Samantabhadra, Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, and Akalarika FunNAGA SIN MIYAKONOJO NATIONAL COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY 0. 0. The two main branches of Jainism, the Di- 1. Akalanka, Digambara philosopher in the g創 nb 紅 as and Svetambaras of Jainism ，訂e gen- eighth century, has written many independent erally erally believed to have no discrepancies in the philosophical works such as Siddhiviniscaya 組 d philosophical philosophical issues. In fact, they have only N ヲ匂 avinisc αya. Among 血em, Prama!la- slightly slightly changed their doctrine in their long his- sarrzgraha with V,rtti 1 is regarded as his last and tory tory of more than 2500 ye 訂 s. Both schools, for most mature work of his career. As the title example, example, have the highly developed karma the- suggests, it is a compendium of prama!las con- ories ories which are not essentially different from taining about ninety verses in nine chapters. In each each other. Their philosophical views seem to the sixth chapter which discusses the way of have have remained monolithic through the ages. This debate (vada), Akalanka refers to three kinds of observation observation is true also when we study the Jaina hetvabhasas mentioning three Jaina philosophers ideas ideas of logic and epistemology 出 a whole. The by name. It reads: Svetambaras Svetambaras as well as the Digambaras classify 邸泊＇ dh α［ち ］s泊＇ dhas 四回ya viruddho devanandi- prama!las prama!las into two sub-divisions: praηak~a and m ちI dvedha samantabhadr 田狗践的， adir parok~a. aca 協加ianillv. 56//2 But when it comes to the details, we come across across different views between the two branches. When we 住y to establish the reality of atman The Svetambaras admit the authority of the can- (which does not change at all) by means of a ons ons written in Ardhamagadhf, while the Digam- hetu, such as sattva or existence, that hetu is reg 紅 ded as asiddha by Siddhasena and viru- baras baras deny it, saying that the old c組 ons vanished in in ancient times. Moreover, the latter does not ddha by Devanandin while Samantabhadra re- admit admit that women can attain the final liberation, gards it as both. while while the former proclaims that even a woman This verse and Akal 姐 ka ’s own commen 町 y 訂 e can can annihilate karmas completely to liberate her- difficult to fully understand.3 Fortunately Aka- self. self. Thus, there is a female tirtha 血kara or savior laiika writes a similar verse in the sixth chapter in in the Svetambara tradition. According to the of Siddhiviniscaya which deals with the charac- Digambaras, Digambaras, however, all the tirthankaras are ters of coηect hetus. The ver 舘 reads as follows: male. male. In addition, the two branches have a dif- Published 1 Published as ap 制 of Akalanka Granthatr の， a, ference ference of opinion as to whether or not a kevalin, ed. by M. K. Jain 酪 SiqighI Jaina Granthamfila, no.12. or or omniscient person, feels hungry. These dis- Ahmedabad ”Calcutta 1939. crepancies crepancies noted by many scholars are well- 2 The letter enclosed in brackets is added by the accepted. accepted. About epistemological differences, we editor. 3 According to the of editor Siddhivini§c のほ， Ana- have so far very little information. In this paper ntavirya ntavirya is said to have written a sub-commentary on some examples of such di 首erences in Jaina Nyaya Akalailka ’s auto-commentary, which is not availabl.e will will be shown. to us. For details, see Siddhivini§caya vol. 1 (Kasi 1959), 1959), Hindi introduction, p. 60. -53- The Annals of the Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic, vol. 2 (2004) siddhaf:i αsiddhaf:i siddh α senasya viruddho devanandi- 2. As far as we know, the verse is quoted, with nal; nal; I dvedha sam α ntabhadrasya hetur ekant α， － some modifications, by three Jaina philosophers: sadhane グv. 21 // Vadir 司a in his Nyay αvini§cay α vi var α，lJa,5 Va- didevasfiri didevasfiri in his Syadvararatnakara, 6釦 d 釘nti- Akal a白ka explains this verse in his own com- sfiri sfiri in his Nyayavataravartika-vrtti.7 And the ment 訂 y as follows: last last two explain its meaning in some length, so If If we try to establish the reality of a thing does Anantavirya in his Siddhivini§cayaffka which is regarded as having absolute nature, when he comments upon Akala 故 a’s verse quoted attributes attributes of a real thing, such as existence above. Hereafter, with the help of these three (sattva), (sattva), when used as hetu, are asiddha be- commentaries, we shall attempt to find out the cause cause absolutism of momentariness as well as differences differences in the opinions among Samantabadra pe ロnanence can never be established. Alter- and the others. natively natively the attributes must be viruddha be- cause cause they establish