Samantabhadra, Samantabhadra, , and Akalarika

FunNAGA SIN MIYAKONOJO NATIONAL COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY

0. 0. The two main branches of , the Di- 1. , philosopher in the g創 nb 紅 as and Svetambaras of Jainism ，訂e gen- eighth century, has written many independent erally erally believed to have no discrepancies in the philosophical works such as Siddhiviniscaya 組 d philosophical philosophical issues. In fact, they have only N ヲ匂 avinisc αya. Among 血em, Prama!la- slightly slightly changed their doctrine in their long his- sarrzgraha with V,rtti 1 is regarded as his last and tory tory of more than 2500 ye 訂 s. Both schools, for most mature work of his career. As the title example, example, have the highly developed karma the- suggests, it is a compendium of prama!las con- ories ories which are not essentially different from taining about ninety verses in nine chapters. In each each other. Their philosophical views seem to the sixth chapter which discusses the way of have have remained monolithic through the ages. This debate (vada), Akalanka refers to three kinds of observation observation is true also when we study the Jaina hetvabhasas mentioning three Jaina philosophers ideas ideas of logic and epistemology 出 a whole. The by name. It reads: Svetambaras Svetambaras as well as the classify 邸泊＇ dh α［ち ］s泊＇ dhas 四回ya viruddho devanandi- prama!las prama!las into two sub-divisions: praηak~a and m ちI dvedha samantabhadr 田狗践的， adir parok~a. aca 協加ianillv. 56//2 But when it comes to the details, we come across across different views between the two branches. When we 住y to establish the reality of atman The Svetambaras admit the authority of the can- (which does not change at all) by means of a ons ons written in Ardhamagadhf, while the Digam- hetu, such as sattva or existence, that hetu is reg 紅 ded as asiddha by Siddhasena and viru- baras baras deny it, saying that the old c組 ons vanished in in ancient times. Moreover, the latter does not ddha by Devanandin while Samantabhadra re- admit admit that women can attain the final liberation, gards it as both. while while the former proclaims that even a woman This verse and Akal 姐 ka ’s own commen 町 y 訂 e can can annihilate karmas completely to liberate her- difficult to fully understand.3 Fortunately Aka- self. self. Thus, there is a female 血kara or savior laiika writes a similar verse in the sixth chapter in in the Svetambara tradition. According to the of Siddhiviniscaya which deals with the charac-

Digambaras, Digambaras, however, all the are ters of coηect hetus. The ver 舘 reads as follows: male. male. In addition, the two branches have a dif- Published 1 Published as ap 制 of Akalanka Granthatr の， a, ference ference of opinion as to whether or not a kevalin, ed. by M. K. Jain 酪 SiqighI Jaina Granthamfila, no.12. or or omniscient person, feels hungry. These dis- Ahmedabad ”Calcutta 1939. crepancies crepancies noted by many scholars are well- 2 The letter enclosed in brackets is added by the accepted. accepted. About epistemological differences, we editor. 3 According to the of editor Siddhivini§c のほ， Ana- have so far very little information. In this paper ntavirya ntavirya is said to have written a sub-commentary on some examples of such di 首erences in Jaina Nyaya Akalailka ’s auto-commentary, which is not availabl.e will will be shown. to us. For details, see Siddhivini§caya vol. 1 (Kasi 1959), 1959), Hindi introduction, p. 60.

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siddhaf:i αsiddhaf:i siddh α senasya viruddho devanandi- 2. As far as we know, the verse is quoted, with

