-economicstatus and gaco andfica for those with a lower status.By calling peoplefica and gaco, Turkish Cypriots are expressingnot only their animosity towards them but also how they resenttheir presencein their country.
The nationalist point of view rejects the idea of Turkish Cypriots having a separate national identity from Turkish people. Developed during the years of struggle against the Greek Cypriot enosismovement, this view makesno distinction betweenTurkish Cypriots and mainland Turks and regardsTurkish Cypriots as an extensionof the Turkish nation, with no distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics(Kizilytirek, 2002). The former TRNC President,Rauf Denktabbecame the embodimentof this argument,always emphasizinghis Turkishnessrather than his Cypriotness.In an infamous statement,which is attributed to him, he claimed the only true Cypriots were donkeys: I am an Anatolian child. I am totally Turk and my roots are in Central Asia. With my culture, my language,my history and with my whole being I am Turk. I have a state and a motherland.These so-called Cypriot culture, Cypriot Turk, Cypriot Greek, common Republic are all nonsense(... ) Cypriot Turk and Cypriot Greek simply don't exist nor do Cypriots. Don't dareto ask us `are you Cypriots'. This could be perceivedas an insult and may causemisunderstandings. Why? The reasonis that there's only one living Cypriot in Cyprus and that is the Cypriot donkey (caglar, 1995).
This dominant concept of Turkish identity has been challengedby a'Cypriot or Turkishcypriot identity (Kizilyürek, 2002, p.290). In reaction to the hegemonic conceptof Turkish identity, this new identity is basedon the notion of a culturally its and ethnically distinct Turkish Cypriot community. The processof construction
54 can be describedas a `transformationin terms of a re-imagining of political and cultural identity that challengedthe previously prevailing Turkish nationalism' (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005, p. 147). According to Azgin (2000) its emergencewas the result of certain social changeswithin the Turkish Cypriot community: First, it was becausethe self-esteemof Turkish Cypriots was restoredas the danger of annihilation passedafter 1974. Second,it developedas a reaction to the threat of cultural assimilation into Turkey. Third, the Turkish immigrants in Cyprus encouraged'theestablishing of differenceswith them as outsiders.Finally, nostalgia for the past of the island had grown. In a similar way, Ya§in (1990) also underlines the presenceof Turkish immigrants as a reasonfor Turkish Cypriots emphasising their difference as Cypriot. He also arguesthat as Turkish Cypriots cannot oppose the annexationof the island on the basis of their `Turkishness',they do that by emphasisingtheir `Cypriotness' (p.71). Thus, to stressthe existenceof this culturally and ethnically distinct community, a Cypriot cultural heritage has begun to be defined and reproduced.Studying the traditions, literature, art, folk danceand folk music of Turkish Cypriots, many cultural associationsnot only aim to promote their cultural characteristicsbut also resist and establisha difference to attemptsat Turkification.
In 1990's the Turkish Cypriot administration's lack of control over some crucial internal affairs, such as economy and security issues,made the TRNC's claim to sovereignty increasingly seemto be mere rhetoric in the eyesof the public (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). However, for the nationalist governmentof the time `the impressionthat political authority in the TRNC seemingly doesnot rest in the sovereignwill of the Turkish Cypriots was not much of a domesticproblem as long as much of the population conceivedof themselvesas Turks and the will of Turkish Cypriots and Turks in Turkey as indivisible' (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005, p. 155). The combination of economic hardship with political discontentand repressionas well as international isolation embodiedthis new senseof identity in a new movement called Cypriots' demandsfor `This country is ours' which expressedTurkish self- determinationand control of their country's future. Its emergencewas also an interpreted indication that Turkey's presencein Cyprus was no longer as being for but for her interest the liberation and protection of Turkish Cypriots own security (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005).
55 Cypriot identity is reflected particularly in Turkish Cypriot literature (Mehmet Ali, 1990). Many works of literature written within this framework have replacedTurkey with Cyprus as the `motherland' and refer to Cypriots as `us' while defining Turks as the `other' (Yapn, 1994,p. 57). Thus, the construction of this new identity requires a new selectionand reconstitution of the past. In the reproduction of a narrative for the nation, the commonalitieswith Greek Cypriots in culture, tradition and history are now emphasisedunder the conceptof Cypriotism, excluding and marginalizing Turkish immigrants. In a sense,as Killoran (1998) points out, fostering an alternate Cypriot nationalism meansthat one nationalism is replacedwith anotherone, leaving nationalism as an unquestionedissue.
The 1990's were a time when identity conceptualisationswere not just increasingly differentiated among Turkish Cypriots but were also politicised in a way that reflected the particular political preferencesof an individual. Each identity discourse signified a certain political orientation (Ramm, 2006). Meanwhile, as the struggle betweenTurkish and Cypriot nationalisms continued, Turkish immigrants arriving in North Cyprus have becomepart of the identity debate.Their presencehas been seen as a political, cultural and economic threat by someTurkish Cypriots. Yet, as Hatay (2005) points out, many who arrived when young have been integratedinto the Turkish Cypriot community and retain only weak links with Turkey. This was especially true for Cyprus-born immigrant descendentswho complained of identity crises. Citizens of the TRNC, thesepeople expressedtheir exclusion not only by Turkish Cypriots but also by Turks when visiting their family in Turkey. Considering themselvesto be Turkish Cypriots, many talked about being treated as `outsiders' in both places,as immigrants in Cyprus and as Cypriots in Turkey (Gildir, 2005, Uludag, 2005).
It was under thesecircumstances that Cyprus experiencedbig changes.The latest attempt for a solution in Cyprus came in the form of a UN settlementplan in November 2002. Also known as the Annan plan, the plan generateddiscussions and debateover the future of the island among the communities of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot community was divided into two groups:the ones who supportedthe plan and the oneswho opposedit. It was also a division betweenthe oneswho saw their believed future within the EU in a partnershipwith Greek Cypriots and the ones who
56 their future lies with Turkey. In the referendumon the plan in April 2004, the majority of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the settlementplan9. As well as being a sign of the transformationin their identity, the result also revealeda re-imagining of the community and identity basednot on ethno-nationalismbut on a post-national form of identity founded on a pluralist character(Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). However, Greek Cypriots' rejection of the plan failed to bring a settlementto Cyprus and causeddisappointment among Turkish Cypriots. Having beatenthe statusquo and marginalized their nationalist leaders,Turkish Cypriots realisedthat their neighboursdid not sharetheir eagernessfor reconciliation and a sharedfuture and felt rejected.
One of the most important developments,which brought big changesto Cyprus, was the opening of the buffer zone in April 2003. Having had minimal contact with the `other' community since the division in 1974,both communities flooded to the `other side' once the borders opened.The main incentive of both was to seethe homesthey in were forced to abandon,visit their family gravesand meet the people they knew in the past. The young generationmet the `other' for the first time. However, this left While Turkish experiencewith Greek Cypriots, Turkish immigrants were out. Cypriots crossedthe border not just to visit but also to look for employment,benefit from health servicesand have accessto travel documentsto go abroadusing their citizenship rights from the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish-origin TRNC citizens were confined to the north. Especially for the young generationwho grew up considering themselvesTurkish Cypriots rather than Turkish, and who alsojoined in and They supportedthe transformation, this was a frustrating and excluding experience. Cypriot were being perceived and treated as outsidersby the Greek authorities even though they didn't feel as such. Their Turkish Cypriot identity raised questionsabout didn't. who belongedto the Turkish Cypriot community and who
Globalisation and the multicultural post-nationalEuropean Union have also identities in encouragedthe questioning of an identity beyond ethnic/national Cyprus. Technological and economic developmentshave provided people with As identification meansof re-imagining an identity beyond the national one. with
75.83%Greek Cypriots 9In thereferendum 64.9% Turkish Cypriots voted in favourof the planwhile did againstit.
57 has been Europe always a common point of both Cypriot communities,the EU has framework beenregarded as a in which the conceptof Cypriotnesscould be developed(Ramm, 2006; Ramm, 2002-2003).Both communities even usedtheir Europeannessas a distinct feature that separatedthem from Turks and Greeks. According to Yqin (1998) `in the age of globalisation, it was easierfor the intellectuals to expresstheir belatedand un-namedCypriot nationalism under the umbrella of Europeanunification. In any casethey believed that Cypriots are more Europeanthan Turks and Greeks' (p.231). However, the accessionof Greek Cypriots to the EU, despiterejecting a reunification proposal, causedmuch resentmentand mistrust towards the EuropeanUnion among Turkish Cypriots. Their continuing isolation in the international arena,despite the promisesof support, addedto their frustration and, it has been argued,could dampentheir enthusiasmfor a future within the EU.
Analysis of Turkish Cypriot Nationalism and National Identity
During the transformation of identity from Orthodox Christians and Muslims into Greeksand Turks respectively, two divergent national consciousnessesused different interpretationsof history as well as the differencesin languageand religion, to justify their identity and claim on the island. Despite having conflicting demandsand exclusionarypolicies, Papadakis(1998) arguesthat both nationalism movementsin Cyprus are actually the reflections of each other. For example, both communities presentedtheir nationalism as `patriotism', which is good and necessary,but the others' as simply `nationalism', which is dangerouslyirrational. Both nationalist ideologies use the samestructure of creating the `other' as an unchangingevil and include elementsof distortion and self-justification in their portrayal of the national self. The conceptof unchanging evil not only signifies primordial links but also createsthe impression of a continual threat, which is useful in the maintenanceof the statusquo and the justification of presentactions. While Turkish Cypriot nationalists still talk about Greek Cypriots' demandfor enosisand describeGreek Cyprus' entry to the EU as a disguised form of enosis, Greek Cypriot nationalists still refer to Turkey's expansionismambitions. Relying on such myths, both nationalismsfeed off eachother. Bryant (2004), on the other hand, disagreeswith Papadakisthat these
58 nationalisms are within the sameframework or are reflections of eachother. Pointing at the differencesin discourses,she categorizesthe discoursesof thesemovements as archaeologicaland genealogical. Turkish Cypriots their history in terms forms ... speakof of contingencyand of historical proof exist within what I will call here an archaeologicaldiscourse, attemptingto securetruth by tracing causation.Their Greek Cypriot compatriots,on the other hand, constructan ineluctable history discussedwithin the framework of what I will call a genealogicaldiscourse in which historical proof is aimed at demonstratingtruths that are taken to be self evident. In genealogicaldiscourse one traceslinks betweenpersons and eventswhose relationship to eachother is already presupposed.In archaeologicaldiscourse in contrastone attemptsto construct a causativesequence that will explain events.In the first, one validatestruth; in the secondone uncoverstruth (Bryant, 2004, p.207).
During the construction of national identities and national imaginations,primordial ties play a crucial role. Claims to ancestralterritories and descentare used to createa historical continuity and roots as nationhood is often evoked through the languageof kinship and ancestry(Calhoun, 1997). Portrayal of nation as being like a large family (assertionof blood ties or talk about how ancestorsfought their enemies)is the distinctive characteristicof nationalistic discourse.In Cyprus, both ethnic and national identities are also basedon the languageof primordial ties. In the Turkish Cypriots' case,the metaphor of blood has beenused as a link betweenthe land, ancestorsand membersof the community. According to Killoran (1998), `nationality is inserted into the "families' sharedblood", the nation's sacredsoil and a national "family's" metaphorical genealogy' (p. 164). It is the blood shedby ancestorsin the conquestby the Ottomans and the martyrs during the inter-communal fighting that gives Turkish Cypriots the right to make a claim on the land (Bryant, 2004). Blood shedis also a link to ancestorsas `blood spilled in Cyprus was not only a legitimation of Turks' presencethere but also expresseda spiritual kinship with the land' (Bryant, 2004, p. 196). In a way, blood acts as the link betweenthe past, the presentand the future of the community or, in other words, it is the link betweenthe members ancestorsof the living of the community and their children.
59 The metaphorof blood is not merely used to justify the claim to territory but also used to `createan ethnic distinction from the "violators" of the life sourceof Greek Cypriots' (Killoran, 1998,p. 163). The claims of purity and continuity of the `other' community is again challengedby blood. For example,the ethnic origin of the Turkish community in Cyprus has been a politically chargedissue used by the nationalists from both communities. There have been claims by Greek Cypriots that Muslims were not Turkish descendantsbut convertedGreeks, while Turkish nationalists set out to prove that Turkish Cypriots are descendantsof the Ottoman Turks and not Greeksby blood (Nevzat, 2005; Killoran, 1998; Bryant: 2004).
In the nationalistic discourse,the nation is constructedas a family and the national territory as a home. In such an imagination, national identity is characterizedby a senseof belonging, security and solidarity among the family members,which come from recognizing the family as the nation and the territory as home (Morley, 2000). In Cyprus, both communities usedthe conceptsof a national family by reflecting kinship relations onto a nation. In the Turkish Cypriots' case,the matrimony of land and the blood of the Turkish martyrs createda national family with Cyprus being the offspring of a Turkish nation (Killoran, 1998; Bryant, 2004). In part, becauseof this and in part to encourageTurkish Cypriots to identify their statehoodwith the statehoodof Turkey (Navaro-Yashin, 2003), in nationalistic discoursesCyprus is always referred as the `Yavruvatan' (Babyland or infantland) and Turkey is always `Anavatan' (motherland). The national family is "`whole" in the marrying of the national father with the land and the citizens as their children' (Killoran, 2000, p. 138). Benefiting from this conceptualisation,a housein which a mother with her two kids was murdered is turned into a museum,the Museum of Barbarism, to symbolise the violation of the nation. This museumnot only functions to enhancethe conceptsof national home and family but also to remind people of the past conflict and hostility (Killoran, 1998). In reaction, the discoursesrelated to Cypriot identity replacedTurkey with Cyprus as the `motherland' (Ya§in, 1994).
The constantprocess of selecting, arranging, interpreting, rearrangingand reinterpreting proceedshand in hand with the identity constructionprocess. In the production and reproduction of a national identity, the dialectical relationship in betweencollective remembering and collective forgetting is an important element
60 the creation of a nation (Billig, 1995).The official history narrativespresented the 1960's as the bloodiest time in Turkish Cypriot history in the collective memory. The close relations and commonalitiesbetween both communitiesrarely occurredin them, limiting such points to personalnarratives (Canefe, 2007). However, in Cyprus, the enemy is not just confined to the official history narrativesbut can be a lived experience.Individuals' personalexperiences and memorieshave also become a crucial determinantin the process.While experiencesbased on fear usually affirm and support the nationalistic discourses,they can also challengeit. This is why according to Bryant (2004) pressurisingthe personalmemory to conform to the dominant nationalistic discoursebecomes a requirementfor the constitution of the nation as personalmemory also acts as the legitimator of politics.
Different conceptualisationsof Turkish Cypriot identity are in a constantprocess of construction and struggle to establishtheir legitimacy. Killoran (1998) arguesthat the legitimacy process`is continuously negotiatedthrough the interweaving of the past with the presentin a battle for control of a national popular memory, which is constructedreciprocally through the interaction of dominant and subordinatepublic representationsof the past and private memory' (p. 161). Thus, the continual selection and reconstitution of the past is also linked to the presentand shapes visions for the future. The nationalist groups constantlyremind Turkish Cypriots of the violent past with Greek Cypriots and, claiming that their enemy's aim has not changed,demand the continuation of Turkey's support and protection in the future. On the other hand, Cypriot-oriented approachesstress the commonalitiesbetween the two communities and use conspiracytheories to explain the violent past. In their view, the future is within the EU after a settlementin Cyprus. In either case,the aim of both views is to createa unity behind the narrativesconstructed for the nation and, interestingly, both narratives are exclusionary. In the nationalistic ones,the sufferings or the point of view of the `other' (the Greek Cypriots) is absent.Thus, while the atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots are kept alive and reflected in the slogansof `We will not forget', the violent actions of Turkish Cypriots towards Greek Cypriots are never mentioned. On the other hand, Cypriot narrativesexclude the Turkish immigrants. Even though some have lived in North Cyprus all their lives, their return to Turkey is demanded,if necessaryfor a settlement,as a headline in Afrika stated: `the settlers should be compensatedand should leave' (Afrika, 25 June
61 2003, p. 1& 3). In summary,exclusive of each other, different forms of national identity demonstratethe highly politicised nature of the identity issue.Having benefited from the usual resourcesof identity during their constructionprocesses, diverse versions of national identity competewith eachother to establishthemselves as the `real' categoryof self-identification.
62 CHAPTER 3: MEDIA AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
This chapterprovides a historical analysis of the role the media have played in the processof the construction and reproduction of Turkish Cypriot national identity. It also examinesthe media dynamics in which news texts are producedto offer a context for the media content. For this purposeI have conductedthirteen semi- structuredinterviews with media professionalssuch asjournalists, editors and media managersas well as political figures, NGO representativesand academicsthrough which I explore the factors that shapejournalism in the TRNC. My aim is to provide an understandingof the production processof the texts I analysein the following chapters.
a. Historical Background
The Development of the Turkish Cypriot Press
The Turkish Cypriot pressdeveloped mainly during the British administration. Lack of newspapersor magazinesin Cyprus throughout the Ottoman period forced Turkish Cypriots to sendtheir articles and poemsto publications in Istanbul. According to Dedecay,Vamik Efendi, a Turkish Cypriot, had one of his poems published in Tercüman-iAhval, an Istanbul newspaper,as early as 1863 (Dedecay, 1989). Soon after the commencementof British rule in Cyprus many newspapers beganpublication'.
The first Turkishlanguage newspaper that appearedin the recordbook, Cyprus Blue Book (1889-1990),was Saded,a weekly newspaper,published only for 16 issues (Dedecay, 1989; Ünlü, no date). For a long time, Sadedwas consideredto be the first Turkish languagenewspaper but according to British Colonial Office documents,an Umid earlier newspapercalled is thought to have been published in 1879.A study of
is 1The number of the newspaperspublished in the early years of the British administration as discussedin the previous chapter.
63 correspondencebetween the Ottoman Empire and the British in 1880 revealed that the paper, published by Aleksan Sarrafian, an Armenian from Larnaca, might be the first Turkish language newspaper in Cyprus (Sonyel, 1985). This would make Saded the first newspaper published by Turkish Cypriots but not the first Turkish language one. According to these documents, the newspaper's criticisms of the Ottoman administrationand the SultanAbdulhamid led the Ottomanauthorities to write to the British governmentrequesting the closureof the paper.Following this complaint,the British decidedto ensurethe newspaperdid not reachthe Sultan'sterritories rather than closethe paper(Sonyel, 1985).
Apart from revealingthe existenceof an earlier newspaper,this correspondencealso confirmedthat newspapersprinted in Cypruswere not confinedonly to the island but aimedat readersabroad as well. Especiallyduring the OttomanEmpire, this interactionwas not one directional as publicationsfrom the OttomanEmpire were also distributedin Cyprus.Thus, as well as facilitating interactionbetween the peopleof Cyprusand the Ottomans,these early newspapersalso actedas a `channel of diffusion of ideasand intellectual currents'between two places(Nevzat, 2005, p. 184).
The development of the press alongside a process of modernization contributed to the imagining of a nation and the development of a modern Turkish Cypriot society. By informing Cypriots of new worlds, beliefs and cultures, the print media not only transformed the relationship between self and the community but also shapedtheir senseof time and place by creating temporal simultaneity. Having been made aware of the existence of the distant others, these newspaperscreated a relationship between individuals and the rest of the members of their community that they had never before encountered. In the imagining of their national community, the press also reduced the distance and fostered a link between the communities on the island and other Greeks and Turks abroad. In summary, the development of the print media facilitated the creation of new publics. The combination of the new administration system the British had introduced to the island, the development of education and the improvement in transportation links between towns and villages also helped the
64 circulation of new ideasby the press.As Bryant points out, `the Cypriot public' was `a new categorycreated only in the ageof print media' (Bryant, 2004, p.32).
Like the spoken one, the language of the print media was an important element in the advancement of a national consciousnessamong Cypriots. As Anderson points out, the media contributed to the process of constructing a national identity by standardizing vernacular languages,which later became `national'. That is to say, while certain dialects were more suitable to print language and continued to exist, others `still assimilable to the emerging print-language, lost caste, above all because they were unsuccessful (or only relatively successful) in insisting on their own print- form' (Anderson, 1993, p.45). In Cyprus, the situation was no different. Since early on, the newspaperspublished in Cyprus were not just confined to Cyprus but distributed abroad as well and so a standard version of the Turkish language had to be usedin order to be readand understoodoutside the island by a wider Turkish readership.Thus Turkish and Greekwere not only standardizedas the print language by the media but also by becomingnational languages, they encourageda divergence betweenthe two communities(Nevzat, 2005).
Education also had an impact on the development of the Turkish Cypriot press. Initially, low literacy rates among the Turkish Cypriot community limited the number of readers of these papers to only a few intellectuals. Compared to the early Greek Cypriots newspapers,there were only a few Turkish Cypriot newspapersand they sold few copies. For example, within the first years of the arrival of the British there were around a dozen Greek Cypriot newspaperswith a combined circulation rate of around 2,000 compared with only one Turkish language newspaper, Saded with sixty-four subscribers (Dedecay, 1989, Ünlii, no date). An increased emphasis on education within the Turkish Cypriot community raised interest in the press, which then was reflected in the circulation rate of the newspapers.The relationship between education and the press was not one directional though, as the press also showed great interest in educational matters and championed better education for Turkish Cypriot children.
65 An increase in the number of printing houses owned by Turkish Cypriots also contributed to the growth of the Turkish language press in Cyprus. Dedecay (1989) argues that at the turn of the century newspaper production was not considered different from any other printing business and both were treated as the same. This was partly becauseit was necessaryto own a printing house to launch a newspaper and partly becausenewspaper publishing was not seen as a profitable business on its own. Zaman, the earliest newspaper to survive till today, is also the first Turkish language newspaper that was published in a printing house owned by Turkish Cypriots. Previously, Saded was published in a Greek Cypriot printing house (Dedecay, 1989).
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the spread of new ideas and movements in Cyprus played an encouraging role in the development of the Turkish language press which, compared with the flourishing Greek language press, was still struggling. With the arrival of a number of exiled Young Turks to Cyprus `who hoped to use the British administration and their strategic position to write critically of the sultan's regime' (Bryant, 2004, p.33), the newspapersbecame the embodiment of new and competing thoughts. They propagated the ideas and movements that were also discussed in the clubs and coffeehouses (Bryant, 2004; Nevzat 2005). One such example, Krraathane-i Osmaniye or the Ottoman Club was initially a coffeehouse where newspapersand magazines could also be read and later was turned into a social club. Attended by the leading political figures and intellectuals of the time, the Ottoman Club provided Turkish Cypriot elite men a public sphere where they discussedpolitical issues and current affairs (Fedai & Altan, 2000). In order to propagate their ideas, the club set up a printing house and launched Zaman. Later, similar publications with similar ideas followed.
Another commonaim of thesepublications was to protestagainst the GreekCypriot movementenosis. Samani (1999) notes that the Turkish Cypriot pressdeveloped as a responseto the GreekCypriot presswhich was promotingenosis. Ünlü also stresses that one of the reasonsfor the establishmentof the Ottomanclub was a reactionto the pro-enosisGreek club, Kipriyakos Silagos(Ünlü, no date).
66 Despite being under British administration,the Ottomansstill had the power to influence and control the pressin Cyprus through the Ottoman Printing Law the British left untoucheduntil 1930 (Dedecay, 1989). For example,when the Young Turks' articles, critical of the Ottoman administration and the Sultan, appearedin Zaman, its proprietor Haci Derviý Efendi was accusedof `stain(ing) the honour of the State' and was sentencedto life imprisonment as well as withdrawal of his mir-i miran or the title of pashaby the Ottoman courts. However, in Cyprus, his sentence was not carried out but his title of pashaceased to be usedby the local government (Bryant, 2005). At a later date,Ahmet Tevfik, a prominentjournalist of his time, was also bannedfrom entering the Ottoman territory for publishing articles critical of the Sultan (Atqin, 1999)2.Again, the sentencewas not carried out in Cyprus and Ahmet Tevfik, having ceasedthe publication of Akbaba, commencedanother publication called Mirat-i Zaman (Dedecay, 1989,Ünlti, no date).
An interesting feature of the pressat the end of the century was the emergenceof satirical publications. Two Turkish languagepublications, Kokonoz and Akbaba, published by Ahmet Tevfik, consistedmostly of political and social satires. Disguised as humour, they criticised the administrationsin both Cyprus and the Ottoman Empire. Another interesting characteristicof the satirical publications in Cyprus, according to Bryant (2005), was that in contrastto other publications, they were intended to be read by Cypriots in general,both Christians and Muslims. They existed at a time when there was still `an obvious ambiguity regarding the boundaries despitethe life' (p.39) of the community ... growing politicisation of communal which also explains their extinction when nationalism took control of both communities.
Turkish Cypriot resistanceto British colonialism was also conductedthrough the press.It was especially reflected in disputesabout the administration of Evkaf. Evkaf was a religious foundation that was in chargeof the communal wealth of Muslims on the island and was regardedas an important institution by the community. The appointmentof its administrationby the British was stronglyresented by some Turkish Cypriots,who werecritical of the British influenceon suchan important
2According to somesources Ahmet Tevfik Efendiwas sentenced to death(see Nevzat, 2005).
67 foundation,while the pro-BritishTurkish Cypriot elite supportedit. The debate betweenthe pro-British group and the opposition was communicatedthrough the presswhich was also divided into two camps.Silnuhat and Seyf,,two newspapers opposing British influence over the Evkaf administration were engagedin a polemical battle with the rival papers,Mirat-i Zaman, Vatan and Kibris that Ünlü, supportedthe administration (Dedegay,1989; no date).
The role of Turkish languagenewspapers in expressingTurkish Cypriots' resistance to the British becameclear especially in the early days of the First World War. In a confidential letter sent to the Secretaryof State,Lewis Harcourt, on 4thSeptember 1914,High CommissionerGoold Adams stressedthat somelocal Muslim newspaperswhich had a great impact on the community turned their readersagainst them when England took over two war ships under construction for the Ottomans (Goold-Adams to Harcourt, 4th September1914, CO 67/ 173; Nevzat, 2005; Samani, 1999).
Nevertheless,the hardshipsbrought to Turkish Cypriots by the First World War also
affected the pressas there was no Turkish languagenewspaper published in Cyprus for between 1916-1919. There are severalpossible reasons the silence of the Turkish languagenewspapers: First, it could be that being at war with the Ottomans, the British authorities were intolerant of Turkish Cypriot support of the Ottomans and their expressionof it in the press.Their increasingpressure on Turkish Cypriots and the obstruction of reporting on the progressof the war probably not only made it difficult for the journalists and the publishersto continue with their publications but Ünlü, might have killed their enthusiasmas well (Nevzat, 2005; no date).
Second,financial difficulties and the scarcity of essentialmaterials such as paper and ink might have had an impact on the closure of the Turkish languagepress during the war years. However, as Nevzat (2005) argues,this does not explain how the Greek languagepress managed to survive.
Third, emigrationthat had startedwith the annexationof the islandby Britain might havealso reduced the readershipand thus supportfor the pressamong Turkish Cypriots.Consequently the Turkish Cypriot newspapersfound it hardto survive
68 (Ünlü, no date).Kibris, the only newspaperthat existedduring 1914-1915, complainedof this lack of supportin an editorial: On the island there are more than 15 Greek newspapersbeing published.They both meet their costsand make profit. Unfortunately, we cannoteven meet our costs.Our friend Seyfunfortunately had to ceasepublication becauseof that. There is only one Turkish newspaperleft on the island and that is Kibris. The condition Kibris is in is as stated(Kibris, 24 August 1914,quoted in Ünlii, no date).
The fourth reasonfor the demiseof a Turkish languagepress could rest with the leadersof the Turkish Cypriot community whom Bryant (2004) accusesof being `the primary causeof the death of a flourishing local press' (p. 106). According to Bryant, it was their demandsfor censorshipto suppressopposing opinions that led to the dissolution of all Turkish languagenewspapers during the First World War. However, Nevzat (2005) disagreeswith her by reminding us that rivalries and animosities in the community had startedlong before the war and resurfacedagain in the presswhich emergedafter it. This is why it does not explain the reasonwhy it would specifically affect the pressduring the war years.
Interestingly, while there were no Turkish languagepublications during the war, six emergedin Cyprus in the aftermath.Even though the censorshipand the unofficial warnings of the British governmentcontinued, there was somerelaxation in the British policy towards Turkish Cypriot publications (Nevzat, 2005). Thus, Dogru Yol was launchedin 1919, followed in 1920 by Söz,Ankebut, Davul, and Vatan Jr, newspapersand a journal/magazine called ad. With the start of the national struggle in Turkey around this time, Turkish nationalism amongstTurkish Cypriots was openly expressedand thesenewspapers became the main supportersand disseminatorsof this nationalism in Cyprus.
Despite rivalries regarding internal issues,the attitude of the Turkish languagepress towards Turkey was supportive. All of them published articles backing the Turkish in keeping nationalist struggle in Turkey and were instrumental nationalistic emotions alive among Turkish Cypriots. Among them, Söz was an especially ardent supporterof Turkish nationalism and was effective in upholding nationalist Press sentiments.It even received a letter of appreciationfrom the Director of and
69 Intelligence Office in Ankara in 1922 for its patriotic publications (Ünlü, no date; Ökstizoglu, 1990). With the secondhighest circulation rate of 1,200in 1922 (Ünlü, no date), Söz spearheadedthe spreadingof nationalist ideasalthough other newspapersalso had a considerablerate of circulation at the time: Both Vatan and Dogru Yol were 800 while Davul's was 600 (Ünlü, no date). Thesefigures were also a sign of an increasein the readershipof newspapersamong the Turkish Cypriot community.
The presshad a crucial role in the transformation of Turkish Cypriots from Ottoman Muslims into Turks. Reporting and supporting the transformationthe Turkish nation was going through after its war of independencein the 1920's, the pressencouraged the adoption of Kemalist reforms in Cyprus. It introduced the symbols of Turkish nationalism, which helped to enhancea senseof belonging and identification with the Turkish nation. For example,having received a printing machinewith the Turkish alphabetfrom the Turkish government,Söz contributed to the spreadof the alphabetreform by publishing a Turkish languagenewspaper using the Turkish Ünltl, alphabet(Dedecay, 1989; no date). Later Ses,another newspaper, used the symbol of six arrows which representedKemalist reforms and ideas (Dedecay, 1989; Ünlü, no date). Hakikat, despitebeing a supporterof the Evkaf administration, referred to the governmentin Turkey as `our government' and Turkey as `our fatherland' (Nevzat, 2005, p.307).
The Turkish languagepress was divided on the issue of the emigration of Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus to Anatolia that had startedwith the commencementof British rule and increasedfollowing the Treaty of Lausanne:Two nationalist newspapers, Dogru Yol and Sbz,were the main promoters of this emigration and, along with the supportof Turkish Consul Asaf Bey, they encouragedTurkish Cypriots to emigrate to Turkey. In contrast,Birlik was pointing at the dangersthe emigration was creating for the Turkish presenceon the island as the population of Turkish Cypriots dwindled over the years, threateningTurkish interestsin Cyprus. Yet anyonewho questionedthe emigration was criticised for not being a nationalist (GUrkan,2006; Nevzat 2005; Fedai and Altan, 2000). According to Ate§in (1999) the move was a sign of the transformation of identity from `Muslim' to `Turk' as those who consideredthemselves Turk choseto emigrate to Turkey.
70 The presslaw introduced by the British in the 1930's brought limitations for publishers andjournalists in Cyprus. The adoption of the Newspaper,Books and Printing PressesLaw in 1930 replacedMatbuat Nizamnamesi(the Ottoman Press Law), which the British, interestingly, had left in place until then. The samelaw had Ünlü, already been changedby the Ottomansin 1906 (Dedecay, 1989; no date). Dedecay(1989) explains that this was partly becausethe island was still officially consideredto be Ottoman territory and partly becauseof the influence Istanbul had on the pressin Cyprus. Following the 1931 revolt, the British took restrictive measuresand introduced the `Newspaper,Books and Printing PressesLaw' in 1934 which increasedthe power of the Colonial Secretaryover the press.These laws gave the Colonial Secretarythe power to issue orders of censorship,suspension and the suppressionof publications. They also made it obligatory to get permission to publish a newspaperand failing to comply with this rule would be subject to fine and seizure(Dedecay, 1989). Under theselaws, the Turkish languagepress found it hard to exist. Birlik as well as Hakikat, a newspaperthat also published articles in English and was a supporterof the pro-British Evkaf administration, could not survive and both ceasedpublication in 1932.Masum Millet had to close down twice throughout its publication life of 1931-1934.To avoid the strict censorshipand the risk of being seizedand closed down, the newspaperschanged their content,reducing their criticism of the government.Avoiding expressingcritical opinions, the newspapers opted for safer options and, as a result, more world news startedappearing in the papers(Unlit, no date).
Apart from causingthe closure of somenewspapers, these laws also increasedthe animosity of the presstowards the British. There was already an existing anti- Britishness among the Turkish languagepress which had existed since the start of had, in its first issue, colonial rule. One of the earliest newspapers,Zaman statedthat fighting against British colonialism would be one of its main functions (Altay, 1969, 10n1ü,no date, Ismail, 1988). Criticisms of the British governmenton the island frequently. Masum Millet appearedin the newspapers For example,the publisher of Con Rifat who was known for his anti-Britishness(Fedai, 1986) wrote an article called `editorial object' in which he criticised the British government: This Governmentnot only restrainedbut also chainedthe press,the freedom of destroyed action and of speech,interfered with our language, with a stroke of a pen
71 the religious institutions without consulting the proper Turkish Authorities and obtaining their consentand did not yet replacethem by the new onesin the way I have suggestedand pointed out two years ago, wanted to govern us without laws and rules, subjectedus to treatmentswhich can only be metedout to a primitive and Bedouin Clansmen,ridiculed with the Moslem rights and openly challengedour social honor and dignity (MasumMillet, 11 April, 1931quoted in Fedai, 1986,p. 74).
The dialectical relationship betweenthe pressand Turkish Cypriot society led the newspapersto contribute to the transformationof the collective identity as well as being constituted and shapedby it. The presscampaigned for a Turkish education identity. which was crucial in the production of a Turkish Cypriot national The newspaperpublishers, who consistedof educatedpeople such as lawyers, doctors in and teachers,argued for an improvement of the curriculum Turkish schoolsor, in other words, they campaignedfor a nationalist education(Nesim, 1987).Hallan Sesi, the longest running Turkish Cypriot newspaper,announced in its first issuethat it would campaignfor the transfer of schoolsto the Turkish Cypriot community (Halkm Sesi, 14 Mart 1942, also quoted in Ünlii, no date,p. 146). Such strong support for educationwas seenas a path to modernisationthat was associatedwith Atatürk's 2004). For Söz reforms in Turkey and Turkish nationalism (Bryant, example, is for We newspaperurged `Before everything a national education necessary us. will in in Turkish seekthe sourceand componentsof it the motherland, the great spirit. is how it be' (Söz, An education systemwill come to us from Turkey. This must 19 March 1931, quoted in Evre, 2004, p.97; also seeBryant, 2004, p. 176).
In turn, the transformation Turkish Cypriots went through also influenced the press. Developed as a reaction to the Greek Cypriot, nationalist enosismovement, as well defending as the British administration, the pressundertook the mission of the rights development of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus and engagingin the of a politically and date; Ismail, 1988). It economically strong Turkish Cypriot community (Ünlü, no in increasein was also seenthat an improvement educationstandards would mean an the readershipof the newspapers,which contributed to the spreadof nationalist thought through the people. Writing under the pseudonym`U', a womanjournalist Ulviye Mithat complained that the literacy rate and thus the numbersof readersof the Turkish Cypriot newspaperswere much lower than the Greek Cypriot ones (Ses,
72 14 October, 1935 cited in Azgin, 1988). It was an indication of how the matter concernedjournalists of the time. Despite this, it should not be thought that the disseminationof ideasthrough the presswas limited only to the educatedas the literate mediatedthe messagesof the pressto illiterates as well (Bryant, 2004).
Following the SecondWorld War, increasingTurkish nationalism interwoven with Pan- Turkist ideasleft no spacefor different imaginings of identity within the Turkish Cypriot community such as Cypriotism (Kizilyürek, 2002; Ya§in, 1990). In thesecircumstances, increasing cooperation between both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot workers and farmers within the trade unions was not welcomed from the nationalist point of view. They were seenas serving communism and communism was the enemy of Turkish nationalism. Such views found expressionin the pressas well and Türk Sözüand Sabah in particular, two newspaperswith a Pan-Turkist and an anti-communist line, published articles critical of such activities (Ismail, 1988). They both were critical of Emekci, the organ of the Cyprus Turkish Workers Organisation.In one article, Türk Sözürejected the idea that the Turkish worker was communist and explained that `communismrejects patriotism but the Turkish worker is a patriot' (Turk Sözü, 10 October, 1948, quoted in Ismail, 1988,p. 104). Nevertheless,such views were not recent as Sözhad, as early as the 1930's, also suggestedthat `the communist movementsin this country are being instigated by the (Söz, Greek Cypriots' 13 August, 1931, quoted in Nevzat, 2005, p.329). Being a patriot was regardedas equivalent to being anti-communist and workers within bi- communal trade unions were pressuredto resign. On the other hand, Emekci and tnkilapci, two leftist newspapers,claimed to be the voice of Turkish Cypriot workers and farmers and were encouragingthem to organisewithin the trade unions to fight for their rights. JnIalapct,that survived only for a few months, called for both Greek and Turkish Cypriot workers to unite and supportedthe unity of both communities (An, 2005). Emekci, on the one hand, was critical of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and was engagedin constantpolemic with the nationalist newspapers.
As the Turkish Cypriot nationalist movement progressed,there was an increasing pressureto unite the Turkish Cypriot community behind a resistancemovement againstthe Greek Cypriots. Therefore, there was no tolerance for anyonewho did not support but criticised or opposedthe nationalist movement or even conceptualiseda
73 different national identity. The Turkish Cypriot nationalist group, TMT, was not only fighting againstGreek Cypriot nationalism and the EOKA militants but also imposing their nationalistic aspirationson Turkish Cypriots and the presswas not Önder, exempt from this. In 1958,Fazil the publisher of lnkrlapcr who supporteda Greek and Turkish Cypriot united workers movement,was murdered(An, 2005). Four years later, Ayhan Hikmet and Muzaffer Gürkan, two lawyers who were publishing Cumhuriyet newspaper,were killed. Cumhuriyet,that had begun publication on the sameday as the Republic of Cyprus was established,not only criticised the Turkish nationalist ideals of the Turkish Cypriot leadershipbut also called for harmoniousrelations betweenthe two communities. In an article entitled `Cyprus belongs to Cypriots', Cumhuriyet wrote duty Turkish Greek Cypriot is to the the to ... the of every and respect rights of other, make an independentCyprus live and develop and work with all its effort to provide both communitiesmore democratic,prosperous, happy and peaceful life. To claim the opposite,in our view, is not to seethe reality, not to understandthe reality or to shut eyesto the reality. In brief, Cyprus' independenceis not its being annexedto anothernation or a statebut to be governedby Cypriots (Cumhuriyet, 2 January, 1961,quoted in An, 2005, p. 168).
Two different imaginings of national identity, Cypriot and Turkish, had found their expressionthrough the print media. While Cumhuriyet defendedthe Republic of Cyprus and a Cypriot identity, HallamSesi and Nacak, two nationalist newspapers, were the voices of the Turkish Cypriot leadershipwho fought for taksim and did not believe in Cypriotness.Therefore, Cumhuriyet was engagedin a polemic with these Ünlü, papers,especially with Nacak, the unofficial organ of TMT (Dedecay, 1989; no date).
During the inter-communal tension and conflict between 1963 and 1974,the community was governedby the Turkish leadershipand the military, which put communal rights aheadof individual rights, preventing Turkish Cypriots from developing any civil organisation.As Kizilyürek (2005) contends,`in Cyprus, becauseof "national cause" for very long yearsconcepts and practicessuch as "civil society", "democracy", "pluralism" were smashed'(p. 277). Lack of opposition was also reflected on the press and shapedit into a nationalist position. All the
74 publications during that period, such as Hallan Sesi,Mitcahit, Limasol'un Sesiand Zafer, were in support of the nationalist movementof the Turkish Cypriot leadership and TMT. Any opposition to the leadershipwas silencedto createa unified voice for the sakeof the national causeor otherwise was labelled as `anti-national'. However, in time an opposition movement led by the studentsand teachers'union against the leadershipemerged. Sava, a newspaperpublished by the poet Özker Yaýin during 1968-1973,had the courageto raise a voice of opposition againstthe Turkish Cypriot leadership.By reflecting the views of the opposition movementthat was already underway and by calling for generalelections, Saval, according to some scholars, pioneereda changewithin the community (Ünlü, no date; Azgin, 1998).
Turkish Language Press after 1974
The division of the island led to a new order for Turkish Cypriots in the north of the island which also brought new roles and challengesto the Turkish Cypriot press.The monopolistic control of the state3over the media servedas a propagandainstrument for the nationalist forces. The print media especiallybecame instrumental in different political and ideological strugglesas politics and the pressbecame more interdependentin the aftermath of 1974. Opposition to the leadershiphad already startedat the grass-rootlevel and led to the foundation of new political parties. But, three Turkish languagenewspapers, Hallam Sesi,Bozkurt and Zaman that continued to exist after the division of the island were supportersof the Turkish Cypriot leadershipand did not give much accessto oppositional voices. In the new multi- party system,to join in the power struggle politicians first neededchannels of communication to createa `public' for themselvesand to communicatetheir message to supporters.Thus, excluded from the existing public sphereof the media, the new parties set up newspapersthat would reflect their views and policies. Such ideological and financial connectionsmeant thesepublications or `party newspapers' actedas the organs of the political parties and reported eventsin line with the views of theseparties. In this way, the pressbecame (and still is) an instrument for the
3 Staterefers to the Turkish FederatedState of Cyprus which was proclaimed in 1975 and also Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which was establishedby the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish FederatedState of Cyprus in 1983.
75 different causesand strugglesof political actors. Party propagandaappeared in both opposition and pro-governmentnewspapers: the opposition printed their criticisms of the governmentdisguised as news reports while the pro-governmentnewspapers praised governmentactions in their stories.Propagating the views of the parties they sympathisewith is still a strong characteristicof the presstoday.
The Turkish Cypriot's nationalistic movement againstthe Greek Cypriot's enosis movement had been a powerful ideology in shapingand setting the boundaries within which the news media operated.It allowed the stateto control them according to its own interests,which consequentlyexcluded any oppositional voice from the public sphereof the media. According to the state,the struggle did not end but still continued under the threats of Greek Cypriots; this is why all Turkish Cypriots should unite behind the Turkish Cypriot leadershipto presenttheir voice as one to the world. In line with statepolicy, all the stateand civil organisationswere expected to function in accordancewith the `national cause'. The `national cause' was the defenceof the right of Turkish Cypriots to live independentlyfrom Greek Cypriots in their own state,one supportedand guaranteedby Turkey and the presenceof Turkish troops in the north of Cyprus. Opinions that did not comply with this view were holders regardedas undermining both the state and the nation and such opinion were brandedas `traitors'. Thus, it causedthe newspapersto avoid reporting issuesthat were critical of the Turkish Cypriot leadership,Turkey and the Turkish military, left which were the main representativesof the `national cause'. The wing newspapersthat took an oppositional standto the nationalist view were constrained by censorshipor self-censorship.The support of the nationalist pressbehind the `national cause' representedthe nation as united, homogenousand stable, making differencesbetween members of the national community invisible, which aided the nationbuilding process.
After the division of the island, Turkish Cypriots dependedon Turkey for the supply This of manpower,the survival of the economy and for national security. reliance intensified with the isolation Turkish Cypriots experiencedin the international arena following the establishmentof the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. Increasinginteraction betweenthe TRNC and Turkey was also reflected in the Turkish Cypriot press.For instance,the daily arrival of Turkish newspapersafter
76 1974 diminished the impact of the Turkish Cypriot press.Better printed, more colourful Turkish broadsheetsled to a reduction in the circulation rate of Turkish Cypriot ones (Ünlil, no date). There are severalpossible underlying reasonsfor this development:First, it could be that reading Turkish newspapersreinforced the identification processof Turkish Cypriots with Turkey. Second,political, economic and cultural changesin Turkey have always had an impact on the TRNC which led many to follow the news there. Another reasonfor the loss of the readershipof Turkish Cypriot newspaperscould also be that having listened to the news on the radio or television, people were not interestedin reading the samestories in the newspaperas the print news was very similar to that broadcast.Increasing interaction with the Turkish news media in Turkey, sometimesin the form of training, set examplesof journalistic practicesfor the Turkish Cypriot journalists and publishers. However, the Turkish media in generalwas supportive of the position of the `national cause' of Turkish Cypriots, regardlessof their political and ideological position, and reproducedand maintainedthe nationalist ideologies and discourses dominant in North Cyprus.
The lack of communication betweenthe two communities assistedthe Turkish Cypriot administration in maintaining a strong conceptof `the enemy' in order to mobilise the populaceagainst the `other' and also to build and shapea nation. Asserting differences from the `other' and reflecting the community as a harmonious one reinforces the feeling of unity among the membersof the nation as well as strengtheningethnocentric and nationalist perceptions(Tsagarousianou, 1999). People on both sides of the line received information about the other through the media, which relied on the information provided by official sources.Thus, the portrayal of Greek Cypriots as an `unchangingevil' and a continuous threat was not difficult and helped the state to maintain andjustify the statusquo. A common practice, especially among the right-wing press,was to strengthenthe stereotype among Turkish Cypriots that `all Greek Cypriots are bad and corrupt' by attaching news value to anything negative about Greek Cypriots. Papadakis(2005), pointing to `the news from the south' page of a right wing Turkish Cypriot newspaper,observed that Anything negative about the Greek Cypriot side was good news over here. They adoredGreek Cypriot extremists.Any statementthey found in the Greek Cypriot
77 pressabout Turkish Cypriots by extremists,made it to the section.If someonesaid `A good Turk is a deadTurk' not only did it becomenews, it was presentedas a generalGreek Cypriot outlook (Papadakis,2005, p. 103).
The conceptof Cypriotnessthat developedas a challengeto Turkish nationalism was both a cultural and political movement.Inevitably, the pressbecame a site where the struggle for domination betweentwo different imaginings of national identity took place. Depending on the media producer and its position within the political spectrum,the representationof Turkish Cypriot identity and its `other' changed. While right wing pro-governmentnewspapers such as Halkin Sesi and Birlik portrayed Turkish Cypriots as part of the Turkish nation and Greek Cypriots as the `other', the newspapersof the left wing opposition such as Yenidilzenand Ortam becamethe voice of an emerging Cypriot identity and posited Turkish immigrants as the `other'. On the other hand, commercial newspaperslike Kibris claimed to be objective but actually reflected the political allegiancesof their owners,which shifted over the years.Depending on their positions, the discoursesof the newspaperson identity also varied. While the discoursesof the nationalist papers were basedon an essentialistTurkish national identity, in a similar mannerthe left wing newspapershighlighted the Cypriotnessof Turkish Cypriots.