that otherwise-not-under- 2.1. In order to explain the meaning of the standableness standableness (anyathanupapatti) proves non- verse, Anantav'irya quotes a verse 合om Siddhase- absoluteness absoluteness of a thing. Moreover if those na ’s Sa'!'lmati-tarka I -sutta'!'l I -prakaralJa. who have not ascertained the meaning of the je sa'!'ltavayadose sakkoluya bhal}a'!'lti truth truth try to prove the momentariness etc. by sa'!'lkhiil}~ I sa'!'lkha ya asavvae tesi'!'l savve means of a hetu, such as existence, then that vi te sacca1 グIII-50 グ 8 hetu hetu would be anaikantika because it exists in The Buddhists as well as the Vai 記号 ikas point both both sapak~a and vipak~a. (sattvader vastu- out the fault in the theory of evolution dharmasya asidd 加 tv 仰 sa 加 lyena k~m:iiketa­ (sα '!'ltavaya, Skt. sadvada) of the Saqikhyas. raikantayor αsiddhe 争／ αnyathanupapatter In In tum the Sarp.khyas also do that to their anekantasadhanad viruddhatvam I anaik 伽 ti- theory theory of creation （α savvaa, Skt. as α dvada). katva'!'l katva'!'l punal; sattvadel; k~al}ak~ayadi­ All of them remain true.9 sadhane asamfk#tatattvarthail; lokapratfti'!'l pramiil}am pramiil}am a§ritya tatha hetur ubh αyα tra Only with the help of this verse we cannot un- derstand derstand why the hetu is reg 紅白d as asiddha in vartate vartate svapak~avipak~ayoJ;, .. .)4 Siddhasena ’ s opinion. In this connection we shall Here Akala 会ka criticizes the ontology of other consider consider the statements of a Digambara philos- schools, schools, such as momentariness or etemalism, op her M 拘ikyanadin. To illustrate the sandi- and refers to three kinds of hetviibhasas. The gdhiisiddha gdhiisiddha hetvabhasa, M 匂ikyanandin de- relationship, relationship, however, among the three Jaina phi- clares, clares, in his work called Parfk~amukha, as fol- losophers losophers and the hetvabhasas remains unex- lows: plained. plained. What we can infer from Akalar 】ka ’s Nyayavini§cayavivara"(la 5 Nyayavini§cayavivara"(la vol. 2 (KiisI 1954 ), statement statement is that Siddhasena, Devanandin ，加d p. p. 181. Samantabhadra seem to have different opinions 6 Syadvadaratnak α ra vol. 2 (Delhi 1988), p. 1032. on hetu and hetvabhasa. 7 Nyayavataravartika 司 vrtti(Bombay 1949), p. 107. Siddhivini§caya 4 Siddhivini§caya vol. 2 (KiisI 1959), p. 404. To 8 Saf(lmati-tark α（Ahmedabad 1939; reprint, 2000), understand understand the auto-commentary clearly, we have to p. 124. consult consult Anantavirya ’s comment 訂 y in Siddhivni§caya 9 SeeSaf(lm αti-tark α，op.cit. vol. vol. 2, p. 404. -54- Fujinaga: Fujinaga: Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, and Akalanka sarri-khyarri sarri-khyarri prati parititimf §abdaJ:i krtakatvtit tion may be that the Siddhasena mentioned by //VI ・27 // ten 司jiiatatvtit II VI-28 II 10 Akalatika is not the author of the Nyayavatara If If someone argues with the followers of the but that of Sarri-matitarka. 15 Saiμkhya school and states that sound is per- 2.2. The next philosopher to be considered is ishable ishable because it is caused, then that hetu is Samantabhadra. AkalaiJ.ka says that, according asiddha since the Saiμkhya school does not to Samantabhadra, sat れ1a etc. are anaikantika accept accept it. hetus which exist both in sapak~a and vipa~a. Thus it is understood that, in 出e Jaina tradition, To explain such an opinion, Anantavirya quotes a verse from Samantabhadra ’s Svayarri-bhastotra 組 y attribute used in reasoning is asiddha when 組 d paraphrases it: the the opponent does not admit its reality. So Aka ・ laiJ.ka's laiJ.ka's intention in the pada ’ asiddho siddhase- ye paras協alitonnidr，碕 svado~e ’bhinimili­ na の1a' seems to be as follows: na ν抑制inas te kirri- kuryur apatrarri- tvan- mata§riya ち1116 According According to Siddhasena, sattva etc. in the proof proof of the reality of a thing is hetvtibhtisa Those pitiable persons who 紅 e not receptacles because because of the absolutism (ektintavada) of oth- of the glory of your doc 回necannotdo 釦 .ything er er schools. In absolutism an attribute of a because they shut their eyes to their own fault 出ing, krtakatva or the attribute of being some- while they are very careful about the defects thing thing that has been created, for example, ad- of their enemy. mitted mitted by the one school, say Buddhists, is 'The glory of your doctrine' (tvanmata§rt) here not not recognized by the other, i.e. ，曲 e Sfuμkhyas. means, as Anantavirya says, the anekantavada Siddhasena Siddhasena is the first Jaina philosopher that in- or nor トabsolutism of Jaina which pervades all dicated dicated such tendencies of absolutism in other things.17 Samantabhadra is the first Jaina philos- schools.11 schools.11 That is why AkalaiJ.ka ref1 町 S to him op her 白紙 has clearly shown the 由eory of 却 ek 面・ in in connection with asiddha.