nal; nal; I dvedha sam α ntabhadrasya hetur ekant α， － some modifications, by three Jaina philosophers: sadhane グv. 21 // Vadir 司a in his Nyay αvini§cay α vi var α，lJa,5 Va- didevasfiri didevasfiri in his Syadvararatnakara, 6釦 d 釘nti- Akal a白ka explains this verse in his own com- sfiri sfiri in his Nyayavataravartika-vrtti.7 And the ment 訂 y as follows: last last two explain its meaning in some length, so If If we try to establish the reality of a thing does Anantavirya in his Siddhivini§cayaffka which is regarded as having absolute nature, when he comments upon Akala 故 a’s verse quoted attributes attributes of a real thing, such as existence above. Hereafter, with the help of these three (sattva), (sattva), when used as hetu, are asiddha be- commentaries, we shall attempt to find out the cause cause absolutism of momentariness as well as differences differences in the opinions among Samantabadra pe ロnanence can never be established. Alter- and the others. natively natively the attributes must be viruddha be- cause cause they establish that otherwise-not-under- 2.1. In order to explain the meaning of the standableness standableness (anyathanupapatti) proves non- verse, Anantav'irya quotes a verse 合om Siddhase- absoluteness absoluteness of a thing. Moreover if those na ’s Sa'!'lmati-tarka I -sutta'!'l I -prakaralJa. who have not ascertained the meaning of the je sa'!'ltavayadose sakkoluya bhal}a'!'lti truth truth try to prove the momentariness etc. by sa'!'lkhiil}~ I sa'!'lkha ya asavvae tesi'!'l savve means of a hetu, such as existence, then that vi te sacca1 グIII-50 グ 8 hetu hetu would be anaikantika because it exists in The Buddhists as well as the Vai 記号 ikas point both both sapak~a and vipak~a. (sattvader vastu- out the fault in the theory of evolution dharmasya asidd 加 tv 仰 sa 加 lyena k~m:iiketa­ (sα '!'ltavaya, Skt. sadvada) of the Saqikhyas. raikantayor αsiddhe 争／ αnyathanupapatter In In tum the Sarp.khyas also do that to their anekantasadhanad viruddhatvam I anaik 伽 ti- theory theory of creation （α savvaa, Skt. as α dvada). katva'!'l katva'!'l punal; sattvadel; k~al}ak~ayadi­ All of them remain true.9 sadhane asamfk#tatattvarthail; lokapratfti'!'l pramiil}am pramiil}am a§ritya tatha hetur ubh αyα tra Only with the help of this verse we cannot un- derstand derstand why the hetu is reg 紅白d as asiddha in vartate vartate svapak~avipak~ayoJ;, .. .)4 Siddhasena ’ s opinion. In this connection we shall Here Akala 会ka criticizes the ontology of other consider consider the statements of a Digambara philos- schools, schools, such as momentariness or etemalism, op her M 拘ikyanadin. To illustrate the sandi- and refers to three kinds of hetviibhasas. The gdhiisiddha gdhiisiddha hetvabhasa, M 匂ikyanandin de- relationship, relationship, however, among the three Jaina phi- clares, clares, in his work called Parfk~amukha, as fol- losophers losophers and the hetvabhasas remains unex- lows: plained. plained. What we can infer from Akalar 】ka ’s Nyayavini§cayavivara"(la 5 Nyayavini§cayavivara"(la vol. 2 (KiisI 1954 ), statement statement is that Siddhasena, Devanandin ，加d p. p. 181. Samantabhadra seem to have different opinions 6 Syadvadaratnak α ra vol. 2 ( 1988), p. 1032. on hetu and hetvabhasa. 7 Nyayavataravartika 司 vrtti(Bombay 1949), p. 107.

Siddhivini§caya 4 Siddhivini§caya vol. 2 (KiisI 1959), p. 404. To 8 Saf(lmati-tark α（Ahmedabad 1939; reprint, 2000), understand understand the auto-commentary clearly, we have to p. 124. consult consult Anantavirya ’s comment 訂 y in Siddhivni§caya 9 SeeSaf(lm αti-tark α，op.cit. vol. vol. 2, p. 404.

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sarri-khyarri sarri-khyarri prati parititimf §abdaJ:i krtakatvtit tion may be that the Siddhasena mentioned by //VI ・27 // ten 司jiiatatvtit II VI-28 II 10 Akalatika is not the author of the Nyayavatara If If someone argues with the followers of the but that of Sarri-matitarka. 15 Saiμkhya school and states that sound is per- 2.2. The next philosopher to be considered is ishable ishable because it is caused, then that hetu is Samantabhadra. AkalaiJ.ka says that, according

asiddha since the Saiμkhya school does not to Samantabhadra, sat れ1a etc. are anaikantika accept accept it. hetus which exist both in sapak~a and vipa~a.

Thus it is understood that, in 出e Jaina tradition, To explain such an opinion, Anantavirya quotes a verse from Samantabhadra ’s Svayarri-bhastotra 組 y attribute used in reasoning is asiddha when 組 d paraphrases it: the the opponent does not admit its reality. So Aka ・ laiJ.ka's laiJ.ka's intention in the pada ’ asiddho siddhase- ye paras協alitonnidr，碕 svado~e ’bhinimili­ na の1a' seems to be as follows: na ν抑制inas te kirri- kuryur apatrarri- tvan- mata§riya ち1116 According According to Siddhasena, sattva etc. in the

proof proof of the reality of a thing is hetvtibhtisa Those pitiable persons who 紅 e not receptacles

because because of the absolutism (ektintavada) of oth- of the glory of your doc 回necannotdo 釦 .ything er er schools. In absolutism an attribute of a because they shut their eyes to their own fault 出ing, krtakatva or the attribute of being some- while they are very careful about the defects thing thing that has been created, for example, ad- of their enemy. mitted mitted by the one school, say Buddhists, is 'The glory of your doctrine' (tvanmata§rt) here not not recognized by the other, i.e. ，曲 e Sfuμkhyas. means, as Anantavirya says, the

Siddhasena Siddhasena is the first Jaina philosopher that in- or nor トabsolutism of Jaina which pervades all dicated dicated such tendencies of absolutism in other things.17 Samantabhadra is the first Jaina philos- schools.11 schools.11 That is why AkalaiJ.ka ref1 町 S to him op her 白紙 has clearly shown the 由eory of 却 ek 面・ in in connection with asiddha. tavada in his Aptamfmarri-sa. With that theory