In their challengeto Turkish nationalism, the left wing pressadopted the methodsOf the nationalist newspaperswhile emphasisingCypriotness. They portrayed Turkish immigrants as the new `enemy', in much the sameway the right wing presshas often cast Greek Cypriots in this role. Events involving the immigrants have been dealt with in a similar manner, especially by the left-wing media. The number of stories showing immigrants in a positive light has beenminimal in thesenewspapers. They have been representedas the causeof anything that goeswrong in the country. The mainlandershave beenportrayed as gangsters,criminals and illegal immigrants who brought crime and corruption to the country and threatenedthe `harmonious' life of Turkish Cypriots. Many stories constructedalong the lines of `our safety in our in country' is being threatenedby `criminals from Turkey' appeared the newspapers. `gangsters, While `they' - the immigrants from Turkey- are murderers,thieves', `we', the Turkish Cypriots, are the `victims'. Such oppositional representationhas not only intensified the perceived differencesbetween Turkish Cypriots and
78 immigrantsgenerally but alsocreated fear amongstTurkish Cypriots about security, the lossof their identity andself-determination.
The transformation of identity the Turkish Cypriot community had been going through was clearly visible during the period in which the latest settlementplan for Cyprus, the Annan Plan, was debated.The argumentsof pro-settlementand opposition groups were related through the media and the discourseof each newspaperchanged in relation to shifts in discoursesin the political arena. Unsurprisingly, while newspapersof the left adoptedthe discourseof settlementand describedTurkish Cypriots as `Europeans',newspapers on the right arguedthat a solution andjoining the EU would achievenothing but enosis.Despite this, the media in the north engagedin more open debateand reflected a spectrumof opinions during this period. According to a study of the information environment in Cyprus regarding the Annan Plan, TheTurkish Cypriot media and information environment reflected a wide varietyof viewsrather than any singletrend. While eachmedia outlet eventually had clear leanings,each displayed a sufficientand comparable level of independencefrom official dictates(Ridder/Braden et. al, 2005,p. 4).
The changesthat occurredwithin social and political contexts also affected the press. During the ongoing hegemonicstruggle, the dominant nationalist discourseswere challenged,sometimes leading to a shift of alliance of the media organisation.Kibris and Kibrish, two commercial and influential newspaperschanged their policy from a very nationalistic stanceto supporting the Annan Plan. Such a changein Kibris, the newspaperwith the highest circulation in the TRNC, was radical, as the paper was known for its nationalistic position regarding the Cyprus issue.Today, the discussion still continues about what motivated Kibris to make such a change;whether it simply followed the support the public gave to the plan and reflected popular feelings or, realising the strong support amongstits readershipfor the plan, decidedto campaign for the settlementso as not to lose its readership.
79 Turkish Cypriot Broadcasting in Cyprus
The developmentof national broadcastingplayed a fundamentalrole in building a senseof Turkish national identity among Turkish Cypriots as well as uniting them in the `national cause' waged againstGreek Cypriots. Until recently, it enforced a Turkish nationalist discourseas well as sustainingan official representationof Greek Cypriots as the `enemy'. As opposedto the press,which developedas part of different political and ideological struggles,the broadcastindustry, until commercialisationin 1997,was the main supporterof official ideologies and claimed to be the voice of the Turkish Cypriots.
Broadcastingin Cyprus startedduring the British Colonial era with the establishment of the first radio station, Cyprus ForcesBroadcasting Service, by the British forces in 1948 (Dedecay, 1988). The radio producedprogrammes for British military personnelon the island as well as broadcastingin Greek and Turkish. The British administration later set up a radio station for Cypriots, the Cyprus Broadcasting Service,which begantransmitting in 1953. Following the introduction of television broadcasts,the Cyprus BroadcastingService becamethe Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation. In 1959 it becamethe official statebroadcaster and its administration was passedto both communities in Cyprus (Sophocleous& Papademetris,1991; Dedecay, 1988). Like many aspectsof public life in Cyprus, the constitution of the new republic organisedpersonnel and administration of the broadcastingcorporation along the lines of ethnic proportionality. According to this, 30% of its personneland administration were Turkish Cypriots and 70% were Greek Cypriots. The samerates also applied to the programming: 30% of the programmeswere in Turkish while 70% were 'in Greek (Dedecay, 1988).
According to a publication by the Pressand Information Office of the ROC concerningthe massmedia in Cyprus, the launch of the service receivedvery little attention by the local press apart from an English languagenewspaper, Cyprus Mail (Sophocleous& Papademetris,1991). This was partly becauseit-was seenas the propagandainstrument of the British administration. Aware of such concernsby Cypriots about the broadcastservice, the British governor at the time assuredthe public that the service was not concernedwith propagandabut, following the English
80 tradition, only aimed to inform the public (Sophocleous& Papademetris,1991). Yet, at the time, a resistancemovement had been launchedagainst the British and such statementswere not found to be convincing. Consciousof the power of radio as an instrument to promote the views and policies of the British throughout the island, the Greek Cypriot nationalist group EOKA bombedthe radio station three times to silence it during their struggle to overthrow the British (Dedecay, 1988; Sophocleous & Papademetris,1991).
Despite all this, Dedecay(1988) arguesthat, broadcastin three languages,English, Turkish and Greek, the radio programmesbecame a social routine of life. Having already attractedCypriots' interest, the radio broadcastmass events such as festivals, carnivals, fairs and other entertainmentprogrammes, which were relevant to the communities in general.By turning someexclusive eventsinto massexperiences and linking the national public with private lives, the radio facilitated a senseof unity among Cypriots which may have servedthe interestsof the British administration. The early radio broadcastsin Cyprus, by uniting the dispersedmembers of the audienceand giving them a senseof belonging, may have contributed to the construction of national unity, but for each community separately.For example, for Turkish Cypriots who were spreadaround the island and surroundedmainly by the Greek Cypriot community, listening to Turkish languageprogrammes on the radio and imagining the other membersof the community doing the samething at the same time might have forged a relationship with other dispersedTurkish Cypriots and enhancedtheir senseof being a community. Following the radio programmesbeing broadcastin Greek and Turkish as well as listening to the radio programmesof the motherlandsmay also have contributed to their imagining themselvesas separate communities. However, it should be noted that someCypriots listened to the radio in eachother's languagesas they were bilingual or trilingual, including English.
With the eruption of inter-communal armed conflict beginning on 21StDecember 1963,Turkish Cypriots were no longer able to work for the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation. Though some still went to the radio station, which was in a Greek Cypriot dominated areaof Nicosia, for anothertwo days (until 23`dDecember 1963), difficulties and dangersprevented them from continuing to do so (Dedecay, 1988). Cyprus' jointly run radio and television serviceswere left to the control of Greek
81 Cypriots, leaving Turkish Cypriots without any meansof communication.No longer a part of the legitimate administrative organsof the Republic and excluded from official communicationchannels, Turkish Cypriots neededan alternativemeans of communicationto broadcastand promote their ideas and news. Such communication was also required to provide Turkish Cypriots with a meansof countering the propagandaand misinformation spreadby the Greek Cypriot run broadcasting services.Apart from representingthe voice of Turkish Cypriots, an electronic form of communication was essentialto preservecontact within the dispersedTurkish Cypriot community as their communicationwas constantly obstructedby Greek Cypriots. As Bailie and Berberoglu suggest,`during the 1963through 1974 period it was necessaryto createan electronic form of communicationthat could overcome the geographicalboundaries faced by newspapersand surfacemail becausethese forms of communication were constantlybeing interrupted by the Greek Cypriot forces' (Bailie & Berberoglu, 1999,p. 256). Another important factor in establishing a broadcastmedia was to facilitate the unity of Turkish Cypriots behind the leadershipand the `nationalist struggle' againstGreek Cypriots.
Launchedin Nicosia on the 25thDecember 1963,within four days of the start of the inter-communal conflict, the radio broadcasterwas given the name of Bayrak which means`flag'. Yet in this case,rather than implying `flag', it was derived from the name given to the leader of TMT who also controlled the radio station, Bayraktar (Bailie & Berberoglu, 1999). Bayrak radio, that was set up and operatedby civilians, be known was actually under the administration of TMT and the radio came to as `the voice of the Turkish Cypriot Mujahedin'.
Sincethe transmissionsignal of Bayrakradio was not strongenough to reachparts of Cyprus beyond Nicosia and its surroundings,following Bayrak's example, five other radio stationswere founded in the main cities of Cyprus within a year. Canbulat Radio was set up in Famagusta,Gazi Baffin Sesi (the Voice of Ghazi Paphos)in Paphos,Doganin Sesi (the Voice of Nature) in Larnaca,Lefke Sancak4Radio in
Lecke and Limasol SancakRadio in Limassol. The main aims of theseradio stations
into 4 During the armed conflict againstGreek Cypriots, TMT divided Cyprus military zonesand each known Sancak zonewas called a Sancak.The radio stationsset up in theseareas were as radio stations.
82 was to inform, to supportthe ongoing conflict againstGreek Cypriots, to counter Greek Cypriot propagandaand provide the community with a channelof communication.Especially in areaswhere communicationwas interrupted,these radio stationsacted as links to the outside. For example,when Turkish Cypriots in Famagustacame under siegefrom the Greek Cypriot militia who had cut off their communication channels,Canbulat Radio was their only meansof communication with the other areas(catal, 2003). Operating under the administration of TMT, these radio stationswere part of the armed conflict againstthe Greek Cypriots. As Erdogan Erdem, who had worked on Canbulat Radio explained,the fight did not just involve weaponsand guns but also the media as well. Theseradio stationshad a different function to that of ordinary radio broadcasters,which was to work for the struggle and thus they were `national struggle media' (quoted in catal, 2003, p. 124).
Like Bayrak, theseradio stationswere under the military administration and functioned as channelsthat carried the instructions of TMT to people at large. The military usedthese broadcasts `to organisethe community around a national struggle, to define the boundariesof that struggle and to encouragethe Turkish Cypriot community to work in the interestsof that struggle' (Bailie & Berberoglu, 1999, p.225). The aim of thesestations was not only to propagatethe military's views on the eventstaking place but also to createpublic opinion in support of theseviews. Ismet Kotak, who had a commentaryprogramme on Canbulat Radio in Famagusta describedthe radio station as acting as an `opinion leader' (catal, 2003, p.70). By contributing to the creation of public opinion in favour of the leadership,these radio stationslegitimized the establishmentand control of an authoritarian leadershipover the public. Also, counteractingthe propagandaor misinformation spreadby the Greek Cypriot broadcastingservices, these Turkish Cypriot radio stations set out to transmit their version of events.Another important function was to act as communication channelsthrough which people sent messagesto their families and friends and in this way linked not only people to eachother but also their private lives with the public one.
Thesestations, especially the main radio stationBayrak, used `the power of the idea of nationto involve peoplein a commonsense of identity' (Morley & Robins,1995, p.91). At a time of insecurityand confusion, they actedas a symbolof securityand
83 integration for Turkish Cypriots againstthe threat of the `other'. By doing this, these radio stationsplayed a fundamentalrole among Turkish Cypriots in the reconstructionof national identity along the lines of Turkish nationalism. Consequently,apart from acting as a meansof uniting the community behind the military, they also aimed to emphasizeclose links with the `motherland' Turkey. By evoking Turkish cultural myths, identifying the Turkish Cypriots' struggle with the one the Turkish nation had beenthrough (Sayil, 2000, p.72-73) and describing Turkey as the `motherland,' the commentarieson Bayrak Radio and the other stationswere contributing to the strengtheningof the identification of Turkish Cypriots with the Turkish nation. At the beginning and end of their programmes,the radios played the Turkish national anthemand military marches(Sayil, 2000). Not only on Bayrak but the programmeson other stationswere also instrumental in creating such an affiliation with Turkey. For example,Canbulat Radio had history programmesabout the Ottoman Empire and Turkish national heroesthat were presentedas part of the history of the Turkish Cypriot community. Cultural programmessuch asAnadolu yu Gezelim (Let's travel around Anatolia) introduced Turkish Cypriots to different cultural and folkloric characteristicsof different regions in Turkey (catal, 2003, p. 73). With special live broadcastson Turkey's national days, which were also celebratedin Cyprus by Turkish Cypriots, theseradio stations helped the spreadof Turkish nationalism, as well as increasingthe morale of the community, as such representationsof nationalist rallies and public rituals play a significant role in the assertionof national unity (Tsagarousianou,1999).
The radio transmissionswere also instrumental in enforcing ethnocentricand nationalist perceptionsamong people. Providing a stereotypicalpresentation, the commentariesbroadcast, especially on Bayrak Radio, describedGreek Cypriots as murderous,savage and barbarous.For example,Bayrak frequently used a well- known poem called `hatred' which spoke of wishing to `crush the thirty thousand headswith a stone', ` extract with pliers the teeth of ten thousand', `throw the carcassesof the hundred thousandinto a river' and so on (Ya§m, 1990,p. 55). Sayil's documentationshows the `hatred' poem amongstthe poemsthat were read on the radio to maintain the morale and nationalist emotions of the public (Sayil, 2000).
84 With the end of the armed conflict in 1974,all local radio stationsapart from Bayrak and Canbulat ceasedto exist. As the Turkish Cypriot community moved from the south of the island to the north, the radio stationspositioned in the south of the island, such as in Paphosand Larnaca,closed down. The radio station in Limassol had already stoppedtransmission soon after its establishment(Sayil, 2000; Dedecay, 1988). Set up to support the Turkish Cypriots' fight againstthe Greek Cypriots, these stations had in many ways completedtheir mission with the end of the conflict and the division of the island in 1974. When Canbulat Radio ceasedits broadcastingin mid-1970's, Bayrak becamethe only radio station broadcastingto Turkish Cypriots. Despite the end of the armed struggle,Bayrak continuedto stay under military administration until 1976 and only then cameunder a civil authority (Bayrak Bayrak Bayrak, BRTK documentary,1998). As television broadcastsbegan in 1976, Turkish Cypriot broadcastingorganised as Bayrak Radyo TelevizyonKurumu (BRTK- Bayrak Radio Television Corporation), the semi-governmentalbroadcasting corporation of Turkish Cypriots. With the establishmentof the TRNC, BRTK transformedfrom being `the voice of the Mujahedin' to being the `voice of the TRNC'.
The ideology of `national cause', which had shapedthe media during the era of armed conflict, still continued to be a powerful concepteven after 1974.Under the control of the government,BRTK had the monopoly over broadcastingwhich also allowed it to becomea political tool in reflecting the government's policies and views (Turgay, no date). Thus, BRTK becameinstrumental in articulating the Turkish nationalist discourseand spreadingthe nationalist ideology. Claiming to be the voice of the TRNC, BRTK actually becamethe voice of the nationalist governmentwhich saw Turkish Cypriots as part of the Turkish nation and excluded any oppositional views. As Bailie and Berberoglu (1999) argue,the combination of the conceptsof `democracy' and `national struggle' limited oppositional voices to official governmentpolicies in order to createa unified, single voice to presentto the international community.
BRTK's monopoly over broadcastingin the TRNC endedwith the Establishmentof Public and Private Radio and Television Law in 1997. Privatisation of broadcast mediahas not only providedincreased access to the mediabut alsoincreased the
85 diversity of voices heard in them. However, the ideological framework of `national cause' still continuedto define the conceptualboundaries of information gathering and disseminationas the commercial media owners implementedself-censorship on political issuesregarding the Cyprus problem (Bailie & Berberoglu, 1999).
The privatisation of the broadcastmedia provided different political, economic and social groups that had beenpreviously excluded with a forum to join in public debate.The best example of this came during the coverageof the Annan Plan and the referendumon it. According to Ridder/Bradenet. al (2005), who studied the media during the period that concernedthe Annan Plan and the referendum,`a rich and diverse information environment emerged' within the Turkish Cypriot media landscape(p. 18). From the time the plan was leaked to the media until the completion of the referendum,the media were dominatedby the two issuesof the UN's settlementplan and the referendum,which was inevitable as `the discussions among citizens on any topic invariably turned to the Plan as it cameto dominate mainstreamdiscourse' (Ridder/Bradenet. al, 2005, p.24). During this period, especially with panel discussions,the broadcastmedia createda forum for diverse political and economic views to be debated. Their talk shows and call-in programmesalso encouragedthe audienceto take part in the discussionsand make comments,which prompted people to speakout more than in the past (Ridder/Braden et.al, 2005). 1
As in the caseof the print media, the allegiancesof someprivately owned broadcast media shifted from the nationalist discourseto a discoursethat favoured the plan. Kibris FM and Kibris TV, which are part of the Kibris Media Group owned by Asil Nadir, as well as Genc TV, becamesupporters of the plan. Meanwhile, BRTK, having positioned itself with the `no' camp initially, changedits coverageof the plan to `somewhatmore positive but significantly more balanced' with a government changeand appointmentof a new director (Ridder/Bradenet. al, 2005, p.20).
86 b. Journalism in North Cyprus
This part of the study focuseson the institutional, political and economicfactors that influence the production of news in the Turkish Cypriot media. As well as benefiting from the findings of other researchon the issue,the investigation of media dynamics is also basedon interviews I carried out to provide evidenceof the conditions and practicesinvolved in media production and also to map the reflection of power onto the media.
I conductedthirteen semi-structuredinterviews with journalists and editors as well as political figures, a NGO representativeand a media academicthrough which I explore the factors that shapejournalism in the TRNC. Interviews were structured around various social determinantsof the journalism as suggestedby McNair (1998), such as professionalculture and organisationaldeterminants, political pressures, economic pressures,technological factors and the activities of `extramediasocial actors' (p. 15). McNair arguesthat a variety of cultural, technological,political and journalistic he economic forces in the society have a role in shapingthe output and be for proposesto study their impact on journalism. McNair's approachcan criticised being very simplified in which the cultural, technological,political and economic factors of news production are studied exclusively of each other, as if they always influence the production individually and separately.Nevertheless, I adoptedhis framework describe approachin this study as it is still useful in providing a to and understandthe social context of news production.
The intervieweesincluded eight journalists and editor-in-chiefs from broadcastand print media, one media owner, two politicians, an academicand a representativeof The an NGO working in the field of conflict resolution5. roles and participation of the intervieweesin the production of media texts have been determinantsin the different selection.Journalists were selectedfrom different positions within media groups with different political orientations. The newspaperowner was selectedto journalistic provide the views of media owners and their influence on output. Intervieweesfrom outside the media were selectedin order to discusstheir
in detailin bibliography. 5The names and the positionsof the intervieweesare provided the
87 relationshipwith the mediaand the role of the mediadiscourse in a wider social, cultural andhistorical context. The academicand the NGO representativewere chosenon the basis of their work on the media, conflict resolution and identity issues.Politicians, one from the governmentand one from the main opposition party, were interviewed to find out their relationship with the media6.
All the interviews were conductedin the workspaceof the interviewees,a place the intervieweesthemselves chose. When askedwhere they would prefer to do the interview they all invited me to their offices. Questioningsome of them whether they would feel comfortable or relaxed talking about the media and their problems in their work places,they were all affirmative. Apart from two politicians who wanted to stay anonymous,the rest of the intervieweeswere willing to be identified in the study which encouragedme to think that they were being sincereand open in expressing their ideas and views during the interview. They statedtheir belief in discussingand exposingthe problems in the media andjournalism in North Cyprus as an important initial step in finding solutions to their problems. Therefore,they voluntarily gave betweenone and one and a half hours of their time to answermy querieswhich included a number of questionsthat ranged from ownership control to political pressure,from the Cyprus problem to the impact of technological advances.As mentioned before, the purposeof the interviews was to give me an insight into the conditions and practices of the media that might otherwise have been difficult to study.
Political Factors and the 'National Cause'
The Turkish Cypriot media have always been a site where strugglesbetween different causesand interestshave taken place. The conflict with the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement was especially influential in shapingthe journalism practiced in North Cyprus. The attemptsof the Turkish Cypriot administration to createa unified voice during and after the conflict set the boundarieswithin which the news
6 Two politicians I interviewed askedto remain anonymous.They were very critical of the media and thejournalism in the country but at the sametime relying on the media to make their views public, they were worried of a backlashfrom the media.
88 media operated.For example,any criticism of the policies and practicesof the Turkish Cypriot leadershipwas regardedas undermining the stateand national unity. Thus, it createdmedia that avoided criticising certain institutions, especiallythe main representativesof the nationalist ideologies in the country such as the Turkish Cypriot administration, Turkish embassyand the Turkish military. The rule applied to both stateowned media organisationssuch as BRTK and TiirkAjansi Kibris (TAK-Turkish Agency Cyprus) and to privately owned ones.
A similar control mechanismto the ideology of anticommunism,as suggestedby Herman and Chomsky (1988), was in play in the Turkish Cypriot media. Although it is strangeto think that communism can be a threat now, the idea behind it is important becauseit is this ideology that `helpsmobilize the populaceagainst an enemy' (p. 29). It is useful in convincing people that there's a seriousthreat which helps to justify bringing somerestrictions to their freedoms.In the Turkish Cypriots' case,the anticommunismfilter was replacedwith the fear of Greek Cypriots' domination of the island and their `never-ending' ambition of enosis.Using such fears and threatswas a way of exercisingpolitical pressureon the media, which helped to control journalists, the media and, indirectly, the public. The media acted as a channel for communicating the messagesand symbols, particularly of nationalist groups,to the generalpopulace in order to `manufactureconsent' (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Drawing a parallel with Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model is not to ignore the other elementsthat the model fails to take into account, in but such as the practical and organisationalfactors influential newsroom practices, to highlight how powerful institutions controlled the media to mobilise support for their own interests.For this purpose,a mix of formal and informal meansof control journalists and pressuresuch as threats, imprisonment, the dismissal of critical from their jobs or the loss of stateadvertising were usedto silencejournalists. For jailed for example,the editor in chief and a journalist from Afrika newspaperwere is criticising the president7.This does not mean that political pressure not applied to journalists any more, but that, as somejournalists interviewed for this study in expressed,it is not as intense as it used to be and with the recent political changes
7 SenerLevent, the editor-in-chief and Memduh Ener, a journalist of Afrika newspaperwere sentenced in "Who is No. 1 " The to six months in August 2002 for criticising the president an article the traitor? court appealin October 2002 reducedtheir sentencesto six weeks.
89 the TRNC, thereis moretolerance towards journalists' criticisms.In any case, political pressureshave influenced and shaped the journalism practiced today.
The affiliation of a media organisationwith a political party is a well-known characteristicof the media in the TRNC. Even though such connectionsare not always statedin the mastheadof a newspaperor on the ownership documentsof the broadcastmedia, the relationship is still recognisedby the public. This is not only becausetheir content is shapedin a similar way to the political parties they are affiliated with but also becauseit is usual for the owners and managersof these organisationsto openly expressthat their policies are in line with certain political views they favour (catal, 2006; Hanger,2006). In thesecircumstances, the main aim of journalism is not to inform their audiencebut to provide interpretation and commentaryon events,in line with the ideology and discourseof the political party. Therefore, somenewspapers have a number of column writers but few or no Irvan reportersat all. explains that while such party journalism allows the political parties to establishcommunication with their supporters,it also shapesjournalism and news selection according to party policies (Irvan, 2006). Meanwhile, official media institutions such as BRTK and TAK (the statenews agency) are not free from political circumstanceseither as their directors and administrative board members changewith changesof government.
One of the main ways of maintaining control within a newsroom is by socialisation, or learning and internalising the norms and policies of the institution, especially by new staff (Breed, 1999). In the Turkish Cypriot media, examplesof this processwere evident in stateorganisations such as BRTK and TAK where news reports were until recently checkedto seeif they were in line with the `national cause' (Ercakica, 2008). Even though somejournalists interviewed from theseorganisations reported no such strict control over their news output anymore,they also admitted that it is becausethey have formed their own boundariesconcerning what they can say or write. Nezire Gürkan, a journalist working for the statenews agencyTAK, notes that experiencedreporters have developeda senseof auto-control which helps them to decidewhat they can and cannot write in their news articles and that new staff learn to do the same,in time. She also adds that knowing such boundarieslimits any intervention by authorities in their stories and journalistic processes(Gürkan,
90 PersonalInterview, 2006). Acknowledging that the reporterswithin BRTK have also developedself-control, Tumay Tugyan, a journalist working for BRTK, explains that they and their news editors control and check that news reports are within the policy of the institution (Tugyan, PersonalInterview, 2006).
News Sources
Governmentscan becomea `communicatorof enormouspower' (Golding & Murdock, 1997,p. 23). By giving subsidiesto media organisations,governments can seducethem into promoting their policies and actions. Providing the media with information not only reducesthe effort required to discover and produce news stories but, for the government,it also provides a way of controlling them (Golding & Murdock, 1997). After 1974 in North Cyprus, a governmentcomprised of nationalist forces did not just act as a regulator of information but was also a powerful sourceof it. Its control of and constraintson journalists contributed to the developmentof a journalism that relied on the governmentand statebureaucrats as credible sources, making them the primary news sourceof the Turkish Cypriot media. It progressedin such a way that the governmentbecame the main provider of the media's steady demandfor information and news material.
The statenews agency, TürkAjansi Kibris (TAK-Turkish Agency Cyprus), plays a crucial role in providing news and information to the media which not only reflects the views of stateofficials but is also `approved' by them. Nezire Gürkan, a TAK journalist, describesthe news producedby TAK as the `official news' or, in other words, the news that is in line with state ideology and cannot be critical of state policies. Gtirkan revealsthat `if the president phonesthe news agency and asks us not to report someof his remarks in a speechhe had delivered earlier, then we have to follow his request' (Gürkan, PersonalInterview, 2006).
Most, or in some casesall of the news items that appearin the news media come from the TAK agency.The media are heavily dependenton TAK, in part to maintain an image of objectivity and in part to protect themselvesfrom criticism of bias and libel court cases.Reporting the officially approvednews shields the media from any
91 risk of prosecutionor endangeringtheir relations with official sources.However, this relationship createsa bias towards authority and dominant groups.Another reason for using TAK's dispatchesis to savetime, labour and cost. Most of the news media use the news articles they receive from TAK rather than employing their own reporters, even in caseswhere their journalists have attended.There are only a few newspaperswith an editorial team and a functioning newsroomwith reporterswhich leads Yenidüzen'schief editor Cenk Mutluyakah to describethe TRNC as a `country where newspapersare published without any reporters': In our country, newspapersare publishedwithout a newsroomstaff or reporters. Editors go to the newsroomin the afternoon,get all the news from TAK, changethe headlines,use the internet to preparea couple of more pagesand fill the rest of the paper with opinion columns.Their journalism is totally dependenton the news agency.We are a country where newspapersare publishedwithout any reporters (Mutluyakali, PersonalInterview, 2006).
Therefore, rejecting claims of diversity, Mutluyakali arguesthat it is more like `an over abundanceof newspapersrather than diversity'. He stressesthat the advertising is shareof the media that have reportersand newsroom staff the sameas the ones that don't employ any journalists and he believes that it acts as an obstaclein the developmentof the media (Mutluyakali, PersonalInterview, 2006).
As a result of the dependenceon the official news agency,the media consists of the headlinesdistinguishing samestories with the samecontent, with only their them. As have a journalist describes`if you read one newspaper,it meansyou read all of them' (Gürel, PersonalInterview, 2006). The extent of the dependenceof the media on TAK is such that, as May Cemal, the editor in chief of Hallen Sesi explains, if there is a mistake in a TAK story, it is repeatedthroughout the media (Cemal, Personal Interview, 2006). But what happensif a story is about an incident or an issuethat the media organisationis critical of? Then they simply changethe headline and some parts of the story according to their views and then publish or broadcastthe rest as it is. There are many examplesin the media where headlinesand content do not match becausethe headline stressessomething while the main body of the text is about somethingtotally different.
92 Economic Factors
Economic forces such as ownership and advertising also have an impact on journalism in North Cyprus. The ownership of the Turkish Cypriot media can be categorisedas a combination of state,political party and private, and eachshapes and determinesthe media output accordingto their political and economic interests.For example, BRTK and TAK news agencyare the state organisationsand until recently were utilized to servethe `national cause'.Kibris, the highest circulated newspaper, reflects the political and economic interestsof its owner, a businessman.The media that are owned by the political parties mainly aim to provide theseparties with a meansof disseminatingtheir political and ideological views to their supporters.
Unsurprisingly, as media owners do not want to publish or broadcastany news that is involved not in line with their political and economic interests,they are very closely Özadam, in the news production process.Levent a print journalist who worked as a it is radio news editor at the time of the interview, noted that a very common process for the owners of the media institutions to interfere with the content of the news and incidents his boss editorial decisionsin North Cyprus. He recalls many of previous going to the newsroom with somebusinessmen and changingthe content of news Özadamhimself for stories and page layout had already edited ready the print (Özadam,Personal Interview, 2006). catal, (2006) and Hanger (2006) who broadcast in conductedtwo separatepieces of researchinto and print media the TRNC, found that the owners have the last say over news output. The news staff, interests who have learned and internalisedthe of the owners, apply self-censorship and do not publish anything that opposesit. The aforementionedresearch also by in revealedthat this situation is acceptedas normal someof the personnel these organisations.
The media owners can also use their media for ideological and cultural dominanceto ideologies shapemessages (Stevenson, 2002). While supporting certain and policies information, is for in the public sphere,they can restrict the flow of which necessary little open debate.Having supportedthe nationalist ideologiesand given very space 2008), Geng TV First FM to opposition voices, Kibris Media Group (Ercakica, and favoured in shifted their allegiancefrom nationalist policies to onesthat a solution
93 Cyprusand had a role in mobilisingthe public to give its supportto the plan (RidderBradenet. al, 2005,catal, 2006;Hanger, 2006).
The media in the TRNC is mostly dependenton advertising and competewith each other for market share.Thus advertising has a big impact not only on the production of news but also on the content of the news. For example,as Yenidilzen'schief editor Mutluyakali admits, it is difficult to write or say anything about a company that has given advertisementto the newspaperso as not to damagethe financial relationship (Mutluyakali, PersonalInterview, 2006). In a similar way, somejournalists and editors explained to catal, (2006) and Hanger (2006) that when requestedby the advertiser,the media would publish or broadcastinformation (or, in some cases, advertising disguisedas news) for the sakeof maintaining a businessrelationship.
Meanwhile, the political position and views of the news media are important for advertisers.$ener Levent, the chief editor of Afrika newspaper,a radical left daily, told me that they get very little advertising from the stateor from any other organisationbecause of the radical political views expressedin the newspaper (Levent, PersonalInterview, 2006). Özal Ziya, the director of Radyo Mayis also told catal, (2006) that there are businessesthat advertiseon their radio station because they are sympatheticto their political views as well as oneswho don't becausethey are againstthem.
Professional Culture and the Production of News
Within such a political and economic environment,journalists find it hard to fulfil their journalistic responsibilities properly. The intervention of owners in the private media and of the pro-governmentadministration of the state-ownedones brings a number of limitations to their news production processes.Having internalisedthe policy of the media organisation,many journalists follow the rules and avoid challenging them.
One important consequenceof this is that journalists steer clear of being critical, Ibrahim Özejder, in especially of stateinstitutions. According to an academic media
94 studies,the existenceof a degreeof criticism shouldnot misleadpeople into believingotherwise: Looking at the criticisms of one radical newspapermay give the impressionthat criticism is toleratedbut actually it is not. They are an isolatedgroup of journalists or intellectualswho are treatedas a group with worthless ideas.They are allowed to be critical becausetheir readersare limited. The oneswho can reachwider audience are preventedfrom doing so either by strict laws or by the boundariesformed in the minds of their journalists that stop them from being critical (Özejder, Personal Interview, 2006).
Many Turkish Cypriot journalists and academicsinterviewed for this researchalso journalism in pointed to a lack of investigation and researchas the main problem of the country. They point out that Turkish Cypriot journalists neither question nor have journalistic a critical approachto the issuethey are working on, which reduces for practice to merely recording what has been said. The underlying reason such a lack of motivation and researchamong journalists could be explained in part by competition for market sharenot really creating a competition for exclusivenessand in also in part with the journalistic practicesdeveloped the conflict yearsthat still prevail.
Without questioningor providing tools of interpretation,the news reports are no different than the pressreleases. They also lead to speculationand the appearanceof further many texts disguisedas news items that actually go no than reporting a in NGO, journalists rumour. Mete Hatay, an academicand a researcher a criticises information for asking questionswithin the news text itself as a meansof reaching Highlighting it easily rather than researchingand reporting the answer. as one of the lack common practicesof the Turkish Cypriot media, either as a result of of sources leads or time, Hatay arguesthat not undertaking detailed research to speculation 2006). Ercakica (2008) rather than proper reporting (Hatay, PersonalInterview, also in North Cyprus points at speculationas an important feature of the print media and statesthat `in the Turkish Cypriot press,it is known that the texts that are printed as have "the news" are plagiarized from other media organisations,many news texts distortions which reachto the point of slanderand most of the time are done for political gains'.
95 Questioning the underlying reasonsof such a journalistic culture, the younger generationof journalists blame the older ones for the lack of investigation and critical approachamong journalists in North Cyprus. They arguethat the older generation,who are mostly in editorial and managementpositions today, startedtheir journalism during the conflict years and therefore learnednot to ask questionsor challenge state authority. As Ekmekci, a journalist, puts it, `the older generationhas learnedjournalism within a different tradition that demandedloyalty to the Turkish Cypriot leadership,Turkey or Turkish Military but the young generationwho has not been through that processis more critical' (Ekmekci, PersonalInterview, 2006).
The job market in the media sectormay also be influential in the journalism practiced today. Consideringthat journalism is a low-income profession (Irvan, 2006), many journalists avoid challenging their employersso as not to risk their positions. As catal (2006) and Hanger's (2006) researchshows, the media owners and managerschoose to work with journalists that have similar political or ideological views. Anyone critical of the media organisation's policy or journalistic practiceswould either keep quiet or risk losing their position.
Perhapsas a consequence,some journalists have becomelazy. Some of those interviewed arguedthat reliance on TAK for the production and distribution of the news has made somejournalists lazy. Gürkan stressedthat somejournalists made a habit of using the TAK dispatcheseven when they had attendedthe event themselves (GÜrkan,Personal Interview, 2006). Some also statedthat journalists are satisfied with the information given to them as they often just record it without asking questions(Gilrel, PersonalInterview, 2006; Basri, PersonalInterview, 2006).
Technological Factors
Technological developmentshave also had an impact on the journalism practiced in North Cyprus. While a lack of technology in newsgatheringled the media to focus on providing editorials and commentaryrather than news reporting, particularly in the past, at presentit has enabledthem to publish or broadcastthe news with fewer staff. Despite this, in a small country, where five universities teach media studies,young
96 journalist candidatesfeel the pressureof equippingthemselves not only with journalistic skills but alsowith technologicalskills suchas using video, editing and pagelayout to find employmentin the media.
97 PART TWO CHAPTER 4: APPLYING CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
The underlying assumption of this thesis is that identity is socially constructed and in this process of construction the media play a significant role. Adopting the idea that symbolic constructions display an articulated structure which shapesthem into truth within a given specific spatial-temporal setting (Thompson, 1990), I outline and discuss the general framework for the study of such constructions and the interpretation of their meaning.
In this chapter,I first discussthe social constructionistapproach as it forms the basisof many theoriesabout culture and society,one of which is discoursetheory. It provides the generalframework for the developmentof the methodsthat fall under the rubric of critical discourseanalysis. Then, drawing upon this, I explorethe research methodologiesthat have developedwithin the broad school of critical discourse analysis,which provides the theoreticaland methodological parameters of this study.
Finally, I identify the particular subjectsof this study,discuss the sampling logic and take a closer look at the appropriateresearch tools that are applied to the analysisof the data in the research.
Social Constructionist Approach
Critical DiscourseAnalysis (CDA), the researchparadigm adopted for this research,is basedon a social constructionistapproach which embracesa variety of theoriesabout society and culture and recognisesthe social aspectof languageuse. Being critical of the conceptof `objectivity' (Lichtenberg, 1996),this approachhas raisedquestions about the relationshipbetween representation and reality (Jorgensenand Phillips, 2002) and ways of understandingthe world.
99' Explaining the philosophicalassumptions of the approach,Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) remark that representationsof the world are not reflectionsof a pre-existingreality but a product of our categorisationof the world or, in discursiveterms, products of discourse. As they note, `this doesnot meanthat reality itself doesnot exist. Meaning and representationsare real. Physicalobjects also exist, but they only gain meaningthrough discourse'(Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p.9). Therefore,the social world is not pre- given or determined by external forces but is socially and discursively constructed. Representations of reality contribute to constructing reality.
Another assumptionis that the way in which we understandthe world is historically and culturally specific and can changeover time (Jorgensenand Phillips, 2002). This is to say,the production,circulation and receptionof the meaningof symbolic forms are processesmade possible by the rules and resourcesof a certainhistorical and cultural context and field (Thompson,1990).
The link betweenknowledge and social processesis also important (Jorgensenand Phillips, 2002). In our understandingof the world we createknowledge through social interactionin which we constructcommon truths and competeover what is true and false.The social constructionof knowledgehas social consequencesbecause different Within social understandingsof the world will lead to different social actions. a particular worldview, someforms of action will be acceptedas natural while others regardedas unacceptable.
The constructionistapproach had a big impact on the developmentof theoriesin relation to languageand discourse.Its view of languageas a social practiceand a medium throughwhich meaningis producedand channelledhas especiallyinfluenced cultural both studies.Thus, many linguistic theories,such as the pioneeringwork of Saussure's semiotic approachand Foucault's discursiveapproach, are all basedon this broad school of thought (Hall, 1997).
100 The media, one of the meansof producingand disseminatingsymbolic forms, play a significant role in the constructionand reflection of reality. Providing a meaningful representationof the world and communicatingit to others,the mediahelp to naturalise social reality which also servesto establishand sustainpower relations.Shaped within a certain social structure,in which the communicationof symbolic forms and meanings are expressed,the media are one of the meansthrough which `reality' is madeapparent.
From Language to Discourse
As researchin the fields of language,meaning and discoursehas demonstrated, language is a way of making senseof the world, relating to it, processingits complexity and also internalising it (Berger, 1984,Hall, 1997,Lee, 1992).Functioning as a classificatory instrument,language helps in assigningconceptual categories to humanexperiences as well as imposinga `structureon our perceptionsof the world' (Lee, 1992,p. 8). That is to say, bound up with a world-view, languageconstitutes and representsreality rather than mirroring it. As Jorgensenand Philips (2002) explain, knowledgeof the world is not a reflection of the truth but the consequenceof the categorisationof the world, and in relation to that, of a world-view. Languagedoes not only transfermeaning and information but also constitutesour social world, identitiesand relations.Within a culture, sharingthe samelinguistic and conceptualcategorisations helps us to seethe world through the sameconceptual map and usethe samelanguage system to comprehendit (Hall, 1997,Lee, 1992).Yet languageis not objective but heterogeneous and subjectto the processesof different perceptionsand interpretations(Lee, 1992). Meaning is not inherentin things in the material world but is a result of the production processof individuals (Hall, 1997).
Describing languageas a `social institution' (Saussure,1983, p. 15), it was Saussurewho first focusedon the social role of languagein society.According to him and the structuralistmodel developedfrom his ideas,language is a systemwhich peoplelearn and internaliseas part of their socialisationprocess to expresscertain concepts and ideas
101 (Hall, 1997).Therefore, to understandits role, it is importantto studythe internal relationshipswhich give languageits form and function (Lee, 1992,Ehrmann, 1970) or the systemsof thought that shapelanguage (Phillips, 2000). In his study of language, Saussureseparated language into `langue' which consistedof the rules and codesof the languageand `parole' which is the linguistic performanceor the act of speakingand writing (Fairclough, 1989,Hall 1997).This approachviews langueas the social aspect of the languagewhile parole is relatedto the individual use that is madepossible by theserules and codesof the language.Thus, the focus of linguistic study is the structure of language,as this is the part that generatesmeaning rather than the actual languageuse which is too arbitrary and lacks structuralproperties to be included in the study (Fowler, 1991;Hall, 1997).
The structuralistapproach attracted criticism for excluding the interactivecharacteristics of languagein actualuse, ignoring the dynamic natureof language,and for trying to study languagewith `the law like precision of a science'(Hall, 1997,p. 35). The linguistic theoriesthat developedin reactionto the structuralistapproach came to regard languageas a structurethat is temporaryand changeable,with meaningsalso changing accordingto the context in which they are usedrather than being stableor fixed. The developmentof the semiotic theory of ideology (Eagleton,1991) highlighted in particular how an ideological struggletakes place in languageto determinemeanings or define which linguistic norms are legitimate (Fairclough 1989).This doesnot imply that it meaningis abstractor floating but, on the contrary,that is fixed within a specific fixed context and historical moment (Eagleton,1991). The meaning,such as that given in a dictionary, is only an indication that one of the meaningsystems has gained dominancein the struggle(Fairclough, 1989).It is also relatedto the influence of ideology as a mechanismof power in modern societiesin which languageis in the centre of the ideological struggle (Fairclough, 1989).
Suchapproaches to languageand languageuse led to the developmentof the conceptof discourse.Discourse points at the close link betweenlanguage and social relations as ideology well as highlighting that `languageis a material form of and languageis
102 investedby ideology' (Fairclough, 1995,p. 73). Thus, it is a conceptthat relatesto the `historical, political and cultural "fixing" of certain meaningsand their constant reproductionand circulation via establishedkinds of speech,forms of representationand in particular institutional settings' (O'Sullivan et al, 1994,p. 93). Reflecting the social power within language(Eagleton, 1991) as the productsof social, historical and institutional formations,discourses influence how an issuecan be talked about.In other words,just as a discoursegoverns a particular way of talking about a topic, it also rules out or limits other ways. This is why Michel Foucault,who played a centralrole in the developmentof the conceptof discourse,was interestedin the production and changing systemsof rules of discourseat different periods(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982).In his view, `eachsociety has its own regime of truth, its generalpolitics of the truth' (cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982,p. 117) in which certain discursiveformations are consideredto be `true'. This processcould also be explainedwith the close link between discourse,knowledge and power as it can be arguedthat power governsknowledge through discursivepractices within an institution to regulatesocial conduct(Hall, 1997). InterpretingFoucault, Hall writes `knowledgelinked to power not only assumesthe authority of `the truth' but hasthe power to makeitself true' (Hall, 1997,p. 49, italics in original).
ResearchParadigm: Critical Discourse Analysis
Influencedby the theoriesof WesternMarxism and especiallyof the social and political thought of Althuser, Gramsciand Foucault,CDA is a critical approach(Titscher et. al. 2000; Faircloughand Wodak, 1997).Its critical attitude comesfrom being basedon the ideasof the Frankfurt Schoolwhich take into accountthe historical contextsof discursiveinteractions and arguefor a link betweenlinguistic and social structure (Titscher et. al., 2000). Wodak (2001a) also addsthat the notion of critical inherentin CDA should be understoodas `having distanceto the data,embedding the data in the social, taking a political stanceexplicitly and a focus on self-reflection' (p.9). In line with critical thought, the underlying assumptionof CDA is that as the power relations
103 that frame reality are reflected in discourse, the main aim of the analysis `is to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control and dominance as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use' (Wodak et. al, 1999, p. 8). Along the lines of the social constructionist approach, CDA seestruth being related to power as well as being historically and culturally specific and contingent (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002).
Essentially,CDA has two main concerns:on the one hand,it is primarily concernedwith languageand linguistic structurewhile on the other hand,it is preoccupiedwith the relationshipbetween language use and the social context it is situatedwithin. In other words, CDA doesnot just deal with the linguistic structureof discoursesbut also with the socio-culturaland discursivepractices in which thesediscourses are producedand received.For CDA, languageis a social practice,which meansthat it is a socially and historically situatedand purposefulaction (Faircloughand Wodak, 1997;Wodak 2001). Although it assumesthat peoplecommunicate within a particular languagethey learned as part of their socialisationprocess, it also believesthat learningand using a language doesnot just involve constructinga linguistic structurebut also selectingan appropriate discourseaccording to certain circumstancesand settings(Fowler, 1991;Fairclough, 1989).Therefore, by treating discourseas a social practice,it investigatesthe linguistic characterof social and cultural processesand tries to makepeople aware of the influencesof languageand social structurethat they have beenpreviously unawareof (Titcher, et. al, 2000).
Discoursesare structurally part of their contextsand therefore,contexts such as the social situationsand structuresin which discoursesare producedand understoodshould also be included in the analysisof discourse(van Dijk, 1997).Describing discourseas a form of social practice,CDA examinesthe underlying structures,conventions and rules that discoursesare relatedto. Yet the relationshipof discourseand its context is not one- directional but dialectical which meansthat as well as constituting and shapingsociety by hand, and culture in many ways, discourseis also constituted them. On the one socio- influence cultural factors shapediscourses; on the other, discourses social and political
104 processesand actions(Wodak et al., 1999;Fairclough, 1995).As Faircloughand Wodak (1997) explain Describingdiscourse as a social practiceimplies a dialecticalrelationship between a particular discursiveevent and the situation(s),institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it. A dialecticalrelationship is a two way relationship:the discursiveevent is shapedby situation,institutions and social structures,but it also shapesthem (p.55).
Within this dialectical relationship,discursive practices can be constitutivein different ways: First, they can produceand constructparticular social conditionswhich may encouragethe constructionof collective identities suchas national and ethnical. Second, they can contributeto the legitimation of the statusquo by perpetuating,reproducing or justifying it. Third, they may be instrumentalin transformingthe statusquo and concepts such as nationality and ethnicity which are relatedto it. Fourth, they may be effective in dismantling and destroyingthe statusquo and conceptssuch as nationality and ethnicity which are relatedto it (Wodak et al., 1999,Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Dependingon the aim, discoursecan adopt different strategiesor practicesto achievecertain political, social or linguistic aims.
Developedwithin critical theory, CDA exploresthe conceptof power and ideology in discursiveacts and how theseare exercisedand negotiatedin discourses.In its view, languageis not powerful on its own but can be usedto challenge,undermine and alter the power within social structures(Wodak, 2001a).Thus, CDA is interestedin examininghow discourse,using language,mediates ideology and manipulatespower relations.According to Fairclough (1989), the relation betweenpower and discoursehas two dimensions,as `power in discourse'and `powerbehind discourse'.He explainsthat while `power in discourse'suggests that discoursecould be a place where power relationsare exercised,`power behind discourse'points at a processwhich shapesand forms relationsof power. Power over discoursein the `power in discourse'indicates power to control and changethe rules of discursivepractices. Both `power in discourse' and `power behind discourse'mean that discursiveaspects of power relationsare not
105 fixed but on the contrary,its exercisewithin discoursesis negotiatedand contested (Fairclough& Wodak, 1997).
Ideology, an importantpart of establishingand maintainingpower relations, is circulated and reproducedthrough discourse(Johnstone, 2002). Embeddedin language,ideology producesrules and conventionsthat promotean understandingand acceptanceof the world. Using language,discourse presents a specific worldview in which certain actions and rules seemnatural while othersare unacceptablewithin that ideological discourse formation (Fairclough, 1995).In other words, while allowing certainperspectives and knowledgein particular domainsof social life as legitimate,discourse excludes other possibilities and other perspectivesfrom thosedomains. Given that discourseexercises power through knowledge(Jager, 2001), CDA questionsthe discursiveformations of knowledge,power and ideology, especiallyin authoritativediscourses, and uncoversthe relationshipbetween discourse and ideology (Johnstone,2002). It focuseson the role of ideology in providing a framework for understandingthe world so that it can make peopleaware of the ideological role of languageand discourseby showing that institutions constructtheir own ideologiesand discourses.
Another characteristicof CDA is seeingdiscourse as historical. As Wodak explains, `every discourseis historically producedand interpreted,that is, it is situatedin time and space;and that dominancestructures are legitimatedby ideologiesof powerful groups' (Wodak, 2001a,p. 3). This is why, for discourseanalysis, it is not enoughto understand the underlying conventionsand rules and considerthe culture and ideology that surroundsit but it is also necessaryto recognisewhat the discourserelates to in the past (Titscher et. al. 2000). Meyer points out that CDA is basedon the assumptionthat `all discoursesare historical and thereforecan be understoodwith referenceto their context' (Meyer, 2001, p. 15). It is also that discoursesare connectedto other discoursesthat were producedbefore them which not only createsan intertextualsituation but also requires thesediscourses to be uncoveredas well.