Here a question arises: why An 組 tavirya does the J ainas maintain that an at 凶bute of a thing not not 児島r to or quote 台。 m the Nyayavatara which exists as its own nature, and does not exist as is is generally regarded 出 a work of Siddhasena? thena 加re of another. In other words, an at 佐ibute h 出e仰のtivattira asiddha, along wi 血 viruddha of X exists in X as X ’s nature and that of Y in Y and anaiktinti 初， is clearly defined.12 S如 tisuri, as Y ’ s nature. Thus a hetu like sattva exists in a in in his commentary on the Ny め1avatara, says that thing which is reg 紅白d as moment 訂 y and as the the Siddhasena referred to by Akala 白ka is the well as that which is regarded as eternal. Such author author of 的1ayavattira. 13 But he does not give ahe 加 should be called anaikantika hetvabhasa. any any reason.14 One possible answer for the ques- 14 14 In order to explain 血 eoriginal verse of Akal 拍 ka, Viididevasiiri Viididevasiiri quotes the sentence beginning with 'sar- 10 10 Parfk~amukha(Lucknow 1940), p. 169. evaikantaviidinii' vam evaikantaviidinii' (Syiidvadaratnakara, op.cit.), 11 11 also refers to 出e Siiqi.khya school whose whose source is unknown. in in his Samayasara, verse 366ab. He, however, does not not refute the absolutism in the school. 15 On the necessity to suppose 白e two different 12 12 Nyayavatara 23: asiddhas tv apratfto yo yo Siddhasenas, see my paper ”Distingushing two Si- d他紙n路” in Indogaku Buk 均ogaku Kenkyu υoumal 'nya 伽 iv op 叩 adyate I viruddho yo 'nyathilpy atra yu- of of Indian and Buddhist Studies 〕48, no. 2, 1999. kto kto 'naikantikafl II 16 16 Svayarμbhastotra 99. This verse is quoted in 13 13 Nyayavataravartika-vrtt~ p. 107: siddhasena のほ Si 必愉in is cay 匂政 a, p. 406. sutrakartufl sutrakartufl sakalyenasiddhatvat sakala eva hetufl asiddhafi asiddhafi iti. 17 Siddhivini§c 句仏 op.cit.: frr. ちsarvapadiirtha ・

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Samantabhadra Samantabhadra does not explicitly refer to 3. With these discussions it C 如 be safely con- anaikantika anaikantika as a hetvabhasa. The following cluded that on the hetviibhiisa Samantabhadra verse, verse, however, shows 由at he has a good knowl- and Siddhasena have different opinions. From edge edge of hetvabhas α． a historical point of view this may show the development development of the idea on the hetvabhiisa in 飢側＇ hika slidhanasadhyadhrs ced v明a- Jainism: Jainism: at 佃 earlier stage Siddhasena, probably namatrasya na hetus 泌＇ dhifl I atharthavattvarμ the the author of Sa1pmati －阻止 a, recognized only vyabhicarado~o na yogig 倒的am pan α：vadisi- ddham/11 もII is one type of hetviibhiisa, i.e., asiddha. Later, Samantabhadra added another kind to it, i.e If If knowledge ofprobans and probandum (=in- an αikantikc l. ference) ference) has no real object, then the vijnapti- matra could not be established by means of he ti ιBut if it had any object, then it would in three volumes. Bhavnagar 1966-1988. commit the fault ofη 1abhicara. 2.3. 2.3. The relationship between Devanandin and viruddha viruddha remains unclear. In his explanation Anantavirya Anantavirya quotes a phrase from Jainendra Vya 初 rm;a: siddhir anekantat.19 But he does not not go into detail. If Akalailka refers to, with the the name Devanandin, the J aina philosopher called called , then we must trace his episte- mological mological thoughts in his Sarvarthasiddhi, a com- ment 訂 y on Tattvartha of Umasvati. But PUjyapada PUjyapada has no epistemological discussions in in that treatise ，由 us naturally there is no metinon of of hetviibhasa. Moreover, Moreover, Vadidevasfiri as well as S加 tisuri reads reads Mallavadin instead of Devanandin. 20 This Mallavadin Mallavadin must be the author of Nayacakra as Santisfiri Santisfiri points out.21 Even then the reason why he he assumes that the he 加 is viruddha remains unknown. Though we already have the well- edited edited text of Nayacakra, 22 most of all 血e con- tents tents of this famous book has yet to be touched by modem scholars. vy 匂yanekiintabhidheyam. 18 18 Yuk り1anusiisana (Bombay 1920), p. 45.

19 19 Jainendra Vyakara-r;a (K 亙Si 1956), p. 1. 20 20 Syadvadaratn 故 ara, p. 1032; Nyayavatarava- rtika-vrtti, rtika-vrtti, P ・107 ：由討rdhaJ ちsiddh 邸側部ya viruddho mallavadina~. Nyayavataravartika-v.rtti, 21 Nyayavataravartika-v.rtti, p. 108: mallavadina ち n町 αcakravidhatur ... 22 22 Nayacakra of Mallavadin, ed. by Jambiivijaya

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