106 It can be arguedthat `the goal of CDA is often explicitly political' (Johnstone,2002, p.45). Its political involvementcomes from its concernfor social problemsand how theseproblems are constitutedwithin discourse(Scollon, 2001). As a problem-oriented approach,CDA doesn'tjust focus on languagebut also on the linguistic characterof social and cultural processesand structures(Fairclough and Wodak, 1997).Fairclough and Wodak (1997) explain that CDA's interestin social and political processesand movementscomes from its claim that they have a partly linguistic-discursivecharacter and that they generallyinclude cultural and ideological elements.Thus, it believesthat studying the discoursesof thesesocial and cultural representationscan reveal new ideological attemptsto establishhegemony over certaindiscourses.
Unlike other discourseanalysis, CDA doesnot have an objective stanceand political indifferencebut on the contrary,has `emancipatoryobjectives' (Fairclough,2001, p. 125) and `allies itself with thosewho suffer political and social injustice' (Wodak et. al. 1999,p. 8). It is interestedin the way discourseis usedin the reproductionof dominance,the violation of norms as well as the humanand social rights of groups, institutions and, in somecases, nation states(van Dijk, 2001). Therefore,by choosing the perspectiveof the suffering onesand criticising unjust social conditionsthat have an effect on social practiceand social relationships,CDA aims to contributeto the improvementof theseconditions by providing alternativeresources for peopleto tackle their problems(Titscher et. al. 2000; Fairclough,2001).
It is this committednature of CDA that has raisedquestions about it being a valid tool of analysis.As discoursecan be construedin different ways, CDA, benefiting from the broad contextsin which it is used,brings its own interpretationto the texts. Yet, this could lead it to being seenmore as an ideological and biasedinterpretation rather than an analysis.Its explicit political stancethat forms the basisof its examinationalso enhances the notion that its ideological commitmentis an important factor in the selectionof the texts and also in their interpretation(Titscher et. at. 2000). Acknowledging this criticism, Titscher et. al. (2000) points out that the resultsare open endedin CDA and that its explicit position and commitmentdifferentiates it from other analysis.
107 Furthermore,Meyer (2001) raisesthe questionof whetherit is `possibleto perform any researchfree of a priori valuejudgements' (p. 17) which accordingto CDA it is not.
Acknowledging thesedebates and criticisms of CDA, there are two reasonsfor adopting it in this research:First, as CDA is suitablefor use in researchthat exploressocial and cultural changes,it will allow observationof the shifts in the discursiveconstruction of Turkish Cypriot national identity along with changesin social, cultural and historical contexts.The secondreason is relatedto the natureof the phenomenonunder study. The ideological power of nationalismhas a naturalisingeffect on national identity, embeddingit in daily life without it being realised.Studying a phenomenonthat is taken for granted,such as national identity, requiresa critical approachlike the CDA's to reveal hidden power relationsand ideological representationsduring its constructionand renegotiation.Thus, following the CDA's approach,this study will not just examinethe linguistic structureof the texts but will also explorethe dialectical relationshipbetween social-culturalfactors and the discursiveconstruction of Turkish Cypriot national identity.
The Discourse-Historical Approach
Developedby the Vienna Schoolof Critical DiscourseAnalysis, the discourse-historical approachis a hermeneuticand interpretativeway of studying discourse.Initially utilized to study anti-Semitismin public discourse,later the approachwas applied to explore issueslike the discursiveconstruction of national identity and racism in general(Wodak, 2001b; Wodak et. al. 1999,Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Influencedby critical theory, Wodak (2001b) explainshow the discourse-historical approachfollows a complex conceptof social critique that consistsof three interconnectedaspects: The first one is text or discourseimmanent critique which aims at discoveringinconsistencies, (self) contradictions,paradoxes and dilemmasin the text or the discourse.The secondone is socio-diagnosticcritique, which is concernedwith the exposureof the persuasive, propagandistor manipulative characterof discursivepractices. It analysesa discursive
108 event within the frameworkof a wider social context ratherthan just focusingon the text to discoverthe social and political aims and functionsof discursivepractices. In this type of critique, the researcherbrings in backgroundand contextualinformation as well as social and political relationsand structuresto the analysis(Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). The third aspectis the prognosticcritique, which is relatedto the ethico-practical dimensionof discursivepractice. It seeksto changeand transformthings by playing a role in finding solutionsfor social problems.One suchexample was the attempt by researchersto contributeto a transformationand improvementof communicationby reducing languagebarriers in public placesas well as providing guidelinesfor avoiding sexist language(Wodak, 2001b;Titscher et. al. 2000, Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).
Following the principle of triangulation,the discourse-historicalapproach benefits from a variety of methodologicaland theoreticalperspectives as well as a variety of empirical data and backgroundinformation. Therefore,it integratesinterdisciplinary perspectives such as historical, socio-political and linguistic, as well as using various methodsof data collection and setsof data in the analysis(Wodak, 2001b; Wodak, et. al. 1999).Thus, the approachis useful in examiningthe interrelationof discursiveand social practicesas well as structures(Titscher et. al. 2000; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). The discourse- historical approachis also basedon a four-level conceptof context which is: a) The immediatelinguistic text, the semanticenvironment of an utterance. b) The intertextualand interdiscursiverelationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses. c) The extralinguistic social variablesand institutional settingsof a specific situation of an utterance. d) The broadersocio-political and historical context in which the discursivepractices are embeddedor relatedto, such as the history of the discursiveevent and the history to which the discoursaltopic is related (Wodak, 2001b,p. 67; Titscher et. al. 2000, p. 157, Wodak et. al. 1999,p. 9).
Another important aspectof the discourse-historical approachis that it analysesthe historical dimensionof discursiveevents. The discourse-historicalapproach is especially
109 effective in the analysisof discoursesabout nations and national identitiesbecause it combines`knowledge about historical sourcesand the backgroundof the social and political fields in which discursive"events" are embedded'(Wodak 2001,p. 65; Wodak et. al, 1999,p. 156).The approachis also useful in observingthe changesparticular discoursesgo through over a period of time which is one of the reasonsfor adoptingthe discourse-historical approachin this research.Even thoughthe focus of this study is the discursiveconstruction of a national identity by the newspapersin recentyears, the processstill needsto be locatedin a historical context to provide a betterunderstanding of the issue.The integrationof the historical dimensioninto the analysisalso helps one to observethe shifts within the discoursesrelated to national identity over the years.
The analysisof the discourse-historicalapproach is three-dimensional:The first one is establishingthe contentsor the thematicareas of the discoursesrelated to national identity. In this study,similar to the researchWodak et. at. (1999) conductedon the discursiveconstruction of Austrian national identity, I focusedon five themes:the linguistic constructionof an essentialunderstanding of national identity, a common political past, commonpolitical future, a commonculture and a national space.
The secondstep of analysisis to examinethe discursivestrategies employed in the texts. Wodak et. al. (1999) describesthese strategies as consciousplans of action to achievea certainpolitical, psychologicalor other kind of objective.They listed the main strategies usedin their data as construction,transformation, perpetuation or justification and dismantlingor destructivestrategies: Constructive strategies `construct and establisha certainnational identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation' (Wodak et. al. 1999,p. 33). Strategiesof transformation,as the name suggests,aims at transforming an establishednational identity into anotherone. In contrast,perpetuation strategy attempts to reproduceor preserve,support or protect a threatenednational identity. Justification strategiesare usedto justify one's actionsby legitimising them if, and when questioned,and also maintain and defenda tainted commonnational self-perception(Wodak et, al. 1999).Finally, destructivestrategies are onesthat are employedto dismantleparts of national identity without providing a new
110 model for it. In this study, I also examinethe newspapertexts to find out which strategieswere employedin the constructionof Turkish Cypriot identity.
The third analytical unit of the discourse-historicalapproach is to study the forms of linguistic implementationemployed in discursiveactions. The underlying reasonfor such an investigationis to identify the linguistic meansthat expressunity, sameness, difference and so on. The use of `we' is especiallyimportant in discoursesabout nations and national identity (Wodak et. al. 1999)as well as other linguistic meanssuch as metonymy, synecdocheand personification.While metonymyhides responsibleagents of an action, personificationattributes a human form to a phenomenon.Synecdoche, on the other hand,by replacingthe nameof a referentwith another,can intensify or diminish the meaning(Wodak et. al. 1999).
Why Study Media Discourse?
The mediaplays a crucial role in reflecting and constitutingmodern society as well as being constitutedby it. According to Bell (1991), analysingthe media languageis importantnot only becausethe media generatemuch of the languagethat is heardin societybut also `the media are dominatingpresenters of languagein society at large' (p.3). Their role as a manufacturerand distributor of symbolic materialsand as public institutions opinion-shapersmake them important ideological of society.Therefore, the media discourseis a useful resourcefor analysingthe relationsof power and control within society as they are also reflected in languagestructures within the media.A critical investigationinto how the media operateand how they communicateto an audiencewould createan understandingand awarenessof how relationsand structures of power are embeddedin the forms of everydaylanguage. Media discoursescan reveal how languagecontributes to the legitimisation of existing social relationsand hierarchies of authority and control in society. For example,media representations may translate official viewpoints into public idioms (Deaconet al., 1999)and encouragethe
111 legitimising of the positions of theseofficials, which is also a factor in sustainingthe order of that society(Fairclough, 1995;Trew, 1979).
The applicationof critical discourseanalysis to mediatexts would show the links betweenthe media texts and the socio-culturalprocesses in which they are produced. The dialectical relationshipbetween media discourse,society and culture meansthat the media discoursenot only contributesto social and cultural changesbut is also constitutedby them. According to Fairclough(1995), media texts are a `sensitive barometer' (p.52) of socio-culturalchanges as thesechanges can be found in the discursivepractices of the media.
The news media,which is the main concernof this research,has an ideological role within societyas an information provider. The societalstructures and ideologiesthat dominatethe selectionand production of the news not only help them to be naturalised and treatedas commonsense but their claim to be factual promotesthe quality of their persuasivenessas well (van Dijk, 1988).Rather than beingjust the transmissionof facts, the news is also the embodimentof the assumptions,values, beliefs and attitudesof its producers(McNair, 1998).However, ideological meaningsare not only embedded within the news discoursesbut also in the routinesof newsproduction which lead journalists to adoptthe framesand ideology of elite organisations,institutions and persons(van Dijk, 1988).As an example,linked to the configuration of power within society,the news media perceivesome institutions suchas government,the judiciary and the police as more important and newsworthythan others.Strengthening their institutional power and position, the news media accreditthese sources as reliable and trustworthy. Thus, given that the news media's production of `reality' influencespublic understandingof the world, their attitudesand behaviour,whose reality they are reflecting becomesan important questionin the newsanalysis.
The way the news media addresstheir audiencealso has an ideological impact. Rather than speakingdirectly to their audience,the newsmedia reports eventsmainly through other institutions, groupsand movements,which readersidentify with or support(Trew,
112 1979).In other words, it is throughthese groups that the newsmedia provide an interpretationof events.By providing dominantknowledge and attitude structuresthat fit with the generalunderstanding of the social, political, cultural and economic structuresof society,they treat them as commonsense rather than raisequestions about them. However, this shouldnot be misinterpretedto meanthat there is only one way of understandingand interpretingevents; on the contrary,the news mediaact as a site of strugglebetween different understandingsand interpretationsfor ideological hegemony in which the dominancyof ideaschanges over time.
Methods and Research Tools
The main concernof this researchis the discursiveconstruction of national identity through the newspapersin North Cyprus; yet it is also interestedin how thesedifferent and sometimesconflicting conceptsof national identity are being imposed,legitimised and maintainedby the news media.Therefore, it questionsthe strategiesthe news media identity. Analyzing employ to maintain and reproducenaturalized concepts of national the mediation of national identity, the study attemptsto revealthe ideological assumptions,relations of power and control that underlie the media representationand discourseof national identity in the TRNC. Following CDA's idea that the media texts and society have a dialectical relationshipin which texts shapesociety and culture as between well as being shapedby them, the researchexplores the relationship discursive actsand the constructionof national identity through the media. For example,studying the discursiveconstruction of national samenessand difference,as Wodak (2001) identity leads suggests,shows how the discursiveconstruction of national to the political discursive and social exclusion of somegroups and exposesthe processof creating `others' in relation to the constructionof `us'.
So far, the study has focusedon the developmentof Turkish Cypriot identity and the Turkish Cypriot media in order to provide a broadersocio-political and historical investigations.The context for the discursivepractices that are under other three
113 contexts,as suggestedby the discourse-historicalapproach, will be taken into account during the analysisof eachcase. The previoustwo chapters,which studiedidentity and media issues,benefited from an interdisciplinaryapproach that combinedhistorical and socio-political perspectivesusing the dataderived from various methodsof data collection suchas archival researchand interviews.The interviewsconducted in the context of newsproduction are especiallyenlightening about the institutional settingsof the discoursesanalysed.
The rest of the researchwill focus on the datacollected by carrying out an analysisof selectedcase studies. As Titscher et. al. (2000) explains,`case studies aim to analysea phenomenonvery preciselyand every unit of investigationas an entity itself' (p.43). Multiple casestudies, as will be the casein this research,are not aimed at developing statistical generalisationsbut theoreticalones, as well as examiningthe relationship betweenthem basedon the similarities or differences.The casestudies chosen for this researchare the newspapercoverage of threepolitically and culturally significant events for Turkish Cypriots in the last 12 years.The use of `significant' is to indicatethat these eventsoccupied the agendaof Turkish Cypriots and led to many heatedpublic and media debates.Focusing only on theserecent years is not to deny the idea that the constructionof national identity is an ongoing process,but to reflect the changesand the hegemonicstruggles in the conceptualisationof a national identity within the Turkish Cypriot community that beganaround the mid-1990.
Among the daily newspaperspublished in the TRNC today, three of them, Kibris, Hallen Sesiand Yenidüzenare included in the study to note their reflection of Turkish Cypriot identity in their news reports.These newspapers were chosenbecause they reflect a broad spectrumof opinions in North Cyprusand are the three newspapersthat have had long and steadypublication lives. Hallen Sesi(The voice of people) is the longestsurviving Turkish Cypriot newspaper,having begunpublication in 1942.During the conflict with the Greek Cypriots, the newspaperplayed a key role in the promotion of Turkish nationalism.Yenidüzen, (New Order) beganin 1975as the publication of the left wing CTP (RepublicanTurkish Party), which favoursa solution to the Cyprus
114 problem basedon a federationwith GreekCypriots. Kibris (Cyprus),on the other hand, is a commercialnewspaper with the highestcirculation in the TRNC.
Three casestudies selected for the researchare basedon the newspaperreports of three events.The analysiscovers a period of a week before and a week after the main eventto include enoughtime to reflect the views of the newspapersand also to limit the timeframe of the study as the newspapersin somecases continued reporting on the issuesfor a longer period.
The first casestudy is aboutthe demonstrationby a group of Greek Cypriot motorcyclistsat the buffer zone in Cyprus in August 1996that turned into violent clashesbetween Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and resultedwith the deathof two Greek Cypriot civilians. I have chosenthis eventto seehow the three newspapers articulatedconceptualisations of a national identity in relation to GreekCypriots and Turkish nationalsin North Cyprus.
The secondevent is the openingof the border that separatesthe two communitieson the island in April 2003. It enabledthe membersof both communitiesto crossto the `other' side for the first time sincethe division of the island in 1974and meetthe peoplethey had regardedas the enemyfor years.This sectionquestions the conceptof border to find out who was included or excludedin the reproductionof the national community by the newspapers.
The third casestudy is aboutthe removal of a footbridge in January2007 which was initially erectedto act as a crossingpoint and link the divided city of Nicosia. The footbridge,that attractedthe criticism of the Greek Cypriot governmentwhen it was first built, causeda rift betweenthe civil authority and the Turkish military in the north of the island when the Turkish Cypriot governmentwanted it to be removed.This part of the of researchfocuses on the articulation national identity in the debatessurrounding the footbridge.
115 I have selectedthe newspapercoverage of theseevents to examine,not only because they occupiedthe media's agendaand createddebate amongst Turkish Cypriots but also becauseof the relevanceof thesenews texts to the constructionof national identity. Along with Turkish Cypriots, the eventsalso involved GreekCypriots and Turks which is useful in the investigationof how oppositionalmetaphors were usedin the constructionof national identity and how the descriptionof the `other' was employedin `our self-perception'.Bearing in mind that the media and societyhave a dialectical relationship,the existing prejudicesand stereotypingwithin the society might be reflected in the constructionof the media texts as well as the mediaplaying a role in constructingthose prejudices and stereotypes.A discourseanalysis of thesetexts may also provide evidenceof how national identity was constructedthrough theseprejudices and stereotypestowards neighbouring nations as well as through the self-perceptionsof the Turkish Cypriots.
Exploring shifts in the conceptof national identity within the media as a result of the ideological strugglewill be anotherpurpose of the analysis.Having discussedthe idea that ideologiesnot only naturaliseand turn somediscourses into commonsense but also in give them meaningas thoughthey had beenpermanently place, the analysiswill test the role of the newspapertexts in providing sucha perceptionof national identity. Also acceptingthat meaningsare not fixed but boundto changeover time as a result of discursive strugglesfor hegemony,which is an important characteristicof practice (Deaconet al., 1999),the news texts are examinedto find out if and what changesthere identity. are in the newspapers'discourses and representationsof Turkish Cypriot
ResearchLimitations
In this researchI focus only on newspaperreports and excludebroadcast ones for two 1997 reasons:First, broadcastingwas under statemonopoly until when When border incidents commercializationof broadcastingwas first allowed. the took BRT, place in 1996,there was only the statebroadcasting corporation, to cover the
116 incidents.Analyzing only BRT's news reportswould only haveprovided me with the discourserelated to the official conceptof national identity and not other discourses. Secondly,the lack of broadcastnews archivesin the TRNC inevitably limits my researchto only the analysisof newspapercoverage of the events.Even if I wantedto extendmy researchto broadcastand benefit from their newsreports as well, I would not be able to find all the relevantbroadcast coverage of the eventsunder study. Insistence on carrying out suchresearch would have risked the reliability and validity of the study.
The researchis also limited to newsreports and excludesall other types of texts suchas editorials (including opinions columns).News reportsand editorialshave different functions as well as different production and receptionprocesses: While news articles are regardedas informative andjust giving the facts, editorials are seenas evaluative texts that include opinion. I am awarethat this is a problematicapproach, as news articles do not consistof objective facts but featurethe opinions,values and beliefs of their producersas well. Despitethat, in generalthe news is consideredand understoodto provide information about eventsand is acceptedto be true or closeto the truth and that is have attributesto them a persuasivefunction (van Dijk, 1988)which why I decidedto concentrateonly on suchtexts.
The main limitation of the study is relatedto me being a native Turkish Cypriot. As well as possessingthe necessarylinguistic skills, I believe I have an intimate knowledgeof issue. society,history and cultural resourcesthat allows me to study the On the other hand,I am awarethat having beenthrough the socialisationprocess of this community, through its educationalsystem and other processes,this might lead to preconceptions aboutthe issuesunder study, even at the subconsciouslevel. Therefore,I cannotclaim a socially neutral stanceand not bring my own valuesand evaluationsto the research.Yet, adoptingCDA's philosophical assumptions,I makeevery effort to createthe distance necessaryto study the naturalisedor common senseunderstandings of a phenomenon suchas national identity. I am not questioningthe ideological aspectsof a discursive be eventto seektruth but to reveal how the claims to truth could usedto reproducethe identity in power relations in the discoursessurrounding national North Cyprus. I
117 believe I will be able to maintain a critical attitude to interrogatethe discourserelated to national identity as reflectedin the newspapers.
118 CHAPTER 5: BORDER CLASHES IN CYPRUSIN 1996
Introduction
This chapterexamines the newspapercoverage of two demonstrationsorganised by Greek Cypriots at the border in Cyprus in August 1996.These were the two most violent incidencesbetween the two communities since the division of the island in 1974 as they resulted in the deathof two Greek Cypriot demonstratorsand had a significant impact on relations betweenNorth and South.
The analysis focuseson the news texts to seehow three different newspapers in articulated conceptualisationsof a national identity relation to Greek Cypriots and Turkish nationals, who were also presentat the clashesthat occurred during the first demonstration.Through critical discourseanalysis, the researchaims to examine how the newspapersreferred to different groups involved in the incidents. The in analysis also enablesone to comparethe differencesand similarities the discourses within the Turkish Cypriot press.
Which Border Clashes The Setting - Brief Description of the Context within the Took Place
In protest at the division of the island a group representingthe organization of Greek Cypriot motorcyclists, accompaniedby supportersaffiliated to European into motorcyclist organizations,decided to break through the buffer zone the Turkish Cypriot area.They startedtheir rally in Berlin on 2°dAugust 1996 and plannedto finish in Cyprus on l la` August 1996. The motorcyclists called their demonstrationa `peacefulanti-invasion activity' and claimed that their protest was for a `borderless world' (Kibris, 11 August, p.2). A photographin Kibris newspapershowed one of `a borders' in the motorcyclists wearing a t-shirt with a logo that said world without Englishand Greek (Kibris, 7 August,p. 1).
119 On 11thof August 1996,the day the motorcyclists' demonstrationwas supposedto take place, the Greek Cypriot Motorcyclists Federationannounced that it had cancelledthe rally following pressurefrom the Greek Cypriot government,citing reasonsof security. Yet, someGreek Cypriot demonstratorsremained undeterred and after congregatingat the border, crossedthe buffer zone into Turkish Cypriot territory. Meanwhile, a sizeablegroup of protestorsfrom the Turkish Cypriot side had also gatheredat the border to stagetheir counter demonstrationagainst the Greek Cypriot demonstratorsand also to prevent them from breaking into Turkish Cypriot territory. When the Greek Cypriot protestersattempted to crossthe buffer zone, the demonstratorsfrom both sidesclashed. One Greek Cypriot, TassosIsaac, was kicked and beatento deathby a mob of men from the north. Someof thesemen belongedto Turkish ultra nationalist groups such as Ülkücü (Idealist)'. Originating in Turkey, the by in group had a pan -Turkist ideology and was largely supported nationalist groups the TRNC. It was reported in the media that around 150 supportersof this group had arrived in the TRNC in order to join the demonstration(Halkin Sesi, 13 August, p.3; Yenidüzen,13 August, p.5; Kibris, 13 August, p.4).
On 14thAugust, the day of Isaac's funeral, anotherdemonstration was stagedat the Turkish Cypriot border, which resulted in the death of another Greek Cypriot, Solomos Spiro Solomou. Having passedthe UN buffer zone and reachedthe Turkish Cypriot side, Solomou climbed a flagpole in an attempt to lower the Turkish flag. He Both incidents increased was shot deadby the military forces from the north. the tensionbetween the two communities.
In 1996,the Green Line acted as a barrier not just for crossingbut also for both Line communication betweenboth communities. Peopleon sidesof the got the information news about the `other' through the media, which relied on the provided by official sources.The Turkish Cypriot media received the news about the `other' through TAK which monitored and distributed the news from the Greek Cypriot side. BRTK also regularly listened to Cyprus BroadcastingCorporation's radio station to follow the news there.
Olküca (Idealist) or Ulkil Ocaklari is an organizationwith a pan-Turkist ideology. Pan-Turkism,on Turkic (Landau, 1995). the other hand, is an ideology and movementthat aims to unite all people
120 At the time, the governmentin North Cyprus was comprisedof nationalist forces and this was reflected in its ideology and practicesas well as its media and communication policies vis a vis the Greek Cypriots. It remainedopposed to any contact with Greek Cypriots and advocatedkeeping the statusquo on the island as divided into two separatestates. In statepronouncements and policies, no distinction was made betweenTurkish Cypriots and mainland Turks.
The left opposition parties, on the other hand, such as Cumhuriyety! Turk Partisi (CTP- the RepublicanTurkish Party), supporteda solution to the Cyprus problem with Greek Cypriots and criticised Turkey's power and control over North Cyprus. They also spearheadedthe new identity of Cypriot (or Turkishcypriot), which not only asserteddistinct Cypriot ethnic and cultural characteristicsbut also did so by specifically emphasizingits difference from Turkishness.
Despiteits claim to be a legal state,the TurkishRepublic of NorthernCyprus (TRNC),the statein the north,was not grantedrecognition from the international community.Actually, the establishmentof the republichad a negativeimpact as it provoked economic sanctionsbeing brought againstthe country. As a consequence, North Cyprus becamemore dependenton Turkey. In this context, its borders became if for a way of emphasisingand legitimising the existenceof the TRNC, not the international world, at least to its own people.
The Position of the Newspapers
The data for this casestudy consistsof around 170 news texts from three daily newspapersKibris, Hallen Ses,and Yenidazen.Most of thesetexts were the sameas in Apart eachother, yet were counted separatelyas they appeared eachnewspaper. had from representinga different spectrumof opinion, thesenewspapers also the highest circulation figures betweenthe sevendaily and three weekly newspapers Taking published in the TRNC in 1996 (Azgin, 1998). the motorcyclists' rally as the between4-18 August 1996, main event, the analysis only includes the newspapers which limits the researchto the reportsa weekbefore and a weekafter the demonstration.
121 Kibris, with the highest circulation in North Cyprus, supportedthe nationalistic conservativepolicies of the governmentin 1996. It gavethe widest coverageto the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' attempt to crossthe border and on somedays the stories were extremely long. For instance,the day after the motorcyclists' demonstration,the related stories filled a full five pagesof the newspaper.
Hal/an Sesialso supported the nationalistgovernment and its policiesat the time. Its coverageof the incidents that took place at the border had many similarities with Kibris' coverage.
Yenidüzen,the newspaperof the left-wing main opposition party, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), unlike the other two newspapersanalysed, did not print any stories about the motorcyclists' planned action until 7thAugust 1996.Even then, the story appearedon the secondpage insteadof the first, anotherdistinction from the other two as they usually reported similar issueson their front pages.
Analysis of Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News
The majority of the reporting during the period chosenconsisted of public statements,press releases, press conferences and interviews given to the newspapers by the governmentand military authorities, political parties and civil organisations. They mainly coveredthe Greek Cypriot authorities having been called to cancel the motorcyclists' demonstrationand the fact that the security forces in the TRNC had taken all the necessaryprecautions to protect its borders. They also posited the idea that the demonstrationwould not help in finding a peaceful solution to the Cyprus Problem. The statementsfrom the representativesof the United Nation and other countries also appearedin thesenewspapers, expressing their anxiety before the incidents and their condemnationafterwards. The news from the foreign media (especiallythe Greek Cypriot media) was anothersource that the Turkish Cypriot media used to report the developmentsbut only the stories that supportedthe political line of the newspaperswere included as a way to increaseor confirm the truthfulness of the newspapers'views. For example,Kibris used a Reuter's news dispatchin which the details of the incidents that led to Solomou's deathwere given
122 greatscrutiny in orderto justify the positionand actions of the TurkishCypriot authorities(Kibris, 15August, p. 4).
Even though the appearanceof a variety of sourcesin the paperscan be interpreted as a reflection of a diversity of opinions and discoursesin the society, their treatment within the newspapersis also important. For example,there were many examplesof the newspapersreporting someaspects of the eventswhile ignoring others or including certain parts of public statementsthey agreedwith but at the sametime avoiding those they did not. Another characteristicof the news during the period studied was that it dominantly reflected the views of stateofficials which reducedthe newspapersto secondarydefiners of the eventsrather than being the primary ones (Hall et al, 1978 and also in Tumber, 1999). The processnot only reproducedthese sourcesas the natural authorities but reconstitutedtheir discoursesand representationsas the norm without leaving spacefor the other or challenging ones. Tsagarousianou(1999) cautionsthat reduceddiversity within national politics restricts the possibility of representationand identity negotiationsseparate from official definitions. Pointing at the example of the Greek massmedia, Tsagarousianounotes that when combined with restricted accessto the media, `the systematicpublicizing of official definitions of the situation and of nationalist discoursehave achievedthe closure of the universe of political discoursein general' (p. 188).
There were many identical stories in the three newspaperswhich could be explained by two reasons:They all employed the samenews dispatchesfrom the news agencies,especially TAK and with very little editing and they all benefited from the samepress releases or written statementsfrom various groups and organisationsin the production of their news articles. They published thesepress releases and statementswith little or no editing due, perhaps,to the lack of sufficient staff, time or resources.This practice createdan intertextual relationship which led to the publication of many pressreleases and announcementsdisguised as news as well as embeddingtheir discoursesinto the news. As a result, the contentsof the newspapers in were very similar in generalto eachother. Often, the only differences these newspaperswere the headlines.Headlines can generally be describedas summaries of the news texts (van Dijk, 1988) but in the caseof the Turkish Cypriot newspapers
123 they reflect the position of the paper in relation to the issuesraised in the stories. In Kibris and Hallan Sesithere were someidentical headlinessuch as: `The UN is anxious' (Hallan Sesi, 9 August, p. 1) `Anxiety in the UN' (Kibris, 9 August, p. 1), `They've gone crazy (or insane)' (Hal/an Sesi, 15 August, p. 1 & Kibris, 11 August, p. 1), `We break the handsreaching out to the flag' (Hal/an Sesi, 16 August, 199:1 & Kibris, 16 August, 199:1). `They just don't learn' (HallernSesi, 18 August, 199:1 & Kibris, 15 August, 199:1). As the similarities of the headlinessuggest, the representationand the news discoursesin Kibris and Hallen Sesi showed strong resemblancesin general.They both reflected the eventsfrom a nationalist framework and adoptedthe nationalist discoursethat was dominant at the time. Yenidüzen,on the other hand, showedsome deviance from the dominant discoursewith its in its reconstructionof the events,the selectionof words and themes reports.
Censorshipby the state authorities was anotherfactor that shapedthe news texts during this period. Yenidüzenrevealed that journalists had been warned that some censorshipshould and would be applied to their news reports on the day of the motorcyclists' demonstrationat the border. According to the newspaper,the day authorities had cautionedjournalists, saying that `friends, on this special not everything can be filmed or written. This is a rule. Don't forget that we have the 3). did namesof each one of you' (Yenidüzen,12 August, p. Yet, the newspaper not disclosethe identity or the statusof the authority that had issuedthe warning. The only clue was that it happenedas journalists gatheredin front of the TRNC Public Information Office (functioning under the Prime Minister's Office), as they waited to be taken to the border to report the events.Also telling was that journalists travelled to the border in military vehicles, implying that their newsgatheringpractices were limited and scrutinized by army officials. Stressingthat this information was not included in the `official news bulletins of both sides', Yenidiizenproposed credibility by suggestingthat it was not following the censorshipthreat (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.3). Whether it followed it or not, the report implied that certain controls and restrictions might have been applied to journalists on other similar occasions.
124 Discourse Analysis
Among the themesdiscussed in the methodology chapter,the news texts analysis showedthat the themesof understandingnation, the representationof `us' and `them' and the collective past mostly appearedin the news texts. The essentialist understandingof Turkish Cypriot identity was embeddedin the articles. The themes of common culture and common future occurredless often in the news discourses.
On the Understanding of Nation and National Consciousness
The news articles that were analysedshowed that people living in the north of the island were identified by various referencessuch as Turkish Cypriots, Turks and Turks of Cyprus, dependingon the context and the `other'. In relation to Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots were referred to as `Turks', `Turkish Cypriot community' or `Turkish side' in all three newspapers.The term `nation' didn't appearin any of the news reports. Whether Turkish Cypriots were referred to as a separatenational entity was also ambiguousin the texts, especially in Kibris and Halkan Sesi. The demarcationbetween Turkish Cypriots and Turks as separatenations rarely appeared in thesenewspapers as the terms `Turks' and `Turkish Cypriots' were used interchangeablyto refer to Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, it was difficult to establish whether or not they were seenas a separatenation from the Turkish one. In some casesit was not even clear if the term `Turk' also referred to Turkish Cypriots or just mainland Turks. Reporting that `Greek Cypriots exhibited animosity again towards Turks during Solomou's funeral' (Hallen Sesi, 17 August, p. 1), Hal/an Sesi left it ambiguouswhether `Turk' included Turkish Cypriots or Turkish nationals or both. In another example,reporting on a speechTurkey's Foreign Minister Tansu tiller delivered in North Cyprus, Hal/an Sesi employedthe term `Turkish' to refer to the youth there: `Calling out to the Turkish youth on the island not to get provoked, tiller said.... ' (Halkin Sesi, 16 August, p. 1). This ambiguity actually reinforced the connectionbetween Turkish and Turkish Cypriots not as two separatenations but as a united one. A similar practice was also discernible in Yeniditzen.Referring to the territory on the north of the island as `Turkish territory', Yeniditzenreported that Solomou had `crossedto the Turkish territory and attemptedto haul down the
125 Turkish flag' (Yenidüzen,15 August, p. 1). It showedthat havinginternalised the identity of Turk in relationto GreekCypriots Yenidazen also treated the interchangeableuse of theseconcepts of identity as normal.
Along with the referencesto national identity, cultural symbols were also used to enhancethe categorisationof Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks into one group. The national flag was one such example.Without making any distinction between the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot flags, Kibris referred to both as `our' flag. This was especially clear in the news texts regardingthe shooting of Solomos Solomou, when he had attemptedto bring a Turkish flag down at the border. Kibris described the action as lowering `our flag down' (Kibris, 15 August, p. 1) even though the concernedflag was a Turkish flag rather than a Turkish Cypriot one. The underlying reasoncould be that representingthe two flags as equivalent moderatedthe paradox of having two state structuresfor the membersof one nation. The word `our' was usedto show the harmony and cooperationbetween Turkey and the TRNC as well as to help Turkish Cypriots identify with Turkish identity. It was also used as a island Turkish, synonym describingthe people on the north of the as without making a distinction betweenTurkish Cypriots and mainland Turks. In contrastto Kibris, both Hallan Sesi and Yenidüzendescribed the flag as the `Turkish flag' (Hallan Sesi, 15 August, p. 1; Yenidüzen,15 August, p. 1).
Kibris andHalkin Sesibenefited in particularfrom constructivestrategies such as the strategyof unificationto categoriseTurkish Cypriotsand Turkish people within the samegroup by emphasisingcommon ancestry. The useof family metaphors TRNC reinforced the relationship betweenTurkey and the as similar to the one between`mother and baby'. Family metaphorsare useful to assigncertain rights and baby/child responsibilities to parentsand alsojustify the dependenceof the to the mother (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Thus, portraying Turkey as the `motherland' (anavatan) imbued somerights to it over the `babylandor infantland' (yavruvatan) its as well as assigning someresponsibilities regarding security. Reporting on a Tansu tiller in TRNC, Kibris speechdelivered by the Turkish Foreign Minister the `tiller determination the edited her words as ... emphasisedthe of motherland Turkey to protect the rights of Turks in Cyprus' (Kibris, 16 August, p. 1). The between statementnot only reconstructedthe relationship two statesalong the
126 `mother-baby' discoursebut also emphasisedthe `mother's responsibility for protection of the `baby'. Yet, it was vague whether it was hers or the paper's choice to use the term `motherland' as the news report of the samespeech in Halkm Sesi did not include the term `motherland' but used `Turkey' instead(Hallen Sesi, 16 August, p. 1). Yenidüzen,on the other hand, did not even include the statementin its news article but published tiller's photo on its front-page with a caption that said `Mother's Cyprus landing' (Yenidüzen,16 August, p. 1). The term `landing' likened her arrival in North Cyprus, along with a crowd of bureaucratsand journalists after the conflicts with the Greek Cypriot demonstrators,to a military action and evoked the one in 1974. The word `mother' replacedthe term of `motherland' or Turkey and helped to personify Turkey with the image of its female foreign minister.
in A similarly genderedrepresentation of the nation was embedded the news texts during the period studied.Although the demonstratorswere not specified as `men' in the texts, the photographsof the eventsshowed only men as the demonstrators.The overall coverageof the eventsreflected only the men's point of view and the idea of divergencefrom women being involved in the incidents was treated as a the norm. For example,when the group of motorcyclists, who had set off from Berlin, arrived in South Cyprus, Kibris published a photo of a young woman to highlight the (Kibris, 11 presenceof women among the motorcyclists as somethingunusual August, p. 1). As the motorcyclists' rally was considereda violent and battle-like being event, normally associatedwith men, the demonstrators male was treated as normal.
The inclusion of women in the representationof the eventswas mostly as `mothers'. According to Kibris and Halkin Sesi, TRNC PresidentDenkta§ warned that Greek Cypriot mothers should worry about the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' attempt to (Kibris, 6 August, 4; enter the country with force and without permission p. Halkin Sesi, 6 August, p.4) as their children would be punishedif they did so. The voices of
women were included in the reports when a women's group made an appealto from joining in mothers from both communities to stop their children the rally (Kibris, 8 August, p.3; Yenidüaen,8 August, p.6). On another occasion,a woman was included in the news reports when a Greek Cypriot woman was shot and injured during the secondborder incident. Kibris reportedthat the woman was a mother who
127 had gone to the conflict zone to get her son out of the area,which suggestedthat she was not a demonstrator.The shooting of this woman was singled out in the reports even though nine Greek Cypriot demonstratorsand two United Nations soldiers were also injured. As the sourceof the information was given as Reutersit is not clear whether it was Reutersthat highlighted this woman's caseor Kibris that choseto focus on it.
There was an emphasison an ethnic community of common origin and descentrather than citizenship in the news discourses,which indicated that the nation was conceptualisedas a Kulturnation. The newspaperscharacterised the nation as `Turkish', implying a common history and ancestryas the basis for national membershipof the nation. Kibris even reproducedthe first border incident as a clash betweenthe `aggressiveGreek Cypriots and our people of the samerace' (Kibris, 12 August, p.2). The statementnot only highlighted the existenceof Turkish demonstratorsat the rally but alsojustified their presenceas part of the `we group'. The conceptof a nation basedon the political will of citizens or Staatsnation appearedless in the news texts. Citizens were included in the newspapersto give their opinions but the term `citizen' was used to distinguish ordinary people from the stateauthorities rather than stressthe statusof their belonging to the nation. In a way, even though the concept of Staatsnationexisted in the news, the emphasiswas more on Kulturnation.
The representationof the nation in the media involves representingboundaries which mark the inclusion and exclusion, or who belongs,to the nation. The inclusion and exclusion process,which is embeddedin the news discourse,is not fixed but shifts dependingon the national identity projects. Differences in the conceptualisationof national identity employ different categories,which involve different social actors in the `we' group and `they' group (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Yet, although the group inclusion and exclusion dynamics change,the strategiesand linguistic means that are employed can be similar. Kibris was full of examplesof linguistic meansof creating a `national we' through the usageof `we', `our' and `us' that excluded the `outsiders' or `them'. For example, expressionssuch as `our troops at the border' (Kibris, 11 August, p. l), `our soldiers and our citizens are guarding the border' (Kibris, 12 August, p.2), `yesterdaythey cameto our border again' (Kibris, 15
128 August, p. 1) contributed to the imagining of a `national we'. Similar references appearedless in Hallan Sesibut it supportedthe `us' and `them' division in a different way. The newspaperhad a pagethat consistedof a selectionof news from the Greek Cypriot press,which generally portrayed the south part of the island as a place full of crime, fraud and people who hated Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Separatingthe news reports from the north and the south of Cyprus not only enhanceda differentiation of Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots but also encouragedthem to imagine themselvesas a national community within its bounded territory.
The categorisationof `us' and `them' were different in Yenidüzenfrom the other two newspapersand was reflected in its discourseon borders.In its reports, while `us' referred to the people who supporteda peaceprocess in Cyprus, `them' were the nationalistic fanatics who opposeda solution in Cyprus, regardlessof whether they were Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots. It depictedboth border incidents as the actions of `fanatics' rather than defining them as Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots. Running the headline `the result of fanaticism' the day after the motorcyclists' demonstration(Yenidüzen, 12 August p. 1), it describedthe people involved at the clashesas `the instrumentsof the chauvinist groups who do not want a solution in Cyprus' (Yenidüzen,11 August p. 1). For Yenidüzen,the physical borders were not regardedas the mark of exclusion or inclusion sincethere were people who belonged to the `we-group' and `they group' from both sidesof the island. Instead,there were ideological and political bordersbetween those in favour of a solution in Cyprus and those supporting the statusquo.
Unlike Kibris and Hallam Sesi,national security and territorial integrity were not the main themesin Yenidüzen.The statementsmade by the Turkish military authorities, whose duty was defined as being to guard the national border, appearedon the front pagesof Kibris and Halkin Sesi. In contrast,they received very little coveragein Yenidüzenand did not appearon its front pages.Instead, the themesof peaceor a need for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus Problem were frequently employed in the articles. The difference shows that rather than supporting the nationalistic view, for which the boundariesacted as a separationline between `us' and the `outsiders' (or Greek Cypriots), Yenidiüzenimagined Cyprus as one country but divided.
129 Adopting a `we' discoursein the news texts also helpedto strengthenthe relationship betweenthe media and the audienceby reducing the distancebetween them. The national media not only symbolize the nation but also in someways construct it. By speakingfor and to the nation, the media representthe nation as well as depicting what is to be represented(Billig, 1995). Frequently using the deictic expressionof `we' in their reports,Kibris and Halkin Sesi claimed to be speakingto and for the nation they represented.The metonymic realisation of `we' referred to both the newspaperitself and also to the society it addressed.The strategynot only forged a national `we- group' but also representedits interestsand affairs. Halkin Sesi claimed to voice the emotions and thoughts of the nation in its headlines.With the headline `Come and let's seewhat happens'(Hallern Sesi, 11 August, p. 1), the newspaper is challengedthe `other' on behalf of the people. When it said `Our attention fixed on tomorrow' (Hallen Sesi, 10 August, p. 1) it meant that as the whole nation `we' are by waiting to seewhat will happenthe next day. Finally, stating that `Motorcyclists can never cross (the border)' (Halle n Sesi, 7 August, p. 1), Halkin Sesi claimed to reflect the determinationof the nation.
In somecases there was confusion about whose views the newspaperswere Turkish Foreign reflecting and who the `we' referred to. For example,quoting the Minister Tansu tiller at the time, Halkin Sesiwrote: A messagefrom Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu tiller to the Greek Cypriot Adminstration WE DON'T LET THE BORDER TO BE PENETRATED
`If the TRNC borders are madeto be unrecognisablewhatever's necessarywill be done' (Hallan Sesi, 13 August, p. 1).
In this case,it is not clear who `we' refers to; whether the words about not letting the border be broken-through belongedto tiller or the newspaperwas ambiguous.While introduced as a messagefrom Ciller, `We don't let the border to be penetrated' was it Quotations from legitimate not in quotation marks, the statementfollowing was. and powerful sourcesincrease the dramatic dimension of the news eventsand (van Dijk, 1988). As Tuchman (1999) strengthentheir rhetorical function and effect describes,quotations are `a form of supporting evidence' (p.301). Using quotations in let facts allow people to distancethemselves from participating the story and the
130 speakfor themselves(Tuchman, 1999). Yet, that was not the casewith Hallan Sesi. Using the marks in one part of the headline to attribute thosewords to tiller but not in others can be interpretedas the statementswithout marks belonging to the newspaper.In this context, rather than establishinga distancefrom the statement,the use of quotation marks actually reducedthe distancebetween the views expressedby the speakerand the newspaper.In other words, it showedthe newspaper'ssupport and agreementwith tiller's statementas well as presentingit as the united opinion of an `us' that included Turkey as well.
In Yenidüzen'sheadlines, the expressionof a `national we' was not as readily emphasised.Instead the newspaperaddressed its readershipas if it were advising them on to how to behavein theseextraordinary circumstances:`invitation to common sense'(Yenidüzen, 10 August, p. 1), `do not get provoked' (Yenidüzen,11 August, p. 1). Its tone was more like a lecture to them: `this was what was expected' (Yenidüzen,9 August, p. 1) `Tension is disaster' (Yenidilzen, 13 August, p. 1). In its representationof the nation, rather than merely speakingon behalf of Turkish Cypriots, the newspaperpointed at both communitiestogether. The expressions`the Greek and Turkish communities living in Cyprus' (Yenidüzen,10 August, p. 1) and `both communities are tense' (Yenidüzen,10 August, p. 1) are other exampleswhich highlighted commonalitiesbetween both communities.
Apart from emphasisingthe unity of `us', national symbols were also used to enhancethe differences from Greek Cypriots. The employment of flags was one such example: The Greek Cypriot demonstratorswere shown carrying the national flag of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) and Greecewhile the Turkish Ulkücil (Idealist) demonstratorswere depicted with their flags composedof their symbols of three crescentsor a grey wolf. Kibris reported that the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists were carrying `the flag of the ROC that they had demolishedin 1963' (Kibris, 10 August, p.2). The photos of them with ROC's flags in their hands frequently appearedin the newspaper.Greek and ROC national flags were also positioned together,just as the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot ones were. On the day of the motorcyclists' demonstration,Hallen Sesi predicted that the demonstratorswould carry `the flags of Greek Cyprus, Greeceand the EuropeanUnion' (HallernSesi, 11 August, p.3). In a similar way, reporting Solomou's funeral, the newspapershighlighted that a Greek
131 (not a Greek Cypriot) flag was wrapped around his coffin (Hal/an Sesi, 17 August, 1997, p. 1; Yenidüzen,17 August, 1997,p. 5) and that there was no `Cypriot' flag at the funeral (Yenidüzen,17 August, 1997,p. 5). Yenidüzenalso pointed out that during Isaac's funeral ceremonyat the border, Greek Cypriot demonstratorsplaced a flag, combining the Greek and ROC flags on the spot where Isaacwas killed. This flag was describedas a 'Greekified Cyprus flag': `the flag is interesting. It is made up of a Greek flag attachedon to the upper left corner of a big ROC flag' (Yenidüzen,15 August, p.3). It was again Yenidüzenthat drew attention to the flags the Idealists carried: `fanatics who carried three crescentsand grey wolf flags with Turkish and TRNC flags and equippedwith all kinds of sharpinstruments... ' (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.3).
The newspapersfrequently benefited from the ideology of consensus(Fowler, 1991; Hartley, 1982) to show the nation as united without any dissidents.The news reports in Kibris and Halkin Sesi reflected a homogenous,condemnatory and unopposed responseto the incidents. Kibris combined all the statementsand announcements from a range of civil society organisationsand political parties in one story, which filled nearly two full pages.In Hallen Sesi,the treatmentof such information varied: In some casesit gatheredall the relevant information into one story and other times published them separately.To stressintra-national unity, though, it positioned opposingviews next to eachother. For example,by juxtaposing the statementsby Mehmet Ali Talat, CTP (a left-wing party) leaderand the ultra-nationalist right wing group Ülkücü close to each other twice, the newspapergave the impression that all the political views were in harmony on the issueof the motorcyclist demonstration.It helped to reinforce andjustify the nationalist views and discourses(Hallan Sesi, 8& 11 August, p. 1). The picture of a united Turkish Cypriot nation was also achievedby publishing the views of people on the issue as a separatefeature, even though only those supportive of the actions and policies of the Turkish Cypriot authorities were included. Presentingthese opinions as the generalview of Turkish Cypriots, the papersdepicted a nation without dissidents(Kibris, 4 August p. 7& 11 August p.7). The opposition to the official discoursesrarely appearedin any of the newspapers.
The Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' demonstrationwas describednot just as an attack on `the national borders', which symbolisedthe Turkish Cypriots' `sovereignty', but
132 also on the national spacethey consideras their `homeland'. As Billig (1995) points out, imagining a nation requiresimagining a community of peoplewith its national space(p. 74). The national spacethat was referred to was not just a piece of land but had `becomehomeland through Turkish Cypriots' blood, hard work and struggles' as a military official stated(Kibris, 4 August, p. 1). In a similar way, Hallan Sesi stressedthat `the borders of this homelandwere drawn with blood' (Hallen Sesi, 4 August, p. l). The accountsof such statementsmade the demonstrationat the border appearto be an attack on `the TRNC's bordersand its territorial integrity' (Kibris, 12 August p. 1). The discoursesin thesetexts also depictedthe borderedterritory of the TRNC as a homelandthat was sacredand thus should be protectedfrom the intrusion of the `others'. The emphasison its existenceand its continuity, especially when attackedby the `enemy', helpedpeople to participate in its existenceby believing and identifying with it. Consideringthat one of the founding myths of the TRNC was the need for security and safety from Greek Cypriots, an emphasison their continued threat contributed to people'simagining themselvesas a national community within a protected,bordered territory. Offering a different perspective,the homelandfor Yenidüzenwas Cyprus as a whole. There were referencesto `our Cyprus' (Yenidüzen,8 August, p.6), `in our small island' (Yenidüzen,10 August, p. 1), `the small island in the middle of Mediterranean' (Yenidüzen,10 August, p. 1) which suggestedthat Cyprus as a whole was imagined as a `homeland'. Therefore, the eventswere reconstructedin the news reports not as an intrusion to `our borders' but as the actions of a group of fanatics who were working to maintain the statusquo and destroy efforts to find a peaceful solution on the island.
Relatedto the discourseon the impassibilityof borders,Kibris andHallan Sesi enhancedthe ideathat the integrity andsecurity of the nationalterritory wasthe responsibilityof its military andpolice forces.Such thinking stressedthe existenceof the TRNC as a legitimate nation state and also naturalisedand justified the use of violence by the state.Reporting on their front pagesa statementby the Cyprus Turkish PeaceForces CommanderKundakci, `no one can cross our borders with motorcycles. Whoever attempts it will be punishedand necessaryactions will be taken' (Kibris & Hal/an Sesi, 4 August, p. 1), both newspapers,Kibris and Hallen Sesi reinforced the idea of nation statehaving the capability for violence within its boundaries.Kibris also reported, again on its front page,that the troops at the border
133 were given ordersto shoot anyoneattempting to violate it (Kibris, 7 August, p. 1). Thus, basedon this notion that nations have the right to use violence within their boundaries,the deathsof two Greek Cypriots were normalised.Employing strategy of justification, the killings of two Greek Cypriots were shown in reaction to the violation of `our national bordersand symbols' (Kibris, 12 August p. 1 & 15 August p.3).
Yenidüzenstressed that, rather than the security forces of the state,it was the Turkish Ulkücü nationalist group (Idealist), with the permission of the military authorities, who used force at the border during the first demonstration.Thus, Yenidüzendid not justify the killing of Isaacas a `patriotic act' but on the contrary, describedit as `lynching'. It describedIsaac being beatento deathwith iron bars by `angry Ülkilcüler2' when his foot got caught in the barbedwire as he tried to get out of Turkish Cypriot territory (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.2). Defining Solomou's death as the result of anotheraction of fanatic Greek Cypriots, the newspaperwrote in a photo caption that it was `as if he was sent to death on purposeto scatterseeds of animosity betweenthe two communities. What fanatics wanted happenedand he died' (Yenidüzen,15 August p. 1). At the sametime, it describedhis attempt to snatchthe Turkish flag as an `ugly behaviour' (Yenidüzen,15 August p. 1) which meant that Yenidüzenalso criticised his action from a nationalistic point of view. Its deviate from dominant it representationof the incident did not the nationalist one as border also treated it as common sensethat the flag and were national symbols of by sovereignty and unity and thus they should be respected everyone.Halkin Sesi justification: also basedits report on a similar discourseand processof `they've gone down flag crazy: the young Greek Cypriot who dared to bring the Turkish paid for his madnesswith his life when he was shot' (Hal/an Sesi, 15 August p. 1). The flag down newspapernot only describedthe attempt to bring the as madnessbut justified the killing for it.
The metaphor of blood was employed frequently during the period studied to remind justify readersof the martyrs and blood shedin the past to the right to claim the territory as homeland. Describing the homeland in this way also legitimised the
2In Turkishsuffix `-1er' makes the word plural.
134 violence committed for the sakeof protecting it. For example,Hal/an Sesi defended Solomou's deathin the following way: `the consequencesof attacking our borders which have beenwatered by blood of martyrs and our moon and crescentflag have once more been confirmed' (Halkin Sesi, 15 August, p. l). Kibris also employed the metaphor of blood in its reflection of the incidents at the motorcyclists' demonstrationin its headline `blood flowed'. However, the expressionof `blood flowed' did not reveal much about whose blood it was and who was responsiblefor it. Even though it published a photo of TassosIsac on its front page next to the headline, 'blood' did not just refer to his but also to the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish demonstratorswho were injured during the clashes(Kibris, 12 August p. 1). Showing injured pictures of 'our' victims who had been while acting `patriotically' was an attempt to moderatethe starknessof the death of one of the 'other'. In Yeniditzen,the image of `bloodshed' was employed as a setbackto the national project it favoured, in Cyprus. It which was the co-existenceof both communities a unified attributed the blame for the bloodshedto the groups that it jointly called `fanatics' and `chauvinists' in both communities: `Was the fanatics' show of strengthand vulgar hopes propagandaworth the blood shedand turning the two communities' of peace to a state of hopelessness'(Yenidilzen, 12 August, p.3)? `Peoplewant to seepeace flowers not blood on the border' (Yenidazen,12 August, p.3).
The name of the state,the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), was Its mentioned in all the news texts of the analysednewspapers. national autonomy, independenceand the impassibility of its borderswere emphasisedthroughout the demonstration period studied. The Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' was portrayed as an `attemptto violate the TRNC borders' which was a way of confirming the existence by and legitimacy of the TRNC, a nation statethat was not recognised the international world. Nations cannot be thought of in isolation but have to be imagined as part of the international world which is made up of nations (Billig, 1995). By reporting the remarks made by stateofficials and the military authorities that the TRNC national borders should not be breachedwithout permission,Kibris legal international presentedthe TRNC as a nation state that was part of the world by it. It legitimate TRNC's London rather than excluded quoted a source,the RepresentativeHakki Müftüzade in an interview with BBC radio:
135 The TRNC statewill take the necessaryprecautions with its police and courtsjust like any other country would againstthe people who try to break through the borders illegally. When motorcyclists come, they will be caught,arrested and appearin court. This is what our rules require (Kibris, 8 August p.3).
Halkin Sesi also quoted TRNC PresidentDenktab, who said that the TRNC police would treat the motorcyclists the sameway as the Greek Cypriot administration would have if a thousandmotorcyclists from the north went to the south without any legal permission to enter the country (Halkin Sesi, 6 august,p. 2). The claim that `any other country would have behavedthe sameway in a similar situation' enhanced attemptsto legitimise the nation stateand alsojustified the use of the police force againstthe demonstrators.
While the name of the Turkish Cypriot state,the TRNC, was emphasisedfrequently, the name of the statein the south did not appearin the news texts. Ratherthan using its internationally recognisedname, the Republic of Cyprus, it was simply described as `the Greek Cypriot Administration' or `the Greek Cypriot side'. Having withdrawn from all the administrational and governmentalpositions of the republic in 1963, during the inter-communal conflict, the official national policy of Turkish Cypriots was to consider the Republic of Cyprus as an illegitimate republic. Therefore, the TRNC authorities refuse to use its official name. Having adoptedand integratedthe official discourseon this issue,none of the newspapersused the `Republic of Cyprus' or describedthe administration as the `government' in the period studied. Unanimously, they all describedit as the `Greek Cypriot administration'. Predictably, the president of the Republic of Cyprus was also not referred to as the `president' but simply as `the Greek Cypriot leader'. In contrast,the TRNC presidentwas the `President' and there was no need to mention the name of the TRNC to statethat the Foreign Minister was the TRNC's minister. It was because unlessstated otherwise, the context of the news texts are understoodto be the nation. Readersassume that the story that they are reading concernstheir nation or happened within its boundaries(Billig, 1995). This is one of the ideological roles the media play in daily flagging the nation.
136 The news texts, especiallyin Kibris and Hallan Sesi,had an interdiscursive relationship with military discourses.Many news articles were constructedaround the topic of national security at the border and adoptedmilitaristic or war terminology. For example, `order to shoot', `the troops at the border are on alert' (Kibris, 7 August, p. 1), `our soldiers will fire' (Kibris, 7 August, p. 1), `Ulkilciiler (Idealists) and university studentsbattled at the front line' (Kibris, 12 August, p.4) were some of the militaristic expressionsthat were adoptedwithin the news reports in Kibris. Similar terminology also existed within Hallan Sesi which reported that `the military was on alert' (HallamSesi, 13 August, p. 1), `hot conflict' (Hallan Sesi, 11 August, p. l), ) and `turned into a battlefield' (Hal/an Sesi, 12 August, p. 1). Having depicted the clashesas a `battle', Yenidazenalso employedexpressions such as `major battle' and `battlefield' in its news texts (Yenidilzen, 12 August, p. 1).
As well as referring to the eventsat the border using war terminology, the news discoursein Yenidiken focusedmainly on the theme of `peace'. It framed both demonstrationsas blows to the attempt for a peaceful settlementin Cyprus. Both border incidents were presentedas the consequenceof the continuing Cyprus problem and the lack of a permanentsolution on the island. The differencesin the frameworks of the newspaperswere especially clear in the news texts about the statementgiven by the Turkish Foreign Minister tiller in North Cyprus following the flag incident at the TRNC border. While both Kibris and Halkin Sesi choseto use an aggressiveand nationalist quote from tiller as the headline, `we break the hands extending to the flag' (Kibris & Hallan Sesi, 15 August, p. 1), Yenidiizen'sheadline for the sameevent was, `Call for peacefrom tiller'. Yenidüzenrestructured tiller's statementin the form of messagesto the UN General Secretary,the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece,the fanatics, the Greek Orthodox church, Europe and the TRNC governmentto work for peacein Cyprus (Yenidiizen, 16 August, p. 1).
Positive Self and Negative `Other' Representation
The choiceof wordsand the linguistic constructionof `we' and `they' groupscan change,depending on the definition of the `nationalinterest'. While the `we' groupis portrayedas representing and defendingthe interestsof the nation,the `other' group
137 is depictedas opposing it (Reicherand Hopkins, 2001). Therefore the discursive constructionof `us', andthe `other' with negativeattributes, maintains the binary opposition,which may contributeto the enforcementof conflict ratherthan reconciliation. The media's representationcan in this way also influence peoples' attitudes and views. Kibris and Halkin Sesi's news discourseswere basedaround the conceptsof `Turkish Cypriots and Turks' versusthe `Greek Cypriot motorcyclists or Greek Cypriots'. In this construction `us' did not just refer to Turkish Cypriots but Turks as well. In other words, while Turks and Turkish Cypriot were in the 'we- group', Greek Cypriots and sometimesGreeks were in the `other' group. The production of the conceptof `we' indicated samenessand the idea of being together.
Discriminatory and nationalist discoursesuse the strategyof dissimilation, which constructsthe `other' in a negativeway and portrays it as `a deviancefrom a preferred norm' (Wodak et al., 1999,p. 33). Both, Kibris and Hal/an Sesiproduced Turkish Cypriot national identity mostly on the basis of differentiation from the `other'. This is not to deny that they did not enforce the concept of a Turkish Cypriot identity with an emphasison Turkishnessbut to note that the focus was more on the included in portrayal of the `other' rather than `us'. In the reports the study, the negative description of the `other' was employed in opposition to the positive production of Turkish Cypriot identity. While describing `them' with negative traits such as `mad', `fanatic' and `provocateur', both newspapersconstructed `us' as the opposite; `peaceful', `patriotic', and `with common sense'.The demonstrationby a group of Greek Cypriot motorcyclists was defined as `madness',while the killing of two Greek Cypriot civilians wasjustified as a necessaryand patriotic action. The negativerepresentation of the `other' and the positive representationof `us' were extendedto Turkey's and Greece'spolicies on Cyprus as well. One of Halkin Sesi's headlineswas as follows: HERE IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TURKISH AND GREEK MENTALITY THEY JUST DON'T LEARN While tiller gave messagesof peace,Simitis exhibited an aggressiveattitude (Halkin Sesi, 18 August, p. 1).
In the overall coverage,the blamefor the eventswas put on to the `other'.Even the Greek responsibilityfor the bloodshedwas shiftedonto Cypriots.For example,
138 showing a photo of motorcyclists carrying the flag of the Republic of Cyprus, Kibris wrote in its caption, `fanatic Greek Cypriot motorcyclists who causedthe bloodshed' (Kibris, 12 August p.2). Halkin Sesi also pointed at the Greek Cypriot demonstrators as the causeof deathrather than `our' demonstrators.According to the paper, Isaac was killed during the clashesthat had startedas the Greek Cypriot demonstrators crossedthe Turkish Cypriot border (HalltenSesi, 12 August p.2). It also focused on the negative actions of Greek Cypriots rather than Turkish Cypriots.
In a different approachfrom the others, Yenidüzendid not differentiate `us' and `them' on the basis of nationality but on the political views and ideological positions in relation to the Cyprus problem; that is to say, whether they supportedthe idea of a peaceful settlementin Cyprus or the continuation of the statusquo. The `other' group included `fanatic' Greek Cypriots and `fanatic' UIkücü militants (Yenidiüzen,12 August, p.2). Referring to the Turkish Ülkücü demonstrators,the paper commented that `the other day fanatical and chauvinist Greek Cypriot protestorsfound exactly whom they wanted to seealong the borders' (Yenidüzen,13 August, p.8). Categorisingboth in the `other' group, the paper portrayed both in a negative light.
For example, it describedthe Greek Cypriot demonstratorsas `a handful of lack in Cyprus' adventurers' (Yenidüzen,10 August, p. 1), `the causeof of tranquillity (Yenidüzen,11 August, p.3), `untethered' (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.3), who `try to deal a blow to peace' (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.2), `crossedthe buffer zone like forces like crazy' (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.2) and `stonedthe security savages' (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.2). Their ultra nationalist positions were illustrated in a bomb similar way: `fanatic Greek Cypriot demonstratorswho want to the roads to lack in (Yenidüzen,15 August, 1) peaceand to reinforce of solution Cyprus' p. and do also `the oneswho becamean instrument to the chauvinist groups who everything 12 August, 1,). Meanwhile, to reinforce lack of solution in Cyprus' (Yenidüzen, p. Mica Yenidiizen'sapproach to the Turkish ultra nationalist group was no different. Critical of the idea that 2,500 motorcyclists from the group intend to go to North Cyprus from Turkey to launch a counter motorcycle demonstration,the newspaper if (Yenidüzen,10 August wrote in its headline `As this were the only thing missing' ÜIkücü TRNC p. 4). Another article reported that groupsthreatened the police becauseof the motorcycle ban issuedon the day of the demonstration(Yenidüzen, 9 ülkücü in August p.3). While no criticism of groups appeared the other two
139 newspapers,Yenidiizen condemned their actions as much as or more so than the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists'. The photos of the clashesin Yenidazenwere not only Ülkiicü of Greek Cypriots but were mainly of groups with Turkish flags or the flags of their groups. Showing disapprovalof them, it published a photo of a group of men posing for the camerawith the following caption: Joyful if for Sunday to beach No as going a out, the or on a picnic ... one could tell the difference if they didn't carry stones,iron bars or chains insteadof picnic basket. Someeven brought their children with them.... but after such activities blood, tears and even war can follow. Shouldn't someonehave told this to them (Yenidiizen, 13 August, p.8)?
Employing such a negative description of thesegroups was to differentiate and distanceTurkish Cypriots from such nationalist Turkish groups.Therefore, Yenidüzenstressed that thesegroups were from Turkey or of Turkish origin: `the Mücü group consisting of from Turkey' (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.! ), `the groups Mlkücü' which 80 % consistedof Turkish (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.2).
In Kibris and Hallen Sesi, a negativeportrayal and attributes was not just directed at the demonstratorsbut to the whole Greek Cypriot population. Generalisingthem as `Greek Cypriots' rather than describing them as the `Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' or `demonstrators',these newspapers attributed negative characteristicsto the Greek Cypriot population in general.The term `Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' that the newspapershad been using until the day of the rally was replacedwith the general term, `Greek Cypriots' on the day of the demonstration.This could be partly because the demonstrationwas not the one that the Greek Cypriot Motorcyclists Federation had organised,as it had been cancelled,but the one that was adoptedby other Greek Cypriot demonstrators.Still, such discoursedefined the demonstratorsnot as a marginal group but as the representativeof the Greek Cypriot community in general. Following the incident, both papersdescribed them as `insolent' (Kibris, 12 August p. 3) `aggressive'(Kibris, 12 August p. 2), `brain washed' (Kibris, 15 August p. 1) or `fanatics' (HallamSesi, 17 August, p.4) and `obsessedwith crossingthe border' (Hallan Sesi, 11 August, p. 1).
140 Apart from their personality,their actions were also attributed with negative features: the demonstrationof the motorcyclists was a `fiasco' and `brought the island to the threshold of war again'. They also `exhibited Turkish animosity again' (Hallan Sesi, 17 August, p. l). The word `again' indicated repetition of such behaviour that also helped to naturaliseit as if all Greek Cypriots were anti-Turks. During the period studied, in contrastto the depiction of a united Turkish Cypriot nation, Greek Cypriots were `divided into two groups' (Kibris, 8 August p. 3; Halkin Sesi, 14 August, p.6) and `scared' (Kibris, 11Augustp. 2). In Hallan Sesi,juxtaposed next to the announcementof a military official who statedthat whoever crossedthe border would be punished,there was anotherstory: `as 11"' August, the day of the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' demonstrationapproached, they startedgetting scared' (Hallen Sesi, 4 August, p. 1). Who was `getting scared', the generalpublic or the motorcyclists, was not clear and did not matter for the newspaper,as the concerned derogatory party was the `other' group. Referring to Greek Cypriots with namesand attributing negative characteristicsto them was part of the predicational strategythat the newspapersemployed which aimed not only to aggregatethe nationalist hysteria justified legitimized amongstTurkish Cypriots againstthem but also and their exclusion and being cast as the `enemy'.
Yenidüzen,on the other hand, was careful to differentiate the Greek Cypriot demonstratorsfrom the generalGreek Cypriot public by frequently describing them Avoiding as `a group of fanatics' or a `handful of adventurers'. stereotyping all Greek Cypriots by representingthem all the sameas eachother, the paper attempted
to stressthe diversity within the Greek Cypriot community. In other words, Yenidazen'sdiscourse was basedon the notion that not all Greek Cypriots were like the demonstratorswho expressedtheir hatredtowards Turkish Cypriots: the general Cypriots, `we' population were not the `enemy' but just like `us', with whom want to live in peace,which emphasiseda Cypriot-oriented identity rather than a Turkish one.
Europeanswho had joined the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists were also cast as the `other' but their representationwas more moderatethan the Greek Cypriot ones.As Reisigland Wodak (2001) point out, thereis a hierarchywithin the `other' groups. The derogatoryterms that wereemployed to referto the GreekCypriots were not
141 used for the Europeans.Only Yenidüzenreported that `someEuropeans who are bought by Greek Cypriots' (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.2) alsojoined in the demonstration.Kibris simply describedthem as `someEuropeans accompanying the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists'. It estimatedtheir numbersas being `around 200' in comparisonto `7 thousandGreek Cypriot motorcyclists'. Later in the article, the newspaperstated that there were `180 Europeans'accompanying the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists (Kibris, 10 August, p.4). After the demonstration,when the European Motorcyclists Union askedfor permission to crossto the north, Kibris again emphasisedtheir Europeanness:`European motorcyclists askedfor permission to crossto the TRNC' (Kibris, 12 August, p.5). Yenidüzen,on the other hand, generalisedthem as the `motorcyclists': `motorcyclists askedfor permission but could not get it' (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.4).
There was also a self-glorification in the news reports throughout the period studied. Benefiting from the topos of comparisonand difference that implies that `they are inferior comparedto us' (Wodak et al., 1999,p. 38), the construction strategydraws a features positive identity of `us' in relation to the negative of the `other'. Therefore, while the Greek Cypriot authorities and their policies were reported in a negative light as `war seeker', `hostile' and `provocateur' in Kibris and Hallan Sesi, the actions of the Turkish Cypriot authorities were referred to as `peaceoriented', `resolute' and as a `stern response'.After the incidents, the TRNC PresidentDenktab was reported to have invited the Greek Cypriot leader Clerides back to the negotiating table for a peaceful settlement(Halle n Sesi, 17 August, p.4), which portrayed him as a peaceoriented leader. In the overall reconstruction of the developments,the `we' was depicted as the group who tried to keep the peacewhile the `other' exhibited hostility.
In the positive presentationof `us', the killings at the border were pictured as the consequenceof Greek Cypriot provocation and their wrongdoings and both incidents werejustified as patriotic acts by `us'. According to Hallan Sesi,people were influenced by what they had seenon the television: As the GreekCypriots who had startedfire in the buffer zoneincreased their provocations,the emotions of people who had been watching the eventson the television, especially live on the Greek Cypriot television channels,became highly
142 arousedand startedflowing to the place where eventswere taking place. Greek Cypriotswho jumped over the barbedwire to theTurkish area encountered the reaction of the peoplefirst rather than the Security Forces(Halkin Sesi, 12 August, p.2).
The clashesbetween the demonstratorsfrom both sideswere shown as betweenthe `aggressiveGreek Cypriots and our citizens' or `people' in the paper. Yenidiizenalso used exactly the sameinformation, which shows that they both benefited from the samesources or, having receivedthe sameinformation as a pressrelease or news agencydispatch, copied it without making any changes.In either case,they found it acceptableto use it in their coverageof the events.
Another example of the positive representationof `us' was showing how the TRNC's Ülkücü nationalist PresidentDenktab and groups were sorry about what had happened.Reflecting a pressconference organised by the latter, Kibris used the headline `Idealistsare sorry as well' (Kibris, 14 August, p.4). Consideringthat headlinesexpress the major topic of the text (van Dijk, 1988),there was a contradiction in the headline and the news text. According to the text, even though Ulkücü groups had expressedtheir sadnessabout the deathof a Greek Cypriot, they had also stressedthat they would repeattheir actions if the samethings happened again. In contrast to the headline,the main news text was aboutjustifying their presenceat the demonstrationand rejecting their responsibility for the killing (Kibris, 14 August, p.4) rather than expressingtheir consolation. Yenidüzen,as opposedto the others, highlighted different aspectsof the pressconference. According to the ülkücü paper,Erhan Ankli, the leader of one of the groups at the pressconference, supportedthe claims of Simerini and Mahl, two `fanatic right wing Greek Cypriot newspapers',that Turkish Cypriots who worked on the Greek Cypriot side were Ülkücü responsiblefor Isaac's death, not groups.The paper's headline was `fanatic Ankle took refuge behind the fanatic Greek Cypriots' (Yenidüzen,14 August, p.6). The statementwas also a good example of Papadakis'(1998) argumentof how in nationalists on both sidesof the border fed off of each other's extremism Cyprus.
The attemptsof the Greek Cypriot administration to stop the motorcyclists from just entering the buffer zone before the demonstrationwere not regardedas sincere
143 by Kibris and Hallen Sesi.Very critical of the administrationand the Greek Orthodox Church, both newspapersblamed them for the incidents.Ha1Mn Sesi stressedthat theseattempts by the Greek Cypriot administration were only `for show' (Halkin Sesi, 11 August, p. 1). According to the paper, The Greek Cypriot administration,on the one hand, by using the television channels and the print media is provoking the motorcyclists to break through the TRNC borders and go to Kyrenia but on the other hand, is trying to give foreigners the impressionthat it is not approving this action (Hal/an Sesi, 8 August, p. 1).
Printing a photo of the Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides and a Greek Orthodox priest holding a motorcycle, Kibris presentedthem as `here are the ones who provoke the Greek Cypriot youth' (Kibris, 15 August, p.5). Previously, both newspapershad already included articles about the Greek Cypriot PresidentGlafkos Clerides criticising the motorcyclists' demonstrationplan: `if the determinationof the stateof our national causeis left to the motorcyclists or other groups, Cyprus will end up in disaster' (Kibris, 6 August, p.4). In Hal/an Sesithe sameexpression was reflected `if is left to the help with some sarcasm: our national cause motorcyclists ... god Cyprus' (Halkin Sesi, 6 August p. 6). Highlighting thesephrases, both newspapers aimed at giving the impressionthat even their own leaderwas mocking the motorcyclists' action. Yet, nearly a week later, they blamed the Greek Cypriot leader for encouragingthe motorcyclists.
Yenidazen,on the other hand, depicted the Greek Cypriot authorities as anxious and trying to discouragethe demonstrators.The first story Yenidilzenreported on the issuewas actually how the Greek Cypriot authoritieswould use violence against the motorcyclists if necessary(Yenidiizen, 7 August p.2). The samestory appearedin the other two newspaperswithout much emphasiswhile in Yenidazenit appearedon a black backgroundto attract more attention. Yenidüzenalso published a statementby the Presidentof the Republic of Cyprus, Glafkos Clerides, asking the motorcyclists not to crossthe border (Yeniditzen,11 August p.3). On the day of the motorcyclists' demonstration,the newspaperwrote that the demonstrators`first had attacked Clerides and then the TRNC border' (Yenidazen,12 August, p. 1). Carrying more news from the southernpart of the island in comparisonto the other two newspapers, Yenidazenalso gave a perspectiveon what was happeningthere. For example, it
144 reported that the Greek Cypriot police had tried to barricadeall the roads that led to the Turkish Cypriot side showing that they were also trying to stop the demonstrators (Yenidüzen,12 August, p.6). A news story about a motorcyclist appearingin court in the south for attacking a Greek Cypriot police officer also appearedin Yenidüzen, which indicated that the other side was punishing someof its nationals for breaking the law. With such stories, Yenidüzenprovided a picture of Greek Cypriots not so evil and anti-Turk as the othersdid.
The criticisms by the Greek Cypriot pressof their own governmentwere used in the negative representationof the `other'. Any Greek Cypriots' self-criticism for not doing enoughto prevent the incidents were included in the news articles while no such criticism towards the Turkish Cypriot authorities was reported in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers.Stating that someGreek Cypriot newspaperswere very angry at their own administration,Kibris reportedthat Simerini, a Greek Cypriot daily paper, used the words, `we disgracedourselves' in its news article referring to the conduct of the motorcyclists and the Greek Cypriot government(Kibris, 13 August, p.5). Similar criticisms that appearedin the international presswere also adoptedin the sameway to justify the Turkish Cypriots' position. However, no such criticism regarding the conduct of the Turkish Cypriot authorities were included in the news texts. Moreover, criticisms directed at both sideswere given as if they were only directed at the Greek Cypriot side. Kibris ran an article with a headline that said `the bloody incidents at our bordersattracted the reaction of the world: the Greek Cypriot administration is guilty' (Kibris, 13 August, p.4). The synecdocheof the `world' actually consistedof Turkey's Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, the UN's Cyprus Representative,the Nicosia Ambassadorof the United Statesand the French Foreign Ministry. In contrast to the headline,the content of the text included condemnationof both sides for the border incidents rather than pointing the finger only at the Greek Cypriots. The samestory was reported in Halkin Sesi with a similar headline `the statementsof the UN and France:the responsibleones are Greek Cypriots' (Hal/an Sesi, 13 August, p. l). Kibris also published a report preparedby the United Nations PeaceForces about the eventson 11thAugust 1996 with a headline `the Greek Cypriot police was ineffective'. The headline did not give any indication that as an account of the UN report, the news text also mentioned that the Turkish Cypriot police was criticised for allowing someTurkish Cypriot
145 demonstratorsequipped with iron andwooden bars into the military areato clash with the GreekCypriot demonstrators(Kibrzs, 15 August, p. 5).
What the demonstratorsfrom both sideswould carry or carried was another issuethat the newspapersfocused on to negativize the `other'. Hallan Sesi announced beforehandthe things that the Greek Cypriot demonstratorswould carry when they broke through the border: the flags of Greek Cyprus, Greeceand the EuropeanUnion and chains (Hallcin Sesi, 11 August, p.3). It seemedas though flags were categorised items by Ülkücil as dangerousitems along with chains. In Yenidiizen,the carried groups were stressedmore than the Greek Cypriot demonstrators':stones, iron bars, chains, sticks, mace and firearms (Yenidazen,12 August, p. 1). The paper also emphasisedIsaac's murder weaponas being an iron bar (Yeniduzen,12 August, p. 1).
To increasethe effectivenessof their news, the newspapersused strategiesthat would promote their political positions and ideological beliefs. They reorganisedthe statementsand opinions of reliable sourcesand sourcesthat were regardedas the `other' or the opposition to fit in with the newspaper'sviews. They gave ignoring For Yenidazen advantageoustreatment to somewhile others. example, by published only a short extract from a long statementmade Bülent Ecevit, who was Turkey's Prime minister in 1974 during Turkey's intervention in Cyprus and was island. The still seenas the authoritative voice on national policy on the extract the he Turkish ülküca paper used was the part in which had criticised the presenceof during demonstrations(Yenidilzen, 15 August, 5). The groups in North Cyprus the p. in he justified Turkish in rest of his statement, which the presenceof the military the from As before, Turkish north of the island, was excluded the text. mentioned the Foreign Minister tiller's speechwas also restructuredto fit the political framework of the newspapers.
By putting the blame for the death of two Greek Cypriots on the Greek Cypriot Sesi justification in administration, Kibris and Hallam used a strategyof their news discourseswhich helped to downplay the negativeactions of the `we-group' in both incidents. For instance,there was very little referenceto the circumstancesand detailed. details of Isaac's death even though Solomou's was This could be because Solomou's action was seenas more unacceptableand could be more easily justified
146 comparedto the circumstancesin which Isaacwas killed for his attempt to enter the Turkish Cypriot territory. In Solomou's case,he not only breachedthe border but in also tried to haul down the flag. Therefore, Kibris only two news texts appeared regarding Isaac's death: one was quoting from an interview given to the Greek Cypriot television channelsby a friend of Isaac's (Kibris, 12 August, p.3). The other died referred to the autopsyresults which statedthat Isaachad as a result of blows to the head.Kibris and Halkm Sesiprinted a statementby the TRNC's Foreign Minister that announcedthat `the findings of the coroner confirm that the young man, of whose deathwe are very upset,was beatenas he crossedthe barbedwires' (Kibris, 15 August, p.3 & HallamSesi, 15 August, p.2) but included no further explanation. As discussedbefore, his deathwas seenas a consequenceof the patriotic action of the `national we group' as he broke through `our barbedwire', meaning the border. There was no indication from the stateauthorities whether the responsibleones issue, would be found and punished.Interestingly, none of the newspapersraised the but reported only that the Greek Cypriot governmentwould demandan international August, 4 & Hallan Sesi, 14 arrest warrant for Isaac's murderers(Kibris, 14 p. August, p.2).
is In a similar way, in Yenidüzen'scoverage of the events,the `we' group, that to say the presenceof the Turkish Cypriots at the first border clash, was downplayed. Ülkiicü Despite emphasisingthe negative actions of groups at the border, Yenidüzen if According madeno referenceto Turkish Cypriots', as there were none there. to the demonstrators be Turkish (Yenidiizen, 12 newspaper,80% of the were statedto August, p. 1) but without mentioning where the remaining 20% came from or Cypriots. whether it consistedof Turkish
The negativeactions of `us' werealso mitigated. As part of this strategy,the news textsof both killings wereconstructed with passivesentences without referringto thoseresponsible. There was no mentionof the Turkish demonstratorskilling Isaac in Kibris andHalkin Sesi.In a newsarticle in Kibris, he was simply definedas `the deaddemonstrator' (Kibris, 14 Augustp. 4) without specifyingwho hadkilled him. Noneof the newspapersasked such questions. Kibris andHal/an Sesiused passive `SolomonSolomou (26) sentencesin their coverageof Solomou'sdeath as well: who flag dead'(Kibris & climbedthe flag pole in an attemptto bring downour was shot
147 Halkin Sesi, 15 August, p. l). The passivesentence again hid thoseresponsible for his deathwhich mitigated the actions of the `we-group'. The responsibility for what happenedwas also Solomou's, accordingto the papers:`he paid for the attack to the Turkish flag and its borderswith his life' (Hal/an Sesi, 15 August, p. 1) because `when the crazy Greek Cypriot youth did not turn back despiteall the warnings, our security forces had no choice but to shoot him' (Kibris, 15 August, p.2). In contrast with the other two, Yenidilzenannounced the ones responsiblefor the killings. In Isaac's caseit pointed at the Turkish rioters and describedhis deathby `angry Idealists' who hit him with iron bars. In Solomou's killing, it identified the responsibleone as the Mobile Strike Force (Yenidüzen,15 August, p. 1&2). Yet, Yenidazenalso frequently benefited from the use of metonymsand personification that hid the actions of the responsibleones. For example,the blame for what happenedwas put on `fanaticism', a vague term that actually pointed at the nationalists without being specific. There were also personifying expressionssuch as `fanaticism left one deadbehind it' (Yenidilzen, 15 August, p.2) or `fanaticism is crying for "blood more blood" but pro-peace,intellectual people of Cyprus say "that is enough"' (Yenidüzen,15 August, p.2).
Another strategyof discrediting the `other' was reporting everything it had said as a claim or mere suggestionrather than a definite statement.Therefore, verbs such as `claimed', `alleged' and `suggested'were employed when a statementfrom the `other' was included in the text. In contrast,the statementsby Turkish or Turkish Cypriot authorities carried more definite verbs such as `said', `told' or `did'. Such linguistic practice attributes `truthfulness' to the actions and statementsof `our' authorities while casting doubt and raising questionsabout the `others". The practice was clear in all the three newspapersincluding Yenidiizen.One explanation for it is that most of the news from the Greek Cypriot side was written and distributed by TAK, which had adoptedthe official nationalistic discourseand the samewas utilized by the newspapers.
The employment of quantification, another discursive strategy for intensifying or in weakeningthe effect of the news (Fowler, 1991) was common the three newspapers.Apart from the countdownof the daysto the demonstration,there was a demonstrators. constantuse of numbersin relationto the numberof Large,rounded
148 figures were embeddedin the news discourses.Emphasising the number of the membersof the Greek Cypriot Motorcycle Federationas `7,000', especially Kibris and Hal/an Sesimight have aimed to escalatethe fear and tension amongstTurkish Cypriots (Kibris, 11 August, p.2; Hal/an Sesi, 11 August, p.3) who in return would justify the actions of the security forces. Dependingon the construction of `us' and `them', the numbersof the demonstratorsvaried. Initially Kibris gave the impression that all seventhousand members of the federationwould join the demonstration (Kibris, 10 August, p.4). Having statedthe samenumber for the membersof the federation, Hallan Sesi later challengedthis number with the figures releasedby the Turkish Cypriot authorities as `2,500- 3,000' (Hallen Sesi, 11 August, p.3). Yenidazendid not mention the number `7,000' but announcedthat `200 motorcyclists from 17 countries' were arriving in South Cyprus for the demonstration,as reported on the CyBC radio station (Yenidüzen,10 August, p.5).
Olkücü Similar strategieswere adoptedin relation to the demonstrators.Although it appearedin the newspapersthat `2,500 motorcyclists from Turkey would come', (HalkanSesi, 10 August, p.2; Kibris, 10 August, p.5; Yenidiizen,10 August, p.4), later the number was reported to be `150' (Hallen Sesi, 13 August, p.3; Yenidüzen, 13 August, p.5; Kibris, 13 August, p.4). Having stressedthat there were `thousands' of Ülkücii demonstratorsat the demonstration(Yenfdüzen, 12 August, p.3), Yenidüzenlater published the samenews article as the others stating that only `150' of them arrived in North Cyprus (Yenidüzen,13 August, p. 5). It meant that the newspaperwas either contradicting its previous report or that there were many Ulkücü sympathisersliving in the TRNC, as only 150 of them were from Turkey. The number of `thousands'was basedon Yenidüzen'sown reporter while the source of the figure 1150' was not clear. However, consideringthat the samefigure appeared in all the newspapers,it probably came from an official sourceor the news agency and all three newspapersprinted it without questioning.
On the day of the demonstration,the number of the demonstratorsfrom both sides `very few also varied according to the newspapers.Yenidüzen stated that Cypriot involved in motorcyclists but lots of militants' from the Greek side were the event (Yenidilzen, 12 August, p.2). The newspaperwas not specific about the Greek Cypriot demonstratorsbut emphasisedthe number of Olkücii demonstratorsat the
149 border as having increasedfrom `around500' to `thousands'(Yenidilzen, 12 August, p.3). Kibris, on the other hand, reportedthat `around 500' Greek Cypriot demonstratorsentered the buffer zone but then quoted one of the Greek Cypriot demonstratorsestimate of the figure as `around 200' (Kibris, 12 August, p.3). While the number of Greek Cypriot demonstratorsin the first rally was not statedin Hallern Sesi, in the secondone it appearedas `hundreds' (Halkm Sesi, 15 August, p.2).
The Construction of Collective History
History and collective memory are the other important ingredientsin the production in of national identity. They createa narrative that allows people the presentto becomea part of it. The continuity they produce establishesthe characterof national identity as essentialand the statusquo as the expressionof that identity (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). In the news discoursesof Kibris and Hallan Sesi,history was used to generatecontinuity betweenthe past and the present.There were constant intervention in island, referencesto the 22°danniversary of Turkey's military the Operations which is called the 2°dPeace Operation. Both the Ist and 2°dPeace are be in history Turkey consideredby Turks and Turkish Cypriots to a time when liberated Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots' atrocities and gave them the in island. On opportunity to live as a separatecommunity the north of the the day Solomou commemorationday of the 2ndPeace Operation, which was also the headline was shot dead,Hallan Sesi published a story with a that said `no return to by the past'. The story evoked the atrocities committed the Greek Cypriot militia Turkey's groups againstTurkish Cypriots and suggestedthat secondoperation, headline in which beganon 14thAugust 1974, savedtheir lives. Even though the was Only quotation marks there was no indication of whose words they were. when one by readsthe text does it becomeclear that it was a summary of the statementsmade day (Hallan Sesi, 14 stateofficials to commemoratethe importanceof the August, p. 10). In contrast,there was no referenceto the 2ndPeace Operation in Yenidazen.The demonstrationforced only referencemade to 1974 was to note that the motorcyclists' the island to live through the uneasiest22 days since 1974 (Yenidilzen, 15 August, p.3).
150 Collective memory was also usedto construct Turkish Cypriot identity through the negative representationof the `other'. For example,two days before the motorcyclists' demonstration,Kibris and Hallen Sesipublished news stories about the 32ndanniversary of the commemorationof the people who had died during the fighting againstGreek Cypriots in Erenköy, a village in the north eastof the island which is now under the control of the Turkish military. Juxtaposed,just under the main story of `Anxiety in the UN' regardingthe motorcyclists' attack on `our' borders, a photo in Kibris showeda family looking sad with some flowers in their hands in front of a gravestone.Next to the photo, on a red backgroundwith white font colour (also the colours of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags), the headline said `we commemoratedour martyrs who madehistory with their blood in Erenköy' (Kibris, 9 August, p. 1). By reminding the readersof the suffering of the `we' group in history, the newspaperevoked the negative acts of the `other' in the past which also acted as part of the collective history. The combination of articles that Kibris had beenpublishing, about the Greek Cypriots' possible attack on `our' borders and the memory of Turkish Cypriots who had been killed by them, was used to give the impressionthat Greek Cypriots continued their ambition of Enosis and that the Turkish Cypriots' struggle againstthem carried on. For example, insteadof referring to the Greek Cypriot presidentwith his statusat the time, the newspaperdescribed him as `one of the leadersof the EOKA organisationthat had causedbloodshed in Cyprus' (Kibris, 5 August, p. 1). The strategyof emphasisingthe continuity between then and now was again employed to show the Greek Cypriot authorities' intentions as unchangingand anti-Turk. In other words, the construction of national identity through the collective history was carried out with the demonisationof the `other'. The commemorationceremony of Erenköy martyrs was reported on page six by Yenidüzen,unlike the other newspapersthat published it on their front pages (Yenidüzen,8 August, p.6).
In summary, constantreconstruction and evocationof the past in the present from encouragedthe interpretation of presentevents the perspectiveof the past. The draw actions and intentions of the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists were used to during similarities with the actions of Greek Cypriots the conflict years and this was defended employedto support the argumentsof the nationalist groups who the status in Kibris quo. For example, Denkta§,the TRNC Presidentof the time, was quoted as
151 saying `If they do such things while the Turkish soldier is here I wonder what they would do if they were not' (Kibris, 12 August, p.2). The view reinforced the need for the presenceof the Turkish military in North Cyprus and naturalisedthe dependence of Turkish Cypriots' security on the Turkish army.
`No return to the past' was also emphasisedin the argumentsthat involved Kyrenia (Girne), a town on the north coast of the island where mainly Greek Cypriots lived until the separationof the island. The Greek Cypriot's desireto return to Kyrenia has always been interpretedby nationalist Turkish Cypriots as a desireto return to the pre-1974 state.As this period symbolisesa time when both communities lived together without the division and the presenceof the Turkish military, this is regardedas unacceptable,especially by the nationalist groups in North Cyprus. Therefore, the pronouncementof the presidentof the Greek Cypriot Motorcyclists Federationthat `our last stop will be Kyrenia' was not welcomed and was treated with sarcasmas an unbelievableclaim: `they claim to be going to Kyrenia' (Kibris, 10 August, p. 1). A day earlier, Hal/an Sesi also ran a similar story using the same tone in its report about the motorcyclists' intention of going to Kyrenia if the Greek Cypriot administration allowed them (Hallan Sesi, 9 August, p. 1). Kibris' headline for the samestory was `on with Kyrenia dream' (Kibris, 9 August, p.5). No news stories related to Kyrenia appearedin Yenidazen.
The collective history was also employed in relation to cultural symbols. The day before the demonstration,Kibris published a photographshowing a motorcyclist with the national flag of the Republic of Cyprus and wrote `the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists are not neglecting to carry the flag of the Republic of Cyprus that they demolishedin 1963' (Kibris, 10 August, p.4). Even though the Republic of Cyprus still functions as a legitimate statewithin the international world, for Turkish Cypriot nationalists the republic ceasedto exist when Turkish Cypriots stoppedbeing a part of it.
The pastwas alsoemployed to establishcertain characteristics and actions of the `other' asa trait that extendedto the present.Kibris remindedits readersthat the had precedingyear the GreekCypriot motorcyclists setsome fields on fire and Security stonedthe soldiersof the UnitedNations and Turkish Forces(Kibris, 4
152 August, p.3). In a similar way, Hal/an Sesi, in its description of a Greek Cypriot daily, highlighted the close relations of its owner with the Greek Cypriot nationalist organisation,EOKA, as if it were relevant: `accordingto MAHL, the newspaper owned by Sampsonfrom EOKA.... ' (Hallan Sesi, 14 August, p. 1). Yenidilzen'suse Ülkiicil of this strategywas againstthe leader Erhan Ankh. Reminding readersof a previous statementin which he remarkedthat `the Turkish Cypriot leftists should be shot like dogs', Yenidiben employed it to reinforce his image as a violent fanatic (Yenidazen,14 August, p.6).
Conclusion
At times of crises or conflict, people rely heavily on the media for information. As the media have the power to influence people's perceptionsof important political issues,the representationof conflict within the media are of paramountimportance. Framing an issuein a specific way, that is to say the selectiveprocessing of information in a way that would lead to a certain interpretation may contribute to the maintenanceof conflict. The analysis revealedthat the newspapersplayed an important role in the discursive construction of a Turkish Cypriot national identity. Benefiting from nationalist representationsand the discoursesof nationalist state representativesat the time, including the government,the presidentand the military, the newspapersnot only legitimised and establishedthem as the authority but also reinforced the tension and perpetuatedthe conflict betweenthe two communities. That is not to say that they createdthe tension, as the elementsof the conflict already existed, but to arguethat they contributed to the aggravationand continuation of it.
The three newspapersanalysed in this chapterhad nationalist discoursesand used a nationalist framework to representthe events.Kibris and Halkin Sesi, in a similar way adoptedthe dominant official nationalist discoursein their articles, which constructedthe `other' as homogenousand evil with the aim of depriving Turkish Cypriots of their independence.Apart from their nationalistic position, the resemblancebetween the two could be explained as the result of their close relationship with the military and governmentalsources, which were the main information sourceon these issuesand events.Giresun (2001), who studied Kibris'
153 news discoursefor the sameperiod, arguesthat corporateinterests could also have a role in determining whose discourseshould be represented.Having interviewed a number of journalists from Kibris, he concludesthat it was in line with corporate intereststo reproducethe dominant official nationalist discourse.
Yenidazen'sdiscourse of the eventswas different from the other two as there was someresistance to the hegemonicnationalistic discourseas well as attemptsto replace it with a Cypriot oriented one. This could be becauseof its affiliation with a political party that promoted good relations with the Greek Cypriot community. Thus it repeated`peace' in its discourseand also pointed to a common future in contrast with the other two who focusedon memoriesof the past. Yet, Yenidiizenalso was not free from nationalist discourses,especially when it employedthe official discourses which carried a nationalist framework.
The analysis of the data confirmed that the reproduction of identity in the news texts was not singular but context bound. Dependingon the setting and the `other', two main conceptsof national identity existed, which were in constantstruggle for domination. Although both called themselvesTurkish Cypriot, one emphasized Turkishnessand the other Cypriotness.However, in the news discoursesTurkishness was stressedmore as most of the storiespositioned Greek Cypriots as the `other'. Even Yeniditzen,that articulated a Cypriot oriented identity, used Turkish identity in relation to the Greek Cypriot demonstrators,particularly in the secondborder incident.
The linguistic construction of national identity benefited from the use of the deictic
expressionof `we' to emphasiseunity which was maintained by the oppositional metaphorsof `us' and `them'. However, `us' and the `other' changeddepending on the national identity projects and similarities and differenceswere drawn into different groups. The newspaperscontributed to the imagining of a national community by assertingdifferences from the `other' and reflecting the community as a united one. While self-representationof the `we' group was positive, the `other' derogatory was constantly attributed with negative featuresand names.Constant use of negative images and stereotypesfor Greek Cypriots reinforced their perception as the `enemy' in a way that dehumanisedthem. Simplification of the conflict to the
154 binary oppositionof `us' versus`them' alsodepicted each group as homogenised and excludeddifferent views and perspectives within them.
Interchangeableuse of the terms `Turkish Cypriot' and `Turk' made it difficult to establishwhether Turkish Cypriots were referred to as a separateentity. Using the strategy of unification, especiallyKibris and Halkin Sesi categorisedTurkish and Turkish Cypriots togetheras one nation. Despite its opposition, a similar collectivisation also existed in Yenidiizenwhich signified that it was a norm difficult to break. The characterisationof the nation as Kulturnation was also dominant in the news discourses.Even if somefeatures identified with Staatsnationwere presentin the reflection of the events,the nation was usually reconstructedon the themesof common history and ancestrywith mainland Turks.
The inclusion and exclusion processwas achievedthrough various discursive strategiesand linguistic means.The use of the deictic expressionof `we' and referencesto national symbols such as `our borders', `our flag' and `our territory' contributed to the imagining of the nation as `homeland'. Representationof homelandas being under attack from an `enemy' that is real and threateningwas also employed to stressthe unity of the nation againstit. As Tsagarousianou(1999) points out, the media construct the nation and its enemiesthrough the enactmentof public rituals such as nationalist demonstrationsand createa moral panic through particular meansof representationof the enemy.Kibris and Hallan Sesi's discoursesassisted the creation of such moral panic which supportedthe senseof togethernessand also the negative perception of the `other'.
Stressingthe statename, the TRNC, acted as a persuasivefeature of the legality of a nation statethat had not gained international recognition. It alsojustified its right to use violence for the sake of protecting the homelandwhich legitimised the death of two membersof the `other'. Respectfor the flag and the border were treated as common senseas none of the newspapersanalysed in this study criticised Solomou's deathor raised questionsas to why the Turkish Cypriot authorities did not stop him in anotherway. Significant lack of criticism contributed to the naturalisation of the Turkish nationalistic notion that the Turkish border and flag cannot be treated with contempt and that they are worth killing and dying for. In other words, these
155 newspapersacted for andbecame one of the nationalisinginstitutions by contributing to the continuityof nationalistmythologies.
Finally, the nationalist discoursesreproduced the myth of unity rather than encouragingidentity negotiation. Therefore,the dominanceof the nationalist discoursesin the newspapersdid not allow room for diverse and challenging discoursesin the representationof thesetwo nationalist demonstrations.Nationalist discoursesnot only perpetuate,reproduce and justify a social statusquo and the national identities related to it (Reisig & Wodak, 2001) but also leave no public spacefor the negotiation of other identities. Lack of alternative discoursesand representationscontribute to the construction of a national identity that does not include diverse and plural understandings(Tsagarousianou, 1999). The processof reinforcing binary divisions and the demonizationof the `other' also creates obstaclesto the formation of a pluralistic and democraticsociety and citizenship as well as the acknowledgementof internal national complexity and plurality (Ozgunes and Terzis, 2000).
156 CHAPTER 6: OPENING THE BORDER IN 2003
Introduction
The opening of the buffer zone in April 2003 was one of the developments that brought many changes to Cyprus. Having had no contact since the division of the island in 1974, the opening of the border by the Turkish Cypriot administration allowed both communitiesto crossto the `other' side for the first time in 29 yearsand meet the people they regardedas their `enemy'.
The developmentsthat followed the openingof the border dominatedthe media.This part of the study analysesthe newstexts of the threenewspapers during the first week of the border openingto find out who was included in the reproductionof the national community by the media.It examinesthe news discoursesabout the border crossingsto seewhich conceptsof identity thesenewspapers reflected.
The Setting - Brief Description of the Context within Which the Borders Opened
The border that separatesthe island into the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides is called the GreenLine. The buffer zonewhich extendsalong the GreenLine is under the control of the United Nations. Deserted,apart from two armiesand a UN force, it is also called the DeadZone (Papadakis,2005). On either side of this zone there are Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot barricadesand checkpoints.Until the 23`dApril 2003 thesebarricades and checkpointsacted as a hindranceto the crossingof the border but on that day they becamethe gatesthat openedto the `other' side.
The restrictionsregarding the crossingof the borderthat separatedthe Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot side of the island were relaxedon the 23v"April 2003 by the
157 Turkish Cypriot government'. This meant that people were able to cross in both directions without the requirement for any special permission, as was the case before, simply by showing their passports or identity cards. Following the meeting of the Turkish Cypriot Council of Ministers on the 21stApril, 2003, the Tourism and Environment Minister, Serdar Denktab, who was also the spokespersonfor the cabinet, announced that crossing between the north and south of Cyprus would be `normalised' (Kibris, Hal an Sesi, and Yenidüzen,22 April, 2003, p.! ). The decision was published in the official Gazette on the 22ndApril, 2003 and the next day Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were allowed to go through the checkpoints to the `other' side. Thousands of people from both sides flooded to the border for the first time in 29 years. Many went to the towns and villages where they had lived and visited their old homes and family graves. Many stories of the meetings of old friends and neighbours appeared in the media.
When the borderwas opened,Cyprus had alreadybeen going through somechanges. The UN had proposeda new settlementplan to reacha solution in Cyprus.The majority of Turkish Cypriots were in favour of this plan, also known as the Annan Plan, and had organisedvery large-scaledemonstrations to expresstheir supportfor the plan. Groups opposingthe plan also stagedprotest marches,claiming that they supporteda peaceful solution in Cyprusbut not the one suggestedby this plan. Hopesof finding a solution to the Cyprus Problemhad had beencrushed when the negotiationsbetween the two sides on this UN brokeredplan collapsedin the Haguein March 2003, to the disappointment of many Turkish Cypriots.
The decisionto allow free crossingof the border cameas a surpriseto everyoneas there was no indication of such a decision.The Turkish Cypriot governmentwas a nationalist one which always claimed that Greek Cypriots still wanted enosisand that their atrocitiestowards Turkish Cypriots should not be forgotten. The TRNC Presidentof the time, Rauf Denktab,also opposedcontacts between two communitiesand thereforewas
I Previously,crossings across the borderwere strictly limited. Anyone who wantedto crossthe borderhad to apply for permissionfrom the securityforces.
158 seenas one of the main obstaclesto the peaceprocess. As both, the governmentand the Presidenthad beencampaigning against the Annan Plan,the openingof the border was an unexpectedmove. The oppositioninterpreted it as a consequenceof pressurefrom the Turkish Cypriot peopleas well as the new governmentin Turkey that seemedto want to eliminatethe Cyprus Problemwhich had becomeone of the obstaclesin its efforts to join the EU.
Soonafter the Turkish Cypriot authoritiesopened the border, it becameclear that it was semi-porousand not opento everyone,only `Cypriots'. The GreekCypriot in administrationwas anxiousto stressat every opportunitythat any settlement Cyprus immigrants shouldnot involve giving rights to from Turkey ('colonists' in its into vocabulary)and refusedto let any Turkish-bornTRNC citizens the areasunder its administration.Anyone who arrived in North Cyprusafter 1974and subsequently becamea citizen was not allowed to enterthe territory of the Republic of Cyprus by the GreekCypriot authorities.This was a big disappointment,especially to the young in Cyprus generationborn to parentsof Turkish origin North and regardingthemselves its as Turkish Cypriots. At a later date,having slightly modified rules, the Greek Cypriot birth Turkey, if governmentlet peoplecross to the southwhose place of was one of their parentswere born in Cyprus or were married to a personof Cypriot origin.
The eventwas describedas the `openingof the border' by the media and the general descriptionin defined public. I have also adoptedthis popular this study and the process `opening borders' did as an `opening' action. Actually, the expression the not meanthat the borderwas abolishedtotally but that the travel restrictionsbetween the north and the southof the island were relaxed,allowing peopleto crossto other side at particular limited checkpoints.Before, suchcrossings were strictly and requiredpermission from the security forces.Also, as the term border referredto the checkpointsas well, it was in employedin plural form the texts.
159 The Position of the Newspapers
Similarly to the previouscase study, the analysisaimed to include a week before and after the openingof the borderon 23 April 2003. However,no news story relatedto the border crossingsappeared in the newspapersuntil 22 April 2003, which limited the period studiedto 22-30 April 2003. The study included around 160texts.
During the period under study,Kibris was still a highly circulatednewspaper but had favoured shifted its allegiancefrom the nationalistposition to one that the plan. According to researchthat studiedthe media environmentduring this period, Kibr: s' Süleyman empathywith the masseswas so closeto propagandathat `the chief editor ErgUglüadmitted that the editorial board was internally conflicted over professional ethics' (Ridder/Bradenet. al, 2005, p.22).
Having changedits editorial team, Yenidüzenconcentrated on becominga newspaper with a broaderappeal rather than being a mouthpieceof CTP (CumhuriyetciTürk Partisi- RepublicanTurkish Party). However, CTP's influence was still apparentin the in Cenk Mutluyakali paper.Under the managementof the new editor chief, the image and in increasingits newspaperchanged its to a more popular one succeeded island circulation. It supportedthe Annan Plan and advocateda solution on the within the framework of the plan.
Halkin Sesi,a conservativeand nationalist newspaper,was scepticalof the Annan Plan. Even though its editor, Emin Akkor claimed that the newspaperstayed neutral in its be However, relation to the Plan (Hanger,2006), stanceappeared to oppositional. daily Annan Plan, comparedto the other newspapersthat were againstthe researchon Hallan Sesi balanced the media environmentat that time suggeststhat was more (RidderBraden et-al, 2005).
160 Analysis of Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News
The discourse and the representation of the events related to the opening of the border were mainly positive in the three newspapers analysed: Yenidüzenpresented the opening as the `victory of the people' (Yenidüzen, 23 April, p.! ) echoing the leftist ideology of the party it was affiliated to. Kibris emphasisedthe historical importance of the event: `the first time after 29 years' (Kibris, 23 April, p. l) and `a historical day' (Kibris, 24 April, p.! ). Hal/an Sesi was a bit cautious initially but still reported that the people crossing in both directions were `pleased' (Hallam Sesi, 24 April, p. 1). Compared to the previous case study, the similarities in the discourse and representation of Kibris and Hal/an Sesi were not that many.
Another differencewas the inclusion of many news articles concerningthe experiences of ordinary people.The statementsand announcementsof the stateauthorities still existed in the form of newstexts. Nonetheless,rather than journalism that was dominatedby the pressreleases of stateofficials, politicians or powerful groups,the storiesthat filled the pagesconsisted mostly of interestingcoincidences that Turkish Cypriots experiencedwhen they met Greek Cypriots,their emotionalvisits to the places they usedto live and problemsexperienced at the checkpoints.The image of ordinary peopleproduced an image of society as a happy one and the news storieswere constructedaround the conceptsof joy, tearsand hope for a peacefulsettlement in Cyprus.
As in the previous casestudy, identical storiesappeared in the newspapersdue to the sourcejournalist relationship and the dependencyof the news media on externally producedtexts, mainly news agencydispatches. Yet there was an increasein the number of newsreports based on journalists' reflections.They reportedtheir observationsof the especiallyat Ledra Palace,the in Lefkoýa (or Nicosia)2 checkpoints, main checkpoint . They travelled with both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to their old towns and
2 Nicosia is the English nameof the divided capital city. Lefko§ais the Turkish nameand Lefkosia is the Greekone. To avoid confusionI will usethe Turkish name,Lefko§a rather than Nicosia, in this research to refer to the northernpart in which Turkish Cypriots live.
161 homesand witnessedreligious rituals on the `other' side. Although direct descriptionsof an ongoing eventis a strategyused to emphasisethe factual natureof events(van Dijk, 1988),in the Turkish Cypriot newspapersthe descriptionor the narrationof the events were not devoid of the journalist's emotionalinvolvement in the events.Some news texts were more aboutexpressing the opinions and commentsof the journalists rather than any factual information.
Numbers in the form of statisticsabout those crossing the borderwere employeda great deal to increasethe effectivenessof the news stories.Numbers generally suggest the truthfulnessand precisionof a story. However, despiteusing the samesource, the police pressoffice, the numbersannounced in the newspapersdid not match eachother. This was becausethe crossingsat the checkpointswere very intenseand continuedall throughoutthe day. The figuresvaried from paperto paperdepending upon the time of the day the numberswere acquired.Therefore, to suggestthe precisionof their news reports,sometimes the newspapersstated what time of the day they had receivedtheir figures. For example,Hallan Sesistated that the `until 21.00 last night, 1,246Greek Cypriots crossedto the North while 2,659 Turkish Cypriots to the South' (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p. l). Yenidüzenalso publishedthe numberof peoplewho had crossedthe border on its front page: `from the North to the South2,659 persons,from the Southto the North 1,246persons crossed (by 19:00 o'clock)' (Yenidüzen,24 April, p. 1). According to the figures thesetwo newspapersgave, no one went over the border for two hourswhich was hard to believe consideringthe long queuesof people on both sides.Kibris, on the other hand,reported that 3,268Turkish Cypriot visited South Cypruswhile 1,476Greek Cypriot crossedto the north the day before (Kibr: s, 24 April, p. 1).
Discourse Analysis
In this casestudy, five themes(as outlined earlier) occurredin the newstexts. These were the linguistic constructionof different understandingsof nation, commonculture
162 and commonpast as well as national spaceand commonpolitical future. The categorisationbetween `us' and `them' was less severe.
On the Conceptof Nation
Citizenship becamea debatedissue, especially when TRNC citizensborn in Turkey were not allowed to crossto the south side by the GreekCypriot authorities.The restriction was not merely directedat theseTurkish-born TRNC citizens3but also at the younger generationof Cyprus-bornimmigrant descendents.In other words, it was not one's place of birth that matteredbut also the parents'as well. The exclusion of these peopleby the Greek Cypriot authorities,preventing them from joining in the transitional period Cypruswas going through,turned the issueof citizenship into a disputebetween the two sides.The Turkish Cypriot stateauthorities, as well as the opposition,reacted againstthis policy. They arguedthat the immigrantsfrom Turkey and their Cyprus-born children were part of the Turkish Cypriot nation and that the GreekCypriot authorities were discriminating againstthem.
The news texts reflectedthese political arguments.All three newspaperspublished articles that included statementsby the Turkish Cypriot stateauthorities criticising the GreekCypriots' policy of not permitting thesepeople into the areasunder their administration.The official discourseon the issue,that regardlessof their place of birth theseTurkish-born immigrantswere `our' citizensand shouldbe treatedas equalto ones born in Cyprus,was integratedin the news discourses.
Along with the official discourseof the stateauthorities, the newspapersalso included the critical attitude of the opposition especiallythat of the main oppositionparty, to the GreekCypriot government'sexclusion of Turkish-borncitizens. The meetingsand the negotiationsof Mehmet Ali Talat, the leaderof the main oppositionparty (CTP) at the
3 In this researchI will usethe terms Turkish-bornor Turkish-origin citizens not to describetheir ethnicity but their country of origin.
163 time, with the Greek Cypriot authorities to allow theseTRNC citizens to travel to the south got coveragein all the newspapers(Kibris, Halkin Sesi, & Yenidüzen,27 April, p.3). The news texts concerning CTP's efforts to convince the Greek Cypriot authorities to lift the restrictions for Turkish-origin citizens were significant as they showed their inclusion to the Turkish Cypriot nation. In the past, CTP was labelled as `anti-Turk' becauseof its opposition to Turkey's power in the country and the arrival of immigrants from Turkey to North Cyprus for work. In the mid 1990's, it was not just CTP but the parties of the political left in generalthat saw immigrants in North Cyprus as representativeof Turkey's dominanceand the main supportersof the nationalist government. However, in recent years things had changedand particularly the younger generation of Cyprus-born immigrant descendents,having aligned themselveswith the left, supportedthe Annan Plan for a settlementin Cyprus (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005).
The referencesto the people from Turkey in North Cyprus in relation to their TRNC citizenship varied in the news texts: `Turkish-born citizens who have the TRNC identity card' (Kibns, 24 April, p.4), `People from Turkey (Türkiyeliler)' (Kibris, 24 April, p.7), `Turkish origin' (Kibru, 26 April, p.3), `Turkish citizens' (Yenidüzen,24 April, p.3), `people who were born in Turkey and not regardedCypriot origin' (Yenidüzen,24 April, p.3), `citizens who came from Turkey' (Yenidüzen,23 April, p. 1), `Turkish origin TRNC citizens' (Yenidüzen,27 April, p.3) and `peoplewho were born in Turkey and gained TRNC citizenship later' (Hal e Sesi, 24 April, p.2). The discourseof `citizenship', which acted as a unification strategy,categorised Turkish Cypriots and Turkish-born citizens, who were excluded by the Greek Cypriot authorities, as one group. Yet the categorisationwas not basedon ethnicity but on political belonging to the nation which showedthat the nation was conceptualisedas a Staatsnationrather than a Kulturnation. The concept of `citizenship' characterisedmembership of the TRNC nation on the basis of political will, regardlessof the place of birth and collectivised Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks into one nation. On the other hand, stating the origin of thesepeople as `Turkish' or `from Turkey' not only failed to acknowledgethem as a heterogeneous population with social, cultural and ethnic differenceswithin themselvesbut also suggesteda differentiation from Turkish Cypriots.
164 Yenidüzenand Kibns's coverageof the exclusion of Turkish-origin citizens was similar. They both printed short news texts about thesecitizens who were not able to cross the border and had to watch the others who could. Highlighting their plight, Kibris wrote: BecauseGreek Cypriot officials allowedonly TurkishCypriots to pass,Turkish nationalshad to watchthe occasionfrom the top of the city walls. Thosewho could not crossto the Greekside watched those who crossedthroughout the day with their families from behind the wire fences (Kibris, 24 April, p. 7).
Like Kibrss, Yenidüzenalso noted that Turkish-born citizens were both sad and angry, Cypriot not only at the Greek Cypriot administration, but also at the Turkish government border (Yenidüzen,24 April, 3). In and Denktag, for not being allowed to cross the p. issue limited contrast to Yenidü en and Kibris, Hallan Sesi's reflection of the was to a Sesi, 24 April, 2) short paragraphwithin a story about the crossings(Halkin p. and to the border official statementsthat not allowing Turkish-origin TRNC citizens to cross the was discrimination among their citizens (Halkin Sesi, 30 April, p.2).
Interestingly,even though it wasthese citizens who were being discriminated against, none of the newspapersincluded their views and emotions. While Cyprus-born TRNC citizens, who could cross the checkpoints,appeared in the newspapersexpressing their joy at being able to do so, no citizen of Turkish-origin appearedin the newspapers expressingtheir feelings or experiencesat the checkpoints during the period studied. The newspaperspublished the opinions and efforts of the stateauthorities and the opposition parties about the unfair treatment thesecitizens had been receiving from the Greek Cypriot governmentbut did not give any voice to them in their news articles. In a way, thesepeople were not only excluded by the Greek Cypriot authorities from the south part of the island but also from the Turkish Cypriot public sphereby the media that `reproduceda symbolic form of nation' (Morley, 2000). It meant that in the mediation of the nation, they were not fully included in the symbolic representationof the nation. Even though they appearedwithin the political discoursesthat Turkish-origin citizens belonged `our' to nation state, in the construction of public life or the reflection of the nation they were not present. Instead,Turkish Cypriotnessor Cypriotnesswas the dominant characteristicof the public spherethat was provided by thesenewspapers.
165 Even Yenidüzen,the only newspaperthat brought the issueto its front page with a headline that said `is it a crime to be from Turkey? ' (Yenidüzen,25 April, p. 1), did not include any views or experiencesof thesepeople in their own words. The text it published on its front page was limited to the opinion of the newspaperon the issue rather than including the voices of thesecitizens: The children who were bom and grew up in Cyprus and shouted `peace' in public being from border because squares... are turned away the checkpoints their parents or just their fathers are from Turkey. People who came from Turkey and have been living on the island, who have set up their businessesand earn their living (here) are being treated as second-classcitizens becausethey are not of `Cypriot origin' (Yenidüzen,25 April, p. 1).
It also linked the wholeprocess to the collapseof the negotiationsregarding the Annan Plan.Speaking on behalfof theseTurkish-born citizens, Yenidiizen wrote: The bordersare open, `excluding Turkish nationals'. Some of the peoplewho were misledby the words`they will sendyou backunder the AnnanPlan' cannow seethe factsmuch better (Yenidüzen, 25 April, p.1).
Yenidüzen'sargument was that if the Annan Planwas implemented,Turkish-origin TRNC citizens would have been citizens of the new entity and would have had no problem travelling anywhere on the island. In the text, it was not statedopenly who `deceived' the people from Turkey, yet it pointed the finger at the Turkish Cypriot state representativeswho refused to acceptthe plan becausein anotherpart of the news text the newspaperdefined them as the `peoplewho pushedthe plan away with the back of their hands' (Yenidüzen,25 April, p. 1). In contrastto `their' act of deception,the newspaperprinted the relevant parts of the plan about the statusof Turkish-born citizens as evidenceof the truthfulness of its claim. By publishing theseparts of the plan, Yenidüzennot only aimed to increasethe impact of its news story but also accusedthe governmentand the President,who opposedthe Annan Plan, of causingthe problem encounteredby thesecitizens.
166 In the mediation of the nation, the representationsof the dominant or the majority were reflected as the image of the nation. For example,joy and excitement were the dominant emotions reflected on the front pagesof the newspapersand everyonewas reported to be happy. HallernSesi noted that `the one who goes (to the south) and the one who comes (to the north) are pleased' (Halkzn Sesi, 24 April, p. 1). The emotions of the majority were extendedto the whole nation and generalisedto include all the people living in the TRNC, even though citizens born in Turkey were excluded. Ethnic minorities such as the Maronites and Greek Cypriots living in the TRNC were also absentfrom the mediated nation and the impact of the developmentson thesecommunities did not appearin the newspapers.Confined to their private sphere,the views of ethnic minorities were missing from the image of the nation in the period studied. The only referenceto the Maronites that appearedin Kibris was a short photo caption that showed a group of people sitting in a garden: While Cyprus historicaldays following free ... the north andthe southof go through the crossingsafter 29 years,the Maronitesin the northalso had a differentweekend. Entertainingtheir guestsfrom the south,the Maroniteslit their ovens,made kebab on barbecue' (Kibrss, 28 April, p.9).
The Greek Cypriots living in North Cyprus were also excluded from the representation of the nation by the newspapers.There was no mention of the impact of the border crossingson this group, even though it made it easier for many Greek Cypriot families from the south part of the island to visit their relatives in the northern part and vice versa. The lack of representationof ethnic minorities contributed to the conceptualisationof the nation on the basisof cultural and ethnic elementsof Turkish Cypriotness,which createda contrast with the imagining of the nation as Staatsnation.
In general,a Cypriot identity, basedon common features,was stressedmore in the news texts than a Turkish one. There was an implicit referenceand linguistic construction of an essentialistunderstanding of Cypriotness.Following Wodak et al's (1999) description of the essentialistunderstanding of national identity, it could be arguedthat such a reproduction of Cypriot national identity reducedthe differences betweenGreek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as well as forging similarities in terms of emotional
167 attachmentto Cyprus,national mentality and behaviours.The linguistic representation of thesetwo communitiesas Cypriots was useful in drawing analogiesbetween them and assigningthem a national character.It was Yenidüzenthat most often usedthe term Cypriot in that essentialistunderstanding: `thousands of Cypriots' (Yenidüzen,24 April p.4), `they both were Cypriot: one from the north and the other from the south' (Yenidüzen,24 April p.3) and `thousandsof peoplewho regardCyprus as the homeland' (Yenidüzen,24 April p.3). Even though the last expressionseemed to include Turkish- origin TRNC citizen as well, it actually did not as the rest of the story told of the people who were permittedto crossthe border.In general,Yenidüzen employing unification strategy,which is a part of constructionstrategy, highlighted commoncharacteristics and experiencesrather than differencesin order to categoriseboth communitiesas Cypriot.
Another headlinein Yenidüzen,`now the one who comesand the one who goesis Cypriot' (Yenidüzen,29 April p.! ), remindedreaders of one of the most debated statementsof PresidentDenktab in relation to the emigrationof Turkish Cypriots and the immigration of Turkish nationals:`the one who leavesis a Turk, the one who comesis a Turk'. It was a statementthat deniedthe existenceof a culturally and ethnically distinct Turkish Cypriot and also indicatedindifference towards the emigration of Turkish Cypriots due to economichardship, rising unemploymentand partisanship.By stating that Turkish Cypriots and GreekCypriots who crossedin both directionswere Cypriots, Yenidüzenchallenged Denktaý's statement as well as categorisingboth communities underthe identity of Cypriot. In contrastto the secrecysurrounding the numberof Turkish immigrants in North Cyprus, Yenidüzenalso proclaimedthat `30 thousand Greek Cypriots arrived in one day' (Yenidüzen,29 April, p. 1).
The conceptof Cypriotnessalso appearedin Kibris but less frequently comparedto Yenidüzen:`foreigners were not allowed, only Cypriots' (Kibris, 24 April, p.6). In Kibris' reproductionof identity, the term Turkish Cypriot was usedmore often. In Hal/an Sesi,an emphasison Turkishnessin relation to the Greek Cypriots was present. In two separatenews texts it interchangeablyreferred to the Turkish Cypriots living in
168 the south as the `Turks living in the South' (Halkin Sesi,24 April, p.5) and `Turkish Cypriots' (Halkin Sesi,28 April, p.4). Having crossedthe border illegally before it was opened,these people were not allowed to go back to the north. Even though Halkin Sesi did not highlight the casesof citizens of Turkish-origin, it was the only newspaperthat included the views and expectationsof Turkish Cypriots in the southabout a changein the rules which would allow them to revisit the north again.
The representationof both communitiesas Cypriots strengthenedthe imagining of a Cypriot nation but divided. Suchconceptualisation in Yenidüzenwas not surprising in that it had beenpromoting the conceptof Cypriotnesssince the 1990's.There were tracesof similar thinking in Kibris, althoughit was not as frequentas in Yenidazen. Reflecting the opinions and emotionsof the peoplewho had went acrossthe border, Kibris generalisedthe view of one personto all: `Turkish Cypriots who say what an indescribablefeeling it is to enterthe separatedpart of the country in which they have for 20 ' (Kibris, 24 April, 3). beenliving years ... p.
Newspaperreports about who really was behindthe decisionto openthe border were decision being conflicting. Although they all announcedthe as the TRNC's Council of Ministers' (Kibris, Halkin Sesi,& Yenidüzen,22 April, p.! ), Yenidüzenand Kibrts later decision-makerin suggestedthat the Turkish governmentwas the real this matter. Yenidüzenexpressed this view openly in one of its headlines:`not the governmentbut the instructionsopened the border crossings'(Yenidüzen, 23 April, p.6). While the 'government' referredto the Turkish Cypriot one, the `instructions' pointed a finger at the Turkish government.It meantthat having decidedto relax the crossingrestrictions in Cyprusthe Turkish governmenthad instructedthe Turkish Cypriot authoritiesto implementit. Neither the headlinenor the main part of the text, which consistedof the instruction it accountsof speechesdelivered in a parliamentarysession, clarified whose left it was. It kept the Turkish governmenthidden as the responsibleagent and to the for readersto construethe responsibility of the Turkish government this. In contrast, decision Kibris quotedPresident Denktab as saying that the to openthe border was taken togetherwith `Ankara and the Foreign Ministry' (Kibris, 28 April, p.7). Highlighting the
169 sourceof the changein Cyprusas Turkey rather than the TRNC authoritiesnot only increaseddoubts about the sovereigntyof the TRNC but also reinforcedthe imageof it as a protectorateand Turkey as the stateholding the power. It reducedthe TRNC stateto an entity that merely followed Turkey's instructions.In a departurefrom the other two newspapers,Hal kn Sesiannounced that `Ankara welcomedthe decision' (Hal/an Sesi, 23 April, p.4). The statementportrayed the TRNC as a sovereigncountry whose decisionwas welcomedand respectedby the other one. In thesetexts, Ankara, the capital of Turkey, was employedas a metonymto refer to the Turkish government.
Regardlessof whosedecision it really was, accordingto Yenidüzenit was also public led pressureon the nationalist governinggroups that to the change.Representing the openingof the border as the `victory of the people' (Yenidüzen,24 April, p. 1), Yenidüzenwrote that it was `Turkish Cypriots' determinationthat brought freedomof travel after 30 years' to the island (Yenidüzen,24 April, p. 1). The discourseof `the will from of the people' shifted the power behind the transformation stateauthorities to citizens,which also reflectedthe leftist ideology of the newspaper.The term `people', acting as a generalisingsynecdoche, also suggesteda senseof consensuswhich illustrated Turkish Cypriots as united in their determinationto make a changein the `statusquo'. Yet, `people' referredonly to the oneswho supportedthe Annan Plan. Next to the story of the announcementthat `the border is opened' Yenidüzenpublished a demonstrationsin photo that showeda crowd of peoplefrom one of the mass favour of the Annan Plan. Underneaththe photo, in bold characters,it said `the power of the do (Yeniditzen,22 April, peoplewill make you more "on your way out"' p. 1). The further in future TRNC expressionsuggested changes the political of the and againthere In was an emphasison the `power of the people' as the causeof change. a way, by positioning `people' oppositethe governinggroups that representedthe `statusquo', the newspaperimplied that peoplewould soon changethe governmentand also the status frequently quo. `Statusquo' was a metonymthat Yenidüzen employedto refer to the included Portraying nationalist governinggroups that the governmentand the president. it: `the them as the `other', the newspaperalso personified statusquo had a first slap on its face' (Yenidüzen,24 April, p. 1).
170 In contrastwith Yenidüzen'sdiscourse of `people', Hallan Sesi'scoverage of the developmentswas dominatedmainly by official representationsand discourses.The storiesof ordinary peoplethat appearedin Yenidüzenand Kibris were lessevident in Halkin Sesi.Instead, the newstexts were mostly basedon the views of the government officials as well as the presidentwhose statements were publishedin more detail comparedto the other two newspapers.
Conceivingof the nation as a borderedspace where a political administrationgoverned over the populationwithin the boundarieswas evident in the newstexts. All the newspapersdescribed the administrationin the north as the `TRNC' and referredto the one in the south as the `GreekCypriot Administration', as in the Turkish Cypriot official discourse.In the newstexts aboutthe bordercrossings, the newspapersnoted that Greek Cypriots crossedto `North Cyprus' or the `TRNC' while Turkish Cypriots crossedto `SouthCyprus' or to the `GreekCypriot side'. For example,Hal/an Sesistated that `on the 4thday of the free crossings,despite the rain and hail, the numberof Greek Cypriots from South Cyprus On hand, from the TRNC 7 Turk that crossed ... the other thousand went to SouthCyprus' (HallamSesi, 27 April, p.! ). The sameexpressions were also depicted employedin both Kibris and Yenidüzen.Both Greek Cypriots as crossingto the TRNC while Turkish Cypriots were shown as crossingto South Cyprus or the Greek Cypriot side, but neverto the Republic of Cyprus.The nameof the Republic of Cyprus appearedonly once in Yenidüzenand this was to compareand challengethe functionality of the TRNC (Yenidüzen,25 April, p. 1). Apart from this exception,the in portrayal of the administration the north as a stateand referring to the one in the south as only an administrationcontributed to the legitimation of the TRNC in the eyesof their readership.It also implicitly portrayedGreek Cypriots as crossingto the territory of a statethat they opposedstrongly. The terms `north' and `south' were two metonymsthat, as well as pointing at the north and the south sidesof the island, also referredto the political administrationsthat governedeach side of Cyprus.
The conceptof nation was usedsynonymously with the conceptof `home'. In the home official discourses,the TRNC was reconstructedas the of Turkish Cypriots while
171 Greek Cypriots visited it as `guests'.The notion of neighbourlyrelationships enhanced the idea of the existenceof eachcommunity within their own territory and next to each other as separatestates. Such representation and discourseswere mostly employedand integratedin the newstexts by Kibris. Proclaimingthe new regulationsregarding the border crossings,Kibris reportedthe Tourism and EnvironmentMinister of the time, SerdarDenktab, as saying `we are readyto entertainour GreekCypriot guests' (Kibris, 22April, p. 1). In the news reportsof the samestatement in Hallan Sesiand Yenidüzen, who usedTAK's newsdispatch, the term `guests'did not appear(Yenidiizen, 22 April, p.2; Hallan Sesi,22April, p.6). In anotherstatement, Serdar Denktab described the Greek Cypriots arriving to the north as `our tourist neighbours'(Kibris, 26 April, p.3), which Kibris quotedas a subheadlinewithin an article. The presentationof Greek Cypriots as `guests'appeared in anotherheadline of the samenewspaper about improvementsin Kyrenia: `Kyrenia is ready for the guestsfrom South Cyprus' (Kibris, 26 April, p.8). The Prime Minister Dervi§ Eroglu's words in a pressrelease that `living side by side is the best solution' (Kibris, 28 April, p.8) also supportedthe existing division and the guest-neighbour relationship. The text did not appearin Yenidüzen,an ardentcritic of the statusquo.
Hal/an Sesidid not define Greek Cypriots as `our guests'but merely `Greek Cypriots'. Its representationand discourseof the border openingwas very similar to official ones. The pressreleases issued by stateofficials appearedmore frequently and in more detail in Halkin Sesicompared to the other two newspapers.For example,a statementby PresidentRauf Denktab,in which he expressedhis satisfactionwith the crossingsbut issues, in detail in criticised the oppositionon other was given Hallan Sesiwhile in Kibris only a short part of it appearedand excludedthe critical part. It could be that with the changeof its allegiancein favour of the Annan Plan that was supportedmainly by the opposition left-wing groups,Kibris chosenot to publish thosesections of his statement.The statementwas not reportedin Yenidüzenat all. It was again only Halkin Sesithat printed a news text aboutthe Tourism and EnvironmentMinister Serdar Denktabstressing that there was no changein the views and policies of the Turkish
172 Cypriot administrationin relation to the Cyprusproblem, which indicatedthe continuationof the existing statusquo, while no suchreport appearedin the others.
In contrast to the concept of `home', Yenidüzendescribed the TRNC as a `prison'. Reporting 'a statement by the opposition party leader Mehmet Ali Talat, Yenidüzen used the headline was `we are free from the prison, we will also be free from a lack of solution' (Yenidüzen, 30 April, p. 1). The speech marks the newspaper used in the highlights on its front page indicated that they were quotes from Talat. Yet, in the headline of the story which claimed that the TRNC was a prison there was no such marks. It could be argued that the lack of quotation marks showed corroboration by the in Turkish newspaper of the notion expressed the statement that Cypriots were imprisoned in the TRNC. In a way, by using the deictic expression `we' in the statement,
Yenidüzenpresented the conceptualisation of the TRNC as a `prison' as the view of the it newspaper as well as the readers' addressed.
The rhetoric of `prison' was employedto stressthe feeling of being trappedin a place ratherthan being locked-awayfor any wrongdoing.It suggestedthat it was the decisions and policies of the Turkish Cypriot staterepresentatives that madeTurkish Cypriots feel as if they were imprisonedin their own country. Apart from the exclusion of the internationalworld, the descriptionof the TRNC as a `prison' referredto the difficulties Turkish Cypriots had beenfacing in travelling abroad.As the TRNC was not an internationallyrecognised legal state,its passportswere not acceptedas valid travel documentsby any other statesapart from Turkey and this madeit hard for Turkish Cypriots to travel out of North Cyprus4.`Getting out of prison' highlighted the senseof getting out of this country as a consequenceof the changethat startedwith the border Cypriots crossings.One impact of this was that many Turkish who were eligible for identity citizenshipof the Republic of Cyprus obtainedits passportsor cardsthat allowed them to travel abroad.With thesedocuments, Turkish Cypriots also benefited
4 Turkish Cypriots who want to travel abroadcan obtainthe passportsof Republicof Turkey as the TRNC documentsby international passportsare not recognisedas valid travel the world.
173 from other servicesthe GreekCypriot stateprovided to its citizens.Highlighting this, Yenidüzencriticised the TRNC's statusas a legal state: Half of the populationwith the Republic of Cyprus' and the other half with the Republic of Turkey's passportsand identity cardsare startinga new life. The TRNC is a state whosepassport and identity card are not needed(Yenidilzen, 25 April, p. 1).
Whetherimagined as a `home' or a `prison', the nation was conceivedas a bounded spacewith some`gates'. The term `gates'actually referredto the border checkpoints, which are also called the `bordergates'. Thus, the relaxationof the restrictions on crossingbetween the two sideswas reportedas the `gatesare opened' (Ha11hnSesi, 22 April, p. 1). The expressionwas commonthroughout the newsarticles of all the newspapers.At the time therewere only three checkpointswhere crossingswere taking in place but they were portrayedas the `borders' general.Yenidüzen also employedthe word `barricade'for the checkpointswhich blockedthe crossings:`the Council of Ministers lifted the barricades'(Yenidüzen, 30 April, p. 1).
In contrastto the previous casestudy in which the official nationalistrepresentation of Greek Cypriots was as the eternalenemy of Turkish Cypriots, the depiction of Greek Cypriots in the news texts during this period was positive. Especially in Yenidüzenand Kibris, the representationand discourseof the border crossingswere reproducedas future for both peacefulevents and pointed at a positive commonpolitical communities. For example,Kibris highlighted a quote from a Greek Cypriot family visiting their housein the north in its headlineas, `we want peace'(Kibris, 26 April, p.2). The discourseof `peace'was dominantespecially in Yenidüzen.Suggesting that `the blow island', Yenidüzen crossingshave led a strongwind of peaceto on the reportedthat a friendshiphad started`between the Greek Cypriot motorcyclistsand the young people from the north' (Yenidüzen,26 April, p.4). It also describedthe coachservice that was Turkish provided by the Greek Cypriot authoritiesto take Cypriots to Limassol as `a discourse peacecoach' (Yenidüzen,29 April, p.4). The of peacenot only supportedthe in (Kibris, 30 April, but argumentthat `things will be better future' p.5) was also an Suchdiscourse emphasison the discontinuity of the existing situation. was not employed
174 in Halkin Sesi,probably becauseit supportedthe stateideology that the peacehad alreadyexisted.
The Construction of a CommonPast
In the production of the newsarticles aboutthe crossingsto the `other' side, the newspapersbenefited from the past to highlight its importancein the present.There were frequentreferences to the past, especiallyto the year 1974,a turning point in history for the peopleon the island. It was in 1974that Turkey's military intervention divided the island into north and southand until April 2003, crossingswere restricted. The significanceof 1974differed in the three newspapersanalysed. Describing the day the border crossingscommenced as an `historical day', Kibris stressedthat it was `the first time after 29 years' (Kibris, 23 April, p. 1) that peoplefrom both communities startedto crossin both directions.The numericalrhetoric of `29 years' referredto the length of time since such social interactionbetween the two communitieshad taken border place. It also remindedone of a time in the pastwhen there was neither a nor from Cyprus checkpointsand when travelling one part of to the other was not described as `going to the other side'. Linking the experiencesof crossings29 yearsago with the developmentsof today, Kibris announcedthat `Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are (Kibris, 23 visiting North Cyprus and SouthCyprus after 29 years' April, p.! ). Using a strategyof perpetuationin combinationwith the strategyof transformation,the for `29 hadjust newspaperimplied the continuity of the situation years', which changed despite hint or signalleda certain transformation.However, the of transformation,there identity was no indication of conceiving of the national as threatenedby this change. Another significanceof the numericalrhetoric of `29' was to increasethe news value of the story and to make it more striking. Statingthat somethingwas happeningfor the first time in 29 yearsindicated that the eventwas extraordinarywhich no doubt fuelled readers'interest.
175 Accordingly, Yenidüzenalso drew similarities with the past and the present.Comparing the presenttime to the past,when therewas no border, it publishedon its front pagethat `it has becomesimilar to the statebefore 1974.This was the situation in 74, furthermore there was no time limit' (Yenidüzen,22 April, p.! ). The temporalreference of 1974was a metonym employedto representthe military and political actionsthat took place in that year and its aftermaththat had changedand shapedthe political situation on the island since. Yenidüzen,benefiting from the strategyof perpetuation,emphasised the similarity betweenthe past and the present,implying that the time in betweenwas a disruption in political continuity. Remindingone of the situationpre-1974, it evokedthe time when both communitieslived together,which was also consistentwith its conceptualisationof a united Cypriot nation and national identity. It indicatedthe in possiblerestoration of a co-existencewhich had beensuspended 1974.However, the presenttransformation was not exactly the sameas the past. For example,border movementshad a time limit, which meantthat everyonewas requiredto return back to their side of the island before midnight, or be fined. In the text, this condition was given in invertedcomas to highlight and probably to mock it, as it was reminiscentof the fairy tale, Cinderella: `with the condition of returningback at 24:00' (Yenidfizen,22 April, p.! ).
Halkin Sesi's discourseof `1974' was different than the other two newspapers.It defined 1974as the date of the `Happy PeaceOperation', as it was referredto in the nationalist discourses.Such representation of 1974connoted the conflict betweenthe communities in the past and the sufferingsof Turkish Cypriots. Even announcingthe start of the border crossings,Halk: n Sesireflected this nationalistideology by linking the developmentto 1974: In Cyprus island,that was divided in two zonesas the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprusand SouthCyprus GreekCypriot Administration following the 20 July 1974 Happy PeaceOperation, free crossingbetween sides was allowed yesterdayfor the first time in 28 years(Halktn Sesi,24 April, p.2).
176 Therewas confusionin Halkm Sesi'srepresentation of how many yearssince crossings took place. The text abovestated it as the first time in `28' yearsbut the one on its front pageon the sameday stressedthat `after 29 yearsGreek Cypriots were rushing to the north and Turkish Cypriots to the south' (Halkin Sesi,24 April, p. l). Either preparedby two different peoplewho had calculatedthe numberof yearsdifferently or simply a typing mistake,the newspaper'sattempt of showing its precision and exactnessby using numerical information was underminedby the confusionor indecisivenessabout the numberof yearswhich was also a crucial part of the story.
HalkanSesi also statedthat GreekCypriots saw Lefkoýa,the north of Nicosia, for the first time after 40 years(Halkin Sesi,24 April, p. 1). However,the newspaperdid not explain further why GreekCypriots had not crossedto the north of the city for 40 years if the border was establishedonly 29 yearsago in 1974. Expectingthe readerto know the reason,Halkin Sesitreated that piece of historical information as generalknowledge. The 40 yearsperiod was a temporalreference to 1964when Lefko§awas divided by the so-calledGreen Line after the increasingtension between the two communitiesturned into armedconflict. By highlighting the length of time as 40 yearsto indicatethe continuity of the presentsituation, Halkin Sesiemployed a strategyof perpetuationthat between justification. emphasisedthe difference then and now as a
Peoplefrom both communitieswere reportedto have crossedthe border to seethe towns, villages and housesthey were forced to abandonin 1974.The newspaperswere full of news articles about suchvisits and the reencounterof old friends and neighbours of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Journalistsaccompanied people from both communitiesduring their visits to their old hometown, housesor family gravesto reflect their emotions,views and experiences.The analysisshowed that the past was not representedby hatredor fear and the narrativeof the past was not basedon the memoriesof the conflict and suffering but, on the contrary, on nostalgicmemories of family homesand neighbours.For some,there was clear longing for life in the past. Reportinga Greek Cypriot couple's visit to Kyrenia (Girne) where they usedto live, Kibris quotedone of them as saying:
177 I amfrom Kyrenia.We're going to thenorth, to Kyreniafor thefirst time in 30 years. I'll go to the churchand light candles.I'll light my candlesfor peace,for us to go back to our pre-1974places and live together' (Kibris, 24 April, p.6).
Despitethe suffering and the unpleasantcircumstances that forced people out of their homes,people in the centreof such featureswere reportedto be happy rather than angry. The story of an old woman called Hatice Attillaogullari was reproducedin this manner: The flowers shehad picked from her housein Akincilar village were for her grandmother'sgrave, left forlorn for 40 years.When the first troublesstarted in 1963, they were taken hostageand were treatedcruelly. Leavingtheir big citrus orchards behind,they resettledin Akincilar village. On the returnjourney that her old body had to endurewith difficulty, shewas happy.Having prayedat the neglectedgraves, she was welcomedin her village. On the way back, shehad flowers from the houseshe used to live in 40 yearsago (Yenidazen,29 April, p.5).
Written in a human-interestnews style, thesetexts includedpeople's accountsof the in past and their feelings as they rememberedthem the present,along with the Turkish observationsof the journalists. The newstext aboutthe searchof two Cypriot women for their homesin Larnacawas one suchnews story: Ay§e Affaroglu, who walking in the streetsof Larnacaand showing excitedly the places she usedto live to her daughterand son in law who have cometo Cyprus from London for a holiday, said `theseplaces are wherewe lived our childhood'. Naile Akalin, who pointed at a shopand said `this usedto be Uncle Ahmet's groceryshop', seemedlike reliving her childhood daysthere one more time. As they approachedtheir housein Haci Ibrahim Street,the excitementof both the Akalin and Affaroglu families increased.But be when they arrived where their houseused to and saw that there was an apartment block with shopsat the bottom and flats at the top, they could not stop their tears (Kibrts,29 April, p.3).
being but family It was not just the housesthat were visited also work places, gravesand importance became religious places.As placesof they symbolsand the embodimentof identity. the past and also their Houses,towns or villages that were conceptualisedas for `home' were also a sourceof a senseof belonging people and provided a basis for an
178 identity. The articles aboutsuch visits functionedlike links back to the past and depicted them as preciousthings that were lost in the past and searchedfor in the present.
It was not just homesthat were once lost and now found but also personalcollections such as photographs.Halkin Sesipublished a picture of a smiling couple holding their wedding photosfrom 29 yearsago (Hal/an Sesi,29 April, p. 1). The only text regarding this event appearedas a photo caption that consistedof the namesof the couple (not eventheir surnames)and statingthat they had found the photographin their old housein a village but without any further details.There was a similar story, treatedin a similar way in Yenidüzenshowing a woman holding a weddingphotograph (Yenidüzen, 29 April, p. 1) againwithout any details as to how it happened.The importanceof stories indication about finding personalitems after 29 yearswas an that the peoplewho had kept theseitems believedor hopedthat their ownersmight return. Indirectly, it reflected an expectationof a changewhich would allow peopleto return to their old placesand family's reclaim their belongings.The news text of a Turkish Cypriot visit to the house they had owned in Limassol before 1974was representativeof the extent of this belief: Even her cupboardswere there.They askedÜstündag to openthe drawer of the cupboardfrom 29 yearsago. Shecouldn't believethe contentsof the drawer shehad openedshyly. Photographsfrom when shewas a young girl and the bairamsgreeting cardsfrom her older sisterswhich shehad receiveddecades ago were still in the drawer shehad left. They evenkept the butterflieswhich shehad madeout of paperbecause they believedthat one day shewould return (Yenidiizen,29 April, p.5).
items The evocationof the past through valuablepersonal rediscoveredin the present in highlighted also enforcedthe representationof the past a nostalgicway, which the it. positive aspectsof the past ratherthan the difficulties of Why and under what conditionspeople had left their homesand hometownswas rarely mentioned.Not the for left atrocitiesand sufferingsof the past but a longing the things that were behind and thejoy of finding them were stressed.Greek Cypriots who were the `enemy' in the being humanised long lost friends nationalistic discourseswere and portrayedas and
5A Muslim religious festival.
179 neighbours.This practicewas especiallycommon in Yenidüzen.The day after the borderswere opened,Yenidüzen reported on the meetingof `old Cypriot friends' at the Ledra Palacecheckpoint, the main checkpointin Nicosia, as an eventworth seeing (Yenidüzen,24 April, p.4).
The past was not the samethough. Going back to the housesthey once owned createdan ambivalenthost-guest situation for the people:The oneswho had owned the housein the past were now in the guestposition. Papadakis(2005) describedthis confusing situation as follows: Many peoplewanted to go back andthousands tried it. Instead,many cameto understandthis could not be becausethey were not the peoplewho left - they were not the samepeople, nor were the placesthe same.....Knocking on the door of their hometo be allowed in, often welcomedand treatedas guests,almost relatives, allowed to walk through every room and checkthe treesin the garden.They met the family now living there,understanding how this was now their hometoo, what it would meanto them too, if they had to leave(p. 245).
This ambivalenceof the owner-guestrelationship existed within the news texts. The belief that thesehouses actually belongedto the peoplewho had owned them before 1974was integratedinto the newsdiscourses of all the newspapers.The definition of housespreviously owned by Greek Cypriots as `theirs' was frequent in the news texts information between and showedthat the was treatedas normal. Despitethe gap the houses'indicated in presentand the past,the term `their continuity that theseproperties before were seenas belongingto the peoplewho had ownedthem the division but at the been in The discourse sametime to the peoplewho had living them. was evident in some house 8 of Kibris' headlines:`Visited his he had abandonedat yearsold' (Kibris, 26 April, p.2), `He found his homewith his mother's description' (Kibris, 26 April, p.2) his family's house' (Kibris, and `Kullos who was born after 1974visited 25 April, p.2). Yenidüzen,on the other hand,highlighted the ambivalentsituation of guest-host "owners house" in house' relationship:`Greek Cypriots entertainedthe of the their (Yenidüzen,28 April, p.2). The inverted comasindicated the awarenessof the Yenidüzen its description `the ambiguoussituation. was consistentwith of owners of
180 their house' as it repeatedthe sameterm in anotherarticle (Yenidiizen,29 April, p.4). In a similar way, Halkin Sesialso referredto the originally GreekCypriot owned housesas `their' housesbut in somecases it addedthat they were their `old' houses(Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p:5).
Identifying the `Other'
The discursiveconstruction of `us' and `them' was not as distinct as it was in the previous casestudy. The border crossinghad createda positive atmospherebetween the two communitieswhich enhanceda senseof reconciliation ratherthan conflict enforcement.The news discourseswere dominatedby ideassuch as `peacein Cyprus' and 'sisterhood/brotherhoodof both communities'which gavethe impressionthat not only the physical bordersbut also the imaginedones were disappearing. Greek Cypriots were no longer cast as the enemyand attributionsto them were no longer derogatory.Instead, the similarities and friendship betweenTurkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were stressed.For example,both were characterisedas hospitable.The newspapersreported how well Turkish Cypriots welcomedtheir Greek Cypriot guests and vice versa.According to the news reports,serving them traditional food and drinks, hostsfrom both communitiestried to maketheir guestscomfortable in the houseswhich, in somecases, had belongedto their guestsyears ago. The newspaperseven attributed somepractices as a commoncharacteristic of both communities.For example,an everydayactivity like the parking of carswas presentedin terms of cultural similarity. Kibris quotedthe first impressionof a group of Turkish Cypriots who had crossedto the GreekCypriot side: `We saw that Greek Cypriots park their cars on the pavementslike (we do) in the TRNC. It looks like we are similar to eachother on this issue' (Kibris, 24 April, p.4).
Forging resemblancesbetween Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots helpedto categorisethem under the identity of Cypriot with an emphasison the cultural coherence of both communities.Such thinking was visible especiallyin Yenidüzenas it accentuated
181 the similarities and had a discourse based on an idealised Cypriot identity. In a way, by following a construction strategy it renegotiated a Cypriot national identity. The concept of `us' as Cypriots included Greek Cypriots as well as Turkish Cypriots and a positive self-representation applied to both. Perhaps not to cast Greek Cypriots in a negative light, Yenidüzen did not report the attack by a Greek Cypriot family on a Turkish Cypriot one when the latter went to see their old house. A report of the incident appeared in Kibris and Halkin Sesi but not in Yenidüzen (Kibris, 29 April, p.2 & Hallten Sesi, 29 April, p. 11).
In Kibris, the distinction betweenGreek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was maintained, forging an `us' and the `other' group. However,the `other' group was not cast as the enemyor a threat but as a group equivalentto the Turkish Cypriot one. The differences and likenessbetween `us' and `them' were blurred: Even though `they' were not exactly like `us', `they' were not so different either. As well as acknowledgingshared cultural habits,contrasts in cultural values and practicesbetween these two groupswere also mentioned.Unlike Yenidüzen,the collective representationof both communitiesin Kibris was not essentialisedunder the identity of Cypriot, eventhough, like Yenidüzen, it also acknowledgedcertain Cypriot characteristics.
For Hal/an Sesi,Greek Cypriots existedas the `other' group. It describedthe Greek Cypriot crowds arriving in North Cyprus in `surges'(Halkin Sesi,26 April, p. 1). In Halkin Sesithe discoursesthat emphasisedthe similarities betweenthe two communities were limited. It focusedmore on official discoursesand actionsrather than the storiesof ordinary people.It also continuedto publish a summaryof the news from the Greek Cypriot pressabout this recentdevelopment. As mentionedbefore, this section of the newspaperpublished anything that showedthe Greek Cypriot side as corrupt and bad. Although the news chosenin this period was not so negative,it still included reports from the Greek Cypriot dailies that cast them in a lessthan positive light: `Greek Cypriots: we are caughtunaware' (Halkin Sesi,27 April, p. 19), and `the Greek Cypriot pressis now putting forth accusationsof smugglingto have negativeeffects on bi- directional crossings'(Halkin Sesi,26 April, p. 19). Meanwhile, in a positive self-
182 representation, Hal/an Sesi quoted some Greek Cypriots as saying that Turkish Cypriots had treated them really well during their visits to the north (Hallan Sesi, 24 April, p. 5).
The opening of the border was presented as a positive action of `our' government in Hal/an Sesi and Kibris. In Kibris, Greek Cypriots (Kibris, 24 April, p. 8) and in Hallan Sesi, Turkish Cypriots were reported as thanking the Turkish Cypriot authorities for opening the border (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p. 2). In contrast to the goodwill of the Turkish Cypriot authorities, the Greek Cypriot ones were portrayed as the opposite, as creating obstacles for the interaction of the two communities. The blame for obstructing Turkish- origin TRNC citizens from going to the south and also Turkish Cypriots travel across the border with their cars, as the Greek Cypriots had been doing, was put on the Greek Cypriot government. Furthermore, reports of the Greek Cypriot authorities trying to discourage their people from crossing to the TRNC by claiming that it would lead to its recognition, enforced negative perceptions about them: `the Greek Cypriot politicians, who could not hinder their citizens crossing to the TRNC, are talking about the risk of indirect recognition of the TRNC' (Kibris, 25 April, p. 5). In summary, the Greek
Cypriot rather than Turkish Cypriot authorities were cast as the ones creating obstacles for the people of both communities to meet and blend together. It was also in this discourse that the responsibility for causing any rift between the communities was shifted from the people to the authorities. Ordinary Greek Cypriots, who were shown as crossing to the north despite the warnings of their politicians, were positioned in opposition to their state authorities. Such depiction also enforced the perception that Greek Cypriots did not support the policies of their own administration on this matter. They were even reported as arguing with their own police at the checkpoints for not being helpful to them (Kibris, 29 April, p. 5 & Yenidüzen,29 April, p.2). In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot police, or `our' police, were described as `working without avoiding any sacrifice' at the checkpoints (Kibris, 27 April, p.4).
In Yenidüzen,the Turkish Cypriot authoritieswere not exempt from similar accusations. It categorisedthe nationalist governinggroups such as the coalition governmentof National Demokrat Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP- Union Party) and Parti (DP - Democrat
183 Party), as well as PresidentRauf Denktab,within the `other' group and depictedthem in duo for a negativeway. According to the newspaper,`UBP-Denktab and their supporters yearsprevented both communitiesin Cyprus from coming together,getting closer' (Yenidüzen,28 April, p. l). The newspaperalso criticised the Presidentfor continuing his island (Yenidüzen, negativity despitethe positive and peacefulatmosphere on the 26 April, p.4). Therefore,without stressingthe role of the Turkish Cypriot authorities in openingthe borders,Yenidiizen depicted the developmentas an action of `the people' that had a negativeimpact on the dominantnationalist groups. The day the borderswere its front Yenidüzen opened,rather than reporting the official announcementon page, do "on choseto say that `the power of thesepeople will makeyou more things your way (Yenidüzen,22 April, ). The Turkish out": the statusquo will collapse' p.! word `cökecek',which means`will collapse',was written with dashesas 'V6-ke-cek'to Yenidiizen emphasiseit. Affiliated with the main oppositionparty, was critical of the by governinggroups and associatedthem with the problemsof the presenttime calling them the `statusquo'. Claiming that Turkish Cypriots wantedmore substantialchanges for future: within their country, Yenidüzenpointed at their expectations the Thosewho think Turkish Cypriots are `their toys' haveopened the borders`for the time being'. But Turkish Cypriots want more, much more than that. More thanjust `touring', Turkish Cypriots are waiting for the day when they would have an identity in the world (Yenidüzen,22 April, p. 1).
As seenin the statementabove, by employing a strategyof transformation,Yenidüzen indicateda changein the political situation in the future as well as a re-imagining of national identity.
Yenidüzen,using the argumentof usefulnessfor the visits of GreekCypriots to the north, justified the action of openingthe borderswith economicbenefits. It claimed that the GreekCypriots' arrival boostedthe country's economy`90 thousandCyprus pound' in 1). Yet, how six days(Yenidüzen, 30 April, p. therewas no mention of much money Turkish Cypriots contributedto the South Cyprus economy.Comparison based on in Greek Cypriots depicted wealth existedwithin many news texts which were as Cypriots. For Turkish wealthier than Turkish example,news reports aboutthe visits of
184 Cypriots to Limassol includedtheir impressionof it as being as developedas a `Europeancity', especiallywhen comparedto the north. However,the modernity and wealth of the city did not spreadto the Turkish quarterof the city as Yenrditzenjournalist observedthat it was full of neglectedbuildings (Yenidüzen,28 April, p.2). Reflecting the public's feelingsand thoughtsabout the crossings,Halkin Sesialso quoted someone describingLefkosia (SouthNicosia) as `more developedthan our side' (Halkin Sesi,24 April, p.2).
The discoursein the newspapersgave the impressionthat more Greek Cypriots went to the north side of the island than Turkish Cypriots to the south.Kibris and Halkin Sesi especiallyexpressed their surpriseregarding the GreekCypriots' enthusiasmin crossing to their side. Both reportedthat, contrary to expectations,a greatnumber of Greek Cypriots had crossedto the TRNC (Kibris, 24 April, p.4; Halkin Sesi,26-27 April, p.2). Their amazementrevealed that in the wake of yearsof anti-Turk propagandaas well as the recentwarnings of the Greek Cypriot governmentagainst an indirect recognition of the TRNC, they did not expectsuch large numbersof Greek Cypriots to go to the north. To stressthe interestGreek Cypriots had beenshowing in North Cyprus,Halk: n Sesi describedthem as `surging in crowds'. The newspaperreported that `due to the increasingdemands of Greek Cypriots, greatcrowds formed on the third day of the in its headline crossing' (Halkin Sesi,26 April, p. l). Kibris also noted one of that there it was a `big interest' (Kibris, 25 April, p. 1). Even though generalisedthe big interestto both sides,it statedthat `especiallyGreek Cypriots had formed long queueswith their Beyarmudu (Kibris, 25 vehicles at the Ledra Palaceand checkpoints' April, p. l). Yenidüzenalso remarkedthat the interestand the crushGreek Cypriots createdat the 29 checkpointsdid not wane but increased(Yenidüzen, April, p.2).
The Linguistic Construction of Common Culture
Culture, anothersignificant elementof national identity, acts as a sourcein its have be interpreted production. Cultural symbols can various meaningsand can
185 differently. Despitethis, sharedmeanings, habits, rituals and ways of speakingare resourcesfor establishinga senseof belonging (Edensor,2002). National identity is producedand reproduceddepending on the invention and the circulation of these cultural materials.
In the news texts analysed,cultural materialswere employedto draw similarities betweenthe two communitiesas well as to statetheir differences.Both communities were imaginedwith certainqualities associatedwith them which were not just traditional onesbut also the habits of everydaylife that are embeddedin the practicesof daily social interaction.For example,both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were describedas being very hospitable.People from both sideswere reportedto have welcomedtheir guestsand invited them for coffee (Kibris, 29 April, p.3; Halkin Sesl,28 April, p.4; Yenidüzen,29 April, p.5). In their accountsof meetingthe `other', people kept mentioninghow they were invited in to drink coffee when they were on the `other' drinking it side. The sharedpractice of coffee was not treatedas anything unusualsince for both This form habitus was a habitual performanceof everydaylife communities. of identity between linking provided a sharedform of the two communities, them together through this daily habitual practiceand creatinga culture of coherenceamongst Cypriots. As well as coffee, food was anotherform of representationof cultural kebab in Cyprus similarity. For example,ceftali, a certaintype of common was describedas `Cyprus' well known dish' (Kibris, 24 April, p.4). The circulation of feftali Greek Turkish it as a Cypriot dish ratherthan or represented as anothershared cultural feature,maintaining the notion of a commonCypriot cultural identity.
Music, anothercultural ingredientthat can be associatedwith national identity also Cypriot In appearedin the newstexts as anotheruniting componentof culture. a Turkish Cypriots romanticiseddescription, Kibris noted that some walked through the folk (Kibris, 29 April, 3). Folkloric streetsof Larnacawhere `Cypriot music' echoed p. distinctiveness Describing music stressesnational and authenticity. the music as `authentic' and `Cypriot' in the newstexts reproducedit as a sharedcultural component Cypriots. The of both Greek and Turkish circulation of such representationssustained
186 the conceptof a Cypriot identity. Yenidüzenalso publishedan article about the performanceof the bi-communalchoir and folk dancegroup on its front page.This bi- communality of the choir and folk dancegroup implied commoncharacteristics in the songssung and the dancesperformed (Yenidüzen, 28 April p. 1).
Along with sharedcultural features,some cultural materialswere treatedas the national cultural symbol of only one group which highlighted the differencesbetween the communities.Food and drink were two categoriesthat inducedsuch separation.One such examplewas a desertcalled ekmekkadayifi, a Turkish Cypriot speciality which the newspapersclaimed Greek Cypriots longedto taste.Linking ekmekkadayifi together with the Greek Cypriots' homesin the north, Yenidüzenwrote that `they have not forgotten the houseand ekmekkadayifi(sic)' (Yenidüzen,26 April, 2003, p. 6). On the other hand,a beer called KEO, a brandy known as 31 and wine were the drinks Turkish Cypriots associatedwith Greek Cypriot culture.According to K: bras,having crossedto the GreekCypriot side, SomeTurkish Cypriots went to a bar and did not forget to tasteKEO and Greek Cypriots' renownedred wine. It was also noticedthat, on the way back, many Turks carried `31' in their hands,the famousdrink of the GreekCypriot side (Kibris, 24 April, p.4).
Language,another cultural ingredientof national identity, also signified a difference betweenthe two communities.In Cyprus,following the division in 1974,the physical boundaryalso actedas a boundaryfor the languagesspoken predominantly on either side of the island; Turkish in the northernpart and Greek in the southernpart. Having crossedto the `other' side, Turkish Cypriots becameaware that the boundaryof Turkish languageon the island was not limited to the TRNC bordersand that Turkish still existedin the Greek Cypriot part of the island.The newspapersreported that Turkish Cypriots who went to Limassol were surprisedto seesome posters on the walls in Turkish and heardsome people speak to them in Turkish, mostly the Turkish Cypriots who lived in the Greek Cypriot side. The articles also statedthat someof the street nameswhere Turkish Cypriots usedto live were kept in Turkish. Theseobservations confirmed the role of the Turkish languageas a sourceof national identity for Turkish
187 Cypriots which had enhancedimagining themselvesas a separatenational group from Greek Cypriots in the pastas well as in the present.
National Space
Conceptualisinga nation in spatialterms also contributesto the production of national identity. Edensorremarks that placesand spacesthat are regardedas national contribute to a senseof national identity with their cognitive, sensualand habitual impact (Edensor, 2002). Sometimesthese places symbolise the combinationof ethnic, religious and cultural characteristicsof the nation.
In the newstexts analysed,the link betweennational spaceand national identity was based,for the most part, on the `other' ratherthan `us'. Landscapesthat were important for `other' differences symbolically and ideologically the emphasisedthe betweenthe two communities.Highlighting certain areasin the north as significant in placesfor Greek Cypriots, terms of religion, was one suchexample as religion was identity in In anothersignifier of national Cyprus. the past,the communitieswere defined by their religion as Christian Orthodox and Muslim ratherthan as Greek Cypriot identities and Turkish Cypriot. It was with the developmentof nationalismthat national kept its importancein definition supersededthe religious ones,yet religion the of division island had brought division The national identities. The of the religious as well. island follow faith Islam majority of people in the north of the mainly the of with very few Greek Cypriots or Maroniteswho sharethe Christian faith. In the south, it is the both reverse.Therefore, many spiritual, religious and sacredplaces of communitieswere left isolatedfollowing the movementof populationsfrom one part of the island to the
other after 1974.
in Someof the significant placesfor Greek Cypriots were Karpas(Karpaz), the from peninsulain the north. Apart the churchesand monasteriesthat are spiritually importantto the Orthodox GreekCypriots, the presenceof a small Greek Cypriot
188 community that stayedin that part of the country evenafter the division made it easyto associatethe areawith GreekCypriots. Two newspapers,Kibris and Halkin Sesi, included news storiesabout Greek Cypriots visits to ApostolosAndreas, one of the monasteriesin the Karpasarea for their Easterservice (Kibris, 28 April, p. 1). Yenidazen only mentionedthat a high numberof GreekCypriots crossedto the north during the Easterbreak (Yenidüzen,28 April, p.3). Kibris, especially,highlighted the religious rituals the Orthodox GreekCypriots performedin churchesand monasteriesin Karpas with big colourful photos.The news of the EasterService in the Monasteryof Apostolos Andreasand the baptismceremony of a baby in anotherchurch in Karpasappeared on the front pagesof Kibris on two consecutivedays (Kibris, 28 & 29 April, p. 1). As well as representingthe Orthodox religion as a national signifier of Greek Cypriots, these texts in Kibris also portrayedthese places as the symbol of their ethnic, religious and cultural traditions. In contrast,there was no suchreport of Turkish Cypriots visiting religious placesin the southside. Unlike GreekCypriots, in the first week of the opening of the borders(which is the period this study focusedon) Turkish Cypriots were not allowed to crossto the southwith their vehicleswhich madeit difficult for them to explore anywhereoutside Lefkosia. It was only when the Greek Cypriot government organisedcoach services to the main towns in the souththat Turkish Cypriots were able to go to theseplaces as well.
Apart from Karpas,the newspapersalso depictedKyrenia (Girre), anothertown in North Cyprus, as a significant place for GreekCypriots in which they showedgreat interestand visited in crowds. Consideringthat it was the home of many Greek Cypriots, this interestwas not surprisingand the newspaperstreated it as normal. Yenidüzen reportedthat `Greek Cypriots also crossedto the North... and many ran to Kyrenia' (Yenidüzen,24 April, p.2). Halkin Sesialso reportedthat `GreekCypriots rushedto Kyrenia and villages' (Halkin Sesi,24 April, p.2). Carrying a newsreport accompanied by a photo from Kyrenia, Kibris informed its readersthat `With the openingof the borders,Kyrenia, the capital of tourism, faceda rush from many Greek Cypriots' (Kibris, 26 April, p.8). There was no similar report about any other town in North Cyprusand this could be explainedby two reasons.One, positionednext to the sea,
189 Kyrenia,its harbourin particular,was always seen as a beautifulspot and a tourist attraction.As statedabove, Kibris describedit as `the capital of tourism', which was why Greek Cypriot excursionsthere were not thought of as unusual.
The secondreason could be linked to the naturalisingtendencies of nationalist ideologies.Over the years,the nationalistic discoursesof Greek Cypriots implied their desireto return to Kyrenia, which symboliseda return to the pre-1974situation. The loss of Kyrenia was associatedwith humanitarian,nationalist and economicfactors as it was the capital of Cypriot tourism before and thus took a centralposition in the Greek Cypriot discourses.In contrast,the Turkish Cypriot official nationalistic discourses pointed to such discoursesof the Greek Cypriot officials as evidenceof their continuing ambition for enosis.In both discourses,Kyrenia appearedas the dreamof every Greek Cypriot and as the place where Greek Cypriots longedto go. The nationalist ideologies adoptedby both communitiesmade these discourses look `natural'. Embeddedin the public consciousness,it seemednormal that every Greek Cypriot wantedto go and see Kyrenia. When the Greek Cypriots filled the streetsof Kyrenia or the touristy harbour, the newspaperstreated this as if it were to be expected.
Whatevermeaning Greek Cypriots assignedto it, Kyrenia had a different significance for Turkish Cypriots, which showshow difficult it is to affix national meaningsto national spaces.During the yearsafter 1974,Kyrenia had beena landscapewhich acquireda national importancefor Turkish Cypriots. The picturesof Kyrenia harbour had becomethe predominantimage of the TRNC for tourist campaigns,together with other imagesthat symbolisedTurkish Cypriot culture. It was an exampleof a local place becomingan imagethat representedthe national space.The photographsof Kyrenia harbour in the newspaperswith someGreek Cypriot tourists showedfamiliar spatial featuresto Turkish Cypriot readersand reproducedit as a national spacethat they identified with.
In Cyprus,the houses,home towns or villages left behind becauseof the division were the other spacesthat acted as a sourceof identification for the membersof both
190 communities.Home, like nation, is a boundedspace that enclosesmemories, emotions and gives a senseof belongingand security.The conceptof homemeans not merely a physical dwelling but also signifies the familial relationshipor sometimesthe community. Therefore,the conceptof home may extendbeyond the physical structure and include locality so that one can feel at home in the neighbourhood,town or city. The news storiesabout going back to the housesowned beforethe 1974division appearedin all three newspapers.They reportedthat the first place Greek Cypriots visited when they crossedthe borderto the north was the homesthey had left behind. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand,were not allowed to crossto the southwith their cars in the first week, which restrictedtheir trips to the placesthat could be reachedwith the coach services provided by the GreekCypriot authorities.The newspaperreports on peoplevisiting the homesthey had left nearly 30 yearsago stressedthe value and the attachmentthey felt towards them. The meaningof home was also extendedbeyond the buildings to neighbourhoodand hometownand they were depictedas the placesof memories, emotionsand relationships.The reflection of thesevisits to theseplaces was in the form dominated of nostalgia.Hal/an Sesisummarised the emotionsthat thesetrips as `joy and sadness': Going aroundthe streetswith the excitementof seeingthe househe spenthis childhood and sharinghis memorieswith his children, a father was getting ready to seehis house when he found an empty field in its place.The rest of the visit past with sadnessfor the oneswho encounteredsuch bad surpriseswhile for the oneswho found their housesand walked aroundthe rooms and gardenthe happinessreached at its peak (Halkin Sesi,8 April, p.4).
Kibris also quoteda Greek Cypriot woman who had goneto seethe housethat shehad abandonednearly 30 yearsago and who describedit as a place of memoriesand familial relationships: I wantedto seemy house.I got marriedhere. My children were born here.I have4 daughtersand 6 sons.Apparently the houseowner is abroadat the moment.I usedto live oppositeto my daughter.My daughtervisited her housebut I was deprived from that. That is my fate. I becamea migrant when I was 40. I am both happyand sadto be here (Kibris, 26 April, p. 10).
191 As the example above suggested,the individual and collective narratives were houses constructed around these as they were symbols of an identity, community and tradition that people had identified themselves with in the past. As well as describing themselves a Turk or Turkish Cypriots, people also identified themselves with local or regional characteristics, as being from Limassol or Larnaca. The houses formed a link between these concepts and also gave them a senseof attachment to those places. Therefore, they meant more than a place of residence but a bounded space that embodied values and meanings that were integral to the existence of the group and its identity. During the nation building process, especially after the division, any internal differences in the conceptualisation of local or regional identities were suppressedand made part of the national identity.
Conclusion
Focusingon the content,the analysisfound that five themessuggested by Wodak et.al (1999) were employedin the discursiveconstruction of the national identity. The analysisfound that eventhough the themesof linguistic constructionof common political past, commonculture and national spaceoccurred more often, there were also referencesto the themesof a commonpolitical presentand an essentialistunderstanding of Cypriotness.The analysisalso revealedthat therewere overlappingdiscourses of identity which existedwithin the newstexts suchas Turkish Cypriot identity co-existing with Cypriot identity. The overall analysisof the data supportedthe argumentthat rather than a single essentialistidentity, there was an ongoingprocess of production of different identities and, dependingon the contextand the newspaper,the characteristics of national identity changed.In somecases, Turkish Cypriots were constructedas a separategroup in oppositionto Greek Cypriots, creatinga `nationalwe' group that also includedTurkish origin citizens.At other times,the cultural similarities of both communitieswere highlighted and their differenceswere suppressedto constructa commonCypriot identity.
192 The characterisationof the nation as both Staatsnationand Kulturnation co-existedin the coverageof the eventin all the newspapers.Thus, as well as characterisingnational belonging on the basisof citizenshipthere was also characterisationof the national identity basedon cultural similarities. The conceptualisationof the nation as Staatsnationwas evidentespecially in the newstexts aboutTurkish-origin TRNC citizens. Using the argumentthat they were TRNC citizensand should be treatedas equalsto Cypriot-born ones,the newspapersrepresented the conceptof nation basedon citizenship. Even though it seemedlike a concernfor democraticsociety and citizenship, in the mediationof the issueneither Turkish-born citizensnor other ethnic minorities were given any meansof expression.The emphasison Turkish Cypriots' excitement pushedthe expressionsof others' to the background.National self-perceptionbased on cultural definitions was also evident in the newsarticles of Yenidüzenand Kibris in particular. Even in Halkm Sesi,it was hard to apply a strict dichotomy of national identification basedon Staatsnationand Kulturnation sincethe featuresof both could be found in its newstexts.
Like the definition of `we' group,the representationof the `other' also shifted depending on the context and the newspaper.Having positioned`people' versus`the nationalist governing groups', Yenidiizentreated the latter as the `other' and portrayed it as the adversaryof the `people'. It treatedTurkish origin citizens as part of the nation basedon the model of Staatsnationbut also drew on cultural analogieswith Greek Cypriots. A similar constructivestrategy was discerniblein Kibris, yet Kibris kept the dichotomy betweenthe two communitiesby reflecting their cultural differencesas well. In Hallan Sesi,whose representation of the issuewas dominatedwith the official discourses, GreekCypriots maintainedtheir position as the `other'.
The rhetoric of `home' was usedin the newspapersin two different concepts.One was the reproductionof the official discoursethat referredto the TRNC as `home' and Greek Cypriots visiting it as `guests'.The secondwas pointing at the placesthat signified familial and community relationshipsin the past.The individual and national narratives were constructedaround the imagesof thesehouses and their surroundingsthat were
193 defined as `home'. The host-guestrelationship kept its ambiguity but at the sametime challengedthe official discourse,which claimedthat the housesabandoned during and after 1974belonged to whoeverowned them after the separation.
The year 1974was a turning point in the history of Turkish Cypriots and the past came to meanthe times before 1974.People revisited the housesthey had lived in and searchedfor their neighboursand friends they had last seenbefore moving to the Turkish Cypriot or the GreekCypriot side. The news articles aboutthe visits to these placesand the meetingof old acquaintancescontributed to the reconstructionof the common experiencethese communities had in the past. The inclusion of suchnarratives of the past within the news storiesalso reinforcedthe nation's cultural memory.Not merely the commonpast but also a commonpolitical future existedwithin the news discourses.Yenidüzen, especially, adopting strategies of transformationand dismantling, emphasisedthe discontinuity of the statusquo and the necessityfor a changein Cyprus, especiallyfor Turkish Cypriots, betweenthe presenttime and the future. Reportingthe recentchanges within the country, Kibris also implicitly employeda strategyof transformation,while Halkin Sesiused the strategyof perpetuationto stressthe positive continuity of the existing situationthat supportedthe nationalistapproaches.
The role of the newspapersin reflecting the `other' changedwith the opening of the border. Before the crossingshad started,the mediawas one of the meansof getting the news on the `other', which was largely controlledby stateofficials. The opening of the border not only madethe communicationof thesegroups unnecessary but also gavea chancefor the media institutions to collect datafor themselvesrather than being provided by the official sources.In other words, rather than mediatingthe `other' through thesesources, having met and observedthe `other', the media controlled the methodof transmissionto the public. Meanwhile,the `other' was no longer an abstract entity for the people or the readersbut materialisedthrough their encountersin everyday life. Therefore,the newspaperswere not just mediating strangersto their readersbut reflecting an issuethat had becomepart of their daily life, especiallyin the first week of the border crossings.
194 There were differencesin journalistic practiceswhich were reflectedin the news discourses.Rather than relying only on the externally producedtexts and news agency dispatches,which they still continuedto benefit from, the newspapersalso carried out their own newsgatheringpractices. Journalists' observations were integratedmore into the newstexts, eventhough in somecases the commentsof journalists replacedthe facts. Along with the pressreleases of the stateand the governmentauthorities, the storiesof ordinary peopleappeared more in the news articles. Suchstories were more frequent in Yenidüzen,a newspaperthat adoptedthe conceptof `people' in its discourse and representation.They were coveredless in HallernSesi as it mostly usedthe official representationand discoursein its coverageof the developments.On the other hand, Kibris tried to amalgamateboth. As Yenidüzenand Halkin Sesikept their ideological positions in relation to the previous casestudy, Kibris shifted its stancefrom a nationalist one to one favouring a solution. Thus, comparedto the previous casestudy, the similarities in the discourseand representationof Kibris and HallernSesi were less.
The routinesof everydaylife, which also reproducedand naturalisednationalism were images family embeddedwithin the news texts. The circulation of the of homesnot only mediatedthe domesticspace but also linked private lives with the national public one, creating a senseof unity. The reflection of the similar habits and nationally shared cultural norms and valuesof Turkish Cypriots within the news reproduceda senseof similarity and togetherness.Identification with thesequotidian ways provided a way of seeingthe world and their mediationby the mediahelped them to be internalisedand treatedas common sense.
195 CHAPTER 7: LOKMACI CRISIS IN 2007
Introduction
The third casestudy focuseson the newstexts concerningthe removal of an overpass built at Lokmaci, one of the military barricadesin Leflcoýa.The overpass,or footbridge, was erectedto act as anotherborder crossingbetween the northernand the southern parts of centralNicosia in December2005. Contraryto the purposeof its construction, which was to bring both communitiescloser together by reuniting the divided city of Nicosia, the bridge becamea symbol of the division. When it was first built, the Greek Cypriot governmentobjected to the idea of an overpassfor civilian use over a military areaand refusedto openthe Lokmaci crossing' until it was demolished.Later, when the Turkish Cypriot administrationannounced that it would removethe footbridge,the Turkish military that controlledthe areathen objected.
This part of the researchexamines the news discoursesof the three newspapersto discoverwhich conceptsof national identity were articulatedthrough the discussions surroundingthe Lokmaci footbridge.It studiesthe way Turkish Cypriots conceptualised themselvesand articulatedtheir identity, having receiveda rejection from the Greek Cypriots to cooperatein an action they consideredto be positive and also when a Turkish military Chief of Staff interferedwith their internal affairs.
Which Bridge The Setting - Brief Description of the Context within the was Removed
Attempts to find a solution to the Cyprusproblem failed when the Greek Cypriots rejectedthe Annan Plan in a referendumon 24`x'April 2004. The result disappointedthe
1Greek Cypriots refer to this crossingas the 'Ledra crossing'or Ledra Streetcrossing'.
196 64.9%2of Turkish Cypriots who voted in favour of the plan, crushingtheir hopesfor a solution to their longstandingproblems that were relatedin a way to the unsolved Cyprus Problem.The relationshipbetween the two communitiesalso seemedto be drifting apartafter the referendum.Research on the relationshipbetween the two communitiesrevealed that neither community trustedthe other (Lordos, 2005). Meanwhile, the GreekCypriots' entry into the EU, despitehaving rejectedthe settlementplan, madeTurkish Cypriots feel let down by the EU which also erodedtheir trust in it.
There had also beenchanges in the political dynamicsin the TRNC. The nationalist coalition governmentof Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP - National Unity Party) and DemokratParti (DP - DemocratParty) was replacedfirst by the CTP and DP coalition but Republican government then by CumhuriyetciTürk Partisi (CTP- Turkish Party) - Özgürlükve ReformPartisi (ÖRP- Independenceand Reform Party) coalition government.CTP's leaderMehmet Ali Talat had also beenelected as the TRNC Presidentin the presidentialelections in 2005, replacingthe nationalistleader, Rauf Denktab.
A total of five checkpointshad beenfunctioning as crossingpoints on the island since 2003. Nevertheless,the openingof the Lokmaci barricadewas seenas a stepto build on the mutual trust of both communitiesby increasingcontact between them. The Lokmaci checkpointwould have connectedthe centresof both cities, making it easierfor people to crossfrom one part to the other. The barricadewas set on a long shoppingstreet called Ledra Street(or Uzun Yol by Turkish Cypriots) in the centreof Nicosia. When the armedconflict betweenthe two communitiesflared in 1963,Turkish Cypriots set up a barricadethere called Lokmaci, which was the first division betweenTurkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Later, both sideserected walls on Ledra Streetthat not only divided the streetbut also becamea symbol of the division3.
2 75.83%of GreekCypriots voted `no' in the referendum. 3 The GreekCypriot side turned the wall into a memorialof the division by putting windows from which one could peekinto the Turkish Cypriot side.
197 Shopkeepersin the north campaignedfor a crossingto be openedat Lokmaci. The retailers in the Asmaalti and Arasta areas4,surrounding the Lokmaci barricade, consideredthe openinga crucial stepin reviving their businesses.They arguedthat it would make it easierfor Greek Cypriots to crossto the north and would also encourage tourists from the southto comeand shop in Lefko§a.
In December2005, the Turkish Cypriot administrationpulled down the defensivewall in the north side of the borderto turn the Lokmaci barricadeinto a crossinggate. However, the areabeing a military zoneas well as a shoppingstreet, this createda potential problem that peoplecrossing through the checkpointmight encounterthe activities of Turkish troops stationedthere. To overcomethis problem,the Turkish Cypriot governmentbuilt an overpassthat would carry peopleover a road usedby the Turkish military. The move angeredthe Greek Cypriot leadership.Arguing againstthe idea that Greek Cypriot civilians should crossover a Turkish military zone,it demandedthe demolition of the footbridge as a preconditionfor any further negotiationson the reopeningof Ledra Streetor the Lokmaci gate.As a result, the Lokmaci crossing remainedclosed.
On 28 December2006, TRNC PresidentMehmet All Talat announcedthat the footbridge in the Lokmaci barricadewould be removed.His spokespersonexplained on behalf of the Presidentthat `he decidedfor the demolition of the footbridge, which was claimed to have beenan obstaclefor the openingof Lokmaci Border Gate,with the aim of contributing to the decision of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot sidesto resumethe comprehensivenegotiations in the first quarterof 2007 and to aid the developmentof cooperationbetween the two peoples' (TRNC President'sOffice, Official Web site accessed2008). The move was also a good will gestureto facilitate talks and revive the peaceprocess on the island following an agreementreached by two community leaders in a meeting with the UN Under-SecretaryGeneral Ibrahim Gambari(Aydin, 31 January,2007). However, the decision sparkeda heateddebate within the country as
I Arasta and Asmaalti are the namesof two shoppingareas that surroundthe Lolanaci barricadein LefkoM North Nicosia.
198 well as Turkey and South Cyprus.Talat's pronouncementon dismantlingthe bridge he had built just a year beforewas criticised by the Turkish Cypriot rightwing opposition as giving in to the demandsof the Greek Cypriot authorities.Meanwhile, not satisfiedwith the demolition of the footbridge,the Presidentof the Republic of Cyprus,Tassos Papadopoulos,insisted that the areashould be demilitarised,cleared of mines, derelict buildings repairedand symbolsof the TRNC removedbefore the Greek Cypriot authorities would openthe passagefor public crossings.Otherwise, he announced,the Greek Cypriot side would not reciprocatein the removal of the bridge. This meantthe wall that actedas a barricadeon their side of the border would not be removed.
The Turkish military, having control of the area,also criticized the decision.According to the GeneralStaff of the Turkish Armed Forces,Ya§ar Büyükanit, who opposedthe dismantling of the bridge, such stepsshould be taken and implementedat the sametime as the Greek Cypriot administration.A picture of a crisis beganto emerge,which Kibris labelled as the `Lokmaci crisis' (Kibris, 5 January,p. 1). Furthermore,BUyükanit disprovedof public a statementthat TRNC PresidentTalat had madeafter a meeting in Ankara with the Turkish ForeignMinister and Büyükanit himself. In his speechafter the meeting on the 5thJanuary, Talat had deniedhaving discussedthe Lokmact Bridge with them. But the General'sstatement contradicted him, revealingthat the TRNC President lied to public concerningthe topic of their meeting.Nonetheless, after some negotiations,a consensuswas reachedand the removal of the Lokmact Bridge went ahead.
In the TRNC, peopleorganised public demonstrationsto expressboth their supportand opposition to Talat's decision.A group of retailers from the Asmaalti and Arasta areas, with the supportof someright wing nationalistpolitical parties,rallied againstthe removal of the bridge beforethe Greek Cypriot governmentpulled down the wall on their side. The demonstrationcaused a conflict with anothergroup which claimed to be the real representativeof the merchantsand accusedthe first group of not acting in the merchants'interest. Meanwhile, anotherdemonstration came from a group of civil society organisationsthat were outragedby the way TRNC PresidentTalat was treated
199 by the Turkish military GeneralStaff. They organiseda protestmarch to expresstheir support for Talat on the Lokmaci issue.
The footbridgewas pulled down on 9 January2007. The UN and the EU approvedthe move and describedit as a contribution to the openingof the crossing.Yet, the crossing remainedclosed. The GreekCypriot leadershipcontinued to claim that the dismantling of the footbridgewas not enoughand other conditionssuch as the demilitarisation of the areaand the removal of TRNC symbolsshould be met beforethey would demolishthe wall on their side and opena border gate.The Turkish Cypriot side refusedthese demands5.
The Position of the Newspapers
This part of the researchcovers the period between2-16 January2007 which is a week before and a week after the removal of the footbridge in Lokmaci on the 9`hJanuary. The large number of texts included in the analysiswas over 200. A proportion of thesetexts is identical but is still included in the count as they appearedin eachnewspaper separately.
There had not beenmuch changein the editorial teamsof the three newspapersbut their political positions had altered.As CTP, the political party Yenidüzenwas linked to, came to power, Yenidüzen'sposition shifted from being part of the opposition to being pro- government.This transformationinfluenced the newspaper'sdiscourse that continuedto frame the issuesfrom the perspectiveof CTP despiteits attemptsto changeits imageto a newspaperwith a broaderappeal.
HallernSesi was consistentin its political position in that it supportedthe nationalist groupsand right wing political partieswhich were in opposition.Therefore, Halkin.
P s Lolanaci crossingopened to public crossingson April 2008.
200 Sesi's representationof the eventsreflected a degreeof oppositionto the governing groups.
Kibris continuedits publicationwith the sameeditorial team and policy. Although, its coverageincluded the views and actionsof various groups,its supportof the governmentand the presidentwas also discernible.It was Kibris that first describedthe situation regardingthe footbridgeas the `Lokmaci crisis' (Kibris, 5 January,p. 1).
Analysis of Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News
An overall analysisof the coverageof the `Lokmaci crisis' showedthat the majority of the news reportswhich appearedin the three newspaperswas basedon externally producedtexts suchas written pressreleases and the pressconferences of state authorities,opposition parties and non-governmentalorganisations. The journalists' role in the coverageof the issuewas reducedmainly to processingthe information provided for them by the source,rather than originating the newstexts, which suggeststhat the story constructionwas determinedby sourcesrather thanjournalists. The argumentis not to deny any involvementof journalists in the productionprocess of the news.They certainly reportedfrom the parliamentmeetings in which the Lokmaci issuewas debated,interviewed politicians and reflectedthe views of someshopkeepers in the area on this matter. The attemptis to highlight the dominanceof the views of sources comparedto any news output originatedby journalists. As a result, many similar news texts appearedin all three newspapersthat did not go further than simply reflecting the views of the sourcesand thereforefailed to provide definition and guidanceto increase the understandingof the text.
The resemblancein the texts also suggestedthat the pressreleases or news agency dispatcheswere either publishedwith little editing or were copied as they were. The heavy relianceon news agencydispatches or pressreleases not only contributedto the centralisationand control of information in the public spherebut also limited the
201 diversity in the discourseand representationof the eventswithin the media sphere affecting the public one.The newstexts that originatedfrom such sourceswere easyto spot as they were identical and appearedin the threenewspapers. Yenidüzen was the only one that indicatedthe sourceof the news article as `TAK' or `Anadolu News Agency' or `GreekCypriot Press',at the end of its texts.
Another consequenceof using given information without putting it through the journalistic processwas that many news items failed to include information that would help readersto understandthe issuein detail. Thus, it forcedreaders to bring in their own knowledgeabout the issueas the texts sometimesdid not evenprovide the crucial information. One such examplewas the newsabout the demonstrationfor the openingof Lokmaci/Ledra gate.Even though it was statedin the newspapersthat a Greek Cypriot organisationcalled `Citizensfor Openingof Ledra' was going to demonstratein favour of its opening,the reportsof the eventannounced that it was stagedby a bi-communal `Openthe gatesinitiative'. However, all failed to explain how a GreekCypriot organisationsuddenly became a `bi-communal' one and changedfrom being `Citizens for Openingof Ledra' to `Openthe gatesinitiative' (Kibris, Yenidüzen& Halkin Sesi, 14 January,p. 1) which showedthat they all acceptedthe information provided by the sourceswithout questioningor researchingit further.
As well as processingthe information sentby the sources,the newspapersalso included articles from the other news media organisationsand particularly from the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish press.The Turkish Cypriot media relied on the Greek Cypriot Greek pressto reflect the views of the Cypriot authoritieson the issue.Despite the fact that crossingto the Greek Cypriot side was possibleand the communicationlines betweenboth sideswere open,the journalists from the north choseto quote the Greek Cypriot pressrather than gatheringthe informationthemselves. This could be explained by various reasonssuch as languagebarriers, lack of motivation or reluctanceof the GreekCypriot sourcesto speakwith Turkish Cypriot journalists.
202 The articles from the Turkish mediawere useful in reflecting the relatedviews and debatesin Turkey as the issuealso involved the Turkish governmentand military authorities.Interestingly, instead of simply reportingthat they included featuresabout Lokmaci, the Turkish Cypriot newspaperspublished the articles as they had originally appeared,without making any changesin them. This practicewas common,particularly in Yenidüzen,although Hal/an Sesiemployed it as well. For example,Halk: n Sesi publishedan article that includeda statementby the GeneralStaff which had already appearedin a Turkish daily, Milliyet (Hallen Sesi,8 January,p. 2). Suchpractices revealeda lack of motivation on the part of the Turkish Cypriot pressto be exclusive or original. Yenidüzenalso circulatedan article aboutthe `Lokmaci crisis' on its front page that was written by a well known Turkish journalist from the Turkish daily, Radikal. Yet it announcedthat it was written for both newspapers,Radikal and Yenidilzen(Yenidüzen, 8 January,p. 1).
Interestingly,Kibris newspaperturned a routine newsgatheringeffort into a front page newsstory. The visit by a groupof well-knowncolumnists and editors from the in SouthNicosia newspaperto Ledra Street and reportsthat they had conducted interviewswith GreekCypriot shopkeepersbecame the lead story that occupiedthe first threepages of the newspaper.Their move, as explainedin the text, was to find out the feelings and views of the GreekCypriot peopleand especiallythe shopkeeperson Ledra Street(Kibris, 12 January,p. 1-3). It was a caseof an ordinary news gatheringpractice being turned into a media eventby the newspaperitself. It contributedto the cultivation image of starjournalists and also enhancedthe of the newspaperas holding the views of the ordinary public as important.
Either becauseof a lack of journalists or of other resources,Hallern Sesi produced few issuebut heavily news storiesitself on the relied on other sourcessuch as news agencies in Halkin or pressreleases. Therefore, many of the stories Sesiwere the sameas the ones in the other newspapersand an original story rarely appearedin it. In one case,Halkin Sesieven published an interview the DemocratParty leader,Serdar Denktab, had given Without to anotherTurkish Cypriot newspaper,Vatan. any explanation,Halkin Sest
203 had in printed the interview that appeared Vatana day before.Considering that it was an itself interview the newspaper could have easily gotten,it is hard to explain the reason behind Halkin Sesi'sdecision to print the piece (HallernSesi, 12 January,p. 3).
As in the previous cases,the newspapersbenefited a greatdeal from other texts such as different individuals pressreleases from and groups,propaganda from political groups and statementsfrom privileged sources.The written pressreleases of many organisations,such as tradeunions or associations,appeared in the newspapers, disguisedin the form of a newsarticle. The newspaperswere also full of texts of party political propaganda,concealed in the newsarticle which also reproducedtheir arguments.Such an intertextualrelationship was discerniblein many articles in the newspapers.One suchexample was the accountof the Turkish General'sstatement in the newspaperswhich was intertextually relatedto the TRNC Constitution.The relation aimed to enhancethe truthfulnessand persuasivenessof the statement.The interviews conductedby the newspaperswere anotherform of `intertexts' (Fowler, 1991,p. 229). The onesKibris and Yenidüzencarried out with Mehmet Ali Talat were not only regardedas newsworthyand were reproducedas news features,but also attributed to him a personalimportance as well as renderinghis speechsignificant.
Discourse Analysis
In this casestudy, of the themesdevised earlier, there appearmostly the understanding of nation and the constructionof `us' and `them' categoriesbased on national interest with a focus on the differenceson the representationof the `other'. The linguistic future constructionof a commonpast and the questionof the arethe other two themes that occurredin the news discourses.
204 On the Conceptof Nation
The developmentsthat turned the demolition of the footbridgeinto a `crisis' were related to the issueof the political sovereignty,statehood and respectabilityof the TRNC. The objection and the obstructionof the GeneralStaff of the Turkish Armed Forcesto the removal of the footbridge,a decisionannounced by the TRNC President,brought the civil power in North Cyprusand Turkish military authoritiesinto conflict. The Turkish GeneralBüyükanit's statements,in which he emphasisedthat the areawhere the footbridge stoodwas under the authority of the Turkish military, addedto the tension.It meantthat the civil power or the people'selected representatives had no control over the areaunder disputeor over the rest of the nationalborders of the TRNC. Furthermore,the GeneralStaff accusedTRNC PresidentTalat of lying to the public. Talat, who had a meetingwith Turkey's ForeignMinister and Turkish military GeneralStaff in Turkey aboutthe footbridge in Lokmaci, deniedthat they had discussedthe issue.The General Staff Büyükanit contradictedTalat's words in his media interviews and statements, leaving the presidentin a difficult position. Later, Talat explainedthat he had spoken like that so as not to give an impressionof a rift within the Turkish side over the issue (Yenidüzen,10 January,p. 6). As a result, the whole developmentcreated a picture of a crisis betweenthe Turkish Cypriot leadershipand Turkey's military authorities,as well as underminingthe authority of the civil power in North Cyprus and damagingthe personalimage of the TRNC President.Elected by the people,President Talat was identified as the representativeof the people'swill in the TRNC. But the attitude of the Turkish Army Generalshowed the will of peoplecould be challengedand that power was not only with them but also in the handsof the Turkish army, especiallywith regard to security issues.The whole situation increaseddoubts aboutthe statehoodof the TRNC. The word `increased'underlines the fact that Turkish Cypriots themselvesdid not fully believe such claims as they were awarethat `an official discourseof Turkish Cypriot "independence"glosses over political and economicdependence on Turkey' (Navaro-Yashin,2003, p. 112). Yet, in this case,Turkey was rarely referred to as the `motherland'.
205 Despite the ambivalentsituation concerning the statusof the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriot its nation statewas still depictedas a genuineone with an emphasison elected head representatives.Yenidüzen and Kibris portrayedthe presidentas the of civil having authority in the TRNC, resolutein his decision, managedto resist the objections in Ankara, Kibris of the Turkish army. Reportingthe outcomeof the meeting attributed be (Kibris, 6 a determinedtone to the President:`the bridge will removed' January,p. 4). Yenidüzen,having announcedthat the problem aboutthe bridge was solved, noted that Talat had not taken a stepback in his decision.The text underlinedhis statusas the TRNC President,which also helpedto legitimise the state.Referring to the meeting in Ankara that Talat had with Turkey's ForeignMinister, Yenidüzenwrote: The ForeignMinistry told Talat that Lokmaci Bridge had not only symbolic but also logistical importance.But Talat, statingthat he hadtaken the decisionfor the demolition his decision,indicated of this bridge as the TRNC Presidentand would not change that he might resign(Yenidiizen, 6 January,p. 8).
Reproducingthe official discoursesabout the footbridgeat the Lokmaci barricadein the hegemony discoursebut justified news texts not only enhancedthe of this also the actions of the governinggroups. The three newspapersused the sameofficial has decided demolition footbridge, explanationthat `Talat on the of the which was for Lokmaci Border Gate, claimed to have beenan obstacle the openingof with the aim Turkish GreekCypriot of contributing to the decision of the and sidesto resumethe in first 2007 for development comprehensivenegotiations the quarterof and the of decision initially cooperationbetween the two peoples'. Interestingly,while the was Cypriot (Kibris, 4 January, 6; Halkin Sesi,4 portrayedas being `the Turkish side's' p. January,p. 2; Yenidüzen,4 January,p. 7), following the conflict betweenthe President being `Talat's decision'. For and the Turkish military, it was stressedas example,the day after the footbridge was dismantled,a newstext about the removal of the bridge Talat decision-maker:`the appearedin all three newspapersthat emphasised as the by PresidentMehmet Ali Talat's decision ' Lokmaci Bridge which was removed ... (Kibris, 11 January,p. 4; Hallan Sesi, 11 January,p. 3 and Yenidüzen,11 January,p. 9). In President being highlighted a way, Talat's power as the of the statewas still even after
206 the bridgewas removed. The underlying reason for this changecould be to reinforceand emphasisethe power of the civil authority in North Cyprusin the eyesof public, especiallyas it was challengedby the Turkish military. Interchangeablereferences to the decision as the `Turkish Cypriot side's' and `Talat's' also reinforcedthe equationof the nationwith the imageof the Presidentof the state.
Dependingagainst whom it was constructed,the national identity of Turkish Cypriots changed:When positionedopposite Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots were frequently referredas Turk ratherthan Turkish Cypriot but in relation to the Turkish military, the term Turkish Cypriot was employed.There were constantshifts betweenthese identities. Even in Yenidüzenwhich adoptedthe discourseof Cypriot in the previous casestudies, the identification in relation to GreekCypriots was basedon Turkishness.In a front page story aboutthe views of the shopkeeperson both sidesof the Lokmaci barricade, Yenidüzencategorised them accordingto their nationality as `Turkish' shopkeepersand `Greek Cypriot' (Rum) shopkeepers(Yenidi_en, 5 January,p. 1). In anothernews feature that also reflectedthe reactionsof peopleto the issue,YenidiLen generalised their views with `the Turkish side has taken anotherpositive step' (Yen1düzen,10 January,p. 10). Unlike the previous cases,there was not much emphasison Cypriotism as an imagined national identity in the paper.Even when positionedopposite the Turkish army, the conceptof Cypriot, as an expressionof distinction, did not emerge.In this way, Cypriot identity was downplayedand a discourseof bipolarisationwas adoptedinstead, especiallyin relation to the Greek Cypriots.
The bipolarising discourseof Turk and GreekCypriot was adoptedalso in Kibris. In a front pagestory, Kibris notedthat the `Turkish side' applaudedthe removal of the bridge (Kibris, 10 January,p. 1). The word 'Turkish' was sometimesemployed as the shortened version of `Turkish Cypriot'. One such examplewas a statementissued by the TRNC President'sOffice in which the term `Turkish Cypriot' was used,yet in the headlineit was changedto `Turkish' (Kibris, 5 January,p. 8). The exclusion of the word `Cypriot' was clearly to shortenthe headlinebut this also showedthat it was acceptablefor the newspaperto interchangeablyrefer to Turkish Cypriots as 'Turkish/Turk'. It also
207 indicatedthat the demarcationbetween Turkish Cypriots and Turks as two separate nationswas not viewed as starkly, particularly when in conflict with Greek Cypriots. In Halkin Sesi,the term `Turkish Cypriots' rather than `Turks' was usually used,which could be explainedwith its relianceon the official sources,whose statements the newspaperreported with few changes.
The Turkish military's Generalof Staff, Yaýar Büyükanit,justified and legitimised the Turkish army's actionsin the country by referring to the TRNC Constitution. Pointing at Article 106,which gaveauthority to the Turkish Armed Forceson national security issues,the Generalemphasized the legal basisof its power in a pressstatement. Both, Yenidüzenand Kibris reportedon the announcementon their front pages.Kibris drew attentionto the authority issueand pointed at the power the TRNC Constitution gaveto the Turkish army over its national borders,which includedthe areawhere the Lokmaci Bridge stood.In its headline`the authority is ours' (Kibris, 7 January,p. 4), the word `ours' referredto the Turkish Armed Forcesand illustrated the point that they had the power to make decisionsregarding the Lokmaci Bridge rather than the Turkish Cypriot leadership,although this part was not clearly stated.Highlighting the section that contradictedTalat's aforementionedpress pronouncement in a separatetext box, the newspaperquoted the generalas stating `it reflectedor was madeto reflect incorrectly in the press' (Kibris, 7 January,p. 4). While the first part of the statementput the responsibility on the media,the secondpart was an expressionthat shifted the blame onto the TRNC President.Even thoughKibris was one of the newspapersthat had used the discussedstatement of Talat, it did not commentor challengethe general'scriticism of the media for wrongly reflecting the issue.Instead, it simply reportedthe pressrelease without including any other information or making changeswhich, it could be argued, helpedreflect the official discourseof the military. On the other hand,having quoted
6 TransitionalArticle 10: The provisionsof Article 117of this Constitutionshall not come into force as long as the defenceand internal securityof the Turkish peopleof Cyprusand the internationalsituation so necessitate.All forcesused in, providing the externaland internal securityon the dateof the coming into operationof the Constitution,shall continueto be so used,and the procedureand provisionsbeing implementedregarding such forcesand the basesof cooperationaccepted and to be acceptedin respectof thesematters shall continueto be implemented.
208 most of the statement,the newspapertried to distanceitself from the views expressedin it.
The news article in Yenidüzenalso highlighted Article 10 of the TRNC constitution, which gave the authority to the Turkish Armed Forces. Suggesting that the article was in conflict with the notion of democracy, Yenidüzen challenged the army's presence in the country: The transitionalarticle 10 of the TRNC Constitution,which cameon the agenda numeroustimes during the strugglefor democracyin the north of Cyprus, but could not be abolisheddue to `the existing securityconditions' of the island oncemore appeared on the agendadue to the bridge at Lokmaci. (All the sameit hasbeen learned that the bridge will be demolishedstarting tomorrow) (Yenidüzen,7 January,p. 6).
Article 10 in the constitutioncreates an ambivalentsituation in termsof sovereigntyof the nation. The right and the authority it gives to Turkey's Armed Forcesto guardthe national bordersalso imposesrestrictions on the civil governingpower over security issues.Yet none of the newspapersraised strong criticisms of this article in the constitution, evenwhen it emergedthat it causeda conflict betweenthe civil power and military authorities.Perhaps having acceptedand internalisedTurkey's domination in the north (and the north's dependenceon Turkey) as normal, or perhapsreluctant to challengethis powerful institution of Turkey, the newspapersdid not treat the involvement of the Turkish military generalstaff in their internal affairs as extraordinary.
Statingthat the authority belongedto the Turkish Armed Forces`until the conditions have changed(or were appropriate)', Yenidüzenvoiced an expectationof a change,in terms of a peaceful settlementin Cyprus,and the phrasepointed at a time in the future when there would be no needfor the presenceof the Turkish army. It was a strategyof transformationthat stresseda positive differencein the political situation of the nation statenow and in the future. At the sametime, it also naturalisedand justified the power and the presenceof the Turkish army in the country until that changetook place. The newspaperreported that the GeneralStaffs statementwas construedas a reminder of the
209 legal basisof its presencein Cyprus (Yenidüzen,7 January,p. 6), but it did not reveal by whom. Thus,to inform its readersabout the content of Article 10, rather than rely on their knowledgeof it, Yeniduzenpublished the details of the article in a separatetextbox as backgroundinformation. It can be arguedthat in this context it was an attemptto make its readersaware of this undemocraticarticle in the constitutionthat had given authority to the Turkish military over their electedrepresentatives. The details of Article 10 also appearedin Halkm Sesibut were integratedinto the newstext rather than appearingseparately. The story linked PresidentTalat's debatedpress announcement as the reasonfor the pressrelease issued by the GeneralStaff (Hal/an Sesi,7 January,p. 2). In this context,the integrationof the details of the constitutionalarticle seemedto supportthe legitimacy claims of the Turkish army.
The national official discoursedefining the Republic of Cyprusas the `Greek Cypriot Administration' was again embeddedinto the news discoursesof the newspapers.As part of this discourse,Mehmet All Talat was describedas the `TRNC President',while the Presidentof the Republic of Cyprus,Tassos Papadopoulos, was referred to as the `Greek Cypriot leader', the `GreekCypriot community leader' or the `leaderof the Greek Cypriot administration'.None of the newspapersdescribed him as the President of the Republic of Cyprus.For example,reporting a declarationby Tassos Papadopoulos,Yenidüzen referred to him as the `GreekCypriot leader' while in the sametext describedMehmet Ali Talat as `the President'(Yenidüzen, 13 January,p. 9). In a similar way, Kibris describedhim as the `Greek Cypriot community leader' (Ktbris, 12 January,p. 10) and Hallen Sesi `the GreekCypriot leader' (Hal/an Sesi, 10 January,p. 2) while both called Talat `the President'.Accentuating the presidencyof Mehmet All Talat in relation to the Greek Cypriot presidentnot only reinforced the political legitimacy of the TRNC in relation to the `other' statebut also strengthenedthe role of the nationalistic official ideology in discreditingthe legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus.Not surprisingly, the territory of the Republic of Cypruswas depictedas the `Greek Cypriot side' while the north was identified as the `TRNC'. A news item from TAK concerninga demonstrationorganised in Lefkosia (the south side of Nicosia) reportedthat somepoliticians from the `GreekCypriot side' and sometrade unions,
210 organisationsand groupsfrom the `TRNC' supportedthe event(TAK, 13 January, 2007). The text appearedin the three newspapersbut in YenidiLenthe term 'TRNC' was replacedwith `North Cyprus', probably in an attemptto equally representboth sides.
In the coverageof the developmentsregarding the Lokmaci Bridge, the conceptof citizenship was employedfrequently. For example,K: br:s choseto call the people watching the destructionof the bridge as `citizens' (Kibris, 10 January,p. 4), while Yenidüzendescribed the oneswhose views it reflectedas `citizens' (Yenldi-en, 10 January,p. 10). In Halkin Sesi,the word citizen did not appearin the articles originated by the newspaperitself but in the texts copied from other sourcesand also in the captionsof two photos,again to refer to people in general.But the way the word citizen was usedcreated confusion about its meaning.As well as the generalpublic or ordinary people,anyone who was not categorisedby occupationor other social grouping was referredto as a citizen. For example,Yenidüzen described a group of peoplewho had gatheredto watch the destructionof the bridge as `a crowded group that consistedof mostly citizens,Arasta people/residents,shopkeepers and journalists' (Yenidi. en, 10 January,p. 11). The newspapergrouped the `Arastapeople, the shopkeepersand journalists' in a separategroup from the `citizen' categoryas if being a journalist or a shopkeeperwas different than being a citizen or that one cannotbe both. In other words, the term `citizen' was usedas a generalterm to describeordinary peoplewho could not be identified as belonging to a group basedon occupationalor other social category.A similar classification existed in anotherfeature in the samenewspaper. Reflecting the views of someshopkeepers and other individuals on the removal of the Lokmact Bridge, Yenidüzenagain categorised its intervieweesas `shopkeepersat Arasta' and `citizens' (Yenidüzen,10 January,p. 10).
The other two newspapersalso employedthe term citizen as a meansof categorisation. Kibris, illustrating the sceneat the Lokmaci barricadeafter the removal of the bridge, wrote, `somecitizens and the presswho wantedto seethe barricadewithout the bridge... ' (Kibris, 11 January,p. 4). Also a personwho protestedagainst the demolition of the bridge as it was being taken apart was referredto as a citizen. This person,
211 Makbule Ötüken,who was a well-known personality in the country becauseof her column in a nationalistnewspaper and from other political actions,was referredas a citizen ratherthan any of her other identities (Kibris, 10 January,p. 7). With a strategyof minimisation, the importanceand the impact of her actionswas mitigated becausethey contradictedthe newspaper'sposition. Benefiting from the ideology of consensusin the representationof theseevents, the newspapersingled her out as the only personcreating conflict. Halkin Sesialso separatedthe citizen from somepolitical and civil organisationsby sayingthat, `Many political and civil organisationsand citizens attendedthe demonstration'(Halkan Sesi, 6 January,p. 3). All theseexamples suggest that although in thesecontexts the word citizenship did not emphasizemembership of a nation state,it still indicateda form of belongingto the national community. The identification of belongingto the national community on the basisof citizenship depicts the national community basedon the democraticparticipation of people and the exercise of citizens' rights rather than cultural qualities (Jenkins& Sofos, 1996).Thus, it can be arguedthat suchdepiction indicatedthe conceptualisationand the reconstructionof the nation as Staatsnationwithin the news discourses.
The image of society as a nation state(Billig, 1995;Edensor, 2002) was discernablein the news texts. The representationof the views of citizens,non-governmental organisationsor Membersof Parliamentcontributed to the reproductionof the image of society, which also mirrored the imageof nation. In a way, by printing the pressreleases and public announcementsof different individuals and groups,three newspapers attemptedto reflect the spectrumof opinion within the Turkish Cypriot nation, which also supportedtheir claim to be a democraticplatform of free expression.Yenlditsen in particular, through the reactionsof the political party leaders,trade unions, civil organisationsand businesspeople claimedto ascertainthe views and emotionsof different segmentsof the society aboutthe Lokmaci Bridge (YenldiLcn, 6 January,p. 1). By presentingthe views of different sectionsof the society, Yenfdüen reconstructedthe Turkish Cypriot nation in relation to the Lokmaci issueand the debatessurrounding it and reconstitutedits readersas the membersof the society as well as the nation. The other two newspapers,Kibris and Halkm Sesi,also publishedsimilar public
212 announcementsand statementsbut they limited their reportsto the onesthat reachedthe newsroomrather than presenting any other views. When it cameto reflecting the public's view, Kibris choseto give Greek Cypriot opinions on the issuerather than Turkish Cypriot. It publishedtwo featuresabout the views of shopkeeperson the south side of the barricadebut none from the north (Kibris, 5 January,p. 4 & 12 Januaryp. 2-3). In HallamSesi, neither community's views aboutthe issuewere reported.
Pointing at the role the mediaplay in daily flagging the nation, Billig (1995) notesthat unlessotherwise stated, the context of the newstexts is understoodto be the nation and readersassume that the story they are readingconcerns their nation or that it happened within its boundaries.For example,unless specified otherwise, `the Prime Minister' meansthe prime minister of the country. However, this was not the casein the news articles in both Halkin Sesiand Yenidüzenregarding Talat's meeting in Ankara. Even thoughthe readersof the newstexts were in North Cyprus,both newspapers,having usedthe samenews article, called Turkey's ForeignMinister `the Foreign Minister', the Turkish Foreign Ministry `the Foreign Ministry' and the Turkish GeneralStaff the GeneralStaff' Hal/an Sesi,6 January,p. 5; Yenidüzen,6 January,p. 9) as if they also representedthe TRNC. Suchuse of the definite article `the' for the Turkish authorities was common in Yenidüzen,especially in texts producedby a reporter in Turkey. One such examplewas written by a journalist in Ankara in which s/he statedTalat's statusas the `TRNC President',but describedTurkey's Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and GeneralStaff with the definite article `the', without statingthat they were Turkish: the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the GeneralStaff (Yenldüzen,6 January,p. 8). The samearticle also cited Ankara as `the capital' as if the readerswere in Turkey. Another news article from Ankara also referredto Talat as the `TRNC President'while Turkey's Prime Minister was called `the Prime Minister' (Yenidiizen,11 January,p. 8). All of this could be explainedas a mistakeon the part of the reporter in Turkey or becausethe news text was preparedfor the Turkish media. Yet, it still doesnot explain the reasonfor the newspaperpublishing it without making necessarychanges or editing it for its readers.A similar practicewas also visible in anothertext in the newspaper.In an article that summarisedthe developmentsin the Lokmaci issue,Yenldiizen reported
213 that `Talat, first met with the GeneralStaff who had objectedto the decision of the demolition of the bridge and then with the Foreign Minister Gal' (Yenidüzen,8 January, p. 8) meaningTurkey's Foreign Minister and GeneralStaff. The treatmentof Turkey's ministers and authoritiesin the news discoursesas `the' revealedtheir comprehensionas normal and commonsense. It also strengthenedthe notion of dominanceand governance of the Turkish Cypriot stateby the Turkish one. Contraryto the other two newspapers, Kibris was careful to usethe proper titles for everyone,such as the `Turkish Prime Minister' and the `Turkish Foreign Minister' and so on, eventhough it also benefited from the samenews text as Hal/an Sesiand Yenidüzen(Kibris, 6 January,p. 4). On the other hand,the membersof the GreekCypriot governmentwere referred as `the Greek Cypriot governmentspokesperson' or `the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister'.
Nations are sometimespersonified by their leaders,governments or the capitals of their state.In many news discourses,Mehmet Ali Talat's nameand image stood for the Turkish Cypriot nation. For example,his decisionto removethe bridge was generalised as the decisionof the Turkish Cypriot nation: `PresidentMehmet Ali Talat announced his decisionto dismantlethe bridge at Lokmaci barricadeas a good will gestureof the Turkish side... ' (Kibris, 9 January,p. 4). Although the three newspapersstudied did not employ the personificationstrategy for Talat as much, it still appearedin them when they included reports from other nations' media.Especially in Yenidüzen,which included more news texts from other mediacompared to the other two, the personificationof the nation through the Presidentappeared frequently: `Radikal newspaper:Talat has overcomeLokmaci' (Yenidüzen,7 January,p. 7), `Financial Times: Talat's position strengthened'(Yenidüzen, 13 January,p. 8) meaningthe Turkish because bridge' (Yenldüzen, Cypriots', `the Greek Press:Talat - Ankara conflict of the 7 January,p. 9). In all thesecases, although Talat was portrayedas a single actor, he actually symbolisedthe civil authority in the TRNC. In a similar way, the Presidentof the Republic of Cyprus, TassosPapadopoulos, stood for the Greek Cypriot nation: `even if the bridge is removed,Papadopoulos will not pull the wall down' (Yenidüzen,9 January,p. 9), `Talat reactedto TassosPapadopoulos, the leaderof the Greek Cypriot Administration who put the clearanceof the symbols as a preconditionfor openingthe
214 crossinggate' (Kibris, 10 January,p. 10) or `Papadopouloswants to preventthe opening of Lokmaci by new provocations' (Halk:n Sesi, 13 January,p. 3). Again, in these expressions,although Papadopoulos was presentedas a single agent,his namereplaced the policies and actionsof the Greek Cypriot government,which was an indirect metonym that stood for the Greek Cypriot nation.
The governmentsor capitalsof the stateswere also employedin place of the nation. Ankara, the capital of Turkey, where its parliamentand governmentare based,was employedas a metonymreplacing the Turkish government.Headlining an article as `Approval also from Ankara: The bridge shouldbe removed' (Yenidilzen,6 January, p. 8), Yenidüzenillustrated Turkey as a staterespecting and approving the decisionof anotherand equal state.In the sametext, Yenidüzenused `Ankara' to refer to the Turkish governmentseveral times: " After the tensionon Ankara- Lefko§aline following the TRNC PresidentTalat's decisionto removethe Lokmaci overpass, yesterday there was Cyprus (diplomacy)traffic in the capital. " Ankara that doesnot want any tensionin the TRNC.... " Ankarathat does not wantto leaveTalat in a politicallydifficult situationand causeturmoil in the TRNC.... (Yenidilzen6 January,p. 8)
Lefkoýa,the capitalof the TRNC,was employed only onceas a metonymfor its governmentand this wasin the text quotedabove.
The discoursesabout the Lokmaci Bridge had an interdiscursiverelationship with the discourseon national security that was integratedinto the news. The pressstatements of the Turkish GeneralStaff and also the Turkish Cypriot opposition,especially UBP, employedthe discoursesof national securityin relation to the Lokmaci Bridge. For example,the opposition arguedthat PresidentTalat's decisionhad overlookedsecurity issues(Kibris, 5 January,p. 7; Halkin Sesi,5 January,p. 3). The statementof the military, pointing to the TRNC Constitution,argued that the institution had given the authority for national security to the Turkish Armed Forces,which included the area
215 where the Lokmaci Bridge stood (Kibris, 7 January,p. 4; Yenidüzen,7 January,p. 6; Hal/an Sesi,7 January,p. 2).
National Interest and the Categorisationof `Us' and `Them'
The developmentsregarding the Lokmaci Bridge situation were presentedas conflict. For example,the disagreementbetween TRNC PresidentMehmet Ali Talat and the Turkish General,Büyükanit over the fate of the footbridgewas namedas the `Lokmaci crisis' (Kibris, 5 January,p. 1). PresidentTalat and the Greek Cypriot leader,Tassos Papadopoulos,were also portrayedas being in conflict about the opening of the Lokmaci crossing.On a public level, the shopkeeper'sdemonstration was depictedas a conflict betweenthe group that claimed to be the `real' representativesof the shopkeepersand the one which organisedthe rally. The constructionof the developmentsas conflicts enhancedthe boundariesbetween `us' and `them'. Therefore, binary categorisationwith the positive self-presentationand negativeportrayal of the `other' was commonin the news discourses.
The deictic expressionof `we' as an expressionof self-presentationof nation rarely occurredin the news articles. It appearedin Yenidüzenonly once in the expression,`our country's agenda',referring to the nation (Yenidüzen,10 January,p. 10). Otherwise,the `we' group was implicitly embeddedin the selectionand constructionof the newstexts. In many contexts,it constitutedthe Turkish Cypriot nation and in somecases referred to the group expressingan opinion. At times, who it referredto was unclear.As an example,Halkin Sesiquoted Talat in its headlineas saying `We have no problem with the GeneralStaff' (Hal/an Sesi,6 January,p. 1) without indicating whether `we' stood for the President'sOffice or the Turkish Cypriot nation. The sameambiguity existed in Yenidüzen'sheadline, a quote from an interview with PresidentTalat, `We have been wounded' (Yenidüzen,10 January,p. 1). Again, it was vaguewhether these were the words of the newspaperor the personinterviewed, Mehmet Ali Talat, or if the word `we' referredto the Presidentor the Turkish Cypriot nation.
216 The representationof the `other' group varied dependingon the newspaperand the context of its construction.It appearedfrequently and the identity of the group it referred to was clearer.For example,`they' meaningthe GreekCypriot governmentKibris wrote, `they are looking for excusesnot to knock the wall down' (Kibris, 4 January, p.6). Putting the leadersof Turkish Cypriot oppositionparties in the position of `they', Yenidüzen,a newspaperthat backedthe government,claimed that `they bumped(or hit) againstthe wall' (Yenidüzen,6 January,p. 1).
The conceptof national interestplays a role in the constructionof `us' and `them' groups.Reicher and Hopkins (2001) note that the inclusion of the `we' group and the `other' group is basedon the conceptof national interest.Far from being a fixed notion, national interestchanges and also determinesthe treatmentof the `other'. If say,they enhance the nationalinterest, they are to be embraced;if theythreaten the national interestthey are to be rejected.This meansthat one can view otherspositively as well as negativelyand also that one can view someothers positively while viewing different othersnegatively. All dependsupon the way in which the national interestis construed,the way the other is construedand hencethe natureof the relationship betweenthe two of them (p.77).
Therefore,the different national interestssupported by the newspapersdetermined who the `us' and `other' were in this caseas well. Even though all the newspapersreported the views of various groupswithin the society,the ideologically close oneswere given preferential treatmentdepending on the newspaper'sconceptualisation of the national interest.For example,Yenidüzen and Kibris' coverageof the issuefavoured the removal of the bridge and representedit as being in the interestof the nation and depictedthe groupswho opposedor obstructedit as the `other' group. In contrast,Halkin Sesibacked the groupsthat saw the move as a concessionto the Greek Cypriot government's demands.In short, whether the groupsdefended or opposedthe removal of the bridge defined the `us' and `them' groups for the newspapers.
217 Yenidüzen
In Yenidüzen,the imageof the Turkish Cypriot nation was shownas being synonymous with the imageof PresidentTalat. Interviewing him on the Lokmaci issue,including the disputeshe had with the Turkish Military authorities,Yenidüzen printed the interview on its front pagewith a headline:`We have beenwounded' (Yenidüzen,10, January,p.! ). Neither who `we' referredto nor if thesewords belongedto the newspaperor the Presidentwere clear. Only a closer examinationshowed that thesewere not Talat's exact words but an interpretationof them by the newspaper.According to a transcript of the interview which was publishedby the newspaper,Talat had usedthe word `wounded' on two occasions:First, `Contraryto all thesedevelopments, we should have shown that Turkish Cypriots are the onesmaking decisionsand carrying them out. Has this process left me in a difficult situation,wounded me? Yes, it left me in a difficult situation and woundedme' (Yenidüzen,10 January,p. 6). Second,`If you look at who is woundedby this event,according to me, everyonegot wounded.First of all, the Cyprus causegot wounded' (Yenidüzen,10, January,p. 7). The newspaperreplaced the expression `everyone'with `we'. Yenidüzen,in the highlights on the front page,also quotedTalat as saying it was the Turkish side which was woundedbut thesewords did not appearin the main interview text. The omissionor the differencesin certain words could be the result of the reproductionprocess. Some words may be left out of the text as part of the summarisingprocess of the reporterwho was actually the Editor-in-Chief of the paper, Cenk Mutluyakali.
Supportiveof the Turkish Cypriot leader'sdecision, Yenidüzenprinted more news articles favouring the idea of dismantlingthe footbridge. Although the views of the opposition also appearedin the paper,most of the storiesin Yenidüzenwere the opinions of different groups and organisationsin the TRNC which backedits removal (Yenidüzen, 6 January,2007). The news reports involving the opposition groupsshowed more variation than the onesthat supportedit and carried a certain degreeof sarcasm.For example,when a group of shopkeeperscalled Asmaalti and Arasta RetailersAssociation demonstratedagainst the bridge being removedbefore the Greek Cypriot government
218 knockeddown the wall on their side, Yenidüzenreported the eventvery briefly. During the protestmarch, which was also supportedby the rightwing political parties with a nationalist stance,the group cameinto a conflict with anotherassociation called the `Union of Turkish Cypriot Retailersand Artisans'. The latter accusedthe first one of being fake and thereforenot representingthe interestsof the shopkeepersin the area.In its coverageof the demonstration,Yenidüzen was not very sympatheticto the demonstratinggroup and supportedthe idea that they were `fake': `during the "demonstration"there were argumentsbetween the real retailersand the group that calls itself "Asmaalti and Arasta RetailersAssociation" which had actually come there from outside Lefko§a' (Yenidüzen,6 January,p. 8). In the two photographsof the event,the chairmanof the Union of Turkish Cypriot Retailersand Artisans, the group which opposedand interruptedthe rally, was in focus rather than the demonstrators. Meanwhile, by putting the word `demonstration'in quotationmarks, Yenidüzen questionedthe definition of their action as a demonstration.
Yenidüzen'streatment of the oppositionpolitical partieswas no different. Having Yenidüzen, announcedthat the conflict over the footbridgewas resolved, on it front page,criticised two right-wing, oppositionpolitical party leaderswho had opposedTalat over the overpassissue: The oppositionleaders who are not supportingTalat and who have beenreinforcing the `civil authority- military unrest/tension'with their statementshit a wall yesterdaywhen the Military opposedthe abolishmentof the bridge at Lokmaci barricadeand Talat who is in office with the supportof the majority public gavesignals of resignation. Ertugruloglu, the leaderof UBP and Denkta§,the leaderof DP, succeededonce more in falling contrary to the will of Turkish Cypriots. (Yenidilzen,6 January,p. 1).
Therewere no furtherdetails or referencesto this long statementanywhere else in the newspaper.The colloquial phraseof `hit a wall' not only meantthat both politicians madea significant error but also, evoking the wall on the GreekCypriot side, also portrayedthem being as uncompromisingas the Greek Cypriot leadership.The text appearedon the sameday that the newspaperannounced a consensushad beenreached about the removal of the bridge. Equatingthe `supportof the majority of the public' with
219 the `will of Turkish Cypriots' and reproducingtheir national interestas the sameas Talat's decision,Yenidüzen portrayed the two politicians as the `other' who were working againstthe national will and the interestof the Turkish Cypriot nation. In other words, by defining the dismantlingof the Lokmaci Bridge as being in the national interest,national identity was invoked in the argumentagainst the intereststhese two politicians represented.The discoursealso createda senseof consensusin which the interestof the public was given as the sameand undivided. Benefiting from the ideology of consensusto createbacking for the President,the newspapernot only implied that everyoneagreed with it on the issuebut also showedit as if the public's interestswere the sameas the actionsand policies of the stateauthorities. By doing this, the newspaper gave an impressionof public supportto the governinggroups, which strengthenedtheir authority and position in power. On the other hand,by employing the expression`one more time' for the actionsof the opposition,the newspapersuggested that what they had done had happenedbefore, thereby establishingtheir behaviouras a trait.
Yenidüzen'streatment of the oppositionwas not an isolatedcase. On its front page, Yenidüzenused headlines from two storiesthat involved statementsfrom the leadersof two oppositionparties, DP and UBP. Pointing at the DP leader,it combinedhis quote with its own comment:`Serdar Denktag still doesnot have any hope: is there anyone who believesthat the bridge will be removed' and for the UBP leader it said `Ertugruloglu continuedto accuseTalat: the Presidentis at fault' (Yenidiizen,7 January, p.! ). The words `still' and `continued' belongedto the newspaperand suggesteda continuation in the behaviourof the oppositionleaders. These expressions attributed the characteristicof `pessimism'to one, while showing the other as someonewho was critical of the President.In short, employing a predicationalstrategy, the newspaper constructedboth opposition leadersas social actorswho belongedto the `out-group' and indicatedthem as having negativetraits. Furthermore,juxtaposed alongside their statementswas the news that the demolition of the bridge would start the following day, as if it to say, `whetheryou believe it or not, the bridge will be removedtomorrow'. To enhancethe effect of its practice, Yenidüzentwisted Denkta§'swords by changingthem. Having reportedhis words as being `is there anyonewho believesthat the bridge will be
220 removed' on its front page,the main text which appearedinside revealedthat what he actually said was, `is there anyonewho believesthat the wall will be pulled down when the bridge is removed' (Yenidüzen,7 January,p. 8). He was talking about the wall on the Greek Cypriot side of the border,not the Lokmaci Bridge. The layout of the stories inside also constituteda responseto the leaders:next to the statementsof both politicians therewere two photos of signpostsat the Lokmaci footbridge that said `to be openedsoon' in Turkish, English, Greek and German(Yenidi&en, 7 January,p. 8). This clearly reflectedthe newspaper'sperspective regarding the Lokmaci debate.
The languageused in the constructionof the news texts which involved the opposition groupswas also different from the one usedfor the governinggroups. While anything the stateofficials said was constructedas the `truth' and the verbs such as `noted', `stated', `said', `emphasised'were usedto mark it, the statementsof the oppositionwere given as `claims', `suggestions'or simply as expressingtheir opinions rather than pointing at facts. Suchuse of languagenot only discreditedthe statementsof the oppositionbut also reinforcedthe power of the governinggroups and their portrayal as the `authority'. Authoritarian tonesof the official discoursesin the news texts were also employedto increasethe factuality of what was being reportedwhile it left the othersas mere suggestions.
The Greek Cypriot administrationwas also characterisedas the `other'. In contrastto the positive image of the Turkish Cypriot administration,whose actions were presentedas a contribution to the settlementprocess, and contributing to an improvementin relations betweenthe two communities,the actionsof the Greek Cypriot administrationwere depictedas obstructive. Yenidüzendepicted the Greek Cypriot government'spolicies as being threateningand againstthe national interestof Turkish Cypriots. It describedthe governmentas `unwilling' (Yeniduzen,6 January,p. 8) to openthe Lokmaci crossingand accusedit of wanting `more', `No news of the wall but!.. the Greek Cypriot Administration wants even more' (Yenidüzen,11 January,p. 5), meaningmore concessions.The paper was also critical of the Greek Cypriot governmentbenefiting from the conflict betweenthe TRNC Presidentand the Turkish Army Generalin their
221 propagandaagainst the TRNC and its leadership:`Turkey's GeneralStaff's attitude aboutthe Lokmaci gatehas beenturned into "material" by the GreekCypriot administration' (Yenidüzen,9 January,p. 13). It also mockedthe Greek Cypriot governmentspokesperson, Christodoulos Pashardis, for repeatinghis statementabout Talat having no authority: `Pashardis'record has got stuck again' (Yenidüzen,11 January,p. 8). Yenidüzendescribed the demandsof the Greek Cypriot governmentfor all symbolsbelonging to the TRNC to be removedas a `new obsessionin Lokmaci' (Yenidüzen,4 January,p. 7).
Kibris
Ktbris' categorisationof the `us-group' and `them-group',as in Yenidiiaen,was basedon who supportedand who opposedthe removal of the bridge. The analysisrevealed that Kibris also backedTalat's decisionand henceprovided a positive representationof him. For example,following the conflict with the military, it quotedTalat with a firm expressionthat showedhis determination:`the bridge will be removed' (Kibris, 6 January,p. 1). Along with that story, the paper also had four news articles that supported the decisionto removethe overpass.On anotheroccasion, quoting Talat in its headline concerningthe wall on the Greek Cypriot side,Kibris again attributed a determined voice to him, `That wall will be pulled down' (Kibris, 2 January,p. 1), which portrayed the Presidentas being resolvedin his decisions.Publishing reports that someGreek Cypriots, or the membersof the `other' group, supportedthe dismantling of the bridge strengthenedthe perceptionof Talat's pronouncementas a positive one. Reflecting the views of Greek Cypriot shopkeepersin favour of openingthe Lokmact crossingwas one such example.Another was the report abouta Greek Cypriot opposition party which praisedthe removal of the bridge as `a very brave step', (Kibris, 10 January,p. 5).
In contrast,the constructionof the news article about the rally organisedby a group of shopkeepersto protest againstthe removal of the Lokmaci footbridge aimed to discredit the group and the event. Having useda newsagency dispatch as well as its own
222 reporter'snotes, the newspapermarked the event as not representingthe interestsof the shopkeepersand accusedthe demonstrationand the demonstratorsof being `fake' and `remotecontrolled' (Kibris, 6 January,p. 7). Informing its readersthat the Asmaalti and Arasta RetailersAssociation demonstrated at Lokmaci, Kibris immediatelyadded that the retailersin Asmaalti and Arasta did not join the event,which implied that they did not supportit. According to the paper,most of the demonstratorsconsisted of uniformed policemenand military personnel.The term `remotecontrolled' was an expressionused by the other associationthat had claimedto be the real representativesof the shopkeepersand Kibris employedit in its text. Yet, despitethe strongtone of this accusation,the paperemployed a linguistic exclusionto the peopleit claimed were controlling the demonstrationand did not raisequestions about their identity in the text.
Like Yenidüzen,Kibris also benefitedfrom the idea and discourseof consensusto illustrate the Turkish Cypriot nation as united in their supportof the president'sdecision: `As the Turkish side applaudsthe abolishmentof the bridge with a wish for the demolishingof the wall, now the discussionis as to what the Papadopoulos administrationwill do' (Kibris, 10 January,p.! ). The `Turkish side' not only included the representativesof the nation but the nation itself. Further down the page,the newspaperannounced that `everyonewas there' to watch the bridge being taken apart. `Everyone' included the stateand governmentauthorities, the representativesof foreign countries,civil society organisationsand citizens.The expressionalso implied for consensuswithin societyon the issue,as well as internationalsupport the removal of the bridge.
Nor was the attitude towardsthe Greek Cypriot shopkeeperswho were supportiveof the Greek Cypriot governmentpositive. Discoveringthat the views of the Greek Cypriot shopkeeperswere the sameas their government,Kibris castthem as being under the influence of their administrationrather than as individuals with free will: In Ledra Streetwhere the Greek Cypriot National Council's view is dominant,the openingof the Lokmaci gate by Turks is supportedonly if the conditionsput forward by the Greek Cypriot leaderTasos Papadopulos are met (Kibris, 12 January,p. 3).
223 Halkin Sesi
Hal/an Sesi gave more coverage to views that opposed the removal of the bridge. A study of the accessedsources in Halkin Sesi indicated that even though there was a reflection of diverse views, wider coverage was given to the opinions of the opposition and nationalist groups that contested the decision and described it as giving in to the Greek Cypriot government. For example, the press statementsby Serdar Denktab, an opposition party leader, were reported in length. Halkin Sesi even published a its photograph showing him climb up the footbridge in the centre of front page, even though there was no story that involved him on that page. The story underneath the demonstration photograph was totally unrelated to him but was about the of the shopkeepers (Hal/an Sesi, 5, January, p. 1).
Halkin Sesireflected the rally organisedby the Asmaalti and Arasta Retailers Associationdifferently. It did not mention the allegationsof the associationabout the demonstrationbeing `fake' and `remotecontrolled' or the conflict betweenthe two it groupswhich occurredduring the rally. On the contrary, representedthe event as if the retailers in Asmaalti and Arastahad attendedit in general(Hal/an Sesi, 6 January,p. 3). The story also appearedon its front page,with somephotographs of the demonstrators carrying Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot flags. The demonstrationwas portrayed as a call to the Greek Cypriot peopleto pull the wall on their side down rather than a protest againstthe removal of the Lokmaci Bridge (Halkin Sesi,6 January,p. l). This castthe action as a peacefulcall to the `other' ratherthan as oppositionto the President.
The representationof Talat in Halkin Sesiwas also dissimilar to that of Yenidüzenand Kibris. Although the news article about Talat's meeting in Ankara was the sameas Yenidüzen's,Halkin Sesi's transformationof the story createda different effect. Rather than highlighting that he and the GeneralStaff had reconciledtheir differencesregarding the Lokmaci issueand thereforethe bridge would be removed,Halkin Sesichose to draw attentionto Talat's denial of claims that a conflict existedbetween them: `we have no problem with the GeneralStaff (Hal/an Sesi,6 January,p. 5). Sinceno news report
224 about the conflict betweenthe Presidentand the GeneralStaff had appearedearlier in the newspaper,the headlinecreated a questionmark aboutthe relationshipbetween thesetwo institutions.Neither did the paperoffer any explanationas to whether `we' referredto the Turkish Cypriot nation or the PresidentialOffice.
Hallan Sesi'streatment of Talat's statementafter the meetingin Ankara is also worth somescrutiny. Having publishedthe news article that includedwhat Talat had said regardingthe outcomeof the meeting,Hallan Sesiinserted a separatetext box in the middle of the main article. Inside the box, it publishedtwo statementswritten in passive sentencesthat gavethe impressionthat they were allegationsmade by other sources rather than by the newspaper.Yet, their aim was to raisedoubts about Talat's decision and whether it was approvedby Turkey: It's beenalleged that the `Lokmaci Barricade' gatethat is plannedto be openedto the GreekCypriot side causeddisagreement between President Mehmet Ali Talat and the army in North Cyprus. It's also beensaid that the reasonfor Talat's hastyvisit to Ankara to meet the General Staff Ya; ar Bilyükamt and Foreign Minister GUIwas to overcomethis problem(Halkin Sesi,6 Januaryp. 5).
Both statements,written in passivesentences, hid the responsiblesocial actorsbehind the remarks.Their passivestructure enhanced the impressionthat they were rumours which helpedthe paperto distanceitself from them.
Differences in the Representationof the `Other'
The President'sannouncement about the removal of the Lokmaci footbridge encounteredopposition from inter-nationaland intra-nationalgroups. Yet, the treatment of thesegroups changed depending on the newspaper.Although both the Turkish demands military and the Greek Cypriot governmentmade some regardingthe Lokmaci footbridge, the Greek Cypriot oneswere denouncedstrongly as interfering in the Turkish TRNC's internal affairs while such criticism againstthe military was
225 downplayed.The differencesin the attitudestowards these groups were obvious: on the one hand,the institution of Turkey, a country on which the TRNC's existencedepends and had a relationshipbased on dominanceand dependencewhich was taken for granted.On the other handwas the country not only castas the `enemy' for yearsbut, as its governmentconsisted of nationalist forces,was regardedto be working againstthe national interestsof Turkish Cypriots in particular by not openingthe Lokmaci gate. Thus, while noneof the newspapersraised questions about the disputebetween the Turkish Cypriot leaderand the Turkish military authorities,they all reproducedthe statementsof TRNC staterepresentatives reacting angrily to the preconditionsput forward by the GreekCypriot government.For example,Yenidüzen, adopting a colloquial style, criticised the GreekCypriot government:`there is no news of the wall (no developmentregarding the wall- SS)but!.. The GreekCypriot administrationwants "even more"' (Yenidüzen,11 January,p. 5). The translationdoes not reflect the real denotationand sarcasmin the expressionbut it expressesthat the Greek Cypriot government'sdemands were unreasonable.
The disputebetween powerful institutions suchas the Presidencyand the Turkish army was also reflecteddifferently than that betweenthe oppositionand government.Kibris showedthe Turkish military to be the causeof the obstructionof the bridge demolition process:`the military authoritiesare obstructingthe removal of the bridge in Lokmaci' (5 January,p.! ). Describingthe whole issueas a `bridge crisis' on its front page (Kibris, 5 January,p. 1), Kibris pointed the finger at the Turkish military for objecting to the removal of the footbridge: `the army is againstit' (Kibris, 5 January,p. 1). Yet, by employing the generalterm `army' as a generalisingsynecdoche to refer to the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces,the newspaperavoided targeting anyonespecifically. Nor did it specify the military authoritiesas Turkish, as it treatedthe information that the TRNC's national territory and borderswere guardedby the Turkish Armed Forcesas commonsense. Yet, it approachedthe pressstatement issued by the GeneralSecretary's Office more cautiously. It publishedthe statementwhich identified the control and authority of the Lokmaci areaas belonging to the Turkish Armed Forceswith the same official discourseused in the statement.The only differencebetween the news article
226 and the pressrelease was the personificationof the Armed Forcesin the headline,in comparisonto the impersonalisedstyle of the official discourse:`We have the authority' (Kibris, 7 January,p. 4). Through a strategyof personification,the Turkish Armed Forceswere put in a subjectposition. Used to give a humanform to such an entity, this strategyhelps people to identify with it but also againstit (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). As the `we' in this expressionwas inclusive of the Armed Forcesand exclusive of the civil authority the newspapersympathised with, the expressionwas not meantto encourage its readers'identification with the armedforces. On the contrary, it createda feeling of exclusion.
Yenidüzen'sconstruction of the military as the `other' was different from its treatmentof the political oppositionin the country. It seemedcautious in its coverageof the General Staff's role in the disputeand avoidedthe criticism it applied to the intra-national opposition.Nevertheless, in its reproductionof the statementreleased by the Turkish GeneralStaff, the newspaperlinked democracydiscussions within the country to the TRNC Constitutionthat gavea legal basisto the Turkish Armed Forces' authority in North Cyprus.By invoking the debatesregarding the undemocraticnature of the article, Yenidüzenimplied that despitethe constitution,the presenceof the Turkish army in the TRNC was not very democraticand was not welcomedby democratsin the country (Yenidüzen,7 January,p. 6), which suggestedindirect criticism of the presenceof the army in the TRNC.
Nonetheless,both newspaperswere cautiousoverall and avoidedwriting anything challengingabout the Turkish army. This could also be the underlying reasonwhy both newspapersadopted an impersonalvoice to report the protestsof somecivil organisationsagainst the Turkish general'sbehaviour, which was perceivedas underminingTalat's authority and indirectly dishonouringthe free will of Turkish Cypriots. Copying the news agencydispatch with very little editing (Yenidüzen shortenedit) both newspapersdistanced themselves from the event. Yenidüzenchose not to include the story on its front-page,as Kibris and Halkin Sesihad. Kibris' headlinewas `Protestagainst violation of free will', without specifying whosewill it was. It put the
227 words `violation of free will' in quotationmarks, supposedlyto highlight them, but did not add that it referredto the will of Turkish Cypriots (Kibris, 9 January,p.! ). Yenidüzen'sheadline was only a quotation from the declarationthat was read during the rally: `we protestagainst the violation of the free will of the people' (Yenidüzen,9 January,p. 8). The paperwas careful to attribute thesewords to the organisers.In contrast,Hallan Sesi'sheadline stressed the nameof only one organisationin the demonstration,even though it was a joint effort by three organisations,with some shopkeepersin the areajoining in as well: `Demonstrationby This Country is Ours Platform to supportTalat' (Hal/an Sesi,9 January,p. 3).
Comparedto the other two newspapers,Halkin Sesireflected in more detail the Turkish army's perspectiveon the Lokmaci dispute.As well as publishing a pressrelease from the military office, the newspaperalso speculatedthat the Generalhimself would publicly announcehis disapprovalof the demolition of the bridge a day before such a statementwas issued(Hallam Sesi, 7 January,p. 1). Therewere no further details as to the newspaper'sprediction in the inner pagesbut the next day it published a news article that had appearedin Milliyet, a mainstreamTurkish daily newspaper,that included an accountof the GeneralStaff Biiyükanrt's views that proved the paperright. It was only Halkin Sesithat printed the article in detail. While the story did not appearin Kibris at all, Yenidüzensummarised and integratedit into anotherarticle about recent developmentson the issue(Yenidüzen, 8 January,p. 8).
The announcementthat a group called `Citizensfor the Openingof Ledra', which was set up by Greek Cypriots campaigningfor the openingof Lokmaci, got front page coveragein the newspapers.It was a caseof the `other' expressingsupport for an issue that was seenas being in the national interestof Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, it got positive coveragefrom the newspapersas it reinforcedthe official discoursethat the openingof Lokmaci was for the mutual benefit of both communities.Having labelled the wall on the south side as a `wall of shame',Yenidüzen stated that the demonstration was organisedby a group called `Citizens for the Openingof Ledra', comprisedof Greek Cypriots campaigningfor the openingof the Lokmaci crossinggate (Yenidiizen,
228 12 January, p. 1). It framed the group as being supportive of the Turkish Cypriots' demand for the opening of the crossing. Similarly, Halkin Sesi also reported that `the Greek Cypriots who wanted Lokmaci to be opened' were going to demonstrate for it. Kibris announced that `Citizens for the Opening of Ledra' was going to demonstrate in front of the Lokmaci barricade on its front page, without defining them as Greek Cypriots (Kibris, 12 January, p. 1). It explained in its inner pages that it was a Greek Cypriot group who supported the opening of Ledra Street.
While the removal of the bridge at Lokmaci was shown as a sign of the Turkish Cypriots' resolutionfor peaceand readinessto take stepstowards it, the existenceof the wall in the southside was usedto portray the GreekCypriot administrationas the opposite.All the newspapersemployed the derogatorynames produced for the wall in the official discoursessuch as the `wall of shame'used by the TRNC Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyeron many occasions(Kibris, 6 January,p. 8, Halkin Sesi, 6 January,p. 4; Yenidüzen,11 January,p. 4). Yenidüzenused the phrasein relation to the demonstration by `Citizens for the Openingof Ledra': `Demonstrationagainst the wall of shame' (Yenidüzen,12 January,p.! ) as well as defining it as `Papadopoulos'wall of shame' (Yenidüzen,14 January,p. 1). A likenessbetween the wall in Nicosia and Berlin was also producedwithin the official discoursesand was again adoptedin the news discourses. All the newspapersreported the Prime Minister's speechin which he had describedit as `a wall of shamelike the Berlin Wall' (Kibris, 12 January,p. 5, Halkin Sesi, 12 January, p.2; Yenidüzen,12 January,p. 8). The comparisonwith the Berlin Wall appearedin Yenidüzenonce more, when someGerman tourists talked about the similarity between the walls (Yenidüzen,9 January,p. 9).
The Linguistic Construction of a CommonPast: the Time before the Lokmac: Barricade
The referenceto a commonpast rarely occurredin the dataanalysed as the newspapers did not often reconstructthe past in their newsarticles. One suchreflection was in the
229 reproductionof the speechthat the TRNC Prime Minister Soyermade. Pointing out that Lokmaci was the first placewhere the division betweenboth communitieshad occurred, Soyer describedthe barricadeas the first one set up by Turkish Cypriots to protect themselvesand to resistthe enosismovement. Referring in his speechto the conflict years of the past, Soyerdepicted the wall on the southside of Ledra Streetas a symbol of the Enosismovement and claimed that it had no place in today's Cyprus (Kibris, 12 January,p. 5, Halkm Sesi, 12 January,p. 2; Yenfdüzen,12 January,p. 8). Illustrating the past as conflict and the presentas peacefulreinforced the image of the Turkish Cypriot administrationbeing the pro-solution side in contrastto the Greek Cypriot side.
In the newspapertexts, the commonpast occurredonly twice. The first was when Yenidüzenintegrated the history of the Lokmaci barricadeinto the definition of the bridge: `it is still unknown what will happento the footbridge on Ledra Streetthat used to function as a single streetbefore Cypruswas divided into two zonesin 1963' (Yenidüzen,8 January,p. 8). Further down the text, it remindedreaders that strife betweenthe two communitieswas the reasonfor the Lokmaci barricadebeing established:`the first barricadethat was set up betweenthe Turkish and Greek Cypriot in 1963 inter-communal in Cyprus ' (Yenidüzen, streets when the conflict started ... 8 January,p. 8).
The secondremark about the past appearedin Kibris when its editorial team visited Ledra Streetto get the views of Greek Cypriot shopkeepers.The article reportedthat Greek Cypriots `expressedtheir wish to live as in the past when there were no borders and checkpointsin Cyprus' (Kibris, 12 January,p. 3).
Recenthistory, basedon the actionsof the `other', was also embeddedin the news discourses.The newspapersused the majority Greek Cypriot `no' vote in the referendum on the Annan Plan as a metaphorfor their political attitude.Pointing to the Greek Cypriot political parties that campaignedfor a `no' vote in the referendum,Kibris wrote, `startingwith the Greek Cypriot community leader,Tassos Papadopoulos, all the 'pro- ' (Kibris, 10). Yenidüzen to the no' political parties ... 12 January,p. also alluded
230 referendumby sayingthat `this time the soundof "oxi (no) to the barricades"came from the South' (Yenidüzen,14 January,p. 1). By employing the Greekword `oxi' in its text, which frequentlyhad appearedin the Turkish Cypriot mediato reflect the opinion of the majority of GreekCypriots on the Annan Plan, Yenidüzenreferred to common knowledgeof the recentpast.
Future: Will the Wall be demolished?
In the coverageof the Lokmaci issue,there were three main issuesthat reflected concernsabout the presentand the future. Thesewere the national security conditions, the imageof the Turkish Cypriot nation stateas a sovereignone and the future of the wall.
Reporting on the disputebetween the TRNC Presidentand the Turkish military fact authoritiesover the footbridge, Yenidüzenhighlighted the that the national security Armed Forces of the country was underthe authority of the Turkish `until the conditions justifying are appropriate' (Yenidüzen,7 January,p. 6). As well as the military's presence at present,the phrasealso voiced an expectationof a changein the future when there would no longer be a needfor the Turkish army to remain on the island.
The opposition of the Turkish military authoritiesto Talat's decision to dismantlethe overpasswas portrayedas damagingto the image of Turkish Cypriot sovereign statehood.Such a depiction was discerniblein both Yenidüzenand Kibris but was particularly strong in Yenidüzen'sinterview with Talat, in which he expressedthe opinion that the nation's imagehad beeninjured. It also exposedthe limitations of the authority of civil staterepresentatives in mattersof national security.
The future of the wall in SouthNicosia was also transformedinto a national expectation. Its destructionwas given as the only obstructionto the openingof the Lokmaci crossing. Especially after the removal of the footbridge, all the newspapersturned their attention
231 to the fate of the wall which actedas a barrier betweenthe two sides.Benefiting from the public declarationsof politicians and governmentrepresentatives, the demolition of the wall was illustratedas a stepthat would bring both communitiescloser together.
Conclusion
The casestudy revealedthat after the referendumon the Annan Plan, the dominant national self-perceptionwas similar to the one shapedofficially, which was mainly as Turkish Cypriot and Turk. Unlike the previous two cases,there was no emphasison Cypriot identity but more on a Turkish Cypriot one. Turkey and the TRNC continuedto be categorisedas the Turkish side in relation to the Republic of Cyprus. In other words, in a conflict with GreekCypriots, Turkish Cypriot newspapershad adoptedthe Turkish identity and thereforethe term, the Turkish side was employedfrequently to emphasise their distinction from them. The practicewas not only noticeablein HallernSesi which Kibris. continuedwith its nationalistdiscourse but also in Yenidüzenand Yenidüzen's interesting adoptionof Turkish discoursein relation to Greek Cypriots was as over the years it had beenpromoting a Cypriot identity which highlighted the common characteristicsof the two communities.The identity of Turkish Cypriots becamea topic of debate,not only in relation to GreekCypriots but also to Turks as well. The national identity that was defined as Turkish when constructedin opposition to Greek Cypriots, was switchedto Turkish Cypriot when renegotiatedin relation to the Turkish army. In other words, despitethe discourseof unity with Turks, Turkish Cypriot identity still stresseda divergence.As a result, an articulation of Turkish Cypriot identity, which emphasiseda distinction betweenthe Turkish nation and Greek Cypriots, was discerniblein the newspaperdiscourses. All this confirms that the conceptualisation of national identity was context bound.
The underlying reasonbehind downplayingthe identity of Cypriot could be explained by two factors: First, the Greek Cypriots' rejection of the Annan Plan in the referendum in 2004, in contrastto Turkish Cypriots' vote in favour of the plan, had causedmuch
232 disappointment,especially among the groupswho supportedthe conceptof a Cypriot national identity. From the Turkish Cypriot's point of view, with their `no-vote' in the referendum,Greek Cypriots not only rejecteda settlementplan that would allow both communitiespeaceful existence on the island but also crushedthe notion of Cypriotness as a collective identity that included both communities.
Second,with the election of a new governmentand President,the political dynamicsof the country had changed.Despite being from CTP, a political party on the left that had beena promoter of Cypriot identity, the governmentand the Presidentintegrated their political party discourseinto the stateone, which resembledthat of the previous nationalist government.Yenfdüzen's affiliation and Kibris' sympathytowards the new governmentwere reflected in their news discoursesand both newspapersembedded its official discourseinto their news texts. As the formal discoursestressed Turkish Cypriotnessand also spokeof the Turkish side in relation to Greek Cypriots, both of theseterms appearedmore frequently in the newspaperswhen comparedto Cypriotness.
In summary,the overall analysisshowed that the discursiveconstruction of national identity was basedon the conceptsof Turkish Cypriot and Turkishnessin all three newspapers.Having adoptedthe official discourse,none of the newspapersshowed much variation in their national self-perceptionand the expressionof it. Therefore, despitethe differentiation along political lines, the constructionof the nation did not show any deviation but, on the contrary, complied with the official one. Unlike the previous cases,there was no attackingof one nationalism in order to defend another (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Each newspaperalso benefitedfrom the ideology of consensusto show their perspectiveof eventswas agreedupon by the generalpublic. Using the languageof consensus,the newspapersdepicted the public as supportiveof the national interestthey promoted.Articulation of consensus,as if agreementhad been reached,led to the perceptionthat any differing view was a deviation from common sense.
233 Like the previouscases, there was positive self-presentationand negative `other' presentationin the newspapers.Yet, the context of the categorisationof `us' and `them' varied dependingupon the newspaperand the context.For example,adopting the Turkish Cypriot leadership'sdiscourse, the newspapersrepresented the removal of the bridge as a steptowards increasing cooperation between the two communities in contrast to the Greek Cypriot government'sobstruction of it. The Greek Cypriot governmentwas pictured as the `other' in all three newspapers.
When it cameto internal politics, the categorisationof `us' and the `other' showed variation. Differentiation along political lines, in terms of national views and ideologies, played a role in the constructionof the `in-groups' and `out-groups' of the newspapers. Yenidüzenand Kibris categorisedthe groupsthat supportedthe Presidentin the `Lokmaci crisis' as `us' and presentedthem in a positive way while the opposition groupsthat disagreedwith the decisionwere treatedas the `other'. In Halkin Sesi,the situation was the other way round. Opposingviews to the policies and actionsof the Presidentgot extensivecoverage throughout the period studied.These belonged to actors such as the main oppositionparties and civil organisationswith nationalist ideologies.Nonetheless, in the overall representation,two distinct discoursesemerged: One was the discourseof the governmentand the Presidentthat the footbridge would be beneficial in facilitating relations betweenthe two communities.The other was the discourseof the opposition groupsand Turkish army officials which employedthe discourseof national security.
The disputebetween two powerful institutions,the Turkish army authorities and the TRNC Presidentwas anotherissue that createda dichotomy of `us' and the `other'. Yet, neither got any strong criticism or negativerepresentation. For example,none of the lied his newspapersquestioned why PresidentTalat to the public about meeting in Only Yenidüzen Ankara, meaningthat none of them perceivedthis as a problem. quoted for his behaviour it because him in an interview, giving as an explanation that was he did the Turkish not want to give the impressionthat conflicting opinions existedwithin side issue being debated, (Yenidüzen,10 January,p. 6). However,when the was none of them,
234 including Yenidüzen,challenged or questionedthe Presidenton his stanceat the time. At the sametime, eventhough the disagreementwith the Turkish army over Lokmaci damagedthe imageof Turkish Cypriot statehoodand attractedthe criticism of thosewho protestedits national autonomy,the military was not so stronglyportrayed as the `other'. Seemingly,the newspaperswere reluctantto criticise it. Therefore,strategies of avoidanceand suppressionof differenceswere employedand the consensusrather than conflict betweenthese social actorswas highlighted in the news articles. The criticism of the army was detectableonly in Yenidüzenand Kibris, while in Halkin Sesi,which had arguedin favour of Turkey's presencein North Cyprus for the security of Turkish Cypriots, supportof the army was more obvious.
There was no discursivepractice based on the essentialistconception of national identity. Productionof national identity basedon cultural elementsrarely occurredin the newstexts. Instead,there was an emphasison citizenship,which indicatedthe perceptionof the nation as Staatsnation.The debatesover sovereigntyalso enhancedthe picture of a statebased on political membershipof the nation. However, the meaningof citizenshipwas ambiguousin the newspapersas anyoneoutside particular social categories,such as occupationalgroups, were called citizens.The newspapersalso frequently usedthe label citizens as a generalterm for individuals and groupsto reinforce the impressionthat peoplein generalwere supportingthe actionsthat the newspaperswere reflecting.
Embeddingthe nationalist discoursesand their representationsin their news texts, the newspaperscontributed to their being internalisedor treatedas a matter of common sense.The relationshipwith Turkey, which is basedon the TRNC's dependenceand Turkey's dominance,shaped the constructionof somestories and helpedcertain ideas and practiceswhich emergedfrom this relationshipto be taken for granted.One such examplewas the power of the Turkish army in the country and the article of the constitution which had given it this authority. Yenidüzenchallenged them slightly but otherwiseno voice was raised againstit.
235 Generalising practices, especially synecdoche, were also frequently employed to create samenessbetween the people of the same group. In particular, some views of individuals were generalised as the attitude of the group they belonged to. For example, the opinions of a few shopkeepersor businesspeople about the issue were attributed to all shopkeepersor businesspeople. Such practices of generalisation helped the newspapers to create an impression that these groups were supportive of the same political interests as the papers. In contrast, mitigation strategies were applied in the reflection of the `other's view along with actions to reduce their effect and importance.
The representationof many issuesfell short of informing readersor encouragingthem to questionexisting power relations; on the contrary, it naturalisedand strengthenedthem. This was partly becauseideological beliefs and practiceswere taken for grantedand partly becausethe newspapersdepended heavily on externallyprepared texts. Powerful sourcessuch as the President,government and political partiesreceived wide coverage and their views shapedthe agendaon the Lokmaci issue.As the newspaperstook large parts of the statementsor news agencydispatches and copiedthem directly, the articles in the paperswere identical to the original one, forming an intertexual relationship.In particular, the news texts in Hallen Sesiwere heavily basedon information that came from outsidesources rather than being generatedby its own reporters,which often made it difficult to isolate its discourseform and the institutional voice. Studying the newspapers'transformation of thesetexts, the highlights and headlineschosen for the storieswere sometimesthe only meansto distinguishthe institutional voice of the newspaper.At the sametime, differencesin the representationof the sameincidents in the pressalso confirmed that rather than reflecting reality, the news is representedor constructedby social and political factorsand carriesideological differences.
236 PART THREE CONCLUSION
Overview of the Findings
The analysis of the data holds light to the ongoing struggle to impose a legitimate mode of thought and expressionabout national identity and the role of the media in this. The researchaimed to scrutinize the universe of discourseon national identity within the media or, as Bourdieu explains, the universeof things that can be stated and thought and the universe of things that are taken for granted (Bourdieu, 1977). Thus, the researchnot only studied statedexpressions and thoughts but also undiscussedor hidden ones.
The investigation confirmed that there are many commonalities in the representation and discourseof national identity. For example,the newspapersstayed within the boundariesof the universe of official discourseand did not challenge its nationalist expressionsin which the `other' was treated as a threat and thus was propagatedin negative terms. On the other hand, the differencesbetween the newspaperswere basedon the degreeof acceptanceor rejection of nationalist rhetoric, their stancevis a vis civilian-military relations and a solution to the Cyprus issue.
On Thematic Contents
Nation, National identity and Differentiation
The main objective of the study was to examinethe role the news media play in the construction and articulation of national identity and to investigatethe various discursive practices employed to mobilise readersaround a particular national imagination. Therefore, the news texts of the three newspapersregarding three politically and culturally important incidents for the Turkish Cypriots were chosen and the data was tested basedon the content, strategiesused in the discursive construction of national identity and the linguistic meansemployed.
238 The key assumptionof the researchis that national identity is produced and renegotiatedthrough discourse.Constructed through the discourseof `us' and `them' or in other words, through the discourseof difference and similarity, various definitions of national identity are employed to rally around different national projects. Contrary to the assertionsthat national identity is a natural phenomenon,the study confirmed that it is a product of the dialectical relationship betweendiscursive acts and social practices.The discursive construction of national identity shifted and transformedwith changesin the social, political and economic dynamics that were influential in its making as well as shapingthese dynamics. For example, the articulation of Cypriot identity that developedas an alternative to Turkish identity was celebrated,especially when the border was openedfor public crossings.Yet, it lost someof its appealwhen Greek Cypriots rejected a solution plan with Turkish Cypriots and refusedto open a new crossingin the divided city of Nicosia.
In contrastto the nationalist discoursesthat stressthe unique characterof national identity, the researchestablished that the constructionsof national identity are diverse and context bound. According to the analysis of the data, different versions of national identity such as Turkish, Turkish Cypriot and Cypriot co-existed throughout the period studied.Although eachpresented itself as the real and natural identity, even within themselvesthese identities did not refer to a single collective definition, but on the contrary, had different meaningswithin different contexts. Depending on the setting, the newspaperand also the `other', different conceptsof national identity were defined and renegotiatedwithin the news texts. In general,the national identity was referred to as Turkish Cypriot, but Turkishnesswas highlighted in relation to Greek Cypriots and indicated categorisationof the mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots in one group. In contrast,when identity was constructed in relation to the mainland Turks, and especially to asserta divergencebetween them, Cypriot identity or Turkishcypriot identity, which expressedcertain distinctions from the other two, was highlighted. An essentialistunderstanding of national identity was also presentin the reflections of the newspapers.According to this understanding, the national identity was presentedas the authentic version with certain mental, characterand behavioural dispositions attributed to it (Wodak et. al, 1999). For example, Turkish cultural symbols were utilised as `ours' to encourageself- identification of Turkish Cypriots with the Turkish nation and to emphasiseTurkish
239 identity within the Turkish Cypriot community. In a similar way, certain traditions, mentalitiesand behaviourscommon to both sides of Cyprus were highlighted to forge a senseof Cypriot identity and to produce a perception of a Cypriot character. In either case,a commonality was implied and national identity was presentednot as a social product but as a natural part of people. Meanwhile, the meaning of Turkish Cypriot identity also changedin time to be an entity of its own, following social and political developmentson the island in recent years. The new meaning indicated a separateidentity from Greek Cypriots and also Turkish people that carried the characteristicsof both Cypriot and Turkish identity, as new researchhas confirmed (KADEM, 2007).
The strugglefor domination among these competing definitions of identity discourseswas discernible during the periods the researchfocused on. Various discourseson national identity that embodiedcertain power relations and ideological assumptionshad beenbattling for dominance.While Turkish identity provided a certain framework for understandingworld relations, Cypriot identity required a different reality. During the struggle,the official discourseof national identity was sometimeschallenged by the discourseof ordinary people. Yet, in some casesboth discourseswere equally presentin the samenewspapers. In 1996, the discourseof Turkishnesswas dominant in the news, which revealedits impact on popular discoursesand its power as a stateideology while Cypriot identity appearedas its alternative.By 2003, the discontentwith international isolation, the economic situation as well as increasingresentment of Turkey's control over the country encouragedTurkish Cypriot's identification with the concept of Cypriot which had gainedmore acceptancewithin the community. Thus, when the restrictions on crossingthe border (in both directions) were relaxed in 2003, Cypriot identity, along with the Turkish Cypriot one, dominatedthe newspapers'discourses. This time, everyday discoursesrather than official ones found a place in the media. However, the rejection of the UN PeacePlan by Greek Cypriots disappointedthe supportersof Cypriotism which led to a renegotiationof identity. As Ramm puts it, this caused`a growing tendencyto expressidentity in terms of a separateTurkish Cypriotness instead of a Cypriotnessshared with their Greek Cypriot co-islanders' (Ramm, 2006, 531). Therefore, p. in the representationof the disputesand events surroundingthe opening of another crossing in 2007, the newspapershighlighted the concept of
240 Turkish Cypriotnessrather than Cypriotness.The other conceptsdid not ceaseto from exist but a Turkish Cypriot identity, as a separatenational self-perceptionapart Cypriot andTurkish identities, was to be found in the newsdiscourses.
The ideological stanceof the newspaperswas anotherdeterminant in the national imaginings they represented.It should not be assumedthat eachnewspaper wrote about only one version of nationhood, as there was no strict dichotomy betweenthe identity discoursesof the newspapers.Yet, the ideological positions and the political parties the newspaperswere affiliated with provided the framework and was a factor in shapingtheir discourses.Even Kibris, a commercial newspaper,was not free from such political influence and its account of eventsreflected the political tendenciesits ownership sympathisedwith at the time. Its attitude towards the Cyprus issue and definitions of national identity shifted over a decadein line with its support of the political power in the country from a nationalist to a more pro-solution attitude.
Like national identity, the categorisationof the `other' also changed,including and excluding different groups at different times. In the nationalist discourses,the `other' was describedthrough oppositional metaphorsas being different than `us' and was cast as the enemy and a threat to the nation. The concept of enemy, as seenin the caseof the demonstrationin 1996,was attributed to the entire Greek Cypriot population and their intentions were describedas wanting to deprive Turkish Cypriots of their state and sovereignty.Demonization of the `other' in such a homogenousway forges and forces the unity of the membersof the national community without leaving much spaceto dissidents(Tsagarousianou, 1999) as well as increasing the conflict betweenco-existing and neighbouring communities (Ozgunesand Terzis, 2000). Thus, the domination of Turkish nationalism in official policies and discoursesnot only promoted the official representationsof the events but also silenced internal dissidents,obstructing the formation of a pluralistic public sphere.On the contrary, the discoursesthat challengedofficial ones placed the state administrators that mainly consistedof the governmentand the president in the Turkish position of the `other'. They presentedthese groups as the adversariesof the Cypriot people.
241 The image of Greek Cypriots as the `other' was transformedfrom their being the `evil' onesinto ordinary people like `us' when the crossingrestrictions were relaxed on the island and contactbetween both communities increased.Then, the negative representationof the `other' shifted to both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot administrationson the island for having preventedboth people from doing so before. The picture becameone of `peopleversus nationalist stateadministrators'. The political power groups governing both stateswere depictedas the adversaryof people. Even though HallernSesi showedthe Greek Cypriot governmentas the `other' more than the Turkish Cypriot one, the other two newspapers,Yenidüzen and Kibris put the responsibility on both governments.However, it should be noted that even though the newspapersshifted their blame to the stateauthorities, the views and representationsof the authorities still prevailed, as they were the main news sources for the media.
The situation was similar in the third casestudy, but here the attitude of the newspapers'towards the governmentshifted following the changesin political power. For example,when the stateauthorities were comprisedof nationalist forces, Yenidüzentreated them as the `other' but when a left-wing political party took control of the governmentand the presidency,then it was Hal/an Sesi that regarded them as the `other', unlike Yenidüzen,which was affiliated with that party. The alteration illustrated how the discursive construction of `other' changedin relation to power relations and the ideological position of the newspaper.
In addition to Greek Cypriots and staterepresentatives, immigrants from Turkey in the TRNC were also treated as the `other'. Their representationalso changedwith time and the context but their treatmentas a homogenousgroup did not. In contrast to the dominant nationalist narratives in the newspapersof 1996, nationalist Turks who were involved in the clasheswith Greek Cypriots were cast as the `other' by Yenidilzen.They were portrayed as negatively as the Greek Cypriot demonstrators.In 2003, when the border was openedto crossingsonly for `Cypriots', excluding the Turkish-origin TRNC citizens, they were then referred to as the membersof the Turkish Cypriot state and were included in the imagined national community. The omission by the Greek Cypriot governmentof these TRNC citizens from the crossingswas criticised as a challenge to the unity of the `national we'. Despite this,
242 failing to give any meansof expressionto thesecitizens showedthat they were not fully included in the symbolic representationof the nation. In fact, in the reproductionof the nation by the newspapers,no ethnic minorities were included. Turkish Cypriots were the dominant group and their accountswere generalisedas the nation's.
In 2007, it was not the immigrants from Turkey but the Turkish army, representative of Turkey's power and domination in North Cyprus, that was implicitly treated as the `other' by mainly Yenidüzenand K: bris. Yet, the Turkish army, a powerful institution both in Turkey and the TRNC, was not cast particularly strongly as the `other'. The attemptsof the stateauthorities to downplay the conflict betweenthe Presidentand the army authorities were reflected in the newspapersthat used them as their news sources.Therefore, avoiding challenging the military institution, the newspapers adoptedthe strategyof downplaying the conflict and insteadhighlighted the consensusbetween these two powerful institutions. In a sense,they all followed the official representationand discoursein reporting developments.
The characterisationof the nation was also context bound. As well as imagining it on the basis of a national culture that indicated an essentialistunderstanding of national identity, the idea of the nation as Staatsnationwas also often implemented. The identification of the nation in the news discoursesabout the border clashesin 1996 was mainly basedon the conceptof Kulturnation. The domination of nationalist narratives led to the perception of the nation as an entity basedon cultural similarities and common ancestry.2003 was a year when challengesto nationalist approachesfound expressionin the massdemonstrations that followed the introduction of the UN's Annan Plan. Mobilised to show their discontent with the government,these public demonstrationsbecame a manifestation of a changing self- perception. In the midst of thesedevelopments, the opening of the border and the increasingcontact of people with the `other' community brought a new perspective to the understandingof collective identity. The discourseof national identity was not only shapedby citizenship or political belonging to the nation but also included culture basedelements. Thus, the conceptsof Staatsnationand Kulturnation were amalgamatedinto the discursive productions of the nation. In 2007, becauseof the nature of the incident that was studied and also becauseof a changein collective
243 consciousnessand self-perceptionwithin the Turkish Cypriot nation, Staatsnation was the dominant featurein the representationof the nation in the news. The case concernedan issueof the political legitimacy of the nation stateand createdan ambivalent situation: on the one hand, Turkey was criticised as the `colonial power', on the other its `guarantorship'status was stressed.The discursivepractices surroundingthis conflict illustrated the nation as Staatsnationwhich equippedit with political legitimacy and the support of its citizens. As thesefindings show that despitedrawing a distinction in the construction of the nation basedon different elementsat different times, in the overall representationit was hard to talk about the existenceof a strict dichotomy betweenthese terms. In the three cases,these two models for the nation co-existed,revealing that Turkish Cypriots have been shifting their alliancesand identity betweencitizen basedand culture basedidentity.
The use of the term citizenship associatedwith the civic model of nation was problematic. There was a lack of non-national definition of citizenship. Expressions such as `Turkish-origin citizens' implied a differentiation from Cyprus born citizens basedon ethnic origin or place of birth. In other instances,the term citizenship appearedsimply as a generalname for individuals or ordinary people to distinguish them from the stateauthorities or other public figures or to assertthat they belonged to neither. Therefore, categorisationssuch as `shopkeepersand citizens' were employed in someof the news articles. Meanwhile, citizens appearedin the newspapersmostly to expresstheir views on the issuesdiscussed. But, instead of promoting the involvement of citizens in political decisions,only opinions in line with the newspapers'positions on the issuewere included, in order to strengthenthe image of the newspapersas being the voice of the nation. The label of citizens was also used to give the impressionthat people in generalsupported the ideas and actions the newspapersfavoured. As a result, the newspapersfailed to representthe real interestsof citizens in the issuesthey reflected.
In eventsthat involved `national security', intra-national differenceswere played down and the unity of the nation was emphasised.In particular, when the borders of the national territory were claimed to be under threat in 1996,almost no dissident voices were heard in the newspapers.Having contributed to the creation of a moral panic by their representationof the events,Halkin Sesi and Kibris newspapers
244 encouragedthe public to unite behind the policies and actions of the national institutions and adopt their discourses.Yenidiizen, on the other hand, tried to distance itself from the dominant nationalist discoursesand representationsbut without much success.The reports of the conflict betweenthe Turkish army and the TRNC Presidentabout the national border and its security had similar features.This time, as well as forging the unity of Turkish Cypriots againstthe proclamationsof the Turkish army authorities,there was also an effort to maintain an accord betweenthe TRNC and Turkey. The discourseof this inter-national unity with Turkey, as well as the intra-national unity that was mediatedby the newspapers,was not only for the consumptionof the Greek Cypriot government,one of the actors involved in the issue,but also for the membersof the nation state.Meanwhile, voices against the Turkish military were barely reflected in the newspapers.As a result, the dominant nationalist discourses,based on infra-national unity, limited the accessof diverse discoursesto the media.
Throughout the period studied, the dominant discoursesin the news supportedthe existenceand the legitimacy of the TRNC. Yet, there were occasionswhen challenging discoursesalso found their way into the newspapers.The legality of a statethat was not recognisedby the international community was emphasisedwith referencesto its national autonomy, independenceand the impassibility of its borders. It encouragedpeople to participate in the existenceof the nation stateby believing and identifying with it. The conceptof `enemy' was another way of persuadingpeople to imagine themselvesas a nation within a bounded territory. Since the TRNC was establishedto provide security and safety to its people, the presenceof an enemy reinforced this process.So when there was a threat from an `enemy' in 1996,the legitimacy and authority of the state was emphasisedmore strongly than at any other time in order to mobilize people behind the idea of the nation state.In contrast, when the border was opened,bringing the two communities together rather than casting them as oppositeto each other, the sovereignty and legitimacy of the state were questioned,particularly by Yenidazen.Again, when doubts about the TRNC's statehoodemerged as a result of the public statementsof the Turkish military authorities in 2007, the newspapersadopted the official discoursesaimed at mending the image of the state,not only in the eyes of its people, define but also the outside world. As Billig argues(1995), becauseit is not enoughto
245 oneself as a nation but also requires recognition as such, gaining the acknowledgmentof other nation statesis important Yet, in the overall representation,the official discoursesthat promoted the TRNC as a legitimate nation statedominated the news discoursesand representations.
The conceptof border played a role in the conceptualisationof national belonging. The Green Line, particularly, acted as a geographicalbarrier that divided both communities and for a long time severedtheir communicationand interaction (Gumpert and Drucker, 1998) Even though the boundariesof the state were fixed, the meaning of the border which divided the island into two zonesshifted in time over the period coveredby this research.In the first casestudy, there was an emphasison the border as a symbol of Turkish Cypriots' territorial integrity and as their national space.It not only separatedthe `national we' from the `other' but also aided in the imagination of the boundedarea as the homelandneeding protection from the intrusions and threats of the `other'. Such thinking justified the use of violence by the security forces in reaction to the violation of `our borders' by the `other'. The existenceof the border acquired a new meaning with the crossings.It was not abolishedbut remainedin its place and was only openedfor crossing. This was an exception to the rule of division and separation.Even though it brought people from both communities together and there was a discoursebased on cultural similarities, it also emphasisedthe separatecitizenships of Cypriots on both sides of the border. The openingof the border,by discursivelyhelping to reaffirm the statehoodof both North and Southindirectly, also stressed the existenceof two separatestates and citizenship.In the Lokmacimatter, the debateabout who hadauthority over the TRNC's nationalsecurity and borders brought the civil powerand the Turkish military into dispute.In this case,the borderbecame a symbolof the `sovereignty'of the TRNC, not to protectit from enemythreats but to showits autonomy.
The CommonPast
History was used a great deal in the reproduction of collective identities. In the news regardingthe motorcyclists'demonstration in 1996,the narrativesbased on the sufferingsof Turkish Cypriotsduring the inter-communalconflict of the pastwere
246 emphasisedto portray Greek Cypriots as a continuing threat. They also demanded the unity of the national community. In thesenational discourses,the past symboliseda time which was associatedwith negativeexperiences of bloodshed,war and a fear that no Turkish Cypriot would want to experienceagain. The collective memory reproducedin this mannerdid not refer to any positive aspectof the relationship betweenthe two communities (Canefe,2007). In contrast, the news reports about the border crossingsused history to highlight the commonalities betweenthe two communities.Again, the purposewas to establisha link betweenthe past and the presentbut this time history was reproducedbased on the narratives of ordinary people rather than official ones.Constructed in a nostalgic way, these narratives focusedon the experiencesof daily life. Referencesto the similarity of some cultural traditions betweenthe communitieshelped the renegotiation of a Cypriot identity. Depicting thesetraditions as the characterof the people on the island hid their constructednessand presentedthem as historical facts. The discursive constructionof the past in the Lokmaci matter rarely occurred. It was only reproducedin official speechesthat referred to the conditions under which the barricadewas built in the past. It helped to distinguish the presentas peaceful comparedto the conflict of the past. Instead,2004, regardedas another turning point in the history of the island, was referred to in order to underline the position of Greek Cypriot staterepresentatives as uncompromising.
The Construction of a Political Future
The construction of a common political future varied dependingon the period studied. While Yenidazenstressed that a common future with Greek Cypriots in the shapeof a solution in Cyprus was obstructedby the actions of the nationalist groups in 1996,the other two newspapersimplied that the future for Turkish Cypriots was the continuation of the statusquo with the `motherland' Turkey. In 2003, the linguistic construction of the future highlighted the expectationof two changesfor Turkish Cypriots: One was a changein political power in the TRNC and the other a solution in Cyprus in which both communities could peacefully co-exist. During the eventsof 2007 it was again Yenidüzenthat voiced the expection of a solution on the island in the future which would no longer require the protection of the Turkish
247 army. The statement`until the conditions are appropriate' (Yenidüzen,7 January, 2007,p. 6) signalledthe possibilityof transformationfollowing an alterationin the political situation of North Cyprus as well as in the will of the Turkish Cypriots.
On Turkish Cypriot Media
The Newspapersand National Identity
The study also confirmed that the newspapersacted as nationalising institutions by constantly reminding their readersof their nationhood. By embeddingnationalist discoursesin their news texts and reporting the nationalist proclamations of various sourcessuch as the president,government and military officials, the newspapers replicated nationalist ideologies. Even onesthat criticised nationalistic statements and policies cannot be said to have an anti-nationalist discourseas they replaced one form of nationalism with another or madetheir argumentsagainst nationalism using nationalistic terms. Having internalised many nationalist discursive practices as common senseand as part of daily life, many times the news texts, rather than being critical of nationalist practicesand discourses,actually enhancedthem. For example, the killing of a Greek Cypriot for being disrespectfulto the Turkish flag was treated as common sense.Therefore, none of the newspaperschallenged the authorities about the way Solomos Solomou was stopped.His killing wasjustified as a patriotic action and went unquestionedby the three newspapers.Challenges to such discoursesand other nationalistic discursivepractices rarely occurred in the press.
The role of the newspapersin normalising certain nationalistic discursive practices was not limited to the reflection of the nationalist views of the state authorities. As Billig emphasises,the power of nationalism comesfrom being obscureand also obvious at the sametime (Billig, 1995). The representationof the routines of everyday life in the news also contributed to the self-perception.The banal representationof daily life, such as the circulation of imagesof family homesand the sharedcultural norms and values of Turkish Cypriots, not only linked private lives to the nationalpublic spherebut their mediationthrough the newspapersstrengthened their internalisation as national and rational. In other words, by showing the routines
248 and assumptionsof everyday life, the newspaperspresented it as the nationally organisedway (Edensor,2002) as if that way of living is a part of the national characterof Turkish Cypriots. Thus, they reinforced the view that national identity is a natural product rather than a social one. It is also important to note that the media are not the only responsibleagent in the disseminationof nationalism in society but part of a complex public spherethat forms and redefinesnational identity. The researchshowed the media (in this casethe newspapers)did not only influence the nationalistic imagination in the society but was also shapedby the prevailing discoursesof the society.
The analysisalso revealedthat the discoursesadopted by the newspapersattempted to mobilize their readersaround certain political projects and national interests. Therefore, claiming to speakon behalf of and to the nation, the newspapers characterisedthe ideasthey presentedas the consensusof the nation. In line with the `consensualmodel' (Hartley, 1993), the society was depictedas united behind one perspective.Differences or challengesto this perspectivewere characterisedas deviancefrom the norm. Such representationsallowed the newspapersto collectivise their readersaround the national interest they had beenpromoting. Benefiting from the notion of unity without any diversity helped the newspapersstate these views as self-evident and a matter of common sense.This approachnot only allowed nationalism to be embeddedin the news discoursesbut also hid its constructedness.
The dominanceof nationalistic discoursesin the news supportedthe unity of the nation without leaving much room for identity negotiations other than those for national identity. Hence, diverse and different identity discoursesdid not have much accessto the public spherethrough the newspapers.Even though regional identities were mentioned in 2003, when people crossedthe border to seetheir homes,the dominant collective identity in the news articles was national identity. The mediation of the symbolic nation did not include any ethnic minorities, indicating their absence in the public sphere.The representationof women in the news also complied with the genderedrepresentation of the nation. In the conflict betweenGreek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in 1996, women appearedin the newspapersmostly as `mothers'. When both communities startedrevisiting their homes,women were again portrayed within the dominant discoursesand imagesof home and family life; as `wife and
249 mother'serving food to the guestsor crying for their lost homes.In the Lokmaci case,which involved state politics andthe military, womenrarely appeared in the news.
Consequently,the lack of negotiation and redefinition of various identities formed an obstaclefor the developmentof a democraticcitizenship. The dominanceof nationalistic discoursesnot only limited the reflection of society as a pluralistic formation but also preventedit being one by restricting diverse and different representationsand discoursesabout it. In a way, the media failed in their role in the production and circulation of the diverse information necessaryfor the development of an informed citizenry (Golding & Murdock, 1997) as well as failing to represent divergent interestsin society. Whether critical or uncritical in their intentions, by relying on authoritative and politically powerful sourcesin the production of their news storiesit led to biasedinterpretations of eventsin favour of these groups. The uniformity of the ideasand frameworks given to readershindered the newspapers from fulfilling their democraticrole in the formation of an informed citizenry and providing them with a pluralistic public sphere.
Journalistic Practices
In the caseof the Turkish Cypriot media, the ideological orientations and political views that shapedthe news texts were recognisable.The newspapersfailed to detach themselvesfrom the stanceand the views of the political parties that they were affiliated or sympathisedwith and instead,reflected the issuesfrom their frameworks. The discoursesthat aimed to encouragethe participation and mobilisation of their readersaround the national intereststhey supportedwere no different than the groups they were affiliated with or backed.For example, Yenidilzen in a way similar to CTP, the political party it was linked with, challengedthe nationalistic discoursesof the governmentin 1996 and 2003, although its defiance did not go further than contesting the policies and actions of the nationalistic groups. When CTP came to power, even this limited challengedisappeared as it adoptedthe official discourse.With no alternative or challenging discourses,the domination of nationalist discoursewithin the media provides a hegemonicframework for the
250 understandingand constructionof a particular social reality (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). The Turkish Cypriot media becameinstrumental in this becausethey accepted and followed the dominant nationalist discourses.For example,none of the newspapersreferred to the administration in the south of the island by its internationally recognisedtitle, the Republic of Cyprus, but insteadadopted the name given in the official national discourses,the Greek Cypriot administration. The newspapersrarely criticised the TRNC's dependenceon Turkey or the power of Turkey over the Turkish Cypriot administration but insteadtreated this as normal, which helpedto naturaliseit. In either case,the argumentsof the newspapersagainst the nationalistic discoursesand actions were not free from nationalist terms. While criticising one form of nationalism, they promoted the alternative national projects that they identified with. Yet, in the overall processof their news production, the newspapersused languageand cultural symbols to constantly remind people of their nationhood.Banal nationalism was common in the discoursesof the newspapersand they flagged nationhoodto their readers.
When investigated,such practices are not independentfrom the broader socio- political and historical context of the media. In particular, the Turkish Cypriot press has always been a site where a struggle betweendifferent causesand interestshas taken place. Thus, as well as informing public it has also been a central forum in winning the `political contest' (Wolsfeld, 1997). Owning and controlling the media meant controlling the information environment. In part, the media gained such a characteristicas a result of the polarisation on the island. Acting as one of the main public spheres,the presshas reproducedand circulated information to createpublic opinion behind the causesthey have been defending and to securethe public discourses.For example, during recent changesintroduced by the Annan Plan and the opening of the border, the media were instrumental in expressingand leading the transformation of the dominant discourseswithin the community.
The practicescommon in the Turkish Cypriot media also influenced the discourseof the news texts analysed.Relying on externally producedtexts, such as news agency dispatchesand press releases,as the sourcesof news and using thesetexts with identical minimal editing or merely copying them causedthe appearanceof news articles in the newspapers.Integration of the pressreleases of various groups and
251 organisationsinto the news discoursewith little changecreated intertextuality which madethe resulting news article very similar to the original document.In some cases, it also madeit difficult to isolate the institutional voices and discourseforms of the newspapers.Such news stories, which gave only one perspective,were also far from reflecting a balancedand fair accountof the events.Juxtaposition of different and sometimesconflicting accountsof stories without much guidancefailed to provide clear information and understandingfor their readers.
All the newspapersreflected the views of various groups in their coverageof the issues.This is because,as van Dijk (1988) points out, the `truthfulness of eventsis enhancedwhen opinions of different backgroundsand ideologies are quoted about such events' (p.85). Nevertheless,an analysisof the overall representationof the issuesby the newspapersshowed that, despiteincluding diverse views, they supportedone or the other idea, which again reinforces van Dijk's (1988) argument that `thosewho are ideologically close will be given primary attention as possible sourcesof opinions' (p.85). By doing so, even though the opinions of different social actors and groups are included in the representationor linguistic inclusion, the advantageousor disadvantageoustreatment given in the representationstill creates inequalities (Reisgl & Wodak, 2001).
On Strategies and Linguistic Means
The main strategiesin the discursive construction of national identity were constructive strategiesas well as strategiesof justification, transformation and perpetuation.In the news articles in 1996,the newspapersusually benefited from the strategiesof construction andjustification. Construction strategieswere mainly used to collectivise and unite people within certain groups such as Turkish and Greek Cypriot. Thus, the binary division within the texts was strong and strategiesof justification helped shift the blame for much criticised actions to the `other'. The nationalistic discoursesthat dominatedthe news in 1996 emphasised`our' actions as intra- `patriotic' and `their' actions as being `crazy' or `irrational'. As well as the national samenessand unity, the solidarity and similarity with the Turkish nation was accentuated.The main strategiesused in the reports of the eventsin 2003 were
252 strategiesof perpetuationand transformation. Going through a time of change,on the one hand,the political continuity betweenpast and presenttimes was emphasised, while on the other hand, a necessaryand desiredpolitical changebetween now and the future was predicted. Constructive strategieswere also employed to forge a unity within communitieswith a perception of Cypriotnessas well as stressing Turkish Cypriotness.Yenidüzen also adopteda strategyof discontinuationto announcethe end of the political power of the governing groups, which implied a changein the future. In the articles on the 2007 Lokmaci issue,a transformation strategy which implied a political changebetween now and the future was used. Justification strategieswere also employedby the newspapersfor the presenceof the Turkish army in the north and also the removal of the much disputed footbridge.
The news texts employedmetonyms, synecdocheand personification to establish samenessbetween groups. While the capitals of the stateswere used as metonyms to refer to the governments,generalising synecdoche as a linguistic meanswas frequently utilised, especiallyto presenta small group of people as the general population. Personificationwas anotherlinguistic tool adoptedin the discursive construction of Turkish Cypriot national identity. Personification of the nation was especially common in the articles published in the Lokmaci casein 2007. As well as using the image of TRNC PresidentTalat to refer to the Turkish Cypriot nation, Turkish Army Forceswere also given a human form, which helped people to identify with or againstit.
Conclusions
The TRNC, a new state founded as a responseto the insecurity of Turkish Cypriots and a challengeto the claims of sovereigntyemanating from the south, offers a unique caseto study national identity. Despite being a statethat is unrecognisedby the international world and whose existenceand rationale for existencehas been challenged,the TRNC has had a reasonablylong life, a material and spatial presence and imprint on society. It has been a sourceof expressionsand experiencesof national identity as well as producing a senseof belonging for its people. Nevertheless,the new state has not managedto fix the meaning of national identity
253 but, on the contrary, has provided the context in which the various identity concepts of Turk, Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot have been debated,which confirms the dynamic and contestednature of national identity. Therefore, seriousresearch into its media, as the significant contributors to the production and propagationof national identity, as well as challenging and modifying social imagination, was long overdue in order to study their role in the process.
There is no doubt that further researchinto media content, linguistic meansand strategiesas well asjournalistic practicesis required. For example, further research into nation and identity using other media such as radio and, in particular, online media would be useful to broadenthe understandingof the role of the media in the construction and renegotiationof identity. One of the aims of this study was to open a channel for more discussionon the issuerather than provide definitive answers. Raising awarenessof not merely the conflicts and tensionsproduced by the identity constructionprocesses but also discriminatory and exclusive practicescommitted for the sakeof nationalism (Wodak et al., 1999) are the key aims of the study.
As this researchconfirmed, particularly at times of crises or conflict, nationalistic opinions and discoursesdominate the news without leaving any spacefor diverse views. As seenin the caseof the Turkish Cypriot newspapers,either becauseof the manipulation of powerful sourcesor the fear of being labelled as traitors, the media avoid challenging the dominant nationalistic opinions at such periods. There is a spiral of silence, which quietensany challenging or opposing opinion (Noelle- Neumann and Petersen,2004; Salmon & Glynn, 1996).
The conflict betweenthe two communities on the island has shapedthe media environment and culture. Therefore, nationalist tendenciesthat are inherent in the media not only reproducethe myths, symbols and traditions which enhanceloyalty to the nation but sometimesthese tendencies cause the representationof eventsto be distorted so as not to let the `other' use it against `us' (Ozgunesand Terzis, 2000) or not to offend national sentiments(Wolsfeld, 2001). Despite this, the Turkish Cypriot media can play an important role in conflict resolution on the island. It is important that the media should recognisetheir responsibilities in the processand act in a way that would promote communication betweenthe sides.The media should develop
254 normsand routines of newsproduction that would encourageresolution rather than nationalisttendencies (Wolsfeld, 2001). Their impacton the peaceprocess should alsobe researchedand highlighted.
One of the roles of the media in the developmentof a democratic society is to allow diverse groupsand organisationsto expresstheir alternative views (Curran, 1997). Unfortunately, in North Cyprus, rather than generatingpluralism in society by reflecting all citizens' interests,the media are acting as the mouthpiece of official and powerful institutions. Insteadof giving accessto different perspectives,the media have becomea meansof exercising power for powerful groups. Thus, rather than representingsociety, it can be arguedthat the media are reflecting the views of thesegroups. In order to achievea democraticsociety, a democratic media system, which would allow diverse views, is required as well as a more critical journalistic approachtowards power relations.
For such a society it is also important that the media promote other identities such as genderand ethnic rather thanjust solely national ones.As well as encouragingthe formation of a pluralistic society this will also help develop an understandingof the interestsof different groups in the society. Therefore, the media should adopt a non- national definition of citizenship and also act as a public spacewhere representation and negotiation of diverse identities can be carried out. Also, by highlighting the collective interestsof citizens, the media can contribute to a peaceful co-existenceof conflicting groups not only within the society but also their neighbouring societies.
Journalists have an important responsibility in the improvement of the media environment and the journalistic culture in the TRNC, especially if they want to play a role in the establishmentof a democratic society and in conflict resolution. By ridding themselvesof political control and their dependenceon official sourcesand applying professional norms and routines in the production processof the news, journalists will increasetheir credibility and influence within the society. It is a hard and slow processto changethe journalistic culture, but journalists in North Cyprus can start scrutinising their relationship with their sourcesand question their newsgatheringpractices. Not taking given information for grantedand making questioning and researcha standardpart of their professional routine would help
255 themgain a moreobjective approach in their newsconstruction process, therefore fulfilling their role asthe facilitatorsof pluralismand debate in society.
Changingsocial, political and economic conditions as a result of increasing interaction, through the advancementin new communicationtechnologies and mobility, not only render the conceptof a homogeneousnational identity impossible but also require a more inclusive or broad appeal.As the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem encouragenew social imaginings, which brings new challenges for the society, the media can play a crucial role in facilitating or hindering (dependingon their positioning in the social/political landscape)these new re- articulations and conceptualisationsof identity. Studying media practices and discoursein such a period of changeis an important task, in order to understand social changenot only in North Cyprus but more generally.
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270 APPENDIX
TIMETABLE OF EVENTS IN CYPRUS
1571 The Ottomanconquest of Cyprus. 1878 Britain was given the administration of the island by the Ottoman Empire. 1914 The OttomanEmpire enteredthe First World War against Britain and in return Britain annexedCyprus. 1923 With the Treaty of Lausanne,Turkey denouncedits rights on Cyprus. 1925 Cyprus becamea British colony. 1955 EOKA launchedan armed struggle against the British Administration. 1960 The Republic of Cyprus was established. 1963 PresidentMakarios put forward a set of proposals for changing the Constitution. In Decemberinter-communal conflict started. 1964 The first borderas a ceasefireline calledGreen Line was drawnin Nicosia. 1974 Turkey'sintervention in Cyprus. 1983 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established.
271